ROUTES TO RESILIENCE

INSIGHTS FROM BRACED TO BRACED-X

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Synthesis paper
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3As</td>
<td>Absorb, Anticipate and Adapt</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>French Development Agency</td>
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<td>ANICT</td>
<td>National Agency for Local Government Investment</td>
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<td>ARD</td>
<td>Regional Development Agency</td>
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<td>ARS</td>
<td>Annual Reporting Supplement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRACED</td>
<td>Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRACED-X</td>
<td>BRACED extension period</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRES</td>
<td>Building Resilience by Changing Farming, Forestry and Early Warning Practices (BRACED-X project)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIARE</td>
<td>Climate Information and Assets for Resilience in Ethiopia (BRACED project)</td>
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<td>CILSS</td>
<td>Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel</td>
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<td>CMESA-E</td>
<td>Climate and Meteorological Service Advancement in Ethiopia (BRACED-X project)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Commercial Pocket Approach</td>
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<td>DCF</td>
<td>Decentralising Climate Funds (BRACED-X project)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Fund Manager</td>
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<td>GCA</td>
<td>Global Commission on Adaptation</td>
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<td>GCF</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Development Corporation</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>Knowledge Manager</td>
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<td>LAPA</td>
<td>Local Adaptation Plan of Action</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MAR</td>
<td>Market Approaches to Resilience (BRACED-X project)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRR</td>
<td>Monitoring and Results Reporting</td>
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<td>NFCS</td>
<td>National Framework for Climate Services</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NNL</td>
<td>Nourishing Nomads Limited</td>
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<td>PASA</td>
<td>Food Security Support Project</td>
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<td>PEPISAO</td>
<td>Integrated and Sustainable Livestock Farming and Pastoralism in West Africa Project</td>
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<td>PRAPS</td>
<td>Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project</td>
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<td>PREDIP</td>
<td>Regional Dialogue and Investment Program for Pastoralism and Transhumance in the Sahel and Coastal Countries of West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRORESA</td>
<td>Strengthening Food Security Project</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Private Service Provider</td>
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<td>RTR</td>
<td>Routes to Resilience</td>
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<td>SACCO</td>
<td>Savings and Credit Cooperative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SILC</td>
<td>Saving and Internal Lending Community</td>
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<td>SUR1M</td>
<td>Scaling up Resilience to Climate Extremes for over 1 Million People (BRACED-X project)</td>
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<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>VSF-B</td>
<td>Vétérinaires Sans Frontières – Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSLA</td>
<td>Village Savings and Loan Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAPC</td>
<td>Ward Adaptation Planning Committee</td>
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<td>WYL</td>
<td>Waati Yelem Labenw (BRACED-X project)</td>
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Foreword

This report, Routes to Resilience: Insights from BRACED to BRACED-X, arrives at a very special point in time.

It comes at the end of BRACED (Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters), the single biggest donor investment in resilience of vulnerable groups in fragile contexts in the face of rising climate and disaster risks. The world has been watching what can be achieved in difficult contexts, operating locally but aiming for results at scale. Now is the time to look back and see what has been achieved, and what we have learnt in the process.

It is also a time of unprecedented awareness of the way risks are rising, not just in the most fragile contexts but everywhere around the world, as demonstrated by costly and deadly events in recent memory such as Hurricane Harvey (US$100 billion damages, three times more likely owing to climate change), or the recent killer heatwave in Europe (at least five times more likely owing to climate change). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has long been clear that, while these Western disasters capture more attention, the most vulnerable groups, especially in fragile contexts, are hit hardest by the rising risks.

Furthermore, it comes at a time of a very strong call to turn the tide. Not just the rising concentration of greenhouse gases, which are putting us on track for an ever more volatile climate, but also the inexcusable lack of attention to these risks, especially in the most vulnerable contexts. This call is coming not just from environmental groups, or from an unprecedented mobilisation of youth around the world; but also from the highest political level. To raise ambition on climate action, UN Secretary General Guterres has called a Climate Summit at Head of State level, coming up in September 2019.

On this front – on how to build resilience among the most vulnerable – BRACED brings some of the most detailed and concrete examples and findings. These findings are also informing the Global Commission on Adaptation (GCA), chaired by former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, World Bank CEO Kristalina Georgieva and Bill Gates. Just ahead of the Summit, the GCA will launch its flagship report and a series of Action Tracks, which aim to increase political momentum and massively scale up implementation of effective adaptation, by governments all around the world, the private sector and civil society.

We are proud of the wealth of detailed analysis from BRACED that can be used to inform political decisions and guide where and how to invest in the resilience of those most at risk.

In this extension year of BRACED, we have looked only at outcomes – a higher bar than just the outputs produced by the projects in their initial years. We wanted to see to what extent the projects have in fact been able to build anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacities, and the extent to which transformational change has occurred in the process.
We addressed five questions in particular:

1. What adaptive capacity outcomes are possible with more time?
2. To what extent can consortia projects be adaptive?
3. How can projects foster gender equality and build resilience?
4. To what extent is policy change possible from the bottom up?
5. How can sustainability be supported within the lifetime of a project?

The report in front of you provides many valuable insights, which I am sure will inform the inevitable increase in attention to the resilience of the most vulnerable, especially in fragile contexts.

I believe the report will be a treasure trove for local, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are supporting communities in fragile contexts and want to learn how their work can enhance resilience. It also contains some warnings and lessons learnt, for instance regarding support on climate services.

But it should also be of value to governments of countries affected by rising climate risks, which are wondering how to reduce the risk facing their populations in the most effective way. There are many messages about partnerships, and the respective role of government across scales, the private sector and civil society, including local groups right at the community level.

There are also clear messages for donors, and for those engaged in project and programme design. For instance, three years is a short time to expect transformational results, especially when the target population comprises the most vulnerable groups (there are trade-offs between quick wins and reaching the poorest people in the most fragile contexts). But what we found is also that it is not just about time but also about timing. Adaptive management, flexible decision making and phased approaches can help achieve better results.

I would like to thank the authors of this report for their detailed and valuable analysis, but also many others who have contributed to these findings, including the UK Department for International Development for its support to such knowledge management over and above the immediate project implementation, and last but not least the NGOs that have implemented the projects and the communities and partners with which they have worked. These actors have generated a great deal of the ideas and much of the information on which our analysis is based. Our BRACED journey is ending but the world’s journey to increase resilience in a changing climate is only just starting – and I trust the analysis you are about to read will help chart an effective course.

Maarten van Aalst
Director, Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre,
and Co-Chair of the BRACED Knowledge Manager
After four years of implementation, this report presents a synthesis of the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) project annual reports, and evidence from four deep dives, from the 18-month extension, referred to as BRACED-X.

BRACED-X started in January 2018, following immediately on from BRACED. Its purpose was to consolidate and expand work already completed, with the aim to foster further progress towards the sustainability of the programme’s outcomes. Funding was organised into two windows: implementation and policy, with nine projects out of BRACED’s original fifteen selected for the extension. These projects continue to work across eight countries in East Africa, the Sahel and Asia.

Using the evidence provided by Implementing Partners (IPs), this report examines the questions: What has BRACED-X achieved and what does this mean for future resilience programming? To do so, the report challenges assumptions underpinning the original programme Theory of Change (ToC) that remain unanswered from BRACED, yet still relevant during the programme extension. To this end, five sub-questions are addressed in detail:

1. What adaptive capacity outcomes are possible with more time?
2. To what extent can consortia projects be adaptive?
3. How can projects foster gender equality and build resilience?
4. **To what extent is policy change possible from the bottom up?**
5. **How can sustainability be supported within the lifetime of a project?**

The BRACED extension has continued to contribute to resilience capacities and, to a lesser extent, to transformational changes. A detailed account of what has been achieved, and analysis and reflection on findings from the extension phase, are in **Section 3** and **Section 4**, respectively. Insight into what the evidence means in relation to the BRACED-X ToC can be found in **Section 5**.

Drawing on findings from across the nine projects, as well as from our learning through monitoring BRACED over the four-year period, we present five key messages that are a continuation of our understanding about what it really takes to build the resilience of the most vulnerable to climate and disaster extremes. The implications of these key messages for policy and practice are in **Section 5**.

**Key Message 1: Sustainability, in resilience terms, is about the ability to adapt as things change**

The uncertainty that comes with climatic variability and extremes challenges the extent to which choices made today can reduce or exacerbate current or future vulnerability, and facilitate or constrain future responses. Hence the ultimate measurement of sustainability must be people and institutions’ capacity to adapt to an uncertain future. This means dealing not only with climate risks that are known and already identified, but also with those unforeseen that are harder to prepare for. From a resilience perspective therefore, sustainability is not just about maintaining activities, but is also about the ability to respond flexibly to different disturbances. To this end, there is a need to think beyond activities that support adaptive capacity, to the factors and processes that underpin it and through which sustainable change can be realised over time (see **Section 4.2.3**). This means greater attention to change processes, and factors such as trust, or types of thinking and behaviour that enable people to positively adapt is needed. Moving beyond a narrow focus on the continuity of activities and benefits after projects end is also critical, as there is a risk that such a definition of sustainability limits the extent to which projects move beyond conventional activities towards transformative, risk-taking interventions that challenge underlying structural and socio-economic inequalities.

**Key Message 2: Transformational approaches are not optional; they are fundamental to strengthening resilience**

BRACED expectations included working at scale and reaching large numbers of people, through large and diverse consortia, while also addressing the vulnerabilities of the most marginalised and leaving no-one behind. Findings from BRACED demonstrate that these are not wholly incompatible goals, but they certainly merit further thought and clarity. Overall, the findings from the extension phase demonstrate that resilience programming needs to be better informed by robust analysis of who is vulnerable and why, and design and implement transformational approaches that tackle inequality directly if people’s resilience is to be improved (see **Section 4.2.1**). Results stress the
importance of making an analytical distinction between projects that display ‘social inclusion’, from those that work directly with the most vulnerable as a key goal for resilience, where transforming inequality is integral to project design. Having gender or vulnerability as an ‘add-on’ criterion for resilience programming is counterproductive, as it incentivises a culture of ‘high-number, measurable impact approaches’ and inadvertently steers project designs towards ‘quick-win’ activities and blanket assessments of vulnerability. While programmes may tick all of the boxes, they may still fall short of delivering adaptive capacity outcomes in the long term if focus remains on activities, rather than also on the linkages, processes and shifts needed to facilitate and support transformational change.

**Key Message 3: Beyond policy content, it is the timing and sequencing of policy engagement work at multiple scales that is critical**

BRACED targeted supporting changes in policies, political discourse and political actors’ behaviours that were favourable towards building the resilience of vulnerable populations. However, the evidence from the extension phase suggests that policy outcomes have, overall, been elusive, notwithstanding some successes in shorter-term changes in knowledge – and awareness-building, and access to and engagement with key stakeholders, which are requisite steps on a policy change pathway (see Section 4.2.2). Knowledge is foundational for building the shared understanding and buy-in required for policy change, and is a vital resource to inform policy outcomes when proactively used for this purpose. Yet a primary focus on knowledge-building alone will not lead to substantially improved policies that benefit those at risk from climate shocks and stresses. Enacting policy change requires longer term engagement or direct facilitation of policy development in the short term, driven simultaneously from the ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’, with relevant, influential actors to be involved in supporting the process. Policy change must also be supported by a shift in attitudes of policymakers towards the needs and capacities of marginalised people and the inequitable structures that underpin their vulnerability. Measuring defined progress markers, such as networks built at individual level, likewise does not indicate whether policy change has been achieved. IPs have built relationships with a variety of stakeholders and obtained endorsement and verbal commitments around the policy changes they want to bring about. Yet these have not necessarily resulted in policy change. Policies need to be acted upon in order to support the populations BRACED engaged with, and the long-term effect of policy depends on the will, capacity and fiscal commitments of key institutions to implement them.

**Key Message 4: Higher degrees of flexibility are needed both in the design and management of resilience programmes**

Evidence from BRACED-X points to the fact that building resilience in the long term is not (only) a question of time, but of the amount of flexibility in project design (see Section 3.2.3). Working in partnerships has provided projects with a more diverse range of capacities, knowledge and experience that would not have been as effective from a single entity working alone. Yet it has also challenged the speed and scope of the projects, and of the programme at large, to be flexible and to learn and adapt. Despite valuable
accomplishments, BRACED provides, at best, ad hoc examples of flexibility and adaptation. Projects have mostly focused on reactive, tactical changes in order to improve performance, rather than adapting by strategic design, which only gets projects so far. Evidence from BRACED-X challenges the extent to which learning and evidence-based adaptive decision making can be done within large consortia programmes, and within the confines of conventional programme designs and contracts that limit the scope for projects to employ adaptive management. In the future, programmes, and their donors, need to embrace the technical elements of working in complex environments, and issues around risk, failure and trust inherent in adaptive and resilient processes. It may take more time – and probably cost more – to manage an adaptive programme than a conventional programme. This means allowing freedom to experiment, and to trial and test approaches, as well as freedom to fail. But failure is not a ‘waste of money’ – indeed, it could represent better value for money versus continuing to fund a failing project – as long as programmes learn from what does not work and make decisions based on this evidence.

**Key Message 5: Phased approaches that layer and link processes and interventions across timeframes and scales should guide the way forward**

In line with our key messages in Year 2 and Year 3, the findings from BRACED-X lead us to reiterate the fact that investing in sustainable and transformational resilience outcomes is a long-term process, requiring alternative approaches to project design and delivery that expand beyond three- to five-year funding cycles. Discussion about timeframes should not be centred on what can be achieved in terms of resilience as a final outcome; more enabling environments may see more ‘results’. Instead, the focus should be on the extent to which projects can support stakeholders within their context to move along development pathways, while at the same time building capacities to enable coping, adaptation and transformation in the face of climate and disaster risk.

To this end, phased delivery approaches, which better consider timing than duration of programmes alone, would help in a number of ways. This includes preventing current deficiencies that lead to projects trying to do too much at once and lacking clear logic between activities undertaken and larger impact claims. It would support working through any resistance to change projects may experience, and open up opportunities gained through an evolving understanding of context and stakeholders throughout implementation. Projects can also better align with cycles relating to agriculture, government planning or national and local policy processes, which findings from the extension demonstrate is needed (see Section 3.2.3). Overall, donor commitment to phased approaches, both in terms of implementation and funding, would better incentivise the ways of working needed for resilience, especially through transformational approaches. BRACED-X proved, short term, the additional value that can be added to project achievements by building on previous phases of implementation. Yet more support is still needed for BRACED communities to be resilient to the changing risks and threats they face.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 The BRACED programme and the BRACED extension

After four years of implementation, this report presents a synthesis of the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) project annual reports, and evidence from four deep dives, from the 18-month extension, referred to as BRACED-X.

The BRACED programme was originally a three-year, £110 million programme funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). BRACED aimed to build the resilience of five million vulnerable people to climate extremes and disasters.

BRACED was launched in January 2015 and comprised over 120 organisations working in 15 consortia across 13 countries in East Africa, the Sahel and Asia. The 15 projects were led by BRACED Implementing Partners (IPs), who were connected to a Fund Manager (FM) and a Knowledge Manager (KM).  

1 www.braced.org.
2 BRACED KM (2016) Learning about resilience through the BRACED programme: an introduction to the role of the BRACED Knowledge Manager. Information Leaflet
introduction and background

The FM was responsible for overseeing the delivery of BRACED projects. The KM led monitoring, evaluation and research activities based on the projects at the programme level. The evidence and knowledge generated fed into learning, uptake and communication activities in order to effect change across and beyond the BRACED focus countries (see Annex 1 for more information about the BRACED components). The BRACED Resilience Exchange summarises existing learning from across the programme about what works to strengthen resilience, supporting the process of ensuring evidence is put into use in policy and programmes.

At the end of October 2018, DFID decided to extend the BRACED programme for an additional 18 months. This period, from 1 January 2018 to 31 March 2019, and the implementation wrap-up period that followed between 1 April 2019 and 30 June 2019, is referred to as BRACED-X. BRACED-X was a continuation of the BRACED programme, with the purpose of consolidating and expanding work already completed. The funds were organised into two windows: implementation (£10 million) and policy (£4 million). While the former aimed to deliver results on the ground, the latter intended to accelerate policy-influencing activities at national and local levels. Within the BRACED implementation period, medium – and long-term changes were achieved. It was expected that IPs would build on these results to ensure progress towards sustainability of outcomes. Nine projects out of BRACED’s original fifteen were selected for the extension (see Annex 2).

