

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.4 2011

SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

The year was remarkable for being the one in which the US/NATO leadership finally acknowledged the unwinnable nature of its war with the Taliban and started to take concrete measures to disengage (both psychologically and physically) under the narrative of 'transition' – the first real change in the structure of the conflict since it began. That this realization came as a result of domestic political and economic pressures – rather than from consideration of the impact of the ongoing war on Afghan civilians – does not lessen its significance in ushering in the new strategic reality which will come to define Afghanistan for the coming generations.

The basic contours of that reality are already visible and bear a striking resemblance to previous periods of instability. Kabul and the country to the North and West is dominated by a fragile alliance of former Mujahedeen groups whose claim to represent any constituency broader than their own political and ethnic loyalists is weak. Corruption, poverty and factional violence remain endemic albeit at a less conspicuous level and - although there has been notable personal diversification - the group remains largely dependent on rapidly waning foreign aid to sustain its largesse and avoid internal conflict. On the other side, another loose alliance of religiously (and occasionally politically) motivated opposition groups make daily gains in the South and East using a combination of terror, faith and guile to capitalize on public resentment with Government and win supporters. Now, as then, this leadership too (barely) struggles to control the horrifying violence it unleashes and is itself instrumentalised by the foreign powers it depends on for resources. We all know how this story ended the last time.

Although some analysts see an almost inevitable return to the chaos of the early/mid 90's after 2014, we – perhaps optimistically – believe that things *can* be different this time. First, we do not foresee the wholesale disintegration of Government (in to factional war) any time soon. Besides offering access to some of the US\$ 6-8 billion projected for annual security funding, membership of the internationally recognized government confers a highly valued 'soft power' that provides a strong incentive to stay engaged. Secondly, while we acknowledge the inevitable return to power of the IEA in some areas, we see no reason to conclude that they will automatically parlay this in to an effort to retake the whole country, especially once the underlying justification of the '*struggle against foreign occupation*' has been removed. A key factor here though will be the difference between what the Taliban wants to be, and what it is allowed to be. We expect they are discussing it now, and we will all just have to wait for their answer.

That Afghanistan has arrived at this point again is perhaps a fitting obituary to the seemingly ill-fated US/NATO military mission that - far from being the '*good*' or '*necessary*' war - has in the end proven itself to be an aimless war, hopelessly neglected by its leaders until it was too late to change. The sad reality reflected in this report, and all the others we have produced over the years, is that the only coherent strategy the international community ever had in Afghanistan ...was the one to leave.

Nic Lee, Kabul, Afghanistan

ANSO Director, 2006-2012

The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author.

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

NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Part 1.


NGO TRENDS

1.1 General NGO Incident Trends

ANSO: Total security incidents affecting NGOs per month, all authors, countrywide 2007-2011




ANSO: Total NGO security incidents per year, by author, 2007 - 2011



At 163, the total number of NGO incidents has grown by 20% over 2010 (136) with 61% attributed to AOG, down from 66% in 2010. However the annual count does not show any notable deviation from longer term trends (top). The number of incidents caused

by all authors grew (above right) although those caused by the IMF grew the most and accounted for 9% of all incidents this year (5% in 2010). The data continues to support to the conclusion that violence against NGOs is seasonal, circumstantial and collateral in nature rather than suggesting any pattern of deliberate or targeted attack. There remain notable localized exceptions, however, where NGOs are indeed deliberately killed or injured in premeditated assaults.

1.2 NGO Incident Location



The chart compares the gross number of NGO incidents, caused by all actors (AOG/ACG/IMF), occurring in each province for 2010 and 2011.





