The United Nations Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset

James Cockayne, Christoph Mikulaschek, and Chris Perry

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JAMES COCKAYNE is Senior Fellow and Director of the New York Office of the Center for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Previously he was Senior Fellow at the International Peace Institute (IPI).

CHRISTOPH MIKULASCHEK is Senior Policy Analyst at IPI.

CHRIS PERRY is Policy Analyst at IPI.

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### Glossary

**active civil war**  
See *civil war*, below.

**battle-related deaths**  
This measure includes all people, combatants and civilians, killed in the fighting. It does not include victims of one-sided violence (such as the execution of prisoners of war or a genocidal campaign), the victims of increases in criminal violence that may follow a collapse of local authority, persons killed in unorganized violence (such as food riots), or increases in nonviolent causes of mortality (such as disease and starvation) that may result from the conflict.

**civil war**  
A civil war consists of one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that (1) concern government and/or territory in a state; (2) are causally linked to the use of armed force, resulting in at least 500 battle-related deaths during any given year during the conflict; and (3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several nonstate opposition organizations. **Active civil war**: A civil war is defined as active during a given calendar year if twenty-five battle-related deaths occur over the course of that year. For more details see Annex I.

**compliance**  
This notion refers to all conduct (acts and omissions) by an actor that conforms to the requirements of the behavioral prescriptions addressed to them. Conversely, noncompliance is conduct that fails to conform to such requirements. The concept of compliance only deals with the degree of conformity between a norm and the norm addressee's conduct. It is agnostic as to the reasons why this conformity does, or does not, occur.

**demand**  
This term designates any behavioral prescription contained in an operative paragraph of a Security Council resolution.

**postconflict situation**  
In this report, a postconflict situation is defined as a situation in which a civil war has ceased to be active—that is, fewer than twenty-five battle-related deaths occur in a calendar year. This may be precipitated by a formal cease-fire or peace agreement, a military victory by one side, or be the result of an unexplained decline in the lethality of armed violence. A postconflict situation may revert to an active civil-war situation if intense armed violence breaks out again and results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in a calendar year.
Foreword

In recent decades, the vast majority of armed conflicts in the world have occurred within single states, rather than between states. Apart from inflicting great human suffering in the immediate area of conflict, civil wars have major impacts on stability and prosperity throughout the region where they occur. Internal armed conflicts can trigger foreign interventions that, in turn, can spark regional crises and even international armed conflict. Additionally, civil wars can cause failures in governance, refugee flows to neighboring countries, declines in economic growth, and increases in organized crime in the neighborhood of the civil-war theater.

Today the landscape of multilateral conflict management is changing. We are witnessing rapid shifts of influence from traditional great powers to emerging actors within the international system. The global economic crisis accelerated this trend. New conflict drivers—such as climate change—threaten to increase social tensions in fragile states, where illicit and violent nonstate actors exert increasing control over territory, populations, and market share. Seeking to maintain international peace and security in an evolving landscape, the United Nations Security Council must constantly adjust its repertoire of crisis-response strategies. By learning from its recent experiences, the Council can successfully adapt to address tomorrow’s threats to international peace and security.

This report presents the most comprehensive analysis to date of the Security Council’s approaches to resolving civil wars during the past two decades. It depicts a gradual but comprehensive evolution in the way the Council applied its mandate under the United Nations Charter to situations of internal conflict between 1989 and 2006; and it is the first publication produced by the International Peace Institute’s multiyear research project on Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars. This project entails the first systematic review of compliance with all Security Council resolutions adopted in the context of civil wars after the Cold War. It will produce a book combining rigorous quantitative analyses and detailed case studies on this very important topic.

IPI will also publish a searchable online database of all Security Council resolutions adopted in the context of civil wars between 1989 and 2006. The IPI Security Council Compliance Database will document the Security Council’s conflict-management efforts and the civil-war parties’ responses to each individual demand addressed to them during the first fifteen years after the Cold War, from 1989 to 2003.

Our research project on Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars builds on IPI’s past research on the United Nations Security Council and civil-war termination, which culminated in the publication of two important edited volumes: Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (2002) and The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (2004). I am confident that this report and future publications produced by this research project will offer major contributions to enhancing the understanding of the role of the Security Council in responding to contemporary civil wars.

Terje Rød-Larsen
President
International Peace Institute
Executive Summary

This report is the first publication produced by IPI’s research project on Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions. It provides fresh insights from the new IPI Security Council Compliance Database. The report examines trends in how the Security Council has engaged with civil wars since 1989, variations in where and when it chose to engage, and the gradual evolution of the Council’s civil-war response strategies. Future analysis by this project will seek to provide answers to two questions: To what extent do civil-war parties comply with demands issued by the Security Council? And what factor or combination of factors best explains the variance in the level of compliance—e.g., conflict settings, conflict management strategies, or political dynamics within the Security Council?

HOW HAS THE SECURITY COUNCIL ENGAGED WITH CIVIL WARS SINCE THE COLD WAR?

The United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council to engage in the management of internal wars when they constitute a threat to, or their continuance is likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security. Between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council adopted 617 resolutions on twenty-seven out of the forty-four civil wars that occurred during that time. These resolutions specified 1,988 demands to warring factions.