1.2 The Routes to Resilience report

This is the fourth synthesis and analysis of BRACED projects’ yearly monitoring and results reporting. The Routes to Resilience report is a key contribution to the BRACED KM’s work, and is based on a BRACED programme Theory of Change (ToC) (see Annex 3) and supporting monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework developed by the KM Monitoring and Results Reporting (MRR) team to understand how resilience is being built in BRACED.3

In the past three years, the Routes to Resilience report has analysed and identified critical insights and lessons about what it takes to enhance resilience for vulnerable populations across a range of contexts, and through different packages of activities and social and policy processes. In Year 1, we gained insight into the types of activities and resilience pathways that can (or cannot) enhance resilience, particularly anticipatory and absorptive capacities (RTR Year 1). Year 2 demonstrated the four main enabling processes for resilience-building (RTR Year 2), with evidence around the importance of sequencing and timing illustrated in Year 3 (RTR Year 3). Now, under BRACED-X, the extension phase has provided additional time to learn more about resilience outcomes and transformative changes as understood under BRACED.

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3 For further information on the BRACED M&E framework and system, see the BRACED M&E Guidance Notes. To understand how the MRR work fits within a broader M&E system implemented by both the KM and FM, see Annex 4.
1.3 Purpose and intended users

As in previous years, this report examines the question: How are BRACED-X projects continuing to build resilience to climate extremes and disasters? The report outlines key evidence and findings in response to this central question, assembling and synthesising evidence in relation to the programme ToC. Based on the evidence and lessons generated during the lifetime of BRACED, the ToC was reviewed and updated for BRACED-X. The purpose was to also reflect the changes in the direction and scope of the programme. The two main overarching hypotheses of the programme remain the same:

1. If people’s resilience capacities to anticipate, absorb and adapt to shocks are built, enhanced and reshaped through policy and transformational changes, then outcomes will be sustainable and will contribute to people’s well-being.

2. If resilience and transformational outcomes are to be achieved, then two types of investments are needed: bottom-up and top-down. These include supporting households and communities to become more resilient through ‘bottom-up’ work led by projects, and ‘top-down’ investment in national-level policy dialogues.

The ‘top-down’ approach to supporting national and local government capacity was not implemented under BRACED. However, during the extension phase, national – and regional-level efforts were commissioned and implemented. In addition, the funds for BRACED-X were structured so that projects could continue implementing community-based activities and/or continue, expand or initiate policy work at subnational level, building on and responding to the learning from three years of implementation under BRACED. To this end, an additional hypothesis was added to the ToC:

3. If projects engaged locally and produced relevant evidence that demonstrates the effectiveness of resilience interventions, then this would provide the basis for successful policy dialogues and potential change from the bottom up.

This year, we challenge these three assumptions in more detail by asking five questions related to the assumptions underpinning the original programme ToC, that remain unanswered, yet still relevant during the programme extension.

1. What types of adaptive capacity outcomes are possible with more time? (Section 3.2.2)
BRACED demonstrated across its portfolio that enhancing people’s anticipatory and absorptive capacity is possible after Years 1 and 2,
with signs of adaptive capacity emerging in Year 3. However, an extra year was needed to see more concrete evidence of adaptive capacity outcomes. This report explores the types of adaptive capacity outcomes achieved during BRACED-X, and examines the timeframes required to attain them.

2. **To what extent can consortia projects be adaptive? (Section 3.2.3)**
   Adaptive and flexible management approaches are essential to ensure the relevance and appropriateness of resilience programmes. This is so communities are not locked into one pathway that may become obsolete in the future, or that programmes operating in shock-prone contexts are not just doing ‘good’ development. Understanding the extent to which large consortia projects are able to employ adaptive management as a programming approach remains poorly understood in BRACED. This report examines evidence from BRACED-X, to present insights into how programmes like BRACED make adaptive management a reality, or not.

3. **How can projects foster equality and build resilience? (Section 4.2.1)**
   The BRACED programme operates on the premise that consideration of gender, and other dimensions of social inclusion, are crucial to effective programming as part of an equitable climate change response. Yet the extent to which projects have moved beyond the participation of socially marginalised groups in particular activities, and contributed to empowering individuals and communities to challenge the drivers that perpetuate their inequality, is not well known. This report examines how forms of equality have been fostered under the extension phase.

4. **To what extent is policy change possible from the bottom up? (Section 4.2.2)**
   This question relates to the hypothesis added to the programme ToC for BRACED-X. This report examines the extent to which projects have generated policy-relevant evidence, and if it has fed into learning and been leveraged to facilitate changes in policy.

5. **How can sustainability be supported within the lifetime of a project? (Section 4.2.3)**
   BRACED demonstrated across its portfolio that strengthening the resilience capacities of project participants can deliver sustainable outcomes. The evidence to date however remains anecdotal, with the programme’s

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6. Ibid. p. 81.

7. This report conceives adaptive management as an approach to programme delivery that seeks to better achieve desired outcomes and impacts through the systematic, iterative and planned use of emergent knowledge and learning throughout programme implementation. It involves reacting and responding to changes in the political and socio-economic operating environment. It also involves recognising that, while the overall programme goal or aim may be clear, the pathway to achieving it may not. Adaptive programmes adopt deliberate processes of testing, learning and experimentation, drawing on monitoring, evaluation and other data and evidence strategies.
timeframe of three years, too short to determine the extent observable changes can potentially be sustained longer term. In response, this report explores in more depth the approaches used by IPs to promote sustainability during BRACED-X.

As in BRACED, BRACED-X is rich in its diversity of projects, contexts and approaches used to promote resilience, and this report aims to illustrate this diversity and difference in implementation and context in practice. The content of the report is substantial in order to sufficiently represent and analyse data from nine projects, from a programme perspective, using the lens of the BRACED M&E framework (see Table 1 in Section 2.1).

The focus of this report is on how change has happened across the extension phase, rather than on the project or programme results per se. The report does not aim to evaluate BRACED project-level interventions or pass judgement on IPs’ progress or performance. The KM has conducted a synthesis of BRACED-X projects’ final evaluations, which provides a detailed assessment of project results. (Resilience Results: BRACED Extension Final Evaluation – synthesis paper).

This report is aimed at the following audiences:

- **BRACED project IPs**: A qualitative assessment of results, evidence and learning across projects from the extension phase to foster shared learning between the KM and IPs on how change has happened under BRACED-X.
- **BRACED KM**: A foundational piece of evidence that informs the wider KM evidence generation process.
- **BRACED donor DFID**: Qualitative insights and lessons demonstrating how BRACED-X enabled resilience for the populations it supported over the course of its implementation.
- **Others designing, implementing and funding resilience-building programmes**: A contribution to broader sectoral knowledge about designing and implementing resilience programmes. The findings, lessons and implications of this report build on the work of BRACED-X IPs firmly grounded in practice.

### 1.4 Report structure

The report is structured as follows:

Section 2 presents the M&E framework that guides data collection and analysis, and the methodology used to analyse and synthesise data to draw findings from project to programme level. The approach used to facilitate the BRACED-X deep dives is also explained.

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8 Ibid. p. 71.
Section 3 presents a summary of analysis of outcome level achievements, measured using three capacities enabling resilience, that is, to absorb, anticipate and adapt to shocks and stresses (3As). It also addresses questions that remain unanswered from three years of BRACED around the adaptive capacity of project participants, and the extent to which consortia projects can themselves be adaptive in light of changing circumstances.

Section 4 presents analysis and reflection on the findings supporting transformational change at outcome level. It also answers questions that remain unaddressed from BRACED around equality, sustainability, and the extent project evidence on resilience has aided policy change from the bottom up.

Section 5, the concluding section of this report, brings sections 3 and 4 together, to draw out five key messages from the evidence presented. Each key message is accompanied by a set of implications for policy and future resilience programme design.

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2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Making sense of project data

IP annual reports from BRACED-X detail the progress and learning of nine projects against the BRACED M&E framework. The BRACED M&E framework tracks progress against the ToC and its assumptions. As in previous years, monitoring and results reporting under BRACED-X aimed to go beyond asking ‘Are projects taking the actions they said they would take?’ to ask, ‘How is BRACED-X progressing towards the expected results?’ The difference between these two approaches is important. In the former, more limited approach, monitoring and reporting may focus on a) tracking project activities and outputs, and b) the use of resources. The latter, broader approach also involves reporting on:

- Pathways that enable projects to move from outputs to outcomes;
- Context and how it has affected project’s resilience-building efforts;
- Outcomes in terms of resilience capacities and transformational change;
- Assumptions, and if and how they still remain valid.

BRACED-X IPs have provided systematic qualitative and explanatory reporting against each of these dimensions, except for pathways moving from outputs to outcomes. The focus of programme reporting under the extension phase has gone beyond outputs, to measure outcomes only, in order to demonstrate final
changes achieved after the additional implementation period. This report takes a thematic approach to analysis and synthesis. This is so patterns (or recurring themes) within the data could be identified and analysed in order to address the questions this report explores. Table 1 summarises the analytical framework informing the project- to programme-level synthesis this year, which is based on the BRACED M&E framework. Building on experience in Year 3, the same approach to analysis and synthesis from project- to programme-level was followed for BRACED-X (see Annex 5).

Table 1: Analytical framework for programme synthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERARCHING QUESTION</th>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>SUB-QUESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How are BRACED</td>
<td>Understanding resilience outcomes</td>
<td>To what extent can we see change happening in terms of capacity to anticipate, absorb and adapt to climate shocks and stresses, and achieve transformation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components A &amp; B</td>
<td>Contextualising change</td>
<td>What impact have shocks and stresses had?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building resilience</td>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent is the context enabling or constraining change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to climate extremes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and disasters?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Deep dives

2.2.1 Undertaking fieldwork and working with IPs

To address the questions this report explores – except for policy change from the bottom up – the MRR team undertook deep dives with four BRACED-X projects: MAR, BRES, Livestock Mobility and PROGRESS. These projects were selected from a portfolio of nine funded by the BRACED extension, on the basis of IP interest in the analysis, and to represent responses from different contexts and project objectives. Two cases are from East Africa (MAR and PROGRESS), and two from West Africa (BRES and Livestock Mobility), with representation from both the implementation and policy windows of BRACED-X.

Data were gathered using semi-structured key informant interviews and focus groups with 108 individuals in total (see Annex 7) during 10-day field visits,

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10 To explore policy change from the bottom up, an analysis of projects’ quarterly reports was undertaken, based on IP responses to questions based on the policy Areas of Change (see Annex 8).
which took place between January and March 2019. Participants comprised of men and women representing project staff and project partners of different designation, and who had been involved in the project for varying lengths of time (ranging from one to four years). Participants were chosen from a limited sample frame through purposive sampling, the most typically used sampling method in qualitative research. This approach was beneficial, as it enabled the MRR team to select information-rich participants who were able to address the questions posed by this report. Those not involved or with low participation in projects were not interviewed. Selection was also influenced by availability and willingness to participate at the time of fieldwork.

All interviews and focus group discussions were based around the same question guide, which was pilot tested to ensure question understanding and ease of response. Each interview and focus group lasted between one and two hours, with up to five participants in each focus group. All methods of data collection were facilitated in person by a member of the MRR team and audio recorded. Using two distinct yet complementary data collection methods, and interviewing a range of stakeholders, was valuable. It enabled the MRR team to triangulate different participant viewpoints and helped reduce any specific biases associated with one particular approach. Asking participants the same question in different ways during interviews and focus groups in order to triangulate data also ensured robustness of response. All findings were validated with IPs at the end of fieldwork, to support sense-making and test the rigour of results.

### 2.2.2 Moving from data collection to analysis

Inductive thematic analysis of all data collected was undertaken once fieldwork was complete. As described, this involved identifying, examining and analysing patterns in the data, which demonstrated participants’ perspectives and understanding around the different aspects being explored during fieldwork. Established protocols for good thematic analysis were followed. Open coding was used, where themes emerged directly from the data and were recorded in an Excel spreadsheet. Finally, a range of analytic tactics were employed to assess and ensure the significance of emergent themes identified.

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11 Fieldwork with Livestock Mobility took place in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, over five days rather than 10 days due to increasing security concerns at the time (see Section 2.3).


2.2.3 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations were given substantial attention during the design of data collection and throughout fieldwork. Consent was sought from participants before data elicitation methods were implemented. Participants were informed of their rights to participate and were able to freely withdraw from the study if they wished to do so. Prior to fieldwork, participants received an information sheet introducing the MRR team, which described the purpose of data collection and its intended objectives and outputs. Providing this information was beneficial, as it helped manage the expectations of participants who chose to engage with us. Attention was paid to the composition of focus groups, to ensure participation and representation. Each focus group and interview also ended with a briefing, which allowed participants to ask questions or raise concerns they may have had.

2.3 Limitations

The MRR deep dives provide one of the main sources of evidence for this report. Constraints related to data collection, and how they were addressed, is as follows:

- Heightened security risks within project locations meant fieldwork in-country with Livestock Mobility was reduced from 10 to five days. This restricted the number and type of key informants met. To capture the perspectives of stakeholders not able to be interviewed in person, remote interviews via Skype were conducted where possible, as the most appropriate option.

- A translator was required for data collection with Livestock Mobility and MAR. Using a translator ensured that participants were better able to express themselves in their preferred language. Yet it also posed challenges around not always being given the ‘whole story’ of what participants said, or assumptions made by the translator around what information was relevant. To minimise these issues, the MRR team re-emphasised protocol with translators before each focus group and interview and frequently sought clarification. Possible interpretation of questions and answers owing to language differences are however acknowledged.

- Focus groups were at times dominated by participants with strong opinions. To mitigate this situation, the MRR team paid attention to ensure all participants were heard and given the opportunity to express their perspective.

IP annual reports also provide key evidence for this report. They are explicitly self-reported with recognition that monitoring and results reporting is a facilitated process of co-generation of evidence and shared learning on resilience-strengthening. This report has attempted to overcome any shortcomings this may create by referring to MRR team knowledge of the projects, as well as the separately conducted BRACED-X Final Evaluation synthesis and other FM and KM data sources. Additionally, our analysis can draw only on what is included in IP reports. We do not have evidence
of what is not reported and whether interventions emphasised are leading to change (or not), and why.

While IPs continued to report against the BRACED M&E framework under the extension phase, and often very comprehensively, there are a number of factors that may limit the analysis. Many of the original risks identified when planning the synthesis were avoided, while most of the ones that did arise were anticipated and mitigated for as described below. Overall, in spite of these limitations, we are confident that the conclusions and key messages in this report hold.

- BRACED-X projects cover a wide range of issues and operate in very different contexts, from promoting trans-border livestock mobility across the Sahel to supporting smallholder farmers in Nepal to take advantage of investments in climate-smart technologies. As demonstrated since Year 1 of BRACED, **context specificity has proven a challenge for the programme-level analysis and synthesis and the aggregation of a large and diverse dataset.** This report has sought to address this challenge by following a similar approach to Year 3, using thematic synthesis. This is a useful approach to analysis, which has enabled common patterns to be identified across the portfolio. In addition, building on learning from last year, we modified and removed some reporting templates to help improve reporting by IPs.

- While much data was received from each project, with improvements made since last year, there is still often **limited detailed analysis of how change happens and of how the context is enabling or constraining change.** This report has sought to overcome this challenge, by consulting with BRACED Evaluation Teams and KM research colleagues in order to deepen the analysis based on their evaluation and research work (see Annex 5).

- Similar to Year 3, in the extension phase of BRACED, there was a summative focus in reporting. There has been a tendency to report positive changes and impacts on resilience, as projects are keen to demonstrate achievements at outcome level, and this is reflected in the content of the Year 4 Annual Reporting Supplements (ARS) received. This has implications for reporting overall achievements in this report. While findings can be triangulated to some extent, particularly through data collected for the MRR deep dives (see Section 2.2), there still remains, in some instances, limited explanation of how and why resilience capacities relate to resilience. The way the information is presented can make it challenging to unpack causality and triangulate evidence to support or reject the outcome claim.
3. RESILIENCE OUTCOMES: WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED?

This section presents a summary of outcomes achieved relating to the 3As at programme level. An analysis of findings, and discussion of key insights and emerging issues that have arisen in achieving these outcomes in BRACED-X are presented in the following sub-sections of this report.

Summary of findings

- More time under BRACED-X has not led to more adaptive capacity outcomes, but has allowed projects to build on what has been achieved to improve sustainability of results beyond projects’ lifetime.

- More time under BRACED-X also reveals that adaptation can be integrated into efforts enabling anticipatory or absorptive outcomes, to mitigate trade-offs between achieving short – and long-term goals, by embedding behaviour and processes of learning and adjusting over time.

