Executive Summary

June 2019

Civil Wars and State Formation

The social construction of order and legitimacy during and after violent conflict

1. Team Members

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- DR. MARTINA SANTSCHI, swisspeace,
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2. Research Plan

This project was financed by the Swiss Network of International Studies from January 2017 to December 2018, with a cost-neutral extension until March 2019. It was conducted by a consortium of five institutions in Switzerland and Africa: the University of Geneva (lead), swisspeace (co-lead), the Catholic University of Angola in Luanda, the Alassane Ouattara University in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire, and the University of Juba, South Sudan. The project researched and analyzed the social construction of order and legitimacy during and after violent conflict. It focused on political orders put in place by armed groups, their strategies to legitimate their very existence as movements as well as their claim to power, and on the extent to which they strive and manage to institutionalize their military power and transform it into political domination.

Recent literature has provided important insights into the organizational structures of armed groups, the emergence of alternative forms of social order in war-affected zones, as well as into the relationships between territorial control and the use of violence. Taken together these studies build a new, ‘re-politicized’ narrative of state-society relations during violent conflict. However, scant attention has been paid to how relations and institutions of governance that were developed in areas controlled by armed groups fit into long-term dynamics of state formation through armed conflict. Moreover, much of the literature on the peace-building/state-building nexus still relies on a normative and prescriptive concept of states as structures rather than as processes, and on the idea that states are the product of conscious policies aimed at constructing the institutional infrastructure of governance rather than historical formations. The
project argued that states cannot be engineered, and that they are the result of long-lasting historical processes including phases of violence. Accordingly, civil wars need to be seen as part and parcel of historical processes of state formation and not as the expression of states’ inability to maintain their monopoly over the use of violence, or as the result of their ‘collapse’ and ‘failure’. A processual, bottom-up approach to capturing formations of statehood provides for a better understanding of legitimate institutions and their formation.

Based on this critical perspective on the politics of government in war zones, the Civil Wars and State Formation project provided fine-grained analysis of three interconnected lines of inquiry:

1. **Manufacturing consent.** What kind of narratives do armed groups construct to legitimize their military actions and shore up popular consent? How do rebel movements and other armed groups build their social base and garner support for their cause and what narratives do they produce to legitimize their military actions in order to counter the negative effects that the exercise of violence has, especially on the populations that armed groups claim to be defending?

2. **Institutionalizing rule.** To which degree do armed movements in different socio-political environments engage in the development of a system of civilian rule and a bureaucratic apparatus? How does military control by armed groups translate (or not) into civilian political institutions in times of war and what, if anything, distinguishes wartime governance from other forms of governance?

3. **The wartime fabric of post-war state domination.** Engaging with what we see as a blind spot in the literature on governance in times of war, and especially in the emerging sub-field of ‘rebel governance’, we focused on the continuities and discontinuities between war and post-war orders. How does ‘rebel rule’ transform into state domination and how does the culture of governance developed under ‘rebel rule’ shape post-war governance by former rebels? Answering these questions has allowed us to see how the symbolic and material aspects of rebel rule ‘survive’ the end of hostilities, especially in formerly rebel-held territories, and how this impacts long-term state formation processes.

3. **Summary of the main results**

This project centred on the role of armed groups in state formation through civil war. It considered state formation as a political process resulting from constant and changing interactions between state and society and as deeply contextual and endogenous, shaped primarily by internal historical dynamics. Accordingly, research focused on states not as a norm, but as dynamic historical processes, and on the social construction of legitimate orders. We therefore produced a political anthropology of governance practices in rebel-held territories through the study of local perceptions of authority and legitimacy as well as of their institutionalisation. Based on this focus, our research approach followed an exploratory, inductive methodology. Legitimacy and struggles around the construction of legitimacy in rebel zones were analysed as a process including a situational and relational quality of public authority based as much on ideas, representations and beliefs as on concrete outputs such as the delivery of services and goods.

