Summary

Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 33/16, this report provides an overview of the situation of human rights in Yemen between September 2014 and 30 June 2017. The report also includes new allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that reportedly occurred between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2017. The High Commissioner emphasizes the continuing nature of many of these violations. The report also provides an update on cooperation between the Yemen National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

* The report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments.
** The annexes to the report are circulated as received.
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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 33/16 and covers the period between September 2014 and 30 June 2017.

2. Human Rights Council resolution 33/16 requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide assistance and advice to the Yemen National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights (the National Commission) to enable it to fulfil its mandate in line with international standards and finalize its comprehensive report; allocate additional international human rights experts to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Yemen to provide such assistance and complement the investigatory work of the National Commission; and present to the Council, at its thirty-sixth session, a written report on the situation of human rights, including violations and abuses since September 2014, and on the implementation of technical assistance.

3. The report examines the human rights situation in Yemen and emphasizes recurring violations and abuses documented since September 2014. In addition, the report presents new allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that reportedly occurred in the past year, between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2017. The report also provides an update on cooperation between the National Commission and OHCHR, including technical assistance provided by the Office.

4. This report should be read in conjunction with previous reports of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on situation of human rights in Yemen.1

II. Methodology

5. The report primarily relies on information obtained from human rights monitoring conducted by OHCHR in Yemen, including through interviews with survivors, witnesses, victims’ family members and other relevant sources, site visits and meetings with authorities. The report also reflects credible information gathered from other United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations, and indicates whether OHCHR was able to corroborate such information.

6. OHCHR employs a “reasonable grounds” standard in its assessment of incidents investigated. In each case, the assessment considers the credibility and reliability of the sources, taking into account their nature and objectivity. OHCHR only reaches conclusions in its assessment of incidents investigated when this standard is met.

7. In the past year, the ability of OHCHR to monitor and report on violations has been limited by numerous constraints, namely security restrictions, delays in issuing visas and inhibitive operational costs.

III. Legal framework


1 A/HRC/33/38, A/HRC/30/31
rights in Yemen contains a detailed analysis of the applicable legal framework and the obligations of the various duty-bearers in Yemen, namely the Government of Yemen, States members of the Coalition forces and the de facto authorities in Sana’a.

IV. Context

9. This report covers the period from September 2014 to June 2017, and focuses on the predominant conflict in Yemen between forces supporting President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, including Coalition forces (together, “pro-government forces”), and the Popular Committees affiliated with the Houthis and the army units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (“Houthi/Saleh forces”).

10. From July 2016 through June 2017, almost 8,700 conflict-related incidents, including airstrikes, armed clashes, shelling and detonation of explosives, were reported throughout Yemen. From January 2017, hostilities escalated with the launch of a campaign by the Coalition forces targeting the west coast. The average monthly number of airstrikes in the coastal Al-Hudaydah and Taizz governorates during the first three months of 2017 was almost double the average for the previous six months. In this context, pro-Government forces commenced operations against the southwestern port town of Al-Mukha, which they took in February, and thereafter pushed northwards along the coast. Since then, Coalition forces have signalled that they may commence operations on Al-Hudaydah. The High Commissioner has warned of the likely devastating consequences of such operations on both the city’s civilian population and the country’s largest port. The city of Taizz remains a heavily contested area, as it has for the past two years.

11. Other armed actors have continued to take advantage of the prevailing insecurity in Yemen. In the past year, extremist groups sustained and adapted their presences. For example, after being driven out of Al-Mukalla in Hadramaut governorate in April 2016, Al-Qaeda is now operational in Taizz city.

12. Despite attempts at humanitarian pauses and ceasefires over the years, none have held. Peace talks held in June and December 2015 in Switzerland and from April to July 2016 in Kuwait were unsuccessful. Although there has been no resumption of talks, the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen has continued to pursue potential avenues for peace.

13. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Yemen has continued to deteriorate. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of June 2017, out of a population of 27.4 million, 18.8 million were in need of humanitarian assistance, including 10.3 million in acute need. There have been more than 500,000 suspected cases of cholera since April 2017, and 7.3 million people on the brink of famine. More than 3 million people have been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began. This catastrophe is entirely man-made.

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2 A/HRC/33/38, paras.8-10.
3 The Saudi-led Coalition consists of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, the Sudan, and, until June 2017, Qatar.
4 UN sources
5 Ibid.
6 www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un-idUSKBN17X1F1
7 Annex I.
V. National commission

14. Following the extension of its mandate for a further year per Presidential Decree 97 of 24 August 2016, the National Commission continued its work. Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 33/16, OHCHR deployed five additional staff members to Sana’a, Amman and Geneva from April 2017 to provide the National Commission with technical assistance and advice, as well as complement its investigatory work. Due to security constraints, no OHCHR staff could be based in Aden where the National Commission sits.

15. In consultation with OHCHR, the National Commission identified a number of priority areas for technical assistance. In accordance with these, OHCHR conducted a variety of activities, including a workshop with Commission members from 21 to 22 February in Doha, Qatar, presenting regional best practices for commissions of inquiry. OHCHR also conducted a working visit to the National Commission in Aden from 23 to 25 May to provide technical expertise on the development of databases, including on information management, protection protocols and archiving. Further, OHCHR delivered training for Commission staff members from 7 to 8 July in Amman, Jordan, on international humanitarian law, interviewing techniques, gender and databases. Future planned activities include more specialized targeted training workshops. However, these plans are limited by security and logistical constraints. For example, owing to operational constraints, namely airport closures, abrupt cancellation of flights and restrictions on United Nations travel due to the deteriorating security situation, the location and dates of the training that was implemented had to be adjusted repeatedly.

16. Additional factors, including political constraints, detrimentally affected the work of the National Commission. The de facto authorities are unwilling to cooperate with and provide access to commission comprising members appointed by the other party to the conflict, namely the Government of Yemen. The perceived partiality of the National Commission and its limited access have prevented it from executing its mandate comprehensively. Despite these challenges, the National Commission has made noteworthy attempts in the past year, issuing a preliminary report covering events through 30 July 2016 and two interim reports covering 31 July 2016 to 31 January 2017 and September 2016 to June 2017. The Commission has also produced monthly reports for five months in 2016, which are available on its Arabic website. Of the more than 17,000 human rights violations reportedly documented, the Commission notes having completed investigations in more than 10,000. In addition to its perceived partiality, the National Commission appears to be lacking any instrument, or mandate, that would enable it to channel its findings into a credible accountability mechanism. The complete absence of this process will further consolidate the climate of impunity in Yemen.

VI. Human rights situation

17. The population of Yemen continued to suffer the impact of armed conflict and violence along with other serious human rights violations and abuses. Airstrikes and shelling repeatedly struck areas populated by civilians. People faced continuing hardships due to limited or no access to food and other basic goods, healthcare and education, circumstances caused by the parties to the conflict who have besieged cities, blockaded seaports, and closed airports. Forced displacement and restrictions on movement, exacerbated by the presence of snipers or landmines, directly affected civilians, causing deaths, injuries, destruction of property, loss of livelihoods, and prevention of access to essential services. Civilians who spoke out or otherwise opposed the parties to the conflict were subjected to harassment, intimidation, detention and, on
occasion, to torture and killing. Women, children, religious and social minorities, refugees, and internally displaced persons were disproportionately affected.

