MIDDLE EAST ENDGAME III:

ISRAEL, SYRIA AND LEBANON – HOW COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENTS WOULD LOOK

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MIDDLE EAST ENDGAME III:
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1. INTRODUCTION

This ICG report is one of three published simultaneously, proposing to the parties and the wider international community a comprehensive plan to settle the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the first report, Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement, we argue that approaches that rely on the gradual restoration of trust, the prior cessation of violence, fundamental Palestinian reform, or various incremental political steps being taken are all inadequate to alter the underlying dynamic that is fuelling the conflict. As much as we would wish otherwise, we fear that the appalling resort to terrorist violence against Israelis, and the large-scale Israeli attacks that are destroying all hope on the Palestinian side, will not be stopped by these means.

Instead, we recommend an approach that, while persisting in the effort to reach a cease-fire, improve the situation on the ground, reform Palestinian institutions and rebuild their shattered economy, seeks to deal with the ultimate political issues up front. Our conclusion is that the international community, led by the United States, should initiate a comprehensive settlement strategy. This should involve not only the Israeli-Palestinian track, although this is obviously at the time of publication the most immediate and serious problem requiring major attention, but the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon tracks as well, which if left unresolved will inhibit the necessary comprehensive reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world.

In the second report, How a Comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian Settlement Would Look, we spell out in detail our proposals for the content of both a bilateral agreement between Israelis and Palestinians and an associated multilateral agreement whose core signatories, in addition to the parties, would be the U.S., EU, Russia and the UN (the “Quartet”) and the key regional supporters of the bilateral agreement – Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. ICG has been engaged in intensive discussions with many Israelis and Palestinians for a number of months, as well as many others in the international community, and the terms of our proposed bilateral settlement represent our best assessment of what can be accepted by both sides as fair, comprehensive and lasting.

In this third report, Israel, Syria and Lebanon – How Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look, we make a similar best assessment of what fair and comprehensive deals on the Syrian and
Lebanese tracks should look like. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is tied in numerous ways to resolution of the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese disputes, the other two outstanding conflicts between the Arab world and Israel. Left unresolved, these disputes threaten to destabilise the region as a whole. Cross-border attacks by the Lebanese Hezbollah, supported and influenced by Damascus, risk provoking large-scale Israeli retaliation and, in the event of miscalculation on either side, a possible escalation toward outright warfare. Syria also harbours several radical Palestinian organizations and provides assistance to similar Palestinian groups based in refugee camps in Lebanon and involved in violent attacks against Israelis. The presence of several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees whom Lebanon adamantly refuses to permanently resettle adds another source of tension. Perpetuation of the Israeli-Syrian conflict means continuation of the alliance between Tehran and Damascus, raising genuine concerns in Israel. In contrast, a peace agreement with Syria would greatly enhance Israel’s strategic posture vis-à-vis countries like Iran and Iraq.

Finally, the prospect of normalisation with the Arab world is a key element in persuading the Israeli public to accept the compromises necessary to reach a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians. But without an Israeli-Syrian settlement, it is hard to imagine that there can be broad Arab reconciliation with Israel, no matter what happens on the Palestinian front. In order for there to be comprehensive reconciliation with the Arab world, in other words, it is a reasonable assumption that there will need to be comprehensive peace deals.

In sum, an international initiative on the Middle East holds the greatest chance of success if it tackles the conflict in all of its dimensions – Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese. This report, together with its companions, shows how this might be done.

II. SYRIA AND ISRAEL

A. BACKGROUND

“Of all the conflicts between Israel and her Arab neighbours,” writes Itamar Rabinovich, Israel’s former chief negotiator with Syria, “the Syrian-Israeli dispute has traditionally been regarded as the most bitter.” Military confrontation in 1948-1949, 1967 and 1973, wars fought on Lebanese soil either directly or by proxy, and Syria’s often uncompromising ideological line form the backdrop to a conflict that lacks the dimension of human interaction characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. To this day, and with a few exceptions, Syrian leaders balk at meeting their Israeli counterparts.

During two recent periods, Israel and Syria sought to reach an agreement resolving their overall dispute, both times with the active help of the United States. The first attempt took place, with several long interruptions, between 1992 and 1996 and grew out of the 1991 Madrid conference. The second took place in January 1999 at Shepherdstown, where U.S., Israeli and Syrian delegations met, and then in March 2000, in a meeting between U.S. president Bill Clinton and Syrian president Hafez al-Asad.

On 31 October 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, the United States and the Soviet Union convened the Madrid Peace Conference. For the first time ever, Syrian and Israeli officials sat down together to openly discuss a resolution of their conflict, which had been ongoing since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Over the course of the following four and a half years, talks between the two parties would continue, and at many times appear quite hopeful, until they collapsed in March 1996.

As a general matter, the negotiations reflected divergent perspectives. For Syria, the only real issue was full return of the Golan Heights or, as they eventually would clarify it, full withdrawal to the line of 4 June 1967. Syria’s president Hafez al-

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3 The line of 4 June 1967 differs from the international border between the two states in several locations. One of
Asad saw such a withdrawal as an Israeli requirement and did not believe that Syria owed anything to Israel in return, save for the formal end of the state of war. He was prepared to contemplate some security arrangements, though for the most part he argued that these had to be mutual and apply equally to both sides since Syria had its own security concerns. As a result, and because he felt that they infringed on Syria’s dignity, he rejected ideas like an Israeli-manned early warning station on the Golan Heights or zones of limited deployment (including demilitarised zones) that were disproportionately large on the Syrian side of the border. Nor was he prepared to move quickly toward normalisation. Although he accepted the notion of “normal peaceful relations,” he argued that reconciliation could not be forced but had to come at its own pace.

For Israel, the conflict could not be reduced to its territorial dimension. There were other issues – security arrangements; protection of Israel’s water needs; and visible signs of normalisation prior to full withdrawal – that went to the core of Israel’s national interests. During prior confrontations with Arab countries, Israelis had been vulnerable to Syrian shelling from the heights of the Golan, and many Israelis came to view possession of the Golan as key to their security. Water is another issue of vital concern to Israelis, and they are concerned that the return of the Golan to Syria would give it the ability to extract, deplete or contaminate water in the watershed of the Jordan Valley. As a general matter, then, Israel was not prepared to commit in advance to the scope of the withdrawal prior to knowing how these other elements would be dealt with.

As a result, the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzakh Rabin, refused to make a direct commitment to the Syrians. Instead, in 1993-1994, he gave President Clinton to hold “in his pocket” an Israeli agreement to full withdrawal to the line of 4 June 1967, provided Israel’s needs were met. Israel sought security arrangements that would protect it from a surprise Syrian attack, including an early warning station and deep zones of demilitarisation and zones of limited deployment reaching to Damascus. Suspicion that the Syrians only were interested in a “contractual peace” as opposed to a warm one made it all the more important for Israel to receive advance commitments on the quality of peace it was being offered. Israel also insisted on protection of its interests regarding water sources (the Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River in particular).

Rabinovich sums up this clash of perspectives as follows:

Asad believed that Israel was bound to withdraw; in his terminology it was “an obligation” decreed by “international legitimacy.” Israel did not deserve to be rewarded for fulfilling its obligation. For Rabin, Israel’s and his personal agreement to a massive withdrawal in the Golan would be a major concession, a radical departure from an entrenched policy, and a risky and costly step. For him what Syria was asked to give were not concessions but prerequisites for making his decisions justified and viable.

