PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: IRAQ

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Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59
1209 Geneva - Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01
E-mail : idpsurvey@nrc.ch
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Iraq is host to the highest number of internally displaced people in the Middle East. Between 700,000 and 1 million people are estimated internally displaced in Iraq. Ethnic Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmen have suffered from several waves of displacement over the past two decades, mainly due to repression by the Iraqi government and to a lesser extent to inter-ethnic Kurdish fighting. Shia Arab populations in the south of Iraq have also been displaced from their homes due to government actions, particularly since 1991.

**Historical Background**

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, an uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein in the north and south of the country was rapidly crushed by government troops. In April 1991, the UN Security Council (UN SC) adopted Resolution 688, which called for the government to end the repression of its civilian population and to allow international humanitarian agencies immediate access to the country (UN SC, 5 April 1991). The same month, the UN established a 'Safe Haven' in the north of the country to protect the Kurdish population from Baghdad's actions. Following the United States' order to end all military activity in the North, the Iraqi government withdrew its troops and administrative personnel from that area. Since then, the northern governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniyeh and Dohuk have been under the control of the two major Kurdish parties and enjoy de facto autonomy.

As of mid-2002 the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1991 were still in place, mainly due to Iraq's refusal to allow international inspections of its weapon industry. Since 1996 the 'oil–for–food' program has allowed Iraq to import essential goods to alleviate some of the needs of its people and to mitigate the impact of the sanctions. The 'oil–for–food' programme has also been implemented in the region under Kurdish administration. Many international observers have criticized the dire humanitarian impact of the sanctions despite the 'oil–for–food' programme. In May 2002 UN SC members finally agreed on a revised sanction regime aiming to lessen humanitarian effects (UN SC 14 May 2002).

**Displacement of ethnic Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians caused by the Iraqi government**

The Iraqi government caused the massive displacement of Iraqi Kurds from their towns and villages in the 1970s and end–1980s. Since the mid–1970s, Baghdad has also forcibly displaced nearly 200,000 of the ethnically non–Arab citizens from the oil–rich region of Kirkuk. The displacement continued in 2002.

During the mid and late–1970s, the Iraqi regime destroyed Kurdish villages and forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kurds living close to the borders with Iran and Turkey and relocated them into settlements controlled by the army. In 1988 at the end of the Iran–Iraq war, Baghdad forces lead the 'Anfal' campaign, destroying thousands of Kurdish villages and towns, killing between 50,000 and 100,000 civilians, and forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of villagers. According to Human Rights Watch, the campaign of destruction led by the Iraqi government against the Kurdish population can be qualified as genocide (HRW, July 1993).

Since the mid–1970s, the Iraqi government has also expelled thousands of ethnic Kurdish, Assyrian and Turkmen families from the oil–rich Kirkuk area through what is known as the 'Arabization' policy. Kirkuk has long been claimed by the Kurds as part of Iraqi Kurdistan but lies just south of the 'Kurdistan Autonomous Region' delineated by the Iraqi government in 1974.

Non-ethnic Arab Iraqis have been given the choice of leaving Kirkuk or signing a form 'correcting their nationality' to be considered as ethnic Arabs. Measures used by the government to encourage departures
and prevent the return of displaced persons have included setting up military checkpoints around Kirkuk, demolishing Kurdish sites and prohibiting Kurds from constructing or inheriting property in the area (CHR, 26 February 1999). Those refusing to comply have been subjected to intimidation, arrest, revocation of ration cards and, eventually, expulsion. From 1991 to 2000, the Iraqi government has been responsible for the displacement to northern Iraq of over 94,000 persons, from Kirkuk and other cities under government control such as Mosul (UN GA, 14 August 2000, para.50). In 2000, five to six families were being deported to northern Iraq each day (UNHCR/ACCORD, 14 November 2000, p57). At the same time, the Iraqi government has encouraged Shia families from central and southern Iraq to resettle in Kirkuk to affirm the 'Arabic' character of the city and to prevent Kurdish claims that Kirkuk is part of its territory. Kurdish sources reported that forced displacement from the Kirkuk area intensified in 2002 (RFE/RL 26 April 2002).

**Displacement of ethnic Kurds due to Kurdish fighting**

Another cause of displacement has been factional Kurdish in–fighting. Two major Kurdish political parties – the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) – have been fighting over the control of the three governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymaniyah, particularly during the period from 1994 to 1997. Forcible exchange of populations took place between the parties, affecting a total of 100,000 to 110,000 people accused of being affiliated with the other party (UNHCR/ACCORD, 14 November 2000). In 1998, both parties accepted a Washington–brokered peace agreement, which provided for the return of the people expelled from each other's territory. The implementation of the peace agreement has been slow, and both parties are still maintaining two separate administrations over the region. Hundreds of families were nevertheless allowed to return home in 2001 (KurdishMedia.com 7 July 2001). The region recently experienced new internal displacement due to clashes between the PUK and Islamic opposition (HRW 2002).

Internal Kurdish conflict has been exacerbated by the intervention of regional players who have all been opposed to the creation of a Kurdish state. Turkey's raids into Iraqi Kurdistan in search of PKK rebels (Kurdistan Workers' Party), as well as Iranian and Iraqi government interventions and shelling from outside the Kurdish–controlled region have all caused internal displacement (UNHCR June 2000 & USCR 2001).

**Displacement of Shia Arab population from the Mesopotamian marshlands by the Iraqi government**

Displacement within the government–controlled area of Iraq has been caused by confrontations between the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein, and the majority Shia Muslim population, which rebelled in the wake of the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait in 1991. Baghdad crushed the revolt of its Shia opponents during which time many people fled to the predominantly Kurdish North but also to the Mesopotamian marshlands of the Tigris–Euphrates Delta, located in the south of Iraq. The Iraqi government then ordered the burning and shelling of villages in the South, and had dams built to divert water from the marshes. This allowed government forces to penetrate into formerly inaccessible areas where their Shia opponents had found refuge (USCR, 2001).

Drawing on satellite images, a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) study shows that the Mesopotamian marshlands – the largest wetland in the Middle East and one of the most outstanding freshwater ecosystems in the world – has now nearly vanished. Previous estimates of the population of the Marsh area, the Marsh Arabs or Ma'adan, varied between 350,000 to 500,000 (Partow, 2001, p15). Following the destruction of their villages and the building of the dam, most of the Marsh Arabs have had to submit to compulsory resettlement within Iraq, leave the country, or remain in the drained marshlands, deprived of their water–based means of livelihood (AMAR 21 May 2001).

**Protection issues**

Information on human rights violations in Iraq is difficult to obtain, since the government does not allow human rights experts to travel outside Baghdad and neighboring countries often refuse passage to the north
of Iraq. However, opposition groups based outside Iraq have managed to gather valuable human rights information from their supporters inside government-controlled Iraq (US DOS 25 February 2000 & HRW December 1999). In addition to forcible expulsions based on ethnic origin, Amnesty International reported in 2001 the execution of hundreds of people, including possible prisoners of conscience, the arrest of hundreds of suspected political opponents and widespread torture (AI, 2001).

In February 2002 the Iraqi government finally authorized the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, after denying entry to the Mandate since 1992. The UN Special Rapporteur, the UN Commission on Human Rights, as well as international NGOs such as Amnesty International and other coalitions (Academic conference in northern Iraq, Assyrian Coalition and the Association Against Ethnic Cleansing in Kirkuk) have repeatedly denounced the Iraqi government's policy of forced displacement from Kirkuk and the southern marshes (CHR 16 January 2001, CHR 18 April 2001, AI 24 November 1999, RFE/RL 8 June 2001, RFE/RL 21 July 2001). The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs has rejected allegations of forced displacement as baseless accusations (Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001).

Living conditions

Living conditions for the Iraqi population are often very poor regardless of whether they are displaced or not. The Gulf War severely damaged Iraq's infrastructure, interrupting the power supply and, consequently, the operation of pumping and treatment facilities. This has led to an overall deterioration in the quality and quantity of drinking water and the rapid spread of infectious diseases such as cholera (ICRC 14 March 2000). A 1999 UNICEF survey reported that in government-controlled Iraq, infant mortality increased from 47 to 108 deaths per 1000 live births, while child mortality increased from 56 to 131 deaths per 1,000 live births between the 1984–89 and 1994–1999 periods (UNICEF, 27 August 1999). It was reported in 2000 that the 1980s–built internally displaced persons camps, primarily in the south of Iraq, had running streams of raw sewage between housing blocs, and untreated standing sewage water with enormous potential for disease (AFSC, 21 March 2000).

A UN Habitat survey found in 2001 that about 40 percent of internally displaced persons in the region under Kurdish administration lived in settlements with standards of water and electricity supplies, sanitation, drainage and road access that were below average for the area. Access to food, education and health care was however found acceptable (UN SC, 2 March 2001). Due to the increasing number of internally displaced in the North, several international observers reported in December 2000 that newcomers were becoming less welcome by local authorities. The Head of UN Programmes in Iraq also expressed his concern about the lack of housing alternatives (Crossette, 11 December 2000). Another element adding to the difficulty to resettle the internally displaced in northern Iraq is that the region is heavily mined and clearing these minefields would reportedly take between 35 and 75 years (UN SC, 19 November 1998).

Response

International response to humanitarian needs in Iraq and to internal displacement has been limited due to the fact that the Iraqi government severely restricts access to the UN and international NGOs. Only a handful of international NGOs have permission to operate in government-controlled Iraq. The government also reportedly harasses and intimidates relief workers and UN personnel throughout the country. In June 2000, two staff members of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were shot dead in Baghdad and six others wounded (FAO 30 June 2000).

WFP is responsible for food distribution in northern Iraq and for observing the adequacy of rations in government-controlled areas (WFP February 2001). The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) builds shelters to enable the displaced to resettle in northern Iraq on a permanent basis (UN SC 2 March 2001). Since 2001, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has been providing emergency relief items such as tents, blankets, heaters and stoves to internally displaced persons in the
North (UN SC 2 March 2001). The European Union is the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq and has focused on the center and south of Iraq. NGOs, ICRC and IFRC have been providing assistance to the IDPs in Iraq, such as non-food items, housing, water and sanitation (EU 19 February 2001 & ICRC 6 July 2001).

(June 2002)
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

Background of the conflict

Vulnerable ethnic groups and their relationship to the regime (1998-2001)

- Predominantly Arab Shi’a Muslims constitute a 60-65% majority
- Sunni Muslims (Kurds, Arabs and Turkomans) make up 32-27% of the population
- Christians and Yazidis represent about 3%
- Part of the Shi’a, Kurdish, Christian, Turkoman, "Marsh Arab", Yazidi and "Bidoon" population has had conflicting relations with the Iraqi regime

"While a precise statistical breakdown is impossible because of likely inaccuracies in the latest census (taken in 1997), according to conservative estimates, 97 percent of the population of 22 million persons are Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi’a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni Turkomans). The remaining approximately 3 percent consist of Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, and a small number of Jews.

The Shi’a, though predominantly located in the south, also are present in large numbers in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the center of the country and in the north." (US DOS, 5 September 2000, sect.I)

"There is no way to know what portions of Iraq's population is loyal to the present regime or loyal to the concept of Iraq as a state – as distinguished from exhibiting primary loyalty to a religious or ethnic group. It is obvious, however, that many Iraqis resent the fact that the present authoritarian regime is controlled by a small group of extended Sunni families. It is obvious that the regime has had to deal with major Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings, and faces a continuing problem with a separate Kurdish enclave.

It is equally obvious that Saddam's rule on policies designed to divide and paralyze Iraq's ethnic factions while using Iraqi military forces, overlapping and competing Iraqi intelligence and security services, the Ba'ath Party, and paramilitary forces to ensure that they remain under control. (Cordesman November 1998, p.4)

The Shi’ites

"Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life. The Government also severely restricts or bans outright many Shi'a religious practices. The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution, arbitrary arrest, and protracted detention against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim population […]." (US DOS 5 September 2000)

However, "The vast majority of Iraq's Shi'ites remained loyal during the Iran-Iraq War, and probably think of themselves primarily as Iraqi and Arab, rather than as Shi'ites. They may want equality or proportionate political power as Iraqis, but it is far from clear that they have any interest in a separate political entity or any ties to Iran." (Cordesman November 1998, p.5)

The Iraqi Kurds
"Saddam practiced near-genocide against the Kurdish tribes he felt support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and has been ruthless in putting down the Kurdish uprisings of 1991 and threatening the Kurdish security zone. Iraq, however, has a total of roughly 3.2 million to 4.3 million Kurds and it is far from clear that a majority of them would choose independence or autonomy […] if Saddam was no longer in power or if any Iraqi regime made good on a long series of promises to give them more rights and a larger share of Iraq's oil wealth. […]

Most of Iraq's Kurds remained loyal to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and only about half of Iraq's Kurds were involved at even the peak of the uprising in 1997. Iraqi Kurdish separatists represent a major force within Iraq, but they do not speak for the Kurds per se. The separatists are also deeply divided into rival factions that are never quite clear as to whether they are seeking rights and fair treatment, autonomy, or nationalism. Iraqi Kurds also do not share any broad identity with Kurdish groups outside Iraq, and the Talabani faction seems to be the only separatist group that has shown serious past interest in creating a greater 'Kurdistan' that involves Turkish and/or Iranian Kurds."

(Cordesman November 1998, pp.5-6)

The Faili Kurds

"Faili Kurds, most of whom are Shi'a, form a distinctive group of displaced people in Iraq, many of them twice displaced and now back in their country of origin. Unlike most Iraqi Kurds, until the early 1970s they lived mainly in central and southern Iraq, many of them in Baghdad. At that time, perhaps 130,000 Failis were deported to Iran by the government of Iraq on the pretext that they were not Iraqi citizens, though it fact it was because their loyalty was considered suspect. Most had lived in Iraq for generations, but in Ottoman times had not registered as citizens in order to avoid conscription. Since the 1970s, most of the Faili Kurds have lived in Iran. However, since 1981, some have returned to Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, where they are not necessarily welcome." (Dammers 1998, p.184)

The Yazidis

"The Yazidis are a Kurmanji speaking group and are exclusively Kurdish. Yazidi beliefs incorporate aspects of several major religions in the region, including Zoroastrianism, Islam, Nestorian Christianity, Judaism and Manichaeism. There are figures of the Yazidi population in Iraq ranging from 30,000 to 120,000 and they live predominately in the Mosul region of Iraq." (UNHCR June 2000, p.16)

"The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to join in domestic military action against Iraqi Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included in the 1998 Human Rights Watch report 'Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its own words', describe special all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to 'pursue and attack' Muslim Kurds. However, the Government does not hesitate to impose the same repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups. For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for. (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")

The 'Marsh Arabs'

"A crucible of civilization, the marshlands have been home to ancient human communities for more than five millennia. The area’s inhabitants are commonly known as the Ma’dan or “Marsh Arabs”, whose population is estimated to range from 350,000 to 500,000. […]Ethnically, the population’s composition has been heavily influenced by immigrations and intermarriages with the Persians to the east and Arab Bedouins to the west. The Marsh Arabs are Shi’ite Muslims, and their way of life is largely based on the traditions of the Arab Bedouin. […]

The Marsh Arabs have evolved a unique subsistence lifestyle that is firmly rooted in their aquatic environment. Most of the Ma’dan are semi-nomadic, but some of them are settled in villages. Their settlements are located on the edges of the marshes, or stand on artificial floating islands that are regularly reinforced with reeds and mud." (Patrow 2001, pp15-16)
"For thousands of years the salt marshes of southern Iraq have been a unique micro-environment. […] The marshes lie at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. […] Successive Iraqi governments had already tampered with the marshes in the way that modern governments often do in developing countries, regarding the hunter-gatherer subsistence lifestyle of the tribes there as being primitive and unworthy of a modern state.

But it was with the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 that wholesale disaster set in. By 1982, Iran had reversed Iraq's original conquest of Iranian lands and the front line surged back across the border into Iraq - including the marshlands. The marsh Arabs of the region were driven out as the Iraqi army sent massive electric charges through the marshes - thousands of invading Iranians were electrocuted like this as they advanced.

That war ended in 1988 but the devastation continued. After Saddam's second defeat in the Gulf War of 1991, rebels rose up against him in the south of the country. When they were defeated, many of them hid in the marshes. The government began to drain the marshes systematically in 1992. Three years later, they had almost finished, creating a desert where the marshland had been. Areas where the water was five foot deep are now bone dry with cracked mud. Less than 10,000 marsh Arabs remain, their traditional lifestyle literally drained away. Those who remain barely eke out a living." (Out There News 2000, "Marshes")

**The Assyrians and Chaldeans**

"The Assyrian Christian minority of about 250,000 people also lives mainly in Iraqi Kurdistan and has been caught up in the conflict and displacement there, particularly in 1987/8 and 1991." (Dammers 1998, p.181)

"Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct ethnic group as well as the descendants of some of the earliest Christian communities. These communities speak a distinct language (Syriac), preserve important traditions of Christianity in the east, and have a rich cultural and historical heritage that they trace back over 2,000 years. Although these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the Government, without any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated regime." (US DOS 25 February 2000, Section 5)

**The Turkomans**

"The Turkomans, who are believed to constitute somewhat less than 2 percent of the population, are village dwellers in the northeast living along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. A number of Turkomans live in the city of Irbil. The Turkomans, who speak a Turkish dialect, have preserved their language but are no longer tribally organized. Most are Sunnis who were brought in by the Ottomans to repel tribal raids. These early Turkomans were settled at the entrances of the valleys that gave access to the Kurdish areas. This historic pacification role has led to strained relations with the Kurds. By 1986 the Turkomans numbered somewhere around 222,000 and were being rapidly assimilated into the general population." (Library of Congress 2001, Chapter 2)

**The 'Bidoon'**

"Prior to the Gulf War, the 'Bidoon', most of whom are of Iraqi origin, were stateless residents of Kuwait. Their name is Arabic for 'without' – that is without nationality. They numbered about 250,000 and most had been born in Kuwait, or had lived there for a long time. Since the war around half of them have fled from or been expelled from Kuwait, mostly to Iraq. Though they are refugees, their statelessness, their displacement and their Iraqi connections mean that their status has much in common with that of other 'internally displaced' people. Detailed information on their situation in Iraq is, however unavailable." (Dammers 1998, p.184)

**Fighting between Kurdish militia and Iraqi government (1960-1975)**
• 1960-1975: fighting between Kurdish militia and Iraqi government, as well as between militia, caused the displacement (internally and abroad) of about 600,000 and the forced relocation of 300,000
• In 1974, the Iraqi government imposed the Kurdistan Autonomous Region which excluded the oil wealth of Kirkuk and Khanaqin
• Following autonomy decree, beginning of Arabization campaign of Kirkuk region and Kurdish revolt in 1974

"In the 1960s, Iraq witnessed several changes of government and fluctuating conflicts in which the Barzani [KDP] and to a lesser extent the Talabani [PUK] militias played a significant role. In 1970, 300,000 people were reported displaced in Kurdistan, the result of fighting between Kurdish militias and the government, as well as between the militias themselves. By 1975, when the government defeated Barzani's KDP, as many as 600,000 were displaced, 250,000 over the border to Iran. The Iraqi government forcibly relocated perhaps 1400 villages and 300,000 people, mainly to 'strategic hamlets' designed to facilitate government containment and control. Along the Iranian border depopulation was almost total, with villages bulldozed to prevent return." (Dammers 1998, p.181)

"In 1970, the Ba'ath Party, anxious to secure its precarious hold on power, did offer the Kurds a considerable measure of self-rule, far greater than that allowed in neighboring Syria, Iran or Turkey. But the regime defined the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in such a way as deliberately to exclude the vast oil wealth that lies beneath the fringes of the Kurdish lands. The Autonomous Region, rejected by the Kurds and imposed unilaterally by Baghdad in 1974, comprised the three northern governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniyeh and Dohuk. Covering some 14,000square miles -- roughly the combined area of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island -- this was only half the territory that the Kurds considered rightfully theirs. Even so, the Autonomous Region had real economic significance, since it accounted for fully half the agricultural output of a largely desert country that is sorely deficient in domestic food production.

In the wake of the autonomy decree, the Ba'ath Party embarked on the "Arabization" of the oil-producing areas of Kirkuk and Khanaqin and other parts of the north, evicting Kurdish farmers and replacing them with poor Arab tribesmen from the south. Northern Iraq did not remain at peace for long. In 1974, the long-simmering Kurdish revolt flared up once more under the leadership of the legendary fighter Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who was supported this time by the governments of Iran, Israel, and the United States. But the revolt collapsed precipitately in 1975, when Iraq and Iran concluded a border agreement and the Shah withdrew his support from Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). After the KDP fled into Iran, tens of thousands of villagers from the Barzani tribe were forcibly removed from their homes and relocated to barren sites in the desert south of Iraq. Here, without any form of assistance, they had to rebuild their lives from scratch.

In the mid and late 1970s, the regime again moved against the Kurds, forcibly evacuating at least a quarter of a million people from Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey, destroying their villages to create a cordon sanitaire along these sensitive frontiers. Most of the displaced Kurds were relocated into mujamma'at, crude new settlements located on the main highways in army-controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The word literally means "amalgamations" or "collectivities." In their propaganda, the Iraqis commonly refer to them as "modern villages"; in this report, they are generally described as "complexes." Until 1987, villagers relocated to the complexes were generally paid some nominal cash compensation, but were forbidden to move back to their homes." (HRW 1993, "Introduction")

The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) is led by Masoud Barzani and is dominant in the north of the country, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is led by Jalal Talabani and is dominant in the northeast. Barzani is the son of the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani while Talabani was one of his lieutenants who split.
Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal campaign against the Kurds (1980-1988)

- Eight year war allowed Saddam Hussein to consolidate its rule in Iraq
- With end of the war in 1988, Saddam Hussein began campaign against Kurdish insurgency
- Anfal policy against Iraqi Kurds killed between 50,000 and 200,000 and deporting about 500,000 to new 'collective settlements' and to detention camps

"The present regime in Baghdad came to power through a coup in 1968. The coup gave prominence to a young officer in the Ba'ath Party intelligence apparatus named Saddam Hussein. Ahma Hassan al-Bakr served as president and maintained titular power until Saddam deposed him and declared himself president on July 16, 1979. Just more than a year after seizing uncontested control over Iraq, Saddam declared war on Iran. While the goals of the war – reclaiming Iraqi territory conceded in 1975 border negotiations, ending Iranian support for Kurdish separatists in the north, and overthrowing a regime in Tehran that was openly calling for an Islamic revolution inside Iraq among others – can be debated, the gruesomeness of the war that followed cannot. The war produced about 1.5 million casualties during eight years of hostilities, ending in a cease-fire that essentially left prewar borders unchanged.

