

Africa: Confronting Complex Threats

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Foreword

Terje Rød-Larsen

President, International Peace Academy

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is pleased to introduce a new series of Working Papers within the program *Coping with Crisis, Conflict, and Change: The United Nations and Evolving Capacities for Managing Global Crises*, a four-year research and policy-facilitation program designed to generate fresh thinking about global crises and capacities for effective prevention and response.

In this series of Working Papers, IPA has asked leading experts to undertake a mapping exercise, presenting an assessment of critical challenges to human and international security. A first group of papers provides a horizontal perspective, examining the intersection of multiple challenges in specific regions of the world. A second group takes a vertical approach, providing in-depth analysis of global challenges relating to organized violence, poverty, population trends, public health, and climate change, among other topics. The Working Papers have three main objectives: to advance the understanding of these critical challenges and their interlinkages; to assess capacities to cope with these challenges and to draw scenarios for plausible future developments; and to offer a baseline for longer-term research and policy development.

Out of these initial Working Papers, a grave picture already emerges. The Papers make clear that common challenges take different forms in different regions of the world. At the same time, they show that complexity and interconnectedness will be a crucial attribute of crises in the foreseeable future.

First, new challenges are emerging, such as climate change and demographic trends. At least two billion additional inhabitants, and perhaps closer to three billion, will be added to the world over the next five decades, virtually all in the less developed regions, especially among the poorest countries in Africa and Asia. As a result of climate change, the magnitude and frequency of floods may increase in many regions; floods in coastal Bangladesh and India, for example, are expected to affect several million people. The demand for natural resources – notably water – will increase as a result of population growth and economic development; but some areas may have diminished access to clean water.

Second, some challenges are evolving in more dangerous global configurations such as transnational organized crime and terrorism. Illicit and violent organizations are gaining increasing control over territory, markets, and populations around the world. Non-state armed groups complicate peacemaking efforts due to their continued access to global commodity and arms markets. Many countries, even if they are not directly affected, can suffer from the economic impact of a major terrorist attack. States with ineffective and corrupted institutions may prove to be weak links in global arrangements to deal with threats ranging from the avian flu to transnational terrorism.

Finally, as these complex challenges emerge and evolve, ‘old’ problems still persist. While the number of violent conflicts waged around the world has recently declined, inequality – particularly between groups within the same country – is on the rise. When this intergroup inequality aligns with religious, ethnic, racial and language divides, the prospect of tension rises. Meanwhile, at the state level, the number of actual and aspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is their ability to acquire weapons through illicit global trade.

As the international institutions created in the aftermath of World War II enter their seventh decade, their capacity to cope with this complex, rapidly evolving and interconnected security landscape is being sharply tested. The United Nations has made important progress in some of its core functions – ‘keeping the peace,’ providing humanitarian relief, and helping advance human development and security. However, there are

reasons to question whether the broad UN crisis management system for prevention and response is up to the test.

Not only the UN, but also regional and state mechanisms are challenged by this complex landscape and the nature and scale of crises. In the Middle East, for example, interlinked conflicts are complicated by demographic and socioeconomic trends and regional institutions capable of coping with crisis are lacking. In both Latin America and Africa, ‘old’ problems of domestic insecurity arising from weak institutions and incomplete democratization intersect with ‘new’ transnational challenges such as organized crime. Overall, there is reason for concern about net global capacities to cope with these challenges, generating a growing sense of global crisis.

Reading these Working Papers, the first step in a four-year research program, one is left with a sense of urgency about the need for action and change: action where policies and mechanisms have already been identified; change where institutions are deemed inadequate and require innovation. The diversity of challenges suggests that solutions cannot rest in one actor or mechanism alone. For example, greater multilateral engagement can produce a regulatory framework to combat small arms proliferation and misuse, while private actors, including both industry and local communities, will need to play indispensable roles in forging global solutions to public health provision and food security. At the same time, the complexity and intertwined nature of the challenges require solutions at multiple levels. For example, governments will need to confront the realities that demographic change will impose on them in coming years, while international organizations such as the UN have a key role to play in technical assistance and norm-setting in areas as diverse as education, urban planning and environmental control.

That the world is changing is hardly news. What is new is a faster rate of change than ever before and an unprecedented interconnectedness between different domains of human activity – and the crises they can precipitate. This series of Working Papers aims to contribute to understanding these complexities and the responses that are needed from institutions and decision-makers to cope with these crises, challenges and change.



Terje Rød-Larsen

Introduction

Africa is grappling with several difficult security challenges. These difficulties result not only from the magnitude of these challenges, but also from the lack of capacity of African states and organizations to respond quickly and effectively to them. While wide swathes of Africa are compelled to deal with problems in an ad hoc manner, there are indications that some states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU) are undertaking promising steps to respond. Some of Africa's core security challenges are (a) the legacy of historic notions of state sovereignty; (b) the rise of regionalism in the absence of common regional values; (c) the difficulty of managing hegemonic regionalism; (d) elitism in the form of regional integration occurring only at the level of leaders without permeating the consciousness of the people; (e) the creation of institutions with little or no capacity to manage them, resulting in a merely formal regionalism; and finally (f) the perception of regionalism as an externally driven project.¹

Within this context of regionalism and the challenges posed to cooperative security in Africa, a number of factors become central to the success of the process of entrenching cooperative security, if Africa is to move beyond its present formalism. Some of the key elements that need to be considered in any scenario building are (a) understanding the nature of the post-colonial state and the nation-building project in Africa; (b) subscribing to and institutionalizing core regional values and norms; (c) focusing on deepening democratic and open governance; (d) strengthening developmental regionalism as a means of addressing the negative aspects of globalization; (e) establishing the parameters of genuine continental and global partnerships – including role clarification between subregional bodies, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations.

Armed conflict in Africa has been the single most devastating challenge for the continent. Not only are there direct effects, but equally critical are the ancillary impacts which create other problems such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), food insecurity, environmental degradation, the threat of unexploded ordnance, organized crime, and public health concerns among others.