- BRACED demonstrates that building resilience in the long term is not (only) a question of time, but of flexibility in project design. Conventional project designs and contracts limit the scope for adaptive management, which is critical for resilience-building.
• The BRACED-X ToC did not articulate the synergies and trade-offs between absorptive, anticipatory and adaptive capacities. Evidence to date demonstrates that, while programmes may tick all of the indicator boxes, they may still fall short of delivering adaptive capacity outcomes.

3.1 Resilience capacities

The monitoring data from across the nine projects shows that BRACED-X has allowed more results and outcomes to emerge. In particular, there is further evidence of adaptive capacity, which was anecdotal last year as signs of adaptive capacity were only beginning to emerge. As well as allowing a maturation of effect, the extension period saw further strengthening and reinforcing of results established under BRACED, as projects consolidated BRACED successes. Projects strove to show how each activity or intervention contributed to one or more capacity, with explanations on the outcomes focused on and the assessment tools used provided. As such, reporting is more detailed compared to the final year of BRACED. This suggests that as BRACED-X comes to an end, IPs are attempting (and are able) to provide a more thorough view of how their projects have enabled people’s resilience. Table 2 presents the outcomes reported, and, from the analysis of evidence, the projects that have contributed to these.

3.1.1 Absorptive capacity

Evidence demonstrating increased absorptive capacity corroborates findings from Year 3 of BRACED. Reported outcomes relating to absorptive capacity continue to be dominated by **improved food security or dietary diversity** (six projects)\(^\text{16}\) as the most common outcome for BRACED-X projects. This reflects the continued need for projects to support individuals and households to meet their basic needs to lay a foundation for building absorptive capacity. The extra time of the extension has been beneficial here, but it is also the sequencing undertaken by projects that is key, so that once basic needs are met, absorptive capacity can be built. **Growth in assets** (six projects)\(^\text{17}\) and in savings through improved access to credit and banking opportunities (five projects)\(^\text{18}\) were also demonstrated as a means to withstand shocks and stresses and avoid damaging coping strategies. PROGRESS is illustrative of this, where activities aimed at building savings in Kenya helped people smooth consumption during periods of drought.

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\(^{16}\) Anukulan, BRES, DCF, PROGRESS, SURm, WYL.

\(^{17}\) BRES, DCF, MAR, SURm, WYL, Livestock Mobility.

\(^{18}\) Anukulan, MAR, PROGRESS, SURm, WYL.
### Table 2: Capacity outcomes and contributing projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3AS Capacity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Projects Contributing to Outcomes</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absorptive</td>
<td>Growth in assets</td>
<td>BRES, DCF, MAR, SURtM, WYL, Livestock Mobility, Anukulan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased savings</td>
<td>Anukulan, MAR, PROGRESS, SURtM, WYL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved food security or dietary diversity</td>
<td>Anukulan, BRES, DCF, PROGRESS, SURtM, WYL</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipatory</td>
<td>Dissemination and use of climate-related information</td>
<td>WYL, Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS, SURtM, MAR, Anukulan, DCF, BRES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity</td>
<td>Developing preparedness and contingency plans</td>
<td>PROGRESS, SURtM, Anukulan, WYL</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased insurance against risk</td>
<td>Anukulan, MAR, Livestock Mobility</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>Incorporation and adoption of climate-smart technologies and innovations</td>
<td>Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS, MAR, SURtM, Anukulan, BRES, DCF, WYL</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversification of income streams</td>
<td>Livestock Mobility, MAR, Anukulan, WYL, BRES</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integration of climate concerns into local planning</td>
<td>Anukulan, DCF, PROGRESS, SURtM, WYL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened links in value chains and markets through formalising</td>
<td>Anukulan, BRES, Livestock Mobility, MAR, PROGRESS, SURtM, WYL</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>producer groups and links to markets (leading to increased incomes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved access to crops (through plant doctors) and livestock (through veterinary services)</td>
<td>Anukulan, Livestock Mobility, BRES</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.1.2 Anticipatory capacity

The key driver of anticipatory capacity under BRACED-X continued to be the dissemination of climate and weather information, as demonstrated by eight out of nine projects. Most projects also reported on issues of timing and described the types of anticipatory actions taken as a result of climate information received (see Box 1).

Other actions to improve anticipatory capacity reported by projects relate to insuring against risk. For example, in Ethiopia under MAR,
19,105 pastoralists signed up to livestock insurance products, while in Nepal, under Anukulan, 2,704 households took up crop insurance during the extension period. As insurance pays out after potential losses, it helps beneficiaries prepare for extreme events.

At higher institutional levels, findings demonstrate projects have made vertical and horizontal linkages across institutions to improve and facilitate building anticipatory capacity as a stepping stone towards building adaptive capacity. CMESA-E in Ethiopia is one example. The project linked 48 woredas at local level to a national climate services platform, getting sectoral climate change adaptation plans in place in four key ministries, that is, Agriculture, Health, the National Disaster Risk Management Commission, and Water and Energy. Government buy-in is also reported to support the potential for sustainability (see Section 4.1.4).

**Box 1: From accessing to using climate information**

Farmers have used seasonal climate and weather information to make decisions around when to plant crops, what farming practices to use and what seeds are most suitable. Other examples include day-to-day choices such as whether or not to put grain out to dry. DCF and BRES have reported higher agricultural yields in some cases, but there is also the possible influence of other farming advice. Decisions made continue to enhance livelihood activities, improving household income. Other examples combine historical information such as flooding risk together with seasonal risks, to integrate into adaptation planning (Anukulan), or local authorities making decisions about public good investments in DCF.

Decisions under the extension phase continue to be based on short-term, seasonal forecasts or early warnings, together with monitoring information (e.g. on biomass or rainfall), which feeds into the information beneficiaries receive. The use of long-term climate information is limited at the local level (as in the final year of BRACED) and is not sufficient to support people’s more immediate decision-making needs, which most projects were designed to enable. This means the majority of IPs lean towards local responses to existing climate variability, and people’s more immediate vulnerability to current climate stresses. A proactive anticipation of future climate change, and future-looking planning and decision making is not emphasised. Challenges remain about the uncertainty, accessibility and relevance of climate information at a local level.20

20 CMESA-E is one project in Ethiopia that is concerned about encouraging communities to use long-term climate information that may prove incorrect and lead to maladaptation. Existing climate models contradict recent trends in rainfall in the Greater Horn region or are inconclusive in West Africa.
BRACED-X also provides novel insights into challenges around timing, which relates to climate services as well as other aspects of the programme (see Section 3.2.3). Now that more than one cycle of climate information has been used from BRACED to BRACED-X, the extra time of the extension has brought into sharper focus tensions around when climate and weather information was available, versus when the information was needed to make decisions. This was particularly the case for Livestock Mobility and seasonal forecasts in the Sahel. Forecasts often arrived just before the start of the rainy season, providing a very short lead time for pastoralists to make decisions before the start of the rains. Similarly, in Burkina Faso under BRES, seasonal forecasts arrived after farmers purchased their seeds. This meant they could not use the forecast to ascertain whether purchasing more drought-tolerant varieties would be advisable. Income to buy additional seeds, if their decision was wrong, or farmers’ ability to exchange seeds with others, was uncertain. These examples, in part, question the extent anticipatory capacity is actually being enhanced, or its full potential reached, if climate and weather information is not available in time to be useful for decision making.

Still, the evidence generated from BRES, now that multiple cycles of seasonal forecasts have been used, was valuable to demonstrate to the national meteorological agency, ANAM, that forecasts need to be released earlier (by two weeks). Farmers, however, require the forecast earlier still. More time would allow the project to work with stakeholders to refine the process and achieve more impact (by the seasonal forecast being available before seed purchasing choices are required), while recognising that there is also a limit to how early a forecast can be provided for a future season. Making climate services decision-relevant is one precondition if climate services are to be an appropriate resilience intervention.

### 3.1.3 Adaptive capacity

The adoption of climate-smart technologies and innovations to manage natural resources and farm systems (seven projects)\(^{21}\) was the most reported contributor to promoting adaptive capacity under BRACED-X. This, on the whole, was a direct result of projects providing training and support to these activities, continuing work started under BRACED. For example, in Kenya, PROGRESS consolidated its successes under BRACED by using climate-smart technologies, such as solar-powered fridges, to improve milk trading in two additional camel milk corridors established in Wajir during BRACED-X. This enabled producers,
mainly women, to diversify their income – with income diversification also central to adaptive capacity.\textsuperscript{22}

Livestock Mobility and PROGRESS are two projects that reinforced results by extending their geographic reach as a way of consolidating outcomes around income diversification during BRACED-X. Still working in partnership with Crescent Takaful Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO), two additional microfinance branches providing Sharia-compliant services opened in Kenya with PROGRESS, helping 2,000 Muslims diversify their income by January 2019.\textsuperscript{23}

Supporting market access has also contributed to building adaptive capacity (seven projects),\textsuperscript{24} predominately through formalising producer groups and value chain development. Ensuring the markets are there and functioning acts as an incentive for people to engage in activities to diversify their livelihoods, and the BRACED-X period allowed more time for market links to be built and strengthened.

For example, BRES used the extra time of BRACED-X to strengthen results through formalising farmer groups established under BRACED. By converting farmer groups into legally recognised cooperatives, farmers could sell their produce in provincial markets without direct project support. This had not happened under BRACED, as responding to more immediate, shorter-term needs around household food security was addressed first. MAR likewise strengthened linkages to markets in Ethiopia, by continuing to work with the private sector to provide microfinance services for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.

The foundations laid by BRACED meant that improving market and value chain linkages were more readily linked to adaptive capacity under BRACED-X than in the previous year. Again, sequencing is key. Building up the change pathway from technical trainings to more comprehensive interventions that consider the role of markets and value chains allowed projects to consolidate results, and promote the potential for sustainability (see Section 4.1.4).

A number of projects also strengthened political, institutional and local ownership in existing locations as a way to reinforce adaptive capacity. For example, Livestock Mobility secured ownership of project outcomes by solidifying its ‘regional dynamic’ with potential long-term benefits. This is a mechanism that brings together key stakeholders to negotiate securing land and resources for livestock corridors across West Africa. This includes pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, the private sector, local government and influential institutions in the region, such as CILSS, the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Livestock Mobility, MAR, Anukulan, DCF, BRES.

\textsuperscript{23} The two additional branches were opened in the rural towns of Habaswein and Bute, outside of Wajir town in Kenya.

\textsuperscript{24} Anukulan, BRES, Livestock Mobility, MAR, PROGRESS, SUR1M, WYL.

\textsuperscript{25} CILSS is a regional authority on pastoralism research and advocacy with strong ties to other influential regional actors.
This example is illustrative of how adaptive capacity strategies can be enhanced when they engage with the underlying economic and political structures that determine risk and vulnerability, in this case for pastoralists. In this way, the extra time of the extension supported Livestock Mobility in laying long-term foundations for pastoralists to be able to adapt with the support of government or the private sector. Being strategic about purposefully fostering such context-specific relationships – and aligning your consortia with them – is crucial for enabling long-term adaptive (and sustainable) change.

3.2 Analysis and reflection

The BRACED-X ToC assumes that community-based interventions will directly lead to the outcome that poor people have improved levels of resilience to climate-related shocks and stresses. This outcome is measured using three interlinked capacities to absorb, anticipate and adapt to shocks and stresses (the 3As). With the additional time of the extension phase, it was expected that projects would demonstrate more concrete evidence of adaptive capacity outcomes.

3.2.1 Building better resilience outcomes

Although projects were expected to achieve resilience outcomes in the three-year period of BRACED, all agree that the extra time of BRACED-X meant projects were better able to achieve (improved) resilience outcomes overall. As such, BRACED-X achieved more in 18 months than BRACED did in the same time period, because projects were able to capitalise on what came before, and link, layer and sequence activities enabling change onto a well-established foundation that helped increase the impact of projects – an important element underpinning the success of the extension phase. The extra time in some cases made up for what increased flexibility in approaches to implementation over the previous three years may have achieved.

Overall, projects had more time and resources to monitor and track results. The additional time of the extension phase also allowed projects to deepen their results by building on relationships and structures already established, and better align and embed outcomes within local processes to sustain them. The opportunity to use learning generated from the previous implementation phase was critical, as it allowed projects to be more tailored, and to improve and refine their approach so that interventions could be reinforced.

Projects reported that they scaled back interventions to focus on what works based on BRACED learning, or revisited and strengthened existing interventions, as Anukulan demonstrated in Nepal. Weather forecasts and plant clinics were added in BRACED-X to the project’s community managed collection.

26 WYL, PROGRESS.
27 BRES, MAR, Anukulan.
This enhanced the package of information and services participants received. It also cultivated relationships between new stakeholders involved, providing a beneficial resource from which to build social relations supporting people’s capacity for resilience.

The examples projects reported also show that it is not possible to do everything at once, with approaches undertaken to be tested over multiple cycles, and to include processes for learning and adjustment over time. As such, the evidence confirms that resilience programming needs to do more than simply establish new mechanisms or activities. It must ensure learning and embed behaviours around evidence-based decision making within projects themselves, as well as in the individuals, communities and institutions that projects support, if interventions are to be effective for resilience.

### 3.2.2 What types of adaptive capacity outcomes are possible with more time?

BRACED-X project monitoring reports reveal insights into the temporal dimension of adaptive capacity, and the benefit of what more time has achieved. By the final year of BRACED, it had become evident that finding ways to integrate adaptive capacity within efforts to build anticipatory or absorptive outcomes might be a feasible pathway to mitigate trade-offs between achieving short- and long-term goals, rather than treating adaptive capacity as a third isolated outcome. However, evidence of how to achieve this was scant. BRACED-X findings add to this perspective, to show that activities and interventions supporting anticipatory and absorptive capacity can be part of the process of enabling adaptive capacity, if they endure and remain adaptive themselves.

For example, local plans intended to manage current risks and threats may support anticipatory or absorptive capacity in the immediate term. Yet they can also contribute to adaptive capacity if these plans are regularly updated, refined and improved as knowledge and skills develop, new information and technologies become available, and the environment and climate changes.

This is demonstrated by the community early warning and emergency response system, known locally in Niger and Mali as the ‘SCAP-Ru’, established during BRACED under SUR1M. The additional time of BRACED-X enabled communities to complete a full iteration of action planning, over two cycles, allowing them to reflect on, update, adapt, and improve their plans based on learning from the initial stage of BRACED. This resulted in certain risks and disturbances that were not at first planned for being included, with approaches on how to respond and whom to work with adjusted. If repeated over time, with multiple cycles run, this

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28 The collection centres developed under Anukulan enabled communities to work with the private sector and government to make crop calendars and assess and seek solutions to climate change impacts. They also provided grassroots representation in the LAPA process.

behaviour can offer a useful grounding for adaptive capacity. This is because it is not just about what activities or interventions projects can implement now with the knowledge and experience currently available. Rather it is about establishing mechanisms and providing a basis for forms of decision making and action that can aid the continual process of adaptation, and is a key value of longer timeframes for resilience programming.

Ensuring learning and developing a culture of behaviour change around evidence-based adaptive decision making is shown in other ways. The findings from BRACED-X suggest it can be supported through the use of shorter-term weather forecasts that enable anticipatory capacity. This is because using short-term forecasts today does not increase adaptive capacity. Yet establishing the value and behaviour of using short-term forecasts every season for the next 20 years can. If people learn from what they are doing to make informed adjustments in actions and decisions taken on shorter timescales, in a repeated manner (over decades), can help people’s ability to adapt over time, even as the climate changes. This is particularly important in the absence of longer-term climate information at the local level (see Box 1). The opportunity for anticipatory capacity to build a foundation for adaptive capacity is also reported by CMESA-E in Ethiopia. This is enabled when a more inclusive and sustained approach is taken, such as the project promotes through its National Framework for Climate Services (NFCS). Feedback mechanisms between provider and end-user are fully embedded into the process and supported by relevant institutions to continuously improve and make adjustments based on users’ feedback. Ensuring climate services remain accessible, responsive and relevant to all user groups over time, can enable adaptive capacity.

These examples demonstrate a need to think beyond activities for adaptive capacity, and instead consider the factors, processes and behaviours that underpin it. Measuring changes in people’s perceptions, attitudes and ability to make more informed decisions, such as those based on weather and seasonal forecast information over time, is essential when measuring adaptive capacity. This challenges the current emphasis on primarily measuring outcomes in terms of resources and assets, with M&E efforts to assess adaptive capacity in terms of process and outcomes.