This project was built around three case studies, South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Angola. The selection was made based on their relevance for the research questions, their comparability and potential for generalization, as well as the expertise of the applicants and existing research collaboration on the ground which are essential for the success of such a project. The main research outcomes are presented here country by country in order to highlight how each of the three main research questions played out in each context.
3.1. South Sudan

During the last six decades, South Sudan has been at civil war most of the time (1955–1972, 1983–2005 and 2013–2018) with only short periods of relative stability and peace. Hence, armed conflict and rebel groups have shaped state formation, governance and public authority in South Sudan as the following research findings illustrate:

Grievances against central governments driving the support to armed groups:

In the first and second civil wars Southern armed groups fought the Sudanese government. Grievances about power and resource allocation to Southern Sudan, the role of religion in national politics and lack of recognition of ethnic diversity as well as violent counterinsurgency drove Southern Sudanese to take up arms against the government. However, the research in the two different case study areas Kajokeji (former Central Equatoria state) and Aweil East (former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state) illustrate that support to armed groups varied across South Sudan over time. During the second civil war for instance, many men from Aweil East joined the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Movement/Army (SPLM/A) because of grievances against the government of Sudan but also to defend their home area against militias allied to the government. In Kajokeji the SPLM/A was initially perceived as being dominated by another ethnic group. Mainly leaders of the areas were able to mobilize substantial support within their communities. Nevertheless, the SPLM/A was not able to “manufacture” consent all over South Sudan even by using force. After a split caused by internal power struggles in 1991 the SPLM/A was increasingly challenged by other Southern armed groups.

Rebel governance: providing rule of law, securing support and coordinating aid

During civil wars, Southern armed groups to some extent “governed” the areas under their control. While the Anyanya fighters of the first civil war did not set up a unified governance system, the SPLM/A first introduced a relief wing that coordinated aid and then after 1994 established a civil administration the so-called Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS). Doing this the SPLM/A acted like a state: The SPLM secretariats were quasi ministries, the SPLM/A and the CANS produced vehicle number plates and a currency and passed laws of the “New Sudan.” Yet, as this study explains, in practice the CANS were mainly geared towards mobilizing recruits and material support for the SPLM/A, provided some rule of law and coordinated some services and relief. The way in which people viewed the SPLM/A and CANS at the local level, was shaped by many factors; including individuals’ positionality in local political arenas, political dynamics, local political contestations and underlying ethnic tensions.

From rebel governance to state domination: continuities and discontinuities

The first and the second civil war ended with the signing of peace agreements. In both peace agreements, the central government accommodated key demands of Southern armed groups in terms of governance, allocation of state resources and citizens-state relations. Hence, the armed groups negotiated new conditions and new political and economic dispensations that paved the way for fundamental changes in state institutions in Southern Sudan. Yet, as research findings point out the post-war periods differed in some respects. While after 1972, leaders of the armed uprising in most cases remained in the armed forces and technocrats and few politicians filled in the positions in the regional government and the administration in Southern Sudan, after 2005 many government and administrative positions were filled with individuals with a SPLM/A background. A military legacy was a key condition for occupying political and administrative positions after 2005. Henceforth, many senior SPLM/A members of the second
civil war, continue to fill in key positions in the government of South Sudan up to the present-day. This entrenched a sense of entitlement on the part of those who participated in the fighting and undermined the evolution of a culture of meritocracy in employments by public institutions. To an extent, it had a role in the emergence of endemic corruption in the post second war period.

During both post-war periods (1972 – 1983 and 2005 to 2013) tensions over power and resource allocation grew within Southern Sudan thereby partly following regional and ethnic lines. These tensions fueled the renewed outbreaks into civil wars. Accordingly, one key continuity of the different periods of war and peace in South Sudan are political and military mobilization along ethnic and community lines as well as deadly violence along ethnic or community lines. Some of the armed groups fighting the government of South Sudan during the most recent civil war, strongly resemble armed groups that took up arms against the SPLM/A during the second civil war. They feature the same leaders and mobilize in the same communities. Again, in the most recent war power struggles as well as local grievances, related for instance to the control over land, feed into the national level of the armed conflict.

