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Chapter 3 of the CCCM (Camp Management and Camp Coordination) case study collection focuses on operations in which the authorities assume the responsibility for site management with the support of humanitarian agencies. The four case studies were collected from four countries: Bangladesh, Columbia, Greece, and Turkey.

These case studies present programmes that have been developed to adapt to an increasingly frequent context of humanitarian agencies providing Site Management Support to the authorities instead of doing Site Management themselves.

The conventional role of site managers in large scale and complex crises have been, in large part, at least initially, assumed by humanitarian actors, in particular in situations of internal displacement. However, the capacity and willingness of national and local authorities to act not only as camp administrator, but to take on direct responsibilities for camp management has increased. Especially with large displacements, sites are often established by the displaced populations or local actors and activities are being implemented before the international community is ready to intervene. As this trend continues, more and more CCCM practitioners are finding themselves shifting from direct implementation to that of a support role at the camp or site level. In order to adapt, site management agencies have implemented several innovative approaches and projects to ensure that the principles and standards of CCCM and wider humanitarian response form a core part of Government actions in site management roles.

The role of Site Management Support agencies can vary depending on the context and the vulnerabilities of the affected population. In general, Site Management Support can be described as any activities aimed at strengthening the capacities of the local authorities or NGOs to discharge the role of camp/site manager in accordance with agreed standards and, if required, complement some of the core activities if the site management agency is yet unable to do so. This could include providing information on response and displaced communities, as well as setting up structures and providing services that ensure that key stakeholders - including displaced communities, host communities, humanitarian actors, and development actors - are included and advocated for in government site management planning and response.

The first case study comes from Bangladesh the lead Site Management Project agency strengthened the representation of the displaced person and established community development structures through a system of block and sub-block committees (BDCs) to ensure community involvement in decision making, response delivery and monitoring.

The second case study describes the response at the Columbian border with Venezuela. The UNHCR reception centre entitled “Centre for Integrated Assistance,” first of its kind in the Americas, aimed at temporarily addressing the urgent humanitarian and protection needs of the most vulnerable people fleeing from Venezuela, as well as supporting the response of the local authorities to the large displacement. The facility used an innovative eligibility determination algorithm, as well as length of stay and rotation determination system as well as exit strategy mechanism combining humanitarian and government efforts.

The third case study describes a site management response across Greece between 2015-2017 in response to large mixed movements to Europe. The Site Management Support (SMS) approach included a holistic multi-sector service provision. Under its shelter component, the implementing agency managed the existing shelter facilities, allocating shelter according to vulnerability. Communication with Communities activities involved coordinating with partners to provide multi-language information to site populations, as well as improving site communication infrastructure.

The final case study highlights what are currently considered the best practices in setting up remote site management support. The CCCM Cluster in Gaziantep, Turkey, responding to the displacement in Northern Syria, established several systems and guidelines including cluster membership agreements, a focal point system to streamline information sharing, an M&E system with independent third-party monitoring, camp establishment policies, IM tools, capacity building mechanisms. In addition, CCCM roving teams were established to address the challenge of maintaining a high quality CCCM response in an environment with severe access restrictions to the displaced populations by the humanitarian actors.
### Keyword Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISPLACED POPULATIONS</th>
<th>C.1 BANGLADESH 2018</th>
<th>C.2 GREECE 2015-17</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internally displaced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Returnees (refugees/IDPs)</td>
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<td>Others of concern (e.g. migrants)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
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<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT OPTIONS (ACCORDING TO SPHERE 2018)</th>
<th>RETURNED</th>
<th>DISPLACED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>Displaced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Displaced (rent/hosted/spontaneous)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communal (collective centres/planned sites/settlements/unplanned sites)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCCM RESPONSES/APPROACHES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal/Camp Management</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Site Management support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile (response) teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remote Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparadness response</td>
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<tr>
<th>CCCM ASSISTANCE TYPE</th>
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<tr>
<td>REPRESENTATION</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Participation</td>
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<td>Capacity building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication with Communities</td>
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<td>Women participation</td>
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<td>Governance structures</td>
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| COORDINATION & MONITORING                 |                     |                    |
| Information management                    |                     |                    |
| Site/community level coordination         |                     |                    |
| Monitoring of services                    |                     |                    |
| Multi-sectorial assessment                |                     |                    |
| Referral pathways                         |                     |                    |
| Service mapping                            |                     |                    |

| SITE ENVIRONMENT                           |                     |                    |
| Disaster Risk Reduction                    |                     |                    |
| Site/settlement planning                   |                     |                    |
| Care & maintenance                         |                     |                    |
| Inclusion/accessibility                    |                     |                    |
| Safety & security                          |                     |                    |
| Gender based violence                      |                     |                    |
| HLP issues                                 |                     |                    |

| STRATEGIC PLANNING                         |                     |                    |
| Durable Solutions                         |                     |                    |
| Mentoring of local authority               |                     |                    |
| Localisation/local authorities             |                     |                    |
| Camp closure                               |                     |                    |

| STAKEHOLDER COORDINATION                  |                     |                    |
| District/area multi-stakeholder coordination|         |                    |
## Displaced Populations
- Refugees
- Internally displaced
- Returnees (refugees/IDPs)
- Others of concern (e.g. migrants)

## Location
- Rural
- Peri-urban
- Urban

## Settlement Options (According to Sphere 2018)
**Returned**
- Returnees

**Displaced**
- Dispersed (rent/hosted/spontaneous)
- Communal (collective centres/planned sites/settlements/unplanned sites)

## CCCM Responses/Approaches
- Formal / Camp Management
- Site Management support
- Mobile (response) teams
- Community centres
- Remote Management
- Preardness response

## Representation
- Community Participation
- Capacity building
- Communication with Communities
- Women participation
- Governance structures