Still, while using short-term forecasts may help bring about behaviour change and build a culture of evidence-based decision making, this may be undermined by climate information not being available in time to be able to use it to make decisions (see Box 1). This highlights the importance of not only viewing adaptive capacity (and resilience-building) as a process as well as an outcome, but also understanding that activities need to be sequenced and timed right, in order to get the foundations in place for change further down the line. As such, resilience outcomes are not ‘proven’ until they have withstood a number of seasons, years, or cycles, and further still until adjustment and improvement over time are demonstrated.

The BRACED extension has also enabled projects to consolidate achievements (Box 2).
Box 2: Deep dive findings in focus – adaptive capacity and sustainability are closely linked

BRACED-X has enabled projects to strengthen adaptive capacity outcomes, such as diversified income and incorporation of climate-smart technologies and innovations. These changes enable communities to plan, prepare and ensure improved flexibility into the future. However:

- More time does not necessarily lead to more adaptive outcomes, but has allowed projects to build on what has been achieved, to improve the potential sustainability of results beyond the lifetime of projects.
- The key value of the extension phase was that it provided projects with the time and resources to do so.
- Projects’ approach to enhancing adaptive capacity in the long term has therefore been primarily addressed by securing and ensuring the sustainability of activities implemented.

Section 4.2.3 explores this finding in more depth, with this report acknowledging the difficulties of making a judgement about sustainability after such a short period of implementation. Section 4.2.3 emphasises that questions remain over whether what is being sustained is the right thing for resilience-building, and how adaptive, flexible and dynamic interventions can be to changing climate challenges.

3.2.3 It is about timing and flexibility, not only duration

This report demonstrates that the additional time of BRACED-X has been integral to strengthening what was achieved during the BRACED programme. However, it is not only duration that matters for enabling adaptive capacity and resilience overall. BRACED-X demonstrates that timing and flexibility are also important, if not more so, than duration of implementation alone.

A number of projects reported they were often constrained by the project management cycles and processes of the BRACED programme, which, in reality, did not align with cycles relating to agriculture, government planning, or national and local policy processes they were seeking to influence. This affected project progress (Box 3).
Box 3: Processes that affected BRACED-X projects’ ability to implement in set timeframes

- **CMESA-E**: Endorsement of the NFCS took longer than expected given the level of engagement required and considerable political changes faced, including changes in government officials.

- **Livestock Mobility**: Local officials were not available to participate in project activities pre- and post-election.

- **SUR1M**: The Natural Resource Management Convention took considerably longer to sign due to the need for a series of community-based workshops, which took time and resources, and needed to be scheduled around access and calendar constraints.

- **PROGRESS**: Project activities were disrupted by the 2017 election, including delayed disbursements of funds to counties and communities.

- **Anukulan**: BRACED’s implementation year ran from April to March, whereas the Government of Nepal’s planning cycle ran from July to June. This presented challenges for agreeing and planning activities in advance and put an extra burden on reporting as well.

Achieving improvements in productivity requires flexibility, rather than just more time, to work with the farming calendar. Achieving policy change likewise requires the flexibility to be able to work within cycles of policy processes and take advantage of policy ‘moments’ that can increase the likelihood of timely policy changes in favour of local communities. In the absence of projects being able to set their own timelines and annual calendars under BRACED, giving projects more flexibility to be able to schedule activities around when they will have the most impact, rather than working around more conventional, but often limiting, implementation schedules imposed by donors, is beneficial. This is particularly important for projects such as BRACED working in consortia and using inclusive and partnership-based approaches (Box 4). Projects will have more impact if their workplans are aligned with the stakeholders they are working with and the processes they are working on.
Box 4: Deep dive findings in focus – to what extent can consortia projects be adaptive?

BRACED-X projects have, to some extent, been responsive and adaptive to local challenges. In some cases, this has been demonstrated by allowing partner roles to shift and flex, so that external events did not undermine project gains.

Livestock Mobility is one project that experienced a deterioration in context during BRACED-X. There were increased security threats in Burkina Faso and Mali, and a humanitarian crisis in southern Burkina Faso. These changes challenged pastoralists and their access to livestock corridors and resources the project enabled. To minimise disruption to project delivery, the project altered its strategy. RECPA East, one of the project’s local delivery partners in Burkina Faso, scaled back training on pastoralism with communities, diverted livestock routes to avoid conflict areas, and embedded liaison officers within communities to monitor the situation. Limited services were able to continue, such as around animal health, by linking with partner VSF-Belgium and communicating regularly with other local delivery partners, such as APESS in the north of the country. The project reported that the large size of their consortium, compared with others under BRACED-X, and its diverse yet strategic composition was critical to ensuring flexibility and successful response to these events. This demonstrates the importance of selecting the right partners, and having time to build trust, so that results can be achieved that could not be attained alone.

Conventional project designs and contracts limit the scope for adaptive management. This example shows BRACED-X projects have achieved valuable accomplishments and undertaken necessary adjustments to support project progress. Yet BRACED provides, at best, ad hoc examples of adaptation, mostly focusing on course correction in order to meet deliverables and deadlines, rather than adapting and experimenting by strategic design. Adapting by default\textsuperscript{30} and making reactive, tactical\textsuperscript{31} tweaks to improve performance only gets consortia projects so far. They have not consciously built adaptive competences or processes or structured themselves to be flexible from the outset in ways that allow projects to be truly dynamic and meet emerging challenges. Nor have projects built a foundation to develop a deep appreciation for iteration, failure and learning that is at the core of adaptive management and resilience.


programming. This is largely because projects were never required to do so and were bound by conventional contracts and expectations, which limits the extent programmes like BRACED can make adaptive management a reality. BRACED was not designed as an adaptive management programme from the start, but it was expected to perform like one and there remains an external expectation that it is. The reality of the possibilities, as well as the constraints of adaptive capacity in large programmes, needs to be better understood.

4. TRANSFORMATIONAL IMPACT: WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED?

This section introduces the transformational outcomes achieved under BRACED-X at the programme level. The following sub-sections present the analysis and reflection on findings and discusses key insights and emerging issues in supporting the likelihood of transformation.

**Summary of findings**

- Contributions to transformational change continue to be shown through the expansion of activities beyond the geographical remit and direct sphere of project influence.

- There is strong evidence of women’s inclusion across projects, but little evidence of empowerment of marginalised groups that fosters equality in a way that enables resilience.

- The outcome level assumption of the BRACED-X ToC holds true, as results suggest that the potential for transformational change is not a capacity the same as the other 3As.

- BRACED, as a programme overall, has not achieved substantial policy change, but projects have had some success in creating an enabling...
environment for policy engagement at the local level. However, given limited progress to date, the underlying assumption that both bottom-up and top-down approaches are required to influence policy change remains untested. Beyond concrete policy change, BRACED shows that changing attitudes can also trigger transformation.

- Projects have taken care to implement in ways that engender ownership and longevity of activities and outcomes. Yet the way sustainability is understood, and the barriers to it, challenge the extent BRACED investments have the potential to endure.

**What is transformational change in BRACED?**

Transformation represents an outcome related to fundamental ways in which people’s capacity to adapt to, anticipate and absorb shocks can be built, reshaped and enhanced. To demonstrate the potential for transformation, any initiative must achieve three essential results:

1. **Catalytic effect**: these imply the ability to leverage change beyond the direct project activities.
2. **Scalable impact**: when interventions are used at a greater scale or in integrated combinations with much larger effects than before.
3. **Sustainable outcomes**: when processes of resilience building are sustained after BRACED support ends for particular projects.

Apart from being catalytic, at scale, with sustainable outcomes, to demonstrate the potential for transformation, BRACED projects must influence:

4. **Social and governance relations** towards downwards accountability, equality and transparency.

### 4.1 Salient results

All projects under the extension phase reported that the likelihood of transformational change had continued. This was demonstrated by the extent projects produced catalytic impacts, change at scale, and fostered equality and social inclusion – yet, most of all, promoted sustainability, which IPs typically interpreted as ensuring the continuity of activities and benefits achieved after programme close.
4.1.1 Catalytic effects and impacts at scale

As in Year 3 of BRACED, clear illustrations of projects delivering the likelihood of transformation are provided through reporting on catalytic impacts. Under BRACED-X, this remains predominately evidenced through expansion of project activities beyond the geographical remit and direct sphere of the project’s influence.

Five projects reported instances of activities being replicated by neighbouring people and communities with no support from the project. For instance, this meant that BRES reached 7,872 farmers in total, who were incentivised by an initial group of 192 lead farmers to adopt Zai agricultural techniques.

Four projects also reported securing co-finance for activities from sources other than BRACED-X, such as county governments, municipalities or other donors. This enabled interventions to reach other communities not directly targeted by projects. For example, Anukulan reported how, on seeing the benefits of the Multiple Use water Systems (MUS), farmers of adjoining villages requested them. The municipality started construction on two MUS installations with its own financial resources, which the project reported also supports the sustainability of the intervention (see Section 4.1.4). PROGRESS likewise used BRACED-X to replicate and sustain its interventions. The project established a further seven Ward Adaptation Planning Committees (WAPCs), adding to eight already established under BRACED, now covering over half of Wajir county in Kenya. Section 4.1.4 illustrates that these committees have the potential to continue post-project completion, as similar to Anukulan, they are embedded within government structures and plans.

To demonstrate impact at scale, projects reported activities achieving influence beyond the local level. This represents project progress compared to the last year of BRACED, even if this component of transformation still remains the most unclear for projects to report against.

In Senegal, for example, DCF demonstrated that the project had a gradual influence at the local and national level. For instance, one of the tasks of the newly established platform in Senegal was to revise the national guide to local planning and incorporate the climate considerations of vulnerable communities as a way of accommodating their priorities. The project’s partnership with the National Programme for Local Development was valuable in enabling this success, as it lay the foundation for mainstreaming climate considerations into local development. In Mali, it was DCF’s relationship with ANICT, the financial arm of the Ministry of Decentralisation, that was key to channeling funds to communities. The project reported their support with ANICT’s

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33 Anukulan, BRES, DCF, Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS.
34 Anukulan, Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS, SURIM.
35 For further reflection on the challenges of monitoring resilience and measuring transformational change see Villanueva, P. and Sword-Daniels, V. (2017) Routes to Resilience: Lessons from monitoring BRACED Year 2.
submission for direct access to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) will likewise enable change at scale, by further strengthening financial access and the decision-making capacities of local governments to improve communities’ resilience to climate change impacts.

CMESA-E in Ethiopia also demonstrates scalable impact. Lessons learnt from earlier BRACED work in climate service provision (CIARE and MAR) were fed into a wider, representative consultation process that has resulted in a NFCS for the country to move forward on.

### 4.1.2 Women’s inclusion and empowerment

Where women’s inclusion and empowerment are concerned, there is evidence of targeting and some inclusion across projects. Anukulan for example, reported that in Nepal, the project had recruited an increasing number of female plant doctors, even among disadvantaged social groups, which helped build relationships with local farmers and government officials. Quotas used in other BRACED-X projects, such as WYL and DCF, have also ensured women are well represented in groups and committees, with the extra time of the extension enabling projects to further formalise and embed quotas and women’s participation into local structures. However, there is little evidence of empowerment from across the BRACED-X portfolio overall.

Women have typically benefitted from projects through improved income and more diverse income-generating activities, often through direct participation in groups such as village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) and increased women’s participation in community affairs. There is some (weak) evidence of women’s higher incomes derived through project activities leading to increased economic power within the household or higher social status. Still, analysis of more significant shifts, such as changes to pre-existing institutional structures and power relationships that shape women’s lives and underpin their resilience, is limited.

In most cases, projects were not able to change the underlying context of entrenched social norms. For example, through increased involvement in profitable agricultural activities, women tend to have some control over the income they have earned themselves, rather than overall household incomes, and women’s earnings tend to be spent on healthcare for the family, household items and school fees. BRES reported that, in some cases, women actually took on greater responsibility for these expenditures compared with before, suggesting some projects had increased the work burden of women as a result of targeted project activities – a potential negative unintended consequence. Similarly, for WYL in Mali, deep-rooted socio-cultural factors that limit women’s access to income-generating activities, basic social services and training, and constrain their participation and decision making in public spaces, acted as barriers to project effectiveness.
The majority of BRACED-X projects primarily focused on women as the vulnerable group. However, a smaller number of projects worked on inclusion, and to a lesser extent equality, of other underserved and socially marginalised groups. MAR is one example, where the focus of reach was on pastoralists and agro-pastoralists living in remote areas of Ethiopia. For PROGRESS, the project targeted people living with disability as part of their policy work. However, evidence of empowerment of these groups is also limited.

### 4.1.3 Policy change from the bottom up

BRACED-X enabled five projects to pursue policy change to support BRACED outcomes. While evidence of actual legislative policy change is limited, projects made steady progress against the foundations identified on the ToC pathway for policy change. This includes building relationships with key policy actors; convening actors and facilitating dialogue towards changes in policy discourse; and influencing the integration of expertise relevant for resilience-building, such as by institutionalising pilots into existing government plans. Progress against each of these aspects is summarised below.

#### BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY POLICY ACTORS

BRACED-X projects operating under the policy window of the extension, built relationships with and between key policy stakeholders through local and international knowledge-sharing activities, such as conferences. IPs also spent much of the year leveraging relationships they had built during BRACED to bring together stakeholders from different sectors and scales in workshops and site visits. These activities helped create a shared understanding of target policy issues and secured buy-in of BRACED-X projects and their approach to resilience-building from key stakeholders involved in policy.

For example, CMESA-E conducted subnational and national workshops, which brought together local and national government representatives and professionals to raise awareness of the project’s NFCS. Participants represented a range of sectors which included agriculture and food security, water, irrigation and electricity, disaster risk management and health. The workshops were successful at generating understanding of climate services and identifying climate policy gaps and sector-specific priorities. At the end of one workshop, participants agreed on the need to establish a steering committee and

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37 MAR, Livestock Mobility, Anukulan, PROGRESS.
38 DCF, CMESA-E, Livestock Mobility, Anukulan, PROGRESS.
39 Livestock Mobility, DCF, Anukulan, PROGRESS.
40 PROGRESS, Anukulan.
41 Livestock Mobility, DCF, Anukulan, PROGRESS, CMESA-E.
42 Livestock Mobility, DCF, Anukulan.
43 Livestock Mobility, DCF, Anukulan, PROGRESS, CMESA-E.
technical sub-working groups to develop the framework (which was endorsed by the government of Ethiopia in July 2019).

Evidence of buy-in of BRACED-X projects is also shown to provide an entry point into policy dialogues and processes, based on new or improved relationships between project partners and stakeholders instrumental in influencing policy (Box 5).

**Box 5: Strategic partnerships impact on pastoralism policy in the Sahel**

Pastoralism, and cross-border transhumance in particular, is a significant source of contention in the Sahel region, with national and sub-regional policy makers discussing pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, mobility and regional integration. A key stakeholder in these discussions is CILSS, based on its role in managing major regional pastoralism programmes. These include the Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (PRAPS), the Integrated and Sustainable Livestock Farming and Pastoralism in West Africa Project (PEPISAO), and the Regional Dialogue and Investment Project for Pastoralism and Transhumance in the Sahel and Coastal Countries of West Africa (PREDIP). Livestock Mobility strengthened its consortia in BRACED-X by purposefully aligning with CILSS, enabling the project to participate in wider policy discussions and regional level programmes focused on pastoralism issues. Acting for Life, the consortia lead, reported this partnership was central to the project’s success.

For example, during Livestock Mobility’s first policy workshop at Ferkéssededougou, Côte d’Ivoire, CILSS convened representatives from PRAPS, PEPISAO and PREDIP, and facilitated a discussion around how development projects operating in the same trans-border region could work together more efficiently. As a result, Livestock Mobility’s technical expertise in livestock markets, and the project’s trans-border committees, were incorporated into existing trans-border consultation frameworks in regions that overlap with the BRACED implementation zone.

**CONVENING ACTORS AND FACILITATING DIALOGUE TOWARDS CHANGES IN POLICY DISCOURSE**

Demonstration efforts of successful community-level investments supported by BRACED and the extension, resulted in increased awareness of resilience-building and, in turn, commitments to improve policy. For example, Anukulan organised for subnational and national government officials to visit sites undertaking the
project’s commercial pocket approach (CPA). As a result of improved knowledge of the benefits of CPA, government officials from Amargadhi municipality in Nepal advised to replicate CPA throughout the municipality. The development of livelihood activities for Dalits and other marginalised groups were also instructed.

Livestock Mobility also provides an example of how facilitating dialogue has been effective in influencing policy discourse. The project convened a regional discussion for a range of stakeholders around the livestock value chain in West Africa. This led to a Memorandum of Understanding being signed between the governments of Togo and Ghana, to exchange knowledge and develop a Plan for Transhumance. It is yet to be seen however if these commitments actually result in improved policy.