In the short to medium term, the critical human,

regional, and international security challenges facing Africa can be summed up as a nexus between what I term as 'old' and 'new' challenges. 'Old' security challenges are characterized by perennial armed conflicts, for example the Chad/Sudan tensions or the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict among others, underpinned by the easy availability of SALW, political violence, and food insecurity. The 'new' challenges are nourished by the 'old', giving rise to public health problems, massive migration, and increasingly ungoverned and ungovernable spaces within which individuals with terrorist affiliations and other opportunistic groups can exploit and threaten human, regional, and international security. While these challenges persist, they also create opportunities within which other criminal entities can thrive. Transnational organized criminal (TNC) groups are emerging that exploit the openings and spaces created by such insecurities to engage in activities detrimental both to human and international security. Such activities include drugs, arms and human trafficking, as well as other activities that feed into the creation of financing opportunities for terrorists and other violent groups. It must be emphasized, however, that even in Africa there are wide variations in the levels of such occurrences and the manner in which they pose threats to particular states and regions.

While these problems exist, one finds different efforts by states, RECs and other international bodies to respond to these challenges. The extent to which such multiple efforts are effective and well coordinated, first in identifying the varying manifestations of security challenges, and secondly in designing credible response mechanisms to prevent, manage, and resolve them needs closer and sustained analysis. Thus, any such evaluation will necessitate a nuanced and differentiated approach, as more often than not, the intended positive intentions of several actors with narrow institutional and national interests can work at cross purposes. There is, however, the increasing recognition that, in several of Africa's regions, benevolent hegemonic leadership can under particular circumstances contribute to solutions to some of these challenges, though with some structural and operational difficulties.

Although the emergence of such security challenges and the designed response mechanisms at the subregional and regional levels are encouraging,

¹ J. Kayode Fayemi, "Framework for Cooperative Security in a Region in Transition: Challenges and Prospects," paper presented at an ACSS Workshop in Maputo, Mozambique, December 2004. The following discussions have benefited from Fayemi's paper, which has been revised after discussions with others.

there is certainly no doubt that in the short-to-medium term these difficulties will be dealt with in a business-as-usual manner. Such responses may not necessarily lead to a worsening of the situation, though the international community's aspirations for improvements in Africa's security environment may not be met in the foreseeable future.

This paper discusses a broad range of issues that affect and impact on Africa's security within the framework of three wide-ranging topics, namely (a) identifying the key challenges posed to human and international security; (b) identifying existing capacity for preventing, managing and coping with these challenges, and identifying key gaps in capacity; and finally (c) developing scenarios and recommendations for tackling identified challenges.

Africa's Major Human and International Security Challenges

In the next five years – that is between the short to medium term – Africa's security challenges may not be markedly different from what they are now. Among Africa's most pressing security challenges are

- increasing fragmentation of political authority across societies;
- mounting political influence of armed sub-state actors;
- fragmented loyalties of armed official military/security groups;
- crises in food security and public health; and
- increasing vigilantism as a societal response to the inability of 'depleted' and often discredited state security agencies to provide protection.

It is important to understand that in some instances individual states and subregions can experience more than one of these challenges concurrently.

Security Complexes

In discussing key challenges to human, regional and international security, it is impractical to examine and to understand Africa's armed conflicts and their relationship to the wider context within which they

occur by examining them in an isolated manner. Therefore, the argument here is that due to the interconnectedness among key actors and players in Africa's conflicts, one should begin to describe them as security complexes. They can be understood within a thematic context, namely in terms of the transnationality of criminal groups and the manner in which their activities undermine and threaten states through weakening public institutional structures. But even in this discussion, there is the need to differentiate between regional and thematic security complexes. Regional security complexes encompass the conflicts in West Africa, the Greater Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes Region. Such complexes can play out through a number of mechanisms:

- subregional economic networks that directly and indirectly fuel insecurity through the exploitation and sale of natural resources (diamonds, timber, cocoa, cotton, and coffee),² and by the transportation and sale of these commodities, facilitated by inadequate state regulatory frameworks;
- regional military networks that supply weapons to combatants and the provision of training facilities to those who are willing to destabilize the region;
- regional political and economic networks that provide support mechanisms and facilitate economic predation; and finally
- networks that comprise illicit smuggling activities and cross-border family ties that facilitate trade in valuable goods.

One related argument suggests that there may be a close correlation between several of the armed conflicts that afflict this region and natural resource exploitation. Economic agendas are consequential to the character and duration of armed conflicts and complicate efforts at conflict resolution, with predatory economic behavior becoming critical to sustaining, prolonging, and transforming conflict.³ Thus, warlords exploit natural resources, using the proceeds to purchase weapons and ammunition and otherwise fuel war. Natural resource availability has also led to the splintering of rebel groups, as disputes occur over control of these resources.

² United Nations, *Report of UN Secretary General on Ways to Combat Subregional and Cross-border Problems in West Africa*, UN Doc. S/2004/200, March 12, 2004.

³ Karen Ballentine, "Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Principal Research Findings and Policy Recommendations," International Peace Academy, New York, May 2004.

Regional Complexes

There are variations to the challenges noted above within and between states and among regions. The consolidation of peace and security in countries emerging from war will depend to a large extent on the situation in contiguous countries. It is the degree to which these challenges are addressed that will ensure that the West, Central, Great Lakes and Greater Horn of Africa regions can be said to have completely overcome their insecurities.

Thus, while West Africa is emerging from armed conflict that plagued the region in the 1980s and 1990s, particular attention should be given to Côte d'Ivoire to prevent possible spillover effects that have characterized other conflicts in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Other potential threats in the short to medium term may arise in Guinea and Guinea Bissau, which, although they seem to have overcome major security challenges in the past decade, still face considerable humanitarian and economic challenges. These flashpoints of instability could threaten the relative peace and security that the region has achieved in the past few years.

The Great Lakes region, Central and Eastern parts of Africa present a less than encouraging situation. The long-running conflict in Burundi, coupled with the armed rebellion by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continue to threaten the security of the region. Even though elections have been held in the DRC, the post-conflict and post-election period will be critical to the future peace and stability of the region. Notwithstanding this region's abundant natural resources, this wealth has not transformed the livelihoods of the population due to the continued instability and insecurity in the region as a whole. Food insecurity in the region has been exacerbated by these conflicts and resulting massive population displacements.