The Iran-Iraq war was the first time since the interwar years that chemical weapons were used in combat. Probably beginning in 1984, and almost certainly by 1986, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in the battlefield against Iranian troops. Such use drew the condemnation of the United Nations in 1986, although such condemnation was muted by international antipathy toward the regime in Tehran.

The eight-year-long war exhausted both countries, but it allowed Saddam to further consolidate his rule in Iraq. The constant war footing allowed an already paranoid regime to more ruthlessly root out its opponents and more loudly proclaim the glories of its leader." When the war wound down, Saddam turned to damping internal divisions in his country and began a campaign against a Kurdish insurgency in the north. In that campaign, Saddam again turned to chemical weapons, using a combination of mustard gas and nerve gas that killed some 5,000 civilians in the town of Halabja in August 1988. As in his war with Iran, Saddam's use of chemical weapons (this time against civilian targets) failed to raise outrage [at the international level]." (USIP 17 February 1999, "The Problem")

"After 1980, and the beginning of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, many Iraqi garrisons in Kurdistan were abandoned or reduced in size, and their troops transferred to the front. In the vacuum that was left, the Kurdish peshmerga—"those who face death"—once more began to thrive. The KDP, now led by one of Barzani's sons, Mas'oud, had revived its alliance with Teheran, and in 1983 KDP units aided Iranian troops in their capture of the border town of Haj Omran. Retribution was swift: in a lightning operation against the complexes that housed the relocatedBarzanis, Iraqi troops abducted between five and eight thousand males aged twelve or over. None of them have ever been seen again, and it is believed that after being held prisoner for several months, they were all killed. In many respects, the 1983 Barzani operation foreshadowed the techniques that would be used on a much larger scale during the Anfal campaign." (HRW 1993, "Introduction")

"The Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) completed the displacement of much of Iraq's Kurdish population. Towards the end of the war, following increasing collaboration between Iran and Kurdish guerrilla forces, the Iraqi regime pursued its genocidal Anfal policy, killing between 50,000 and 200,000, and destroying about 3000 Kurdish villages and hamlets. Their inhabitants – over half a million people – were deported to new 'collective settlements' away from border or mountain areas, or to detention camps in south and west Iraq. Others fled to Iran. Many of these people have been displaced more than once since then." (Dammers 1998, p.181)

"Anfal—'the Spoils'—is the name of the eighth sura of the Koran. It is also the name given by the Iraqis to a series of military actions which lasted from February 23 until September 6, 1988. While it is impossible to
understand the Anfal campaign without reference to the final phase of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal was not merely a function of that war. Rather, the winding-up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the immediate historical circumstance that gave Baghdad the opportunity to bring to a climax its longstanding efforts to bring the Kurds to heel. For the Iraqi regime's anti-Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or more, well before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq." (HRW 1993, "Introduction")

To view official Iraqi documents on the Anfal policy, please visit the site of the Iraqi Research and Documentation Project, launched in June 1993 and sponsored by the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)

For key dates of Iraq's history, please see BBC News Timeline

The invasion of Kuwait had severe consequences for Iraq (1990-1992)

- Invasion of Kuwait in August 1990
- Coalition of allied forces intervened in Kuwait in January 1991
- Following cease-fire agreement, under UN SC Resolution 687 Iraq was supposed to destroy certain types of weapons and to accept international monitoring
- Northern no-fly zone declared by the U.S., France and Britain in April 1991 to provide safe haven for Kurds
- Southern no-fly zone imposed by U.S., British and French forces in August 1992 in an effort to protect Shi'ite Iraqis

"With Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the perception that Saddam Hussein was a potential ally against an ideologically expansionist Iran – as well as a potential customer for American grain and other products – gave way to a new consensus. Under the revised thinking, Saddam was seen as threat to stability in the Persian Gulf and to steady oil supplies from that region. […]"

When a coalition of allied forces rolled back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in January and February 1991, the UN-imposed cease fire agreement bound Iraq to declare fully to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the ‘locations, amounts, and types’ of biological and chemical weapons it possessed, as well as similar information regarding ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers. Under the agreement, Iraq agreed to destroy such weapons under international supervision, and to accept ongoing international monitoring to ensure that such weapons programs were not revived in the future. Pursuant to that charge, the United Nations created a 'Special Commission,' or UNSCOM, to carry out on-site inspections of declared Iraqi facilities as well as any other sites UNSCOM designated.

The agreement, articulated in United Nations Security council Resolution 687, established similar conditions for whatever nuclear program Iraq might possess, to be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Only after Iraq completed its responsibilities to fully disclose its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, destroy prohibited materiel under international supervision, and dismantle any programs to develop such weapons in the future, all to the Security Council's satisfaction, would the United Nations lift the sanctions it imposed in Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990." (USIP 17 February 1999, "The Problem")

"In April 1991, the United States, France, and Britain unilaterally declared a 19,000-square-mile area of northern Iraq a safe haven for Kurds and imposed a no-fly zone that prevented Iraqi aircraft from operating above the 36th parallel. U.S. and British warplanes still patrol the skies of northern Iraq, bombing frequently since December 1998. France withdrew from the mission in 1996. No United Nations Resolution supports or calls for a no-fly zone."
A southern no-fly zone was imposed by U.S., British and French forces in August 1992 in an efforts to protect Shi'ite Iraqis. President Saddam Hussein's forces had crushed a Shi'ite uprising soon after the end of the Gulf War in February 1991. In 1996, President Clinton extended the zone in response to Iraqi military intervention in northern Iraq in support of one Kurdish faction against another. The zone now covers the southern third of Iraq, reaching the 33rd parallel, and touches the outskirts of Baghdad." (AFSC 2000)

Since the Gulf War two Kurdish parties have been controlling northern Iraq (1991-2000)

- In 1991 the cease-fire between Iraqi and Allied forces which put an end to the Gulf War was immediately followed by uprisings in the Kurdish north
- Since 1991 regions in the north and northeast of the country have been under the control of Kurdish parties
- The Iraqi government ended the internal economic blockade against northern Iraq in 1996
- The two major Kurdish parties of northern Iraq, KDP and PUK fought intermittently since the Gulf War until 1998 when they agreed to a Washington-brokered peace agreement
- Most of the measures described in the 1998 peace agreement were still not implemented in 2000

"The cease-fire between Iraqi and Allied forces [following the Gulf War] was immediately followed by uprisings in the Kurdish north and Shi'a south of Iraq. Kurdish guerrillas briefly occupied the whole of Iraqi Kurdistan, but the reoccupation of most of the region by Iraqi government troops led to as many as two million people fleeing to Iran, Turkey, and those areas still under Kurdish control. These areas soon included the 'safe haven', initially patrolled by Allied troops, comprising those parts of Iraqi Kurdistan adjacent to the Turkish border. Most of the cross-border refugees later returned to areas under Kurdish (and/or Allied) political control, which expanded greatly following the substantial withdrawal of Iraqi troops in October and November 1991." (Dammers 1998, p.182)

In April 1991, the UN SCResoultion 688 said that the UN SC:
"1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population." (UN SC 5 April 1991)

"The safe haven zone in northern Iraq, created and maintained by the United States, Britain, and France since 1991 through Operation Provide Comfort, showed signs of collapse throughout the year [1996]. As the two sides fought, the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq each appeared ready and willing to intervene overtly or covertly in an attempt to take advantage of the situation. […]

On August 31 [1996], [Iraqi] government forces entered the city of Erbil, located within the Kurdish safe haven zone, after being invited in by the KDP, which hoped that an alliance with the government would tip the balance of power in the north against the PUK. After surrounding Erbil with tanks, Iraqi troops and government agents entered the town, searching house to house for suspected opponents of President Saddam Hussein, killing some immediately, arresting others and taking them back to Baghdad. Iraqi troops reportedly looted and vandalized the areas they entered, completely looting 500 schools, according to UNICEF, and ransacking hospitals and municipal buildings. […]
The penetration of the safe zone by Iraqi troops and fighting between the Kurdish factions created widespread hardship and displacement. […] Ironically, in some respects the collapse of the safe zone had its benefits for many of the other residents of the north. In addition to international sanctions, northern Iraq had been subjected to an internal blockade from Baghdad. Starting in September [1996], that blockade was eased, and Kurds from the north were able to engage in trade with government-controlled Iraq." (USCR 1997, pp.151-152)

"In northern Iraq, all central government functions have been performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the Government withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from the area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament and local government administrators were elected in 1992. This parliament last met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July. The cease-fire held throughout the year; however, reunification measures were not implemented and no election was held." (US DOS 25 February 2000, Section 3)

"Despite mediation efforts by U.S. government officials, little progress was made towards the implementation of the provisions of the 1998 Washington Accord. Both sides [KDP and PUK] pledged to normalize relations but continued to maintain separate administrative, legislative and executive structures in areas under their control. On October 22, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of measures, including prisoner exchanges, the gradual return of internally displaced people to their homes, and arrangements for the organization of free movement of people and trade between their respective areas. Most of these measures were not implemented." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")

**Improvement of KDP-PUK relations but parties maintain separate administrations (2001-2002)**

- In 2001, both parties agreed to improve coordination but are disagreeing over the unification of both administrations
- Negotiations between Baghdad and Kurdish political parties reopened in 2001 but quickly failed
- Improvement of KDP-PUK relations following tensions between Kurdish parties and Islamic opposition in 2001-2002

In 2001, "The 'reconciliation' between the Kurdish parties administrating the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is driven by a review of priorities in anticipation of the possible consequences of the failure of the ongoing negotiations between Baghdad and the United Nations on the new sanctions system and in preparation for the expected political changes, according to a commentator from Irbil writing in London's "Al-Hayat" of 29 May.

The rapprochement and coordination between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has descended to deeper levels than the differences in views over the distribution of customs revenues, unification of the two administrations, and the reactivation of the KRG parliament. (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)

"The two enclaves are not equally strong. Talabani controls an estimated 1.2 million of the roughly 3 million Kurds living in the autonomous region. (There are still parts of Kurdistan under Saddam Hussein's control.) Iran is his main protector. His "state" raises its main revenues from duties on goods smuggled into and out of Iran and Iraqi-controlled Kurdistan, as well as taxes on the population. Unemployment and poverty are widespread in Talabani's region, although the economy remains much healthier than that in government-controlled Iraq.
By contrast, Barzani's region is enjoying the fruits of the burgeoning trade across the Turkish-Iraqi border. At virtually every time of day, hundreds of trucks laden with goods wait to pass from Turkey to Iraq through the Ibrahim al-Khalil crossing. On their way back to Turkey, these trucks are loaded with cheap oil and petroleum products in specially installed tanks. Barzani's customs service reaps tremendous revenues from the duties both ways. But more important are the booming smuggling networks -- many run by influential personalities -- linking Turkey, Iraq and Syria through Barzani-controlled areas.” (al-Khafaji 24 January 2001)

"Current Kurdish moves toward coordination with Baghdad are a result of increased confidence in the Kurdish establishment and the Kurds' success in establishing a solid defense system that can handle any conventional attack by Baghdad on Kurdistan. Over the last two years, Kurdish military leaders both trained a semi-professional military force and exploited the international market to obtain good weapons in the same way as Iraq, namely, by using the smuggling networks. Thus, the defense network resulting from these efforts became an actual deterrent to attacks from the Baghdad-controlled areas.

At the same time, the Kurdish leaders are aware that they cannot rely on firm Western stands toward the Iraq issue. These caused them to turn to Baghdad with specific initiatives. In this context, PUK leader Jalal Talabani made the teaching of Arabic compulsory at the start of the next school year and promised not to use any regional party for developing oil production from wells in his areas.

The major stumbling block remaining between the KDP and PUK is the question of the unification of the PUK and KDP administrations. Leader of the KDP Mas'ud Barzani said to "Al-Hayah" that "I personally do not see any problem in the presence of the two administrations at the crucial transitional stage." But Talabani disagrees.” (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)

"President Hussain proposed the reopening of negotiations between the government and Kurdish political parties on July 15, but in a joint statement on July 27, the KDP and PUK set preconditions: they demanded an end to mass deportations of Kurds and Turkman, clarification of the fate of detainees in Iraqi government custody and missing persons, and acceptance by the Iraqi government of federalism as the basis of future relations between the Kurdish region and Baghdad. The government rejected these demands in August." (HRW 2002)

**Improvement of KDP-PUK relations following tensions between Kurdish parties and Islamic opposition in 2001-2002**

"Tensions are increasing between the secular PUK and militant Kurdish parties following the 2 April [2002] assassination attempt on PUK Prime Minister Salih and a rumored 18 March attempt on the life of KDP President Mas'ud Barzani […]. The Islamist parties are based near Tawella, in the mountains along the Iran-Iraq border. The Iranian government facilitates transport of men and material to the militant Islamist group, according to the December 2001 'Middle East Intelligence Bulletin.'

The assassination attempt on Salih has furthered reconciliation between the PUK and KDP, according to a 15 April report in the Iraqi Kurdish newspaper "Hawlati." The often-strained relations have warmed steadily since the appointment of Salih to the PUK premiership in January 2001. According to "Hawlati," the KDP and PUK "decided to set up an operations room in order to follow and gather information on people and terrorist groups who may be active in Kurdistan." Also on 15 April, "Hawlati," reported that the previous day, "the Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan" (Peshtiwanli Islam le Kurdistan), had unilaterally revoked the cease-fire in place between them and the PUK. Over the past year, the militant Islamist group has had a steady progression of names including the Islamic Unity Movement, Jund al-Islam, and Ansar-i Islam." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)
For more information on Islamic groups in northern Iraq, please see Michael Rubin's article, "The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.3, No.12, December 2001, [See reference below]

Iraqi security forces conducted attacks in southern Iraq and diverted water in the southern marshes to better access the region (1999-2001)

- Shi'a revolt against Iraqi regime erupted following the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait
- In 1994, the Iraqi government intensified a pacification campaign that it had been directing toward the marsh population since 1989
- Diversion of water from the marshes allowed government forces to penetrate into formerly inaccessible areas; UNEP reported in 2001 that about 90% of the marshlands had disappeared by 2000
- Unrest in Southern Iraq sparked off by the killing of prominent Shi'a cleric in February 1999
- Iraqi armed forces conducted deliberate artillery attacks against Shi'a civilians and large-scale burning operations in the southern marshes in 1999
- Iraqi security forces reportedly attacked villages in the marshes of Southern Iraq in 2001

"Tensions between the secular, Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein and the Shi'ite populace of southern Iraq erupted into civil war in early 1991, when the Shi'ite revolted in the wake of the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait. The revolt was quickly crushed, with heavy casualties, and many displaced Shi'ites and deserters from the Iraqi army fled into the extensive marshlands between the Tigris and Euphrates river.

The Iraqi government had long viewed the inhabitants of this region, the Marsh Arabs, or Maadan, with hostility. In 1994, the Iraqi government intensified a pacification campaign that it had been directing toward the marsh population since 1989, diverting water from the marshes and depriving the Shi'ites of food and cover. This allowed government forces to penetrate into formerly inaccessible areas." (USCR 1995, p.116)

"Throughout the marsh areas, dykes as high as six meters have been built to cut off flood waters from replenishing the old marshlands. Between the ancient Tigris and the Euphrates, a manmade river - the Saddam river - now carries the flood waters down to the Gulf. Marsh Arabs used to live by tending buffalo, fishing and hunting in the marshes. With no reeds, there is nothing to feed the water buffalo. There are hardly any fish left in the rivers either. The government claims to be giving land to the Marsh Arabs to cultivate. There is some farming close to the Euphrates and Tigris but many of those farmers are not Marsh Arabs but have come from the towns. The government also seems intent on preventing any rebels entering from Iraq across the water, as they have traditionally been able to do." (Out There News 2000, "Marshes")

According to a UNEP study carried out in 2001, "[...] about 90% of the marshlands had disappeared by May 2000, with devastating impacts on wildlife and unique human communities that have lived there for millennia." (UNEP May 2001)

"Since the beginning of this year [1999] there have been many clashes between the security forces and armed Islamist opposition groups in the pre-dominantly Shi'a Muslim Southern Iraq, especially in Basra, which have reportedly left dozens dead on both sides and have been followed by arbitrary mass arrests and summary executions. It was not until May that the government acknowledged that unrest had broken out in Basra in mid-March. It accused Iran of instigating the troubles since one of the biggest opposition groups is based in Iran. The unrest was sparked off by the killing in suspicious circumstances of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, a prominent Shi'a cleric, in February 1999." (AI 24 November 1999, "Introduction")
"As in previous years, the armed forces conducted deliberate artillery attacks against Shi'a civilians and large-scale burning operations in the southern marshes [in 1999]. In 1991 and 1992, the Gulf War allies imposed 'no-fly zones' over northern and southern Iraq respectively. The no-fly zones continued to deter aerial attacks against the marsh dwellers in southern Iraq and the residents of northern Iraq, limiting the Government to ground-based assaults." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")

"The Special Rapporteur received information that armed raids are still being carried out by the Iraqi security forces against villages in the south of Iraq. Reportedly some of these raids, which are aimed at the capture of armed guerrillas and army deserters, have resulted in loss of life, damage to property and searches and arrests without warrant." (CHR 16 January 2001, para. 37)

"Iraqi security forces attacked villages in the marshes of southern Iraq on 15 May resulting in many casualties, according to reports received by the INC [Iraqi National Congress]" (INC 20 May 2001)

Causes of displacement

Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian incursions and Kurdish internal conflicts all caused internal displacement in the north (1998-2002)

- Turkey incursions against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, based in Turkey) and fighting between the PKK and the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party, based in northern Iraq)
- Fighting between KDP and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, based in northern Iraq) in 1994-98
- On a smaller scale, guerrillas of the KDPI (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran) have been bombarded by Iranian troops, generating displacement of both Iranian and Iraqi Kurds
- Iraqi incursions into northern Iraq despite no-fly zone reported in 2000 and 2001

"In northern Iraq the causes of internal displacement are complex: they include Turkish military incursions, PKK activity, internal conflict between Iraqi Kurdish political parties, and deportations of Kurds and Turcomans from government-controlled areas of Iraq." (Graham-Brown April 1998, "Conflicts Intersect")

Turkish incursions against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and fighting with KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)

"Despite increasing hostility for the KDP [Kurdish Democratic Party], guerrillas of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), which pursues a separatist guerrilla war in Turkey, have established bases in northern Iraq. These have been the target of frequent Turkish bombardments and incursions, with major invasions taking place in October 1992, March 1995, June 1996, May 1997 and September/October 1997. Fighting between the PKK and KDP has continued intermittently since 1995, and was a significant factor in the displacement of late 1997." (Dammers 1998, p.183)

"Since 1994, displacement has most commonly followed conflict between the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, usually along the border between their respective territories: in and around the city of Arbil and along a fluctuating front line from Arbil to the Iranian border. People identified with one party (an identification generally based on clan loyalty rather than ideology) living in territory controlled by the other feel highly vulnerable and have frequently been displaced." (Dammers 1998, p.182)

"The Turkish army signed an agreement with the KDP in May 1997, reportedly to use its forces as a border police. The truce of 1998 between the PUK and the KDP further came under strain since several thousand PKK fighters moved back into Northern Iraq in 1999, after withdrawing from South-Eastern Turkey,
disestablishing the political and military balance in the area. However, there are no reports of renewed alliance between the PUK and the PKK. A prominent member of the KDP has referred to the PKK as a terrorist organization who is responsible for the massacre of Kurdish villagers along the border with Turkey.

Turkey continues raids into Iraqi Kurdistan in search of Kurdish rebels and this in turn has led to Iran to search for Kurdish organizations in Northern Iraq to use as proxies. Iran, Turkey, Syria and the Government of Iraq are all opposed to the creation of a Kurdish state." (UNHCR June 2000, p.5)

"Further incursions [by Turkey's armed forces into northern Iraq] were carried out in April, May, and August 2000, resulting in one case in the killing of thirty-eight Iraqi Kurdish civilians." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")

"The leader of one of the main Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, has pledged [in October 2000] renewed cooperation with the Turkish government. […] The meeting agreed to continue joint Turkish and KDP action against the rival Kurdish Workers Party PKK which is fighting a guerrilla campaign inside Turkey." (BBC News 5 October 2000)

"Turkey launched a major incursion into Iraqi Kurdish on 3 December [2000] in order to back the PUK against the PKK, according to the 19 December 'Ozgur Politiika', a pro-PKK journal. This outlet also claimed the invasion force involves hundreds of troops as well as heavy weapons and has passed through the Habur Gate." (RFE/RL 22 December 2000, "Turkish Incursion")

"Two PKK members who fled from northern Iraq claim the PKK is prepared to resume its activities in the New Year. They say that nearly 4,500 armed PKK members are in camps in northern Iraq, headed by commanders from Armenia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. […]

Kurds claim that more than 400 Turkish troops have crossed into Iraq since the beginning of January and are camped 60 kilometers east of Zakho. They have also reinforced the military base at Bamarni, a former Iraqi military camp in northern Iraq. Residents of the area say that the Turkish army now has 2,000 troops and 30 tanks in Bamarni." (RFE/RL 11 January 2002)

**Iranian incursions and the KDPI**

"A parallel situation, though on a smaller scale, has existed on the Iranian border, with guerrillas of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) being bombarded by Iranian troops, generating displacement of both Iranian and Iraqi Kurds. Iranian conflict with its own Kurdish separatists has not, however, precluded cooperation between Iran and the PUK, especially when the rival KDP has allied itself with the Iraqi or Turkish governments. Indeed, the events of 1997 generated common interest between the KDP, Iraq and Turkey on the one hand and the PKK, PUK and Iran on the other, which proved quite capable of translating into unlikely alliances on the ground." (Dammers 1998, p.183)

**Iraqi troops incursions into Northern Iraq**

"Iraqi military forces have entered areas lying north of the 36th parallel, a reliable Kurdish source in Irbil ha told London's 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat' on 10 November [2000]. The paper noted that Iraqi forces are forbidden from entering these regions which have been subject to British and American patrols of the no-fly zone for the past nine years. This latest encroachment reportedly took place in a village in the Irbil plain close to the area which separates the governorate of Ninaweh from the Kurdish regions outside of Baghdad's control.