The Council’s practice evolved considerably over the course of this period. During the first eighteen years following the Cold War, the Security Council gradually but comprehensively changed the way it applied its mandate to maintain international peace and security to situations of internal conflict. Between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council moved from a stance of disengagement from civil wars to one of engagement. Once it did engage, the Security Council did not merely seek to end armed conflict; rather, it more actively moved to encourage civil-war parties to reach and implement political and governance arrangements that could sustain peace and prevent conflict relapse. Yet, this evolution of the Council’s practice did not develop evenly over time.

In 1989, for the first time, four civil wars simultaneously figured on the active agenda of the Security Council: the conflicts in Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Just three years later, the Security Council was issuing resolutions on nine active civil wars. In 1993, at the peak of expectations about the central role of the Security Council in a “new world order,” the Security Council adopted resolutions on peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding in more than one-third of all active civil wars in the world. During the same period (1989-1993), the number of Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars increased from three to sixty-nine.

Subsequent crises in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia led to a reevaluation of the Council’s role in resolving civil wars and a period of decline in the Council’s engagement with internal conflict during the late 1990s. Yet after 2000, the Security Council once again increased the frequency and degree of its involvement in resolving civil wars. In 2008, it issued forty-five resolutions addressing eight active civil wars. This means that it formally engaged in more than 40 percent of all active internal wars in the world—a higher share than ever before.

The Security Council not only increased the extent to which it engaged with civil wars, but also changed the manner in which it sought to resolve these conflicts. Between 1989 and 2006, it became more willing to issue complex sets of demands to conflict parties. By 2006 the Council was adopting fewer—yet more complex—resolutions than it did in the early 1990s. Between 1989 and 2006, the average number of specific demands to civil-war parties in each resolution increased six-fold. After 1993, the Security Council adopted more demands addressing governance issues in countries undergoing or emerging from civil war than demands dealing with the conflict parties’ military conduct. This shift toward issues of governance and internal political relations as a focus of the Security Council’s demands to civil-war parties coincided with the Security Council’s increasing engagement with the postconflict phase of peace processes. Immediately after the Cold War, it issued 96 percent of all demands to civil-war parties before a conflict ended. By the mid-2000s, almost half of such demands were being made in postconflict situations.
WHICH CIVIL WARS DID THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESS?

Between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council engaged in the resolution of a growing portion of civil wars. At the same time, it did not address a single resolution to seventeen of the forty-four civil wars that were ongoing during this period (39 percent). Many factors explain this pattern. The Council was deliberately invested with significant discretion in choosing strategies to maintain international peace and security, and civil wars without an international dimension may not be viewed as threats to international peace and security despite their implications for human security. Moreover, regional organizations, individual states, and even nonstate mediation bodies have played important roles in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, thereby rendering it neither necessary, nor perhaps desirable, for the Security Council to engage in every civil war in the world.

During the first eighteen years following the Cold War, the Security Council tended to engage more quickly and more actively with civil wars in Africa and Europe than those in the Americas and Asia. Between 1989 and 2006, 59 percent of all civil wars took place in Africa and Europe, but the Security Council addressed 88 percent of its civil-war-related demands to warring factions in these two regions. The civil wars that figured most prominently on the active agenda of the Security Council in this period were those in Angola, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Georgia.

On average, countries whose civil wars were addressed by Security Council resolutions tended to be less populous and have less military capacity than civil-war-affected states in which the Council did not undertake such conflict-management efforts. There was almost no difference between the level of economic development of civil-war-affected countries addressed by Security Council resolutions and those that were not.

In contrast, differences in political-regime characteristics do appear to bear some relation to Council involvement in resolving a country’s civil war. Civil wars that figured on the active agenda of the Security Council tended to take place in autocratic countries, while major internal conflicts without formal engagement by the Security Council typically occurred in states with a mixed regime (with both democratic and autocratic characteristics). This seems to indicate that the Council’s conflict-resolution efforts were linked to a broader strategy of encouraging democratization in war-torn countries.

Almost half of all civil wars active in the post-Cold War era (1989-2006) had already broken out during the Cold War, and many of them had originally pitted proxies of the Cold War superpowers against each other. At least during the first fifteen years after the Cold War, the Security Council engaged more actively in ending new conflicts that broke out after 1989 than in ending civil wars that continued from the Cold War era.

Post-Cold War civil wars in which the Security Council undertook peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding initiatives tended to be shorter and less deadly than those that were not on the active agenda of the Council. Our findings do not allow us to conclude whether UN conflict-resolution efforts mitigated the harmful effect of those wars, or whether the Security Council primarily addressed the conflicts that were shorter and less costly in human life. However, prior research has tended to support the claim that the harmful effects have indeed been mitigated by UN conflict-resolution efforts.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S CIVIL-WAR RESPONSE STRATEGIES AND TOOLS

Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has developed a diverse repertoire of civil-war response strategies. Borrowing from and adding to its past practice in interstate wars, the Council gradually adjusted its toolbox to fit the special circumstances of civil wars. The Security Council has consistently sought to reinforce emerging peace processes, notably by adopting most of its demands in the context of ongoing peace processes between the conflict parties. Almost half of the demands in Security Council resolutions addressed to civil-war parties requested those parties to conduct themselves according to a course of action to which they had already formally committed themselves in peace agreements.

Peace operations provided a central tool in the Security Council’s civil-war response strategies. As the Security Council increasingly addressed the
political aspects of postconflict peacebuilding, its demands to civil-war parties were increasingly adopted in the context of multidimensional peace operations. One of the tasks frequently performed by peace operations was to monitor civil-war parties’ compliance with its demands. The Security Council also entrusted mandates to monitor their behavior to a range of other mechanisms—including those of other international organizations. Between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council turned more frequently to the stick of sanctions than to the carrot of conditional promises of benefits.