The negotiations that took place between 1992 and 1996 went relatively far in clarifying the two sides’ positions on a number of these issues and even suggesting possible areas of compromise. Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995 left his successor, Shimon Peres, with the task of taking over responsibility for the talks. Peres had two options: he could try to rapidly complete the negotiations and present an agreement to the Israeli electorate or go for early elections. Having concluded that a quick agreement was not in the cards, he went for early elections. They were held on 29 May 1996. Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of the Likud, won by less than one-half of one per cent.

Although formal Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations would not resume for another three years,
Netanyahu used a secret channel via an American businessman and influential Jewish community leader, Ron Lauder, to try to move the process forward. Reports suggest that further progress was made, and Prime Minister Barak – Netanyahu’s successor – indicated that Netanyahu, too, had been prepared to accept the principle of withdrawal from the Golan, but the effort was inconclusive. Asad’s request to see a map specifying the precise extent of Israel’s withdrawal, and Netanyahu’s refusal, put an end to the initiative.

After Prime Minister Barak won in a landslide on 17 May 1999, he quickly displayed his keen interest in reaching a deal with Syria. Barak had committed to withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon within a year, a goal he knew would be greatly facilitated in the context of a peace agreement with Damascus. He had other reasons for privileging the Syrian track over the Palestinian one: he believed a Syrian deal was by far the more significant strategic prize; he was more familiar with the issues and convinced they would be easier to resolve; and he thought that reaching an agreement with Syria would facilitate negotiations with the Palestinians by increasing both their isolation and the pressure on them to agree.

For Barak, three red-lines had to be met for him to reach an agreement:

- Israel had to have sovereignty over a strip of land a few hundred metres in depth along the Kinneret’s northeast shoreline: in other words, east not only of the line of 4 June 1967, but also of the 1923 Palestine-Syria international border, which was ten metres east of the shoreline (see Map 1). The Syrian border could not reach water’s edge. For Barak, it was essential that Israelis feel secure in their control over the Lake, the country’s main water reservoir, and in their ability to protect it from depletion or contamination.

- Israel needed an early warning station on Mount Hermon with an Israeli presence so that it would not be vulnerable to the kind of surprise attack that threatened it in 1973.

- There needed to be visible signs of normalisation at the front end of the implementation period and evacuation of the Israeli settlements on the Golan at the backend. Israelis, in Barak’s mind, needed to see immediate evidence that this would not be a peace on paper only, but one that heralded genuine reconciliation and acceptance of Israel by Syria.

In December 1999, acting uncharacteristically, President Asad agreed to the resumption of high-level political talks with Israel without any prior Israeli commitment. These were held in the U.S., in Shepherdstown, West Virginia in January 2000. President Clinton headed the U.S. delegation, Prime Minister Barak the Israeli delegation, and Foreign Minister Shara the Syrian delegation. According to U.S. participants, the Syrians showed unusual flexibility on a number of issues. However, it quickly became apparent that Barak had not come to try to conclude an agreement. Alarmed by opinion polls that showed broad Israeli opposition to a full withdrawal from the Golan, and fearful of appearing as if he were rushing into an agreement, Barak failed to offer reciprocal concessions. On the key question of the withdrawal, he refused to commit to the line of 4 June 1967, claiming that for him to do so at that stage could scuttle the prospect for an agreement by prematurely exposing the deal to the Israeli public. The Syrians left feeling angry and betrayed. The talks, which had been due to resume, were suspended indefinitely.

The dilemma that had long plagued the Israeli-Syrian negotiations was once again in evidence: Syria’s insistence that Israel agree in advance to a withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967, and Israel’s demand that it know what it would get in return in terms of security and peace. As a means of cutting through the process, and in order to create the drama necessary to get Asad to yes, Barak persuaded

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8 ICG interview with former U.S. officials, June 2002. Dennis Ross, Clinton’s Special Middle East Coordinator, concluded that in January 2000 “during a short period of time, Asad was ready to reach an agreement. Barak had taken that decision, but then was unable to implement it politically.” Enderline, op. cit., p. 151. The leak of a U.S.-drafted “Framework of Peace Between Israel and Syria” that purported to show areas of agreement and of disagreement further embarrassed the Syrians by suggesting that they were prepared to negotiate the precise contours of the border while Israel had yet to agree on its basic location.
Clinton to meet with the Syrian President and describe to him Israel’s proposal in full. Clinton told Asad he had an interesting proposal to suggest, and the two men met in Geneva on 26 March 2000.

Under the proposal president Clinton had in hand, Israel would retain a strip of land east of the Kinneret’s northeast shoreline – land over which Syria clearly had sovereignty before 4 June 1967 (indeed, even under the 1923 international border). In return, Barak was prepared to trade land southeast of the Kinneret to more than compensate for any territorial loss in the northeast quadrant. According to the proposal, however, Syrian sovereign territory would not reach the lake. Nor would it touch the Jordan river, as Barak asked for Israeli sovereignty over a strip of land running parallel to the river between Lake Hula and the Kinneret/Lake Tiberias. In a matter of minutes, and before the president could get through with his presentation, it became apparent that the meeting would go nowhere. Asad, refusing to engage in a substantive discussion or offer his own compromise suggestions, simply told Clinton: “Barak does not want peace.”

B. A TREATY OF PEACE: EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY

The key issues to be resolved by Israel and Syria in the context of a peace treaty involve the boundary, water, security and normalisation of bilateral relations. The draft presented here represents an attempt to reconcile and accommodate the central concerns of each Party. Although the focus of this treaty, like its Israeli-Palestinian companion, is on resolving the consequences of the June 1967 War, their resolution would, in the Syria-Israel context, also resolve issues that plagued the bilateral relationship from its beginning in 1948.

In essence, this draft treaty is built on the following key elements for a workable, sustainable compromise between the parties:

- It meets Syria’s political requirement for a specific border based on the lines of 4 June 1967. Because that border is not specifically defined, the treaty vests in a UN-led demarcation committee the responsibility to carry out that task. In so doing, it injects an aura of international legitimacy into the process of demarcation.

- It meets Israel’s water requirements in a way that reflects Israel’s critical need for resources that are of marginal utility to Syria, the geographic and topographic realities of the area in question, and the need for full bilateral cooperation to preserve a vital and scarce natural resource.

- It outlines security arrangements that address Israel’s core concerns without unduly infringing upon Syria’s sovereignty or sense of dignity.

- It entails the quick establishment of diplomatic ties and the systematic implementation of those steps that characterise peaceful, normal relations between neighbours.

- Finally, it envisions a major security role for the U.S., one that will be costly and even labour-intensive. Yet the price of an American-provided security regime should, in the end, be measured in two ways: against the alternative of a continued danger of war; and in terms of the value attributed to being the only party in whom Israel and Syria both would repose such an extraordinary level of trust.

The following is a brief rationale for the approaches offered in the key articles of the Israel-Syria Treaty of Peace.

1. Boundary

In 1923 Great Britain and France instituted a boundary between Palestine and Syria that kept Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the upper Jordan River entirely within Palestine by a matter of a few metres; in the case of the lake’s northeast quadrant, ten to be exact. During the mandate period, however, Syrian access to these water resources was guaranteed by treaty and topography. In effect, the water resources were basically indefensible given Syrian control over the Golan Heights that stood right above them. For all practical purposes,
Mandate Syria’s political jurisdiction extended across the border to the northeastern shoreline of the lake and the east bank of the Jordan River north of the lake.