The Kurdish source said government forces 'came to the edge of the village where they dug trenches and set up fortifications. The soldiers began intimidating the people of the village to force them to abandon it.' In the preceding year, Iraqi forces had crossed the demarcation line at the village of Unwaynah, between Irbil and Ninawah, and also shelled the villages and areas along the line." (RFE/RL 8 December 2000)
"Iraqi troops were deployed to the northern region on several occasions, apparently with the aim of launching armed attacks on Kurdish-controlled territory. In mid-June, the government deployed tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and infantry units south of Arbil, coinciding with efforts by the U.K. and the U.S. to restructure the economic embargo imposed on Iraq and to impose "smart sanctions." Government troops clashed with PUK forces in the Kifri region on September 9 [2001], and in early October they reportedly entered and occupied the village of Sadawa, south-west of Arbil. The KDP said that repeated artillery bombardment of some thirty front-line villages by government troops had resulted in the displacement of their inhabitants." (HRW 2002)

**Iraqi government is displacing Kurds, Assyrian and Turkoman inhabitants from the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul (1998-2001)**

- Thousands of Kurds as well as Turkmen and Assyrians have been expelled from Kirkuk, because of their ethnic origin and because of Kirkuk's strategic location as well as its oil fields and are replaced by Arab families
- The majority of the people expelled were accused of having affiliations with opposition parties
- Other parts of northern Iraq under government control have seen similar displacements, for example of Kurds for the predominantly Arab city of Mosul

"The strategic city of Kirkuk, which is surrounded by oil fields, has traditionally had a mixed Turkoman, Kurdish and Arab population. Although long claimed by Kurds as part of Iraqi Kurdistan, it lies outside the 'Kurdistan Autonomous Region' delineated in 1975. Of the cities captures and then lost by Kurdish forces in the uprising of 1991, only Kirkuk subsequently remained under permanent Iraqi government control.

Most Kurds fled Kirkuk when it was retaken by Iraqi government troops following the Kurdish uprising in 1991; about 140,000 are thought to remain in Kurdish-controlled areas, fearful of returning because of the persecution and displacement of Kurds remaining in the city. Turkomans (Turkish-speaking Iraqis), who number up to a million, live mainly in the lowland and urban areas of northern Iraq, but used to be predominant in Kirkuk. They too have been subject to repression, with many reportedly moving under pressure to Baghdad, though figures are unavailable. Shi'a Turkomans have been particularly vulnerable. Arab families from central and southern Iraq have been settled in Kirkuk, part of government efforts to 'Arabize' the city.

While Kirkuk has been the most seriously affected, other parts of northern Iraq under government control have seen similar displacements, for example of Kurds for the predominantly Arab city of Mosul." (Dammers 1998, p.183)

"A lot of it is about oil. Iraq's northern oil fields are rich, and could produce over a million barrels of oil per day for the foreseeable future (worth about five billion dollars a year at current oil prices). Many of them lie within the Kurdish areas. That's why Iraq has made great efforts to settle Arabs from elsewhere in the country in the oil city of Kirkuk and has never conceded that Kirkuk is part of Kurdish territory." (Out There News 2000, "Kurds")

"[…] [A]n estimated 100,000 people […] were deported from government-controlled areas, especially from Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Mosul. They were sent to Northern Iraq for several reasons, yet the majority of them were accused of having affiliations with the opposition parties in the north or abroad. Being a Kurd or Turkmen also sufficed as a reason." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000, p.57)
Displacement of Kurdish families in northern Iraq due to clashes between PUK and Islamic opposition (2001-2002)

"In the afternoon of April 2, 2002, as Mr. Barham Salih, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government was leaving his home in Souleymanieh, two gunmen in a taxi machine gunned his home. Although Mr. Barham Salih was not hit, his five body-guards (Amanj Abdul Kadir, Hama Jaza Hama Raza, Shuwan Khidr, Abdullah Ismail Muhammad, Karzan Anwar Ibrahim) and the two assailants were killed. The people behind the attack have yet to be identified.

Over the last few years, the regions run autonomously by the Kurdish administration in Iraq have been the victim of terrorist attacks aimed at political party leaders, the local population and expatriates. Several states or armed groups, backed by these same states, not only threaten the coexistence of multiple political parties in a democratic experience unique in this region of the world, but also threaten the very existence of the Kurdish autonomous region.

Several leaders or members of Kurdish political parties, journalists, or members of humanitarian aid organizations have been victims of these attacks. A few examples are Lucy Schmidt, a German journalist, Vincent Tollet from Handicap International, François Hariri, member of the central committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iraq (KDP) and former governor of Erbil, more than one hundred members of various political groups of Iranian Kurdistan such as Firouzi Shapour, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iran.

In early September 2001, the armed group “Jund al-Islam” (soldiers of Islam), result of the fusion of three groups – the Islamic group Tawhid, the Force of Soran-2 and the Hamas, and based in the villages of Biara and Tawela, near the city Halabja on the Iranian border, called for a holy war against the secular Kurdish parties. This group has never declared a holy war against the Iraqi government. Many members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were mutilated and executed throughout the month in the village of Kheli Hama. A good deal of “Jund al-Islam” fighters, including “Arab Afghans” were imprisoned in Kurdistan following these acts of violence. Jund al-Islam and other Islamist groups, with suspected links to Al-Qeda, are thought to have regrouped in a new organization known as “the supporters of Islam” and they remain a serious threat for the region." (AIJ 9 April 2002)

Iraqi government is displacing Shi'a inhabitants from the Marsh area (1999-2001)

- In the Marsh area, government forces have burned and shelled villages, and built dams to divert water from the marshes to depopulate the area
- Population in the Marsh area had to submit to compulsory resettlement within Iraq, leave the country, or remain in the drained marshlands, deprived of their water-based means of livelihood

"The Iraqi government has long been openly hostile to the Marsh Arabs, or Maadan, people living in the marshlands between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in a triangle-shaped region formed by the cities of Amarah, Basra, and Nasiriyah. Following the suppression of the 1991 Shi'a uprising in southern Iraq, many opponents of the Baghdad regime fled to the marshes, and the Iraqi government intensified a pacification campaign it had been directing toward the Maadan since 1989.

Since 1991, government forces have burned and shelled villages, and built dams to divert water from the marshes to depopulate the area. Repressive policies in 1999 included diverting water from the marshes and denying food rations to thousands of people allegedly associated with opposition groups." (USCR 2000, p.188)
"The construction of dams, forcible migration of communities, the draining of the Marshlands that was carried out in the 1990s was an extension of earlier trends. However an obsession for security drove the agenda. By depopulating the Marshlands, by reducing the area to desert, the region was no longer able to provide a sustainable refuge for dissidents. Saddam Hussein was able to impose his own will on the refractory people of the Marshlands. The drainage was carried out with no regard to international obligations concerning water rights or the environment. […] The Marsh Dwellers had limited options. Like hundreds of thousands of other Iraqis they could submit to compulsory resettlement in an environment not their own. Or they could leave the country as refugees, as about 200,000 did. Or they could remain in the drained Marshlands, deprived of their inherited water-based means of livelihood." (AMAR 21 May 2001, p.6)

**Difficult to assess extent of internal displacement caused by U.S. and British bombing raids (2000)**

- Since the end of 1998 US and UK forces have been carrying out regular strikes on Iraqi targets inside the no-fly zones
- The extent of internal displacement caused by U.S. and British bombing raids could not be determined

Since the end of December 1998 US and UK forces have been carrying out regular strikes on Iraqi targets inside the two air exclusion zones in northern and southern Iraq. These zones, north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd parallel, were imposed by allied forces at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and were intended to protect Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'a Muslim population. These strikes have reportedly resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians and the destruction of civilian property and left many more injured." (AI 24 November 1999, "Background")

"The United States and Britain said the attacks were launched after Baghdad refused to cooperate with the inspectors, who are charged with ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction." (Reuters 17 December 1998)

"The extent of internal displacement caused by U.S. and British bombing raids could not be determined, but such raids continued in the skies over southern Iraq throughout 1999. By mid-August, 134 Iraqis had reportedly been killed by bombing raids. Press reports indicated that this figure includes civilians, such as 11 members of one family who were killed in Jassan, 125 miles southeast of Baghdad on August 17." (USCR 2000, "Southern Iraq")
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Global figures

About 700,000 to 1 million internally displaced persons in 2001 (2001-2002)

- Estimated number of internally displaced persons is very difficult to assess because of lack of reliable sources
- A survey by UN Habitat estimated the number of IDPs in northern Iraq at 805,000 in Oct 2000
- PUK and KDP officials reported that 119,000 IDPs in the North were expelled from government-controlled to Kurdish controlled areas
- USCR estimated the total number of displaced at 700,000 for 2001

UN-Habitat survey (Oct 2000)

"A preliminary survey carried out in northern Iraq by the U.N. Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) estimated the number of internally displaced persons at 805,000 by the end of October 2000, comprising 23 percent of the population. […]

A major factor in the rising number of internally displaced persons was the government's continued expulsion of Kurds and Turkmen from their homes in Kirkuk, Tuz Khormatu, Khaniqin, and other districts as part of its "Arabization" program. Most were expelled to areas controlled by Kurdish opposition forces and a smaller number to central and southern Iraq. According to PUK officials, those expelled between January 1991 and December 2000 and resettled in areas under its control totaled 93,888, while some 25,000 others expelled during the same period were resettled in KDP-controlled areas. Scores more were reportedly expelled between January and March, particularly from the Tuz Khormatu area. In August and September, Kurdish opposition sources said the government was intensifying the rate of resettlement of Arab families in areas from which Kurds and Turkmen had been expelled, including the Lailan, Shwan, and Qara Hanjir districts of Kirkuk." (HRW Dec 1999)

The UN-Habitat Survey can be obtained from the UN-Habitat office (Hilda.Rajab@unhabitat.org)

USCR estimate: 700,000 as of End of 2001

"The estimated 600,000 internally displaced persons in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleymaniyah included not only long-term internally displaced persons and persons displaced by Kurdish factional infighting, but also more than 100,000 persons, mostly Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkomans, more recently expelled from central-government-controlled Kirkuk and surrounding districts in the oil-rich region bordering the Kurdish-controlled north. At least another 100,000 persons were internally displaced elsewhere in Iraq, mostly in the southeastern marshlands." (USCR 2002)

UNEP estimate of IDPs in Southern Iraq in 2001

According to the UN Environment Program, "Of the 95,000 southern Iraqis who sought refuge in Iran since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, an estimated 40,000 are Marsh Arabs. The fate of those who stayed inside Iraq remains poorly documented, but an estimated 200,000-250,000 are considered to be internally displaced." (Patrow 2001, pp33-34)
USCR reported a great increase of IDPs from 640,000 in 1994 to 1 million in 1995 to then decrease the following years (1994-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of Year</th>
<th>Conservative estimated number of IDPs</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>700,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>USCR 2001, p.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>USCR 2000, p.6</td>
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<td>USCR 1999, p.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>USCR 1998, p.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>USCR 1997, p.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>USCR 1996, p.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>USCR 1995, pp.115-116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographical distribution

UN-Habitat survey reported highest concentration of IDPs in Sulaimaniyah (2001)

"The IDP population of North Iraq assessed by the Site survey on October 2000 comprises 805,505 individuals, or 22.91% of the 3,515,921 inhabitants of the same region (total population figures are based on WFP food ration database). With comparison to North Iraqi population distributed by Governorate (in this case Darbandikhan population added to Sulaimaniyah) the highest condentration of IDPs occurs in Sulaimaniyah (48.23%), whereas the lowest is in Duhok Governorate." (UN-Habitat Jan 2001, p5)

Evolution of number of displaced persons in northern Iraq (1994-2002)

- Although accurate figures are not available, estimates fluctuated between 600,000 for 1994 to 800,000 for 1999
- USCR estimates that the number of persons still displaced in northern Iraq is about 600,000
- Current estimates include short and long-term displacement within northern Iraq, but also about 100,000 persons expelled from the government-controlled area to northern Iraq

Northern Iraq (including people displaced from Kirkuk)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of year</th>
<th>Estimated number of IDPs in Northern Iraq</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>USCR 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>USCR 2001, p.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>USCR 2000, p.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>USCR 1999, p.150</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>At least 500,000</td>
<td>USCR 1998, p.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>At least 666,000</td>
<td>USCR 1997, p.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>No figure for the North</td>
<td>USCR 1996, p.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>USCR 1995, p.115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1988-1995
"In the 1980's, the Iraqi government launched a punitive campaign known as Anfal, which destroyed up to 4,000 Kurdish villages. In 1988, tens of thousands fled into Iran and Turkey.

Following a failed Kurdish uprising in early 1991, some 1.5 million sought temporary refuge in Iran and along the Turkish border. By the end of 1991, most Kurdish refugees had returned, but some 700,000 remained displaced within northern Iraq. Many of these had been displaced two or more times, as fighting continued between Kurdish and Iraqi government forces. [...] 

During 1992 and 1993, more Kurds were displaced by skirmishing and shelling along the confrontation line dividing the Kurdish zone from government-controlled Iraq, and government forces expelled many Kurds into the Kurdish zones. [...] 

During 1994, about 100,000 previously displaced persons were able to return to their home villages, many of which had been destroyed during the Anfal, but were being rebuilt with UN and NGO assistance. However, an estimated 600,000 persons remained displaced within northern Iraq. Of those, about 400,000 were not able to return to their places of origin in government-controlled Iraq or along border areas due to fears for their safety. The remainder were displaced from one area of northern Iraq to another. For example, about 100,000 persons in Aqra, Shekan, and surrounding areas – dependent on the government-controlled energy grid – had to abandon their homes for lack of electricity, water, and sanitation. Others fled areas subjected to shelling either from Iraqi government forces or from Turkey." (USCR 1995, pp.115-116)

1996
"It was almost impossible to calculate the number of internally displaced people in northern Iraq. Many people had been displaced multiple times, many also for brief interludes during sporadic fighting. Persons also fled or continued to be displaced as result of various conflicts and threats, including displacement in some cases from government-controlled Iraq into the north as well as displacement within the north. During the year, displaced persons fled incursions by Turkish and Iranian military forces. [...] Although the incursion of government forces into Erbil caused additional displacement, the most significant cause of internal displacement in 1996 was fighting between the KDP and PUK, as well as fighting between the KDP and the PKK. WFP was targeting assistance to 666,000 persons in the north, although this number was based on an assessment of need, not displacement per se." (USCR 1997, p.152)

"Kurdish nationalist aspirations have experienced rivalry between the main parties, reaching a peak in September 1996 when the KDP briefly allied with the Government of Iraq regime to oust the PUK from its main bases. The crisis of September 1996 caused the largest population displacement since 1991 (approximately 200,000 persons), as the population feared the Iraqi army and its security services as well as the rivalry between the Kurdish factions. In the North-East, when the PUK announced an imminent Iraqi attack on Suleymaniya, it contributed to an exodus of 40,000 people towards the Iranian border, while another 40,000 were displaced in Suleymaniya itself." (UNHCR June 2000, p.3)

"UN figures for those displaced by the fighting in 1996 and the first half of 1997 were: Dohuk governorate 13,281; Arbil governorate 67,283; and Suleimaniyah governorate 38,453 (total 119,017)." (Dammers 1998, p.182)

1997
"Factional fighting among the Kurds in the north, particularly in the last three months of the year, and Turkish incursions into northern Iraq in May and September [1997], internally displaced, at least temporarily, 30,000 to 100,000 people. Another 500,000 long-term internally displaced people remained in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymaniya. [...] 

The UN secretary general reported in 1997 that about half of the 500,000 people displaced in northern Iraq left their homes before 1991, that 150,000 became displaced between 1991 and 1995, and that 100,000 were displaced in 1996. [...]
In 1997, Baghdad intensified its systematic efforts to 'Arabize' the predominantly Kurdish cities of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Douz at the edge of government-controlled Iraq near the Kurdish-controlled zone. To solidify control of this strategically and economically vital oil-rich region, the government expelled Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkomans – at times, entire communities – from these cities and surrounding areas. … Although it was difficult to find a credible estimate of the number of internal expulsions in 1997, reports indicated that large numbers were involved." (USCR 1997, pp.143-144)

"A WFP survey conducted in August 1997 reported 1291 people still displaced from the border regions of northern Iraq affected by the Turkish incursions. In November, a UN security report revised this to '600 families'." (Dammers 1998, p.183)

1998-1999

In 1998 "The Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq] […] cited the more than 150,000 persons of Kurdish origin who had been evicted from the oil-rich regions, where the policy of 'Arabization' continued. That number did not include the problem of more than 200,000 internally persons in the rest of the country, mainly in the southern regions of Iraq." (UN GA 4 November 1998)

"[T]he following figures were provided in respect of the number of families forced to leave the area: 13,367 families from 1991 to 1993; 112 in 1994; 395 in 1995; 282 in 1996; 710 in 1997; 394 in 1998; 449 in 1999; and 155 in 2000 (as of 4 June). The total number of individuals who were forced to leave Kirkuk since 1991 reportedly amounts to 94,026. (UN GA 14 August 2000)


- Because of lack of access to the government-controlled part of Iraq, estimates of the number of internally displaced in the South varied from 40,000 to 1 million between 1994 and 1997
- In 1999, USCR adopted the conservative estimate of 100,000 internally displaced persons and confirmed this estimate for 2000 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of year</th>
<th>Estimated number of IDPs in Southern Iraq</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>USCR 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>USCR 2000, p.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No figure for the South</td>
<td>USCR 1999, p.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40,000-1,000,000</td>
<td>USCR 1998, p.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>40,000-1,000,000</td>
<td>USCR 1997, p.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>40,000-1,000,000</td>
<td>USCR 1996, p.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>40,000-1,000,000</td>
<td>USCR 1995, p.116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"The number of persons displaced in the south, including to, from, and within the marshlands, is nearly impossible to determine with any degree of certainty because the Iraqi regime denies the UN and other relief agencies access to the area. Estimates of the number of displaced and at risk Maaden (i.e. Marsh Arabs) range from 40,000 to 1,000,000." (USCR 1995, p.116)
USCR quoted the same estimate (40,000 to 1,000,000) for 1995, 1996 and 1997 (USCR 1996, p.113, USCR 1997, p.152, USCR 1998, p.145). It renounced to provide any estimate for 1998 because of lack of access for independent sources to the area. (USCR 1999, p.153). It stated for 1999 and 2000 that "[a]lthough there are no reliable sources on the number of displaced people in southern Iraq, the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) conservatively estimates that about 100,000 are internally displaced from and within the southern region." (USCR 2000, p.188 & 2000 p.180)
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Eviction of Kurds but also of Turkmen and Assyrians from the Kirkuk area (1997-2002)

- Since 1997, Iraqi government forced Kurds, as well as a number of Turkmen and Assyrians to leave the Kirkuk area as part of its policy of "arabization" or "nationalization" of this oil-rich region
- Most of the people expelled from Kirkuk decided to go north, despite government decree that doing so would cause them to lose their property and food rationing cards
- 5-6 families are deported every day to northern Iraq
- Families perceived to be opposed to the regime, families who have relatives outside Iraq or in southern Iraq and those who have relatives in detention or executed are said to be the first targeted in the process of forced displacement
- Baath Party members are responsible for ordering the eviction of families viewed as opponents of the Iraqi regime
- Kurdish sources reported acceleration of forced displacement of non-Arabs citizens in 2001 and 2002

"Since mid-1997 thousands of Kurds and a number of other non-Arabs, including Turkmen and Assyrians, who have lived all their lives in the Kirkuk region, which is about 260 kilometers north of Baghdad, have been expelled to the Kurdish provinces in the north controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) because of their ethnic origin and because of Kirkuk's strategic location as well as its oil fields. The authorities have given Kurdish families targete
d choice of either going to Southern Iraq or to the Kurdish provinces. If the families choose Southern Iraq then they are allowed to take some of their possessions with them. However, if they choose to go to the north their properties, as well as their food rationing cards are confiscated by the authorities. The majority of the families have reportedly chosen to go north. [...]"