The findings in this report suggest that between 1989 and 2006 the Security Council typically collaborated with a number of regional and other actors as a means to gain leverage over civil-war parties. The Security Council—however unique and authoritative—frequently does not control access to a range of sources of leverage over civil-war parties, such as conditional promises of economic aid, which are often in the hands of other UN bodies, member states, other international organizations, and even the private sector. Yet the salience of these kinds of leverage may have become increasingly important as the Security Council has become more engaged with matters of postconflict peacebuilding, governance, internal political relations, and external relations of civil-war parties, and the political economies in which civil-war factions operate. Consequently, partnerships with other regional and international actors have become an increasingly important component of the Council’s repertoire of civil-war response strategies.

The Security Council faces varied and evolving challenges as it engages in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in countries affected by internal conflict. Increasingly the Security Council is confronted by new conflict drivers, with organized crime becoming more intertwined with civil strife in venues from Haiti to West Africa to Afghanistan, and with climate change threatening to produce new social tensions that may lead to armed conflict. An understanding of where and how the Security Council has been able to impact conflict parties’ behavior in the past will be crucial for strengthening the effectiveness and legitimacy of its efforts to address the challenges yet to come. We hope that IPI’s Security Council Compliance Database, and the future work of IPI’s project on Understanding Compliance with Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars will prove useful in developing such insights.
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the resolution of civil wars has become a prominent part of the work of the United Nations. Today, the large majority of the conflicts on the agenda of the UN Security Council are civil wars. Since 1989, the Council has deployed UN peace operations to twenty-four different countries affected by civil war, imposed sanctions on dozens of civil-war parties, and established several transitional administrations and international criminal tribunals to address civil wars and their consequences. In just the eighteen years after the Cold War (1989-2006), the Security Council issued 617 resolutions expressing almost 2,000 demands to warring factions in twenty-seven different civil wars.

Recent studies have made great strides in identifying the circumstances in which peacekeeping, embargoes, sanctions, and mediation can bring about self-sustaining peace after civil war. Significant attention has also been paid to the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. At the same time, the narrower question of how the Council’s efforts impact on peace processes has not been conclusively answered. We have only a limited grasp on such basic issues as the circumstances in which civil-war parties are most likely to comply with demands issued by the Security Council, or the relationship between the conflict-management tools and strategies used by the Council and the way civil wars have played out.

IPI’s project on Understanding Compliance with Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars seeks to begin to answer these questions. The project involves a quantitative and qualitative review of compliance by civil-war parties with Security Council resolutions during the first fifteen years after the Cold War (1989-2003) in the context of civil wars. The project combines detailed studies of specific cases with a statistical analysis of civil-war parties’ compliance with all 1,531 demands issued to them by the Security Council in twenty-five civil wars. It seeks to provide evidence-based answers to two questions: (1) To what extent do civil-war parties comply with demands issued by the Security Council? and (2) What explains the variance in the level of compliance—conflict settings, conflict-management strategies, and/or political dynamics within the Security Council?

The analysis in this report, and in future results of this research project, is based on a database of all demands issued by the Security Council in the context of civil wars between 1989 and 2006—the IPI Security Council Compliance Database. IPI will make this searchable database publicly available in 2011. To date, this database includes over 1.5 million data points, describing each demand made in any operative paragraph of a Security Council resolution adopted in response to civil wars between 1989 and 2006. The database describes the conflicts, the Security Council’s conflict-management efforts, characteristics of each individual demand-addressee, the substance of the demands and the process leading to their adoption. For the first fifteen years after the Cold War, from 1989 to 2003, the database also records compliance with each demand. While our analysis of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions will only examine the behavior of civil-war parties, the dataset includes the full range of actors addressed by the Council between 1989 and 2006 in the context of civil wars. These include civil society, states, private companies, and regional organizations.


3 The term “civil war” is brieﬂy defined in the Glossary. A longer discussion of this definition is provided in Annex 1.

4 While the data reported in this publication cover the period between 1989 and 2006 (and Figures 1 to 4 also extend through 2009), our forthcoming analysis of compliance with Security Council resolutions will only analyze the first fifteen years after the Cold War, 1989-2003. This cut-off date allows the evaluation of compliance in both the short term and in the medium term, on the basis of numerous primary and secondary sources on the events in question.
This report examines some of the key trends already discernible from this data, even before we examine the question of what factors correlate to compliance. The aim of this report is to depict the Security Council’s engagement in post-Cold War civil wars and not to systematically test any theoretical predictions. It marks the most comprehensive effort to date to quantitatively map the Security Council’s engagement in post-Cold War civil wars.

In its first part, this report describes major trends in the Security Council’s efforts to manage civil wars after the Cold War. The second part compares the characteristics of twenty-seven civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions between 1989 and 2006 with the characteristics of the seventeen civil wars the Council chose not to address through resolutions. The final part of the report looks at trends in the conflict-management strategies the Security Council used in the twenty-seven civil wars it addressed through resolutions between 1989 and 2006. Unless specified differently, all data presented in this report are derived from the IPI Security Council Compliance Database.