Western, Eastern, and Central Africa all face numerous 'old' security challenges, which have been worsened by the current drought being experienced across these regions. According to the United Nations, more than 11 million people in eastern Africa are affected by the current drought, which is partly caused by climatic change. Overall, close to 18 million people

are facing serious challenges related to food insecurity in the five-affected countries, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia.⁴ Livestock herds have been decimated, and most communities have exhausted their coping mechanisms. In the Southern African subregion, 25 percent of the population is already dependent on food aid as a result of reduced production of staples.⁵

Issue-Based Complexes

Armed Conflict, Family Disintegration, and Food Insecurity

Problems of food insecurity will be increasingly exacerbated by conflict. First of all, during armed conflict the existence of the household is severely threatened, as fathers and children are either compelled to or willingly join the rebellion, children are sometimes abducted, and women are forced to abandon their homes and farms for relatively safer places. With the disintegration of the family unit during armed conflict, ensuring food security becomes a major challenge. Secondly, further worsening the food security problem is the inability of humanitarian agencies to provide food supplies due to lack of access to deprived communities. Widespread conflict has also contributed to reduced education at the primary school level in Africa. According to the NGO Save the Children, "any efforts to increase opportunities for children's education will end in failure if the millions living in conflict zones are not given the same opportunities as those in more peaceful areas."

The lack of educational opportunities in conflict and post conflict situations and its attendant problems such as youth unemployment may also contribute to an increase in criminal activities. Furthermore, ineffective post-conflict demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR) programs have resulted in large numbers of former fighters flocking to neighboring countries to join in other rebellions. While some of the fighters may be disarmed, reintegration into society has not always been entirely successful for several reasons. First, due to the inadequate education, most of these young former fighters are unable to reintegrate properly into society. Second, the skills training that they undergo are not subsequently matched with job opportunities in their communities.

⁴ Adam Mynott, "Hunger and misery ravage Kenya," BBC, January 10, 2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4598172.stm>. On food security in Africa see generally Marc Cohen, "Food Security: Vulnerability despite Abundance," *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

⁵ Nana K. Poku, "HIV/AIDS Financing: a Case for Improving the Quality and Quantity of Aid," *International Affairs* 82, no. 2 (2006): 345-358; Colin McInnes, "HIV/AIDS and Security," in *ibid.*: 315-326.

Organized Crime, SALW Proliferation and Human Trafficking

Organized crime also flourishes in situations of armed conflict, as in most cases state control is either weak or totally lacking. In such instances, state security services may break down and in certain situations become active participants in the conflict, often with an accompanying breakdown in their ability to check criminal activities. Organized crime also has the tendency to fuel armed conflict,⁶ through revenues drawn from drugs, human and arms trafficking, smuggling of migrants, and money laundering.⁷

There are further challenges and threats posed by domestic and 'new' transnational criminal groups to African states, especially in West, East, and Southern African States. While crime has previously been perceived as state-based, the activities of emerging transnational criminal gangs and networks now demonstrate the need for closer state collaboration and cooperation to fight such groups across national, subregional, and regional frontiers. In 2004 Austrian officials arrested 1,171 Nigerians for drug-related crimes. In Switzerland, four out of five arrested drug couriers were from West Africa, while in Germany, these same groups represented nearly a third of all drugs-related detentions between 2002 and early 2005. Even in the conflict-torn Basque region of Spain, out of 557 arrested traffickers in 2003, 45 percent claimed Guinea-Bissau nationality. These figures, it can be argued, demonstrate a growing presence of West African criminal gangs in Europe.⁸

The threats and challenges posed by organized criminal activities in Africa have become so pronounced that experts now characterize such groups as representing particular 'African criminal networks' (ACN). Their characteristics differentiate them from other criminal organizations and indicate a distinctive African character. Accordingly, "[a]lthough the majority of the criminals engaged in these networks originated in the West African countries of Ghana and Nigeria, the networks have expanded their bases of operations beyond West Africa throughout the

African continent, where Kenya, for example is now perceived as a 'traffickers haven.'"⁹ For Africa, as a whole, opiate seizures alone have risen by 60 percent since 2004, while other drugs have seen a similar increase.¹⁰ The ACN concept has been coined to characterize what is essentially a 'new' challenge feeding on the 'old' challenges posed by weak state institutions. Other factors appear to contribute to the position of several African states as critical intersections in the activities of transnational organized criminal groups.¹¹ These groups explore for weak entry points within state structures and then exploit such institutional fragilities to their economic and political benefit. Several African states exhibit such vulnerabilities, which create opportunities for criminal groups to manipulate such openings for personal gains. According to Pape, "[African] governments ... are too weak, too corrupt or too consumed by their own problems to enforce laws or adequately monitor their coastlines and airports. Add to that tens of millions of poor potential 'mules' and the picture becomes all too clear."¹²

Applying the concepts of state weakness and failure to analyze the growth of criminal groups has gained acceptance in the academic literature. Shaw argues that "the origins of criminal networks from Africa directly parallels the decline and economic crisis of the...state in the 1980s... Economic mismanagement, a failed structural adjustment programme, continuous political contestation and on-going and harsh periods of military rule marked the decline of the [African] state[s]."¹³ Yet little scholarly work has been done on the wider ramifications of the potential threats that TNCs pose to states and subregions across the continent. This is an area where further research deserves to be undertaken.

One related challenge emerges from SALW proliferation, which continues to have adverse effects on security in Africa before, during conflict and in post-conflict situations.¹⁴ In armed conflict, state and non-state actors purchase large quantities of weapons.

⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa*, New York, 2005, p. 15.

⁷ Andre Standing, "Re-conceptualizing Organized Crime," *African Security Review* 12, no. 2 (2003): pp. 103ff.

⁸ On organized crime see further James Cockayne, "Transnational Organized Crime: Multilateral Responses to a Rising Threat," *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

⁹ Karen Allen, "Traffickers' drugs haven in Kenya," BBC, May 9, 2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4753377.stm>.

¹⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2006* (Vienna: UNODC, 2006) p. 16ff; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Crime and Drugs as Impediments to Security and Development in Africa: A Programme of Action, 2006 – 2010* (Vienna: UNODC, 2005).