Once in Northern Iraq some of the families expelled tried to live with relatives. The majority, however, have been resettled in camps such as the al-Salam camp near Chamchamal and Benislawa camp near Erbil. The KDP, PUK and UN agencies have provided them with basic food, tents, blankets and other items. Their empty properties in the Kirkuk region and in Khanaqeen are given by the authorities to pro-government Arabs brought from other regions in Iraq. Thus far thousands of Arabs from other regions in Iraq have been resettled in the Kirkuk governorate." (AI 24 November 2000, "Forcible expulsion")

"The policy of the Iraqi government is very systematically implemented in and around Kirkuk. Everyday 5-6 families are deported to Northern Iraq." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000, p.57)

"Kurds and Turkomans who settled in these places after the 1950s are the principal victims of this policy. Kurdish and Turkoman families are required to move either to the southern part of the country, often to the city of al-Ramadi, or to the three northern governorates. At the same time, Arabs are reportedly encouraged to settle in Kirkuk; their proportion is increasing. According to the interviewees, Arabs are given incentives of money and apartments to settle in Kirkuk. As such, the Government's policy of Arabization, as reported by the Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq] in the past, is continuing. [...]"
Families who are perceived to be opposed to the regime, families who have relatives outside Iraq or in southern Iraq and those who have relatives in detention or executed are said to be the first targeted in the process of forced displacement. (CHR 10 March 1998, "Forced displacement")

"Forced displacement of the Turkomen was reported to have resumed in the last months of 1998, particularly in the Kirkuk area. The head of the coalition of the Turkoman parties stated that about 5,000 evicted Turkomans were living in 'sub-human conditions in Northern Iraq.'" (UNHCR June 2000, p.12)

In 2000 "The government continued its forced expulsion of Kurds and Turkmen from Kirkuk, Khaniqin, Makhmour, Sinjar, Tuz Khormatu, and other districts as part of its 'Arabization' program.[...] Over 800 people were reportedly expelled between January and June, bringing the total number of those expelled since 1991 to over 94,000, according to Kurdish opposition sources." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")

In 2001 "Iraqi authorities have forcefully deported five Kurdish families in Tuze Khurmatoo south of Kirkuk city. Their documents were ceased and their houses were expropriated and given to Arab families. The families were asked to register as Arabs or face deportation to the areas controlled by the Iraqi government. The deportees who arrived in Kurdistan asked UN to pressure Iraqi government to allow them to return to their land and to halt further deportation activities. The deportees numbered 33 persons, all from the farm lands near Tuze Khurmatoo." (Kurdistan Observer 26 March 2001)

"Emanuel Khoshaba, an official with the Assyrian Democratic Movement, said that '10 Assyrian families have been forced to move to...Baghdad since the beginning of the year,' according to 'Zinda' on 12 February. The deportation of these families is part of the arabization campaign spearheaded by the ruling Iraqi Ba'th Party." (RFE/RL 15 February 2002)

"The Iraqi government's ethnic-cleansing campaign against the country's non-Arab citizens has accelerated, according to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Kurdish-language daily "Kurdistan Nuwe" on 17 April [2002]. "Daily, the Iraqi government further intensifies the policy of ethnic cleansing and deportation of Kurds in the regions under its own control," reported "Kurdistan Nuwe." The article continues, "Whenever the global problems become more intricate and more threatening, the Iraqi government finds it an opportune time to further implement its schemes against the Iraqi people in general and the Kurdish people in particular.[…]"

'On 5 January 2002, [Saddam Hussein's] Presidency Council issued a directive through the Interior Ministry, to the Kirkuk Governorate in which it called for probing into the causes of death of all the Kurdish citizens from 1991 to 1996 in Kirkuk, for the purpose of expelling...the families and relatives of the Kurds who were martyred in the battles for liberating Kirkuk...,,' the report said. The battles for liberating Kirkuk refer to the brief seizure of Kirkuk by Iraqi Kurdish forces during the abortive March 1991 Kurdish uprising." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)

**Multiple displacements in northern Iraq (1998-2001)**

- In 1998 UN-Habitat estimated that out of 3 million people in northern Iraq, 1 million had been internally displaced at one time or another
- The displaced in the north include victim of the Anfal campaign, people expelled from government-controlled regions, people displaced by factional Kurdish in-fighting, or people living close to the border who had to flee foreign incursions and shelling

"Many residents of northern Iraq have been displaced multiple times. In 1998, the UN Center for Human Settlements (UN-Habitat) estimated that more than 1 million people (out of a population of 3 million) were
internally displaced in the three northern governorates at one time or another. At least 100,000 of the displaced in the north are people from the government-controlled regions of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar bordering the north who have been expelled into the north in recent years, including 1999.

Those displaced in northern Iraq also include people previously displaced from government-controlled Iraq; about half of the displaced were forced out before 1991, many during the 'Anfal' campaign in the late 1980s when Baghdad forces wiped out about 4,500 Kurdish villages, including virtually all villages near the borders of Turkey and Iran. The rest of the displaced have been uprooted from one part of northern Iraq to another by factional Kurdish in-fighting or, for people living in border areas, by incursions or shelling from outside the Kurdish-controlled region by Turkish, Iranian, or Iraqi government forces." (USCR 2000, "Northern Iraq")

"At 1999 Sulaimaniyah Conference the following category definition was produced:
Those from Kirkuk (old and new caseload). Khanaqin, Kifri, Makhmour, Sinjar, Tala'far, Mosul and other areas.
Those displaced as a result of conflict between the two major factions in Iraqi Kurdistan.
People affected by conflict involving the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).[…]
Others in collective towns including widows and children, who would like to return to places of origin if given the opportunity to do so.
All other citizens of Iraq displaced/expelled for political reasons." (Habitat Jan 2001, p1)

"The composition of the displaced population now includes: (a) those in collective towns who are unable to return; (b) those who do not wish to return; and (c) those displaced persons who have taken refuge in urban and semi-urban areas and who, because of their vulnerable position, require water and sewage and other infrastructure services. […] These two groups ((a) and (c) make up 0.8 million persons." (UN SC 19 November 1998, Sect. IV)

"About 900,000 internal refugees – as much as a third of the region's population – are scattered across Iraqi Kurdistan. Some of them have been displaced several times in the last twenty years by violence between the Kurds here and Turkey. Some are unable to return home because the soil is still strewn with landmines. About 200 people each month are killed or maimed by mines, according to the UN de-miners." (Aquilla Lawrence Summer 2000)

"The other kind of displacement happened in Northern Iraq after the conflict between the PUK and the KDP, especially after the KDP gained the control over Arbil City, which had been in the hands of the PUK since 1995. A forcible exchange of population took place from Arbil City to Sulaymaniyah City and vice versa, affecting around 50,000-55,000 people respectively (100,000-110,000 all in all). These people were sent to the other town just because they were accused of being affiliated with the other party. They lost their social status and support as well as their property: houses, cars, land." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000)

**Local officials in Kirkuk area are granted impunity to carry out expulsion process described in government decree (1998-2000)**

- Procedure to follow during the expulsion process includes confiscation of property, of ration cards and of membership cards to government agencies
- One member of each Kurdish family expelled to the northern provinces was often detained and had to sign note acknowledging to move voluntarily
- Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq observes that the Baath Party and its members are effectively granted impunity in carrying out forced displacement policy
Measures used by the government to encourage departures and prevent the return of displaced persons include the mining of the area, the setting-up of military checkpoints and the demolition of Kurdish sites.

Other measures include sealing off entire districts and taking hostage children from families of minority groups to intimidate their families into leaving their home regions.

"The Kirkuk Governorate was renamed 'Al-Ta'mim' which means in Arabic 'nationalization'. On 12 January 1998 a decree was issued by the Governorate of al-Ta'mim ordering the expulsion of 1468 families from the governorate because of its 'very important security status and geographical location'. The decree was based on directives issued by the office of the President of Iraq. It sets a date, between 15 April 1998 and 15 June 1998, for the deportation of the 1468 families. The decree gives details of the number of families to be expelled from different neighbourhoods in the Kirkuk governorate. It also includes details of the procedure to be followed by the security forces, it states:

1. One member of each Kurdish family expelled to the northern provinces should be detained;
2. Confiscation of property belonging to the expelled;
3. Confiscation of ration cards;
4. Confiscation of membership cards to government agencies;
5. Notification of the decree to: the head of security of each district; the Ba'ath party official of each district, the chief of each village. […]

The expulsion of Kurdish families and other non-Arabs continued throughout 1998 and 1999. The same procedure described above is followed on each occasion. (AI 24 November 1999, "Forcible expulsion")

"According to several persons interviewed, Baath Party members from the local offices of the Baath Party in the city of Kirkuk are responsible for implementing the decision to forcibly remove the targeted families. They are in possession of lists of people living in the neighbourhood under their 'jurisdiction'. These lists contain information on each household of the neighbourhood. Baath Party members are responsible for implementation of the decisions. Aside from the various human rights which are violated in the process of forced displacement (e.g. the rights to privacy, property, movement and personal integrity), the Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq] observes that the practice of forced displacement as carried out by the Baath Party is an extralegal use of self-ascribed authority; to the extent that the ostensible authorities permit the practice to occur, the Baath Party and its members are effectively granted impunity.

According to testimony received, the following is the typical experience of those families subjected to forced displacement. Once the decision is taken to expel a family, Baath Party members present themselves at the residence of that particular family and order them to leave the area within 24 to 48 hours. In order to ensure that the family will effectively move, Baath Party members usually withhold the identification cards of the members of the family. In some cases a member of the family is put in detention in order to accelerate the process. Once the family is ready to leave their home, they need to pass by the local police station and fill in a form stating that they are voluntarily changing their residence. Their identification cards are only then returned to them and if a member of the family was detained, only then is he or she released. […]

Iraqi authorities used to issue a 'displacement order' to families who were required to leave. However, it was reported that the Government of Iraq stopped this practice when they learned that the document was being used by asylum seekers outside Iraq as proof of their claims." (CHR 10 March 1998, "Forced displacement")

"In Kirkuk the regime periodically sealed off entire districts and conducted day-long, house-to-house searches, evidently as part of its 'Arabization' campaign to harass, and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from the region. Government officials also take hostage children from families of minority groups to intimidate their families into leaving their home regions. […] As part of its policy, the authorities
demolished the houses and detained and executed family members of Shi'a who protested government actions." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, f.")

"The Government of Iraq has reportedly been using other measures aimed at encouraging departures and preventing displaced persons from returning. The Government has reportedly declared the area around Kirkuk, including the oil-fields and production facilities, a military and security zone and has mined the area to impede transit. The roads into the area have been heavily fortified with military checkpoints. The regime has also changed the administrative composition of Kirkuk governorate, eliminating four predominantly Kurdish districts and effectively reducing the Kurdish population to minority status. Most recently, the Iraqi Government has reportedly evicted the residents of Kirkuk's citadel and begun the demolition of this ancient Kurdish site, claiming that the envisioned new construction will generate considerable tourist revenue." (CHR 26 February 1999, para.24-28)

**Most of the 500,000 Marsh Arabs have been displaced or had to give up their traditional way of living (1998-2000)**

- To escape government repression aimed at Shi'a uprising in 1991, many insurgents fled to the marsh areas in central and southern Iraq
- Government drained the marshes to regain control of the region and most of an estimated 500,000 'Marsh Arabs' have been displaced, or have had to abandon their traditional livelihoods
- The Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights Iraq has received lists of allegedly destroyed villages and houses, located in the marsh area and in Baghdad
- The government has also reportedly forced the Shi'a population from the marshlands to relocate in the Kirkuk area

"In the South of Iraq a combination of administrative neglect and political repression had long reinforced migration to the towns and cities (especially Baghdad) as well as to Iran. The Shi'a uprising following the Gulf War led to an estimated 50,000 refugees fleeing to Iran, as well as many more fleeing to those areas of the marshes in central southern Iraq, which remained outside government control. The draining of the marshes has facilitated the establishment of government control of this region-which was limited even before the Gulf War – a process accompanied by further displacement. Most of an estimated 500,000 'Marsh Arabs' have been displaced, or have had to abandon their traditional livelihoods. Large numbers of villages, particularly in the A.-Nasairiya, Al-Amarah and Basra Districts, have been destroyed." (Dammers 1998, p.184)

“Reports of the destruction of civilian settlements have been received by the Special Rapporteur on an intermittent basis since 1991. The Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Iraq] has received lists of allegedly destroyed villages and houses, located in many parts of the vast marsh area (now mainly drained), as well as in Baghdad.

It was reported that, in late March 1999, Armoured Division Six carried out operations surrounding and bombarding a number of residential areas of some of the tribes living in the Governorate of Basra. Such operations reportedly took place in the areas of Al-Ghameigh, Bait Wafi and Bait Sayed Noor.

Since the beginning of 1999, the Special Rapporteur has regularly received reports indicating that the Government of Iraq has been destroying the houses of opponents with bulldozers, operating during the daytime in full view of the occupants. [...]"

The Special Rapporteur has received a list of names of hundreds of people so affected, indicating their addresses, the date of destruction of their homes and the action taken against the families (arrests, executions, expulsions etc.)." (UN GA 14 October 1999, para.15-19)
"The practice of the security services to force large numbers of Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern cities and to areas along the Iranian border probably is connected to the destruction of villages. Special Rapporteur van der Stoel described this practice in his February report, and added that many other persons were transferred to detention centers and prisons in central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")

Security forces also have forced Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern cities and to areas along the Iranian border. […] The Government reportedly also continued to move forcibly Shi'a populations from the south to the north to replace Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians, who had been expelled forcibly from major cities. (US DOS 5 September 2000, Sect.1)

Other displacements include flight of political opponents and forced relocation of people who had found refuge in Baghdad (1998-2000)

"Thousands of non-Kurdish opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime have also sought refuge, or a base for continuing their opposition, in the Kurdish-controlled regions of Iraq, particularly since the Gulf War. The entry of Iraqi government troops and agents into these regions in 1996 left them particularly vulnerable - many were captured or killed, particularly in Arbil. In late 1997, the Iraqi National Congress reported that around 2000 non-Kurdish political displaced were still sheltering in PUK-controlled regions, mainly in Suleimaniyeh. Many reportedly had difficulty finding work, and were often regarded with suspicion (as potential government agents) by the PUK authorities." (Dammers 1998, p.184)

"Thousands of Gulf War refugees who sought haven in Baghdad were relocated forcibly to their home provinces." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, d.")
PHYLOGENETIC & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Right to life and personal security

Reports of gross human rights violations committed by government, despite obstacles to assess abuses (1999-2002)

- Government does not allow human rights experts outside Baghdad nor in the 3 Northern governorates
- Opposition groups based outside of Iraq relay information on human rights abuses from inside government-controlled Iraq
- Human Rights organizations report gross human rights violations in Iraq, ranging arbitrary arrest and detention, to torture, extrajudicial and judicial executions after unfair summary trials, 'disappearances', and forcible expulsions on the basis of ethnic origin
- Presence of Iraqi government intelligence operatives in autonomous northern Iraq and refusal of neighboring countries to allow passage to the north of Iraq complicate the task of human rights organizations

"The Government does not permit the establishment of independent human rights organizations. Citizens have established several human rights groups abroad and in northern areas not under government control. Monitors from foreign and international human rights groups are not allowed in the country.

The Government operates an official human rights group that routinely denies allegations of abuses." (US DOS 25 February 2000, Section 4)

"The government allowed no independent human rights organizations to operate in the governorates under its control and prevented foreign journalists or diplomats and persons working with humanitarian relief programs from traveling outside of Baghdad without escort or reporting on human rights abuses.

The Centre for Human Rights, affiliated with the Iraqi Communist Party, relayed information from inside government-controlled Iraq through its office in Shaqlawa in the autonomous region and its headquarters in London. Other Iraqi opposition groups such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraq National Accord, and the Iraq National Congress also provided information about human rights abuses by the government in Baghdad. The border between the government-controlled and autonomous regions remained relatively porous, and many Iraqis reportedly traveled to the north and back with little hindrance. However, the presence of government intelligence operatives in the north and the refusal of neighboring countries to allow passage to the north of Iraq made it difficult for international human rights organizations to investigate abuses or to verify the information provided by opposition groups." (HRW December 1999, Human Rights Developments")

"The Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein perpetrated widespread and gross human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests of suspected political opponents and their relatives, routine torture and ill-treatment of detainees, summary execution of military personnel and political detainees as part of a 'prison cleansing' campaign, and forced expulsions of Kurds and Turkmen from Kirkuk and other regions." (HRW 2002, "Human Rights Developments")
In 2001, Amnesty International still reported the execution of hundreds of people, including possible prisoners of conscience, the arrest of hundreds of suspected political opponents, widespread torture and forcible expulsions from Kirkuk (AI 2001)

"Victims of torture have included suspected government opponents who range from army, security and intelligence officers suspected of having contacts with the Iraqi opposition abroad or accused of plotting against the government, to followers of leading Shi'a Muslim religious personalities. Torture has also been used against women suspected of having links with Shi'a Islamist groups in the country or simply because of family links. In many cases relatives of those active in the Iraqi opposition abroad have been tortured or ill-treated as a way of putting pressure on those opposition leaders to cease their activities." (AI 15 August 2001)

"The Iraqi government continued to commit widespread and gross human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests of suspected political opponents, executions of prisoners, and forced expulsions of Kurds and Turkmen from Kirkuk and other districts. Known or suspected political opponents living abroad were reportedly frequently targeted and threatened by Iraqi government agents." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")

"The Iraqi government executed 15 Kurdish oppositionists in Kirkuk last week. They were arrested last month by the Iraqi security apparatus, according to the Radio of the Iraqi Kurdistan Conservatives, cited by KurdishMedia.com of 19 November. The victims were buried in a mass grave near a military barrack north of Kirkuk.

It is also reported that Saddam's security apparatus has increased its activities in recent months. Some 40 percent of Kurdistan (south of the no-fly zone which demarcates the Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG]) is under Baghdad control. UN Security Council Resolution 688 is supposed to protect the Kurds and Shi'a population but no steps have been taken by the international community to implement it. Kirkuk also contains a significant population of Iraqi Turkmen who are equally unprotected." (RFE/RL 23 Nov 2001)

Human rights situation in northern Iraq has improved over recent years (2000-2002)

- In 2001/2, deterioration of security climate due to clashes between Islamic groups and Kurdish political parties

"Since 1997 the human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan had gradually improved. A cease-fire declared in 1997 brought an end to large-scale abuses by the ruling parties, their militias and security forces. However, isolated cases of human rights abuses continued to be reported in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1999. These included arbitrary arrests and political killings. The fate of scores of political prisoners and people who had 'disappeared' in previous years remained unknown." (AI 2000)

"Other bomb blasts in KDP-held territory, including one in Arbil on April 23 and another in Zakho on October 15, were reportedly attributed to Islamist groups based in the region, notably Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami (Islamic Unity Movement, IUM). The IUM, one of three Islamist groups which broke away at different times from the mainstream Islamic Unity Movement in Kurdistan (IUMK) and in September merged to form Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of God), was also held responsible by the KDP for the assassination on February 18 of Francois Hariri, governor of Arbil and member of the KDP's Central Committee. He was shot dead by unidentified assailants as he drove to work in the city. His bodyguard was also killed and his driver wounded. The KDP announced in late March that it had identified several IUM members as being responsible for the assassination, one of whom was apprehended."
Clashes between PUK forces and Jund al-Islam began in September, shortly after the group's leader, Abu 'Ubaidullah al-Shafi'i, declared Jihad (Holy War) against secular and other political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan deemed to have deviated from the "true path of Islam." After the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the PUK accused the group of links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda (The Base) network and said its members included Arabs of various nationalities who had received military training in Afghanistan. The PUK also accused the group of imposing an extreme form of Islam in their strongholds of Biyara and Tawela, including barring women from employment and education, and of preventing the Naqshabandi Sufis based in the area from practicing their religious rites.

On September 22, Jund al-Islam abducted a doctor, Rebwar Sayyid 'Umar, from his surgery in Halabja and detained him for twenty days in Biyara near the border with Iran. On September 23, thirty-seven PUK fighters were killed by Jund al-Islam in the village of Kheli Hama on the Sulaimaniya-Halabja road. Several died in an ambush, but the majority was reportedly killed after surrender. Photographs of the victims made available by the PUK showed that some of the prisoners' throats had been slit and some of the dead had been beheaded or mutilated, including by having their sexual organs severed. During the ensuing clashes, an estimated one hundred PUK fighters and some forty Jund al-Islam fighters were killed. The PUK regained control of Halabja and its vicinity by September 26, arresting suspected supporters or members of Jund al-Islam, and during October the fighting extended to Sharazur, Hawraman, and elsewhere. At least thirty-eight Jund al-Islam fighters were reportedly killed in these clashes, while some twenty-four others were captured or surrendered. Other Kurdish political parties, including the KDP, offered military assistance to the PUK. On October 11, the PUK declared a ceasefire and on October 25, it issued a thirty-day amnesty for Jund al-Islam fighters. The amnesty did not cover those responsible for the assassination of Francois Hariri, or those involved in the killing of the thirty-seven PUK fighters on September 23. The PUK also said that foreign nationals among them would not be permitted to remain in Iraqi Kurdistan." (HRW 2002)


- Assyrians are accused of collaborating with the PKK (Kurdish party in Turkey) by the KDP (Kurdish party in northern Iraq) and of collaborating with Iraqi Kurds by the Iraqi government
- Human rights abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and Chaldean Christians include forced movements from northern areas and repression of political rights.