In 1948 independent Syria and Israel went to war. Syria maintained its positions on the shoreline of the lake and the east bank of the Jordan River. It also occupied more territory in what had been Palestine, most notably the Yarmouk River town of Al-Hamma and a salient extending westward across the Jordan from the Banat Yaqub bridge. The parties agreed in their 1949 armistice that Syrian forces would withdraw from what had been Palestinian territory, and that the vacated land would be a demilitarised zone. There was no mutually recognized boundary between these two states remaining in a legal state of war, only an armistice demarcation line. Between 1951 and June 1967 the Parties sporadically fought to dominate the demilitarised zone, which fell between the armistice demarcation line and the expired mandatory boundary. On the eve of war (4 June 1967), Syria was in control of Al-Hamma, the northeastern shoreline of the lake, the east bank of the Jordan flowing into the lake, and a small patch of land west of Banias, in the north. One week later Israel was in control not only of these small Jordan Valley tracts, but of the Golan Heights as well.

In discussions between the Parties that took place in the 1990s and early 2000, it was clear that while Israel would evacuate the high plateau of the Golan Heights in the context of a peace treaty, it was not prepared to withdraw fully to the line of 4 June 1967. Indeed, Prime Minister Barak proposed a border running several hundred metres inland of the lake, through territory indisputably Syrian prior to 1967. Barak also insisted on Israeli sovereignty over a strip running several metres east of the Jordan River. In short, Israel wanted to keep Syria away from water resources essential to the economy of the Jewish State. Yet a fundamental tenet of the Syrian “price” for peace was complete Israeli withdrawal to the “line of 4 June 1967.” Negotiations never seemed to get to the point where mutual accommodation was seriously discussed.

The approach taken in this draft treaty may be summarized as follows: *Syria gets the land and regulated access to the water; Israel gets the water and regulated access to the land.* Syria gets its cherished “line of 4 June 1967;” Israel gets full title to the water resources west of that line. In order to endow the entire arrangement with a sense of international legitimacy, the “line of 4 June 1967” would be demarcated by a commission headed by the Chief Cartographer of the United Nations, who oversaw the drawing of the “line of withdrawal” between Israel and Lebanon in 2000. The boundary line itself would correspond to the Chief Cartographer’s determination of the extent of Syrian control as of 4 June 1967.

In order to help safeguard the water resources of the Jordan Valley and facilitate mutual access, key portions of the Syrian side of the boundary would be designated a “Jordan Valley Nature Preserve” under Syrian administration. This Preserve would extend eastward from the boundary to an elevation of sea level (bearing in mind that Kinneret/Lake Tiberias is more than 200 metres below sea level). It would be free of permanent residents except for a resettled town of Al-Hamma and Syrian conservation and law enforcement personnel. Visitors from Israel would be free to enter; Syrian border and customs posts would be east of the Preserve. The practical effect of this arrangement would be that visitors from Israel would continue to have 360 degree access to Kinneret/Lake Tiberias, an important psychological boost for Israelis who have enjoyed such access for the past 35 years and who would probably oppose a treaty barring them from the lake’s northeastern shores. In return, visitors from the Syrian side would be granted recreational access to the lake, an important psychological boost for Syrians who enjoyed access to its waters before the creation of Israel and even during the 1949-1967 period, when access was often limited to the military because of periodic combat. The Jordan Valley Nature Preserve might also provide the parties a venue for a “warm,” people-to-people peace to take root.

This draft treaty would direct that the boundary be demarcated and filed with the UN within one year of the treaty coming into force. Evacuation of all

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11 See Map 2.
12 An analogous approach was suggested in the wake of the failed Geneva summit by Patrick Seale, Hafez al-Asad’s official biographer. Under his proposal, the Kinneret would remain under Israeli sovereignty, and Syria would get formal sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the northeast coastline of the lake. The United Nations would be asked to administer the area on the northeast corner of the lake, which would be open to Israelis and Syrians.
Israeli military and civilian personnel from territory returned to Syria would be completed within two years of the treaty coming into force. The draft does not call for phased withdrawals, each one of which could be the occasion for disputes and misunderstandings. Rather it gives the parties a clear horizon and deadline for the transfer of all territory up to their common boundary.

2. Water

The approach taken to the water issue complements the boundary accommodation. It establishes a Joint Water Consultative Committee that would focus on safeguarding the water resources of the Jordan River watershed and sets forth some water-related commitments that meet both sides’ needs in this vital sector.

The basic operating principle is that water resources below and to the west of the Golan plateau flowing naturally into the Jordan Valley and Kinneret/Lake Tiberias will, with limited, specified exceptions, continue to do so notwithstanding the return of territory to Syria and the placement of the boundary. This principle accommodates Israel’s concerns about the quantity and quality of water flowing to it after its withdrawal. It does so by acknowledging that Syria’s objective water needs atop the Golan Heights and in the country’s interior cannot, for reasons of geography and topography, be met economically by water pumped up (at great expense) from areas of lower elevation west of the heights and down in the valley.

The water-related commitments are as follows:

- Israel would refrain from dismantling the water-capturing infrastructure it has built on the Golan Heights. Syria would limit resettlement with a view toward mitigating environmental risks to Jordan Valley water resources. In this way the treaty would seek to avoid both spiteful destruction of efficient water-capturing facilities and the over-population of a key part of the Jordan River watershed.

- Syria would limit its extractions from rivers flowing below the Golan plateau (the Hasbani and Banias) to the servicing of local needs, and would pledge to manage the catchment area of the Yarmouk River in a way that respects the needs of downstream riparians.

- Israel would make available to Syria water from the Jordan River and the lake sufficient to meet the needs of the Jordan Valley Nature Preserve.

3. Security

The article on security draws on previous discussions between the parties as well as precedents rooted in the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Syrian and Israeli Forces and the 1949 General Armistice Agreement. The basic operating principle is that a combination of demilitarisation, additional limits on armaments and forces, and third-party early warning and monitoring would give both parties an enhanced sense of security while political normalisation between them takes root. A key element in providing the parties the requisite level of mutual security would be a robust American role in providing early warning, surveillance and monitoring services to both sides.

The demilitarised zone (in which police with side arms would be authorised) consists of three elements: all territory occupied by Israel and returned to Syria; the currently demilitarised “Area of Separation” to the east of the occupied Golan Heights; and, to the west of the Golan Heights, those parts of the 1949 demilitarised zone that will remain in Israel once the Syria-Israel boundary is demarcated by the UN. The idea is to create distance between military forces and remove the chronic insecurity that plagued the bilateral relationship during the 1949-1967 time frame – insecurity that once again came to the fore during the October 1973 war.

The demilitarised zone would be further insulated by “Areas of Limitation in Armament and Forces” on its eastern and western flanks. To the east, the two ten-kilometre areas established by the 1974

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13 See Map 3.

14 See Map 4.
Agreement between the Parties would remain in effect, but with one amendment: all armour (tank) units would be removed. To the west of the demilitarised zone, a single ten-kilometre zone would be established with the same limitations that would apply to the two western zones. The narrower zone on the Israeli side is justified by (a) Israel’s lack of strategic depth in comparison with Syria; and (b) Israel’s need to secure its border with Lebanon, a frontier zone whose security will require a convergence of security forces instead of their separation. (See section III of this report.)