## Coordination & Monitoring
- Information management
- Site / community level coordination
- Monitoring of services
- Multi-sectorial assessment
- Referral pathways
- Service mapping

## Site Environment
- Disaster Risk Reduction
- Site / settlement planning
- Care & maintenance
- Inclusion / accessibility
- Safety & security
- Gender based violence
- HLP issues

## Strategic Planning
- Durable Solutions
- Mentoring of local authority
- Localisation / local authorities
- Camp closure

## Stakeholder Coordination
- District/area multi-stakeholder coordination
**CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT**  
Ethnic Violence

**DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT**  
25 August 2017 - Present

**PEOPLE DISPLACED**  
More than 894,187 refugees identified in camps as of 31st October 2018

**PROJECT LOCATION**  
Sub-district of Ukhiya, Teknaf under the district, Cox’s Bazar

**PROJECT DURATION**  
March - October 2018

**NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT**  
50,500 beneficiaries

**CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM**  
Sectorial working group

**SUMMARY:**

The Site Management Project aims to improve the living standard of the camp population and host community in Cox’s Bazar by supporting the government of Bangladesh’s Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) Camp in Charge to ensure equitable access to services and protection for displaced Rohingya living in Camp 15 (Jamtoli). The project established community development structures through a system of block and sub-block committees (BDCs) to ensure effective and targeted delivery and monitoring of the services, assist with the relocation of vulnerable households, ensure accountability through a complaint-response mechanism and liaise across different activity-based committees. The project activities were coordinated with the site management sector and implemented within the framework of the sector strategy to improve quality of life and dignity and to advocate for solutions.
The United Nations has called the Rohingya the world’s most persecuted minority group. Since the 1970s, Rohingya refugees have been coming to Bangladesh from Myanmar. The most recent violence stems from Myanmar’s military crackdown after an armed Rohingya group carried out a deadly attack against the army in retaliation to their constant struggle for peace, identity and dignity. Since then the army has killed more than 400 people and driven out hundreds of thousands from the western Rakhine state, creating one of the biggest refugee crises of recent times. The latest exodus began on 25 August 2017, when violence broke out in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The Rohingya are now a stateless Muslim minority, often arriving in Bangladesh after walking for days through jungles and mountains, or embarking on dangerous sea voyages across the Bay of Bengal.

The refugees have been settled in makeshift camps in Cox’s Bazar, where a concerted effort to respond to the emergency has been carried out by the implementing agency. Working as Site Management Agency (SMA) for camp 15 and working together with other humanitarian agencies to ensure coordination among service providers, find gaps and service provisions, address set standards and reflect community needs in service delivery.

Before the August 2017 influx, there were two registered camps and two makeshift places for Rohingya people where they were authorised to live. As for the area of camp 15, there was no settled camp. As the influx begun, the Government and humanitarian agencies began immediate response, but none of the actors were prepared for the scale and complex dynamics of the influx. The humanitarian capacity on the ground was being rapidly exhausted. Post-influx, the Government of Bangladesh, UN agencies and humanitarian actors worked together to build shelters and provide basic services for the Rohingya people. Camp facilities were also constructed, including Child/Women Friendly Spaces, religious facilities, WASH facilities, health clinics and protection facilities.

Camp 15 was one of the largest new spontaneous settlements in Cox’s Bazar and was divided into 8 blocks with a population of approximately 50,000 Rohingya people. As the implementing agency took charge of camp coordination and camp management in camp 15 in Jamtoli as the focal organisation for Site Management, a leadership role in establishing an inclusive and participatory community development structure was taken up. The aim of the community development structures was to ensure a community-based participatory approach that was community-owned and contributed to their own protection. Coordination between the community development structure and different sector groups was imperative to create alignment and minimise gaps in such a complex emergency response.

**PROJECT**

**CCCM ACTIVITIES**

For this project, a community development system was established consisting of a series of block and sub-block committees. The Block Development Committees (BDCs) addressed a number of issues within camp 15 including general protection, accountability, service delivery, household relocation and coordination of various activity-based committees.

In cases of general protection issues, BDC members were informed immediately by the members of the community and then passed on information to the implementing agencies. Previously, protection issues were directly referred to the Army, Site Management Agency (SMA) and/or the Camp-in-Charge (CiC), but with the formation of the BDCs and coordination with implementing agencies, cases have been addressed in a timelier manner with a clear way to follow up on referrals.

With a focus on ensuring accountability for effective site management, the BDCs played a significant role by establishing a complaint-response mechanism as part of the accountability process. BDC members mobilised the camp population to inform the SMA regarding protection and other issues through complaint boxes and when possible, demonstrated the response the SMA carried out to address those complaints.

In cases of delivering services, such as establishing latrines or hand wash stations, BDC members collaborate with the implementing agencies to identify the most suitable place for installation. For example, recently site management identified areas/blocks for the installation of street solar lights in consultation with BDCs as they were aware of which area / blocks is more vulnerable in the night time due to lack of street light.

BDCs also supported site management in the relocation of households to new areas, particularly engaging with identified households living in hazard risk areas to help them understand the risks associated with staying in their existing place. Eventually they were able to relocate 142 households out of 390 identified households, with some households refusing to move due to different reasons such as service accessibility.

Camp 15 included a number of activity-based committees such as the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) committee, safety committee, graveyard committee and cyclone preparedness program committee. All of these committees included a certain percentage of BDC members from the relevant blocks along with additional community members. This system meant that BDC members were also connected with different committees, which was useful to ensure alignment across the community development structure. For example, site management engagement with BDC members of the DRR committee in resilience audit data collection.

A key task of site management was to establish the balance between these roles and how BDC members play in at different points. For example, if BDC members were on specific committees, then these members were trained to speak for their committee along with expressing their individual opinion.