"Most Assyrians live in the northern governorates, and the Government often has suspected them of 'collaborating' with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly executed and tortured many Assyrians. Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government occasionally targets Assyrians as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkomen for expulsion from Kirkuk, where it is seeking to Arabize the city." (US DOS 5 September 2000, Sect.I)

"Assyrian Christians claim that they are persecuted in northern Iraq, particularly in KDP-controlled areas. The Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) charged that KDP-aligned elements directed a concerted campaign of intimidation against eight Assyrian villages in the Nahla region near Aqra (east of Dohuk and north of Erbil) during the year. AINA reported that KDP-aligned elements blockaded these villages in August and conducted raids on the villages of Kesh Kawa on August 27 and 28 and Belmat on September 10. AINA claimed that Assyrians in the region were caught in factional fighting between the KDP and the PKK; after PKK raids on Assyrian villages for food and supplies, the KDP would then attack the villages for their imputed support of the PKK." (USCR 2000, "northern Iraq")

"The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from northern areas and repression of political rights. Most Assyrians live in the northern governates,
Government often has suspected them of 'collaborating' with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

General

Internally displaced persons' living conditions in northern Iraq are lower than the ones of the rest of the population in the North (2001-2002)

"The initial report of the [UN Habitat] survey of internally displaced persons has been finalized, and work is about to begin on a second stage, consisting of more in-depth interviews. The preliminary findings are that, while conditions vary considerably, about 40 per cent of internally displaced persons live in settlements with standards of water and electricity supplies, sanitation, drainage and road access that are below average for the area. Most internally displaced persons have, on the other hand, acceptable access to the food basket, education and, in most cases, health care." (UN SC 2 March 2001, para. 135)

"On December 4 [2000], the executive director of the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) told the Security Council he was "greatly concerned with the increasing number of internally displaced persons, 'whose living conditions in some cases were 'abominable.'" (HRW 2002)

The Iraq Foundation reported that the displaced have been stripped of their possessions and papers, and have no access to shelter, food or work. "The deportation of Kurds and Turkoman from areas under government control, and particularly from the Kirkuk governorate, has left over 100,000 people from northern areas homeless and destitute. The deportees have been stripped of their possession and papers, and have no access to shelter, food or work. The Kurdish regional administrations in Erbil and Suleimaniya are having difficulty sheltering and feeding such large numbers of people. The situation of those deported to areas under government control, such as Al-Anbar, are in even worse shape, as they are still under government surveillance and victims of both deprivation and persecution." (The Iraq Foundation 26 January 2001)

According to UN-Habitat survey in January 2001, "There is only 47.85% of the sites [ie collective towns, self-built houses and tent camps] that are provided with the entire range of needed facilities, that can be considered as the minimum standard. 32.43% are lacking in one, 12.39% in two, etc. 1212 individuals live in sites with no services at all. These sites are mainly concentrated in Duhok and Erbil regions, on the contrary in Sulaimaniyah and Darbandikhan areas IDP sites are provided with better services.[…]

Finally the levels of settlement services (water, electricity, sanitation, drainage and road) range from 1 to 10 (where 10 is given the highest possible level of services available in an IDP settlement). Some 38.8% of IDP population is located in settlements, whose index is less than 6. The worst settlement conditions occur in Erbil area." (UN-Habitat Jan 2002, p6)

Health & Nutrition

One-third of children in the south and centre of Iraq suffers of chronic malnutrition (2002)

"Surveys carried out by UNICEF during 2001 show that almost one-third of children in the south and centre of Iraq suffer from chronic malnutrition. Other issues of concern in the health sector include low
exclusive breast feeding rates, high bottle feeding rates, and high prevalence of anaemia among women, high incidence of low birth weight contribute to Iraq’s very high child mortality rates - 131 per 1000 live births in the south and centre of Iraq (1999) - a rate comparable to that of Pakistan or Haiti. Diarrhoea leading to death from dehydration and acute respiratory infection (ARI), together account for 70 per cent of child deaths.” (UNICEF 29 May 2002, 1)

According to FAO, as of November 2001, "[…] child malnutrition rates in the centre/south of the country do not appear to have improved significantly and nutritional problems remain serious and widespread." (FAO 6 Nov 2001)

UNICEF survey found that child mortality increased in government-controlled Iraq while decreasing slightly in northern Iraq (1999)

- In government-controlled Iraq infant mortality increased from 47 to 108 deaths per 1000 live births, while child mortality (under five years of age) increased from 56 to 131 deaths per 1,000 live births between the 1984-89 and 1994-1999 periods
- In autonomous northern Iraq, infant mortality decreased from 64 to 59 deaths per 1000 live births, while child mortality decreased from 80 to 72 deaths per 1,000 live births between the same periods
- The presence of humanitarian organizations in the north as well as the policies of the Iraq government are elements to explain discrepancy between north and south

"UNICEF, comparing the 1984-89 and 1994-99 periods in the government-controlled center and south of the country, found that infant mortality had increased from 47 to 108 deaths per 1000 live births, while child mortality (under five years of age) had increased from 56 to 131 deaths per 1,000 live births-a rapid and sustained increase in infant and child mortality rates that was virtually unprecedented. UNICEF reported, by contrast, declining mortality rates in the northern autonomous governorates." (HRW December 1999, "Human Rights Developments")

Survey in the 15 southern governorates

Infant mortality rate
the probability of dying between birth and exact age one year

Under-five mortality rate
the probability of dying between birth and exact age five

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period preceding survey</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate</th>
<th>Under-five mortality rate</th>
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<tr>
<td>(in years)</td>
<td>(per 1000)</td>
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<td>0-4 (1994-1999)</td>
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<td>5-9 (1989-1994)</td>
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<td>15-19 (1979-1984)</td>
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<td>67.1</td>
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* Excluding the autonomous region of Dhi Qar, Kirkuk and M-Sulaymaniyah governorates.
(5-year period, are from March to March; e.g, March 1994 to March 1999)

How to explain discrepancy between North and South?

"The UN has reported that, despite Iraqi claims of infant malnutrition, the government of Iraq has ordered only a fraction of the nutrition supplies for vulnerable children and pregnant and nursing mothers recommended by the UN and for which money has been set aside under the oil-for-food program. Only $1.7 million of $25 million set aside for nutritional supplements has been spent by Iraq. In the past eighteen months, Iraq has ordered no nutritional supplements. The United Nations has reported that $200 million worth of medicines and medical supplies sit undistributed in Iraqi warehouses." (US DOS 13 September 1999, "Iraqi Obstruction")

"Although food availability has increased since 1997 following SCR 986, nutritional problems continue to exist. Reasons for this include prolonged reliance of the population on a nutritionally inadequate and unvaried diet, the inability of the agricultural sector to make up this shortfall, particularly in view of the current drought, the dilapidation of the economy, underemployment and low incomes, poor quality of essential service delivery, unhealthy lifestyles and practices, and infection and disease." (FAO September 2000, p.36)

"In the north of the country, where the Oil-for-Food Programme is implemented by the UN-Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme on behalf of the Government of Iraq with the participation of FAO and WFP, there have been 'significant improvements in the nutritional situation.' Acute malnutrition has almost been eliminated and infant and child mortality rates have fallen, largely because the region is more self-sufficient in food and receives far greater assistance per person. Additionally, focus here is given to targeted nutrition programmes, food production, growth promotion and the early detection of malnutrition among children under five." (FAO 13 September 2000)

"In short, nutrition and health care were declining in government-controlled Iraq, but improving in the northern autonomous zone. The presence of international humanitarian organizations in the north accounted, in part, for the better health of the Kurdish population there. Even so, UNICEF noted that 'chronic malnutrition has remained at about 24 percent over the past six months [in the north], which is comparatively high for the region'." (USCR 2000)

For a broader discussion on disparities in Northern Iraq and Government-controlled Iraq, please see [Internal link], "UNICEF and other UN officials highlight reasons for North-South economic disparities (2000)"

Spread of infectious disease due to lack of drinking water and adequate sewage systems in government-controlled Iraq (1999-2002)
UNICEF reported in 2002 continued lack of essential public services, poor water supplies and resulting diarrhoeal infections

Over half of the rural population did not have adequate access to clean drinking water according to UNICEF/government survey conducted in 1997 which had led to the rapid spread of infectious diseases, such as cholera

Hospitals and health centers have been without repairs since 1991

Internally displaced persons camps in southern Iraq have open sewage, which has an important potential for disease

"Essential public services have continued to suffer from a lack of maintenance and resulting in decreasing capacity and efficiency, and rapidly increasing demand through population growth. (Some 16 million in 1990 compared to 22 million in 2000). Poor water supplies both in terms of quality and quantity and inadequate sanitation services contribute to frequent and repeated diarrhoeal infections. Environmental pollution further compounds the problem. Additionally, 500,000MT of raw sewerage is discharged directly into fresh water each day; 300,000MT of this discharged into rivers in Baghdad. Access to safe water in rural areas has dropped to just 41%. Per capita share of safe clean water has also decreased from 330 to 218 litres per day in Baghdad, while in rural areas, the capita share to those who have access dropped from 91 to less than 18 litres per day. It is therefore not surprising that each Iraqi child under 5 years of age suffers an average of 14 diarrhoeal episodes per year - a five-fold increase from pre-1990 figures." (UNICEF 29 May 2002)

"Another major threat to the health of the population is the quality of the drinking water. The Gulf war severely damaged Iraq's infrastructure, interrupting the power supply and consequently the operation of pumping and treatment facilities. Since then, money and spare parts have not been available to repair sewage works and purification plants, which are often working at reduced capacity, or not at all. This has led to an overall deterioration in the quality and quantity of drinking water and the rapid spread of infectious diseases, such as cholera.

A UNICEF/government of Iraq survey in 1997 on the availability of water and sewage systems reported that more than half of the rural population did not have adequate access to clean drinking water, while for sewage disposal some 30% of the total population, predominantly in rural areas, were without adequate services. Much of the waste is discharged directly into rivers and streams, so that much of the water supplied is contaminated or below acceptable standards.

The low availability of power, averaging 50% in rural areas, frequent cuts and unstable supply place an additional strain on the installed electrical equipment. This, added to the fact that the chemicals used to purify the water contain around 30 times more impurities than before the embargo, leads to premature deterioration of the equipment, which subsequently requires more maintenance. […]

For the first time in decades, diarrhoea has reappeared as the major killer of children. The highly specialized Iraqi doctors are now faced with third-world health problems – malnutrition, diphtheria, cholera – which they were not trained to handle." (ICRC 14 March 2000, II)

"According to the report [of the humanitarian panel established on 30 January 1999 by the UN Security Council], hospitals and health centers have remained without repairs and maintenance since 1991 and the 'functional capacity of the health care system has degraded further by shortages of water and power supply, lack of transportation and the collapse of the telecommunications system.' (AI 24 November 1999, "Background")

"In areas where the Iraqi government had not installed or not improved functioning water and sewage treatment facilities in the past, the current sanctions-era impoverishment has prevented current improvements. Thus the 1980s-built internally displaced persons camps, primarily in the south of Iraq, have
running streams of raw sewage between housing blocs, and pond-size pools of untreated standing sewage water with enormous potential for disease." (AFSC 21 March 2000 "Humanitarian Effect of Economic Sanctions")

**In the South, government limited access to food, medicine, drinking water and transportation for Shi'a Arabs (1999-2000)**

- Iraqi government burned hundreds of square miles and drained the marshes in the south, supposedly to increase agricultural production
- Thousands of persons were denied rations supposed to be supplied under the U.N. oil-for-food program and had limited access to food, medicine, drinking water and transportation.
- As a result the humanitarian condition of Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite the expansion of the oil-for-food program

The military also continued its water-diversion and other projects in the south. Observers gave little credence to the Government's claim that the drainage is part of a land reclamation plan to increase the acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production. Hundreds of square miles have been burned in military operations. The U.N. Special Rapporteur has noted the serious detrimental impact that draining the marshes has had on the culture of the Shi'a marsh Arabs. The SCIRI [Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq] claims to have captured government documents that detail the destructive intent of the water-diversion program and its connection to 'strategic security operations,' economic blockade, and 'withdrawal of food supply agencies.'

In addition the regime's diversion of supplies in the south limited the Shi'a population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and transportation. According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur and opposition sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were denied rations that should have been supplied under the U.N. oil-for-food program. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to food allegedly is used to reward regime supporters and silence opponents. Shi'a groups report that, due to this policy, the humanitarian condition of Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite a significant expansion of the oil-for-food program." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")

**Shelter**

**Deterioration of shelter conditions for the internally displaced in northern Iraq (2000-2002)**

- Thousands of people expelled from Kirkuk live in tent or abandoned military facilities (2002)
- Internally displaced persons in northern Iraq live in tents or in open, unheated public buildings
- Head of UN Programs in Iraq concerned about the increasing number of internally displaced and the lack of housing possibilities for the new comers

"According to Kurdish sources, "Thousands of Kurdish and some Turkoman Iraqis expelled from Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar live in tent cities near Chamchamal, or in temporary housing in Kifri and Kalar, as well as in abandoned Iraqi military facilities in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)

"Shelter and infrastructure conditions in rural and urban settlements of northern Iraq have deteriorated to critical levels in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. This situation has been compounded by problems arising
from previous population movements in the north and the return of families to rural villages; the increase of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in recent months; the sheltering of large numbers of IDPs in inadequate buildings without a minimum of services and facilities; the continuous deterioration of urban and semi-urban areas due to lack of supplies for essential operation and maintenance; and the inability of families settled or returning to rural centres to support themselves.

As a result, there is a clear need to undertake humanitarian rehabilitation activities which enable the sustainability of resettled centres, focusing on access roads, essential infrastructure to support productive activities, water supply and sanitation and the construction of community facilities such as health centres and schools. The experience gained in the implementation of previous programmes also points to the need for a greater emphasis on establishing community-based methods for project implementation.

The population increase and limited land available in rural areas also restricts the number of people that can return to rural villages in the medium-term. This creates a humanitarian need for maintaining selected basic services and infrastructure in certain collective towns to serve those families that do not have resettlement alternatives as well as to accommodate new IDPs. A case by case approach is applied to define the humanitarian rehabilitation actions to be carried out in these settlements.

Cities and towns in the northern Governorates are home to near 2 million people. Approximately 1.1 million people inhabit the three capital cities, Suleimaniyeh (480,000), Erbil (440,000) and Dohouk (190,000). Urban settlements with previously satisfactory coverage of infrastructure and services have witnessed a dramatic decline in their quality and coverage in recent years.

The situation of IDPs is of great concern in northern Iraq. Most of them, including widows and children, live under precarious conditions in public buildings and provisional shelter." (UNCHS December 2000)

"Just a few miles outside Sulaymaniyya […] in makeshift tents, with open pits for waste disposal, displaced Kurdish families, or fractions of families, survive on UN rations. This particular camp is called New Kirkuk, because people thrown out of Kirkuk by the Iraqi army arrive by the dozens almost every day." (Aquilla Lawrence Summer 2000)

"Majority of IDPs are located in collective towns (55 per cent). Others are in self-built houses (some 15 percent) and a small percentage live in tent camps." (WFP February 2001)

"In a briefing to the Security Council last Monday, Benon Sevan, who directs all of the United Nations programs in Iraq that are not related to weapons, said he was 'greatly concerned with the increasing numbers of internally displaced person.' He said conditions at refugee centers were 'abominable.' […]" (Aquilla Lawrence Summer 2000)

At refugee camp at Kani Shaitan, east of Kirkuk in Kurdish territory, 1,375 people, 994 of them children, have been crowded into a settlement built for 550 people. People continue to arrive at the camp, officials say, sometimes in groups that appear to have been driven out of government-controlled regions en masse.

'Unfortunately, the number of families at the Kani Shaitan camp appear to be increasing,' Mr. Sevan said. Arrivals are getting ahead of efforts to build homes for newcomers. At another nearby camp, Chamchamal, plans to build nearly 500 houses in time for the harsh winter of mountainous northern Iraq have been held up by a dearth of materials. In other settlements the United Nations has been putting up tents and supplying them with heaters. The latest report of the United Nations program under which Iraq exports unlimited quantities of oil to buy civilian goods says the presence of so many refugees is taxing the ability of the United Nations housing agency, Habitat. Housing experts are looking for ways to encourage local builders to provide labor and material for crash programs." (Crossette 11 December 2000)
ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

A quarter of Iraqi children are no longer attending school (May 2002)

"The Government of Iraq now acknowledges that at least 23 per cent of all school-aged children (6-15 years of age) are no longer attending school; many are working to supplement family incomes. Schools are not being maintained and repaired, and experience severe shortages of basic school supplies, classroom furniture, textbooks and teaching aids. Lack of adequate investment in teacher training, and in teaching and learning materials has seriously affected the overall quality of education. Teachers' salaries are grossly inadequate. This grim situation has prompted an increasing number of qualified teachers to leave the sector in search of better-paid jobs. This has also been reflected in school entry rates: only 66.8 per cent of male and 66.6 per cent of female students at the age of six were enrolled in 2000 against 88 per cent and 87 per cent respectively in 1991." (UNICEF 29 May 2002)
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

General

IDPs living under Iraqi government control demonstrated at UN headquarters in northern Iraq (January 2002)

- IDPs asked the UN to urgently provide aid and relief services and to pressure the Iraqi government to halt expulsion from Kurdish areas under government control

"Scores of IDPs (internally displaced persons) protesting the Iraqi policy of displacing Kurds and other non-Arab communities in Kurdish areas which are under the control of Baghdad, held a demonstration outside UN headquarters in Sulaymaniyah on 30 December, reported the "Iraqi Kurdistan Dispatch" on 10 January.

The demonstrators, mostly from the Bardaqaram camp for displaced people, demanded that the UN take urgent action to provide aid and relief services and called on the UN secretary-general to pressure the Iraqi government to halt the ethnic-cleansing campaign against citizens of the Kurdistan region which is still under its control.'

Iraqi authorities have intensified the policy of displacement with the aim of arabizing Kurdish regions under their control, particularly in the Kirkuk region. Arab families from southern Iraq are settled in the place of Kurds who are expelled either to the KRG-controlled region or to the south of Iraq.

UN agencies are acting in Kurdish-held areas on behalf of the Iraqi authorities as stipulated by the memorandum of understanding signed between Iraq and the UN. The head of the PUK-led KRG government directed Minister for Human Rights Salah Rashid to raise the urgent needs of the victims with UN agencies' representatives in the region.

The Kurdish daily 'Kurdistan Nuwe' of 7 January reported that Baghdad authorities have informed the Kirkuk Governor's Office to be prepared for the displacement of another 575 Kurdish families who will be forcibly removed from the city. According to unofficial estimates, more than 200,000 Kurds have been expelled from the Baghdad-held Kurdish areas in the region in the past 10 years to the KRG. There are no data available on the number of Kurds expelled to southern Iraq.

Nor are the Kurds the only ones to protest Baghdad's arabization policy. The bimonthly Iraqi Turkmen newspaper 'Qardashlyq Yolu' of 8 December published by the Turkmen Brotherhood Party, complained of another displacement in Kirkuk, saying that 'the displacement cycle will continue until the end of all national existence of the peoples of Iraqi Kurdistan. This policy does not reflect anything but a hostile racist policy with illusionary success for its oppression and inhumanity.'

'Qardashlyq Yolu' reports that Baghdad has resettled more than 20 Chechen families near Kirkuk. The newspaper claims this is part of the regime's plan of 'deforming the demographic characteristics of the regions of Kurdistan.'" (RFE/RL 18 Jan 2002)
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General

*Iraqi government is destroying evidence that Kurdish families were expelled from Kirkuk (August 2001)*

"[...] in August 2001, the Ministry of the Interior sent a document to the Department of Statistics demanding that during the expulsion of any family from Kirkuk, false names and numbers should be written on the documents that are usually issued for them by the governorate office to the checkpoints, and that the documents should not be registered in their records.

[The Sulaymaniyah Kurdish newspaper] 'Kurdistani Nuwe' believes that the intention behind these measures is to destroy any evidence that the Iraqi government has expelled Kurdish families from Kirkuk in case of accountability by official sides, particularly the United Nations. In this way, Iraq could easily deny the allegation." (RFE/RL 14 September 2001)

*Ethnic minority members forced to choose between signing a form correcting their nationality or being expelled (2000-2002)*

- Many Kurds and Turkoman families in Mosul and Kirkuk expelled to northern Iraq for failing to sign form
- In Sept 2001 the Iraqi government passed Resolution No. 199 giving all non-Arab Iraqis over 18 the right to change their ethnic identity to that of Arab

"In 1999, Baghdad continued its systematic efforts to 'Arabize' the predominantly Kurdish districts of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar at the edge of government-controlled Iraq near the Kurdish-controlled zone. To solidify control of this strategically and economically vital oil-rich region, the government expelled Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkomans—at times, entire communities—from these cities and surrounding areas. At the same time, the government offered financial and housing incentives to Sunni Arabs to persuade them to move to Kirkuk and other cities targeted for Arabization. New Arab settlements were constructed on expropriated Kurdish land holdings.

In 1999, Baghdad gave a name to its Arabization program: 'nationality correction.' The government began requiring ethnic minority civil servants to sign a form correcting their nationality. Persons refusing to sign the forms—for example, a Kurd refusing to 'correct' his nationality and list himself as an Arab rather than a Kurd—would be subject to expulsion to northern Iraq or the no-fly zone in the south. During the year, Kurds and Turkoman families in Mosul and Kirkuk were reportedly expelled to northern Iraq for failure to sign the forms. Although the Arabization campaign was not publicized, sources in northern Iraq reported that more than 2,000 people were expelled to the northern region between January and November." (USCR 2000)

"On the 6th September 2001, in an unprecedented move, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council – which ranks higher than the so-called Iraqi Parliament – passed Resolution No. 199 giving all non-Arab Iraqis over 18 the right to change their ethnic identity to that of Arab. Such a decision is contrary to all the principles of human rights and is politically motivated. Its purpose is to compel all non-Arabs in Iraq to
adopt an Arab ethnic identity. This law legalizes the regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing directed against all Kurds, Turkmans and Assyro-Chaldeans.

For decades, the Iraqi regime has continued to deport tens of thousands of Kurdish families from that part of Kurdistan still under its control to either the Kurdish controlled area of Kurdistan or to southern Iraq and has confiscated their properties and belongings, including their identity cards. The choice facing these people was deportation or the enforced change of ethnic identity. This law, which legalizes such acts, is in direct violation even of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970, Article 19/A of which states that all Iraqis are equal, regardless of ethnic language, religion or social class.

Furthermore, Article 5/B of that Constitution states that the people of Iraq is composed of two main ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds, and recognizes the rights of the Kurds and other minorities. This decision of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council effectively divides the population according to ethnicity. It favours one group over the other and gives a higher status to Arabs.

It should also be remembered that this Resolution is in direct contravention of Article 18 of the International Charter of Civil and Political Rights adopted by the UN in February 1966. Just as everyone has the right to their place in a family line, so every person has an inalienable right to his claim of ethnic identity, but Resolution No.199 makes no distinction between ethnic identity and nationality." (KTRS 27 Jan 2002)

For more information on the "Arabization policy", please see [Internal link], "Eviction of Kurds but also of Turkmen and Assyrians from the Kirkuk area (1997-2001)"
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

Kurds displaced to northern Iraq are less and less welcome by tribe members and local authorities (2000)

- Sharing the tribe, the culture, the past, the displaced were welcome in the beginning
- As numbers continually rose, people coming from government-controlled areas were not very much tolerated by both the locals and the authorities
- Due to the hard living conditions of the displaced, splitting of families is quite common

"The displacement had of course serious effects not only on the individuals, but also on social relations. Those who left Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Arbil found themselves in new places and in a new atmosphere. People residing in those places were confronted with a challenge for accommodation, food and jobs. While their future had not been secure before, they suddenly found a new neighbours that maybe they never would have liked to have. Sharing the tribe, the culture, the past, these people were welcome in the beginning. However, as numbers continually rose, people coming from the government-controlled areas around Kirkuk to Arbil were not very much tolerated by both the locals and the authorities. The locals started to keep distance from the newcomers. The IDP situation is more or less at the limit. The KDP immediately took measures, requiring the IDPs to abide by given conditions, if they wanted to stay. Therefore the Arabs as well as those Kurds and Turkmen who were obliged to leave government-controlled areas preferred to go to Sulaymaniyah where they could find better social conditions. Displacement is defecting individuals very much since they are losing all or most of their social connections. This, however, does not imply the total destruction of the tribal or ethnic identity in their families. In the KDP-controlled area the IDPs are mainly living in residential centers provided by the Kurdish authorities. The conditions there force them to find jobs of whatever kind. Unlike in the past, the splitting of families is quite common." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000, p.58)
PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Ethnic Kurds who changed their identity to Arab received plots of land in certain areas only (September 2001)

"In the beginning of August 2001 the Ba'th Party sent a document to branches within the Baghdad-controlled north demanding that Kurdish members of the Ba'th Party at the rank of 'party comrade' and who have changed their identity into Arab are included by the measures of the allocations of plots of land and party donations, but they should receive plots of land in the center or southern cities, but these should be outside the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Diyala, Tikrit and Baghdad.