Within the demilitarised zone the U.S. would run for the benefit of both parties an early warning ground station on the slopes of Mt Hermon, operated by American personnel. In addition to having its own organic surveillance assets, the ground station would receive data from unmanned aerial vehicles operated from within the region by U.S. personnel. The U.S. would share with Israel and Syria, as appropriate, data from its intelligence collection. The entire “surveillance and early warning security system” would have a duration (“sunset”) provision of five years, unless extended by the parties.

Within the demilitarised zone and the flanking Areas of Limitation in Armament and Forces, a multinational “monitoring, inspection and verification mechanism” would operate to ensure the implementation of these security arrangements. The U.S. would design the team in consultation with the parties, and personnel would be provided by the U.S., the European Union, Russia and others as agreed. Although there is a clause allowing for mutual agreement on other contributors – including, hypothetically, monitors provided by the parties themselves – this multinational approach is intended to bridge differences articulated by the parties in past discussions. It is neither an Israeli-Syrian mixed team approach favoured by Israel, nor an international/UN approach favoured by Syria. The monitoring mechanism would have a five-year “sunset” provision.

(An alternative that could be considered would be to expand the limited forces zones on both sides of the border, in line with what Israel had in mind in the 1999-2000 discussions. It would mean that southern Syria outside Damascus and the Galilee outside Haifa would have limited military forces, probably only a division each of armour, to be monitored by the U.S.-led force. The question would be how to square this with Israel’s requirement to secure its northern border with Lebanon, which would be covered by this expanded limited forces zone. Even in the context of a peace agreement with Lebanon (see below), the past three decades have taught that "limited forces" is the wrong medicine for the Israel-Lebanon frontier; there, it is the absence of the Lebanese army in the south that has been destabilizing.)

Finally, the parties would establish a Mutual Security Working Group to facilitate the implementation of the foregoing security arrangements.

4. Normalisation

In previous contacts between the parties, Israel expressed a strong interest in fast-paced normalisation of relations, while Syria articulated a firm preference for a “go-slow” approach to a process that would open borders and facilitate, among other things, Israeli tourism throughout Syria.

The approach suggested in this draft treaty is to mandate the speedy establishment of full diplomatic relations (exchange of resident ambassadors within 72 hours of the treaty coming into effect), to “front-end load” some stabilising elements of normalisation, and to tie other steps to the implementation of mutual commitments enumerated elsewhere in the treaty. For example:

- Within 90 days of the treaty coming into force, economic boycotts of a bilateral nature would be removed. Normal communications services would be in place within 180 days. Indeed, there would seem to be no objective reason why acts reflecting past hostility or preventing the establishment of normal communications could not be rectified quickly.

- Other, more controversial aspects of normalisation – the unimpeded flow of people, goods and services, the full opening of land, sea and air transportation links, and cooperation to promote tourism – would be fully in place within 90 days of the removal...
of Israeli military forces and civilians from occupied Syrian territory. Although the implementation of these steps would be deferred pending the end of occupation, the “short fuse” implementation deadline thereafter would mandate active planning and communication between the parties well in advance of the deadline itself.
C. AN ISRAEL-SYRIA TREATY OF PEACE: DRAFT NEGOTIATING TEXT

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic:

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and within the framework of the peace process initiated at Madrid on 31 October 1991;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognising their right and obligation to live in peace with each other, as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Desiring to establish mutual respect and to develop honourable, friendly and good neighbourly relations;

Resolving to establish permanent peace between them in accordance with this Treaty;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I – Establishment of Peace and Security within Recognised Boundaries.

1. The state of war between Syria and Israel (hereinafter “the Parties”) is hereby terminated and peace is established between them. The Parties will maintain normal, peaceful relations as set forth in Article III below.

2. The international boundary between Israel and Syria is the boundary to be demarcated as set forth in Article II below.

3. To enhance the security of both Parties, agreed security measures will be implemented in accordance with Article IV below.

ARTICLE II – International Boundary

1. The boundary between Israel and Syria will be based on the line of 4 June 1967.

2. The Parties agree on the need to precisely demarcate their boundary. To that effect, the boundary will be demarcated by an International Boundary Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) organised and chaired by the Chief Cartographer of the United Nations. The Parties shall participate as members of the Commission and shall facilitate its work fully. Final demarcation decisions shall be made by the Chief Cartographer in consultation with the Parties and in a manner consistent with the precedents, principles and special provisions agreed to by the Parties as enumerated below. Boundary demarcation shall be completed within one year of this Treaty entering into force, and a full record of the demarcation including maps and other supporting documentation shall be annexed to it as an integral part of the Treaty and filed with the United Nations.

3. Israeli military and civilian personnel shall fully vacate all territory returned to Syria no later than two years after this Treaty enters into force. Israel will leave intact the housing and infrastructure in territories it evacuates.

4. The boundary to be demarcated by the Commission shall take fully into account the following principles:
(a) Syrian sovereignty shall extend to all land areas occupied by Israel as a result of Israeli-Syrian combat during the June 1967 War.

(b) Israeli sovereignty will apply to all bodies of water lying to the west of the boundary.

5. The boundary to be demarcated by the Commission shall take into account the following historical precedents:
   (a) The provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242;
   (b) The locations of Syrian and Israeli nationals in the Jordan River Valley as of 4 June 1967;
   (c) The terms of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between the Parties; and

6. In order to facilitate good neighbourly relations, the Parties agree that the following special provisions shall apply to land and water resources in close proximity to their common boundary:
   (a) A Jordan Valley Nature Preserve (hereinafter “the Preserve”), covering Syrian territory within the Jordan River Valley up to an elevation of zero metres above sea level, shall be established under Syrian administration. Within the Preserve all permanent human habitation, except for Syrian residents of Al-Hamma and Syrian conservation and law enforcement personnel and their families, shall be excluded. Syria shall refrain from establishing border and customs posts within the Preserve.
   (b) The Preserve shall be accessible to visitors from both sides without restriction, except for Syrian rules and regulations within the Preserve designed to protect the ecology of the Jordan River Valley and to maintain law and order.
   (c) Irrespective of the placement of the boundary, access by motor vehicles from Israel to roads and highways lying within the Preserve shall not be impeded. In order to ensure the timely provision of emergency services to motorists and other visitors within the Preserve, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the Israeli Magen David Adom shall establish a joint Emergency Services Centre at a location mutually agreed by the two organisations within the Preserve in the vicinity of Kinneret/Lake Tiberias. The Parties agree that the Emergency Services Centre shall be empowered to summon appropriate emergency assistance from either Party. The Parties further agree to provide emergency medical assistance to visitors within the Preserve solely on the basis of medical exigency, without regard to the nationality of any person requiring emergency medical assistance.
   (d) The recreational access of Syrian citizens to bodies of water adjacent to the boundary shall likewise be unrestricted, except for Israeli rules and regulations for Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River pertaining to boat safety, fishing and the like.

ARTICLE III – Normal Peaceful Relations

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in time of peace. In particular:
   (a) They recognise and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries; and
   (b) They will establish and develop friendly and good neighbourly relations, will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other, will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.
2. The Parties will establish full diplomatic and consular relations, including the exchange of resident ambassadors. The exchange of resident ambassadors shall be completed within seventy-two (72) hours of this Treaty entering into force.