3.2. Angola

The modern Angolan state has been shaped by war, since the country has been at war from 1961, which marked the beginning of a 14-year long decolonization war, to 2002, when the rebel forces of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) were defeated militarily by government troops. The civil war that has been the focus of our research can be divided into three phases: (1) from the time of the country’s independence in 1975 to the first peace agreement signed in 1991, the war was marked by Cold War logics. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which took power in Luanda in 1975, was supported by Cuba and the USSR, while UNITA concluded a strategic alliance with apartheid South Africa and received strong support from the USA, especially under the Reagan administration. (2) In 1991, a peace agreement was signed, and first general elections held in September 1992. Organized hastily in a context of strong tensions between the two warring parties, the elections were not concluded, and the civil war started anew. It was marked first (1992-1994) by extreme violence, especially for the civilian population, and, second (1994-1998), by a time of ‘no peace, no war’ following a second peace agreement signed in Lusaka in 1994. Control over natural resources played an important role during this second phase, with UNITA controlling up to 80% of the national territory and its diamond mining areas, and the MPLA financing its war effort thanks to its control over oil. (3) The last phase of the war (1999-2002) started when the government launched a vast offensive against UNITA, which eventually led to the death of UNITA’s founder and historical leader Jonas Savimbi and the capitulation of the armed group in early 2002. The focus of our research in Angola has been on UNITA.

*Competing nation views and varying institutionalization processes*

From the mid-1970s onwards, UNITA presented itself as the champion of what it argued were marginalized people from the interior of the country. Its legitimization discourse was built on and instrumentalized feelings of marginalization by those sectors of the Angolan population who felt estranged from the social groups that took power at independence. UNITA also instrumentalized the presence of Cuban troops as a sign of ‘second colonization’ against which it offered to fight. More broadly, in a context where colonial rule created deep divisions within Angolan society, UNITA presented itself as the bearer of an alternative national project, a ‘nation-view’ that competed with that of the MPLA who had taken power in Luanda. In the project we analyzed the ways in which this alternative model of a modern Angolan nation was put forward and with what effects. We found interesting variations in space and time.
In the South of the country, where it established its main military bases and built its ‘bush capital’ Jamba, UNITA tried to put into practice its alternative nation view. The years in Jamba are remembered, especially by UNITA cadres, as something akin to the ideal of an egalitarian, de-monetized society. In stark contrast however, these years were also marked by Jonas Savimbi’s growingly totalitarian rule and by his ruthless physical or political elimination of any potential competitor. While the bulk of existing research on UNITA focuses on the party’s historical strongholds, we also researched UNITA’s legitimization strategies in the areas where it tried to expand its activities beyond these strongholds.

Whereas in the Central Highlands and Jamba much emphasis has been placed on UNITA’s attempts to mimic a functioning state, the situation in the North of Angola (provinces of Uíge and Zaire) and in the Lobito-Bocoio corridor, where Savimbi’s movement tried to expand starting in the mid-1980s, was much more fluid from the beginning. A careful examination of the fluctuating mosaic of territorial control and the ways in which UNITA sought to garner support and establish its dominance in the areas it controlled breaks up the neat dichotomy of Cold War/conventional land war in the 1980s v resource war/war of destruction in the 1990s. Results of the research in Uíge and Zaire underscore the importance of previous political mobilization in the North through FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), Angola’s oldest of the three anti-colonial liberation movements, and how UNITA was able to position itself as a ‘brother movement’, both as a means of forging a pragmatic alliance with remaining FNLA pockets of resistance in the North (in itself a largely unacknowledged fact) and to mobilize popular support. In the 1980s UNITA’s presence was largely limited to temporary, shifting bush bases to which the nearest villages gave more or less voluntary support. In the 1990s, following the derailing of the 1992 elections, UNITA quickly occupied the entirety of the province, marking presence in the actual municipal towns and cities, and relinquishing control only in 1997. Research in Lobito and the Lobito-Bocoio corridor show that support for UNITA in the port city of Lobito was widespread and that it was maintained by clandestine cells. The situation in the Bocoio area was marked by great fluidity.