INFLUENCING THE INTEGRATION OF EXPERTISE RELEVANT FOR RESILIENCE-BUILDING

IPs have worked to institutionalise the inclusion of BRACED-X stakeholders in policy discourse. For example, the governor of Mopti in Mali revised the staffing of the Regional Commission to include new members from the Regional Development Agency (ARD) and National Agency for Local Government Investment (ANICT) Regional Office, both of whom are key partners of DCF. The project reported this representation will ensure that decision-making processes in Mopti will include the input of stakeholders involved in DCF beyond the project period, which will ensure a maintained focus on resilience-building.

BRACED-X projects have had some success in integrating their technical expertise and evidence into guidelines and frameworks, and getting their pilot interventions integrated into government plans. For example, in PROGRESS, the Kenyan government has adopted both the WAPC and the decentralised climate finance models supported by BRACED in Wajir county. These approaches will be scaled up across the country as a result, with government involvement also providing a foundation for sustainability (see Section 4.1.4).

Understanding the extent BRACED-X projects have enabled change related to policy from the ‘bottom up’ is not the only evidence generated around policy change under BRACED-X. There is also evidence of what the ‘top-down’ investment from the extension phase has achieved in supporting national and local government capacity, through its policy dialogues and influencing processes at the national level, led by the FM. A summary of insights emerging at the time of writing from Kenya and Nepal is presented in Box 6. Although not a key focus of this report, the findings are important. They link to and build on existing policy work led by projects, to explore whether IPs have contributed to changes in policy around resilience at the national level.

46 DCF, Anukulan, CMESA-E, PROGRESS.
47 Livestock Mobility, DCF, Anukulan, PROGRESS.
48 PROGRESS, Anukulan.
Overall, national policy dialogues appear to be relevant, timely and aligned with national priorities. However, evidence from national-level dialogues examined in Nepal and Kenya suggests that, while there may have been some indicative policy relevant changes, the degree to which the dialogues contributed to these is unclear. During the course of the 18-month implementation period of the national-level policy work, no concrete evidence emerged to suggest policy change, as conceived under BRACED-X,\textsuperscript{50} had been brought about as a direct result of the dialogues in these two countries.

In Kenya, the scaling out of the County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) to all counties requires a legislative change, which appears to be underway. Yet this work was already in motion, and, while there may have been some contribution of the national-level policy work, it was very late in the process and impossible to determine with any certainty. In Nepal, there are positive signs of vertical integration of BRACED-X project interventions into government programmes, but there is no evidence of this translating into policy change.

The fact that there is little evidence of policy outcomes being achieved from the national level is largely due to the short implementation window of 18 months. This stream of work was built from scratch during the extension phase. It was unable to build on foundations laid from the previous three years of implementation in BRACED, which this report demonstrates has been instrumental to enabling other achievements under BRACED-X.

Still, while there is limited progress from national level efforts towards resilient or transformational policy outcomes, the engagement of key actors and raised awareness of actors to the efficacy and value of adopting a resilience approach to tackling intractable, national policy issues is, in itself, a positive foundation for potential future change. This will not, however, be detectable within the lifetime of the BRACED programme.

The policy work at national level has adopted a broad definition of policy change, which is not limited to actual legislative change: 1. **Framing debates** and getting issues on the national political agenda by drawing attention to new problems with evidence and new knowledge; 2. **Influencing behaviour** change of policy and non-policy actors so that policies are effectively implemented and make use of evidence to inform implementation; and 3. **Legislative change**, such as changes in regional and national budget allocations, or the passage of new legislation and/or ministerial policy positions.
4.1.4 Sustainability

The BRACED extension reveals there are different routes to sustainability. Each project reported the potential for interventions to be sustained, demonstrated through a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies. Efforts range from entire models being taken up and funded by local, regional or national government, to some aiming for local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other donors to continue interventions after BRACED-X ends. Table 3 shows that evidence from IPs points to five common approaches used to promote the potential for sustainability during the lifetime of their projects. Each approach is explored in turn below.

Table 3: The main approaches used by BRACED-X projects to promote the potential for sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>PROJECTS USING EACH APPROACH</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PROJECTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influencing government systems that frame resilience and embedding approaches or models within existing structures and plans</td>
<td>Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS, Anukulan, SURtM, WYL, MAR, BRES, DCF, CMESA-E</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnering with the private sector</td>
<td>Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS, Anukulan, SURtM, WYL, BRES, MAR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring community ownership</td>
<td>BRES, Livestock Mobility, Anukulan, SURtM, PROGRESS, WYL, DCF</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing additional finance by linking with other development assistance projects and programmes, or with project partners</td>
<td>Livestock Mobility, SURtM, Anukulan, DCF</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating access to markets and credit opportunities by formalising local producers or savings groups</td>
<td>BRES, MAR, SURtM, WYL</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INFLUENCING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS THAT FRAME RESILIENCE AND EMBEDDING APPROACHES OR MODELS WITHIN EXISTING STRUCTURES AND PLANS**

In Kenya, PROGRESS continued to align its WAPCs with government legislation, in the form of the 2016 Climate Change Bill of the Government of Wajir County. Responding to this window of opportunity that arose in 2016, and redesigning the intervention to better fit the local context, is what the project reported as central to its sustained benefit – that is, communities can keep qualifying for and receiving county adaptation funding to implement their adaptation plans, particularly against drought, which they could not do on their own. In this case, the potential for sustainability is that the approach is still politically feasible, with the mandate and institutional capacity in place for durability.  

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51 SURtM and PROGRESS.

52 The county government is responsible for disbursing the annual budget from its domestic funds, 2% of which targets community-identified activities, as well as supporting WAPCs through its County Climate Change Steering Committee.
The evidence from BRACED-X demonstrates that sustainability is also promoted through a cumulative process from which government builds commitment and trust over time. In the Sahel, Livestock Mobility reported a series of steps through which sustainability unfolds in this way. Shifting negative attitudes and mindsets of government (and private sector actors) towards pastoralists was an important first step. This incentivised government and private sector stakeholders to collaborate and come together to form a common vision of trans-border livestock mobility, which had not been observed in the region before. As part of this process, the management of pastoral resources has been included in local and national government planning.

Other ways in which projects secured government recognition include showcasing their efforts to government actors, as the case of Anukulan demonstrates (see Section 4.1.3). This strategy has been valuable for the successful phase-over of responsibilities formerly supported by the project for a number of interventions. A number of projects also built the capacity of government actors, to promote sustainability and build trust. Purposefully aligning activities with work already undertaken at local government level was also carried out, on the premise that dedicated resources in place can help support the continuity of interventions.

These examples demonstrate that laying robust foundations promoting the potential for sustainability beyond the lifetime of projects requires creating an enabling environment within the project timeframe. This depends in part, on successful partnerships with government actors, and building their trust and commitment, so that project interventions can more likely continue once projects end. Sustainable outcomes also require projects to actively promote accountability and local ownership of activities, supported by political mandates, will and capacity to act.

**PARTNERING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

Seven out of nine projects reported that they aimed to promote sustainability through partnering with private sector actors. This was most typically done in relation to value chains and market linkages, where financial incentives provide motivation to continue offering services established by projects. Notable among this group of projects is PROGRESS (Box 7).

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53 This includes Anukulan’s plant doctor clinics. The length of time government funding will continue is not known, but in Kanchanpur, government officials have formally committed to conduct at least one plant clinic per month, using Anukulan-trained plant doctors.

54 PROGRESS, MAR, Anukulan, DCF.

55 MAR.

56 Livestock Mobility, PROGRESS, Anukulan, SUTIM, WYL, BRES, MAR.
Box 7: The multiplier effect of private sector investment delivering potential benefits over time

In Kenya, various private sector actors have invested in milk transportation generated by women’s milk trading cooperates in two milk supply corridors in Wajir. This will enable camel milk producers, mainly women, to continue increasing their income and enhance their adaptive and absorptive capacity. Incentivised by this result, and the commitment of other private sector players, Nourishing Nomads Limited (NNL), a Kenyan company run by a local entrepreneur, responded positively and will also build a modern milk processing plant in Wajir town (at a total cost of £1.5 million). NNL previously supported the project under BRACED by building camel milk solar chilling and bulking kiosks. Underpinning this success is the project’s phased exit strategy, developed in Year 2 of BRACED, following its Mid-Term Review, and an in-depth contextual analysis. These identified gaps in the market and strategic partnerships promoting the likelihood of sustainability. Mid-term reviews often underpin key moments for identifying change for BRACED IPs and provide an important opportunity for shifting direction based on mid-length lessons learnt.

Another useful illustration of private sector engagement relates to sustainability in the context of climate information. In this instance, private sector involvement can play out in different ways, which might not always be useful for enhancing resilience long term.

WYL partnered with a private company, IGNITIA, to generate weather forecasts, rather than the National Meteorological Service. The project also worked with Orange, the mobile phone provider, to distribute the forecasts, with the business model viable enough to last post-project close. 49% of farmers who used the mobile forecasting platform in Mali reported they would pay a small fee to keep receiving the forecasts (FCFA 25, equivalent to less than £0.50). This is because they have proved useful, being localised and specific to farmers’ needs compared to forecasts provided by the National Meteorological Service.

While a positive achievement, this example raises questions around ‘ethical’ climate services and the role of the private sector in a climate services system. Forecasts from the private sector are often perceived to be better due to increased specificity. Yet the forecasts may undermine the National Meteorological Service, which should have the sole mandate to issue warnings.

The project reported that enhancing the camel milk value chain had provided a new source of income for herders, milk traders and transporters along the value chain, promoting their adaptive capacity. The income could also potentially help people smooth consumption during periods of drought, building their absorptive capacity.
related to hazards. If this convention is not followed, users may receive conflicting messages from various sources, creating confusion rather than inspiring action.

Other projects reported that climate services would not continue once their projects end, with the lack of sustainability of climate services in most cases possibly undermining the long-term resilience goals of the BRACED programme. By definition, climate services should be provided over many years to prove useful (depending on the level of detail of the forecast). This is because climate and weather information is inherently uncertain and is unlikely to be accurate all of the time. Climate services are founded on users’ trust of the forecasts, and need to be used consistently, over time, in order to improve people’s decision making. The report from the final year of BRACED demonstrated that trust was key to establishing new partnerships that would support climate-informed decision making. But from BRACED-X we learn that, in fact, introducing climate services, and then having that access reduced or rescinded, may reduce the likelihood that beneficiaries will trust the information provided, or decide to act on it in the future. Sustainability, and the role of trust that underpins this outcome, is therefore to be considered an important precondition of an effective climate service and should be prioritised alongside decision-relevant information if climate services are to be incorporated into resilience projects and programmes.

Overall, these examples demonstrate that laying the foundations to promote the potential for sustainable outcomes beyond the lifetime of projects, may require forming strategic alliances with private sector entities that have the incentive, expertise and financial capacity to continue promoting project benefits. The examples also demonstrate that sufficient time to achieve impacts during the implementation period is needed. This can incentivise the private sector, and other funders or programmes, to expand and support project achievements beyond project lifetimes. However, the role of the private sector in resilience interventions is to be carefully considered, particularly around the use of climate services, with positive effects to not be assumed.

SECURING ADDITIONAL FINANCE BY LINKING WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES OR WITH PROJECT PARTNERS

This was not a reality for all IPs at the time of data collection, but four projects reported that communities could continue to reap benefits from projects in this way. Livestock Mobility is illustrative of this group of projects and has been able to leverage successes achieved under BRACED to attract funding from other donors. The IP is working with the World Bank, the EU and the French BRES and MAR.


Livestock Mobility, SURfM, Anukulan, DCF.
Development Agency (AFD). One member of its consortium, Vétérinaires Sans Frontières – Belgium (VSF-B), is also incorporating services on animal health established by the project into other initiatives funded for an additional two to three years. Another illustration is from SUR1M. The World Bank will continue to work with the 'SCAP-Ru' disaster management groups in Niger, and the EU in Mali.

These examples point to the fact that three years of funding and implementation is not enough when considering sustainability and that longer-term funding and support is needed. The short timeframe of the BRACED programme makes it challenging to ascertain the extent to which outcomes achieved will be sustained. Still, the additional external financial support secured by IPs creates the time for project activities and outcomes to continue to mature, further building evidence on ‘what works’ to enhance resilience. This is valuable, as it helps gain a clearer understanding of what is to be sustained, and how adaptive, flexible and dynamic interventions can be to changing climate challenges.

ENSURING COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP

The potential for sustainability was also reported by seven projects through the strengthening of local ownership in existing locations. For some, income generation activities are durable as a result of community buy-in and adoption of these activities. Individuals now possess the knowledge and skills to keep these activities that promote adaptive capacity going without external project support, such as under BRES, with market garden production. Alternatively, in Senegal and Mali, DCF reported community ownership by the management and monitoring committees included in each climate adaptation investment. The committees work with communities, to ensure that their investments remain transparent and aligned with their priorities. Finally, Livestock Mobility reported community ownership through a continued improvement in social relations between pastoralists and farmers. Their cooperation to secure livestock corridors established by the consortium continues to be enabled by the project’s ‘social agreements’ and ‘informed debates.’ These mechanisms are owned and led by pastoralists and farmers, enabling this change in cooperation and continued reduction in conflict along livestock corridors it brings, to continue once the project closes.

Livestock Mobility is working with the World Bank through its Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (PRAPS). It is also working with the EU/AFD-funded PAMOBARMA project, under the third component of the Regional Dialogue and Investment Project for Pastoralism and Transhumance in the Sahel and Coastal Countries of West Africa (PREDIP). This component operates across borders in the south Sahel and in the north of the coastal countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea) for 50 months. It enables partners to keep working on activities established under BRACED and BRACED-X with a budget of €13,075,353.

The Kandaji dam project and the Food Security Support Project (PASA) funded by the World Bank will support the SCAP-Rus in Niger, and the LaFa/Strengthening Food Security Project (PRORESA) project, funded by the EU, in Mali.

BRES, Livestock Mobility, Anukulan, SUR1M, PROGRESS, WYL, DCF.
FORMALISING LOCAL PRODUCERS OR SAVINGS GROUPS

Lastly, a smaller number of projects\(^\text{64}\) reported sustainability as a result of market access and credit opportunities, most commonly through the formalisation of local producers or savings groups. In Niger for example, under SUR1M, Private Service Providers (PSPs) have been certified and, using a fee-for-service approach, are continuing to create Savings and Internal Lending Community (SILC) groups beyond those created by the project. The PSP methodology was specifically developed to ensure ability to sustain activities and scale SILC groups beyond the limits of the project’s timeframe.

4.2 Analysis and reflection

The BRACED ToC hypothesises that people’s capacity to anticipate, absorb and adapt to shocks can be built, enhanced, and reshaped through transformational changes. Put differently, BRACED intended to move beyond supporting incremental changes in people’s resilience, to support a more radical shift in vulnerability in BRACED project locations. After three years of implementation, BRACED demonstrated across its portfolio that strengthening communities’ resilience capacities could deliver sustainable outcomes. Yet the evidence was limited, as the timeframe of three years was too short to determine the extent to which observable changes are sustainable. It was expected that the extension phase would enable IPs to promote the sustainability of the resilient outcomes described in Section 3.

4.2.1 How can projects foster equality and build resilience?

The BRACED programme operates on the premise that actions to enhance social equity and inclusion are essential, as inequality undermines resilience and a just climate change response. As such, inequality is a component of transformation under BRACED, and is viewed as an approach to understand the structural and fundamental ways in which people’s capacity to anticipate, absorb and adapt to shocks and stresses can be enhanced. As the BRACED-X ToC stipulates, key to promoting equality is to transform the power structures and relationships that expose people to risk and prevents them from increasing their capacities for resilience.\(^\text{65}\) This is a different approach to targeting project activities to particular groups of people. It is not enough to simply build people’s agency through skills, knowledge and abilities without the transformation of power structures and relationships that determine what people can do, have, and participate in.\(^\text{66}\)

\(^{64}\) BRES, MAR, SUR1M, WYL.


\(^{66}\) A common framework for understanding empowerment is through changes in three domains of agency, structures and relations, as per CARE’s (2012) Good practices framework: gender analysis, recommended as a tool for gender analysis to IPs in BRACED’s Monitoring and evaluation guidance notes, p. 64.
Section 4.1.2 demonstrates however, that most BRACED-X projects systematically targeted women, through capacity-building and activities, particularly around improved or diverse income, which is not sufficient for transformative change (Box 8).