However, all Kurdish Ba'th Party members who left the region controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government after 1992, and who have changed their identities to Arab are deprived of all privileges, like allocation of rent and financial aid. "Kurdistani Nuwe" thinks this is because of their participation in the 1991 uprising. They are blamed for staying in Kurdistan after the uprising." (RFE/RL 14 Sept 2001)

Kurdish party denounces Iraqi authorities' new decree on land compensation in Kirkuk (2001)

According to the PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]: "The official newspaper of the Iraqi Governorate of Taameem [new name of Kirkuk province, which means "Nationalization"] published a new decree (AL TAAMEEM, June 25, 2001 edition) […]: 'It has been decreed that all jurisdiction has been withdrawn from the courts relating to litigation cases seeking compensation for agricultural lands covered by the Development Plan in the Governorate of Taameem, including lands covered by the security of the Ministries of Defense and Oil. This decree makes null and void all claims of compensation for the relevant lands. It further voids all judicial decisions pertaining to those cases and cancels all the consequent remedies provided by the verdicts.'

A legal expert confirmed to Kurdistan Newsline that the purpose of this decree is to deprive the Kurdish farmers from their lands which have been in their heritage for hundreds of years and preventing them from even leasing them for cultivation. Thus, the regime is confiscating Kurdish lands without compensation and distributes them free to Arabs, transplanted from South and Middle Iraq." (Kurdistan Newsline 26 June 2001)

Kurds are forced to sell homes to Arabs in Kirkuk (1999-2002)

- Kurds are prevented from constructing, renovating, registering or inheriting property in Kirkuk (1999-2000)
- The Iraqi government will provide new housing and employment to more than 300,000 Arab residents resettled in Kirkuk (1999)
- Kurdish sources reported in 2002 that the Iraqi government has decided to allocate vast areas of land to Arabs exclusively and to auction government property in Kirkuk to ethnic Arabs only
Kurdish sources also reported in 2002 that Arab families got piece of land for each dead member of family transported to Kirkuk

"Kurds [in Kirkuk] are reportedly not permitted to sell their homes to anyone other than Arabs. New construction or renovation of Kurdish property is said to be forbidden and Kurds are prevented from registering or inheriting properties. At the same time, Arab settlement is favoured. The Revolution Command Council has mandated that the State must provide new housing and employment to more than 300,000 Arab residents resettled in Kirkuk. In the past several months, at least seven new Arab settlements have been built in Kurdish areas on properties confiscated mainly from ethnic Kurds. The new settlements are given Arab names and local merchants are instructed to give their companies Arab names. Finally, the governorate's administrative offices are being moved to the Arabized side of the city, as are the headquarters of major professional and political organizations." (CHR 26 February 1999, para.26)

"Sulaymaniyah's 'Kurdistani Nuwe' on 30 November [2000] reported that Baghdad's Arabization program has intensified via the distribution of land to 80 Iraqi Arabs who will thus displace the local Turkmen and Kurdish population. The paper cited a report in the 27 November 'Sawt al-Ta'mim,' a newspaper which is under the control of the Iraqi government.

Lieutenant-General Sabah Nuri Alwan, the governor of Kirkuk (Al-Ta'mim), distributed the land deeds to 'those whose incomes are limited.' At the celebration accompanying the deed distribution, the recipients 'expressed their love and admiration to the leader, 'the Mujahid, Saddam Hussein.'" (RFE/RL 15 December 2000, "Arabization in Kirkuk")

According to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Kurdish-language daily "Kurdistan Nuwe", "the Iraqi government had recently begun construction of 200 houses to be reserved for Arab families transported from southern Iraq."

Since the beginning of this year, "Kurdistan Nuwe" reported, the Iraqi government has "decided to allocate vast areas of land" to Arabs exclusively. This land includes plots in between the Zewiya and Azadi districts, around the football stadium in Azadi, and between the Iskan and Karama districts. Land behind the Pepsi Cola plant in Rahim Awa is now allocated only "to the Arab [Ba'th] party comrades." Numerous Arab families have been relocated to the surrounding villages of Hafta Chashma, Omara Gada, and Qara Ways, the report said. The Regional Secretariat of the Ba'th Party has further ordered that ethnic Kurds may not purchase contracts for shops and businesses.

There are also reports in the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) press concerning the Iraqi government's continuing ethnic-cleansing campaign. The 19 April issue of the KDP Arabic-language daily "Khabat" reported: "Within the framework of the continuing Arabization policies implemented by the central [Iraqi] authorities in Kirkuk...the authorities decided to auction some of the government-owned houses in Kirkuk. Instructions allow only Arabs to buy these houses, preventing the indigenous Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian inhabitants from doing so." The article continued, "Observers say that the city's Kurdish, Turkoman and Assyrian inhabitants are considered second-class citizens and are deprived of any legal or constitutional rights." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)

"Citing an article in the KDP daily "Brayati," kurdishmedia.com reported on 2 April from Irbil that the Iraqi government has stepped up its "Arabization" campaign in Kirkuk, displacing increasing numbers of Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian Iraqis, and confiscating their property. The measures include asking Arab settlers to move their dead relatives from the place where they came from, to Kirkuk. "The government has ordered each family of Arab settlers to move at least one of their dead relatives from the graveyards of their original place to a graveyard in Kirkuk," according to the "Brayati" report.

The report continues: "Each family gets a piece of land, as a present from the president, per each dead relative moved to Kirkuk. The Iraqi government has taken this extraordinary course because its policy of
ethnic cleansing doesn't work as it [is] supposed to.... As most Arab settlers leave to their original place after a while. It has been reported that many Arab settlers have sent apologies to people, who [were] cleansed from Kirkuk, for being forced to settle on their properties and offered to share the revenues of these properties with them." (RFE/RL 12 April 2002)


"In a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, Dr. Barham Salih, Director of PUK's Bureau for International Relations, called on the international community to intercede with the Government of Iraq to end its ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurdish inhabitants of Kirkuk, Khanaqin and other districts of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The letter cited a recent announcement by the Iraqi Governor of Kirkuk which was published in the ruling Ba'ath Party's daily newspaper, al-Thawara, in its issue number 9833 on August 25, 1999, calling on deportees from 89 villages and districts to meet with GOI authorities to receive 'financial compensation' for their confiscated land. The villages were destroyed by the GOI in the late 1980s and their inhabitants, overwhelmingly Kurdish, were forcibly deported and their land distributed to Arab settlers brought from southern and central Iraq.

Dr. Salih said 'the Iraqi announcement is an effort to finalize the dispossession of the Kurdish landowners by giving a semblance of legal authority to the Arabization campaign which is aimed at changing the demographic characteristics of these districts of Iraqi Kurdistan." (Kurdistan Newsline 13 September 1999, "PUK Urges U.N. to End Iraq's Ethnic Cleansing Campaign")
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Northern Iraq

Kurdish parties start to implement agreement of the return of internally displaced within northern Iraq (2001-2002)

- Kurdish parties agreed in 1998 and again in 1999 to return people expelled from their home in northern Iraq but with no tangible result
- As of July 2001, following a new agreement between the Kurdish parties, over 120 displaced families had gone back home
- In Oct 2001, close to 600 families displaced within northern Iraq returned home
- According to USCR, some 1,300 families returned home between June and October 2001

"The KDP and PUK reiterated [in 1999] their September 1998 agreement to begin returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons that each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the three northern provinces; however, no effort to implement the agreement was begun during the year. (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")"

"According to the agreement of the Higher Peace Committee between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), yesterday 40 families from Arbil went back to Suleymania and 35 families from Suleymania went back to Arbil. More will follow soon.

Both parties have signed an agreement in Arbil, South Kurdistan capital, on 16th of this month, regarding the return of the displaced people between Arbil and Suleymania because of the exceptional circumstances."

The first returnees are those who do not have the problem of housing and property. They were all received at both sides by the concerned authorities and taken to their places wit respect and dignity. […]

Task forces have been established to ensure the returnees settle smoothly. (KurdishMedia.com 25 June 2001)

"Tomorrow on 8th of this month [July 2001], more displaced people are going back to their homes on their free choice. 52 families are coming back from Suleymania to Arbil and 55 families are going back from Arbil to Suleymania and its surroundings." (KurdishMedia.com 7 July 2001)

"Before similar number of displaced families returned home on both sides at the same time. But now, because of the strengthening of the peace, the Higher Coordinating Committee has decided to let this to take its natural course and neither side has to allocate a date to return any groups of displaced families. This is why yesterday for the first time the biggest number of families (279 of them) came back from Suleymania to Arbil. (200) more families will return home from Arbil to Suleymania this week."
Out of the 279 displaced families came back from Suleymania, 223 of them went to Arbil, 39 of them went to Shaqlawa, Soran, Harir and the surroundings and 6 families went to Akry and Dihoke. 118 Of these families in Arbil went back straight to their houses. In Suleymania and its surroundings, 83 houses of the displaced family have already been vacated to be given back to their owners this week.

According to a source from Joint Committee of displaced families, all farmlands, on both sides, have been freed for their owners and all returned families have gone back to their farm. The few, left, will soon receive back their property and farms." (KurdishMedia.com 21 Oct 2001)

"The PUK and KDP also began implementation of an October 1999 agreement that called for the return of displaced people within northern Iraq to their places of origin; between June and October [2001], some 1,300 families reportedly returned to their homes in Erbil, Dohuk, and Suleymaniyah." (USCR 2002)

**In northern Iraq landmines prevent return (1998-2002)**

- Population of Northern Iraq has one of the more extensive landmine/unexploded ordnance problems in the world
- Northern Iraq was heavily mined during the Iran-Iraq war to protect the country from invasion
- The UN Office for Project Services said that many IDPs cannot return home because villages remain infested with mines
- Additional landmines were laid during the Kurdish uprising
- According to the UN Secretary General, landmines impede displaced persons from returning to their homes in northern Iraq but clearing these minefields would take between 35 and 75 years
- Return movements were however observed in 2000
- The Iraqi government has also mined the area around Kirkuk to prevent return of displaced families

"The population of the three northern governorates of Iraq faces one of the more extensive landmine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems in the world. Even though the exact number of mines is unknown, the national survey conducted by UNOPS up to September 2001 has identified 3,400 mined areas covering some 900 square kilometers of land required for reconstruction, resettlement, agricultural purposes and the rehabilitation of basic services such as electricity and water, affecting approximately 1100 communities.

In addition to medical and social consequences resulting from mine accidents and casualties, mines and unexploded ordnance have had a significant impact on socio-economic factors. Many displaced people now wish to return to their villages of origin and resume their normal life, farming their land, but entire villages are still infested with mines making it unsafe. In addition, the mine problem is having long-term negative repercussions on economic development making reconstruction of road networks, power lines and waterways more protracted, dangerous and costly. Lastly, mines impede the mobility of teachers, technicians, doctors and healthcare workers, undermining the rehabilitation process. Even where mines do not prevent food and medical aid from reaching people in need, they make already difficult operations even more hazardous, and the associated security measures increase the cost of humanitarian relief." (UNOPS 2002)

"Northern Iraq (Kurdistan) is severely mine-affected. The region was heavily mined during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war as the conflict waged throughout the region. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraqi military resources were concentrated in the south, and the northern borders were mined to protect the country from invasion. During the post-war Kurdish uprising, additional landmines were laid in the northern region."
The UN estimates that there are more than 10 million landmines and a large quantity of UXO [Unexploded Ordnance] in Iraqi Kurdistan. Of these landmines, 8 million are estimated to be antipersonnel and 2 million antitank. [...] Some minefields were mapped, but the army has since destroyed those records. [...] Landmines and UXO are concentrated in the northern Kurdish region, southern Iraq, and the area along the Iran and Kuwait borders, and are commonly found near water sources and in rural farmland. Mining was not restricted to borders; mines are known to be located throughout the northern region in such areas as Penjwin. In addition, the region near Basra in the southeast is heavily mined.

Following the Gulf War, IDPs and refugees returned to the Kurdish region and settled in the mountainous, heavily mined area. Landmines continue to be the primary obstacle to economic productivity; their clearance and the restoration of the land are essential to the long-term economic self-sufficiency of the region. The presence of landmines has allowed only 50 percent of agricultural land to be cultivated in the region, and in the governorate of Sulaimania alone only 40 percent of the land is usable. Simple chores such as herding animals and collecting firewood have become life-endangering activities. [...] Following the Gulf War, return movement within northern Iraq was occurring, and that some of the 4,500 Kurdish villages destroyed by Baghdad forces during the 'Anfal' campaign of the late 1980s were being rebuilt and reoccupied."

The Iraqi government has no known program for demining. The demining activities that have been conducted in Iraq have been in the autonomous Kurdish region in the north."

"Landmines continued to make northern Iraq dangerous and impeded displaced persons from returning to their homes." (USCR 1999, p.152)

"Studies indicate that there are approximately 210 million square metres of minefields, disregarding minefields that continue to be added and new discoveries. These include 4.5 million square metres of minefields in Dohuk, 55.7 million square metres in Erbil and 149 square metres in Sulaymaniya. It is estimated that it will take between 35 and 75 years to clear those minefields. (UN SC 19 November 1998, Sect. IV)

However, in 2000: "It was [...] clear [...] that return movement within northern Iraq was occurring, and that some of the 4,500 Kurdish villages destroyed by Baghdad forces during the 'Anfal' campaign of the late 1980s were being rebuilt and reoccupied." (USCR 2001, p.180)

"Those expelled [from Kirkuk] are not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur reported that citizens who provide employment, food or shelter to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. In order to encourage departure and prevent displaced persons from returning, the Government reportedly has mined the area around Kirkuk, and has declared it a military and security zone. Roads into the area are fortified with military checkpoints. " (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")

**Government-controlled Iraq**

**Forced return of families originally from the Provinces and living in Baghdad (1999)**

- Residents of the Kurdish provinces in the north and Shiite Muslims provinces of the south sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War
- Iraqi government forced 4,000 families to return to their province of origin in 1999
- Opposition sources said that most of the people expelled were opponents to the regime

"More than 4,000 families from northern and southern Iraq who sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War have been expelled to their provinces, Interior Minister Mohammed Zamam Abdel Razzak said."
'The interior ministry decided to move the families who poured into Baghdad since 1991 and took them back to their provinces of origin,' he was quoted by the weekly Al-Iilam as saying. Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, 'thousands of families have left the northern and southern provinces, affecting the economic and social situation in Baghdad,' he told the Iraqi parliament.

'The interior ministry has set up a committee to criss-cross Baghdad to make a list of the families and sent them back to their original provinces,' he said. So far, the authorities have expelled 4,099 families from Baghdad, he said, without providing the total number of people moved.

Baghdad has a population of about five million. Residents of the Kurdish provinces in the north and Shiite Muslim provinces of the south flooded into Baghdad after the war because of instability in those regions." (AFP 27 November 1999)

"Opposition sources, however, contended that most of the expelled families were Kurds and Shi'a, many from the Al-Thawra neighborhood, the scene of an anti-regime riot in February. They said that the expulsions were aimed at preventing political unrest in the capital. They noted that persons displaced from President Hussein's hometown of Tikrit were not included in the expulsion order." (USCR 2000)
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

The Iraqi government severely restricts access to international NGOs and to the UN (2000-2002)

- Only seven international NGOs have permission to operate in government-controlled Iraq
- Government reportedly harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. personnel throughout the country
- U.N. Special Rapporteur has been repeatedly denied to visit Iraq since 1992
- In June 2000, two staff members of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were shot dead in Baghdad and seven others wounded
- Baghdad refused to issue over 270 visas to experts for the 'oil-for-food' program and the program to remove land mines in the Kurdish north in 2001
- Iraqi government continued campaign of intimidation against UN and NGO personnel as of end 2001

"President Hussein obstructed humanitarian agencies from assisting the civilian population in government-controlled areas. For example, only seven international non governmental organizations (NGOs) had permission to operate in Iraq: CARE, Enfants du Monde, the IFRC, the Middle East Council of Churches, Ponte per Baghdad, Première Urgence, and Voice in the Wilderness." (USCR 2000)

"The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. personnel throughout the country, maintained a threat to arrest or kill relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices in the capital.

As in previous years the Government did not allow the U.N. Special Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it respond to his requests for information. The Government continued to defy various calls from U.N. bodies to allow the Special Rapporteur to visit the southern marshes and other regions." (US DOS 25 February 2000, Section 4)

"It remains the responsibility of the UN to deal with concerns about the situation in Iraq; but, from 1992, the Iraqi authorities denied entry to Max van der Stoel, who served as Special Rapporteur of the UNCHR until November 1999, and failed to answer any of his communications. His successor, Andreas Mavrommatis, who took up his duties in January 2000, still awaits a response to his request for permission to visit Iraq." (Foreign & Commonwealth Office November 2000, p.2)

"The UN agencies working in Iraq do so under extraordinarily difficult, daunting, circumstances. Their work and living conditions are tightly constrained, and they face enormous obstacles from a number of sources." (AFSC 21 March 2000, "Problems facing UN agencies' work)

"One June 28 [2000], two staff members of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were shot dead in Baghdad and seven others wounded, reportedly by an Iraqi identified by the authorities as Fowad Hussain Haidar. He said he had carried out the attack in protest at the U.N.-imposed embargo." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")
"The government of President Saddam Hussein is slowing crucial aid work in Iraq by refusing to issue visas to international experts, United Nations officials said today.

Experts assigned to Iraq under the 'oil for food' program to work on electricity projects and the removal of land mines in the Kurdish north have been singled out, officials say. More than 270 visa requests have been rejected or have gone unanswered."

"The [Iraqi] Government has continued a campaign of intimidation directed at U.N. and nongovernmental organization (NGO) relief workers. In February [2001] the Foreign Minister threatened to break off official ties to U.N. workers supervising Oil-for-Food Program distribution in northern Iraq, and to revoke their visas and deport them. In September the Government expelled six U.N. humanitarian relief workers without providing any explanation." (US DOS 4 March 2002, Sect.1.g)

**Bomb attacks against buildings used by UN personnel and by NGOs in Arbil end 2001 (2002)**

"There were at least eight bomb attacks in Arbil in other cities between November 2000 and October 2001. Some targeted buildings used by U.N. personnel and by local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In August, the KDP said it had arrested two men in separate incidents whose vehicles were apparently carrying explosives, and that they had confessed to working for Iraqi intelligence. Among them was a Tunisian national employed by the U.N. who was caught on July 19 while returning from Baghdad with explosives in his vehicle. He was released on July 31 and handed over to Tun Myat, U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, during his visit to Iraqi Kurdistan." (HRW 2002)
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

Iraq is a state party to several international human rights agreements (2000)

Iraq is a state party to the following international human rights instruments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Date of Accession/Ratification</th>
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<tr>
<td>Against Women</td>
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Source: UNHCR/REFWORLD, July 1999

Iraq signed but has not yet ratified the following international human rights instruments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
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<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>Human Rights Covenant International Covenant on the Elimination</td>
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<td>of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and</td>
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<td>of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Children</td>
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<td>and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid</td>
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Source: UNHCR/REFWORLD, July 1999

Iraq is not a state party to the following international human rights instruments:

- Treaty Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- Refugees and Stateless Persons Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
- Refugees and Stateless Persons Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
- Refugees and Stateless Persons Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
- Convention on the Political Rights of Women
- Human Rights Covenant International Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
- 1994 Arab League Convention on the Status of Refugees

Iraq has ratified regional instruments such as:

- The Arab Charter on Human Rights
- The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Cairo, 5 August, 1989
- Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World, 19 November 1992

(UNHCR June 2000, pp.8-9)

Government denies policy of forced displacement from Kirkuk and the southern marshes despite local and international accusations (1998-2002)
Amnesty International wrote to the Iraqi Government to denounce the grave violation of the rights to freedom of conscience, freedom from discrimination and the right to physical and mental integrity of the people displaced from Kirkuk.

Academic conference in northern Iraq sent memorandum to UN SG urging the international community to intervene to stop Arabization of Kirkuk area.

An Assyrian coalition denounced in May 2001 the steps taken by Baghdad to change the population demographics, as well as the destruction of historical buildings.


Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected allegations of forced displacement of non-Arabs around Kirkuk as baseless accusations.

Iraqi Minister of Interior said to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iraq in 2002 that activities in Kirkuk were sanctions imposed on people who did not cultivate their land.

Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that only routine activities to track criminals and deserters are conducted in the southern marshes.