Site management was also working closely with the local government. The Camp-in-Charge (CiC), who were senior government officials appointed by the RRRC as the leading government authority in each designated camp, adjusted activities as necessary to align with government priorities based on humanitarian principles.
When the SMA began operation, the Majhi system was in practice where Rohingya community leaders of blocks and sub-blocks were appointed by the Army and Camp-in-Charge (CiC). The Majhi system was not established with the participation of the Rohingya community and does not reflect a participatory process and lacks accountability. Women were not represented in Majhi or allowed to participate in the decision making, therefore there has been no gender representation in the system. In some cases, the Majhis used their influence to control camp dynamics. Hence, it was necessary to develop a community-based system to ensure efficient delivery of services and accountability among different actors as well as to limit Majhis’ roles in humanitarian aid provisions. Developing an alternative system was challenging. Preliminary discussions occurred with the Army on site (to ensure security) and Camp-in-Charge (CiC). Both actors found that the proposed community-based approach would be instrumental to ensure unified service delivery.

Initially, it was difficult to include women in the community development structure, as they preferred not talking to community mobilisers and were reluctant to be a part of governance structure. A series of community consultations were carried out to mobilise refugee men and women. In order to support refugee women to participate more than half of the community mobilisers were female.

In camp 15, the 8 blocks were split into 100 sub-blocks forming sub-block development committees (SBDCs). Each SBDC had 10 members and nominated 2 members to form the Block Development Committees (BDCs). The BDCs were gender-balanced and inclusive in structure, with one female and one male representatives for each sub-block. The BDCs also included one elderly member, 2 adolescents, (one male and one female), and 2 representatives from differently-abled people. Members were selected through consensus during sub-block level meetings. The Camp Development Committee (CDC) has 17 members, with 16 members representing the 8 blocks. Roles and responsibilities of BDC and CDC members was specified through written Terms of Reference (ToR). While the BDC meetings were held weekly and covered issues arising in the blocks, the CDC meetings were held bi-weekly and covered issues that arise in the entire camp. Meeting discussions were documented and then sent to the CiC office for a decision on the meetings.

Through community consultations, member nominees were selected at block level by the block communities, after which the Committee members received multiple trainings for instance on disaster risk reduction, first aid, grave yard and dead body management. With the BDCs activated, information dissemination and receiving feedback from the community was enhanced.

**IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT**

The project improved the overall community access to information resulting in reduced influence of the Majhis’ role particularly by establishing accountability mechanisms, reducing corruption and making service delivery more effective. The project was partially successful in limiting the Majhis’ role in delivering humanitarian aid and addressing protection issues through meaningful participation.
ACHIEVEMENTS

- Community members were actively participating in service delivery and community development.
- As the monsoon season approached, the SBDCs and BDCs worked to identify households vulnerable to landslides and flooding. 390 households were identified and 142 relocated.
- There were ensured alignment of community development across all camp-based committees by having BDC members involved in different activity-based committees.
- The established disaster risk reduction received trainings contributing to the general understanding and knowledge of DRR issues within the camps.
- The SBDCs and BDCs established a complaint-response system enhancing the accountability mechanism within the camp.

CHALLENGES

- In Camp 15, every block selected a Majhi to become a BDC member, whereas other camps did not select Majhis into the committees when given the opportunity. In this case the selection reinforced the Majhis legitimacy as “camp leadership”.
- The frequent updating and membership changes within the committees posed a challenge to retain knowledge and introduce new members to agreed procedures and activities.
- Some members of the BDCs expected monetary benefits in exchange for their service in the community development structure.

LESIONS LEARNED

- Through coordination and recognition of all stakeholders, the site management team mitigated initial conflict with community members while introducing the system of block and sub-block committees.
- It was critical to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the members of the committees and strengthening volunteerism.
- Shared decision-making processes facilitate greater buy-in from the communities and support the development of shared solutions.
- Defining the community as service users, enhanced the accountability of the site management agency and service providing agencies.

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1 Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG), Situation Report Data Summary on Rohingya Refugee Crisis
2 as per NPM (Round 8)
3 Source
4 Source
5 The case study context was drafted in accordance with the news reports published in Bangladesh’s National TV and newspaper.
6 The Camp in Charges (CiC) are senior government officials appointed by the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) as the leading government authority within each designated camp. CiCs are frequently seconded by the Government of Bangladesh from across various Ministries to serve within the RRRC Office for periods ranging from a few months to over a year. In line with RRRC policies and directives, the CiCs oversee all humanitarian actors within their respective camps and ensure close coordination at the field level with other GoB divisions, such as local elected officials, police, and the Army.
7 More information on the Protection Considerations on the Majhi System can be found here.
**GREECE**

**SITE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT**

**KEYWORDS:**
- Refugees, Communal, Set-up, Care and Maintenance, Site Management Support, Capacity Building, Referral Pathways, Service Mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT</strong></th>
<th>Influx/outflux of persons of diverse nationalities in search of international protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT</strong></td>
<td>2015 to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEOPLE DISPLACED</strong></td>
<td>Total: 150,000¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROJECT LOCATION</strong></td>
<td>Greece: Attica / Thessaloniki Region / Lesvos Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROJECT DURATION</strong></td>
<td>October 2015 – December 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT</strong></td>
<td>In Camps: 2015: 250,000+ 2016: 13,000 2017: 9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM</strong></td>
<td>No cluster activated. Remote Camp Management from early 2016.²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUMMARY:**

From 2015-2017, the implementing agency engaged in site management support across Greece. The goal was to uphold dignity and strengthen access to basic rights for persons on the move in Greece. This goal was pursued through a range of interventions across sectors, both in and outside of sites. The implementing agency’s approach to Site Management Support (SMS) included a holistic multi-sector service provision. In Greece there was a heavy focus on protection, legal aid, food security, shelter, non-food items, WASH and education, capacity building of local actors and volunteer groups.