18. In the past year, conflict along the west coast of Yemen raised serious human rights concerns. During intense clashes in Al-Mukha over two weeks in late January and early February 2017, civilians were caught between the conflicting instructions of warring parties. Houthi/Saleh forces instructed civilians not to leave their homes while pro-government forces demanded they evacuate. OHCHR verified incidents of Houthi/Saleh snipers shooting at civilians trying to flee, which may indicate an attempt to use civilians as human shields, in violation of international humanitarian law. OHCHR verified at least 32 civilians were killed or injured over the course of the two weeks of fighting, and more than 200 homes damaged or destroyed.

19. Since February, tension has risen in anticipation of similar armed operations against Al-Hudaydah. According to information gathered by OHCHR, airstrikes and attacks on boats at sea off the shores of Al-Hudaydah caused at least 98 civilian casualties (52 killed and 46 injured) over three weeks in March and April 2017. There are fears that a full-scale operation on Al-Hudaydah may lead to significant civilian casualties and increased displacement, while likely rendering the port inoperative, further limiting access to food, medicines, fuel and other supplies. The impact would be felt far beyond Al-Hudaydah, as most of the country is supplied by goods shipped through the port.

A. Conduct of hostilities

20. Since OHCHR began civilian casualty monitoring in March 2015, the Office has verified at least 13,520 civilian casualties, with 4,980 killed and 8,540 injured, in more than 1,000 incidents through June 2017. Data collected by OHCHR shows that the most conflict-affected governorates are Aden, Al-Hudaydah, Sana’a and Taizz. Given the strict verification methodology applied by OHCHR and access constraints, the actual total of casualties is likely to be higher.

21. Some of these incidents involving the various parties to the conflict, may amount to violations of international humanitarian law. In many cases, information obtained by OHCHR suggested that civilians may have been directly targeted, or that operations were conducted heedless of their impact on civilians without regard to the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. In some cases, information suggested that no actions were taken to mitigate the impact of operations on civilians. According to the Office’s findings, at no time were civilians given effective advance warning of the commencement of operations so as to have the opportunity to leave areas of operations safely, and their access to life-saving or life-sustaining humanitarian assistance was severely limited or, in some instances, prevented.

i. Shelling

22. Houthi/Saleh forces primarily relied on shelling in the conduct of their operations. Given their wide-area effects, use of such weapons is frequently indiscriminate. OHCHR has documented the recurrent use of shelling in densely populated civilian areas, such as residential neighbourhoods and markets, which have

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8 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Rule 97.
9 Annex III.
caused hundreds of civilian casualties and vast destruction to civilian objects.\(^\text{10}\) Since July 2016, OHCHR documented that shelling by Houthi/Saleh forces has killed at least 178 civilians and injured 420. The city of Taizz has been particularly affected.

### Shelling of Taizz

23. Throughout the conflict, the city of Taizz has witnessed consistent shelling carried out by both sides of the conflict, intensifying at times, such as in January and May 2017. Due to denial of access to areas controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces in Taizz, OHCHR has rarely been able to verify incidents of shelling attributed to pro-government forces. The following are examples of shelling incidents verified by OHCHR that caused high numbers of civilian casualties.\(^\text{11}\)

24. On 3 October 2016, in Beer Basha area, Al-Mudhaffar district, Taizz governorate, a mortar shell struck a civilian house, killing 10 civilians, including six children, and injuring 17 civilians, including six children and three women. The attack occurred in the vicinity of a public market at the busiest time of day. According to witnesses, the mortar shell was launched from an area under the control of Houthi/Saleh forces, while the market area was controlled by pro-government forces.

25. On 18 January 2017, in Al-Noor area, Al-Mudhaffar district, Taizz governorate, mortar shells struck among civilian houses. About 15 minutes later, as residents gathered to assess the damage, another mortar shell struck the same area, killing nine civilians, including three children, and injuring nine civilians, including four children. Witnesses told OHCHR that the shells were launched from an area controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces.

26. From 21 May to 6 June 2017, continuous shelling between forces in Taizz city impacted civilian residential areas, resulting in the killing of at least 26 civilians, including four children and three women, and injuring of at least 61 civilians, including 29 children and nine women. Based on witness testimony and the locations of the impact, OHCHR attributed 19 killed and 59 injured to Houthi/Saleh forces, and the remaining casualties to pro-government forces. The shelling also damaged at least nine homes.

27. The shelling of Taizz has been unrelenting, even after the impact of these attacks on civilians and civilian objects became apparent to the parties involved. The use of such tactics appears to be in violation of prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and of the obligation to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects.

### ii. Airstrikes

28. Coalition airstrikes continued to be the leading cause of civilian casualties in the conflict, killing at least 933 civilians and injuring 1,423 since July 2016.\(^\text{12}\) As in past years, OHCHR continued to document airstrikes against targets that appeared to be of a civilian nature.\(^\text{13}\) In addition to markets, residential areas, and public and private infrastructure, the past year witnessed notable airstrikes against funeral gatherings and small civilian boats. Such incidents were widespread and continued to take place, once again, even after the impact of the attacks on civilians became apparent. Directly targeting civilians and civilian objects, or conducting disproportionate or indiscriminate

\(^{10}\) A/HRC/30/31, A/HRC/33/38, annex III

\(^{11}\) Annex I

\(^{12}\) Annex III

\(^{13}\) Annex I.
attacks, and the failure to take all necessary precautions to avoid and, in any event, minimize, the impact on civilians during air operations targeting military objectives, constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Al Kubra Hall

29. The most deadly incident of the conflict thus far occurred on 8 October 2016 when Coalition airstrikes targeted the Al Kubra Hall in Sana’a during the funeral of the father of a senior official, killing at least 132 civilians and injuring 695, including 24 boys. At the time of the attack, the hall, the largest such facility in Sana’a, with capacity of more than 1,000 people, was full of mourners attending the funeral. Those present included military leaders affiliated with the Houthis and former President Saleh, but the majority were civilians.

30. When OHCHR visited the site that day, survivors reported that they had heard aircraft hovering above the hall around 3.30 p.m. immediately prior to the two missiles that struck the hall only minutes apart. Many individuals fleeing the first strike had not yet exited the building when the second strike hit. The short interval between the strikes meant that those responding to assist victims of the first strike were hit by the second.

31. The points of impact of the two strikes were 15-20 metres apart. Based on information available to OHCHR, the remnants of the munitions used revealed that they had been fitted with precision guidance units, indicating that the targeting of the Hall had been deliberate. Based on the circumstances, including the prior announcement and public nature of the funeral, as well as the timing of the strike, Coalition forces should have been aware of the high risk of civilian casualties inherent in carrying out such a strike. Despite initial denials of responsibility by the Coalition forces, a subsequent investigation of the incident by the Coalition’s Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) found that Coalition aircraft had conducted the strike and that it had resulted in “several” casualties. According to JIAT, the targeting was based on faulty intelligence provided by a party affiliated with the Government of Yemen, and the airstrike was conducted without proper approval or in non-compliance with Coalition procedures.