"Amnesty International wrote to the Iraqi Government on 30 March 1998 expressing serious concern about the forcible mass expulsions of Kurdish and other non-Arab families on the basis of their ethnic origin. The organization stated that the action taken by the Iraqi authorities is considered a grave violation of the rights to freedom of conscience, freedom from discrimination and the right to physical and mental integrity. Amnesty International urged the government to halt the expulsions and to allow all those families already expelled to return to their homes in the Kirkuk area. The organization also made its concerns public in a statement issued on 29 April 1998 [...] As of August 1999 no response from the Iraqi Government on these forcible expulsions had been received by Amnesty International." (AI 24 November 2000, "Forcible expulsion")

"An April 2001 academic conference in Irbil issued a memorandum that has now been sent to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The memorandum urged the international community to intervene to block the further arabization of the Kirkuk area and also to end the ethnic cleansing of that region. It asks that the UN force Baghdad to reveal the fate of thousands of Kurds and others who have been detained and then disappeared. And it calls for an expansion of the safe haven to include Kirkuk." (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)

"The 23rd Assyrian Universal Alliance World Congress expressed its concerns about Iraqi oppression of the Assyrians in Bet Nahrain, 'Zinda' reported on 29 May. The congress declaration condemns 'steps being implemented by the Iraqi government to change the population demographics on the Nineveh Plain,' as well as the destruction of historical buildings and archeological sites. And it denounced 'the implementation of a policy in Kirkuk, Mosul, Ein Sifneh and elsewhere to prevent Assyrians, Kurds and Turkmen[s] from buying land for the construction of homes unless they are willing to change their legal (census) nationality designation to Arab.' (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)

For the entire declaration of the 23rd Congress of the Assyrian Universal Alliance, please see [External Link]

"[...] [T]he Association Against Ethnic Cleansing in Kirkuk has announced its foundation and declared that the ethnic-cleansing policy of the Iraqi government in Kirkuk and other areas under its control aims to eradicate Kurdish identity in these areas; it maintains that this policy represents a danger to Iraqi unity." (RFE/RL 21 July 2001)

According to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Fabrications made by (Stoel [i.e. former Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Iraq, Max van der Stoel]) about violations against the Kurds in Al- Ta’nim province (Kirkuk) and coercive displacement and resettlement campaigns are merely untrue and baseless allegations. We [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
confirm that no such cases had existed, that citizens in those areas are leading their normal life and practicing their daily works and duties, and that their rights are guaranteed under the Constitution and effective laws. (Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001)

**According to the Iraqi Minister of Interior:** "the Special Rapporteur [on the situation of human rights in Iraq] pointed out that several allegations received recently claimed that non-Arabs were being forcibly expelled from their land in the north, especially in the Kirkuk area. The Minister [of Interior] pointed out that what was currently going on in the north was related to initiatives aimed at maximizing the agricultural output of one of the most fertile regions of Iraq. The Minister explained that a specific policy was currently in place which would require landowners to cultivate their land. If this was not done, certain restrictions could be imposed. While it was acknowledged that this issue was too complex to be covered in depth during the meeting, upon the request of the Special Rapporteur the Minister undertook to work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare an explanatory note on the issue. This would then allow the Special Rapporteur to study the question in depth and to formulate additional questions, recommendations, etc." (CHR 15 March 2002, para.39)

**According to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs:** "Iraq is accused of committing grave violations of human rights in the marshes area, launching arbitrary bombing against villages there and coercively displacing their residents.

In this respect we [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] would like to highlight the fact that the government authorities there undertake their routine activities in tracing criminals and deserters who in most cases resort to the marshes area to hide there taking advantage of the area’s geographical nature in order to evade legal persecution for the crimes they have committed." (Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001)

**Regional government in northern Iraq works with the UN to implement programs in favor of the displaced and other vulnerable groups (2001-2002)**

- Mine awareness campaign and coordination with the United Nations for de-mining activities (2001)
- Reconstruction of houses for internally displaced from Kirkuk and other vulnerable people (2001)
- Construction of housing units in Irbil and Dahuk governorates (2002)

"Landmines continue to jeopardize the safety and security of the people of Kurdistan region. A new organization - Mine Advice Action Group (COMA in Kurdish) -to increase public awareness of the lethal effects of mines has been established within the Kurdistan Regional Government's Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. It will function in coordination with the United Nations organization for de-mining, UNOPS and complements its activities." (Kurdistan Newsline 8 July 2001)

"One of the largest projects to be undertaken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is the reconstruction of the region to repair the damage done under the successive Iraqi regimes. During the past two to three decades, more that 4,000 villages were destroyed and the inhabitants forced to move from their traditional lands and homes. Wars and internal conflicts have added to the problem of displaced people living in the region too. The Iraqi policy of Arabization continues to fuel the problem of people displaced from their homes and lands with many of them choosing to move to Iraqi Kurdistan. The KRG commits funds towards the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the area along with funds allocated under the SCR-986 Oil-for-Food Program.

As part of the KRG goal to reconstruct the region, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development has begun work on a project to construct 400 houses for families of the martyrs, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) – many from Kirkuk, and returnees from Iran." (Kurdistan News May 2001)
"The Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (MORAD) in Irbil has released its 2001 data for projects both completed and currently under implementation. According to the figures acquired from MORAD Minister Nasreen Sideek Mustafa, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) spent $68.5 million in 2001 for reconstruction in the Irbil and Dahuk governorates (the KRG in Sulaymaniyah separately handles projects in the Sulaymaniyah and "New Kirkuk" Governorate).

In the Irbil and Dahuk governorates, MORAD completed 1,833 housing units, with an additional 3,463 under construction. UN Security Council Resolution 986 "Oil-for-food" income funded the completion of 36 educational projects (including schools, dormitories, and teacher's guest houses), with another 140 under construction. During the first eight phases of the UN oil-for-food program, MORAD built a total of 351 village schools and 91 staff houses. The KRG also built or has under construction more than 1,000 kilometers of new roads in the two governorates, as well as five bridges. All nine new veterinary clinics to support local husbandry have been completed.

Providing access to water remains a major MORAD concern in the Irbil and Dahuk governorates, especially after a three-year drought. MORAD trucked water into 193 villages at a cost of nearly $218,000. In addition, MORAD drilled 43 new wells, and upgraded 857 water systems." (RFE/RL 12 April 2002)

Kurdistan Regional Government officials criticized slow pace of UN aid programs (2002)

- Many Iraqi Kurds reportedly complain that the UN does not respond to their needs

"Many KRG officials, however, are not satisfied with the "slow pace" of UN aid programs. PUK Deputy Prime Minister Adnan Mufti met with a delegation of the United Nations Development Program and criticized it for the slow pace of its operations, according to the 19 April issue of "Al-Ittihad," the Arabic-language daily newspaper of the PUK. According to "Al-Ittihad," Mufti "called on the UN to play its role in dealing with failures and shortcomings in the electricity sector and consolidating cooperation and coordination with the institutions of the Kurdistan Regional Government." Mufti also requested the UN speed up organization of teacher-training courses, and "to respond to the needs of the health and agriculture sectors." (Some Iraqi Kurdish hospital officials interviewed in spring 2001 said that the UN often takes up to 18 months to deliver approved equipment. If that equipment is faulty, then another 18 months can be wasted waiting for replacement parts.)

Many Iraqi Kurds complain that the UN does not respond to their needs and concerns; they say that many Arab national UN employees, such as those from Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and Sudan are especially unresponsive. According to a 27 March 2001 United Press International report, Husseyn pressured UN agencies to "do his bidding in northern Iraq." The article pointed to one example where Rima al-Azar, a Lebanese UNICEF child protection officer in Irbil, unilaterally severed UNICEF's contracts with NGOs operating in Iraqi Kurdistan, apparently without any authorization from her superiors or UN offices in Geneva and New York. There have been other problems with the UN. According to farmers and officials of the University of Sulaymani College of Agriculture, a pesticide supplied to farmers by the UN wiped out nearly the entire chickpea crop in spring 2001, leaving several farmers who had sought UN agricultural advice destitute." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)

UN response
Oil-for-food program established to alleviate humanitarian needs of Iraqi population (1996-2002)

- Oil-for-food program was set-up in 1996 as a temporary measure while the sanctions were in place
- In May 2002, UN SC members agreed to revise the sanction regime to ease its humanitarian impact

"In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations sent a mission to Iraq which reported the makings of 'an imminent catastrophe if minimum life supporting needs are not rapidly met.' The Security Council responded by offering Iraq, in August 1991, an opportunity to sell oil to meet its people’s basic needs while the sanctions, imposed in August 1990, remained in place. That offer was not accepted and over the following five years there was widespread suffering with food shortages, an absence of essential medicines and a general deterioration in essential social services.


'Oil-for-food is a unique programme, established by the Council as a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, which is being implemented within the context of a sanctions regime with all its attendant political, psychological and commercial dimensions, until the fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991.' (The Supplementary Report of the Secretary-General of 1 February 1998 - S/1998/90)" (UN Office of the Iraq Programme 2001)

"Under the program, the country also is permitted, under U.N. control, to import food, medicine, supplies for water, sanitation, electricity, agricultural, and education projects, and spare parts for the oil sector." (UN DOS 4 March 2002)

**May 2002: UN SC members agreed to revise sanction regime to ease humanitarian impact**

"The European Union welcomes the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1409 of 14 May 2002 which significantly eases the United Nations sanctions on Iraq. The new "Oil for Food" programme will allow Iraq to import civilian goods more freely, while maintaining strict control on dual use goods. Such control remains necessary owing to the continuing concern of the international community regarding the potential use of these goods in mass-destruction or conventional weapons programmes. The European Union calls upon Iraq to cooperate fully with this new sanctions regime, which should help improve the humanitarian situation and above all benefit the Iraqi people." (EU 20 May 2002)

*To see UN SC Resolution 1409 of 14 May 2002 modifying the sanction regime, please see [External Link]*)

"The key element in the new arrangements is the Goods Review List provided for in paragraph 2 of UNSC Resolution 1382, passed in November 2001. Items specified on this list, defined as for military or dual use, are to be separated from humanitarian goods. Russia's agreement to accept this list, after protracted negotiations, cleared the way for implementation of the new "smarter" sanctions. The US sweetened the pot for Russia by removing holds on over $200 million of Russian contracts with Iraq in late March. By the rules of the 661 Committee which presently scrutinizes orders for humanitarian goods, all Security Council members are allowed to query and hold up such orders. About 90 percent of the $5 billion worth of contracts currently on hold are being blocked by the US and Great Britain.

The new proposals are expected to end this system of 661 Committee scrutiny of humanitarian goods. Under the new system, contracts containing goods on the Goods Review List will be reviewed by the UN"
Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) -- which administers oil for food. This office would then send the contracts to the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which head up efforts to prevent Iraq from obtaining banned weapons. In turn, these offices can refer contracts considered objectionable to the 661 Committee for rejection or passage.

A proposal to tighten up on regional smuggling -- key to earlier drafts of the "smart sanctions" resolution -- has been dropped. Neighboring states, including Syria, which is currently a Security Council member, are unlikely to give up their expanded commercial contacts with Baghdad and resisted any attempts to restrict this trade. The State Department estimates that Iraq reaps $2.5 billion a year from smuggling oil outside the oil for food program.

The imposition of "smarter" sanctions has arguably come as too little, too late. As the Iraqi regime is well-adapted to sanctions, both in terms of political control and its regional and international networks of trade, clandestine contacts and money laundering, the new measures are unlikely to exact a significant tax on regime coffers." (Graham-Brown 14 May 2002, in MERIP)

For a chronology of crises between Iraq and UN over arms inspections between 1991 and 1998, see AFP 12 Nov 1998 [Internet]

To access the home page of the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-Food: [Internet]

Sanctions raise serious concern at international level despite "Oil-for-food" Program (1999-2002)

- The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that Iraq's GNP had already dropped before the Gulf War due to the Iran-Iraq War and low oil prices
- NGOs denounce the high human price paid by the Iraqi population because of the embargo
- For ICRC, the 'Oil-for-Food programme' has had some positive effects, but has neither halted the collapse of the health system, nor improved the economic situation of the population
- Several NGOs doubt that the revised sanction regime of May 2002 will improve the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi population

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the embargo is not the cause of Iraq's current economic decline

"Saddam has […] tried to blame most of Iraq's current economic decline on UN sanctions, but Iraq's GNP dropped much further as a result of the Iran-Iraq War and lower oil prices before the Gulf War began. The World Bank estimates that Iraq's GDP dropped by an annual average rate of 6.8% during 1980-1990, the worst economic performance of any of the more than 200 countries it surveys. Iraq also exhausted virtually all of its national reserves and went deep into debt. Estimates of Iraq's total foreign debt in 1990, including interest, range from $80 billion to $109 billion.

The increases in Iraq's population interacted throughout this period with the decline in its economy to cut Iraq's per capita income. Iraq's population increased from 13.2 million in 1980 to 18.4 million in 1990 - an increase of 38%. Its GNP shrank by well over 65% during the same period. US and World Bank estimates indicate that Iraq's GNP per capita dropped by well over 50% from the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War to the time [when] Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Any estimates of the trends since the Gulf War must be far more speculative, but CIA, EIA, and World Bank estimates indicate that Iraq's population increased by another 16% between 1990 and 1997, while its GNP shrank by at least another 55%. If one examines the impact of nearly two decades of continuous war,
austerity, and sanctions, the Iraqi population rose by more than 50% during 1980-1996, while the GNP shrank by well over 80." (Cordesman November 1998, p.8)

According to other sources, sanctions have an dire impact on the humanitarian situation
"The sanctions have, according to many international experts, journalists and UN agencies, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), crippled Iraq's economic infrastructure and have resulted in the breakdown of the socio-cultural fabric of the society, acute poverty, malnutrition, wide-spread corruption and crime, and the reported deaths of over half a million children under the age of five." (AI 24 November 1999, "Background")

'The Oil-for-Food programme' "has done much to alleviate the plight of the civilian population, especially as regards food and medicines. Malnutrition rates have stabilized since the programme began to be implemented in 1997. However, it has not halted the collapse of the health system and the deterioration of water supplies, which together pose one of the gravest threats to the health and well-being of the civilian population.

Resolution 986 also allows certain equipment to reach Iraq, for example pumps for water treatment. This does not, however, solve all the problems. The equipment needs to be properly installed and backed up by more general maintenance work on existing equipment and structures. The government often does not have the resources to pay for contractors to install it. This has thus become one of the major tasks for humanitarian organizations in Iraq." (ICRC 14 March 2000, III)

"The overall humanitarian situation in Iraq remained dire despite the expanded 'oil-for-food' program'. In his March 10 [2000] report to the Security Council on the operation of the program, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that 'an excessive number of holds' continued to impede the relief program. These included holds on contracts in the water and sanitation and electric power sectors, which he stated were a major factor impeding progress in the area of public health. In his most recent report of September 8 to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted some improvements in this area, but said that 'infrastructural degradation' of the water and sanitation sector was being exacerbated by "the absence of key complementary items currently on hold and adequate maintenance, spare parts and staffing.' As regards the electricity sector, the report stated that the 'entire electricity grid is in a precarious state and is in imminent danger of collapsing altogether.' The overall provision of health care and services was said to be in 'steep decline.' This assessment was supported by the findings of U.N. and other humanitarian agencies." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")

"[The] embargo, unprecedented in its comprehensiveness and now well into its tenth year, has taken an enormous toll on Iraqi lives and had a ruinous impact on Iraqi society. [...]The balance sheet of several years of sanctions against Iraq reveals a minimum of political dividends as against a high human price paid primarily by women and children. The food rationing system provides less than 60 percent of the required daily calorie intake, the water and sanitation systems are in a state of collapse, and there is a critical shortage of life-saving drugs. [...]"

The devastating impact of the sanctions is largely a consequence of their unprecedentedly comprehensive scope and duration, coupled with the fact that their imposition followed the military campaign to compel Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. This campaign, conducted under the authority conferred by Resolution 678 (1990), included air attacks that crippled most of Iraq's electrical power system. Because of the centrality of the country's electric power grid to water and sewage treatment, the health care system, agricultural irrigation, and other vital civilian areas, these attacks have had grave civilian consequences. The embargo, in turn, has severely impeded the repair and reconstruction of these sectors that together function as a life support system for most of Iraqi society. More than nine years after the war, it is less and less possible to resort to the make-shift repairs and cannibalization of parts that for a number of years enabled the country to keep in operation some of its pre-war stock of generators, transformers, water pumps, and similar sorts of equipment.
This physical breakdown has been accompanied by the devastation of the country's human resource infrastructure. Real incomes and purchasing power of the great majority of Iraqis plummeted, leading many salaried professionals and skilled workers to emigrate or to shift to casual unskilled labor. This systematic 'de-skilling' of the population has been aggravated by the severe intellectual isolation stemming from the extension of the embargo to cover professional and scientific journals and books as well as travel outside the country to professional conferences and the like. The damage to the country's physical and human infrastructure and the acutely distressed income levels of most of the population have seriously compromised the beneficial impact of a program limited to commodities alone." (HRW 5 January 2000)

"As in war, it is civilians who are the prime victims of sanctions. Salaries are as low as US$2 a month; there is around 50% unemployment. People have had to sell their belongings in order to survive -- first their cars, then household appliances, even their books and furniture. Regular school attendance by children under 15 has fallen drastically since 1990 for 'school does not give us money in order to live'. And in the schools themselves, pupils often have to squat on the floor for want of chairs and desks. Water pipes have not been repaired, and there are huge pools of stagnating water in the school yard." (ICRC 14 March 2000, I)

**Several NGOs doubt that the revised sanction regime will improve the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi population**

"CAFOD, the Catholic Aid Agency, says the new economic sanctions on Iraq reflect little more than cosmetic changes and will do little to help the plight of the ordinary people.

The new UN resolution on economic sanctions focuses on streamlining procedures rather than on radical change while the number of projects on hold continues to escalate dramatically." (CAFOD 16 May 2002)

"The Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI) today expressed its disappointment at the failure of UN Security Council Resolution 1409 to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq sufficiently. The resolution, which implements a revised Goods Review List of 'dual-use' items with effect from 30 May 2002, indicates the cementing of the US-UK policy of 'smart sanctions' on Iraq.

The resolution is likely to have little effect on Iraq's humanitarian situation." (CASI 15 May 2002)

**UNICEF and other organizations highlight reasons for North-South economic disparities (2000-2002)**

- The Oil-for-food program in the South is administered by the Iraqi regime, while in the North it is under UN responsibility
- 87% population living in the Center/South have access effectively only to about 53% of the oil for food money
- In the North, the program includes a cash component, through which oil for food money can be used to pay local labor or to purchase local goods, which is not the case in the Center/South
- The North benefits from other elements as well: many international NGOs are present in the North; the North is the traditional agricultural center of Iraq
- According to a SCF UK study in 2002 on Kurdish livelihoods in northern Iraq, sanctions have almost totally impoverished the population of northern Iraq despite oil-for-food program

"At the political level, the largely Kurdish North functions under the Western protection, and the food, health, and economic life of the three governorates are managed by local Iraqi Kurdish officials under the control of the UN. In the Center/South the Iraqi government maintains sovereign control of food rationing.
health infrastructure, the economy, etc., although it remains under close and constant supervision by the UN. Economically, the North is far more productive: it is the traditional agricultural center of the country, its border with Turkey is thoroughly porous for both legal and clandestine trade, it has sufficient indigenous water supplies, officials are permitted to purchase local food and other commodities, and it has access to a cash component out of its oil for food funds that can be used to hire local workers or buy local materials for reconstruction. It currently receives a higher per capita amount of money from the oil for food program.

The UNICEF director spent some time explaining to the staff delegation [of the American Friends Service Committee] the question of disparity in health and other social indicators between the North and South/Center of Iraq. This has been a consistent issue in U.S. and other policy debates, with the assertion made that 'the' reason for the discrepancy is the fact that the UN controls distribution in the North, and the Iraqi regime in the South/Center.

Dr. Rao Singh [UNICEF Director] made clear that the issue arises from a complex set of factors, not any single issue, and is certainly not only because the UN is responsible in North and Iraq in Center-South. There are many reasons:

1) There is a significant per capita disparity in oil for food money available for education, infrastructure, etc. in favor of the North. This is because the 13% component of the oil for food funds reserved for the North is taken off the top; the Center/South's share is not 87%, but is only what is left over after deducting the required 30% off the top guaranteed to the Kuwait reparations fund, and the amount deducted to cover costs of the UN operation. The result is the 87% population living in the Center/South have access only to about 53% of the oil for food money.

2) In the North, the program includes a cash component, through which oil for food money can be used to pay local labor or to purchase local goods (food or supplies). In the Center/South, no oil for food money can be used for local purchases or labor, creating additional problems in transport, installation, and use of imported goods. Therefore in the North that cash component allows a much more efficient use of money.

3) Human resources are a serious problem in the Center/South. There are many highly trained professionals left there still working, but they work for government wages which now average $10/month.

Other UN officials provided additional insight to the complexity of the disparity. Non-governmental humanitarian organizations with large-scale financial and political support from Western governments, began working in the North immediately after the Gulf war in 1991; there are now more than 30 agencies working there. In the Center/South, partly because of Iraqi government restrictions and other difficulties, most NGOs began working only after 1996, and there are only 11 there now, mostly with much smaller-scale resources. Additionally, the North was the traditional agricultural center of Iraq; almost half (48%) of Iraq's arable land is in the North, populated by only 13% of the people, and locally produced food is far more abundant. The availability of fresh water is also far higher, and the North's longstanding traditional agricultural methods were far less vulnerable to coalition bombing during Desert Storm than was the newer high-tech, industrialized electricity-dependent agricultural systems in the Center/South.

There are certainly related problems having to do with the role of the Iraqi regime. It seems clear that the government has access to some amount of money (generally thought to be between $300 and $400 million) obtained from smuggled oil sales. That money is generally not being used for civilian assistance, although the palace-building projects provide WPA-style construction work for Iraqis, using local cement, local labor, and payment in local currency. However, it is likely that it is not a sufficient amount of money to be able to play a major role in the broader sanctions-driven impoverishment." (AFSC 21 March 2000, "Humanitarian effect of economic sanctions")

"The Save the Children UK study [on Kurdish livelihoods in northern Iraq] concludes that sanctions and the Oil for Food program have almost totally impoverished the population of Northern Iraq -- raising dependency levels to internationally unprecedented levels - and that the Government of Iraq is a major
beneficiary of the Oil for Food program, as it manages food distribution. The organisation warned, however, that any scaling back of the Oil for Food program currently associated with sanctions could "send Kurds living in Northern Iraq over the edge into a humanitarian catastrophe." (SCF-UK 4 Feb 2002)

**UN conducted IDP survey in northern Iraq in 2001 and plans to conduct census to assess recent demographic changes (Feb 2002)**

"The United Nations is to conduct a large-scale census in Northern Iraq. The World Food Program hopes the data received will facilitate the relief Kurds receive under the oil-for-food program, "Iraq Press" reported from Irbil on 5 February. UN estimates put the Kurdish population in the region at 3.5 million, but it wants to obtain exact data due to recent demographic changes.

The region was the target of massive relocation in the decade following the Gulf War. The census is expected to provide information on the movement of peoples, living standards, types of houses, and even the number of disabled persons.