Two notes of caution are warranted at the outset. First, it is important to emphasize that the analysis in this report deals only with demands made formally by the Security Council, through the vehicle of formal resolutions. Given the nature of the body, some of the Security Council’s conflict-resolution work—including demands to civil-war parties—may in fact be conducted through more informal channels, and therefore may be beyond the remit of this analysis. Second, since this report only depicts broad trends in the work of the Security Council, the resulting picture necessarily omits conflict-management efforts of other parts of the UN system and of regional organizations, coalitions of states and other actors. This report offers an in-depth analysis of the work of the Security Council in the context of civil wars, but it does not aim to describe all international efforts at ending these conflicts.

Due to time and resource constraints, the scope of this project is currently limited to demands issued in Security Council resolutions. We acknowledge that this restriction omits other means by which the Council conveys demands to civil-war parties, most notably Security Council presidential statements. However, we have no reason to believe that the patterns of compliance with presidential statements would be fundamentally different from those of compliance with resolutions, and we expect that our analysis will also allow general inferences to be made on compliance with presidential statements.
How Has the Security Council Engaged with Civil Wars Since the Cold War?

Civil wars have, since the end of the Cold War, become a major focus of the work of the UN Security Council. With the shackles of superpower rivalry removed as Cold War antagonisms faded, the Security Council became much more proactive in its engagement with civil-war issues. The first part of this paper presents new data that depict broader trends in the Security Council’s engagement with civil wars between 1989 and 2006, including the following:

- movement away from nonengagement to engagement in active civil wars;
- increased engagement with postconflict aspects of resolving civil wars;
- growth in the complexity in Security Council resolutions; and
- increased engagement in the governance, internal political relations, and external relations of countries undergoing or emerging from civil war.

FROM NONENGAGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT

During the post-Cold War era, the Security Council’s approach to civil wars underwent a sea change. Where the Security Council had largely refrained from engagement with civil wars during the Cold War, soon after the Cold War ended they became its main focus of activity.

The first line of the preamble to the UN Charter expresses the determination of the organization’s founders to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” To put this noble aspiration into practice, the delegates to the San Francisco Conference, which established the United Nations, conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Since four out of five wars in the first half of the twentieth century were fought between states, the expectation was clearly that the Security Council’s primary task would be the prevention and resolution of interstate wars. However, the UN Charter also empowered the Security Council to engage in the management of internal wars, when they constitute a threat to, or their continuance is likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since 1945, this “scourge of war” has mostly taken the form of internal strife. Between 1945 and 1976, 85 percent of all wars were fought between governments and rebels, rather than between states. Yet, until the end of the Cold War, the Security Council rarely qualified civil wars as a threat to international peace and security, paralyzed as it was by superpower rivalry. While it did actively engage in the resolution of a few internal armed conflicts, including those in the Congo, in Cyprus, and in the Dominican Republic during the 1960s, it generally refrained from intervening in civil wars.

The end of the Cold War brought a paradigmatic shift in the Council’s approach to internal armed conflicts, with the Council rapidly moving toward a more proactive policy of engagement with civil-war situations. In 1992, at the first Security Council meeting ever held at the head of state and government level, the Council declared that “[s]ome of the most acute problems result from changes to State structures. […] The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security.” This proclamation also translated into the Council’s practice. When the Council undertook efforts to resolve the emerging secessionist civil war in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, it stressed that its engagement was based on the consent of the Yugoslav government. However, it also implied that large-scale fighting causing heavy human and material losses and “consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of the neighboring countries” could constitute a threat to international peace and security. Soon afterward, in its first resolutions dealing with the civil war in Somalia, the Council emphasized the...
“consequences on the stability and peace in the region” as a justification for taking enforcement action in the context of an internal conflict. However, it omitted any reference to transborder effects of the conflict in later resolutions dealing with the Somali civil war, hence considering that “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia […] constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security.” Since then, the Council has repeatedly expressed the same reasoning when it has identified specific civil wars as threats to international peace and security.

The Security Council’s movement toward “engagement” with civil-war situations did not develop in a uniform manner. As the Cold War thawed during the late 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly shared the desire to disentangle from a number of conflicts with proxy dynamics, for example in Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, and Namibia. They turned to the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, to provide a framework for managing this process of disengagement. Early post-Cold War successes in peacemaking and peacekeeping in Cambodia, Central America, and Mozambique led to an unprecedented upswing in Security Council activity on civil wars in the early 1990s. In 1989 the Security Council issued three resolutions addressing civil wars; in 1993, it issued sixty-nine. Figure 1 shows the trend in UN Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars from 1989 to 2009.

In the words of former UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Marrack Goulding, successes in early post-Cold War efforts by the Security Council to resolve civil wars created a “kind of inebriation in New York and a feeling that the UN could not put a foot wrong.” This led to the spike in the early 1990s—evident in Figure 1—in resolutions addressing civil wars. A similar surge is also evident in other indicators of Security Council activity: between 1989 and 1993, the Council established eighteen peace operations, as

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Figure 1: Security Council resolutions and civil wars, 1989-2009

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compared with fifteen in the previous forty-three years. Almost 80 percent of those early post-Cold War missions were deployed in response to civil wars. In contrast, 80 percent of Cold War-era UN peace operations were established in theaters of interstate or colonial wars.