32. OHCHR verified two other incidents of airstrikes against funeral gatherings in the past year.

Attack on a boat carrying Somali migrants and refugees

33. As a result of military operations along the western coast of Yemen, the waters off Al-Hudaydah have become dangerous, with many boats coming under fire. OHCHR verified six incidents of attacks on fishermen in early 2017, three of which occurred on 15 and 16 March 2017.

34. The most devastating attack was on a boat carrying 146 Somali migrants and refugees, along with four Yemeni crew members. Survivors told OHCHR that on 15 March, they saw ships and a helicopter near their boat. The following night, survivors reported that a ship fired on their boat and that, minutes later, a helicopter circled over their boat, opening fire on it. The survivors reported that they screamed, waved and

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14 Annex II, figure I.
15 Accountability section XIII for additional information on the JIAT.
16 www.justsecurity.org/33615/full-text-saudi-led-coalitions-statement-explanation-funeral-hall-bombing-yemen/
17 Annex I.
18 Annex I.
shone flashlights in an effort to signal they were civilians, however, the shooting continued. Once the attack ended and the helicopter departed, the crew turned off the lights and the boat drifted to shore.\textsuperscript{19} Forty-two civilians were killed, including 11 women, and 34 were injured, including eight children.

35. Emirati State media reported that an official of the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Coalition, acknowledged that its forces had spotted the boat and, as it was identified as a civilian vessel, had refrained from firing on it.\textsuperscript{20} In an unprecedented move, the official welcomed an independent international investigation into the incident, and denied that Emirati forces had been involved in the attack.\textsuperscript{21} The Coalition also reportedly denied responsibility for the incident.\textsuperscript{22} As of 31 July 2017, there had been no acknowledgement of responsibility for the attack, nor any explanation as to why this vessel, along with other civilian boats, were attacked.

iii. Restricted weapons

36. Due to the ongoing armed conflict, a variety of explosives litter the landscape of Yemen, including anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), unexploded ordnance and cluster munitions. All of these explosives pose a danger to civilians, causing casualties and hindering the safe return of displaced populations. The legality of these weapons varies\textsuperscript{23}, but use of anti-personnel landmines, victim-activated IEDs, and cluster munitions may violate international humanitarian law, particularly in the absence of precautionary measures due to their inherently indiscriminate nature.\textsuperscript{24}

37. No comprehensive statistics are available on civilian casualties caused by these weapons, but credible reports from demining experts, medical professionals and local residents indicate that the danger is widespread and continuing. According to the United Nations Development Programme, de-miners had cleared nearly 450,000 explosive remnants of war between February 2016 and June 2017, including thousands of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.\textsuperscript{25} The vast majority of mines and explosive devices are reported in areas currently or previously controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces. Residents regularly told OHCHR that their areas were not mined prior to the arrival of those forces. OHCHR has no evidence of any precautionary measures being taken, such as warnings or symbols, to indicate the presence of mines or explosive devices. Due to access and capacity constraints, OHCHR is only able to verify a few cases of civilian casualties from such explosives, sustained mostly while people go about their daily activities.\textsuperscript{26}

38. As reported to the Human Rights Council in 2016, OHCHR found credible allegations of the use of cluster munitions by Coalition forces dating back to December 2015. On 19 December 2016, the Coalition acknowledged the use of cluster munitions and avowed that it would cease the use of UK-manufactured BL-755 cluster

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302603973
\textsuperscript{21} http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302603973
\textsuperscript{22} http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security-refugees-idUKKBN16O0WF
\textsuperscript{23} Yemen ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, but neither Yemen nor any Coalition members, except Senegal, are parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
\textsuperscript{24} ICRC, Rules 71 and 81.
\textsuperscript{25} Demining activities were limited prior to February 2016.
\textsuperscript{26} Annex I.
munitions. OHCHR has documented two new apparent cases of the use of cluster munitions, both in Sa’ada governorate, in December 2016 and May 2017.

iv. Siege and Blockade

39. Most movement of goods and people in and out of Yemen is by sea or air. Moving within the country by land requires crossing active conflict lines. The sieges and blockades imposed by the warring parties have had a devastating impact on civilians, preventing them from leaving areas affected by conflict to safety and, when they remain, preventing them from accessing goods necessary for survival, including life sustaining or life-saving humanitarian assistance.

40. In August 2015, when pro-government forces gained control of parts of the city of Taizz, Houthi/Saleh forces besieged the city, controlling the two main entrances and effectively blockading it until March 2016. OHCHR documented several incidents of Houthi guards at checkpoints preventing civilians from bringing essential items into the city, such as food and medicine. Houthi/Saleh forces also denied passage to civilians trying to exit or enter the city for urgent healthcare. OHCHR has documented the Houthi/Saleh forces’ brutal tactics of enforcing the siege of Taizz, including more than 20 incidents of beating and shooting of civilians at checkpoints.

41. In March 2016, pro-government forces established control of a third entry point into the city. Accessible only via circuitous, arduous secondary roads, this entrance does permit civilians to move and to bring goods in and out. As a result of international pressure and other factors, Houthi/Saleh forces have intermittently allowed the passage of civilians and small quantities of civilian goods, including humanitarian aid, through the main entrances to the city. Nevertheless, access to Taizz city remains extremely limited and residents continue to suffer.

42. The prices of basic commodities in Taizz have skyrocketed, leaving civilians unable to afford basic essential items even if they are accessible or available. To access basic services such as healthcare, residents report that they have to traverse routes mined with explosives and are exposed to the constant risk of shelling, airstrikes and snipers. Residents also report that if they manage to reach locations where healthcare may be available, they often find that the facilities have been destroyed or damaged in the fighting, or that they lack even the most basic supplies. No public healthcare facilities in the city, and few private facilities, are fully functional.

43. Given the geography of Yemen, the powers exercised by the Coalition along the land borders and coasts and in the airspace enable the Coalition, to a great extent, to determine the conditions of life in Yemen. Reportedly to enforce the UN-sanctioned arms embargo, the Coalition imposes de facto naval and aerial blockades. All ships entering ports under the control of Houthi/Saleh forces require prior authorization from the Coalition. Few ships receive such authorization; many are delayed, denied or rerouted. In one case, Save the Children issued a public statement, alleging that the Coalition’s prevention of three of its supply shipments from reaching Al-Hudaydah, by rerouting them to Aden and thereby delaying them for up to three months, killed children.