While the project’s focus on ideology and political motivations is salutary for a number of reasons, results from that second phase in Uíge also point to the centrality of the production of a ‘normal life’ under occupation. This was aspired to, on the one hand through the imposition of discipline through the threat and meting out of violent punishment (ranging from corporal punishment to the death penalty); on the other hand through creating the conditions for trade to continue and even to flourish. Here, the research produced valuable insights into the organization of wartime commerce and supplies, both in comparison between the two neighboring provinces of Uíge and Zaire and between differently privileged/affected municipalities — and also in contrast to the predominant periodization of the Angolan conflict, which depicts the second phase of the war in the 1990s as a typical ‘resource conflict’.

Peace and discontinued legitimization

The modalities of peace in Angola have had a very strong impact on UNITA’s legitimacy and its potential for legitimization. In 1999, after 4 years of a ‘no peace, no war’ situation, the MPLA government decided to launch a vast offensive against UNITA in order to put a military end to the civil war. One of the important drivers of this change in strategy were mounting pressure, both nationally and internationally, for a negotiated settlement and a reconciliation process. The military option was a way for the MPLA and President dos Santos to avoid making any concessions to its archrival, as a negotiated deal would have implied. Besides, in the late 1990s, UNITA, who, after losing its Cold War allies, financed its war effort mainly through its control of the country’s diamond mines, became the target of international sanctions as part of
the campaign against ‘blood diamonds’. Savimbi, a former ‘Freedom fighter’ of the 1980s, received as a Head of State by Ronald Reagan in 1986, became a pariah of the international community. In Angola itself, the international discourse of the blood diamond campaign was instrumentalized by the government in support of its own military strategy. Thus, it is not only UNITA as an armed group that was de-legitimized, but the social imaginaries and the nation view it stood for that lost their relevance in the post-war context. While UNITA is still the first opposition party in Angola, it has very little, if any, influence over government policies. However, the social, political, economic and cultural grievances that it mobilized in its own legitimization discourse and which were central in the creation and sustaining of its social base throughout the conflict, have not disappeared. They have not been addressed by the post-war government and could be an important factor of destabilization in the long run.

3.3. Côte d'Ivoire

Contrarily to Angola and South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire was for most of its post-independence history known as a beacon of stability and prosperity in the West African region. In 2002 however, fighting erupted when rebels originating from the North of the country attempted to take power in the capital Abidjan. The failed coup attempt was the culmination of years of political crisis and of mounting tensions between the North and the South of the country, where struggles over citizenship and the definition of Ivorian nationhood played center stage. The country was rapidly divided in two: the rebel Forces Nouvelles took control of the North of the country from their ‘capital’ Bouaké, the government ruled over the South and the de facto capital Abidjan, while international forces were in charge of protecting the ceasefire line. A peace agreement was signed in 2007, opening the way for Presidential elections which took place in December 2010. However, allegations of fraud and the refusal of incumbent president Gbagbo to accept his opponent’s victory eventually led to renewed fighting marked by great violence, especially in Abidjan, and eventually to the military takeover of power by the former rebel Forces Nouvelles backed by French troops and to the inauguration of Alassane Ouattara as new President.