¹¹ Chris Allen, "Africa and the Drugs trade," *Review of African Political Economy* 26, no. 79 (1999): 5-7; Henry Bernstein, "Ghana's Drug Economy: Some Preliminary Data," in *ibid.*: 13-32.

¹² Eric Pape, "West Africa: The New 'Drug Triangle'", *Newsweek International*, August 25, 2005. See also "Does Africa have a drug problem?," BBC, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4744728.stm>, March 1, 2006.

¹³ Mark Shaw, "Regional Trafficking: Towards an Understanding of West African Criminal Networks in Southern Africa," *African Security Review* 10, no. 4 (2001).

Even though disarmament is a key factor in any peace agreement, it is almost impossible to rid post-conflict societies of all the weapons that were imported and sometimes manufactured in the war-affected country. In cases where certain states are complicit in supplying arms to war affected countries or acting as transit for these arms, some of these weapons remain in the transit countries resulting in other weapons-related criminal activities such as armed robbery, hijacking, and even armed rebellion.¹⁵

Another aspect of this phenomenon plays out in the rising incidence of human trafficking throughout the continent, especially in women and children. Even though there are no entirely accurate absolute data on women and children trafficked, a general trend shows increase in the phenomenon, especially in Central and West Africa. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there are about 1.2 million victims each year worldwide, of which 32 percent are African.¹⁶ While the root causes of human trafficking are complex and interrelated, poverty is a primary factor. Other identifiable push factors include traditions and cultural values, gender discrimination, social changes altering migratory patterns, labor requirements, evolution of the African family affected by rapid urbanization and marked by an alteration of the extended and community forms of solidarity.¹⁷ These factors are worsened by situations of instability or conflict in some regions, especially West and Central Africa. However, increasing demand also seems to be a crucial factor in the rising incidence of human trafficking in Africa. Trafficking victims often become prey not only to sexual exploitation and economic exploitation, but also forced participation in conflict. Whereas trafficked girls feed prostitution rackets in Europe, boys are often enlisted in the illicit sale of arms and drug trafficking.¹⁸

Political Islam and Terrorism

One issue of increasing concern for the continent is the role of political Islam, which has begun to provide

new dimensions to conflicts both within states and across subregions. Political Islam serves as a medium for political mobilization and/or activism, taking many forms.¹⁹ In Senegal, for instance, the Sufi brotherhoods provide a religious and social network with deep historical roots which has bolstered a democratic and secular government. However, *Wahhabism* is offering an increasingly radical form of Islam in the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. Political Islam thus has far-reaching implications for the domestic and external politics of the countries and subregions in which it is active. The spread of Wahhabism, while initially imported from Saudi Arabia, has been fed in part by local developments.

Thus, while Islam may serve as a vehicle for the expression of local grievances, the ways in which those grievances are expressed may vary greatly, from peaceful politics to a wide variety of terrorist tactics (from abductions to suicide bombings). In Nigeria, political Islam has led to the adoption of Islamic shari'a laws in about one-third of states.²⁰ The ideological and religious underpinnings that accompany islamized politics make it very difficult to both understand and unravel its multiple linkages to certain conflicts. In particular, the religious underpinnings make resolving related conflict situations more difficult as the positions taken by actors are more knotty to resolve with conventional conflict resolution modalities.²¹

In Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts was routed in December 2006 by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with the support of Ethiopian troops. This 'victory' however is already beginning to unravel. Without assistance the TFG cannot even control Mogadishu which is faced with increasing factional violence and assassinations. A proposed AU force of 8,000 African troops has failed to materialize after only half the pledged number was actually made available. In the short to medium term, Somalia is likely to return to a period of instability similar to the

¹⁴ Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, eds., *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005).

¹⁵ Global Witness, *The Usual Suspects*, Global Witness Report, March 2003. For more information on SALW-related problems, see Keith Krause, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Towards Global Public Policy," *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

¹⁶ Okey Ndiribe, "Human Trafficking: Africa Tackles Evils of Modernized Slave Trade," *Vanguard* (Nigeria), July 12, 2006.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ David Dickson, "Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda," Special Report 140 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), pp. 3ff.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.1.

²¹ Godwin R. Murunga, "Conflict in Somalia and Crime in Kenya: Understanding the Trans-territoriality of Crime," *African and Asian Studies* 4, nos. 1-2 (2005): 137-162; Jeffrey Haynes, "Islamic Militancy in East Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no.8 (December 2005): 1321-1339; Bjorn Moller, "Religion and Conflict in Africa with a Special Focus on East Africa," DIIS Report 2006:6 (June 2006).

last decade and a half. Increasing attention is also being paid to the possibility of the Horn of Africa reemerging as a terrorist staging-point. Following the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and particularly in the post-9/11 era, a number of counterterrorist initiatives have emerged in the subregion, and further afield on the Continent, for example through the US Pan-Sahelian Initiative (PSI) and Trans-Saharan counter-terrorist initiatives (TSCTI). As a strategic partner of the United States in the global war against terrorism, Ethiopia, for instance, is increasingly spoken of as being on the frontline in efforts to root out al-Qaeda infrastructure in Africa. However, in some countries in Africa, for instance Nigeria, there is an increasingly complex blend of communal tensions, political Islam, radical Islamism, and anti-Americanism, which makes the country a potential breeding ground for militancy and terrorism.²² Elsewhere in West and Central Africa, transnational money laundering networks associated with illicit trade in diamonds operate to provide a conducive environment for financial activity of terrorist groups.²³

Public Health

Public health issues relating to diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria will continue to pose both 'old' and critical 'new' challenges. Presently, these diseases are among the world's biggest killers, with sub-Saharan Africa particularly affected.²⁴ HIV became noticeable in the early 1980s as a new public health problem, with many AIDS-associated maladies having no cure. Within 25 years, this public health problem had escalated into an epidemic, killing an estimated one million people a year. About one third of all deaths of those who are HIV positive are TB related and those with HIV are 100 times more likely to develop TB than other members of the public. Whereas TB is often associated with the elderly in developed countries, in Africa it is more common among young people – with serious demographic implications. HIV/AIDS has orphaned more than 12 million children in sub-Saharan Africa. The toll is expected to rise to about 43 million in 2010 with about \$30 billion p.a. being wiped off the economy of South Africa alone. East, Central, and

Southern Africa seem to be more affected by this pandemic.²⁵ Nevertheless, the inability of countries in Africa to afford – and sometimes even acknowledge the need for – anti-retroviral drug therapies makes the situation much more serious. Malaria is close behind TB in terms of impact on world health, killing over a million people each year. Despite being endemic in ninety countries around the world, nearly 90 percent of all malaria cases are in sub-Saharan Africa where it is the main cause of death for children and poses a major threat to child health in general. It has been estimated that in Africa, a child dies from malaria every thirty seconds. Even though it can be tackled with the proper medication, in many African countries, these drugs are nonexistent or unaffordable, leading to preventable deaths. Even where the drugs are available, there is a startling trend in which the disease is increasingly becoming resistant to known and affordable traditional treatments.