30 www.savethechildren.org.uk/2017-03/saudi-delays-yemen-aid-killing-children
44. Through a variety of regulatory, mostly arbitrary, restrictions, the Coalition has strangled imports into the country. Prior to the conflict, Yemen imported 80-90 per cent of its food, medical supplies and fuel. Yet for most of the last two years, for example, only 20-30 per cent of the country’s estimated monthly fuel needs have been met.\footnote{www.logcluster.org/countries/YEM} As a result of such restrictions, as well as the danger of sailing in an active conflict zone, many commercial shipping companies are no longer willing to attempt shipments to Al-Hudaydah. Coupled with Coalition airstrikes that significantly damaged Al-Hudaydah port, the effects of the naval blockade have been paralyzing for the importation of essential supplies into the country.

45. Since March 2015, Coalition restrictions on air access have also crippled the country, particularly in the north where the population is under Houthi/Saleh control. Sana’a international airport has remained closed to commercial aviation since 9 August 2016 when the Government of Yemen and Coalition forces closed the surrounding airspace.\footnote{United Nations and international non-governmental organization flights have resumed.} The closure has prevented thousands of Yemenis from seeking medical care abroad, while the healthcare system in Yemen has disintegrated. The aerial blockade has also further limited cargo importation into the country, and has severely restricted the ability of civilians to enter and leave these areas.

46. All parties to the conflict must do their utmost to ensure the respect and protection of the civilian population at all times and in all circumstances. In particular, the parties must allow and facilitate “rapid and unimpeded” passage of humanitarian relief, including food and other items essential to the survival of the civilian population.\footnote{ICRC, Rule 55.} They must do all they can to facilitate or ensure that civilians have access to essential humanitarian supplies and are able to leave areas affected by conflict in safety, dignity and in full compliance with humanitarian standards. Further, the parties must also facilitate or ensure access to civilians by humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.\footnote{ICRC, Rule 56.}

\textbf{v. Forced displacement}

47. Forced displacement of civilians has been exploited as a tactic in the conflict in violation of international humanitarian law. In the past year, OHCHR verified two cases of entire villages forcibly displaced by Houthi/Saleh forces.

48. On 1 November 2016, following weeks of harassment, movement restrictions and arrests, 175 families were forced to leave Al-Dabah Al-Rabee’i village, in Taizz governorate, after the Houthis threatened by loudspeaker that if the villagers did not leave within 24 hours, all the men would be detained. On 18 February 2017, again following weeks of harassment and movement restrictions, two villagers were killed by sniper-fire while trying to leave Tabaysha’a village, in Taizz governorate. The following day, armed Houthi/Saleh forces entered the village, destroying homes and seizing vehicles, while fighters positioned on the mountains overlooking the village began to fire on the residential areas. As a result of the violence, all the villagers - at least 250 families - fled the village while waving white banners.
vi. Specially protected persons and objects

49. Despite special protections afforded under international humanitarian law\textsuperscript{35}, medical and education facilities and personnel, as well as cultural and religious sites, continued to be damaged or destroyed by Coalition airstrikes and shelling by Houthi/Saleh forces\textsuperscript{36}. Parties to the conflict have also endangered the protected status of such objects by positioning military objectives within or around them. Extremist groups have carried out direct attacks against cultural and religious sites.

Medical facilities and personnel

50. The conflict has ravaged the health system. According to the World Health Organization, as of October 2016, at least 274 health facilities were damaged or destroyed by fighting, and 13 health workers killed and 31 injured while performing their duties. Some of these incidents were reportedly the result of direct, targeted attacks, while others resulted from indiscriminate attacks or were incidental. As of June 2017, less than 45 per cent of health facilities in the country are fully functional. Furthermore, many health personnel have been forced to relocate due to insecurity and the risks associated with carrying out their duties.

Abs Hospital

51. OHCHR investigated a Coalition airstrike that took place on 15 August 2016 against Abs Hospital, in Hajjah governorate.\textsuperscript{37} That afternoon, a vehicle was admitted to the hospital compound; the occupants were reportedly unarmed and wearing civilian clothing. Within minutes, an airstrike hit within the grounds of the hospital complex, near the emergency ward where the vehicle had stopped and where a large number of patients and caretakers were waiting for treatment.\textsuperscript{38} OHCHR has verified that 19 civilians were killed, including one woman and three children, and 28 were injured, including four women and four children.

52. Reportedly, in communications immediately following the airstrike, a Coalition general told those in charge of the hospital that the airstrike had intended to target the vehicle that had entered the hospital compound. Later the JIAT found that Coalition forces had targeted a gathering of Houthi armed leaders in the north of the city, and when a vehicle left that targeted site, it was pursued and struck.\textsuperscript{39} The JIAT found that the vehicle was next to an unmarked building at the time of impact, a building allegedly only later determined to be Abs Hospital. The JIAT concluded that the incident was an “unintentional error”.

53. Following the attack, the hospital remained out of service for 11 days. Once it reopened, many patients did not return to the hospital to seek care out of fear of future airstrike. One survivor of the incident, who lost her husband in the attack, explained to OHCHR: “I will not go back to any hospital no matter how much pain I will feel.”

\textsuperscript{35} ICRC, Rules 25, 28, 38 and 39.
\textsuperscript{36} Annex III. Such attacks may also violate international human rights law, including International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 12, 13 and 15.
\textsuperscript{37} OHCHR findings corroborate the findings of the internal investigation by Médecins sans frontières, which ran the hospital (www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/yemen_abs_investigation.pdf).
\textsuperscript{38} Annex II, figure IV.
\textsuperscript{39} www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1567351
Further, as a consequence of this airstrike, among others, Médecins sans frontières evacuated its teams from six hospitals in Sa‘ada and Hajjah governorates.40

Education facilities and cultural sites

54. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, more than half of the schools in Yemen have been damaged in the conflict, with 28 attacks on schools documented in the past year by the country task force on monitoring and reporting.41 Parties to the conflict also occupied and used schools as fighting positions, detention centres and arms depots. The following are two examples of incidents verified by OHCHR in the past year involving attacks on schools.

55. On 13 August 2016, in Juma’a Bin Fadil village, Haydan district, Sa‘ada governorate, an airstrike hit a religious school, killing at least seven children and injuring 19. The children, aged between six and 14 years old, were studying at the time. According to local residents and witnesses, the school was used solely for religious instruction, and no military training activities were conducted there. JIAT reported that the closest site targeted by Coalition forces that day was a weapons store ten kilometres away.42

56. On 6 January 2017, in Al-Khameis area, Arhab district, Sana’a governorate, several airstrikes damaged civilian objects, killing nine civilians, including five children, and injuring four civilians. The first airstrike hit a school, and a few minutes later a second airstrike hit a mosque. The facilities, 50 metres apart and empty at the time, were both damaged. Approximately an hour later, a third airstrike hit a vehicle transporting local civilians responding to the scene to assess the damage. All those on board were killed or injured.