Mobilizing citizenship and political grievances

The Forces Nouvelles articulated their legitimizing discourse around experiences of marginalization and discrimination of populations of the North of Côte d’Ivoire on the part of the central government in Abidjan. The discourse had two components. The first was economic and political marginalization of the North of the country, which translated into a developmental differential to the detriment of the North. The second, and more important, echoed the politics of nationhood put forward by the successors of the first Ivorian president and ‘Father of the Nation’ Félix Houphouët-Boigny after his death in 1993. As part of a complex political game, Henri Konan-Bédié and Laurent Gbagbo, instrumentalized the notion of ‘Ivoirité’, a very restrictive definition of what it meant to be Ivorian, in order to consolidate their power and fight their historical opponent, Alassane Ouattara, a Northerner. This policy resulted in what were resented as discriminatory policies against Northerners, especially for those whose families had immigrated to Côte d’Ivoire in previous decades as response to the strong demand for labor forces in the country’s plantation economy. The Forces Nouvelles tapped into these grievances in order to legitimize their attempted coup in 2002 as well as the military and political control they exerted on the North. Since the ambiguous victory of the Forces Nouvelles in 2011 and the coming to power of Alassane Ouattara, the latter’s government has repeatedly been accused of ‘ethnic compensation’, i.e. of a politics of favoring Northerners for all important public offices.
**Institutionalizing centrifugal power during rebellion**

After the ceasefire in 2002 and an agreement signed in Paris in 2003, the *Forces Nouvelles* established their control over the Northern half of the country. Bouaké, the country’s second city, became their capital. Governance by the *Forces Nouvelles* was a complex mix of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. The area under control of the *Forces Nouvelles* (called CNO – Centre, Nord, Ouest) was divided into 10 military zones, each headed by a zone commander (**‘comzones’** as they are referred to). The **comzones** were crucial in the military, political and economic control of the whole area and wielded important power. The central authority of the *Forces Nouvelles* in Bouaké were headed by Guillaume Soro, a former student leader. Governance in the CNO ‘rebel’ zones was dominated by two tendencies. On the one hand, a constant struggle between the **comzones**, who fought for their independence and to maintain their discretionary powers, especially in terms of taxation, and the Central authority in Bouaké who strived to centralize economic revenues and to prevent the **comzones** from preying on the local populations and thereby delegitimizing the *Forces Nouvelles*. Tensions between some of the **comzones** and political authority in the post-war context continues to be an important problem of governance and stability. On the other hand, the *Forces Nouvelles* paradoxically had to draw on the Ivorian central state, especially in the area of education, in order to avoid too severe disruptions in the school system and therefore respond to local demands for ‘normal life’ under rebel rule. This confirmed our hypothesis that the ability of armed movements to institutionalize their power is strongly influenced by the kind of state-society relationship that characterized social life prior to conflict in the areas under their control.

**Security transition and makeshift production of the post-war order**

After two decades of crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, one of the main challenges for the Ivorian state is to reinstate its control over the army and the security forces at large. The latter went through a series of profound changes. First, throughout the crisis the security forces were divided between the *Forces Nouvelles* and the loyalist forces. Second, during the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis, the security forces were recomposed as Republican Defense Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI). The creation of the FRCI included the promotion and integration into the army of former rebel rank-and-file soldiers as well as officers. In parallel, the Ivorian state implemented a classical program of DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR). This allowed in a first instance Côte d’Ivoire’s security index to rise, which, in turn, served the new government’s policy of economic growth backed by foreign investments. However, over five years after the termination of the war, the Ivorian army is still heavily politicized and divided, and its somewhat makeshift composition is a source of growing instability and insecurity. This was particularly visible during several instances of mutiny within the army in Bouaké, starting in 2014, that were the focus of our research. The mutinies were based on financial claims, mostly from former *Forces Nouvelles* soldiers who claimed they had not received what they had been promised (and were eventually paid a substantial amount by the state, thus creating resentment among other soldiers). Our analysis shows, on the one hand, the continuity of networks of allegiance and legitimacy between some FRCI soldiers and their former **comzones** and, on the other, the extent to which the Ivorian army is the crux of the process of peace consolidation and long term (in)stability. The Ivorian security forces are being reconstructed ‘from above’ through the official process of SSR, but primarily ‘from below’, through the complex web of relations between soldiers, demobilized soldiers and their former commanders. This creates tensions and insecurity.
4. **Key findings and recommendations:**

1. **Legitimacy** matters. Our research clearly illustrates the importance of analyzing the variegated strategies that armed groups develop in order to legitimize their (violent) actions. These strategies are of different and complementary types.