The new-found enthusiasm for United Nations engagement in civil wars was abruptly curtailed by experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. In all three situations, the United Nations was blamed for a failure to restore peace and to attain its humanitarian objectives. These setbacks resulted in a stern reevaluation of the effectiveness of international intervention in civil wars by the international community. After 1993, the annual number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council declined markedly, and so did the number of resolutions addressing civil wars. As Figure 1 shows, between 1994 and 2004, the Council on average adopted fewer than half as many resolutions on civil wars per year as it did in 1993. Between 2005 and 2008 the number of resolutions on civil wars was markedly higher than during the late 1990s and early 2000s, but it remained significantly below the corresponding figure for the early 1990s. In 2009, the number of resolutions addressing civil wars dropped significantly, reaching its lowest level since 2001.

Does this mean that addressing internal strife became a less pressing concern for the Security Council after the mid-1990s? On the one hand, the Security Council adopted fewer resolutions on civil wars after 1993, while the annual number of resolutions on other threats to international peace and security did not undergo a similar decline. On the other hand, the Security Council gradually expanded the thematic scope of its work to include security challenges closely related to internal strife. The Security Council increasingly addressed international terrorism, HIV/AIDS, Africa’s food crisis, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in volatile regions as threats to international peace and security. Moreover, it established an increasingly sophisticated mechanism to monitor and influence the conduct of governments and rebels related to children and armed conflicts.

It also actively addressed the issue of protection of civilians in armed conflict and the issue of women, peace, and security. On each of these topics, the Security Council adopted thematic, as opposed to conflict-specific, resolutions. Clearly these universally applicable resolutions had ramifications for ongoing civil wars even though they did not address specific conflicts. Thus, it would be problematic to conclude that resolving civil war has become a less pressing concern for the Security Council over the past fifteen years. This conclusion is supported by a more thorough analysis of trends in the Council’s work presented below.

ADDRESSING A LARGER PORTION OF CIVIL WARS

The rise, fall, and stabilization of the number of Security Council resolutions dealing with specific civil wars over the past twenty years can in part be explained by trends in global conflict patterns. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2. The number of civil wars in the world peaked at twenty-nine in 1992, up from twenty-three in 1989. Over the same period (1989–1992), the number of active civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions more than doubled. In 1989, for the first time ever, four civil wars simultaneously figured on the active agenda of the Security Council: the conflicts in Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Just three years later, the Security Council was issuing resolutions on nine active civil wars. In 1993, at the peak of expectations about the central role of the Security Council in a “new world order,” the Security Council adopted resolutions taking peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding measures relating to more than one-third of all active civil wars in the world.

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Between 1993 and 2009, the number of civil wars in the world decreased by almost one quarter, from twenty-five to nineteen. Over the same period, the annual number of resolutions dealing with specific civil wars declined by 56 percent. At the same time, the number of active civil wars that saw formal engagement by the Security Council decreased by only 22 percent, from nine to seven. These simultaneous trends explain the growth of the share of active civil wars addressed by at least one Security Council resolution per year.

Figure 3 shows that these trends did not play out...
evenly over time. During the mid- to late 1990s, the Security Council’s appetite for engaging in the resolution of active civil wars was tempered by its recent experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. During those years, the Security Council addressed resolutions to a decreasing number, and percentage, of active civil wars. In 1999, the Security Council started the second surge in UN peacekeeping with the deployment of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since then, it has deployed eight new missions to civil-war theaters, and it has addressed an increasing share of active civil wars. In 2008, for the first time, the Security Council engaged in the management of more than four out of ten active civil wars. In 2009, the Security Council took charge of more than one in five active civil wars. In total, eight active civil wars were the subject of Security Council resolutions in that year—more than at any point since 1993. In 2009, this number dropped by one, but the percentage of civil wars on the active agenda of the Security Council remained very high in comparison to earlier years, at 37 percent.

The growth of the portion of civil wars on the active agenda of the Security Council during the post-Cold War era becomes even more apparent when both active civil wars and post-civil-war situations, which involve fewer than twenty-five battle-related deaths in a given year, are considered together. Between 2003 and 2009, the number of countries undergoing or emerging from civil wars which were addressed by at least one resolution per year doubled, from nine to eighteen. This increase occurred roughly a decade after a previous surge in civil-war-related activity by the Security Council had tripled the number of active civil wars and post-civil-war situations on its active agenda. Figure 4 displays this trend. In part, this trend is due to the fact that the Security Council typically remains engaged with those civil-war situations it formally addressed during their active phase long after large-scale fighting has ended. In addition to undertaking peacekeeping and peacebuilding in post-civil-war situations, the Security Council issued resolutions on a majority of civil wars that broke out during the post-Cold War era. Thus, the list of active civil wars and postconflict situations in which the Security Council formally engages is an

20 Figure 3 suggests that this upward trend does not hold for the years 2002, 2003, and 2005. However, the Security Council was not less engaged in resolving civil war during those three years than at other points during the past decade. In 2002, 2003, and 2005, some active civil wars on the Security Council’s agenda moved, at least temporarily, into a phase characterized by a low number of battle-related deaths, which qualifies as “postconflict.” Thus, the number of active civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions declined while the number of postconflict situations with formal Council engagement significantly increased during these years.
expanding one. What this figure does not show, however, is to what extent and how the Security Council addressed these active civil wars and postconflict situations. These questions will be further explored below.