Iraq carried out its first census under the UN trade sanctions in 1997, but it did not cover the three northern provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah, which constitute the territory of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Iraq's population was then estimated at 22.4 million." (RFE/RL 8 Feb 2002)

**2001 UN-Habitat IDP Site and Family Survey**

"The objective of this survey is certainly that of accounting for the IDP population according to […] the definition according to which IDPs are all those people that have been displaced in any time against their will. The survey aims also to satisfy some more specific policy information needs that will help international community to develop policies for humanitarian aid. These needs are: Assessing the magnitude of the IDP phenomenon with reference to the size and location of IDP settlements. Producing evidence on problems that affect this population and to ascertain vulnerability gradients and differentials existing among them. Acknowledging their different biographies and their different needs and expectations, particularly with respect to on-going resettlement programs. Making decision makers aware of the groups that are receiving support from humanitarian programs and the groups that are lacking assistance." (UN-Habitat January 2001, p2)

**Habitat (UNCHS) provides shelter, infrastructure and services activities to internally displaced persons (1999-2002)**

- United Nations Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq is the ad hoc agency coordinating implementation of Security Council Resolution 986
- Habitat (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) assists in implementing settlement rehabilitation component of Oil-for-Food Program
- Program gives particular attention to the needs of internally displaced persons and those most affected by the breakdown of services
- According to Habitat, rehabilitation activities in the south of the country started in 2000 but were slow due to sanctions (2002)

"UNOHCI (United Nations Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq) is the ad hoc agency coordinating implementation of Security Council Resolution 986. All the UN agencies, apart from UNHCR, are involved in supervising implementation of the oil-for-food programme in their specific fields through small-scale but regular programmes." (ICRC 11 June 2001, Sect.1)
"UNCHS (Habitat) was called upon to assist in the implementation of the Settlements Rehabilitation component of the 'oil for food' agreement between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations. The agreement allows for attention to be paid to the urgent humanitarian needs of the population affected by the conflict in the Gulf. Other UN agencies are implementing complementary activities under the programme in other sectors such as food, health, energy and de-mining.

The programme gives particular attention to the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those most affected by the breakdown of services, numbering over half a million people. The overall works on urban and rural services benefit either directly or indirectly the three million people living in the Northern Governorates. The programme provides integrated packages of infrastructure and services to achieve four main goals: the resettlement and consolidation of rural villages; the attention to growth centres and towns; the rehabilitation of infrastructure in urban areas; and, the attention to Internally Displaced Persons. The programme is implemented in close collaboration with the local authorities and the active participation of communities and the private sector in all stages from planning to actual execution of work […]

Each of the programme components consists of 'packages' of shelter, infrastructure and services activities aiming at giving and integrated humanitarian response to the needs of IDPs and rural and urban communities. The selection of the 'package' of activities to be implemented in each community is carried out with the participation of the beneficiaries and in consultation with other external support agencies implementing complementary activities.

The activities included in each package in consultation with the affected communities and local authorities might include:

i. Rural access roads and ancillary works
ii. Water supply and sanitation
iii. Essential infrastructure (irrigation channels and others)
iv. Buildings for schools and health centres
v. Organisation and capacity building for rehabilitation and operation
vi. Shelter with community participation

Organisation and capacity building activities are an integral part of the community rehabilitation process in order to ensure its sustainability." (UNCHS December 2000)

"The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) continued to construct shelters and associated facilities in the three northern governorates. […]

So far, about 8,000 new houses have been constructed since the start of the programme. The number of additional houses planned to be built across all three governorates is estimated at about 26,000. These figures are too low in comparison with the high estimated number of internally displaced persons in the area. In that regard, the results of the Habitat surveys will be used in devising, through improved planning and coordination in cooperation with all concerned, an accelerated resettlement strategy that addresses more precisely the particular needs of the various categories of beneficiaries within viable communities. The strengthening of local sustainability, the availability of building materials and the maximization of local construction industry output are also factors in this programme. […]

A total of 150 families, previously living in most deplorable conditions at a temporary camp at Kani Shaitan in the governorate of Sulaymaniyyah, have since December been moved to new houses constructed by Habitat in nearby Chamchamal. Habitat is planning to construct additional houses in Chamchamal for priority allocation to the approximately 50 families remaining in Kani Shaitan. Local authorities have demolished the camp and are planning to close off the area completely once the remaining eligible families have been housed in Chamchamal town." (UN SC 2 March 2001, para. 135-137)

**The case of Dal da Ghan, village of Northern Iraq**

"During the Iraqi Anfal campaign about 4000 villages like this one [Dal da Ghan, northern Iraq] were forcibly depopulated, burned to the ground and dynamited by government troops. In some cases soldiers
burned down the trees, and relocated the inhabitants to camps away from the borders with Iran and Turkey. You can still see the ruins of village after village along the highways. Dan da Ghan itself was destroyed in 1987.

The reconstruction of Dan da Ghan is part of a virtual UN welfare state in northern Iraq. Over the last few years the UN Habitat program scouted out villagers who were willing to return. The program spent about US $24,000 to provide the village with material to build houses, schools, roads and water facilities. 

(Aquila Lawrence, Summer 2000)

**Construction activities in the south of Iraq**

"Par suite des sanctions imposées par les Nations Unies sur l'Iraq, beaucoup d'activités de construction ont été suspendues. Malgré de grands efforts de réhabilitation, les réseaux de traitement des eaux et d'approvisionnement en eau et les systèmes d'élimination des eaux usées ont été réduits à moins de la moitié de leur capacité. L'effet de la dislocation des services sur les populations urbaines qui se concentrent dans certains quartiers de Bagdad deviennent catastrophiques. Les conditions de vie se sont détériorées et les risques de maladies se sont accru. Il faut des processus novateurs pour améliorer les conditions de vie dans les quartiers, s'appuyant sur la participation des communautés, en partenariat étroit avec les autorités locales. […]

Le projet consiste en un schéma pilote de réhabilitation communautaire qui est mis en œuvre dans deux communautés choisies de Bagdad, Shu'lla et Habibia." (UN-Habitat 2002)

**WFP distributes food to the internally displaced in northern Iraq and observes adequacy of rations in government-controlled area (2000-2001)**

- WFP reports also runs special income generation projects targeting internally displaced persons

"The WFP operation in Iraq includes both participation in the general food distribution to the Iraqi population under Security Council resolution (SCR) 986 and a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) [Iraq 6085.00] targeted to malnourished children, their families, patients in hospitals and residents in social institutions. Under SCR 986, also known as the 'oil for food' agreement, WFP is responsible for observing the equity, efficiency, and adequacy of the ration throughout Iraq, and for conducting distribution of commodities to 3.1 million people [including displaced persons] in the three northern autonomous governorates." (WFP 2000)

"While WFP assisted IDPs under different EMOPs in the aftermath of Gulf war, IDPs are no longer a WFP category of beneficiaries under SCR 986 and the general food distribution scheme as, according to the MOU between the UN and the GOI, every person residing in Iraq is entitled to food ration regardless of status […]

[The] food need [of the internally displaced persons] is fully met through the WFP safety food basket net. Hence we can say that WFP feeds all 800,000 IDPs in Northern Iraq. IDPs major needs, mostly unmet, are houses, water, sanitation, drainage system, electricity etc.

WFP considers IDPs among the most vulnerable of all the beneficiaries. Hence, in addition to general food distribution to all IDPs, all WFP household food security/income generation interventions (about $ 6 million) started in 1999 are targeted to IDPs, particularly Female Headed Households. This include small ruminant projects, backyard poultry projects and gardening projects. These interventions enable households to supplement the general food ration ( eggs, meat, vegetable etc..) and generate some income to meet other needs." (WFP February 2001)
UNOPS procures emergency relief items to internally displaced persons in northern Iraq (2001)

"[...] [T]he United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has taken over from the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq the responsibility for procuring emergency relief items such as tents, blankets, heaters and stoves to support internally displaced persons. [...] At the beginning of April [2001], UNOPS will conduct an assessment of emergency needs for those living in camps and 'hard' shelters in order to ensure that appropriate and adequate relief items are provided." (UN SC 2 March 2001, para.138)

UN Human Rights bodies condemn forced displacement from Kirkuk and other human rights violations in Iraq (2000-2002)

- Government challenged the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to provide evidence of allegation of forcible expulsion
- UN Commission on Human Rights urged government to stop practice of forced deportation and relocation (April 2000 and April 2001)
- Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Iraq is gathering evidence of forced displacement from Kirkuk
- UN Special Rapporteur finally allowed in Iraq in Feb 2002; last visit of Special Rapporteur was in 1992

"The practice of forcible expulsions of thousands of families on the basis of their ethnic origin violates Iraq's obligation under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to which it acceded in 1970. Article 2(1a) of CERD states that 'Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against person, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this legislation'. In its 14th periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in February 1999 Iraq denied that it had expelled non-Arab families. It stated that 'The Government of Iraq categorically refutes the allegation that it has forcibly expelled non-Arab ethnic groups and requests the Committee to provide it with the factual evidence substantiating that allegation.' [CERD/C/320/Add. 3 - Periodic Report of Iraq, page 9.]." (AI 24 November 2000, "Forcible expulsion")

"The Special Rapporteur [of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Iraq] asked those alleging [that non-Arab resident of the Kirkuk area are driven from their homes by the Government] to supply him with a list of the families who left the Kirkuk area, containing names, addresses, circumstances and date of departure from Kirkuk, copy or mention of any legal documents invoked or served on them, and information on circumstances connected with their relocation, as well as information as to who moved into their abandoned residences." (UN GA 14 August 2000, para.51)

"A significant breakthrough was achieved in the context of the relations with the Government of Iraq when the Government, in January 2002, announced that it would accept a visit to Iraq by the Special Rapporteur, who eventually undertook a mission to the country from 11 to 15 February 2002. [...]"

The Special Rapporteur appreciates this positive response from the Government to his repeated requests for a visit. He sees this initial mission as an exploratory one, the main purpose of which was to set the stage for future cooperation. Owing to the short notice prior to the mission, as well as the short duration of the visit, the Special Rapporteur decided that only a limited number of pre-selected human rights issues could be raised.
The Special Rapporteur is pleased that contacts with the Government were established and that mechanisms and procedures for communications with the Government regarding allegations of violations of human rights were put in place during the mission. The success of the dialogue will depend on the continued cooperation of the Government. The ultimate measure of success will be the successful implementation of recommendations submitted by the Special Rapporteur.

[...] the Special Rapporteur continued to receive from various sources a number of written allegations of human rights violations. Allegations of violations committed by the Government covered a very broad range of issues, including arbitrary and extrajudicial execution, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment and punishment, restrictions on religious and political freedom, forced displacement of ethnic minorities and "arabization", and forced military recruitment. The Special Rapporteur plans to investigate these allegations further in the context of the new mechanisms and procedures established with the Government of Iraq in this regard." (CHR 15 March 2002, Introduction)

"Special rapporteurs are independent experts who report to the annual sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission, which established the mandate for a rapporteur on Iraq in 1991.

Since then, the Iraqi government has accepted only one visit, which was conducted by the former special rapporteur Max van der Stoel in 1992." (AFP 12 Feb 2002)

[The Commission on Human Rights] "calls upon the Government of Iraq [t]o respect the rights of all ethnic and religious groups and to cease immediately its continued repressive practices, including the practice of forced deportation and relocation, against the Iraqi Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmen, in particular their deportation from the regions of Kirkuk and Khanaquin, and against the population of the southern marsh areas, where drainage projects have provoked environmental destruction and a deterioration of the situation of the civilian population, and to ensure the personal integrity and freedoms of all citizens, including the Shia population." (CHR 18 April 2000 & 18 April 2001)

The UN General Assembly "Notes with dismay that there has been no improvement in the situation of human rights in the country;

Strongly condemns:
(a) The systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror;
(b) The suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information, association, assembly and movement, through fear of arrest, imprisonment, execution, expulsion, house demolition and other sanctions." (UN GA 27 Feb 2002)

**UNOPS and several NGOs conduct mine clearing programs in northern Iraq (2000-2002)**

- UNOPS has an emergency de-mining program with teams in the three northern governorates
- UNOPS launched the night phase of the mine action project in northern Iraq in 2002

"Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before 1991, continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them before it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted haphazardly in civilian areas. Landmines are also a problem along the Iraq-Iran border throughout central and southern Iraq. There is no information on civilian casualties or the efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields in areas under the central Government's control. According to reports by the U.N. Office of Project Services, the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian Peoples Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed in the three northern governates since the 1991 uprising. The Special Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation..."
under the Land Mines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of mines. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued efforts to remove land mines from the area and increase awareness of the mine problem among local residents. In December 1998, the Government declared that mine-clearing activity was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such activity to leave Iraq. On April 26, a New Zealander working for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was shot and killed by an unknown assailant who first asked for water and then fired three times at close range." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")

"UNOPS is the UN organization which is officially dealing with mines in the autonomous governorates of Erbil, Dubouk and Sulaimanyah. UNOPS, under UNDP, has established an emergency de-mining programme with one team of expatriate de-miners stationed in each governorate. The expatriate teams are training local teams in de-mining techniques and have already started clearing identified fields." (IFRC 5 December 2000, Sect.3)

"UNOPS has been asked by the UN Office of the Iraq Programme to launch the ninth phase of a mine action project in northern Iraq.[…]

The project will help create a safer environment for farmers and others who depend on the land for their livelihoods in three northern governorates of the country and complete the implementation of a comprehensive network of services for victims.

Statistics show that as of the end of August 2001, approximately 27,000 families in 165 communities have so far benefited from UNOPS-implemented mine-clearance activities. As a result of UNOPS’ work, more than 400,000 kilogrammes of crops were produced in 2001 on cleared land, 34,700 livestock can now graze safely, 3,300 people have improved water supplies, and 400,000 people near Sulaimaniya have access to electricity.

According to a UNOPS survey of almost 4,500 communities in the region, about 1,100 of them, mostly in rural areas, have been affected by the explosive devices. Mines hamper economic development because they prevent the reconstruction of road networks and power lines, restrict the movement of teachers, technicians and doctors, and the transport of food and medical aid." (UNOPS 29 Jan 2002)

**Governments and NGOs response**

**ICRC & IFRC provide assistance to the internally displaced population in northern Iraq (2000-2002)**

- In northern Iraq, ICRC focuses on providing basic infrastructure to the displaced (water & sanitation)
- In 2000, ICRC provided non-food items to 400 displaced families in southern Iraq
- In 2001, IFRC distributed to IDPs in northern Iraq items most needed during cold winter months such as blankets, kerosene heaters, etc.

*ICRC*

*In 2000*, the "ICRC remained concerned about the humanitarian implications of the sanctions on Iraq. To alleviate the plight of the civilian population, it continued to focus its activities on needs not covered by the oil-for-food programme." (ICRC 6 July 2001)

"The ICRC’s goal in northern Iraq is that internally displaced persons and rural communities in particular should have access to water and benefit from sanitary conditions in accordance with WHO standards. The
focus is therefore on basic infrastructure such as water-supply systems and sewage-evacuation networks requiring either maintenance work or emergency repairs. An important criterion for new projects in 2001 will be, apart from the humanitarian needs, that for some reason they cannot be carried out under the oil-for-food programme.” (ICRC 11 June 2001)

"In northern Iraq, the water situation improved in a camp for 5,000 displaced persons in arbil following work by ICRC engineers to extend the internal network and increase the number of water distribution points. […]

In Iraq thousands of people have been driven from their homes, in particular in northern Iraq where, according to the authorities, fighting between rival Kurdish factions has displaced some 120,000 people. Many of the displaced are living in tents, open spaces, or unheated public buildings. In northern Iraq, the ICRC continued to carry out individual surveys of displaced families, and pursued its cooperation with the Iraqi Red Crescent for the distribution of non-food items.

In 2000 the ICRC carried out a survey, in cooperation with the Iraqi Red Crescent and local authorities, of the internally displaced population in southern Iraq. A group of 400 families (2,334 people) was identified as the most vulnerable and received an ad hoc supply of non-food items. (ICRC 6 July 2001)

"The ICRC's main office is in Baghdad, and there are three offices in northern Iraq (in Arbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah). It is thus the ICRC's largest operation in the Middle East." (ICRC 14 March 2000, IV)
"An important development in 2000 was the reopening of an office in the southern city of Basra." (ICRC 6 July 2001)

**IFRC**

*In its annual report for 2001, IFRC said that:*

"Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees have settled in the northern governorates and live in precarious conditions in abandoned complexes, tents, schools or other unoccupied buildings. The vulnerable families needed blankets, heaters, plastic sheeting, kerosene lamps, tents, cooking sets, jerrycans and water tanks.

**Goal**

To alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable refugees, IDPs and returnee population in the three northern governorates. The total number of beneficiaries was more than 6,500 families in the Duhouk, Erbil and Suleimaniah governorates. Distributions included the items most needed during cold winter months such as blankets, kerosene heaters, etc." (IFRC 28 May 2002)

**Governments' and international NGOs' activities aim to complement Oil-for-Food Program (1999-2001)**

- EU is the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq and focuses on the center and south of Iraq
- CARE & Première Urgence both have projects to house internally displaced persons

**EU**

ECHO's current criterion for establishing priorities is to provide actions that are complementary to the oil-for-humanitarian goods program in favour of the most vulnerable, concentrating on topical sectors where it would remain useful and cost-effective. In particular, compensation for the lack of 'cash assistance' in the centre and south ( pop. Mio 19, Baghdad Mio 4) where humanitarian needs are greater than in the north of the country (pop. Mio 3). A 8,6 million Plan of Action for Iraq for the year 2000 was approved by the Commission on 19 April 2000. […]
The Plan of Action activities are implemented through various NGOs and UN agencies namely: Care-UK, Première Urgence (France), Enfants du Monde - Droits de l'Homme (France), Médecins du monde (France), Netherlands Red Cross, UNICEF and UNHCS (UN Centre for Human Settlements, Habitat)." (EU 19 February 2001)

"The E.U. remained the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq, with 8.6 million euros allocated for the year through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)." (HRW December 2000 "The Role of the International Community")

**CARE**
"Apart from the United nations and Red Cross, CARE is the only international NGO that has a significant and active presence in Iraq. CARE International has been working in Iraq since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in 1991, meeting the basic humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Projects have been funded by various donors including the Government of the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, USA, Australia, South Africa, the European Union in addition to UNICEF, UN WFP, UNHCR and UNDHA." (CARE 16 December 1998)

"CARE has been actively engaged in various sectors, but most extensively in the areas of water, sanitation, education and health." (CARE Australia 2001)

**Première Urgence**
"The situation of the displaced populations is particularly precarious since they are not covered by any governmental programmes. Thousands of families live in great difficulty in unhealthy shelters; unused barracks, temporary dwellings made of earth or branches, abandoned schools,…

In 1999, Première Urgence started the rehabilitation of community centers to house these displaced populations. Our objective is not only to provide them with better living conditions, but also to encourage their integration into the economic and social fabric." (Première Urgence 2000)

**U.S. Government approved aid to Iraqi opposition to conduct humanitarian program benefiting the displaced population in Iraq (2001)**

- Iraqi National Congress plans to use U.S. funds to distribute humanitarian aid to displaced persons in northern Iraq and to Iraqis living in areas controlled by the regime, like the Marsh Arabs
- There is some skepticism as to whether the INC's action will be efficient

"In a report submitted to Congress on Wednesday, the [Clinton] administration outlined plans to distribute food, medicine and other forms of humanitarian relief inside government-controlled areas of Iraq by means of the Iraqi National Congress, or INC, the main umbrella group for opposition forces arrayed against Hussein's government.

Notwithstanding its humanitarian purpose, the $12 million program has important political and security implications because it would commit the United States to assist the INC in reestablishing a substantial operation inside the U.S.-protected 'safe area' of northern Iraq, from which it was ousted by Hussein's forces in 1996. Congress appropriated funds for the program last fall and gave the administration until Jan. 5 to develop a plan for carrying it out.

According to the plan, prepared in close consultation with the INC, opposition members will make clandestine forays into government-controlled areas to distribute relief supplies and propaganda. Administration officials acknowledge that the Iraqi leader is sure to regard the opposition's presence as a provocation, raising questions about the willingness of the incoming Bush administration to protect the relief operation from Iraqi government forces.
Opposition leaders, meanwhile, say they view the operation as a precursor to the armed insurrection that they hope to mount one day with the help of American weapons and air support. […]

In 1998, Congress passed, and Clinton reluctantly signed, the Iraq Liberation Act. It authorized the Pentagon to provide the opposition with as much as $97 million in arms and military training. So far, however, the Pentagon has spent barely $2 million of that sum, most of it to provide nonlethal training in areas such as civil-military relations and logistics. In addition, the administration last fall provided the London-based INC with $4 million for administrative and broadcasting expenses. […]

According to the eight-page report, the INC plans to distribute humanitarian aid to displaced persons in northern Iraq and to 'Iraqis living in areas controlled by the regime (especially Marsh Arabs and other people living in southern Iraq and the Iran-Iraq border areas).’ To that end, the opposition will set up relief offices in northern Iraq and southern Iran; aid will be distributed in government-controlled areas of the south 'through temporary deployments of mobile teams supported by offices in Iran.’” (Lancaster 14 January 2001)

"The once moribund Iraqi National Congress (INC) has apparently gained a new lease on life. After weeks of intensive talks in Washington, Ahmad Chalabi – leader of the self-appointed Iraqi opposition in exile-visited Iran to establish a base for sending roughly 100 INC operatives into northern Iraq to gather intelligence and distribute 'humanitarian aid,' all at US expense. The INC, widely distrusted in the Arab world and known to have seriously mismanaged its funds, has been unable to convert the millions of dollars in US aid granted by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 into a credible threat to the Iraqi regime. Still, the INC and its Pentagon and Congressional champions clamor for increased aid.” (Jabar 23 March 2001)
### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
<td>Energy Information Administration</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>HROI</td>
<td>Human Rights Organization in Iraq</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>INC</td>
<td>Iraqi National Congress</td>
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<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdish Democratic Party</td>
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<td>KDPI</td>
<td>Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIP</td>
<td>United Nations of the Iraq Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers' Party</td>
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<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation</td>
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<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<td>SCIRI</td>
<td>Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>Sfr.</td>
<td>Swiss Francs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>UN-Habitat or UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Center for Human Settlements</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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