¹ Source: Danish Refugee Council
² Source: Danish Refugee Council

Elliniko site 2016: For a long period in 2015 and early 2016 the Elliniko site in the old Athens airport was unmanaged and unsafe.
BACKGROUND
The Government of Greece established a set of geographical restrictions to practically implement the EU - Turkey Agreement of March 2016. According to these geographical restrictions, Reception and Identification Centers (also known as Hot Spots) existed on the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea for the reception of displaced and migrant populations. Upon decision by the Ministry of Migration Policy (MoMP), asylum seekers were transported through official means to Open Accommodation Centers in mainland Greece. From early 2016 the Refugee Coordination Model was activated in the form of a site management support sector working group.

Improvements in 2017 were observed resulting in more common language between authorities and international actors and therefore more agreed processes. This improvement was helped by ECHO’s initiative on establishing a monthly videoconference with all relevant actors including MoMP and occasionally other duty bearers.

CONTEXT
Between November 2015 and the time of the EU - Turkey Agreement of March 2016, the implementing agency’s intervention in Greece aimed to improve the access to dignified reception conditions in Moria emergency reception site. It started its operations in Greece immediately following the peak of the Mediterranean refugee and migrant influx in Moria on the island of Lesvos (Oct 2015 averaged well over 6,000 new arrivals per day). The aim was to support the relevant Greek government authorities, namely the Ministry of Migration Policy, to strengthen their footing and managing the large influx of refugees and migrants arriving on Greek shores. The Site Management Support (SMS) term was coined to emphasize the leading role of the Greek government in managing the reception sites. The high number of arrivals had put extreme pressure on the island, with regularly more than 10,000 refugees and migrants staying on the island against a reception capacity of roughly 2,800 between Moria, the Kara Tepe reception site, and the assembly points on the northern shore. At the time, Lesvos was seeing nearly 70% of all arrivals in Greece, and in addition to being an emergency reception site, Moria became the only registration center on the island (hotspot).

Overall in the Greek context, the implementing agency understood its role as a Site Management Support agency and as having the ability to fill gaps within its areas of expertise, particularly providing last resort solutions should these gaps not be filled through coordination and mobilization of resources. As such, the implementing agency’s interventions also covered (alongside coordination efforts) shelter and infrastructure, WASH, CRI distributions, food security and protection.

Furthermore, with the opening of activities on mainland Greece, the National Site Management Support Sector Working Group was established and reorganized to fit the change in context. The implementing agency played a key role in this process and took over the lead role of the Sub-national SMS SWG in Attica.
The implementing agency’s integrated approach to SMS also included shelter, site maintenance, protection, Communicating with Communities (CwC) and food distribution of three meals per day (in coordination with partners). Under its shelter component, the implementing agency managed the existing shelter facilities - Refugee Housing Units, dormitories and communal shelter for single men. Shelter management consisted of shelter allocation based on set criteria for each type of accommodation available, according to vulnerability as well as daily cleaning, maintenance (plumbing and electrical works) and repairs of the shelter facilities. Standard Operating Procedures for shelter allocation were developed and implementation was done using mostly volunteer labour, under supervision of staff on duty. The implementing agency was also part of a project of recycling used blankets, by washing them at hospital standards and reusing/redistributing to beneficiaries. Additionally, it implemented infrastructure improvement projects in the site, with the aim of making it more accessible and generally improving living conditions for all refugees and migrants transiting through Moria.

CwC activities focused on coordinating with relevant actors to provide adequate information to the beneficiaries (availability of services, registration process, ferry schedules, etc.) in a language they understood. To aid these activities, Arabic, Farsi and Pashto speaking staff from other country programs were seconded, in addition to improving on site communication infrastructure (PA system, information booths) and installing notice boards for information to be made available to people, in their language. Frequent vulnerability assessments identified needs and helped to tailor assistance, especially under Protection.

From the beginning of its operations in Greece, the implementing agency had an active protection presence in Moria. It’s protection activities during that phase included protection monitoring and support for the development and implementation of an adequate referral system for vulnerable cases. The key challenge in delivering protection services in Moria was the speed with which refugees and migrants transited through the site. It was rare for Persons of Concern (PoCs) to remain in Moria for longer than 24 hours, and was in sharp contrast to a conventional “camp-like” environment where individuals might remain for months, perhaps even years, and have numerous opportunities to seek counselling and assistance from protection staff.

An additional protection challenge was the uncontrolled access to the Moria site. MoMP was supported in implementing a system where access to the site was only granted to visitors and volunteers carrying ID cards issued by the MoMP, and the establishment of a population flow system that ensured all refugees and migrants were guided through and able to follow the different steps of the process from arrival to registration and onward movement from the site.

Following the closure of the Balkan routes, the implementing agency adjusted its programming to the new context requirements. Therefore, protection needs identified in open accommodation centres on the mainland included new elements, directed more towards durable solutions. This development resulted in new challenges such as saturation of the already overwhelmed and under resourced Greek social services. Thus, asylum seekers and recognized refugees remained within Refugee Sites for prolonged periods, resulting in overcrowded Sites.

Coordination between government actors and international organizations was challenging and did not always align in approach. Improvements in 2017 were observed resulting in more common language between authorities and international actors and therefore more agreed processes. This improvement was helped by ECHO’s initiative on establishing a monthly video conference with all relevant actors including MoMP and occasionally other duty bearers. Another element that supported this improvement was the better understanding by international actors on the importance of working with local authorities. The implementing agency took a lead in working with local authorities and promoted a similar approach vis-à-vis other international actors.
Moria 2015: Having the right language and cultural competencies present in the SMS team 24/7 was a top priority for DRC as an SMS actor. In the photo a dedicated staff member, normally working with DRC in Afghanistan, talks to a group of people on the move from Afghanistan outside the Moria site.
IMPLEMENTATION

The project was implemented directly with local implementing partners and in close coordination with relevant authorities, such as MoMP. With the agreement of and in collaboration with MoMP and other relevant actors, the approach was to understand and tap into the capacities existing within the independent volunteers and volunteer groups, by implementing a process of screening, training and designating roles and responsibilities to volunteers. Subsequently these volunteers supported the implementation of activities in Moria. The challenge of this arrangement was the high turnover rate among volunteers, and overall lack of experience. With new arrivals landing around the clock, the implementing agency instituted a 24/7 presence on the site, starting December 2015.