57. Yemen’s cultural heritage has been another casualty of this conflict. Since September 2014, cultural sites, including castles, ruins, shrines, museums and other historical premises, have been damaged. Much of this damage has been incidental, as all parties to the conflict fail to respect and take the required measures to protect cultural property in the conduct of hostilities. Yet, OHCHR has also documented several cases of targeted attacks against cultural and religious sites during the course of the conflict; most of these cases are attributed to armed groups affiliated with Al-Qaida or unknown actors. For example, on the evening of 29 July 2016, in the Old City, Al-Mudhaffar district, Taizz governorate, four armed men were seen leaving an ancient mosque and tomb in the area, just before an IED detonated, destroying the site and killing one civilian and injuring four others when a nearby home collapsed.

vii. Child casualties and recruitment

58. Since March 2015, when documentation began, OHCHR has verified that 1,120 children were killed and 1,541 injured in incidents of armed conflict.43 Continuing the trend of recent years, more than half of the child casualties in the past year were due to Coalition airstrikes. Ground engagements, shelling, landmines and unexploded

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41 The task force, established in the context of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict, comprises 15 United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations.
43 The country task force on monitoring and reporting has documented 1,676 children killed and 2,760 injured. OHCHR is a task force member and contributes its casualty figures to these totals.
ordnance also resulted in child casualties. These casualty figures reflect the nature of the conflict, in that areas where children are present, such as residential areas, markets, schools and hospitals, continued to be affected by attacks conducted by all parties to the conflict.

59. Children also continued to be recruited and used in hostilities, contrary to international humanitarian law and human rights law. Such violations remain challenging to document. Since March 2015, the country task force on monitoring and reporting documented 1,702 cases of child recruitment and use, 67 per cent of which were attributed to Houthi/Saleh forces and 20 per cent to pro-government forces. In the past year, nearly one-quarter of the 488 documented cases were reportedly from Taizz governorate. Around 100 of these children were reportedly younger than 15 years old. OHCHR monitors frequently observed children as young as 10 who were armed and uniformed and manning Houthi/Saleh forces’ checkpoints.

viii. Drone attacks and raids

60. The continuing conflict between Houthi/Saleh and pro-government forces has exacerbated security vacuums that have been increasingly exploited by extremist groups, including Al-Qaida. In its campaign against suspected Al-Qaida affiliates, the United States of America, in cooperation with the Government of Yemen, continued to conduct targeted drone attacks and raids. In one such incident, on 29 January 2017, in Yakla’a village, Rada’ district, Al-Bayda governorate, a night raid by US forces on suspected Al-Qaida operatives resulted in the killing of at least 10 children and five women. The operation also resulted in the destruction of more than 12 homes and public buildings, including a school, a mosque and a health facility. The United States acknowledged that civilians were “likely” to have been killed in the raid.

B. Arbitrary or illegal detention and violations of due process

61. Since March 2015, OHCHR has documented 1,019 cases of arbitrary or illegal detention. Of these, 82 per cent were attributed to Houthi/Saleh forces and their affiliates, and 15 per cent to pro-government forces, with the remainder of cases being abductions attributed to extremist groups such as Al-Qaida and the so-called “Islamic State”. Throughout the conflict, OHCHR has documented 51 cases that may amount to enforced disappearances, with the whereabouts of the victims remaining unknown.

62. OHCHR has conducted approximately 150 monitoring visits to detention facilities since March 2015. Conditions of detention observed by OHCHR have notably deteriorated, with overcrowding, damaged facilities and shortages of food and medicines, all exacerbated by the conflict. OHCHR can rarely access the arbitrarily or illegally detained; the Office relies on interviews with released detainees, family members and lawyers, as well as information from authorities. In all cases classified as arbitrary or illegal detention by OHCHR, the detainees are not charged, do not have access to legal assistance and are not brought before a court. Often, they are held in

46 Annex III.
unofficial or secret facilities, and prevented from contact with their families. In extreme cases, detainees appear to have been subjected to torture or ill-treatment.

63. Since September 2014, the de facto authorities in Sana’a affiliated with Houthi/Saleh forces have engaged in widespread detention of individuals. Those perceived to be opposed to the de facto authorities – including political figures, activists, human rights defenders, journalists or private individuals – have been particularly targeted. Most detainees are held for several days, weeks or months before being released. Some remain detained indefinitely.

64. In addition to targeting individual opponents, the de facto authorities use mass detentions to instil fear among the wider population. Since July 2016, OHCHR has documented at least nine cases of mass detentions, where more than 10 individuals, including men, women and children, were taken in one operation. Most were held for a few days before being released.47

65. OHCHR has monitored two trials of opponents in Sana’a by the de facto authorities that raised serious due process concerns. On 12 April 2017, a journalist was convicted and sentenced to death on charges of spying. He was not notified in advance of the trial and was not permitted to offer a defence. The trial lasted 15 minutes. In the second case, 36 individuals are currently accused in a mass trial, reportedly on terrorism charges. In open court, the detainees raised challenges to the use of video confessions, claiming that they were coerced and fabricated. As of June 2017, the procedure was ongoing.

66. Another development of concern has been the preventive detention of migrants by the de facto authorities. According to the International Organization for Migration, in the past year, authorities in several governorates began to systematically detain migrants, invoking the security implications of high numbers of migrants as well as for military recruitment. OHCHR has also observed this practice during visits to detention centres.

67. In the south of the country, controlled by the Government of Yemen, the official prisons have been significantly damaged and the criminal justice system remains largely defunct. Criminal justice is localized in the hands of militias, security actors and local authorities. In this context, OHCHR has received numerous reports of arbitrary detention and possible enforced disappearances and torture. In 2017, allegations have mounted against both the Hadrami Elite Forces in Hadramaut governorate and the Security Belt in Aden, both Yemeni armed elements that have emerged in the past year, supported by Coalition members. Although enjoying limited access to detention facilities in the south, OHCHR has verified 46 cases of arbitrary detention in the past year in Hadramaut and Aden.

C. Violations of freedom of expression

68. Since the beginning of the conflict, an effective campaign of repression has been waged by both the de facto authorities in Sana’a and the Government against journalists, activists and other civil society members through restrictions on freedom of expression, intimidation, arbitrary and illegal detentions, enforced disappearances and killings.

47 Annex I.
69. Since 2015, the de facto authorities in Sana’a have blocked 21 news websites, censored seven television channels and banned 18 newspapers from publication. Moreover, they have raided or closed the premises of 52 human rights and civil society organizations. Pro-government forces have censored seven television channels and raided seven organizations. As a consequence of this repression, few avenues remain for free expression and a chilling effect has led to self-censorship. Many activists have left the country for fear of reprisals.

70. In a disturbing development, as of December 2016, the Coalition has prevented the United Nations from providing journalists seats on its flights into the country; this extended to international human rights organizations in May 2017. Combined with the ban on commercial flights into Sana’a, these restrictions have minimized coverage of the conflict in the international media.48

71. Individual journalists and activists have borne the brunt of this repression, with 74 arbitrarily or illegally detained by all parties. As of June 2017, at least 16 journalists remained detained, all by the de facto authorities. In one notable case, nine journalists taken by the de facto authorities in a single raid on 9 June 2015 in Sana’a remain in custody. The journalists were held for months incommunicado, and have been denied family visits at various stages as they have been transferred between different facilities. OHCHR is concerned that these and other detainees face a serious risk of torture or ill-treatment.