   - The *narratives* they produce help armed groups garner support for their cause and legitimize the disruption they cause to the lives of those they set out to defend. These narratives are also central for their claim to international recognition and support.
   - The legitimacy of armed groups depends on their ability to *provide a ‘normal life’* despite and beyond the disruptions caused by the war. This ‘normal life’ can take several forms, but it relates to economic activities, the provision of basic services such as health and education, as well as a system of justice.
   - Armed groups may be brought to develop *institutions of governance* in order to provide these elements, but the extent to which this happens depends on the context and on the temporalities of the civil war. Armed groups often rely on international actors, including humanitarian agencies, to help them provide support to civilian populations. They also, counter-intuitively, sometimes rely on the state against which they fight, as was the case in Côte d’Ivoire.

**International aid** significantly interacts with public authority (of armed groups and the “formal” state) and conflict dynamics. While aid actors, particularly humanitarian agencies often stress the neutrality and apolitical nature of their engagement, aid is in practice an important resource and its allocation is deeply political. **Aid influences the legitimacy of armed groups and state actors.** It shapes power relations and it impacts on the relation between citizens and the state/armed groups. It is important that policy makers and practitioners critically reflect on the unintended consequences of aid on the public authority and on conflict dynamics. This is particularly the case in South Sudan, where international aid has a long history and was entangled in conflict dynamics.

2. **Local dimensions** of wars matter. It is widely acknowledged that civil wars have a strong idiosyncratic character. But this fact is often seen from a national rather than local perspective. As our research has shown, the micropolitics of civil wars do however differ greatly when looked at from a local perspective, and this needs to be taken into account, both for understanding the conflict itself and even more so for any intervention. Local dynamics of conflict can ignite conflict on a much broader scale if not addressed properly.

3. **(Dis)Continuities** matter. War and peace stand in a continuum, and there is rarely a clear break between the two. This was particularly visible in our research on Côte d’Ivoire and South Sudan. In Côte d’Ivoire, post-war stability and security are dependent on balances of power that developed during the civil war. As the end of President Alassane Ouattara’s second term and general election approach in 2020 approach, the risk of seeing conflict dynamics reignited by the electoral game is real. Deep-seated grievances, some of which have been flared up by the strategy of economic growth as a way out of the politico-military crisis, need to be addressed before they can be instrumentalized for electoral purposes.

In South Sudan, even though the state as such is new, structures and institutions of public authority have a long history and senior government officials and local authorities have often worked for institutions of public authorities (rebel movements/administrations and “formal” state institutions) for decades. This important aspect has often been overlooked by external actors who largely assumed that international state building endeavors started from a blank slate
at the end of the second civil war in 2005. It is important that future peace building and state building endeavors take into account existing structures of public authorities, political dynamics as well as power relations and their institutionalization.

Our research however also shows that, in certain cases, peace can represent a break – at least to a certain extent. This has been the case in Angola, where the 27-year long civil war ended with the clear military victory of government troops over UNITA. Due to the particular context within which the offensive that led to the defeat of UNITA took place – a context where leaders of UNITA, the armed group itself as well as its military and civilian followers were growingly criminalized in the wake of the blood diamond campaign –, there has been very little, if any, space for the expression of the social, political and economic grievances of those who adhered to UNITA’s project. One positive consequence was that the unification of the defense forces in Angola was not as bumpy as in Côte d’Ivoire, since wartime loyalties could not materially survive UNITA’s military defeat; the civil war has also been absent from public space and discussions in Angola. But in the middle to long term, unaddressed grievances may re-surface, including in a violent form, and especially after memories of the lived experiences of the civil war will have faded away – as the case of Mozambique shows.