**Box 8: Deep dive findings in focus – towards a more transformative resilience agenda**

Strategies and approaches to tackle the root causes of inequalities, and to empower women or other groups, are rarely integrated into projects. Building equality and inclusion means not only sharing the benefits of projects, but also shifting entrenched power relations and control over resources. Hence tackling issues related to gender and inclusion requires strategic approaches to shift power if transformational changes are really to occur. Projects are to go beyond resilience results (disaggregated by marginalised group), to include equality as a specific objective. This is an important distinction, as including equality as an expected outcome requires projects to design specific pathways for it, that are integrated into project design in a systematic way. The findings from BRACED-X continue to demonstrate that it is still important to make an analytical distinction between projects that display ‘participation’ and ‘social inclusion’ – the category under which BRACED-X projects typically fall – from those that identify gender and other forms of equality as a key goal for resilience. This is because projects must truly empower if they are to transform.

The findings from the extension phase demonstrate that resilience programming needs to be better informed by robust analysis of who is vulnerable and why, and to design and implement transformational approaches that tackle inequality directly if people’s resilience is to be improved. Based on BRACED-X evidence, two examples here show how projects might move towards this objective.

**A CLEAR VISION OF HOW EQUALITY CONTRIBUTES TO RESILIENCE MUST BE ARTICULATED**

Livestock Mobility is an example of a project that did not work on the inequality and marginalisation of women in the pastoralist communities with which they worked, but has been effective in working towards equality for pastoralists in the Sahel. Although the majority of reporting across the nine projects is still unclear on how equality relates to resilience outcomes, Livestock Mobility put the marginalisation of pastoralists as central to its understanding of resilience in its project design. This is different to how marginalisation has been approached in other projects, which included marginalised people in resilience-related activities and reported disaggregated data. The focus was also not dominated by activities focusing primarily on the marginalised group’s own agency, which typifies gender work under BRACED-X. Evidence from
other BRACED projects show that attention to agency alone has affected the individual and household level, but not the community or system level, despite transformation requiring change beyond individual capabilities. Livestock Mobility, and its emphasis on marginalised pastoralists, has instead paid more attention to power structures and relations that frame the resilience of the vulnerable and marginalised group, which is the direction future resilience programming requires.

Box 9 explores the approach taken by Livestock Mobility. It presents a model from which other work on forms of inequality can potentially learn and replicate for other marginalised communities and subgroups. This is useful, as analysis of the BRACED-X deep dives also show that beyond a focus on gender, future projects and programmes need to do more to identify and develop strategies to engage with and address the inequality of socially marginalised and remote or underserved groups, because climate change and disasters can exacerbate existing disparity.

**Box 9: What can we learn about gender and other equality issues from pastoralist inequality in Livestock Mobility?**

The social, cultural and political marginalisation of pastoralists in West Africa has led to a significant decline in pastoralism and high dropout rates, in a context with few viable alternative livelihoods or jobs. Pastoralist marginalisation and inequality is made evident by the fact that big business commercial agriculture is prioritised, despite evidence of lower productivity and higher water use than traditional pastoralist systems.67

Livestock Mobility started with two clear visions:

1. That mobility is the key for pastoralists to be more resilient;
2. Ways to transform power structures that limit resilience capacities of pastoralists.

This led the project to successfully work on issues of pastoralist marginalisation and inequality in decision making and resource allocation and management compared to other communities.

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The model used by Livestock Mobility to address the inequality of pastoralists in the Sahel can be conceived as follows:

1. **Address misinformation and negative preconceptions** of [the marginalised group];

2. **Articulate the positive impacts** of [the marginalised group] being enabled to thrive, both benefits to them and wider benefits to society (such as avoidance of negative consequences of pastoralists marginalisation and the new opportunities provided to others by them thriving);

3. **Include** [the marginalised group] in decision making in ways that enable their needs to be considered alongside the needs of other groups and communities, and not easily dismissed;

4. **Demonstrate the positive impacts** of better resource access, better services, and longer-term investment and management by and for [the marginalised group];

5. **Garner wider stakeholder support** for change at scale.

There is now an opportunity for Acting for Life, the consortium lead, to see if its experience in addressing external inequality of pastoralists in wider society can help address inequality internal to pastoralist communities in the future. The shared experience of being a marginalised community could be used as a pathway to build understanding of how others are marginalised within their own community and families. Using pastoralist men’s experience of being constrained by the structures and power held by others could also be used to understand and address the structures and power they hold, and how it constrains women in their own community.

The example of Livestock Mobility also highlights that benefitting one group does not have to disadvantage another. Secured access to resources benefits pastoralists and local farming communities, with positive shifts in social relations (see Section 4.1.4). In fact, if done right, there are advantages for more people, socially, economically and environmentally, by tackling inequality. In situations of resource scarcity, such as BRACED-X operating environments, it is often hard to perceive the benefits of equality. There is a common perception that there is not enough for everyone, and it is often wrongly understood that, to benefit one group means to take away from another, with resistance to change as a result. Yet equality is not about taking benefits away from one group and giving them to another. It is about finding more fair ways for everyone to live together, and everyone having the same rights and opportunities, so that no one is ‘left behind’ and more can benefit from more resilient and thriving communities.
Overall, projects need to better understand the specific causes of vulnerability that affect the individuals, households, and communities they support, and clearly articulate how project activities contribute to addressing it. Blanket statements that women or any other marginalised group are vulnerable are unhelpful, because they do not clarify the resilience pathway needed, and they further marginalise the contribution of women and marginalised groups to building community resilience. It is only by understanding in what ways a whole community’s ability to thrive is constrained by a lack of agency, limiting structures, and unequal power relations, that resilience and transformation can occur. This shift in focus on equality needs to start within donor agencies themselves.

**POLICY CHANGE IS NOT ENOUGH; ATTITUDINAL CHANGES ARE NEEDED TOO**

Evidence from BRACED-X demonstrates that projects tend to view policy change as the key modality for transformational change. However, there are examples showing the role of changing attitudes as a trigger for transformation, and examples of where policy change without attitude change towards marginalised people and inequality has limited impact.

In BRACED, changes to negative or entrenched mindsets, views, perceptions and beliefs is understood to be one of the pillars of transformational change, in line with the wider literature on resilience and transformation. As such, projects that have contributed to changing stakeholders perceptions – such as Livestock Mobility around pastoralism – have helped build a foundation for a long-term change that can enable resilience in ways considered transformational.

Other BRACED-X projects also worked on changing attitudes and mindsets and used approaches such as forming new relationships, trust-building, raising the voices of different groups, and co-creating knowledge as enablers to help change occur.

For example, SUR1M reported that it organised a Democracy Day in Mali, which brought together a variety of stakeholders: all village chiefs in Gounzourey commune, NGO and service providers operating in the area, administrative authorities, and the mayors of neighbouring communes. The purpose of the approach was to take a first step in helping to change the attitudes of decision makers by bringing them into communities to meet people and answer questions, to better understand the challenges they face. This intervention was

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effective, and in spite of there being no funding for it from the project, five out of seven remaining communes have already replicated the event using their own financial resources. The remaining two communes are budgeted to hold this event in 2020.

An example of policy change that is not accompanied by the needed change in attitudes from decision makers comes from PROGRESS. The Kenyan Constitution requires representation of women in governance arrangements, which resulted in 30% of members of WAPCs established by the project being women. While the IP anecdotally observed women taking on more responsibilities in the planning process, voicing their opinions and engaging in decision making more actively than before, no concrete impacts on equality were obvious as a result of meeting the quota. This example demonstrates that even with quotas for women and agreements to take forward policy provisions supporting equality and/or social inclusion, without changes in attitudes from policy makers, the impact remains limited.

4.2.2 To what extent is policy change possible from the bottom up?

The BRACED-X ToC defines success for the policy-influencing pathway as the contribution projects can make to transformational change. This includes improving policies and planning associated with managing the risk of climate extremes and disasters at national and subnational level, as well as influencing governance relations towards greater downward accountability and increased transparency. Furthermore, a central assumption of BRACED was that community-level investments would eventually lead to higher-level shifts in decision making and policies related to climate adaptation and resilience. However, the evidence from three years of BRACED implementation suggested that change in policy and related decision making was difficult to achieve from community-level investment alone, and likely needed specific strategies focused on influencing those changes. The Policy Window funding, as a part of the BRACED-X extension, was therefore an opportunity for BRACED projects to pursue and implement strategies specifically focused on policy change.

The ToC recognised that one year of implementation would not be enough for policy change. As such, BRACED-X projects have, overall, not seen substantial changes in policy, especially at the national and international level.\textsuperscript{70} The policy discourses that BRACED-X projects have been involved in were ongoing at the time of writing, as was expected, with potential changes in policy anticipated to occur after programme implementation ends. Still, BRACED-X projects have managed to affect some change on the ToC policy pathway through their investments at community level. This has been achieved

\textsuperscript{70} This is apart from a more recent example that has been reported after data collection ended. The NFCS developed under CMESA-E was endorsed by the government of Ethiopia in July 2019, with its implementation starting in 2020. The project reported this achievement demonstrates policy change, from forecast development and provision to applied climate service development.
through the strategies projects have implemented, with the majority of projects approaching policy change in similar ways.\textsuperscript{71}

First, projects aligned their policy goals with emerging or existing policy windows. Second, knowledge activities were organised to create a shared understanding of policy goals and target issues between relevant stakeholders, which often leveraged relationships built during BRACED to maximise impact. Third, projects used the buy-in generated during these knowledge events to participate in or facilitate policy dialogues and processes. The evidence suggests projects that went beyond conducting knowledge activities to implement aggressive agendas, with the goal of achieving specific policy outcomes, achieved the most change.\textsuperscript{72} For example, Anukulan was successful in integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) plans into Local Adaptation Plans of Action (LAPAs) in all 41 \textit{palikas} in Nepal by working directly with local government. The project also repeatedly engaged local and national government in its advocacy, which resulted in the inclusion of marginalised groups in the LAPA development process.

Under BRACED-X, all five projects also focused on policy change by institutionalising project pilots and integrating technical expertise into policies and plans in complimentary ways. Using the credibility and legitimacy that IP's community-level investments had earned from BRACED was useful to gain the attention of decision makers, and secure demand and buy-in for their pilot projects. In particular, evidence of successful community-level investments supported by BRACED was critical to the wider uptake of project pilots and IP's technical expertise, such as the WAPCs under PROGRESS, trans-border committees in Livestock Mobility, the CPA in Anukulan, and the work of DCF on climate finance at the regional and national level in Mali and Senegal. DCF, for example, explicitly used project evidence and publicity to increase demand from local governments for mechanisms similar to those promoted by the project, that increased government control over local resilience-building investments and their access to funding. As such, initiatives aimed at institutionalising project pilots, or integrating technical expertise into policies and plans, had more success than projects focused on creating new policy.

Political change and instability was typically reported as a significant challenge to achieving policy change during BRACED and BRACED-X. Yet the evidence suggests that change can be achieved in challenging political environments, if political interests and ongoing policy dialogues are relevant to the policy goals of the project.\textsuperscript{73} Anukulan, for example, was able to progress with the integration of DRR plans into LAPAs despite a significant restructure of government in Nepal. The restructure meant that LAPAs had to be updated

\textsuperscript{71} Livestock Mobility, DCF, Anukulan, CMESA-E.
\textsuperscript{72} Anukulan, CMESA-E, Livestock Mobility, DCF.
\textsuperscript{73} Anukulan, Livestock Mobility.
in line with new geographic boundaries, and Anukulan seized this opportunity to change the discourse around LAPA implementation.

Policy is considered key to institutionalise resilience gains and sustain the capacity of beneficiaries to address different types of climate-related disturbances over time. However, the evidence from BRACED-X shows that policies need to be developed and actually implemented if they are to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations, which, on the whole, did not happen during the extension phase. IPs have therefore tried to promote sustainability around their project approaches, with the expectation that they will lead to policy outcomes longer term by working towards institutionalising inclusive approaches into decision-making spaces,\(^\text{74}\) as well as including BRACED-X advocates in the process.\(^\text{75}\)

Overall, the evidence from community-level investments under BRACED-X suggests that projects have had some success in creating an enabling environment for policy engagement work to take place, with some early accomplishments in this area. Yet the extent to which investment made will be sustainable is uncertain given the limited progress to date on social inclusion and policy change.

### 4.2.3 How can sustainability be supported within the lifetime of a project?

Evidence from four deep dives, and project monitoring reports, shows that the majority of BRACED-X projects are significantly moving beyond delivering project activities, to contributing to the potential sustainability of services and outcomes in the long term. The examples highlighted in Section 4.1.4 in part corroborate other studies demonstrating critical factors for sustainability,\(^\text{76}\) and emphasise that laying the foundations for sustainable outcomes beyond project timeframes requires creating an enabling institutional and policy environment. Working with government and the private sector in some cases has been paramount. Creating demand through project partners and communities’ direct collaboration and participation, and achieving meaningful results during the implementation period that clearly show that change is worthwhile, also increases the likelihood of uptake of approaches and activities beyond the project lifetime from individual to institutional level. Sustainability is likewise shown to be a process that builds over time, requiring ongoing commitment from the actors involved.

The insights on approaches used to promote sustainability reiterate the added value of BRACED-X that Section 3.2.2 posits. That is, without the BRACED

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\(^{74}\) DCF, PROGRESS, Anukulan.

\(^{75}\) DCF, CMESA-E.

\(^{76}\) Sustainability is suggested to depend on (sustained) resources, capacity, motivation (incentives) and upwards linkages (Rogers, B. et al. (2015) Sustaining development: a synthesis of results from a four-country study of sustainability and exit strategies among development food assistance projects. Science and Policy, Tufts University).
extension, projects would not have had the time or the resources to secure the sustainability of activities. This is because most projects found the additional time of BRACED-X important for reinforcing project gains, which is the key added value of the extension phase.

What projects have achieved is valuable and worthy of merit. Yet still, evidence of the potential for sustainability at the time of project close does not necessarily imply sustained benefits over time. Interventions still require support from a limited number of external agents and inputs, and rely on more conventional structures and implementation strategies, rather than being sustainable on their own terms. As such, there is a need to reflect and challenge what is to be sustained (Box 10).

**Box 10: Deep dive findings in focus – challenges in defining sustainability and what should persist**

BRACED-X projects tend to overly focus on a narrow conceptualisation of sustainability – that is ensuring the continuity of activities and benefits after project implementation and funding ends, so that the outcomes of action remain ‘intact’ and grow further post-intervention. From this perspective, it is assumed that what projects are doing should be sustained to begin with, with sustainability treated as a positive outcome. Yet understanding what exactly is to be sustained in contexts of resilience to climate-related changes requires more clarity.

A more conventional approach might look at a specific activity or outcome and judge whether it is sustainable or not. However, for resilience, there is a need for projects and donors to move away from an explicit focus on the sustainability of activities and outcomes, where practices today may not be resilient in the long term, towards key social processes and types of thinking, behaviours or trust, and approaches to implementation that underpin sustainability and the change processes through which durable changes are to be realised over time. In this way, adaptive capacity and sustainability are keenly linked.

Pinpointing what it takes to build resilience in ways that are durable, and identifying what is worth sustaining, is not well understood if project approaches are not tested against future uncertainty and potential outcomes.

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77 Kuntz and Gomes (2012), in Mapfumo et al. (2017) (Pathways to transformational change in the face of climate impacts: an analytical framework. *Climate and Development* 9, 5: 439–451), argue that change processes are to be sustainable through ‘internal’ resources, rather than requiring unending funding and support from ‘external’ agents (p. 441).

unexpected shocks. The uncertainty that comes with climatic changes and unpredictable events or extremes questions the extent to which choices made today can reduce or exacerbate current or future vulnerability and facilitate or constrain future responses. As such, sustainability poses a complex challenge for resilience initiatives if projects are to not inadvertently hinder long-term development, and people’s resilience, by locking communities, or institutions into potentially negative (maladaptive) pathways. Hence the ultimate measurement of sustainability must be people and institutions’ capacity to adapt to an uncertain future. Thus tracking adaptive capacity, and bringing attention to the ability to address unforeseen and multivariate risks as well as those familiar, will truly test project sustainability.

A starting point might include the use of strategic scenarios and prioritising decisions that are flexible and robust across different possible futures when developing resilience-building actions. More flexible and adaptive programming approaches may help stimulate and encourage this shift in decision making for planning and design.