What Capacity to Cope with Africa's Security Challenges?

Response mechanisms for dealing with both the 'new' and the 'old' security challenges confronting Africa are primarily ad hoc, whether organized at the state level or through regional organizations. However, a clear trend is emerging toward formalization and institutionalization, particularly at the regional level. Yet this process of regionalism is not without its own challenges, since form may not always be backed up by substance.

Subregional Security Mechanisms

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provides an example of this process, having intervened in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Learning from these interventions, in 1999 ECOWAS adopted a protocol formalizing its mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and security. This mechanism and its supplementary protocol on good governance and democracy sought to consolidate and build on the experiences of ECOWAS and undertake deepening institutionalization processes to improve its

²² *Ibid.*

²³ For a detailed discussions of terror-crime linkages see Cockayne, "Transnational Organized Crime: Multilateral Responses to a Rising Threat," pp. 13ff.

²⁴ See further Margaret Kruk, "Global Public Health and Biosecurity," *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

²⁵ McInnes, "HIV/AIDS and Security"; Poku, "HIV/AIDS Financing."

capacity to resolve conflicts in the West African subregion.²⁶ Beyond its conflict management and prevention mandate, the mechanism also spelled out modalities for controlling transborder organized crime and terrorism by promoting close cooperation among the security services of its member states through the establishment of specialized departments within their ministries of Justice, Defence, and Security.²⁷ More importantly, this mechanism also enumerated measures against corruption, money laundering, and SALW proliferation.²⁸ A number of the provisions in the mechanism have had varying degrees of success, particularly in relation to efforts to improve operational and structural performances.²⁹ The establishment of these mechanisms and others has contributed to a more institutionalized handling of emerging crises, resulting in greater effectiveness.

Other subregional organizations such as the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have similar protocols and conventions to tackle transnational challenges. These two subregional organizations have attained a level of effectiveness when it involves armed conflict, small arms and light weapons, peacemaking and conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

While RECs are undertaking peacekeeping, it is necessary to recognize the work on peacekeeping that is being undertaken by the AU under the African Standby Force (ASF) process. Structured around five brigades – one from each of Africa’s subregions – the ASF has started negotiations for capacity-building assistance from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Among some of the identified areas where the UN may assist are personnel management, force generation, logistic and management assistance and training.

The Role of Hegemons

Benevolent hegemonic leadership has contributed to designing and finding solutions to some of these challenges. In this respect, both Nigeria and South Africa have played key roles.

Nigeria’s contribution in the form of fuel, finance, troops, and logistic support for the operations of the

ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) offers one operational example of how hegemonic contributions can underpin collective security responses. These operations occurred during a period when the country was under military rule and the government was largely unaccountable to its citizenry. It could therefore commit substantial resources to the resolution of conflict in a neighboring country. As democracy has progressed, however, several questions have been raised about this perceived ‘waste’ of resources, resulting in a reduction in active engagement in war-affected countries, which would result in a financial burden to the state. But more importantly, Nigeria’s hegemonic potential will be seriously undermined by its own domestic troubles and the feasibility of its own collapse if the present divisive politics are not resolved.

South Africa, as the other clear subregional hegemon, has been similarly influential in determining collective responses to security challenges, reflecting its political willingness, institutional strengths, and resource availability. Both Nigeria and South Africa have achieved relative peace and stability over the years, along with relative economic stability. Both are usually at the forefront of peacebuilding and peacemaking processes in countries in crisis, although they are somewhat constrained by domestic democratic processes. A typical case is the Ivoirian peace process in which leadership in the mediation process shifted from one country to the other. At the initial stages of the conflict, Ghana was at the forefront of the mediation. The ‘baton’ was handed over to Nigeria at the time when national elections were being held in Ghana. Subsequently, South Africa took over the mediation process before an International Working Group (IWG) was established to attempt to resolve the crisis. Despite the encouraging trends in the roles of subregional benevolent hegemons, a disintegration of any of them, especially Nigeria, would presumably be a fatal blow to the region’s efforts to deal with its emerging security challenges, because of negative impacts on energy prices, possible population flows destabilizing neighboring states, and possible sectarian and religious violence with regional or even broader implications.

²⁶ ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, signed on December 10, 1999, Lomé, Togo.

²⁷ Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, “Investing in Peace and Security in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS,” in Bob Picciotto and Rachel Weaving, eds., *Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity*, (London: Taylor & Francis, 2006), pp. 156ff.

²⁸ ECOWAS, *Protocol*, 1999.

²⁹ Structural factors make up the milieu within which these organizations operate and encompass issues such as democracy, human rights, and good governance, while operational factors deal with the hands-on capacity of the organizations to undertake conflict prevention and crisis management operations.

The African Union

While hegemonic leadership is essential, the African Union has also stepped up its role in the prevention and management of conflict, particularly through the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is a critical institutional component of the Union's peace and security architecture. The PSC is a collective security arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflicts and crisis situations in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities; and coordinate and harmonize efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism.³⁰ Furthermore, it is also expected to promote close harmonization, coordination, and cooperation between regional mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, stability, and security in Africa. Although this is an important institutional framework, very little scholarly work has been done on the AU's PSC. This is certainly an area that needs further research.