3. The Parties recognise a mutuality of interest in honourable and good neighbourly relations based on mutual respect and for this purpose will:
   (a) Promote beneficial bilateral economic and trade relations including by enabling the free and unimpeded flow of people, goods and services between the two countries; remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations; terminate economic boycotts directed at the other Party; repeal all discriminatory legislation; and cooperate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties.
   (b) Promote relations between them in the sphere of transportation. In this regard, the Parties will open and maintain roads and international border crossings between the two countries, cooperate in the development of rail links, grant normal access to ports for vessels and cargoes of the other or vessels or cargoes destined for or coming from that Party, and enter into normal civil aviation relations.
   (c) Establish normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite between them on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with relevant international conventions and regulations; and
   (d) Promote cooperation in the field of tourism in order to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.

4. The Parties undertake to ensure mutual enjoyment by each other’s citizens of due process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.

5. The Parties agree that the commitments enumerated in Article III, Sections 3 and 4 above, shall be implemented in full no later than ninety (90) days following the implementation of Article II, Section 3 above, with the following exceptions:
   (a) Economic boycotts of a bilateral nature shall be terminated within ninety (90) days of this Treaty entering into force.
   (b) The provisions of Article III, Section 3c above shall be implemented within one-hundred-eighty (180) days of this treaty entering into force.

ARTICLE IV – Security

1. The Parties undertake to refrain from cooperating with any third party in a hostile alliance of a military character directed at the other Party and to ensure that territory under their control is not used by military forces of a third party (including their equipment and armaments) in circumstances that would adversely affect the security of the other Party.

2. The Parties undertake to refrain from organising, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in any act or threats of violence against each other, the citizens of each other or their property wherever located, and will take effective measures to ensure that no such acts occur from, or are supported by, individuals on their respective territory or territory under their respective control. In this regard, without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, the Parties will take necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence and operation in their respective territories of any group or organisation, and its infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other Party by use of, or incitement to the use of, violent means.
3. Both Parties recognise that international terrorism in all its forms threatens the security of all nations and therefore share a common interest in the enhancement of international cooperative efforts to deal with this problem.

4. Each Party recognises that the security of the other is an essential element of permanent peace and stable bilateral relations. The Parties have agreed, therefore, drawing upon historical precedents, to the following special security arrangements:

(a) A demilitarised zone will be established. It will cover the following areas:

   (i) The territory to be vacated by Israeli military personnel and civilians.

   (ii) The Area of Separation established under the Agreement on Disengagement between Syrian and Israeli Forces of 31 May 1974.

   (iii) The demilitarised zone established by the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949.

(b) No military forces, armaments, weapons systems, military capabilities or military infrastructure will be introduced into the demilitarised zone or its airspace by either Party. The Parties agree that civil police may be deployed into the demilitarised zone, but that all weaponry beyond police side arms will be excluded.

(c) Areas of Limitation in Armament and Forces shall be established in Syria and Israel on territory adjacent to the demilitarised zone. To the east of the demilitarised zone, the First and Second Areas of Limitation in Armament and Forces as designated and defined by the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974 shall remain in effect, except that armour (tank) units shall be excluded. To the west of the demilitarised zone, there shall be an Area of Limitation in Armament and Forces ten (10) kilometres in depth, with limitations on armaments and forces equal to those of the Area of Limitation in Armaments and Forces to the east of the demilitarised zone.

(d) A comprehensive surveillance and early warning security system shall be designed and implemented by the United States in consultation with the Parties. The system shall include an early warning ground station on Mt. Hermon to be operated by American personnel and shall also employ unmanned aerial vehicles operated in the region by the United States. The United States will share with the parties, as appropriate, the information gathered through its collection efforts. The surveillance and early warning security system shall become operational within ninety (90) days after the completion of the boundary demarcation referred to in Article II section 2 above. It shall remain in effect for five (5) years from the date it becomes operational, unless the Parties mutually agree on its extension.

(e) A monitoring, inspection and verification mechanism to oversee and ensure the implementation of the foregoing security arrangements shall be designed and implemented by the United States in consultation with the parties. The mechanism shall be multinational in composition, with personnel provided by the United States, the European Union, Russia and elsewhere, as agreed by the Parties. The mechanism shall become operational immediately upon the implementation of Article II, section 2 of this Treaty and shall remain in effect for five (5) years from that date, unless the Parties mutually agree on its extension. Pending the commencement of operations by the monitoring, inspection and verification mechanism, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) will, with the full cooperation of the Parties, continue its mission.

(f) A Mutual Security Working Group shall be formed by the Parties within thirty (30) days of this Treaty entering into force to facilitate the implementation of the foregoing special security arrangements.
ARTICLE V – Water

1. In order to promote communication, cooperation and good neighbourly relations in the water sector, the Parties will establish a Joint Water Consultative Committee [hereinafter “the Committee”]. The Committee will be comprised of three members from each country. It will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its work procedures, the frequency of its meetings and the details of its scope of work. The Committee may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required.

2. The principal mission of the Committee will be to facilitate bilateral cooperation in the protection of water resources. The Parties acknowledge their individual and joint responsibilities for the prevention of contamination, pollution and depletion of water resources in the watershed of the Jordan River, which includes territory of each. They recognize that the subject of water can form the basis for practical cooperation between them, and therefore jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.

3. The Parties further agree that their mutual undertakings in the water sector will be governed by the following commitments:
   (a) With respect to the Golan Heights, Israel agrees to leave undisturbed the water-related infrastructure it has constructed during its presence and to make available said infrastructure without charge for use by Syrian citizens. Syria, in turn, agrees to regulate the resettlement of lands returned to its sovereign control in such a way as to mitigate the risks of contamination, pollution and depletion to the Jordan River and its sources, Lake Tiberias/Kinneret, and the Yarmouk River.
   (b) With respect to the Banias River, Syria agrees to limit its extraction of water to that amount needed to service resettlement of Syrian citizens in the village of Banias and its immediate environs, and to allow the balance to flow freely into Israel.
   (c) With respect to the Hasbani River, Syria agrees to limit its extraction of water to that amount needed to service the Syrian residents of the village of Al-Ghajar and its environs, and to allow the balance to flow freely into Israel.
   (d) With respect to the Yarmouk River, Syria takes note of the Jordanian-Israeli undertakings contained in Annex II of the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace and pledges to manage the catchment area of the Yarmouk basin in a manner respectful of the interests of all downstream riparians.
   (e) With respect to the Jordan River and Kinneret/Lake Tiberias, Israel agrees to make available to Syria sufficient amounts of water to service the requirements of the Jordan Valley Nature Preserve (see Article II, Section 6 above).

ARTICLE VI – Rights and Obligations

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfil in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. The Parties will take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are Parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions. They will also abstain from actions that would curtail the rights of either Party to participate in
international organisations to which they belong in accordance with the governing provisions of those organisations.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE VII – Legislation

The Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement the Treaty, and to repeal any legislation inconsistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII – Settlement of Disputes

Disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation.

ARTICLE IX – Final Clauses

1. This Treaty shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall supersede all previous bilateral agreements between the Parties.