ENGAGING WITH POSTCONFLICT SITUATIONS

In the early 1990s, the vast majority of all Security Council resolutions were adopted in response to active civil wars, and aimed at ending mass violence. In more recent years, the Security Council has increasingly spoken to postconflict situations, while continuing to remain involved in attempting to resolve active wars. Between 1989 and 1991, less than 5 percent of all demands the Security Council addressed to civil-war parties in its resolutions were issued after the end of fighting. Between 2004 and 2006, however, almost 48 percent of all Security Council demands on warring factions were adopted in the aftermath of civil war. During this three-year period, the Security Council specified more demands on conflict parties in postconflict situations than in the first nine years of the post-Cold War era taken together. This suggests that after the end of the Cold War the Security Council has gradually become much more active in guiding and sustaining peace processes after the end of fighting.

This trend is evident in Figure 5, which depicts the number of demands to civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions adopted during active civil wars and in postconflict situations. It also shows that, with some significant annual variation, the percentage of demands addressing postconflict situations strongly increased during the eighteen years following the Cold War. The Security Council’s formal engagement in postconflict situations almost always followed earlier involvement of the Council in peacemaking and humanitarian relief in the same conflict at a time when fighting was still ongoing. This partly explains why the Security Council’s movement toward engaging with active civil wars at the end of the Cold War occurred earlier than the growth of its involvement in postconflict peace processes.

Historically, the Council has often been actively

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21 Please refer to the Glossary for a definition of the terms “postconflict situation” and “active civil war.”

22 The years 2004 and 2006 constitute notable deviations from this trend. In both years, postconflict situations intensely dealt with by the Council relapsed into active civil-war situations (most importantly, Georgia in 2004 and the DRC in 2006). Consequently, the Security Council’s conflict-management efforts do not constitute engagements with postconflict situations during these years. Moreover, in both years the Security Council addressed certain active civil wars for the first time (most notably, the Sudan in 2004 and Uganda in 2006, through its subregional approach to resolving interlinked conflicts in the Great Lakes region). The Council’s involvement in these active civil wars partly explains why postconflict situations made up a less significant portion of its civil-war-related work in 2004 and 2006.
engaged in safeguarding peace after the end of armed conflict. Indeed, the primary task of traditional peacekeeping missions ever since the deployment of the first full-scale UN peacekeeping operation in the Sinai in 1956 has been to monitor cease-fire lines or buffer zones between belligerents after they stopped fighting. In Cyprus and Syria, for instance, UN peacekeepers have been deployed for decades after the end of fighting between states.

The application of this approach in the civil-war context in the 1990s required the Security Council to innovate. It assigned tasks to postconflict peace operations that went far beyond those of traditional peacekeeping operations and increasingly depended on non-military personnel. On the basis of the consent of the warring factions in Cambodia, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was given the authority to exercise direct control over Cambodian authorities in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, and information, and supervision of and the right to investigate certain other government organs. However, it was never able to fully establish this degree of control. In Croatia, the peace agreement for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium requested that the United Nations establish a transitional administration to govern the region during a transitional period. The UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) fulfilled this task between 1996 and 1998. Little more than one year after the Security Council terminated UNTAES, it authorized the UN Secretary-General to establish an international civilian presence in Kosovo (UNMIK) that continued to work as an interim postconflict administration during the 2000s. While the Security Council has not subsequently granted such extensive formal governance authority to UN missions, it has mandated a number of missions, such as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to support host-government activities across a similarly wide range of governmental functions.

The increased involvement of the Security Council in the postconflict phase of peace processes indicates that the Security Council has moved away from a minimalistic application of its mandate to maintain international peace and security, which would merely seek to end armed violence. In recent years, the Security Council has increasingly sought to entice warring factions to implement postconflict political arrangements that can sustain peace and prevent relapses into armed conflict during the volatile years after the end of civil war. The Security Council now pursues more ambitious agendas in postconflict situations that often include political reform and strengthening state institutions. These strategies potentially offer important contributions to conflict prevention, given that post-civil-war countries confront a very significant risk of deteriorating into renewed war.

Gradually, the Security Council has become more prepared to engage with peace processes after the effective termination of hostilities, to mitigate some of the threats to fragile peace civil-war countries experience during the early recovery period. In turn, this has led to shifts in the content of Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars.

**THE INCREASED COMPLEXITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS**

The decrease in the number of Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars after 1993 masks another significant development: the simultaneous increase in the complexity of those resolutions. As Figure 6 shows, the Security Council adopted increasingly detailed resolutions between 1989 and the mid-1990s. In 1989, Security Council resolutions dealing with civil wars contained only one demand, on average. For every two resolutions the

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26 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, November 12, 1995.
28 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1244.
Security Council adopted, it typically issued a single demand to warring factions and another single exhortation to third parties to assist the resolution of the conflict. Six years later, an average resolution specified more than six demands, four of which were addressed to civil-war parties. Since the mid-1990s, the degree of complexity of Security Council resolutions related to civil wars has remained consistent, though with some significant annual variation.

The DRC provides a good example of the Security Council’s increased willingness to address the fine details of multiparty peace processes during and after civil wars. On average, each resolution addressing this civil war between 1996 and 2006 contains 6.5 demands to civil-war parties. Overall in that period, the Council issued forty-five resolutions containing 295 specific demands to the warring factions. In comparison, the fourteen resolutions addressing the civil war in Cambodia, all of which were adopted before 1994, contained thirty-four demands to the conflict parties in total.