While RECs, civil societies and other organizations are working hard to stymie conflicts, the AU as the principal regional organization has undergone a normative shift by positing that non-interference does not mean indifference.³¹ On this basis, the AU has moved towards a more preventive, principled, and coercive role. The complexity of challenges faced by the African continent has contributed to the 'new' idea that "the notion of non-interference must be revised because it must be *never* associated with *indifference*. And this non-indifference must lead to *coercive measures*, to well-adapted and active policies."³² In whatever sense one examines this statement, this is a radical departure from the nature of traditional African international relations since 1963. It is important to appreciate the context within which the African Union is developing such specific 'principles' to guide community action. What can be deduced is that by emphasizing issues of security (among a panoply of other issue-areas), the African Union is developing into a regime with specific rules and principles.

Although the concept, as has been enunciated, will be challenging to implement, it is not impossible. However, what is critical in this discussion is the political will to apply coercive measures when this becomes imperative. Situations may also arise where there is a need to disaggregate the type of coercive

measures that are anticipated in terms of state size, influence, and power. Although this issue has not yet arisen, it is critical that there be advance thinking about how best to respond coercively to a large powerful state. However, since 2004 these norms, values, and principles have been unevenly applied to states that have fallen afoul of them. In the case of Togo for example, it took the combined leadership of ECOWAS and the AU to bring about a reversal of the palace *coup d'état* that took place after the death of the President in February 2005. In Mauritania, the blanket application of sanctions after the *coup d'état* has not yet brought the desired change and a reversal of the military take-over, despite the suspension of its membership by the AU and broader international efforts to encourage a return to democratic government. Darfur presents a unique challenge concerning how such developing norms and principles should be applied. Here it is obvious that both the AU and the wider international community have so far failed to change Sudan's behaviour.

What all this points to, however, is a willingness to move to a more principled approach to regional conflict resolution, facilitating preventive measures through, for example, early warning. The Early Warning system of the AU is potentially complementary to those of the subregional organizations, which are expected to collect and process data at their own level to be forwarded to the Situation Room of the AU. The challenge in this regard lies in the fact that while the subregional organizations are establishing their own early warning mechanisms, they have not yet effectively interfaced with the AU Situation Room. Enhancement of the capacity of the early warning systems of ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD (which has established its own conflict early warning and response mechanism – CEWARN – which primarily focuses on small scale pastoral conflicts) and ECCAS (the Economic Community of Central African States) will ensure that the Continental Early Warning system (CEWS) of the AU receives relevant, accurate and timely data. An integrated approach will also inform action at the REC level.

Typically, these early warning systems have not succeeded in the prevention of conflicts in any of the countries concerned. This could be for a variety of reasons: First, the regional early warning systems are not yet sufficiently developed to enable the various

³⁰ African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, Art. 3.

³¹ Alpha Oumar Konare, "Security is the African Union's priority," *African Geopolitics*, No. 13, Winter 2004.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 2, emphasis added.

countries to send reports back to headquarters; thus the system has received little support from the individual member countries. Second, these early warning systems seem to be more skewed towards detecting potential situations that may have political outcomes, ignoring local and small-scale conflicts, which although they have no immediate impact on national security may have adverse effects on local communities. Third is the lack of political will, which is also linked to the political sensitivity of early warning (unearthing things that states would rather keep hidden). Finally, there is the issue of capacity. Across Africa response capacities to early warning signals are at best weak, non-existent, or subjected to political tinkering. Both the AU peace and security architecture with its Panel of the Wise (if and when established with clear operating modalities and mandates) and ECOWAS's Council of Elders are expected to visit and admonish states that are deemed to be heading towards some form of problem. However, the response to this preventive diplomatic framework has been weak either because leaders are unwilling or genuinely unable to respond or because these institutions do not have supporting structures to enable them to work effectively.

Partners in Peacekeeping

While there is better coordination between the regional organizations and the UN, coordination among the subregional organizations has usually been lacking, leading to a duplication of efforts and programs. However, the UN is increasingly stepping into this gap, supporting the efforts of African regional organizations' peace operations. A form of partnership has begun to evolve whereby regional forces are mobilized and dispatched to the war affected country as a contingency measure. This force then transitions into a full-blown UN multi-functional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission – or, as now seems likely in Darfur, a hybrid UN-regional organization force. The trend of re-hatting regional forces or otherwise combining UN and regional organization efforts is increasingly accepted as the norm, since African subregional and regional organizations are unable to sustain forces for long periods without external logistical, financial, and even personnel support. External donors and partners have therefore provided the financial and logistical backing for several African

peace support operations (PSOs). For example, during the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the EU contributed \$23,609,756.00 while the United Kingdom gave \$3,591,150.00 out of the total of \$29,643,533.96. A similar development is apparent with the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) where the AU's partners contributed \$179,244,528.95 to the AMIS Special Trust Fund for the period 2003 to December 2005. For the AU Peace Fund, out of a total cash flow of \$83,730,622.59 for the period June 1993 to December 2005, external donors contributed a total of \$57,280,651.67.

These figures create a particular dilemma for the popular rhetoric of “African solutions to African problems.” Presently, no single PSO takes place without the role of key external partners, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the European Union. For now, the role of these partners will continue to be critical factors in African PSOs. PSOs have also seen an increasingly proactive role being played by these bilateral partners. In the second Liberia war for example (2000–2002) the USA provided logistical support and an offshore backup force to ECOWAS troops. In Sierra Leone, British forces have continued to provide support to the UN peace operation and continue to provide support in the post-war security sector process. In Côte d'Ivoire, the French Operation Licorne forces provided and continue to support the UN forces in the country. These bilateral partners play a significant supporting role for both regional organizations and the countries in crisis.

If the Darfur experience is indicative of the role of partners in African PSOs, then it is reasonable to conclude that in spite of the concerns of African leaders about the influence of multilateral and bilateral partners, they will continue to play important roles in such operations. Yet what has remained constant is the provision of African political leadership and guidance while such operations are ongoing, as evidenced by the work of the AU's Peace and Security Council.³³ The continued dependence of the region on these partners risks limiting the development of a home-grown response capacity. At the same time, a solely African approach based on the rhetoric “African solutions to African problems” might simply be utopian without the requisite economic, logistical, and political commitment and technological capacity.