D. Violations of freedom of religion

72. The de facto authorities in Sana’a have targeted the Baha’i community in Yemen in what appears to amount to “a persistent pattern of persecution”, including raids, arrests and prolonged arbitrary or illegal detentions.49 In the past year, OHCHR documented a mass arrest of 22 Baha’i, including women and children, at a public community event in Sana’a in August 2016; the arrest of three Baha’i men in Al-Hudaydah and Sana’a, in April 2017; and threatening phone calls to tens of Baha’i in Sana’a from the prosecutor of the ‘Specialized Criminal Court’, pressuring them to recant their faith or be subject to arrest, in April 2017.

73. As of June 2017, five Baha’i remain in detention. One of them has been held for nearly four years, accused of apostasy, which carries the death penalty.

74. Although most Baha’i in Yemen live in areas controlled by the de facto authorities, the persecution of Baha’i is not limited to those authorities. On 17 January 2017, two Baha’i men attempting to leave the country were detained by security officials at Aden international airport. They were moved from the airport and their whereabouts remain unknown, despite OHCHR inquiries.

E. Sexual and gender-based violence

75. The ongoing conflict has exacerbated the entrenched inequalities faced by women and girls in Yemen, leading to increased vulnerability. The breakdown of formal and informal protection mechanisms, together with large-scale displacement, have given

48 As of 23 June 2017, there were no signs that the Government of Yemen would allow journalists into the country.
rise to negative coping strategies, particularly child marriage. More than two-thirds of Yemeni females marry before the age of 18, compared to half before the conflict.\textsuperscript{50}

76. Sexual and gender-based violence is under-reported owing to the stigma and risks associated with reporting. While no statistics are available, some information received by OHCHR indicates that migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons and detainees are all at increased risk of such violence.

F. Violations of economic and social rights

77. The ongoing armed conflict has negatively impacted a range of economic and social rights, including the right to food, housing, education, health and water and sanitation. The imposition of sieges, blockades and restrictions on movement imposed by the parties to the conflict have had a severe impact on the availability of goods and services and their accessibility by the civilian population. Public and private infrastructure has collapsed and access to basic services remains low or non-existent. Factories and farms have been damaged, and food imports restricted. The non-payment of public sector salaries for most of the past year, and the economic uncertainty caused by the Government’s re-location of the central bank to Aden, have further exacerbated the situation. Teachers, doctors and sanitation workers – and therefore schools, hospitals and city streets – are all affected. Less than half of the health facilities are functional. Many people cannot purchase medicine or food, even where they are available. These circumstances have accelerated the spread of cholera and other diseases, and have increased the risk of famine. The population in Yemen is increasingly impoverished, hungry, displaced, sick, injured and/or dying, and people face a desperate situation.

VII. Accountability

78. Impunity is both a cause and consequence of the current conflict in Yemen. The 2011 crisis and the eventual failure of the National Dialogue Conference were in part due to the unwillingness of the parties in Yemen, as well as the international community, to pursue accountability for past crimes and human rights violations and abuses.

79. International human rights law and international humanitarian law include obligations to investigate violations, to ensure the perpetrators are brought to justice and to provide victims with full and effective reparation. Despite the ongoing armed conflict, there have been some developments in this regard.

80. In August 2016, the Coalition forces announced the establishment of an investigative mechanism, JIAT, comprised of 14 individuals with military and legal experience from member States.\textsuperscript{51} As of June 2017, JIAT had released the findings on the Coalition’s compliance with international humanitarian law in 21 airstrikes since March 2015.\textsuperscript{52} In all but one of these cases, it found that the Coalition was pursuing a legitimate military objective. Without necessarily acknowledging wrongdoing, JIAT suggested the Coalition should pay compensation or offer assistance to the victims in five incidents, and take action against those responsible in two incidents. OHCHR has

\textsuperscript{50} \url{www.unicef.org/videoaudio/PDFs/Yemen_2_Years_-_children_falling_through_the_cracks_FINAL.pdf}
\textsuperscript{51} \url{www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1524799}
\textsuperscript{52} \url{www.spa.gov.sa}
requested more clarity and transparency on JIAT, including in a meeting between the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights and representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia held on 3 May 2017, in Geneva. Based on a review of the limited available JIAT findings, OHCHR is concerned that JIAT appears to accept assertions that an intended target was a legitimate military objective as sufficient justification for carrying out attacks that result in civilian casualties and damage or destruction of civilian objects. Critically, to date, there appear to have been no concrete actions taken on either prosecutions or on reparations to the victims and survivors of such incidents.

81. On 22 June 2017, with Presidential Decree No. 115, the Government of Yemen opened an investigation into alleged torture and enforced disappearances by the United Arab Emirates and its allied Yemeni forces in the country’s south.53 As of mid-August 2017, the six-member committee had not yet released its findings.

82. As far as OHCHR is aware, efforts by Houthi/Saleh forces to pursue accountability for violations and abuses are limited to a single incident. On 31 July 2016, in Sha’ab Al-Shaqab valley, Al-Malagim district, Al-Bayda governorate, Houthi/Saleh forces killed four influential sheiks. That day a group of armed men affiliated with Houthi/Saleh forces came to the homes of the tribal leaders in Al-Omer area, Dhi Na’im district, making demands. When the sheiks did not acquiesce, they were abducted from their homes and taken to the valley 20 kilometres away. Their bodies were found there three days later. An autopsy reportedly determined they had been killed by multiple gunshot wounds, many to the back. As a result of significant outrage within the community, criminal charges were filed against three of the individuals involved. As of June 2017, the case remained pending.

83. OHCHR acknowledges these efforts towards accountability by the parties to the conflict, but notes that they are wholly insufficient to respond to the gravity of violations and abuses continuing every day in Yemen.

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

84. The perpetuation of the conflict and its consequences on the population in Yemen continue to be devastating, with Yemen currently the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.54 At least 4,980 civilians have been killed and more than 8,540 injured since the beginning of the conflict. Millions, particularly the most vulnerable, face threats of cholera, famine and displacement. The economy teeters on the brink of collapse.

85. The conflict has given rise to unrelenting allegations of violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law. The degeneration of the situation has created security vacuums that are increasingly exploited, including by new armed groups in the south and groups affiliated with Al-Qaida.

86. The High Commissioner recognizes the attempts of the National Commission in documenting and reporting on violations and abuses. However, the National Commission is not perceived to be impartial and, in the absence of its recognition by all parties to the conflict, cannot deliver comprehensive, impartial reporting on the human rights situation in Yemen.

53 www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-abuse-idUSKBN19F08D?hl=0
87. The High Commissioner reiterates his call to the parties to the conflict and the international community to cease hostilities, reach a negotiated and durable solution to the conflict, adhere to the principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief.

88. In this context, the High Commissioner urges all relevant actors to immediately implement all prior recommendations contained in the 2016 report of the High Commissioner to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/33/38, paras. 71-74).