We have also learnt from the MRR deep dives that, while projects have taken care to implement in ways that engender ownership and longevity of activities and outcomes, barriers to sustainability exist. These often relate to continued difficulties in accessing remote and underserved communities, with implications for the ‘leave no one behind’ commitment by 2030 under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the UN’s Agenda 2030. For MAR, for example, there is concern that government officers and microfinance institutions may not continue to offer their support to remote areas, given the time and budget needed to do so. Such barriers can take time to address, with linkages with external entities or institutions to be carefully considered, so that the resources, capacity and motivation to sustain activities are present in the long term. This often rests on ownership and capacity built up during the project, with resilience programmes to allocate extra resources to ensure remote and underserved populations are reached effectively. As such, the examples from BRACED-X emphasise the importance of paying greater attention to the fact that more immediate, shorter-term successes or conventional approaches that do not challenge existing (power) structures or socio-economic inequalities, that can constrain access to resources and the choices people make, can come at the expense of supporting sustainability over time. Similarly, if project approaches are not sustained, it raises questions around whether projects can actually claim resilience has been built.

There is a risk that the definition of sustainability typically used by BRACED-X IPs also limits the extent to which projects move beyond conventional activities, towards transformative risk-taking interventions that challenge existing (power, political and social) structures and conditions and socio-economic inequalities
that generate or perpetuate underlying causes of people’s vulnerability to climate risk to begin with. Working towards this more radical, deep-seated type of social change is needed, and is important if sustainability is to be taken seriously. This is because intentionally bringing about change in power structures and reshaping behaviours and drivers of risk and vulnerability is of benefit to people irrespective of specific disturbances they face. This form of substantial change can support addressing multiple types of climate and other changes progress towards sustainability requires. It also enables resilience to be influenced beyond the individual or household level – the sphere in which BRACED has achieved most impact – to effecting change at scale, by engaging with institutional and political factors that often shape people’s capacity for resilience via decisions driven by the values and priorities of removed or external stakeholders. There is a role for projects and NGOs to act as facilitators and brokers of such interactions, together with other actors, helping local stakeholders work towards enabling this more fundamental kind of change. Resilience programmes present the opportunity to support communities to ‘adapt forward’ and work along an aspired development pathway towards the SDGs. A prerequisite for the sustainability of resilience programmes is therefore addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability. This includes the structural inequalities that create and sustain poverty and underpin people’s resilience.

Radical changes to inequalities and power dynamics however rarely show in a few years, and often take longer than the BRACED timeframe of three to four years. Changing structural drivers of risk is a gradual process that takes time and sustained commitment, further highlighting the importance of tracking adaptive capacity as a measure of project sustainability in the medium (five to 10 years) to long term (10+ years).

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5. WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE TELL US ABOUT RESILIENCE?

This report presents the summative findings from the annual reports of BRACED-X projects. BRACED was an ambitious programme, which aimed to build resilience locally in highly vulnerable and volatile places, yet at scale, in a three-year period. Much has been learnt about resilience across a range of contexts and through different packages of activities and social and policy processes that underpin and reshape people’s ability to address climate-related changes. In Year 1, we gained insight into the types of activities that can enhance resilience, particularly anticipatory and absorptive capacities. Year 2 demonstrated a number of key processes for resilience-building, with evidence around the importance of timing illustrated in Year 3. Now, under BRACED-X, the 18-month extension phase has provided additional time to learn more about adaptive capacity and transformative changes as understood under BRACED. These relate to policy, equality and social inclusion, and sustainability, and offer greater insights for policy, design and the funding of future resilience programmes.

In this report, we challenged the main assumptions underpinning the BRACED ToC, by asking five questions that remained unanswered during the programme extension yet relevant (see Section 1.3). **Findings suggest that the updated BRACED-X ToC holds, but changes need to be made to the current design to reflect the findings of this report.** The main overarching outcome-level assumption holds true, as evidence to date reveals that building resilience is
not just about responding, coping, and adapting to shocks, but is also about transforming the social, political and/or economic system.

Although most projects delivered high-impact activities that generated quick gains and helped improve the resilience of stakeholders within a short timeframe, outcomes related to adaptive capacity remain limited to date. In line with last year’s findings, results reveal that anticipatory and absorptive capacities are essential, but not sufficient for building resilience alone. Anticipatory and absorptive capacity can be a part of the process of enabling adaptive capacity, if they both endure and remain adaptive themselves. Therefore, the implicit assumption that more time would lead to more evidence of adaptive outcomes is partially confirmed, as the extension period has enabled projects to update, adapt and refine their plans based on learning from the initial stage of BRACED. Yet BRACED-X also demonstrates that timing and flexibility, as much as duration, is important, if not more so than length of implementation time alone. Put differently, enhancing adaptive capacity in the longer term is a question not (only) of time, but of project design.

Similarly, although projects effectively facilitated policy processes, and regularly brought key stakeholders together, projects so far have not, overall, seen substantial change in policy content. Transformational outcomes require two key processes: scaling and embedding approaches into government systems and policies (top-down); and including the most vulnerable and marginalised to achieve changes that are structural, catalytic, scalable and sustainable (bottom-up). **BRACED projects have contributed to resilience capacities and, to a lesser extent, to transformational changes.** In line with last year’s findings, results reveal that policy change is essential, but not sufficient if decisions are not inclusive and if investments do not address social inequality, where climate change and disasters can exacerbate existing disparity. While BRACED-X projects ensured vulnerable groups, particularly women, benefitted from project activities, they were not able to change the underlying context of social inclusion and entrenched discriminatory social norms.

What projects have achieved is valuable and worthy of merit, but the extent to which the capacities built are sufficient for long-term resilient change remains unknown. In spite of progress during the BRACED extension, the delay in the design and commissioning of national policy work limited the transformational impact of the overall programme. Considering progress to date, the underlying assumption that both bottom-up and top-down approaches are required to influence policy change remains untested.

The authors acknowledge that the lack of (internal) exploration of the operational assumptions underpinning the BRACED model, in particular the working relationships within and across components, is a significant weakness. **The opportunity to learn from BRACED’s management successes, ‘productive failures’ and innovations to understand what is actually involved in the funding and management of global resilience programmes was missed.** In addition, having a programme-level M&E framework in place was the foundation for the measurement, communication and learning the line of action in the ToC. Several tensions and trade-offs within the M&E process were to be
expected, and it is critical to be aware of the trade-offs between programme—and project-level M&E.  

Drawing from the findings of this report, as well from our learning through monitoring BRACED over the four-year period, we present a set of five key messages that build on the BRACED final report. In line with the key messages shared last year, these reflect our interpretation of what this learning means for other resilience-building efforts. They should not be seen as a stand-alone set of messages, but rather a continuation of our understanding about what it really takes to build the resilience of the most vulnerable to climate and disaster extremes. We strongly encourage the reader to also look at the summary of recommendations from previous reports.

Our aim is that these five key messages, alongside findings from previous years, provide the basis for a deeper evidence-based discussion about resilience-building practice, as well as considerations for designing and commissioning resilience programmes.

**Key Message 1: Sustainability, in resilience terms, is about the ability to adapt as things change**

The uncertainty that comes with climatic variability, climate changes and extremes, challenges the extent to which choices made today can reduce or exacerbate current or future vulnerability, and facilitate or constrain future responses. Hence the ultimate measurement of sustainability must be people and institutions’ capacity to adapt to an uncertain future. This means dealing not only with climate risks that are known and already identified, but also with those unforeseen that are harder to prepare for. From a resilience perspective therefore, sustainability is not just about maintaining activities, but is also about the ability to respond flexibly to different disturbances. To this end, there is a need to think beyond activities that support adaptive capacity, to the factors and processes that underpin it and through which durable change can be realised over time (see Section 4.2.3).

A narrow focus on ensuring the continuity of activities and benefits after project implementation and funding ends, so that the outcomes of activities remain ‘intact’ or are enhanced post-intervention, is insufficient. It fails to acknowledge the dynamism of resilience and that it is change processes and factors such as trust or types of thinking and behaviour, that enable people to positively adapt, that are to be sustained. Needless to say, projects must ensure that the investments and resources put in place to support, for example, climate services are financially sustainable and do not rely on external interventions and funds after project completion. This, for the most part, with some exceptions, has not been achieved in BRACED, and the lack of sustainability of climate services may undermine long-term resilience outcomes (see Section 4.1.4).

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82 CMESA-E and DCF.
More attention not on what projects are doing, but on what they are going to achieve in the short-term to enable longer-term changes for ultimate beneficiaries is required. Further, there is also a risk that such a definition of sustainability limits the extent to which projects move beyond conventional activities towards transformative, risk-taking interventions that challenge underlying structural and socio-economic inequalities.

BRACED-X has demonstrated that adaptive capacity can take longer to promote than anticipatory and absorptive capacities. But it has also shown that with sufficient time, anticipatory and absorptive capacity can provide a vehicle through which adaptive capacity can be built, and the processes through which people can begin to sustain their resilience. Addressing more immediate needs in ways that provide a foundation for adaptation is of essence. Yet it is tracking adaptive capacity that will truly test project sustainability.

Implications for policy and practice

• Sustainability requires a deliberate, strategic process right from design stage, with a clear definition from the outset. Resilience projects must be designed with both short – and long-term objectives and vision, regardless of the duration of the project. Donors could consider building ‘sustainability funds’, so projects that implement interventions with impact (particularly for the most vulnerable and marginalised and to leave no one behind) are not transitioned to other entities in the immediate term, which may leave resilience gains exposed, but can be continued while pursuing more robust transition. Plans should include coherent strategies and partnerships that can support this approach, and where appropriate, link results to subnational policies and national plans. Sustainability also brings attention to timescales, as measuring processes is likely to take longer than conventional programme timeframes. Given that resilience programmes like BRACED still remain short term (three to five years), phased approaches to implementation become even more important (see Key Message 5). This will support projects and programmes to move away from achieving and measuring activities and outcomes over a short period, towards measuring the change processes that lay the foundations for sustainability over time.

Key Message 2: Transformational approaches are not optional; they are fundamental to strengthening resilience

BRACED expectations included working at scale and reaching large numbers of people, through large and diverse consortia, while also addressing the vulnerabilities of the most marginalised and leaving no-one behind. Findings from BRACED demonstrate that these are not wholly incompatible goals, but they certainly merit further thought and clarity. Overall, the findings from the extension phase demonstrate that resilience programming needs to be better informed by robust analysis of who is vulnerable and why, and design and implement transformational approaches that tackle inequality directly if people’s resilience is to be improved (see Section 4.2.1). Results stress the importance of making an analytical distinction between projects that display ‘social inclusion’, often demonstrated through quotas in BRACED-X, and results disaggregated...
by marginalised group, to include equality as a specific objective. This means working directly with the most vulnerable as a key goal for resilience, where transforming inequality is integral to project logic and design. Building equality and inclusion means not only sharing the benefits of projects, but to also shift entrenched power relations and control over resources. Tackling issues related to social exclusion requires strategic approaches to shift power if fundamental changes are really to occur. Ultimately, resilience programmes should lead to people having a greater voice and agency over the decisions that impact their ability to address climate-related change.

Having gender or vulnerability as an ‘add-on’ criterion for resilience programming is counterproductive as it can incentivise a culture of ‘high-number, measurable impact approaches’ and inadvertently steers project designs towards ‘quick-win’ activities and blanket assessments of vulnerability. While programmes may tick all of the boxes, they may still fall short of delivering adaptive capacity outcomes in the long term if focus remains on the ‘activities’ rather than also on the linkages, processes and shifts needed to facilitate and support transformational change.

**Implications for policy and practice**

- A transformative agenda must start ‘within’ donor agencies and organisations and requires programmes to be much more precise on the role of gender, marginalisation and inequality in achieving (or preventing) resilient communities. Where climate change and disasters can exacerbate existing inequality, gender and power analyses are required to identify and develop strategies to engage socially marginalised groups, which should include consideration of disability, ethnicity and other types of diversity. Project design needs to include a combination of activities and strategies to tackle the root causes of social exclusion and inequality from the start. Designs need to reflect realistic timeframes about what can be achieved and at what scale within existing levels of funding and resources. Specific budgets for social equality and inclusion should be allocated to support specific change pathways towards these objectives, with resilience programmes to allocate extra resources to ensure remote and underserved populations are effectively reached.

**Key Message 3: Beyond policy content, it is the timing and sequencing of policy engagement work at multiple scales that is critical**

Policy change is often cited as an example of systemic, transformative change. Shifting institutions, their representatives and legislation takes time, but enshrining change in law is often seen as a way to bring about durable change. For this reason, supporting changes in policies, political discourse and political actors’ behaviours that were favourable towards enabling the resilience of vulnerable populations, was targeted by BRACED and made explicit in the BRACED-X ToC. However, evidence suggests policy outcomes have, overall, been elusive, notwithstanding some successes in shorter-term changes in knowledge – and awareness-building, and access to and engagement with key stakeholders, which are requisite steps on a policy change pathway (see Section 4.1.3).
A primary focus on knowledge building and awareness raising will not however lead to substantial policy outcomes alone. Knowledge is foundational for building the shared understanding and buy-in required for policy change and is a vital resource to inform policy outcomes if it is proactively used for this purpose. Yet enacting policy change requires long-term engagement or direct facilitation of policy development in the short term, with relevant, influential actors to be involved in supporting the process – an area of enquiry warranting further exploration beyond BRACED. Policy change must also be supported by a shift in attitudes of policy makers towards the needs and capacities of marginalised people and the inequitable structures that underpin their vulnerability.

Policy outcomes can be achieved in challenging and changing political contexts, as long as project goals align with emerging policy windows. However, it is difficult to say if policy outcomes can be sustained through ongoing political change. Measuring defined progress markers alone does not indicate whether policy change has been achieved. IPs have built relationships with a variety of stakeholders and obtained endorsement and verbal commitments around the policy changes they want to bring about, but these have not necessarily resulted in improved policies, which may benefit those at risk from climate shocks and stresses. Policies need to be acted upon in order to support the populations BRACED engaged with, and the long-term effect of policy depends on the will, capacity and fiscal commitments of key institutions to implement them.

**Implications for policy and practice**

- Working at multiple scales, resilience programmes should fund projects that develop a phased strategy for building resilience that includes both bottom-up community-level investments and top-down institutional change. Bottom-up investments are key for building credibility and legitimacy, and generating policy-relevant evidence, which can then be leveraged to facilitate policy changes. This needs to be considered and built in at design stage with work at different scales, not conducted in silos, but mutually reinforcing. For projects and programmes with policy objectives, nested theories of change that are linked via policy change pathways between levels may be a useful way to ensure there is a link between them. Supporting policy change is a long-term process, with results not certain and often beyond the control of implementing entities. Policy outcomes can be subject to the vagaries of political change, particularly in the contexts in which BRACED has operated. To account for this, a higher tolerance for risk of failure is required than is perhaps the norm for official development assistance funders, bound by understandable accountability rules. If M&E frameworks are also to move beyond standard progress markers for policy change, such as networks built at individual level, to measure the resilience of institutions and their capacity to ultimately implement policy, this will require more top down investment.
Key Message 4: Higher degrees of flexibility are needed both in the design and management of resilience programmes

Time and timing has been a recurring theme throughout BRACED across a number of issues relating to programming approaches, resilience-building processes, project and consortium management and demonstration of results. Evidence from BRACED points to the fact that building resilience in the long term is not (only) a question of time, but of the amount of flexibility in project design (see Section 3.2.3). For example, working in partnership has provided BRACED projects with a more diverse range of capacities, knowledge and experience, which would not have been as effective from a single entity, institution or organisation working alone. Yet it has also challenged the speed and scope of projects, and of the programme at large, to be flexible and to learn and adapt. Despite valuable accomplishments, BRACED provides, at best, ad hoc examples of flexibility and adaptation. Projects have mostly focused on reactive, tactical changes, and course correction in order to meet deliverables and deadlines, rather than adapting and experimenting by strategic design. Making tactical tweaks to improve performance however only gets projects so far. Evidence from BRACED-X reveals the importance of ensuring learning and evidence-based adaptive decision making. But it also challenges the extent to which this can be done within large consortia programmes, and within the confines of conventional programme designs and contracts that limit the scope for projects to employ adaptive management. In the future, programmes and their donors need to embrace the technical elements of working in complex environments and issues around risk, failure and trust, inherent in adaptive and resilient processes.

A potential way forward is to consider hybrid management models that ensure accountability and enhance flexibility in project design and decision making. While it is critical to remain flexible, ever-evolving strategies can become moving targets, making it difficult to know when a programme has achieved success. Frameworks and indicators are necessary to maintain a minimum degree of accountability to donors and communities while adapting to the situation and approach used. Programmes must consider the role and purpose of the logframe and how it is used; where progress, not targets, can drive programme adaptation, and experimentation, not only quantitative results, is recognised. For example, concept notes and project or programme proposals should be based on broad outcomes, providing implementers the flexibility to define their own approaches, work plans, reporting and indicators, and adapting them towards shared goals. Projects could also work towards fixed, ‘bedrock’ indicators at higher outcome levels, with lower-order outcomes and outputs remaining flexible and changeable. A key measure of project effectiveness should likewise be the extent projects incorporate learning. In addition, to truly test the effectiveness of adaptive project management and implementation, ToCs need to clarify how much adaptation and change projects and programmes should demonstrate.