³³ A classic example is the ongoing discussion between the AU and the UN concerning its African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops. See Catherine Guicherd, “The United Nations Contribution to African Capacity-building for Peacekeeping,” Meeting Note, International Peace Academy, New York, April 2006.

What is therefore the most likely scenario is the blending of support from development and peace operations partners with the efforts of the region, with critical emphasis placed on African input and political and strategic direction.

While regional engagements in PSOs have been encouraging, and bolstered by UN and other donors' support, there are still gaps. The same measure of commitment from regional organizations has not been translated to such areas as bio-security and public health, climate change, energy security, food security, resource security, cyber security and demographic trends. Consequently, while these challenges and many more are recognized, developments in the capacity of different African states and regional integration schemes to respond effectively to these challenges are highly varied. The primary reason for this is the fact that post-independence Africa has been struggling so much with issues of conflict and insecurity and has therefore been unable to commit to long-term capacity-building processes, not least because they often require effective institutional capacity at the state level which many of these states have not yet developed. As a consequence, long-term engagement on food security, cybersecurity, energy security, and biosecurity and public health has principally been the responsibility of international organizations like the UN and its agencies and development partners.³⁴ Where food security and climate change has been a problem, populations have often depended on food aid and other crisis relief for their survival.

Civil Society

In all these institutional processes, one other dynamic force for change and source of response capacity is the role of civil society. Civil society in Africa has been assisting in the drive to address some of the identified challenges. Due to its grassroots engagement, it has been able to work in areas where some international organizations are reluctant to venture. Increasingly, some international organizations have been channeling resources through civil society groups. These groups are very much engaged in the democratization process in Africa through mass campaigns, education, and sensitization. In particular instances, some gender-focused civil society groups have funded

the participation of women in local elections. Civil society groups have also ventured into the security domain by engaging in such programs as security sector reform, and conflict prevention and resolution. Notable examples include the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) and the civil society desk at the ECOWAS Secretariat manned by the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF).

African civil society has a role to play in improving the performance of African states and RECs. To achieve this, there is the need for increased awareness of the role that RECs play in ensuring the peace, security, and development of their regions. To a large extent, it is civil society that will be tasked with this assignment as it is both sufficiently informed to relate to states and RECs and sufficiently rooted within local communities to relate to the general population.

One example of the positive influence of civil society is in the area of SALW proliferation. All the subregions have protocols, conventions and moratoria aimed at curtailing SALW proliferation, as well as coordinating agencies, which have been established at the regional level. States are expected under these structures to develop legislation on domestic firearms control and review laws to make them more effective, as well as take steps to improve border, customs and law enforcement cooperation. Yet such efforts remain minimal. Most RECs and their member states do not have the real institutional capacity to address the menace of SALW adequately. Especially in cases of artisanal small arms manufacture, RECs and state agencies have not as yet demonstrated abilities to interdict and arrest manufacturers and movements of small arms.³⁵ But civil society organizations have been organizing targeted capacity-training workshops for law enforcement agencies, demonstrating the important complementary role they can play in capacity-building.³⁶

Scenarios and Recommendations

From the above discussions, it is obvious that while scenario building can be undertaken, it is fairly difficult to place scenarios in neat categories.

³⁴ Cyber-security and critical infrastructure protection, for example, are two areas that have not been on the agenda of most African states and organizations. For information on the status of access to the internet in Africa, see www.internetworld.com.

³⁵ Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, E. Sowatey, E. Birikorang and T. Ajayi, "Illicit Small Arms in Ghana: A Baseline Assessment" (Accra: UNDP/Government of Ghana, 2006).

³⁶ Kizito Sabala, "African Commitments to Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries," African Human Security Initiative (2004), p. 71.

Nevertheless, we can discern three rough scenarios for the future development of African security challenges. Which of these scenarios eventuates will depend in part on the policy choices made by states and international organizations in building coping capacity.

Catastrophe

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that if there are no radical reversals in the low levels of public funding of several social infrastructural projects, then the HIV/AIDS pandemic, for one, would worsen into a spiraling crisis. Closely following on its heels would come a crisis in education where the quantity and quality of education provided does not fulfill the expectations of an increasingly service-oriented and technology-based labor market. A result will be rising unemployment leading to massive migratory flows to Europe of Africa's youth.

In this context of social upheaval and population movements, the challenges posed by transnational organized criminal groups will continue to grow, threatening the authority of states (and eventually entire subregions), undermining public institutions such as the police, customs, immigration, judiciary, and armed forces and starting the process of infiltrating political parties. When the state and its agencies are weakened and undermined in this way, there will be cases where these groups will begin to provide social welfare services, thus further undermining the authority and efficacy of the state. But the activities of these transnational criminal groups will also bring in their wake more violence as different groups fight to expand and protect their territories, using the cover of conflict zones to plunder the resources of Africa, especially in West, Central, and Southern African states.

In the discussion above of the important potential of benevolent hegemonic leadership by South Africa and Nigeria, I made reference to the threatening nature of Nigeria's domestic troubles and how this could lead to the disintegration of this powerful and populous state. A disintegrating Nigeria with an estimated 120 million people would be a worst case scenario for West Africa as the subregion's economies would be seriously affected. Migratory flows of Nigerians seeking zones of peace would almost certainly ruin the economies of Togo, Benin, Ghana, and states much further afield. But more critically, such a scenario would lead to the loss of a key continental stabilization anchor.

Business as Usual

In the next 5-10 years, the "business as usual" mode is most likely to define both identification of and response mechanisms to human and international security challenges in Africa, both at the level of the state and the RECs. In terms of identification of issues, challenges already known will likely be left alone until they are about to reach catastrophic proportions. For example, funding for HIV/AIDS in most East, Southern and Central African states is still considerably lower than resources spent on primary education, debt servicing, and general health care. Depending in which state and subregion a crisis is about to break out there will be different response initiatives. One can presume that in both ECOWAS and SADC, because of the presence of hegemonic states and relatively adequately functioning regional institutions, there is a higher prospect of effective responses to challenges that need a peacekeeping response. Even in such cases, there will still be a need for the UN and other bilateral and multilateral partners to provide immense financial and material support to realize the success of such efforts. The migratory flows out of Africa, with the region's best and brightest and other less skilled manpower leaving for better opportunities elsewhere, will continue to decimate the already reduced skilled manpower base.