89. In accordance with the findings of this report and the overwhelming circumstances that continue to prevail in Yemen, the High Commissioner repeats his call upon the international community to establish an international, independent investigative body to carry out comprehensive investigations of violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen.
Annex

I. Additional Information

Additional Information on the Humanitarian Situation

90. Since 27 April 2017, a cholera epidemic has swept through Yemen at an unprecedented scale. As of mid-August 2017, there were more than 500,000 suspected cases and 1,930 related deaths across the country. More than a third of all suspected cases affect children. The risk of the epidemic spreading further is significant, as health and sanitation systems have collapsed or are unable to cope. Nearly half of all health facilities are non-functional, with 14.8 million people lacking access to basic health care, and 14.5 million people without consistent access to clean water and sanitation. A child under the age of five dies in Yemen every 10 minutes of a preventable disease, such as cholera, measles or polio.

91. The current level of hunger in Yemen is also unprecedented. As of June 2017, 17.1 million people in the country are food insecure. Of these, 7.3 million – more than one in four – are severely food insecure, meaning they rely entirely on external assistance and are on the brink of famine. In a country that was previously nearly 90 per cent dependent on imported food, there is no longer enough. Where food is available in the markets, people cannot afford it. Such malnutrition increases susceptibility to disease.

92. More than three million people have fled their homes seeking safety during the conflict; one million of them have returned home, but often to find their homes and livelihoods destroyed, as well as lurking threats of unexploded ordnance. Of the two million who remain displaced, 81 per cent have been displaced for more than one year. Nearly 75 per cent of the displaced people come from Taizz, Hajjah and Sa’ada governorates and Sana’a city, where conflict has hit the hardest.

Additional Shelling Incidents

93. On 5 July 2016, in Marib city, Marib governorate, mortar shelling struck a residential neighbourhood, killing eight children and injuring 12 other civilians, including two women and seven children. Witnesses told OHCHR that the shelling came from an area 25 kilometres to the west where Houthi/Saleh forces were positioned. At the time, pro-government forces controlled Marib city. Local residents told OHCHR that a military camp was located about three kilometres to the east of the area impacted. In addition to the civilian casualties, five homes were totally damaged and 30 were partially destroyed as a result of the attack.

94. On 16 January 2017, in Al-Mawjer village, Maqbanah district, Taizz governorate, mortar shelling struck a residential building, killing five civilians, including two children and two women, and injuring five civilians - two women and three children. The house was completely destroyed. Witnesses told OHCHR that the mortar came from the mountain controlled at the time by Houthi/Saleh forces, while the area affected was controlled by pro-government forces.

95. On 1 February 2017, in Majzar district, Marib governorate, two mortar shells struck Al Khaniq IDP camp, killing two civilians and injuring four others, including two

All information in this section provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
women and two children. According to witnesses, the shelling, which struck three tents inside the camp, came from the Sareem area controlled by the Houthi/Saleh forces in a neighbouring district.

96. On 12 February 2017, in Qa’atabah city, Qa’atabah district, Al-Dhale’ governorate, mortar shelling struck a residential area, injuring four civilians, including three children. The children had been playing in front of their home at the time. Two of the injured, the adult and one girl, succumbed to their injuries the following day. At the time, the city was controlled by pro-government forces and, according to local authorities, the shelling was launched from the area controlled by the Houthi/Saleh forces.

97. On 24 February 2017, in Al-Mujama’a area, Marib city, Marib governorate, mortar shelling struck a restaurant, killing three civilians, including one child, and injuring 12 civilians, including one child. According to witnesses, the shelling came from the Heylan mountain, which was controlled at the time by the Houthi/Saleh forces.

Additional Airstrike Incidents

98. On 7 August 2016, in Al-Madeed village, Nihm district, Sana’a governorate, two airstrikes hit residential and commercial buildings, killing 16 civilians, including seven children, and injuring 24 civilians, including 13 children and one woman. Further, four houses were damaged and a pharmacy was destroyed. At around 7.00 p.m., the first strike hit two large houses belonging to two brothers. Among the casualties, 29 were members of this same extended family. The remaining casualties were civilians in the vicinity. Two hours later, another airstrike hit a shop that sold cooking gas canisters, causing a massive explosion that burned down the pharmacy.

99. On 9 August 2016, in Al Sofan area, Ath’thaorah district, Sana’a governorate, an airstrike destroyed a food factory, killing 10 factory workers, all civilians, including three women, and injuring 13 more. The bodies were so charred that the victims’ families had difficulty identifying them. Some survivors were stuck under rubble for hours before rescuers could pull them out. OHCHR had previously verified an airstrike against the same factory in January 2016. The factory stood adjacent to a military camp. In its response to allegations of the attack, JIAT reported having bombed military objectives seven to 10 kilometres away from the factory, and denied hitting the factory itself.56

100. On 10 September 2016, on the eve of Eid al Adha, in Bait Sadan village, Arhab district, Sana’a governorate, at least 10 airstrikes targeted the village, killing at least 31 civilians, including two children, and injuring 42 civilians, including four children. According to local witnesses, the first strike hit an artesian well-drilling machine around 2.00 a.m., killing five workers and injuring six more. The airstrikes then continued for the next 10 hours. Many of those killed and injured were participating in the rescue efforts from nearby villages. In addition to the civilian casualties, the airstrikes damaged three buildings used for storing crops, civilian cars and motorbikes.

101. On 20 September 2016, in Al-Mensaf area, Al-Matammah district, Al-Jawf governorate, an airstrike hit a civilian vehicle, killing 15 civilians (three women and 12 children), and injuring three more children. The victims’ bodies were charred and torn into shreds except for the three injured children who had stepped out of the vehicle just a few minutes before the attack. Local residents told OHCHR that the vehicle belonged to a farmer and the victims were on their way to work at the farm.

102. On 17 May 2017, in Shawba area, Al-Wazi’iyah district, Taizz governorate, an airstrike hit a pick-up truck serving as a taxi, killing 16 civilians, including two women and four children, and injuring 10 civilians. According to witnesses, the vehicle was coming from the market at the time of the airstrike.

103. On 17 June 2017, at Al-Mashnaq market, Shad’aa district, Sa’ada governorate, an airstrike hit a house, killing at least 23 civilians, including eight children, and injuring another civilian. Reportedly the house, just a few metres from the Yemen-Saudi border, was used by qat smugglers. According to local residents, those who survived the airstrike tried to flee the house, but came under machine gun attack from helicopters that flew over the area about 10 minutes after the airstrike. Rescuers from neighbouring villages were unable to reach the market for an hour due to continuing insecurity in the area.

Additional Attacks on Funerals

104. In addition to the attack on Al Kubra hall, OHCHR verified two other incidents of airstrikes against funeral gatherings in the past year. The first incident, on 21 September 2016, in Al Hunoud area, Al Hook district, Al-Hudaydah governorate, impacted a residential area in the city center, killing at least 28 civilians, including two women and eight children, and injuring 62 civilians, including 11 women and three children. At the time of the airstrike, civilians were gathering in a tent for a funeral procession of a local resident, accounting for the high number of casualties. The attack also destroyed six houses and damaged 30 more. In the second incident, on 15 February 2017, in Al Shiraa village, Arhab district, Sana’a governorate, an airstrike impacted a two-story house, killing five women and one child, and injuring another eight women and two children. The house was completely destroyed. At the time of the attack, the women and children were participating in a funeral ceremony for the son of a community leader. Reportedly the family of the deceased had no political affiliations. The affected area is residential and surrounded by qat farms.