The risks faced by people on the move in Moria ranged from exploitation to unequal access to basic services. In addition, there were several instances of stampedes occurring in the context of massive and poorly managed queues. To address risks, the implementing agency invited crowd-management and security experts. A major component of meeting the objective of human rights protection of persons on the move was strengthening the rights of transient people and improving the protective environment around them, including through improved and new ways of communicating, increased transparency, access to information and better queue management. Following the EU – Turkey agreement, activities were cut down to “protection by presence” to prevent the mistreatment of refugees and migrants on the site and to encourage the authorities to ensure full and equal access to all elements of basic social services provision, and their continued and meaningful access to asylum rights. Additionally, the implementing agency continued providing individual assistance to PoCs with pressing protection needs, including referral for acute medical care, family reunification services, etc. As a result of the closure of the FYROM border following the agreement, over 50,000 refugees and migrants became stranded on mainland Greece, with some 12,000 trapped at the northern border. Based on the cooperation model established in Moria between the implementing agency and the MoMP, the start of implementation of SMS activities was requested, starting in Attica region with the Elliniko sites.

In Elliniko and Skaramangas sites in Attica, the implementing agency supported the Greek authorities with undertaking the day-to-day management of the sites, coordinating and monitoring the delivery of assistance ensuring care and maintenance of site infrastructure, and providing capacity building to staff from partner organisations and volunteers in coordination with UNHCR.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

The activities in SMS generally impacted positively on the protective environment in the targeted sites. In particular, they reduced the vulnerabilities of the most vulnerable persons on the move by providing equal access to dignified conditions and basic rights, in particular in terms of shelter.

In addition, SMS activities have had a positive impact on the capacity of national duty bearers and civil society organisations to assume their responsibilities in the site-context vis-à-vis persons on the move as well as persons applying for asylum in Greece.

Finally, in terms of the large and diverse group of volunteers in Greece, the implementing agency’s activities positively impacted their capacity to contribute to the humanitarian response in a protection-sensitive manner and in respect of humanitarian principles.
ACHIEVEMENTS:

- Creation of high-quality and sustainable site infrastructure through sharing of best practice and experience
- Enabled displaced population to more effectively interact with public authorities and agencies through establishing nation-wide procedures and documents
- Information Management efficiency and improvement of data quality by standardizing data collection across SMS actors, creating compatible database, and exchanging technical expertise.

CHALLENGES

- Community mobilization has been limited as accommodation sites are comprised of various displaced communities and the relevant duty bearers have not promoted the organization of displaced populations along community lines
- Living standards vary between sites as well as within sites due to the reactive, rather than proactive character of the overall coordination and planning, generating localized push and pull factors.

LESSONS LEARNED

- In this type of context it was imperative to clarify roles and responsibilities among the different actors so expectations between local authorities and international/national actors were better managed. Furthermore, the element of capacity building from specialized actors to duty bearers and other stakeholders (such as local NGOs and SCOs) was critical for an efficient and effective handing over / transition to local authorities. Such issues should be clearly listed in agreements (i.e MoU) between all relevant actors, including the funding management mechanisms.

1 Site management support sector working group active. No cluster approach is used within EU. There are sectorial working groups, which however do not have the leverage for coordination or decisions on approving tools or standards (mainly information exchange and some suggested guidelines to Government). Considering the lack of HCT or similar forum, WGs have basically nowhere to suggest guidelines.
COLOMBIA  CENTER FOR INTEGRATED ASSISTANCE

KEYWORDS: REFUGEES, MIGRANTS, CAPACITY BUILDING, MENTORING, PROTECTION, REFERRALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT</th>
<th>Mixed refugee and migrant response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT</td>
<td>2015 - Ongoing, Venezuela crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEOPLE DISPLACED</td>
<td>Approx. 3 Million</td>
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<td>PROJECT LOCATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT</td>
<td>36,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM</td>
<td>Cluster activated</td>
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SUMMARY:
The reception center entitled “Center for Integrated Assistance”, first of its kind, aims at temporarily addressing the urgent humanitarian and protection needs of the most vulnerable people fleeing from Venezuela, as well as supporting the response of the local authorities. The most noteworthy innovative elements of the facility stand in its eligibility determination algorithm, length of stay and rotation determination system and its exit strategy mechanism combining humanitarian and government efforts.
BACKGROUND

It is estimated that a total of 123,756 people are currently displaced in the Department of La Guajira, which hosts the third largest number of people originating from Venezuela, after Bogota and Norte de Santander.

Maicao is one of the cities in La Guajira with the highest concentration per capita of refugees and migrants from Venezuela. Hundreds of people, including children, the elderly, persons with disabilities and critical medical conditions, are forced to live on the streets, due to lack of alternatives or options. According to a recent UNHCR assessment, over 50% of Venezuelans in Maicao are living on the streets or in informal settlements and 81% of those interviewed said that they required temporary shelter and services.