5. List of Publications and Communications

5.1. Academic publications

Published peer-reviewed articles


doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.833

Perazzone, S. 2018 (published online). ‘Shouldn’t you be teaching me? State Mimicry in the Congo’, International Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/oly023


In preparation

Moro, L. and Santschi, M. (2019). ‘State formation in South Sudan: Continuities and discontinuities from 1955 to the present’.


Péclard, D. & Zina, O., ‘Continuities of power and legitimacy through civil wars: com’zones and the securitization of post-war politics in Côte d’Ivoire’, to be submitted to Civil Wars.

Santschi, M. and Moro, L. (2020), the SPLM/A’s practices of governing, mobilizing support and its legitimacy in Aweil East and Kajoje.


5.2. Communications


5.3. Project Scientific Events

During the course of the project, two workshops and one international conference were held. Together with team members’ presentation at various national and international conferences, they contributed to the dissemination of the research results.

1) **April 2018. War and State Formation Project Workshop**, swisspeace, Bern.

This first workshop was the opportunity to test the first research results in a small setting. For logistical and budgetary reasons, only the three Swiss members of the research team presented papers:

- Santschi, M. ‘Negotiating and contesting local service tax: trajectories of revenue generation and state formation in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan’.
- Péclard, D. ‘Vying for legitimacy in war-torn Côte d’Ivoire. Security, taxation and State formation’
- Schubert, J. ‘Two Captivities. UNITA’s rule on the Northern Front in the Angolan Civil War’


This international conference was the main scientific event of the project. It was structured around two keynote lectures and three panels, with a total of 13 presentations by academics from Africa and Europe. The programme can be found [here](#). Discussions for a publication as an edited volume are still under way.

3) **March 2019. Civil War and State Formation Wrap-Up Conference, Juba, South Sudan**. Academic workshop, Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies, University of Juba, South Sudan.

This third and last project workshop took place at the University of Juba, South Sudan. It provided a unique opportunity to bring some of our research results in one of the case study countries and exchange with students and academic staff at the University of Juba. The workshop was structured around five presentation from team members:

- Péclard, D. ‘Understanding violent conflict in the post-Cold War era.’
- Moro L. and Santschi, M. ‘State formation through conflict in South Sudan: Continuities and discontinuities since 1955.’
- Péclard D. ‘City Life is Poison. Imaginaries and practices of power in rebel Angola’.
- Zina, O. ‘The security transition and the messy production of post-war order in Ivory Coast’.

5.4. Project Outreach

Research conducted during the project as well as some of its results made their way in a number of events, courses or workshops organized by team members or with the participation of team members.
**Events**

2019 (March). “Coffee and Research”, *Civil Wars and State Formation South Sudan in Comparative Perspective Research findings for practitioners/policy makers*, EU Compound, Kololo, Juba, South Sudan

- Moderators: Didier Péclard and Audrey Bottjen
- Moro, L. and Santschi, M. ‘State formation through conflict in South Sudan: Continuities and discontinuities since 1955.’
- Perazzoine, S. ‘DDR processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo’
- Zina, O. ‘DDR and security sector reform in Côte d’Ivoire: how formal and informal structures of power are reproduced beyond the end of conflict?’

Santschi, Martina (April 2019). swisspeace statehood roundtable: Working with the State: How to engage with authoritarian governments? swisspeace, Bern, ‘How to engage with authoritarian governments? The case of South Sudan.’


Moro, L. (October 2018). swisspeace South Sudan roundtable, swisspeace, Bern: ‘Reflections on Ongoing Peacemaking in South Sudan’.


**Publications**