2. The Annexes and other attachments attached to this Treaty shall constitute integral parts thereof.

3. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE THIS DAY ----- IN ------- IN THE ENGLISH, HEBREW AND ARABIC LANGUAGES, ALL LANGUAGES BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC. IN CASE OF ANY DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE ENGLISH TEXT WILL BE AUTHORITATIVE.
III. LEBANON AND ISRAEL

A. BACKGROUND

The 1967 war opposed Israel to all of its Arab neighbours, save Lebanon. The two countries are in agreement that their border is the international boundary ratified in 1923 between the two mandatory powers. The Lebanese state presents no military threat whatsoever to Israel. And yet, paradoxically, over the past few decades Lebanon’s soil has served as one of the principal battlegrounds between Arabs and Israelis, and Lebanon has been used by all – Israelis, Palestinians, Syrians and Iranians alike – as a “safety valve for unresolved aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict.”15 Indeed, “Lebanon became, ironically, the one battlefield from which Israel did not emerge victorious.”16 Tensions along the Israeli-Lebanese border today have little to do with any outstanding issues between the two countries. Rather, as a brief history suggests, they have everything to do with the outstanding issues between Israel and its other Arab neighbours – Syria and the Palestinians.

Southern Lebanon has for some time been a privileged arena for the Arab-Israeli conflict. A “security vacuum,” it was filled first by Palestinian combatants then by the Lebanese Hezbollah. Hostile Palestinian cross-border activity in the 1970s and 1980s and the growing presence in Lebanon of Israel’s archenemy, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, led Israel to twice invade Lebanon, in 1978 and then, on a far more massive scale, in 1982.17 It also led Israel to establish a long-term “security zone” in southern Lebanon that it hoped would serve as a bulwark or buffer against future cross-border actions. In turn, Israel’s occupation of parts of southern Lebanon helped fuel the growth of Hezbollah, a radical organisation of Lebanese Shiites, which resorted to violent and ever more sophisticated forms of attacks against Israel.

Lurking behind all this has been Syria’s overwhelming authority over Lebanon. Syria’s army entered Lebanon in 1976 and to this day a substantial Syrian military presence remains. But Syria’s influence extends far beyond the military. As Hof comments:

> Damascus exercises suzerain powers in Lebanon. As such, it has enormous influence over the government of Lebanon, the Lebanese resistance and anti-Arafat Palestinian factions resident in the refugee camps of Lebanon and in bases near the Syrian border in Lebanon’s Biqa’ Valley.18

As a result, Syria has been able to use Lebanon and Lebanese forces as proxies in its battle against Israel. Hezbollah in particular has been used by its Syrian backers to maintain constant pressure on Israel while minimising risks to Syria’s own security. Southern Lebanon, in effect, became the ace in Damascus’ hand – so long as the Golan remained occupied, the Golan front would remain quiet, but Israel would have to contend with Hezbollah’s attacks from the north.

Lebanon’s peculiar status meant that while in theory it should be able to end its conflict with Israel, in practice it lacks the capacity to do so. That its fate is intimately tied to Syria’s was made unmistakable in 1999-2000, when Israeli Prime Minister Barak was determined to carry out his commitment to withdraw from Lebanon and remove any pretext for continued cross-border attacks.

Throughout the negotiations with Syria, Barak unsuccessfully sought to launch parallel negotiations with Lebanon. But Syria, determined to preserve its Lebanese leverage, had no intention of allowing Israel to advance prematurely on the Lebanese track. Only once a breakthrough had been achieved between Syria and Israel and an agreement was in sight would Beirut join in. In short, movement on the Lebanese track was wholly derivative of movement on the Syrian one.

Ideally, for Barak, a withdrawal from Lebanon would have taken place in the context of an agreement with Syria. Once the Clinton/Asad Geneva summit failed, however, he decided to proceed nonetheless. On 16 April 2000, Israel formally notified the UN Secretary General of its decision to withdraw from Lebanon in fulfilment of United Nations Security Council Resolution

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15 Frederic Hof, “Beyond the Boundary: Lebanon, Israel, and the Challenge of Change,” Middle East Insight, p. 68.
16 Id., p. 3.
17 Id., p. 7.
18 Id., p. 43.
On 24 May 2000, Israel ended its occupation and, on 16 June 2000, the UN confirmed Israel’s withdrawal.

While Israel’s unilateral withdrawal significantly reduced the number of casualties on Israel’s northern border, it has not brought total quiet. In an obvious attempt to maintain Syria’s Lebanon card, both Beirut and Damascus contested the UN line of withdrawal, focusing on Israel’s continued occupation of the Shebaa farms, a 25-square kilometre area on the slopes of Mount Hermon that Israel seized from Syria in 1967. The United Nations had concluded that the farms formed part of occupied Syrian Golan, a claim validated by Lebanon’s own maps, and therefore were not part of the Israeli-Lebanese dispute. Regardless, Syria and Lebanon maintained their position, and Hezbollah directed its fire at Israeli outposts in the Shebaa. As a result, the Israeli-Lebanese border remains to this day one of the most volatile borders in the world, at the mercy of a miscalculation by either of the principal players – Hezbollah, Syria or Israel.

B. A TREATY OF PEACE: EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY

As is the case with the Syria-Israel peace treaty, the key issues that would dominate Lebanese-Israeli negotiations are the boundary, security, water and normalisation of relations. Yet, in several key respects, the approach recommended to resolving these issues differs from the approach recommended in the Syrian context. To begin with, the boundary issue is considerably less controversial. “Occupation” has, for all practical purposes, ended. Water lacks the saliency it possesses in the Syria-Israel context. Normalisation – while it might be tied in practice to progress on the Israel-Syria front – need not be tied to the implementation of other treaty provisions. It is the security issue that will probably dominate Israeli-Lebanese discussions. Because Lebanese-Israeli frontier problems have been defined for over 30 years by the absence of official Lebanese security forces in southern Lebanon, the approach recommended by ICG involves the convergence of Israeli and Lebanese security forces along the boundary rather than their separation by demilitarised zones and the like.

Three issues are deliberately not addressed in this draft. First, many Lebanese believe that the principal issue to be discussed in bilateral peace negotiations is that of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. Lebanon claims that Israel bears responsibility for its presence and therefore for its ultimate removal from Lebanon. In the absence of an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, however, it is difficult to see how this issue will be addressed. On the other hand, as discussed in the companion ICG report, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should include a massive international effort aimed at relocating and resettling the refugees, with priority being given to those currently in Lebanon.

Secondly, on the question of the “Shebaa Farms,” this treaty assumes that Israel’s withdrawal from the tract in question will take place in the context of a treaty with Syria, and that the ultimate disposition of the Shebaa Farms would then be up to Lebanon and Syria.

Thirdly, there is the issue of Syria’s continued military presence in Lebanon. While it is and will remain a significant matter, it, too, is one that needs to be addressed between Lebanon and Syria as part of their bilateral relationship.

This draft treaty is built on the following key elements for a workable, sustainable compromise between the parties:

- The key to establishing a bilateral relationship between these parties that differs from the destructiveness that has characterised the past three decades centres on an effective, sustainable frontier security regime.
- The treaty reflects the fact that both sides agree on the definition of the boundary, and merely need to agree on its precise location.
- It meets the two parties’ needs regarding water issues.
- Although this draft contains language that would encourage bilateral cooperation while fully preserving the sovereign privileges of...
both parties, it is important to underscore that if Palestinian refugees are left to live the balance of their lives in Lebanese refugee camps, no frontier security arrangement – no matter how binding and notwithstanding the best of intentions – will long keep the peace between Lebanon and Israel.