Provinces not listed had no recorded incident in either year. A number of observations can be made:

- Incidents occurred in >80% of provinces in both years giving a good indication of the size of the NGO footprint and suggesting that it has not recently reduced.
- Faryab, Balkh and Ghor are the only provinces to be counted in the top five in both years with the per capita density of NGOs there undoubtedly contributing to this fact. In Balkh, incidents are mainly classed as ‘collateral’ while in the other two AOG commanders have taken a deliberately hostile stance towards NGOs in an effort to establish their legitimacy and dominance. At the time of writing these stand as outliers to the norm.
- Severe escalation of the underlying conflict in RC-EAST is visible in the NGO incident trends for Nangahar - which

moved from 9th to 1st place (+183%) due to a rise in collateral damage from AOG/IMF conflict in the east and inter-tribal conflict in the south - as well as in the substantial escalations in Khost (+250%) and Paktya (+700%) where IMF and AOG pursue intense campaigns.

- At the opposite end of the spectrum, NGO incidents have fallen dramatically in Baghlan (-83%) consistent with the drop in AOG attack rate noted after introduction of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) but also following a reduction of road movement in the province after a difficult 2010.

1.3 NGO incident types




The bulk categorization of incidents by type and author (*left*) shows minor growth in most AOG attack types, notable growth in criminal armed robberies and a disturbing new trend of aggressive IMF raids on NGO clinics (*bottom left*). The more nuanced disaggregation of serious AOG attacks (*above*) shows that NGO compound attacks remain roughly half accidental/ half deliberate; that targeted IED strikes are decreasing while accidental strikes are increasing; that small arms fire is more common against individuals (target killing) than it is against vehicles (at a VCP for example) and that AOG attacks that specifically target NGO operated schools or clinics have reduced since last year.


1.4 NGO Abduction/Detention Trends

Detention of NGO staff grew by a gross 220% this year, however, as 140 of the 2011 count occurred in just five cases of mass detention (all deminers) the adjusted growth rate is closer to 20%.


The main purpose of detention remains information gathering and accordingly most victims were unconditionally released, often in under 48hrs. Unusually however, eight persons were killed in captivity this year - in Ghor, Logar, Farah and Faryab - with causes assessed to range from personal enmity to breakdowns in AOG chain of command. We are concerned that such cases will become more common as foreign fighters swell



ANSO: NGO staff abduction/detention per province, Jan-Dec 2011
 (#persons/# cases)



1.5 NGO Fatalities & Injuries



The murder of eight detainees was enough to make it the leading cause of NGO death this year (*above*) however the assessed motivation in each case was sufficiently different to refrain from calling it a new ‘trend’ at this stage.


Targeted killing of an individual was the second leading cause, and growing, with cases ranging from murder of females for involvement in education, personal family disputes through to murder for political statement. The data also shows a sharp reduction in IED related deaths, most likely as a result of less NGO road travel. Collateral death in AOG or IMF attack remains a concern.

There were no deaths of foreign aid workers in 2011 (*above right*) and a nominal increase in Afghan national fatalities. Overall death rate has dropped slightly (*mid-left*) consistent with total civilian fatality trends (*left*).

Part 2.


State of the Conflict

2.1 AOG Initiated Attacks



AOG initiated attacks grew by 14% over last year and demonstrated an enhanced operational tempo - with 64% of all operations occurring before the end of July (compared to 52% in 2010) - and then trailing off sharply once OP BADR ended over Ramadan.

The tactical portfolio remained consistent with 2010, with close range engagements (SAF/RPG) making up the bulk of operations (55%) and IED/IDF operations at 44%. Suicide attacks remained at just 1% of the total yet caused close to 70% more fatalities this year, including roughly 400 Afghan civilians (230 in 2010).




Throughout the year ISAF made a number of statements claiming a 3% reduction in attacks between Jan-Aug when compared with 2010. We are not in a position to evaluate their data but, obviously, we do not agree with their finding and advise NGOs to simply ignore it as practical security advice - a use for which it was likely never intended in any case. We find their suggestion that the insurgency is waning to be a dangerous political fiction that should be given no consideration in NGO risk assessment for the coming year.

Interestingly, our data does find that this years 14% growth rate (what you might call the IEA profit margin) is substantially lower than previous years (*above right*) suggesting that there has indeed been some serious reduction in the effort that the that the IEA is putting in. Whether this reduction has been forced upon them by ISAF or whether they consciously chose it - on the calculus that there is no point sprinting to the finish if everyone else has dropped out of the race - is unknown to us and, we suspect, to ISAF.