Specifically, according to a CCCM and Protection Multi-sector Needs Assessment carried out by the implementing agency in February 2019 in Maicao, while many became apparent, the most striking needs were identified as protection and accommodation (shelter including basic services):

• Almost 70% entered Colombia through an informal crossing point (if this were added to the official population figure of people originating from Venezuela in Maicao, the figure would increase to 68,000 people at any given time as compared to the official estimation of 40,000 people having crossed through the official point and thus having been recorded);
• 67% of those interviewed find themselves in a situation of irregular/undocumented stay
• Regarding their previous housing situation but also as an indicator of previous economic status in Venezuela, 80% reported living in a house (60% owning while over 20% were renting)
• Currently, over 50% find themselves living in the street or informal sites in Maicao and over 70% at risk of being evicted
• 81% indicated requiring humanitarian shelter and access to basic services.

CONTEXT

Prior to the establishment of the Center, a set of required criteria of functionality was developed:

• Provide a safe space for the largest number of those in need.
• Identify the most vulnerable.
• Provide access to basic emergency relief assistance to the largest amount of people possible in an organized manner however within the limited reception capacity of the site.
• While also having the ability to ensure case management.
• Government ownership.

Through technical support, a unique reception Center typology emerged directly connecting case identification to access to emergency assistance and basic relief integrated services (both at a community at an individual level) as well as connecting it to case management (expanding beyond protection services to all available services required).

IMPLEMENTATION

Through CCCM technical support, CCCM/field and protection drafted an initial version of a document outlining key site management procedural aspects with regards to the modalities the Center would function under. This served as the main inter-agency guidelines under which the Center currently functions.

According to these guidelines agreed by the humanitarian community and government of Colombia, the Center provided assistance to the following categories of people:

1. People with specific protection needs.
2. People with unmet basic needs, specifically those living in the street.
3. People in transit.

Of these categories, only the most vulnerable are eligible for entry. To this respect, a vulnerability index system was developed in accordance with the implementing agency’s Global Protection Indicators. To further adjust levels of services to be provided within the Center while construction was ongoing and to establish a baseline of profiles of those most vulnerable, several activities were organized:

• an urban service mapping exercise was carried out with support from the interagency (GIFMM) team.
• a Multi-sector Needs Assessment carried out with support from the IM team.
• community consultations.
With regards to multi-sector commitments from different agencies, key stakeholder exchanges were held with Government entities and NGOs. These confirmed the inter-agency agreement on the modus operandi of the Center and differing agencies’ interest to participate (both in the further development of sectorial operational documents and on their implementation in the Center) within their area of responsibility. These exchanges were fundamental to ensure the well-coordinated, multi-partner/multi-sectoral nature of the Center required to deliver a comprehensive, integrated response.

Given the presence of indigenous communities surrounding the site, the management of the office saw it as an integral part of site development to involve the community through:

• Consultations
• Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)
• Cash for Work Projects (CFW)

As a result, the community felt a sense of ownership, obvious in their subsequent interactions related to the development of the site and thus they supported willingly with no sense of tension. This support provided the ability to access the most vulnerable in a community otherwise resistant to outside interventions.

With regards to the methods of communication, careful choices were made in light of the large number of those in need and the small amount of space available in the initial phase of the Center (an initial 350 people reception capacity). As such, specific and targeted activities were selected to be implemented at specific times with the aim to ensure that the largest amount of population had access to information regarding the Center, all processes were transparent, and eligibility was well understood.

Several activities and events were organized and delivered several days prior to the opening of the Center:

• Key messages were produced and tested.
• All humanitarian service providers in Maicao and key government staff attended several trainings based on these messages.
• All humanitarian service providers in Maicao and key government staff made visits to the Center prior to its opening.
• Community representatives made several go-see visits to the Center prior to its opening.
• Messages were disseminated at points of humanitarian aid delivery.
• Messages were delivered, and a specific communication event took place at the primary locations identified through the multi-sector needs assessment.

External communication was also carefully planned with several low key bi-lateral pre-opening day meetings with community leaders, government and the press. Several communication events were also organized jointly with government representatives to take place at strategically timed manner. Coordination with the CCCM partner for the Center, also entailed establishing in advance of the opening day systems such as (but not limited to):

• Manual on co-habitation of those hosted in the Centre
• Site rules and regulations
• Access cards for those hosted in the site
• Inter-agency reporting and 3Ws (Who’s doing, What, Where?)

With regards to an exit strategy, as with any camp, site or humanitarian center, the element of solutions for its inhabitants is of great importance and assures the overall success of the location from an advocacy perspective.

Regarding an exit strategy in the context of the constant rotation of beneficiaries, from the time of the initial discussions regarding the opening of this Center, the strategic objective was for it to be used as an advocacy tool for solutions for those inhabiting it. As the authorities requested that this Center functioned within a transitional/rotation basis of people, the element of solutions for those exiting in the site, would provide the premises for such an exit strategy. As such, through government and humanitarian coordination and collaboration, several possible steps were identified and implemented such as documentation and cash assistance.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

• Best value for money:
  ○ Targeted approach identified and served only those most vulnerable, thus a well prioritized investment
  ○ The multi-sector multi-partner service delivery aspect ensured cost-sharing
  ○ The beneficiary rotation system ensured the most amount of people are serviced. With an initial capacity of 350 people, it is estimated that 1,000 will be served per month. Once the full planned capacity of 1,000 was reached, the number rose to 3,000 which in a year amounts to 36,000 people served.
• Interagency benefits through collaboration and partnerships.
• Contingency planning capacity in case of sudden influxes
• Advocacy tool, through its existence UNHCR has been able to advocate for further rights and access to documentation and continues to do so.
ACHIEVEMENTS

The implementing agency developed partnerships with Governmental Institutions, such as Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and Civil Defence (Defensa Civil) as well as NGOs, UN agencies and the private sector to ensure multi-agency support. Through these partnerships the “Center for Integrated Assistance” provided access to basic emergency relief assistance (such as shelter, food, protection services, health, WASH, site management, cash assistance, etc.) in a comprehensive and organized manner. Due to the nature of the facility, a complete package of protection services was provided including but not limited to child protection, registration and individual case management, psychosocial support, legal orientation, status regularization, access to documentation as relevant.