1. Boundary

Lebanon and Israel agree on what their boundary is; they do not agree entirely on where it is. The boundary provisions recommended in this treaty aim for a peaceful, cooperative resolution of this ambiguity which – unlike in the Syria-Israel case – involves essentially nothing of value.

The same 1923 boundary drawn by Great Britain and France to divide Palestine from Syria also separated Palestine from Lebanon. After Lebanon half-heartedly joined in the first Arab-Israeli War (1948), the parties agreed in 1949 that the 1923 boundary would serve as their armistice demarcation line. Under UN auspices in the early 1950s, the armistice demarcation line was marked, all but for the eastern-most five kilometres, which were the subject of a minor dispute. In 2000, with most of the boundary markers long-since destroyed, the UN tried to replicate the demarcation in order to confirm the completeness of Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon, occupied since 1978. Records of the earlier UN demarcation had disappeared, so in 2000 the UN Chief Cartographer marked out what came to be known as the “blue line”: a practical “line of withdrawal” more or less corresponding to the actual boundary-armistice demarcation line, the line behind which Israeli forces would have to move in order for their withdrawal from Lebanon to be deemed complete, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425.

Lebanon has taken the position that, in a few places, the “blue line” encroaches on Lebanese territory. The draft treaty would establish a Bilateral Boundary Commission empowered to make adjustments on the basis of mutual agreement. If indeed there are areas in dispute, they amount to several hundred square metres at best and involve no inhabited areas or natural resources on the Lebanese side.

2. Water

Notwithstanding a modern political history that is rich with claims and accusations centring on the water resources of southern Lebanon, the only salient bilateral issue between the parties is that of potential Lebanese withdrawals from the Hasbani River, which rises in Lebanon but (after passing through a small piece of occupied Syria) enters Israel and is one of the three key sources of the Jordan River.

The approach taken in the water article of the draft treaty stresses practical bilateral cooperation and historical precedent. The parties will establish a Joint Water Consultative Board as a bilateral forum to safeguard that part of the Jordan River watershed containing territory of each Party. As for the Hasbani, the treaty would authorize Lebanon to withdraw the amount agreed to at the technical level during the mediation of Eric Johnston in the 1950s: 35 million cubic metres per annum. Lebanon would also agree to undertake to safeguard the quality of Hasbani water flowing south.

3. Security

The article on security takes a different direction entirely from its counterpart article in the Israel-Syria treaty. In the past, frontier security problems have arisen and/or been aggravated because one side of the boundary (Lebanon’s) has been both formally demilitarised, with practically no official Lebanese security forces to maintain law and order, and informally militarised, with irregular groups like Hezbollah wielding considerable military ability. Unlike the Syria-Israel treaty, therefore, this treaty would formally militarise the frontier so as to counter the threat to peace posed by illegal militias and individuals armed with military weaponry on the Lebanese side of the border.

Drawing upon a definition offered by the 1949 General Armistice Agreement, this draft treaty would first define geographically a “frontier zone” consisting of southern Lebanon and northern Israel (see Map 5). Within the zone each side would exclude from its territory irregular organisations and individuals bearing military arms and would maintain sufficient official forces to implement the exclusion. The parties would focus cooperative
efforts on the removal of landmines from southern Lebanon, and would establish a Bilateral Frontier Security Committee to facilitate the implementation of their respective commitments. Unlike the abortive 1983 treaty, however, each Party would be responsible for neutralising security threats on its own territory; there would be no treaty language authorising (for example) Israeli forces to operate in Lebanon. Finally, the parties would authorise an extension of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ease the transition to a new, cooperative frontier security regime.20

4. Normalisation

The text of the normalisation clauses in this draft treaty parallels that of the Israel-Syria draft, but without deadlines or triggering mechanisms. The pace of normalisation between Lebanon and Israel will likely be strongly influenced by the pace of normalisation between Israel and Syria, by the resolution of the ongoing humanitarian crisis presented by the existence of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and by the success or failure of the frontier security regime devised by the parties.

It was long assumed by many independent observers that normalisation between Israel and Lebanon would happen naturally and easily once peace was established between Israel and Syria. Whatever validity this observation may have possessed in the past, it is now gone. More than three decades of widespread death and destruction have embittered significant portions of the Lebanese populace toward Israel. Ironically, ordinary Syrians may be more disposed than their Lebanese cousins toward normal relations with Israelis. In any event, the potential military threat posed by Syria and the prospect of Damascus opening the gate of normalisation to the balance of the Arab world makes Syria, in the eyes of Israel, more important than Lebanon for a host of reasons.

20 UNIFIL already has an automatic sunset provision since its mandate requires renewal by the United Nations Security Council.
C. AN ISRAEL-LEBANON TREATY OF PEACE: DRAFT NEGOTIATING TEXT

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of Lebanon:

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and within the framework of the peace process initiated at Madrid on 31 October 1991;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognising their right and obligation to live in peace with each other, as well as with all states, within secure and recognised boundaries;

Desiring to establish mutual respect and to develop honourable, friendly and good neighbourly relations;

Resolving to establish permanent peace between them in accordance with this Treaty;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I – Establishment of Peace and Security Within Recognised Boundaries

1. The state of war between Lebanon and Israel (hereinafter “the Parties”) is hereby terminated and peace is established between them. The Parties will maintain normal, peaceful relations as set forth in Article III below.

2. The international boundary between Israel and Lebanon is as set forth in Article II below.

3. To enhance the security of both Parties, agreed security measures will be implemented in accordance with Article IV below.

ARTICLE II – International Boundary

1. The Parties agree that their boundary is the boundary between Lebanon and Palestine instituted in 1923 by Great Britain and France and confirmed as the armistice demarcation line between Israeli and Lebanese military forces by the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949.

2. The Parties also take note of the “Line of Withdrawal” demarcated by the United Nations to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 425. Pending adjustments (if any) to the United Nations’ demarcation as mutually agreed by the Parties, the Parties agree that the “Line of Withdrawal” is their de facto boundary.

3. The Parties agree to the establishment of a Bilateral Boundary Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”). The Commission shall review the “Line of Withdrawal” demarcation of the United Nations and identify adjustments, if any, required to bring the United Nations’ demarcation into compliance with the agreed boundary. The Commission is empowered to implement such boundary demarcation adjustments as it may deem proper. Disagreements, if any, shall be referred to the respective Governments for a negotiated settlement.
ARTICLE III – Normal Peaceful Relations

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in time of peace. In particular:
   (a) They recognise and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries; and
   (b) They will establish and develop friendly and good neighbourly relations, will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other, will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. The Parties will establish full diplomatic and consular relations, including the exchange of resident ambassadors.

3. The Parties recognise a mutuality of interest in honourable and good neighbourly relations based on mutual respect and for this purpose will:
   (a) Promote beneficial bilateral economic and trade relations including by enabling the free and unimpeded flow of people, goods and services between the two countries; remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, terminate economic boycotts directed at the other Party; repeal all discriminatory legislation, cooperate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties; and allow Lebanese workers into Israel.
   (b) Promote relations between them in the sphere of transportation. In this regard, the Parties will open and maintain roads and international border crossings between the two countries, cooperate in the development of rail links, grant normal access to ports for vessels and cargoes of the other or vessels or cargoes destined for or coming from that Party, and enter into normal civil aviation relations.
   (c) Establish normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite between them on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with relevant international conventions and regulations.
   (d) Promote cooperation in the field of tourism in order to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries; and
   (e) Promote cooperation in areas of special interest, such as helping determine the fate of Israeli soldiers missing in action.