Absent further analysis, we cannot be sure whether the shift in the Council’s approach toward issuing more specific prescriptions in fact increased the institution’s impact on civil-war parties’ behavior. Future work within IPI’s project on Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars will provide insights into the effects of different conflict-management strategies pursued by the Security Council during the first fifteen years after the Cold War. At this point, we can conclude that the increased complexity of Security Council resolutions constitutes a significant evolution in the Security Council’s “messaging strategy.” It coincided with broader changes in the Security Council’s interaction with conflict parties during the 1990s. Since its first in 1992, the Council has undertaken thirty-six overseas missions to conflict regions. During these travels the Security Council often communicated directly and confidentially with leaders of warring factions and regional actors. In total, the Security Council made ninety-nine country visits during these missions. Seventy-three of these countries visited by the Security Council members were experiencing civil war during the first eighteen years after the Cold War. This fact suggests that the Security Council used
missions as a communication channel much more actively in relation to the management of civil wars than it did in other areas of its work, such as the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Security Council members have traveled to the DRC ten times since 2000, meeting a broad range of representatives of the government, rebel groups, members of parliament and political parties, civil society, the media, the UN peacekeeping force, and the field offices of international financial institutions.31

All of this activity suggests that the Security Council not only increased the complexity of its resolutions, which constitute the most highly visible means for conveying demands to conflict parties, but also developed new ways of communicating confidentially with leaders of warring factions. Of course this begs the question: what does the Security Council demand of these actors?

INCREASING ENGAGEMENT ON GOVERNANCE, INTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS, AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY CIVIL WARS

The Security Council’s demands to civil-war parties became more numerous and increasingly oriented toward postconflict peacebuilding between 1989 and 2006. Over the same period, the Council shifted its thematic focus from demands relating to military conduct toward prescriptions on internal political relations, governance issues, and the factions’ external affairs. Between 1989 and 2006, the Council issued resolutions containing 1,988 specific demands to warring factions. The IPI Security Council Compliance Database categorizes demands issued by the Security Council to civil-war parties into twenty thematic types, which range from “military conduct” to “humanitarian assistance/access to victims of violence,” and from “dialogue/reconciliation with internal political actor(s)” to “cooperation with the Security Council or its subsidiary organs.” These twenty thematic types of demands can be arranged into five broad categories: military and law enforcement, humanitarian actions, governance and internal political relations, warring factions’ external relations, and cooperation by them with the United Nations. Annex III provides a detailed list of the various types of demands in each broad category. Figure 7 shows the percentage of demands to civil-war parties issued by the Security Council, broken down by the category of requested behavior and aggregated for the entire period 1989-2006. Figure 8 shows the same breakdown, but on a year-by-year basis.

In Security Council resolutions addressing post-Cold War civil wars, the largest portion of demands (29 percent) addressed to warring factions pertained to governance and internal political relations (see Figure 7). These demands related to issues such as the reconfiguration of local or national government, political dialogue between factions, the conduct of free and fair elections, the management of natural resources, and measures against media broadcasting of hate speech. Figure 8 indicates that the Security Council became gradually more willing to address the political aspects of peace processes in its resolutions between 1990 and 1993.32

In contrast, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the majority of demands issued by the Security Council to civil-war parties related to their military and law-enforcement conduct (see Figure 8). These demands include calls for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces from a certain area, the halt of an offensive operation, or the cessation of the use of landmines.

Calls for cooperation with UN bodies figure prominently in recent Security Council resolutions (see Figure 7). The Council asked civil-war parties to afford security and freedom of movement to UN peace operations, to assist groups of experts in the verification of compliance with sanctions as well as to work with international criminal tribunals toward bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice.

Humanitarian action was the subject of approximately one in ten post-Cold War demands by the Security Council to civil-war parties. However, the humanitarian motivations of the Security Council’s

32 In 1989 the Security Council only issued three demands to civil-war parties. All of them addressed the civil wars in Central America, and each related to internal political relations and governance in the country suffering from civil war. This anomalous distribution is very different from the pattern observed in subsequent years, and it can be explained by the exceptionally low number of demands by the Security Council to civil-war parties in 1989.
engagement in civil wars may not only have translated into demands relating specifically to humanitarian action by the warring parties, but may also underlie the Council’s demands for cessation of hostilities and for conflict resolution.

Finally, it is interesting to note that, during the 2000s, the Security Council has become more willing to issue demands related to civil-war parties’ external relations (see Figure 8). In part, this can be explained by the high prominence of internationalized civil wars in Georgia and the DRC on the Council’s active agenda between 2000 and 2005. However, this trend also indicates a second shift in the way the Security Council speaks to civil wars. In the early 1990s, it increasingly addressed governance and internal political relations in civil-war-affected countries; ten years later, it became more willing to issue demands pertaining to their external relations. These shifts in the thematic focus of the Security Council’s demands to civil-war parties illustrate how the Council gradually moved away from a minimalistic application of its mandate to maintain international peace and security during the first eighteen years after the Cold War.
Which Civil Wars Did the Security Council Address?

The first section of this report identified major trends in the Security Council’s engagement with civil wars between 1989 and 2006, notably its gradual shift from a stance of disengagement from civil wars to one of engagement. It indicated that, during this period, the Council’s civil-war response strategies did not evolve evenly over time. This section demonstrates that the Council’s engagement in conflict management also greatly varied between different civil-war situations. The UN Security Council is a political body deliberately invested with significant discretion in choosing strategies to maintain international peace and security. This section of the report describes the way in which the Security Council exercised this discretion between 1989 and 2006.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DISCRETION IN RESPONDING TO CIVIL WARS

Between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council adopted resolutions addressing twenty-seven of the forty-four civil wars that either broke out or were continuing from the Cold War era. While this means that the Council was actively involved in managing or resolving a majority of civil wars that were ongoing during the period 1989 to 2006, it also implies that a significant minority of recent civil wars have not been addressed by the Security Council. What does this indicate about the Security Council and its role in resolving civil wars?