Since its opening in March 2019, the Center achieved the systematic identification of the most vulnerable through a unique eligibility determination algorithm. The system applies a detailed vulnerability criteria-based calculation methodology. Those deemed eligible were referred to the Center through the implementing agency’s protection desks (PAOs) and a multi-partner system.

In addition, the Centre provided a safe space, holistic/integrated emergency relief services and tailored individual/family support, as well as establishes connections with support mechanisms when leaving the Center.

CHALLENGES

Resources and funding have consistently been a challenging aspect. At the time of writing, the Centre functions in only one of the four phases of development. The Centre could expand to three other similar areas within the same space, tripling capacity, if resources became available.

LESSONS LEARNED

Exit strategy:
A sustainable exit strategy is central to the project; through effective coordination between humanitarian and government agencies, connecting those most in need to additional services upon departure from the Centres.

“Why is it not a camp?”

The Center only admits those evaluated as being the most in need which are hosted at the center for only a limited amount of time. The length of stay of each case is determined upon entry based on a calculation which evaluates profile and level of need. This allows for a rotation system to be ensured on a continuous basis.
TURKEY / SYRIA
REMOTE SITE MANAGEMENT AND REMOTE COORDINATION

KEYWORDS:
IDPS, REMOTE MANAGEMENT, SITE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT, CROSS-BORDER M&E, EMERGENCY CROSS-BORDER PROGRAMMING, ONLINE METHODS OF CAPACITY BUILDING, MOBILE TEAMS

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<td>DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEOPLE DISPLACED</td>
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<td>PROJECT LOCATION</td>
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<td>PROJECT DURATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT</td>
<td>90,000 in 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM</td>
<td>CCCM Cluster activated</td>
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SUMMARY:
This case study describes how remote coordination and CCCM remote operations were effectively applied in the case of Gaziantep, as one of the most advanced good practice case study.

Displaced families in Atmeh, North West Syria.

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The North Syria Cluster system is remotely operated from Southern Turkey – mainly the city of Gaziantep, where the cross-border humanitarian community is based. The CCCM Cluster is based in Gaziantep with frequent trips to other border towns. The team is composed of a Cluster Coordinator, Cluster Support Office and two Information Management Officers.

Due to insecurity, conflict induced crises trigger a humanitarian context which to a various degree implies remote coordination/management. Such contexts are also strongly correlated to the proliferation of informal sites and settlements. This aspect determines the need of adapted methods of CCCM cluster coordination and partner implementation to be applied.

Operating from Southern Turkey in Gaziantep, the Camp Coordination & Camp Management (CCCM) sector has been active in Northern Syria since 2013, first as a working group and then as fully activated cluster in 2014.

Between the 26th of February to the 3rd of March 2018, semi-structured discussions were conducted in Gaziantep with CCCM Cluster members and stakeholders which included the implementing agencies. Results of these discussions are presented in this case study such as, what needs to be established with regards to how remote coordination and CCCM remote operations that were effectively applied in the case of Gaziantep, as one of the best good practice case study.

PART 1: Ensuring effectiveness of coordination in a remote coordination context

1.1 Set up active membership agreements and systems: Traditional and Non-traditional members

The CCCM Cluster operating from Gaziantep, Turkey in Northern Syria, counts 138 members (71 active) composed of international, national and Syrian NGOs and UN Agencies amongst its membership, all committed to the core principles of service delivery. The Cluster agreed to ensure a multi-sectoral response to assist and protect camp-based populations and to make all efforts to identify durable solutions. Additionally, partners agreed to ensure the identification of areas hosting high concentrations of IDPs in Syria for use by cluster members and the wider humanitarian community.

To ensure that the CCCM has a coordinated understanding of the needs, services and sector coverage in each IDP site and to ensure that issues are followed up in a timely manner, the cluster has created a focal point system. To the extent possible, there is a general focal point and a sector specific focal point for each IDP site.

The general focal point is charged with updating the cluster on general matters and gaps. This includes new movements, issues related to camp residents, plans for service provision and liaising with other service providers who may wish to work in that IDP settlement. For planned camps, the focal point is also the member directly responsible for the management of the camp. Principally the general focal point reports the population of their site to the CCCM’s IDP Sites Integrated Monitoring Matrix (ISIMM). As the CCCM cluster team coordinates most multi-sector aid delivery in camps and informal settlements ranging from site set-up to specifically services related to tent distributions, infrastructure development (of various type including WASH) and stocks. This is done in collaboration with the relevant clusters. While these activities are coordinated directly by the cluster, for the remaining activities such as food, education or health, the CCCM cluster has designated an agency as the service focal points per camp cluster (a multitude of sites grouped together geographically). They have the responsibility of delivery oversight/coordination of the specific sector services per a specific area against needs/population size. The agency is usually the largest service provider of that specific sector but does not have the responsibility of covering the entire need but rather oversight and connecting with the relevant cluster.

1.2 Ensure partners set-up functional M&E systems and third-party monitoring

In the case of Syria, the local organizations with the best access (which normally correlates to being able to reach the populations in greatest need) are also the organizations that represent the greatest risk to their international partners. These organizations and their personnel are moving in extremely insecure areas. By nature, they are interacting with armed groups; this interaction is required in almost all instances to secure and maintain humanitarian access. Therefore, these organizations are also most likely to experience the loss or diversion of goods and cash when operating in the conflict zone. They are the least likely to be able to do follow-up Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) or to provide the necessary documents to comply with the requirements of their international partners (such as vetting local providers, documenting transactions, and getting multiple quotes for potential services or inputs).