4. The Parties undertake to ensure mutual enjoyment by each other’s citizens of due process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.

ARTICLE IV – Security

1. The Parties undertake to refrain from cooperating with any third party in a hostile alliance of a military character directed at the other Party and to ensure that territory under their control is not used by military forces of a third party (including their equipment and armaments) in circumstances that would adversely affect the security of the other Party.

2. The Parties undertake to refrain from organising, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in any act or threats of violence against each other, the citizens of each other or their property wherever located, and will take effective measures to ensure that no such acts occur from, or are supported by, individuals on their respective territory or territory under their respective control. In this regard,
without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, the Parties will take
necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence and operation in their respective
territory of any group or organisation, and its infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other
Party by use of, or incitement to the use of, violent means.

3. Both Parties recognise that international terrorism in all its forms threatens the security of all nations
and therefore share a common interest in the enhancement of international cooperative efforts to deal
with this problem.

4. Each Party recognises that the security of the other is an essential element of permanent peace and
stable bilateral relations. The Parties have agreed, therefore, to the following special security
arrangements for their common frontier zone, which is defined as the land area in Lebanon south of a
line from the mouth of the Qasimiyah (Litani) River to the village of Hasbaya, and in Israel north of a
line from Nahariya to the Jordan River.

(a) Within the frontier zone military weaponry will be borne only by members of official Government
of Lebanon and Government of Israel military, internal security and police organisations.

(b) Within the frontier zone both Parties will maintain military, internal security and police forces of
sufficient capability to exclude irregular forces or combatants and organisations bearing military
arms.

(c) Within the frontier zone military, internal security and police units will be armed with weaponry
consistent with the missions of ensuring internal and border security. Neither party shall introduce
weaponry posing a threat to the security of the other.

(d) The complete removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance from the Lebanese sector of the
frontier zone is an urgent priority both Parties pledge to address immediately and resolve quickly.
They will seek the assistance of the international community in this regard.

(e) In order to facilitate the objective of a peaceful frontier zone free of unofficial armed elements,
incidents of violence along the common boundary, and the detritus of past conflicts posing threats to
the health and safety of civilians, the Parties will establish within thirty (30) days of their ratification
of this Treaty a Bilateral Frontier Security Committee (hereinafter “the Committee”). The
Committee shall be composed of security representatives designated by both Parties and co-chaired
by two officials designated by each Party. The Committee shall establish liaison offices in Naqura,
Lebanon and in Metullah, Israel. Formal meetings shall alternate between these two sites. The
Committee shall devise its own rules and procedures in accordance with the following principles:

(i) The territory of each Party – land, sea and air – is inviolable. Security forces of one Party
shall not operate in the territory of the other without the explicit permission of the other.

(ii) Security-related information bearing on boundary security shall be shared by the Parties
fully and in a timely manner.

(iii) Resolution of security-related problems in the frontier zone is exclusively the province of
the Party on whose territory the problem exists.

(iv) Resolution of issues arising within the Committee shall be on the basis of consensus, with
unresolved problems to be submitted to the appropriate political authorities for appropriate
action and peaceful settlement.

5. The Parties agree on the desirability of extending the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a period of time to be determined by the Committee with the concurrence of
6. Nothing in this Article obviates or mitigates the right of each Party to defend its territory in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE V – Water

1. In order to promote communication, cooperation and good neighbourly relations in the water sector, the Parties will establish within six months of their ratification of this Treaty a Joint Water Consultative Board [hereinafter “the Board”]. The composition, mandate and mode of operations of the Board will be as agreed by the Parties in bilateral discussions.

2. The principal mission of the Board will be to facilitate bilateral cooperation in the protection of water resources. The Parties acknowledge their individual and joint responsibilities for the prevention of contamination, pollution and depletion of water resources in the watershed of the Jordan River, which includes territory of each. They recognize that the subject of water can form the basis for practical cooperation between them, and therefore jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other party.

3. The parties further agree that their mutual undertakings in the water sector will be governed by the following principles and guidelines:

   (a) The Government of Lebanon places an extraordinarily high priority on developing its water resources for the benefit of its citizens living in the frontier zone. The Government of Israel acknowledges this priority and poses no objection to it.

   (b) The Government of Israel places an extraordinarily high priority on receiving into the Jordan River water of sufficient quantity and quality from the Hasbani River, a source of the Jordan River arising in Lebanese territory. The Government of Lebanon acknowledges this priority and poses no objection to it.

   (c) The respective priorities of the Parties should be accommodated to the maximum extent possible. To this end, the Parties agree that:

      (i) Lebanese utilisation of the Hasbani River and its sources shall be limited to that annual amount specified by the Jordan Valley Plan, i.e., 35 million cubic metres per annum. The Government of Lebanon shall provide to the Board accurate and timely data concerning Lebanese utilisation of waters from the Hasbani River and its sources.

      (ii) The Government of Lebanon shall safeguard the quality of Hasbani River water and shall ensure that the Board is made fully aware of its actions to this end.

      (iii) The Board shall do its utmost to promote the provision of water-related technical assistance between the Parties, information exchanges concerning best practices in water management, and scholarly exchanges between Lebanese and Israeli water experts.

      (iv) The Board shall be the forum for discussing any proposals concerning potential joint water projects and the transfer of water from one Party to the other on a commercial basis.

ARTICLE VI – Rights and Obligations

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Parties undertake to fulfil in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. The Parties will take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are Parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions. They will also abstain from actions that would curtail the rights of either Party to participate in international organisations to which they belong in accordance with the governing provisions of those organisations.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE VII – Legislation

The Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement the Treaty, and to repeal any legislation inconsistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE – VIII – Settlement of Disputes

Disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation.

ARTICLE IX – Final Clauses

1. This Treaty shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall supersede all previous bilateral agreements between the Parties.

2. The Annexes and other attachments attached to this Treaty shall constitute integral parts thereof.

3. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE THIS DAY ----- IN ------- IN THE ENGLISH, HEBREW AND ARABIC LANGUAGES, ALL LANGUAGES BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC. IN CASE OF ANY DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE ENGLISH TEXT WILL BE AUTHORITATIVE.
MAP 2: JORDAN VALLEY NATURE PRESERVE
MAP 3: SYRIA-ISRAEL FRONTIER WATER RESOURCES

Syria-Israeli Frontier Water Resources

Based on map © Middle East Insight
MAP 4: THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI FRONTIER DEMILITARISED ZONES
APPENDIX A

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, 22 NOVEMBER 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(I) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict (according to the French version, des territoires occupes)

(II) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measure including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338, 22 OCTOBER 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Adopted at the 1747th meeting.
APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation’s Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and across four continents.

In Africa, those locations include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan; in Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.


July 2002
APPENDIX C

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* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program in January 2002.
APPENDIX D

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

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Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S.

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Todung Mulya Lubis
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia

Barbara McDougall
Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

Mo Mowlam
Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, UK

Ayo Obe
President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria

Christine Ockrent
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