Best Case

A best case or 'golden' scenario would involve massive investment in both public and private sector institutions creating functional institutional capacity at multiple levels, whether in individual states (where there would emerge effective public institutions capable of enhancing their regulatory capacities), RECs (where one would observe deepening political and economic integration processes, through faster incorporation of REC policy into national legislation) and with the AU (which would provide a more assertive leadership role on the continent in terms of ensuring that its policies are implemented by member states). Here, the institutional and policy environment change needs to occur at all levels – local, national, subregional, and regional – and in different forms and types, to bring about a reversal of, or to avoid both the 'catastrophic' and 'business as usual' scenarios above.

If this 'golden' scenario were to occur, in the medium to long term, this would produce an improved response to the economic, security, and political challenges facing the region. This would

likely be reflected in a shift of emphasis away from conflict issues towards economic and political governance issues. Practically, this would lead to recognition of the need to grapple with more fundamental, everyday problems, especially at the individual state and RECs levels. Here, one is projecting a situation where there is massive investment in social infrastructure such as public health systems, educational facilities (especially curricula design) and development adapted to suit the socio-economic and political challenges facing Africa.

Also, such a scenario would promote long-term conditions for security and development. Entrenching democratic governance at local, national, subregional and regional levels will help move us towards such a golden scenario. Such processes of democratic control should also be brought to bear on the security sector by establishing a clear definition of the role of national security services while enhancing professionalism of the sector. Furthermore, a 'golden' scenario would in the medium to long term see improved private-public partnerships, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction, where private sector actors could engage in a wide spectrum of political, military and especially economic activities.

But to ensure that such a golden scenario succeeds, three critical priorities must prevail at all levels—local, national, subregional and regional: (a) continuous human resource capacity building through focused and targeted training schemes, matched with the requisite strategies for African organizations to retain trained staff; (b) sustainable and predictable levels of financial support to ensure the continuation and the initiation of new processes of social and infrastructural development; and (c) institutional transformation processes which focus both on managerial and leadership training and development at the core of both public and private sector institutions.

Conclusion

The events of the last decade show that the rest of the world is not placing Africa's concerns at the top of their agendas. To deal with the scenarios identified above, Africa's states and organizations must move beyond rhetorical clichés and genuinely take it upon themselves to develop African solutions to African problems.

This paper has attempted to describe the security challenges that Africa faces, as well as the coping mechanisms states, RECs, and the AU have established, as well as the types of support that the wider international community is providing, to enable Africa to respond to these challenges. Three scenarios for future development were highlighted, ranging from the worst to the most optimistic. While all do have elements that can be identified as already being present, it is necessary to discuss the coping capacities of some of these institutions. In terms of the primary subregional organizations, both ECOWAS and SADC are showing signs of deepening and effective institutionalization processes and mechanisms to tackle the myriad challenges that their respective subregions are facing, which may support the institutional reform processes that the African Union is undertaking. Though the success stories are few and far between, the political will to transform these institutions is growing. Due to financial constraints, there may be the need to prioritize the critical areas of peace support operations where the AU and RECs have some experience.

However, there are troubling signs that African regional organizations appear to lack the capability to institute comprehensive conflict prevention and management systems. The international community and bi- and multilateral partners should work with African regional and subregional actors to develop mechanisms that reliably forecast conflict, facilitate joint missions and deepen Africa's security mechanisms along the lines of the AU's Peace and Security architecture.

Further Reading

Adebajo, Adekeye and Ismail Rashid. *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

Though West Africa-specific, this book analyses the different facets of West Africa's endemic conflicts and brings constructive policy suggestions about the way forward. A useful guide to understanding the complexities of the conflicts that have bedeviled this subregion for close to two decades.

Ballentine, Karen and Heiko Nitzschke. *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

Applying a political economy approach, this brings new and nuanced perspectives to bear on the greed and grievance arguments that generated such controversy.

Bayart, Jean-Francois. *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly*. Harlow: Longman, 1993.

The African state has been one of the most misunderstood aspects of African politics. In this provocative but informative book, information is provided in a new way that dissects and brings understanding to the different machinations employed by those who operate and exploit the state. A must read book to help in understanding what ails the African state.

Chabal, Patrick. & Jean-Pascal Daloz. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Currey, 1999.

Explaining what might be considered the irrationality of African politics as a particular type of 'order', this book goes beyond the common phrases and rhetoric of the state and demonstrates how beneath the veneer of disorder, there is a rationality understood and applied by those who rule in Africa which allows them to build and exploit power.

Clapham, Christopher. *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Probably one of the most magisterial works on how Africa fits into the international system while concurrently playing and bending the rules to its particular understanding, this book explores how new African states have managed to survive and benefit from this system despite their weakness.

Crocker, Chester A., F. O. Hampson and Pamela Aal. *Turbulent Peace: the Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005.

This is a practical book that explores the different facets of conflict and conflict resolution and mediation strategies. A few Africa-specific chapters, but overall a helpful compendium of articles of both a theoretical and practical nature.

The Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Although not an Africa specific document, it provides very useful insights and interpretations of perceptions about war and peace and other related topics that are very useful for researchers and policy makers. Available at www.humansecurityreport.info.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS), documents available at www.iss.co.za.

The ISS has extensive downloadable materials on all aspects of Africa's security and conflict issues, including the role of the AU and the RECs. It also contains links to all AU/RECs official documents.

International Crisis Group, documents available at www.crisisgroup.org.

Crisis Group is an independent, non-governmental organization working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. They produce analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers and a useful guide for materials on African conflicts in particular.

Pugh, Michael, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand. *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

This book provides interesting insights into how conflict interdependencies are formed and the usefulness of applying a security/conflict complex approach to understanding the dynamics of conflicts.

Reno, William. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

This book explores how alternative power structures to the state arise and challenge legitimate authority when states start to collapse. A good overview of how different wars in Africa started with the collapse of the state and the emergence of different power bases. A useful and practical overall theoretical and empirical discussion of warlordism in Africa.

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