Attacks on Fishermen

105. OHCHR verified six incidents of attacks on fishermen off the shores of Al-Hudaydah in early 2017. On 3 February, a helicopter gunship fired on the tents and boats of fishermen gathered on an island off the shores of Al-Hudaydah, killing six civilian fishermen and injuring seven more. On 15 March, two different fishing boats were attacked in the waters off Al-Hudaydah. The first boat was fired upon by a helicopter, and two fishermen were killed and five injured. Seeing their fellow fishermen attacked, the second boat of fishermen tried to escape from the area but was hit by a projectile fired from a nearby ship, which killed five civilians and injured three. Two of the casualties, one killed and one injured, were boys. The next day, another fishing boat off Al-Hudaydah went missing. The 10 civilian fishermen who were aboard are still missing; parts of the boat were later found burned. On 5 April 2017, four fishermen were killed in an attack on their boat by helicopter. On the same day, another fishing boat was damaged as result of an attack by a helicopter in the same area. No civilian casualties were reported as the fishermen jumped out of the boat as soon as the attack started.

Incidents of Casualties Caused by Explosive Weapons

106. On 8 July 2016, in Neijad village, Al-Qabbaytah district, Lahj governorate, four civilians, including a woman, from one family were injured as a result of explosions along a secondary road. The victims were traveling on foot along the road, which was too small for vehicle traffic. A witness described to OHCHR how the first explosion triggered a second explosion nearby.
107. On 15 July 2016, near Al-Ma'sar village, Damt district, Al-Dhale'e governorate, one child was severely injured when he stepped on an explosive while grazing his livestock.

108. On 9 August 2016, in Wadi Hanna village, Al-Wazi'iyah district, Taizz governorate, an explosive planted in the road killed 10 civilians, including six children, and injured nine civilians, including four children. All of the victims were traveling in the same taxi pick-up truck. The driver had safely used the same route earlier in the day to reach the destination.

109. On 31 October 2016, in Al-Masar area, Damt district, Al-Dhale’e governorate, an explosive planted in the road killed three children and injured another civilian. The children were riding in a pickup vehicle; the driver was injured.

110. On 5 November 2016, in Khour village, Jabal Habashy district, Taizz governorate, two children were severely injured when one of the victims stepped on an explosive while grazing his livestock.

Incidents of Mass Detentions

111. On 10 August 2016, in Sana’a city, forces aligned with the de facto authorities detained 68 civilians, including 22 women and two children, while they were attending a peaceful community event focused on youth development. Around 20 of those detained were followers of the Baha’i faith, including Iranian and Iraqi citizens. The civilians were never charged; most were released within one week. Two men, who were detained after coming to the authorities to seek the release of their wives, were detained for months. One man – Iranian-born and raised in Yemen – remains in detention as of the finalization of this report.

112. On 22 October 2016, in Haqib village, Damt district, Al-Dhale’e governorate, 40 civilian men were detained by Houthi/Saleh forces. Witnesses told OHCHR that the forced conducted house-to-house searches and aggressive raids, arresting civilians perceived as sympathizers of the pro-government forces. The detainees were transferred among various unofficial or secret detention facilities in Ibb, Dhamar and Sana’a governorates, before being released after several days without charge. During their detention, their families did not know their whereabouts and were not able to visit or communicate with them.

113. On 4 December 2016, in Teiab village, Dhi Na’im district, Al-Bayda governorate, Houthi/Saleh forces detained 61 civilian males, including 19 boys. Sixty armed men accompanied with armored vehicles and a tank conducted the operation on the main road, stopping and searching several vehicles passing the checkpoint. The arrested civilians were transferred to a secret prison. The mass arrest came after an attack by pro-government forces on Houthi/Saleh military positions in the area the day before. Reportedly the Houthi/Saleh forces accused the local tribes of the area of failure to protect their military positions during the attack. During the detention, the families of the civilians were not able to visit or communicate with them. They were all released without charge, most on the same day though 12 were released after several days.

114. On 11 February 2017, in Al-Rameid IDP camp, Al-Udayn district, Ibb governorate, 82 civilian males, including seven boys, were detained by Houthi/Saleh forces. In the middle of the night, while the families were sleeping, armed men raided their homes, causing severe panic among women and children in the camp. The mass arrest followed the ambush and assassination of a Houthi military leader that morning 10 kilometres from the camp. The civilians were transported to an unrecognized place of detention where they were held 40 detainees to a single cell. Their families had no access to them during their detention. They were released the following day without charge.
II. Photographs

Figure I
The points of impact at Al Kubra Hall on 8 October 2016

Figure II
The destruction caused to Al Kubra Hall on 8 October 2016

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57 Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 9 October 2016.
58 Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 9 October 2016.
Figure III
Boat attacked the night of 16 March 2017 while carrying Somali refugees and migrants\textsuperscript{59}

Figure IV
The destruction caused to Abs Hospital on 15 August 2016\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 18 March 2017.
\textsuperscript{60} Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 15 August 2016.
III. Infographics

On average, more than 110 people killed or injured per week in the conflict.
Impact of Airstrikes in Yemen July 2016 – June 2017

Selected incidents affecting civilian objects and causing civilian casualties:

- **School**: Haydan district, Sana'a, 13 Aug 2016
  - 7 killed, 19 injured

- **Hospital**: Aike district, Hodeidah, 15 Aug 2016
  - 19 killed, 28 injured

- **Well-Drilling Machine**: Arhab district, Sana'a, 10 Sept 2016
  - 31 killed, 42 injured

- **Boat carrying Somali Migrants and Refugees**: Waters off Al-Mukha, 16 Mar 2017
  - 42 killed, 34 injured

- **Funeral Hall**: Sana'a's off., Sana'a, 8 Oct 2016
  - 132 killed, 695 injured

From July 2016 to June 2017, coalition airstrikes have killed at least 933 civilians and injured 1,423.

*All sources*

Total Airstrikes: 4,583
Arbitrary or Illegal Detentions in Yemen 

March 2015 – June 2017

Arbitrary or illegal detentions by perpetrator:
- Houthi/Saleh affiliates
- Pro-Government affiliates

Total: 831
Total: 154

Arbitrary or illegal detentions of targeted groups:
- Political opponents: 103
- Journalists: 55
- Humanitarians: 41
- Religious persons: 38
- Human rights defenders: 29

Verified cases of arbitrary or illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, and torture/ill-treatment:
- Arbitrary or illegal detentions: 1,019
- Enforced disappearances: 51
- Torture / Ill-treatment: 27

ONCHI monitoring of arbitrary illegal detention statistics begins in March 2015.