2.2 Attack Rate Mapping

ANSO: AOG attack volumes, per province at Q.4 2011

(Please note this is an incident rate map that enables comparison of areas seeing similar attack rates. It is not a threat map and a lack of incidents can indicate AOG dominance (see Nuristan). Areas shaded green are not implied to be safe, particularly those provinces bordered by highly insecure areas.)



The map shows the final AOG initiated attack count, per province, for the whole year overlaid with ISAF Regional Command divisions. As noted in previous reports, the establishment of a 'second front' in Loya Paktya/Ghazni (circled) has clearly been one of the main results of AOG Operation Badr this year. Besides targeting IMF/ANSF, AOG have conducted an extensive campaign to undermine the capacity of local government with more than 600 attacks on District Administration Centers and approximately 40 civilian government workers - including district governors - killed in targeted assassinations. The campaign has impacted NGOs in terms of increased collateral damage and the dramatic increase in detention/abduction noted on p.6. In comparison to the other epicenter of the conflict (Helmand/Kandahar) fighting in these areas (as it is in Kunar/Nuristan) is increasingly characterized by a high volume of cross border combatants. The question of whether these fighters are really under the effective command & control of the IEA leadership will become increasingly critical as the latter moves to formulate a political settlement. In a worst case scenario, the current over reliance on foreign support could backfire and turn the area in to something of a no mans land - defying effective control by either IEA or GIROA - and providing a tactical safe haven to beleaguered combatants from either side of the border.

2.3 Comparative Attack Rates Per Province

PROVINCE	Total AOG OPS 2010	Total AOG OPS 2011	Actual Change	% Change	
BAMYAN	4	10	6	150%	Above Average
HELMAND	1408	2416	1008	72%	
BADAKHSHAN	35	57	22	63%	
JAWZJAN	75	111	36	48%	
ZABUL	353	479	126	36%	
SAR-E PUL	82	111	29	35%	
PAKTIKA	898	1193	295	33%	
PARWAN	84	109	25	30%	
GHOR	84	107	23	27%	
PAKTYA	490	608	118	24%	
HERAT	258	317	59	23%	
KHOST	910	1106	196	22%	
BADGHIS	358	407	49	14%	
FARAH	257	290	33	13%	
LAGHMAN	196	220	24	12%	
URUZGAN	363	404	41	11%	
NURISTAN	64	71	7	11%	
KANDAHAR	1167	1285	118	10%	
FARYAB	296	323	27	9%	
NANGARHAR	505	551	46	9%	
GHAZNI	1544	1679	135	9%	
NIMROZ	109	104	-5	-5%	Reduction
KAPISA	129	121	-8	-6%	
KUNAR	1468	1280	-188	-13%	
LOGAR	265	226	-39	-15%	
BALKH	183	144	-39	-21%	
DAYKUNDI	23	18	-5	-22%	
KABUL	151	115	-36	-24%	
WARDAK	512	383	-129	-25%	
KUNDUZ	355	205	-150	-42%	
SAMANGAN	21	12	-9	-43%	
BAGHLAN	222	81	-141	-64%	
TAKHAR	144	34	-110	-76%	

Table shows the total AOG attack operations per provinces for 2010 and 2011. The 'average' referred to is the countrywide growth rate of 14%. That Baghlan and Takhar occupy the bottom two slots, with substantial reductions over last year, is credited to the impact of the ALP although it is unclear whether this also accounts for the 37% increase in armed crime (far above the 29% national average) in those two provinces. Of nine Tranche II transition provinces, five (Daykondi, Nimroz, Takhar, Balkh, Samangan) saw less attacks than last year with the others all falling in to the 'above average' growth category. At the higher end, the attack rate in Helmand grew substantially as did in Paktika, Paktya and Khost (p.9).

Acronyms:

IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH)

IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)

EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)

SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)

REPORT ENDS

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