A robust M&E system featuring compartmentalized layers of monitoring and verification, combined with independent third-party monitoring, is recommended as a good practice for cross-border M&E and remote management in general. Though difficult due to security concerns and the inability of M&E experts to work in Syria, efforts to conduct long-term impact evaluations should be increased to measure the qualitative effects that emergency cross-border programs are having on civilian populations and overall conflict dynamics.
1.3 Set-up Policies

The cluster coordination team agreed with cluster members and donors to prioritize:

- Establishment of policies with regards to camp establishment
- Required parameters for any tent distribution activity
- Establishment of a unique site list and methods of reporting new sites
- Levels of engagement in camp management activities with regards to different types of sites and management structures present, irrespective of the partner intervention in a camp like setting
- Establishment of roles and responsibilities of IDP committees

The rational of policies and guidelines were reflected in a unique booklet the CCCM developed in Arabic and English.

1.4 Ensure policy is supported and monitored through Information Management (IM) tools

Given the remote context, informal settlements and spontaneous camps were reported as a mushrooming phenomenon for purposes wider than humanitarian although stated as such. To limit their proliferation and to have an overview of locations of sites and services and figures, the ISIMM was created.

1.5 Ensure capacity building mechanisms exist

Partners reported that physical interaction with staff on the ground is not possible and that several systems and online platforms were set-up with regards to capacity building and technical guidance. These vary from partner to partner and are composed of a lengthy induction periods in parallel with coaching systems, online training sessions, online resource centres. Most partners explained that frequent if not daily interaction with staff on the ground coupled with online methods of capacity building was the most effective.

PART 2: Remote Management

2.1 Set-up site information systems

Having the ability to provide information to the extent described has strongly positioned the CCCM Cluster with respect to cluster members’ coordination commitments and has facilitated their adequate CCCM implementation with respect to multi-sector service delivery in camps. Additionally, by establishing such a system in a remote context, the cluster coordination team has obtained the ability of direct oversight of the humanitarian situation in camps and to coordinate a multi-sector response remotely.

Partners reported that having such systems in place which they are actively contributing to with regards to having data collection teams as part of CCCM activities, has improved targeting methods and facilitated defining the operational design of CCCM programs.

2.2 Establish CCCM roving teams and allocate (geographical) area-based coordination roles: Adapted CCCM activities to the remote context

Outputs of CCCM implementation by partners include:

- Multi-sector responses in IDP sites
- Monthly needs assessments in camps
- Site renovations and improvements to key infrastructure
- Promotion of participatory management structures
- Training on camp governance and/or protection mainstreaming for Humanitarian Actors
- Promotion of equal access to goods and services in IDP camps to all residents
- Equip and train emergency responders and IDP committees in IDP sites
- Implement tailored livelihood activities designed to enable HHs to restore their assets and leave IDP sites for better solutions
- Assisting site residents in the closure of IDP sites with emphasis on collective centres in school buildings
- Tracking and sharing IDP movements and analysis of displacements trends.

These are achieved through a combination of direct camp management where formal camps are established and in most cases through CCCM roving multi-functional teams active in informal settlements. All those spoken with reported that an insecure conflict affected context triggers the existence of informal settlements and consequently require a CCCM remote management implementation modality.

The roving teams cover a multitude of sites within geographic proximity, thus also acting as CCCM area (or camp cluster as defined in the Gaziantep context) focal points. The methodology of the roving teams is an adaptation of the CCCM Collective Centre and Urban Displacement living Outside Camps (UDOC) approach to the Gaziantep context which entails among other aspects the empowerment of local community-based structures to self-manage while functioning as the link between the needs on site and the humanitarian community.

The teams are composed of five to seven team members which carry out a multitude of activities such as but not limited to:

- Identifying existing governance structures and focal points for sites
- Set up of CCCM coordination structures in collaboration with appropriate community-based structures
- Ensuring through CCCM coordination that relevant responders are mobilised towards providing relevant sectorial assistance to those identified as very vulnerable
- Ensuring the relevant Protection and Shelter responders are aware and act with regards to HLP issues
- Conducting data collection
- Monitoring service delivery at site level to ensure that there are no gaps or duplication of activities
- Establishing community engagement mechanisms
- Establishing feedback mechanisms
- Initiate site infrastructure improvements and maintenance, mainly implemented through Cash-for-work (CFW).
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS:

• The CCCM cluster coordination team frequently issued data regarding displacement and relevant up to date information.

• Given the policies of the cluster with regards to site establishment and oversight of multi-sector interventions, many partners preferred to comply with coordination requirements.

• The large Humanitarian Fund allocation also had a significant impact on coordination contribution.

• The CCCM Cluster was invited to general briefings at both country and regional levels, to provide briefings on the humanitarian situation and remote response in northern Syria.

CHALLENGES

• Inability to be present in the field due to security concerns which lead to a remote presence and having to develop context-specific tools which required translation into a local language.

• A lack of grassroots and field knowledge.

• Proliferation of informal sites with no risk assessment.

• High staff rotation leading to challenges to understand the tools that were developed.

• Challenges to implement Monitoring & Evaluation tasks remotely.

• Information communication was challenging, in particular between implementing and lead agencies in regard to stated capacities and soft skills.

LESSONS LEARNED

• Development of context-specific tools that are translated into a local language to address the issue of remote presence. Vital to have internet access in order to develop WhatsApp and Skype groups and be able to respond to call and questions from the field.

• It is essential to conduct trainings in the local language to address the lack of grassroots and field knowledge.

• Develop an online needs-based IDP sites reporting tool, develop IDP sites establishment and management guidance notes.

• Reach out to the donor and humanitarian sites to further influence the random destruction of tents and the continuous advocacy on the needs to ensure that camps should remain the last resort.

• Expansion of the cluster “reach-out mechanisms” and train the non-traditional actors on basic coordination approaches and establishment of solid monitoring mechanisms.

Child-friendly activity at a reception centers, North West Syria.