Needless to say, it takes more time – and probably costs more – to manage an adaptive programme than a conventional programme. It means allowing freedom to experiment and freedom to fail, so halting initiatives that seem unlikely to
succeed and scaling up others where strategic impact is more likely. Failure is not a ‘waste of money’ – indeed, it could represent better value for money versus continuing to fund a failing project – as long as programmes learn and adapt from what does not work and make decisions that are based on this evidence.

Implications for policy and practice

- Programmes need to balance rigour and accountability with agility and responsiveness to complexity. This could mean, for example, that donor organisations promote flexible reporting templates and timelines, freedom to reallocate funding and update budgets within a certain threshold, and the ability to make decisions swiftly based on action, experimentation and rapid evaluation. Donors must also ensure investments in creating and enabling ongoing space for structured reflection and learning. This is to help partners stand back from projects so they can consider the bigger picture, think creatively, and use lessons learnt to feedback into and inform planning and strategic direction.

Key Message 5: Phased approaches that layer and link processes and interventions across timeframes and scales should guide the way forward

In line with our key messages in Years 2 and 3, the findings of this report make us reiterate the fact that investing in sustainable and transformational resilience outcomes is a long-term process, and therefore future resilience programmes should consider alternative approaches to project design and delivery that expand beyond three- to five-year funding cycles. Discussion about timeframes should not be centred on what can be achieved in terms of resilience as a final outcome; more enabling environments may see more ‘results’. Instead, the focus should be on the extent to which projects can support stakeholders within their context to move along development pathways, while at the same time building capacities to enable coping, adaptation and transformation in the face of climate and disaster risk.

To this end, phased delivery approaches would help match design to context with longer lead-in times to allow for a deeper analysis of the context(s) in which the project is working; an extended inception phase to build relationships and trial new ways of working; and several phases of implementation without assuming that full results can be delivered in one project period or at the same time. Such approaches would require iterative learning to be built into the design of subsequent phases. For example, by addressing immediate needs and helping people improve their absorptive and anticipatory capacity first, while laying the groundwork for adaptive capacity and transformational change, rather than pre-planning it all. Also, by having a longer-term commitment to fund selected projects to support a deeper and more sustainable resilience-building process (Key Message 1).

Working in this way, where timing is better considered, than just duration of programmes alone, would prevent current deficiencies that lead to projects trying to do too much at once, and lacking clear logic between activities undertaken and larger impact claims. It would help work through any resistance to change
projects may experience and open up opportunities gained through an evolving understanding of context and stakeholders throughout implementation. Donor commitment to phased approaches, in both implementation and funding, would also better incentivise the ways of working needed for resilience, especially through transformational approaches (Key Message 4). This includes enabling trust and social relations that develop over time; changing attitudes towards the contribution of those traditionally marginalised in decision making; and embedding adaptive management and feedback mechanisms that improve people’s ability to make decisions and take action that positively enhances their resilience. BRACED-X demonstrated, short term, the value that can be added to project achievements by building on previous phases of implementation. Yet more support is still needed for BRACED communities to be resilient to the changing risks and threats they face.

Taking a phased approach to programming can help move towards changing structures of inequality that undermine resilience, also which projects struggle to influence during standard implementing timelines. It can enable projects to learn from experience and failure over time, and better understand what works and what is important to sustain to begin with. Projects can likewise better align with cycles relating to agriculture, government planning or national and local policy processes, that the findings of this report demonstrate is needed (see Section 3.2.3). ‘Opportunity costs’ associated with a phased approach would in part be offset by the future, and further opportunities it brings for resilience-building.

**Implications for policy and practice**

- Donors need to reconsider funding cycles and implementation phases, requiring potential changes in donor mindsets, as a reassessment of existing practice is required. Practitioners and donors should adjust to a rolling planning mechanism, over longer timeframes and move away from shorter term project cycles. Reviews at the end of each phase would inform the next, together with active learning cycles, with identification of measurable actions to provide focus and direction. Rolling plans are to be reflected in budgetary procedures, with different accounting systems than those used in more conventional programmes to be potentially explored. Project managers should take the time to tailor their practices to best fit the needs of a phased approach, with M&E approaches to be designed around the phased project cycle, with ability to grow and evolve over time as projects develop.
Annex 1: Components of the BRACED-X programme

The BRACED-X programme comprises four components:

**Components A and B** are field-based resilience-building projects in the Sahel and East Africa/Asia, respectively. These nine projects are being run concurrently, usually in one or two of the BRACED countries. Each BRACED project is unique in its design, target stakeholders, activities and operating context, and is delivered by a BRACED IP. IPs are typically multi-organisation consortia that have come together to design and deliver a resilience-building project under BRACED. Annex 2 provides a list of the IPs and their projects. A Fund Manager (FM) manages the performance of the nine projects.

**Component C** aims to develop a better understanding of what works in building resilience to climate extremes and disasters. To this end, DFID is also supporting a Knowledge Manager (KM). The BRACED KM is a consortium of M&E, research, learning, communications and regional organisations. Working alongside the nine project IPs, the KM is building a knowledge and evidence base of what works to strengthen resilience. The KM networks internally and externally to get that knowledge and evidence into use within and beyond BRACED countries.

**Component D** aims to build the capability and capacity of developing countries and regional organisations to prepare and plan for the expected increases in the frequency and severity of climate extremes and disasters.

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83 The BRACED countries of operation are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan (Component A) and Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, Myanmar, Nepal (Component B).
Annex 2: The BRACED-X projects

Each BRACED-X project used different intervention strategies and was implemented in different climatic and operating contexts. The table below provides a brief synopsis of the location and focus of each of the nine projects considered in this report, and the name/abbreviation by which they are referred to throughout the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>PROJECT ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>PROJECT LOCATION</th>
<th>PROJECT FOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anukulan</td>
<td>Anukulan</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Driving small farmer investment in climate-smart technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate and Meteorological Service Advancement in Ethiopia</td>
<td>CMESA-E</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Improving access to reliable climate information and increasing local communities’ capacity to respond to climate threats through developing a National Framework for Climate Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralising Climate Funds</td>
<td>DCF</td>
<td>Mali, Senegal</td>
<td>Strengthening climate adaptation planning and access to finance by local governments to improve communities’ resilience to climate change in Mali and Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Mobility</td>
<td>Livestock Mobility</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal</td>
<td>Strengthening the resilience of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, through trans-border livestock mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Approaches to Resilience</td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Financial models and economic opportunities adaptable to climate extremes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRESS</td>
<td>PROGRESS</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Building resilient governance, markets and social systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaling up Resilience to Climate Extremes for over 1 Million People</td>
<td>SURtM</td>
<td>Niger, Mali</td>
<td>Intelligent agriculture, saving circles and radio messaging for resilience in the Niger River basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Resilience by Changing Farming, Forestry and Early Warning Practices</td>
<td>BRES</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Changing farming practices to prepare for heavy rain and high temperatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waati Yelema Labenw</td>
<td>WYL</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Strengthening communities’ initiatives for resilience to climate extremes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: BRACED-X Theory of Change

**Mid-term changes**
- Evidence informed attitudes and discourses
- Improved dialogue, and coordination contributes to a more enabling policy environment
- Improved climate resilience policy and planning

**Outcomes**
- Transformational change
  - Households improve their anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacity to climate extremes and disasters

**Pathway 1**
- Actively participate in the planning, implementation and decision-making process of project activities
- Apply and adopt new skills;
- Access and use medium-term and longer-term climate information;
- Uptake and replicate project activities

**Pathway 2**
- Build knowledge and capacity of communities to improve access and use of a wide range of skills, assets and services
- Work in partnership with climate centres to promote access and use of climate and weather information
- Work in partnership with the research institutions and private sector to improve access and quality of basic services
- Build the capacity of local governments to improve local planning

**Assumptions**
- The well-being of poor and vulnerable people improves despite exposure to climate extremes and disasters
- Improved dialogue, and coordination contributes to a more enabling policy environment
- Improved climate resilience policy and planning
- Evidence informed attitudes and discourses
- Amplification beyond BRACED countries

**Areas of intervention**
- Disaster risk management and early warnings; financial schemes and markets; agricultural practices and innovative technologies; health and nutrition; governance and natural resource management; gender and social inclusion
Annex 4: BRACED M&E ‘infrastructure’

Activity

- Quarterly & Monthly Reporting
- Direct engagement with IPs
- Areas of Change (Outcome Mapping)
- 3As – Resilience outcomes
- Evaluative Monitoring (context analysis)
- Contribution Analysis (Country Case Studies)
- Realist Evaluation
- Quasi-Experimental Impact Evaluation
- Contribution Analysis
- Case based analysis

Method

- Quarterly Performance Reporting
- Monitoring visit reports
- Evaluation
- Monitoring & Results Reporting (MRR)
- Consistent project results reporting (Outcome level)
- Annual Reporting Synthesis
- Project to programme evidence & learning
- Evaluation
- BRACED Fund Manager Results Team

BRACED Fund Manager

- Direct engagement with IPs
- Monitoring visit reports
- Consistent project results reporting (Outcome level)
- Evaluation

BRACED Knowledge Manager

- How is BRACED performing?
- How are BRACED projects building resilience?
- How effectively are activities being delivered?
- What results has BRACED delivered?
- Does the BRACED model work? For whom?
- What does this mean for future resilience programming?
- What does this mean for resilience strengthening more broadly?
- What have we learned about monitoring and measurement of resilience programming?

EA: Evaluation Activity
ToC: Theory of Change
Annex 5: Analysis from project to programme level

Based on experience in Year 3, we followed the same approach to analysis and synthesis in BRACED-X. The project-to-programme-level synthesis was undertaken in five steps:

**Synthesis methodology**

![Flowchart of synthesis methodology]

**Project-level analysis and synthesis (Steps 1–3, June 2019)**

- First, based on discussions of the process and necessary clarifications needed from Year 3, we modified the project-screening grid (see Annex 6), which comprises of 16 questions that allow a close examination of components in the BRACED M&E framework. These questions form the *a priori* categories for structural coding.  
  
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- We then systematically coded the set of project annual reports using the project-screening grid. During this process, we identified some recurring key words for each question, which were specific terms used by projects. We used these terms to systematically search IP reports, to ensure we captured the main findings. The team also coded any emergent or unexpected findings to ensure all dimensions of the data were captured.
• At this stage we summarised the findings against each of the 16 questions in an Excel spreadsheet, and used this tool to organise the data into project-specific themes. This approach resulted in a clear understanding about each project’s efforts and challenges to date.

• We then synthesised each annual report at the project level against the analytical framework (see Table 1). This produced a new interpretation that went beyond the results reported by IPs and provided coherence across projects. This process was guided by expert knowledge and interpretation of the MRR team based on our intimate knowledge of the programme.

**Project – to programme-level synthesis and analysis (Steps 4–5, July 2019)**

• Once project-level data was synthesised against a common framework, we proceeded with a programme-level thematic synthesis. We looked across the project-level syntheses to identify and analyse patterns within the data relating to the core questions of this report. This step allowed us to look across the nine projects, to see what extent change had occurred and the impact of context on achieving change at outcome level across the programme. A rule of thumb was used, where a minimum of three occurrences of an idea represents a pattern within the data (a theme).  

To triangulate and deepen analysis and understanding of the findings, we conducted consultations with the KM research teams. This included climate information and services, access to markets and gender equality and social inclusion.

Finally, we validated findings with IPs, triangulated findings with the FM, and explored the findings and conclusions with DFID.

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Annex 6: Project screening grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRACED M&amp;E FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>HOW ARE BRACED COMPONENTS A&amp;B BUILDING RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE EXTREMES?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contextual factors affecting change</td>
<td>Contextualising resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the main <strong>constrainers</strong> of the project related to (internal or external) to the project? <strong>How</strong> are these contextual factors constraining change from the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the main <strong>enablers</strong> of the project related (internal or external) to the project? <strong>How</strong> are these contextual factors enabling change from the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have the contextual factors contributed to any <strong>unexpected outputs or outcomes</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the key <strong>lessons learnt</strong> in relation to change processes (how to build resilience or design projects to build resilience)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>What is the level of evidence?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shocks and stresses</td>
<td>Shocks and stresses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What <strong>shocks and stresses</strong> have occurred during Year 4?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What <strong>impact</strong> have shocks and stresses had on <strong>project progress</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding resilience outcomes</td>
<td>Categorising outcome-level changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who are the direct/indirect <strong>stakeholders</strong> and how have they benefitted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the main <strong>capacities</strong> being built?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>What works best</strong> to build each capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do any project activities/initiatives help enhance <strong>more than one capacity</strong> at a time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are there any <strong>trade-offs</strong> in initiatives to enhance adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive capacity, where enhancing one capacity may result in the erosion of another?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What evidence is there that building adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive capacities has <strong>reduced the impact of shocks and stresses</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do <strong>transformational changes relate</strong> to anticipatory, absorptive or adaptive capacities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>What is the level of evidence?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
<td>Theory of Change reflections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the project <strong>revised its Theory of Change</strong>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 7: MRR deep dive informant list

### BRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF INTERVIEWEE</th>
<th>ROLE</th>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erik Dirkx</td>
<td>BRACHED Chief of Party</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harouna Sonde</td>
<td>BRACHED M&amp;E Officer</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Ouedraogo</td>
<td>Head of M&amp;E</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouedraogo Abdoulaye</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (Field Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bougouma Hamado</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (Field Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouedraogo Issouf</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (Field Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouedraogo Baukary</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (Field Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zango Samaile</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Welthungerhilfe (Field Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edouard Ilboundo</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Direction Provinciale d’Agriculture (Kourweogo Province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouattara Siaka</td>
<td>M&amp;E Officer</td>
<td>Direction Provinciale d’Agriculture (Kourweogo Province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domo Sanata</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Direction Provinciale d’Environnement (Kourweogo Province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulin Yougbare’</td>
<td>Mayor Secretary General</td>
<td>Mairie de Bousse’</td>
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<td>Claudine Banissi</td>
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<td>Karim Kabre</td>
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<td>Alexandre Al-Hassan Kabre</td>
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<td>Nikiema Traore Adiza</td>
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<td>Leonard Kinda</td>
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**Livestock Mobility**

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<tr>
<td>Soumaila Fomba</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
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<td>Amadou Togola</td>
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<td>ICD, Mali</td>
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<td>Youssouf Boubacar Cisse</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>GAJEL Sudu Baba, Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lompo Paripouguini</td>
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<td>Duouba Victor</td>
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<td>Banki Dodj</td>
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<td>Ato Melaku</td>
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<td>Solomon Zegeye</td>
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<td>Nyla Insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Okelo Fekadu Roro</td>
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<td>iDE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniel Fikeryesus</td>
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### PROGRESS

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<tr>
<td>John Burns</td>
<td>Programme Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diyad Hujali</td>
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<td>Professor Jesse Njoka</td>
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<td>Peter Kamande</td>
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<td>Ubah Kahiye</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amina</td>
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Annex 8: Policy Areas of Change

**Area of Change 1**: Awareness, knowledge and understanding of targeted stakeholders around key policy issues

**Area of Change 2**: Representation or participation of key stakeholders in policy dialogues or policy-making processes

**Area of Change 3**: Connections, networks or relationships made that connect with and influence policy actors or processes

**Area of Change 4**: Discourse of policy actors or public discourse around key policy issues

**Area of Change 5**: Changes in policy content or policy-making processes
BRACED has built the resilience of up to 8.5 million vulnerable people against climate extremes and disasters. It has done so through a four year, UK Government funded programme, which has supported 120 organisations, working in 15 consortiums, across 13 countries in East Africa, the Sahel and Southeast Asia. Uniquely, BRACED has also had a Knowledge Manager consortium.

The Knowledge Manager consortium is led by the Overseas Development Institute and includes the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, ENDA Energie, Itad and Thomson Reuters Foundation.
The BRACED Knowledge Manager generates evidence and learning on resilience and adaptation in partnership with the BRACED projects and the wider resilience community. It gathers robust evidence of what works to strengthen resilience to climate extremes and disasters, and initiates and supports processes to ensure that evidence is put into use in policy and programmes. The Knowledge Manager also fosters partnerships to amplify the impact of new evidence and learning, in order to significantly improve levels of resilience in poor and vulnerable countries and communities around the world.