The Security Council’s selective approach to resolving civil wars is rooted in the UN Charter. The Council’s mandate is limited to responding to disputes or situations which currently threaten, or whose continuance is likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter grants considerable discretion to the Council in determining which situations constitute or may result in such a threat. In some cases, civil wars without an international dimension may not be viewed as threats to international peace and security despite their implications for human security.

Whether the Security Council engages with a civil war or not seems likely to depend on a complex equation involving the preferences of its members (we might call this the “supply side” of the equation) and on those of the conflict parties and their supporters, particularly of the government (we might call this the “demand side” of the equation).

On the supply side, we must remember that the UN Charter assigns a prominent role to regional arrangements, many of which have become increasingly active in resolving civil wars since the Cold War. At times, regional organizations and nongovernmental actors may enjoy comparative advantages over the United Nations in engaging in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. For instance, nonstate mediation organizations may be better able to operate outside the limelight of the international media than the Security Council. In 2005, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) was successful in facilitating an end to the long civil war in Aceh, Indonesia. CMI’s success could, in part, be ascribed to its ability to afford the parties confidentiality and deniability during the peace talks, and to the fact that its involvement in the negotiations could not be represented as curtailing the Indonesian government’s freedom in the discharge

33 Since 2007, the Council has issued resolutions pertaining to two more of these forty-four civil wars. Taking into account presidential statements increases the number of civil wars addressed by the Security Council rather modestly. Between 1989 and 2006, twenty-eight out of forty-four civil wars were addressed by either resolutions or presidential statements. That number includes the conflict in Chad which was also addressed by resolutions after 2006. As of the end of October 2009, the Security Council had formally expressed on thirty out of the forty-four civil wars fought between 1989 and 2006 in the form of resolutions. In 2007, it issued resolutions and deployed peace operations to Chad and Nepal. In the same year, on Myanmar, it issued a presidential statement but not a Security Council resolution.


35 Charter of the United Nations, Chapters VI and VII.


of its internal affairs, in the same manner as the involvement of an intergovernmental body might have been represented. When African regional and subregional organizations have taken the lead in efforts to resolve internal conflicts on that continent, they have often created a sense of regional and local ownership that enhances the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of many Africans. These examples illustrate the important conclusion that it would be neither possible nor perhaps desirable for the Security Council to take the lead role in resolving every civil war in the world.

Moreover, the veto power granted to the Security Council’s permanent members has constrained the Council from engaging in the resolution of civil wars within their borders and in areas of perceived vital interest. For example, it was said to be “simply out of question”* that Russia would admit a UN peacekeeping force to Chechnya. Although the United Kingdom’s “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, and France’s war in Algeria both fall outside the definition of civil war used in this project, it was similarly unlikely that that the Security Council would intervene in those conflicts. In 1997, China used its veto power to delay the authorization of the deployment of UN military observers to monitor the peace agreement in Guatemala, because the Guatemalan government had allowed Taiwan to take part in the signing ceremony for the accord. Two years later, Russia made clear that it would veto any attempt to authorize enforcement action against Serbia to end the civil war in Kosovo.

On the demand side, governments confronted with a civil war may resist a role for the Security Council out of concern that it will “internationalize” the conflict and give legitimacy to rebel movements. They may fear that the Council’s involvement could thereby level the playing field in which government and opposition conduct their contest over political power. Armed opposition groups may, in turn, fear that the Security Council, as an intergovernmental body, will be biased in favor of the government. The weaker side in a civil war is more likely than its stronger opponents to favor the involvement of international actors, such as the Security Council, in the resolution of the civil war, if they expect that the foreign peacemakers will attach equal weight to both sides’ interests. The Security Council indeed often appears to respect the opposition of civil-war parties, particularly of the government side, to its active involvement in the termination of hostilities and postconflict peacebuilding.

Since the degree of engagement by the Council in resolving civil wars seems likely to depend on both supply-side and demand-side considerations, it would be problematic to ascribe all differences in the Security Council’s conflict-management strategies to the political positions of the fifteen Security Council members. Bearing this in mind, we proceed by describing the characteristics of the civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions between 1989 and 2006, and then compare them to the characteristics of those civil wars the Security Council chose not to address.

**VARIATIONS BY COUNTRY**

During the first eighteen years of the post-Cold War era, one in three Security Council resolutions dealing with civil wars addressed the conflicts in Angola, Bosnia, and Croatia. The Security Council adopted 106 resolutions on Bosnia, seventy-four on Croatia, and fifty-nine on Angola. Figure 9 indicates the number of resolutions the Security Council adopted in relation to each of the twenty-seven civil wars on its active agenda between 1989 and 2006.

The number of resolutions does not tell the full story, because some resolutions are more complex and detailed than others. Moreover, some of these resolutions merely fulfilled administrative purposes, such as nominations of judges of the International Criminal Tribunals in the former

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41 The “Troubles” in Northern Ireland never reached the level of intensity (500 battle-related deaths in a single year) that we use to define “civil war” (See Annex I.) The war in Algeria has been qualified as an “extrastate” war. See J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1865," in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, edited by Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972).


43 Ibid.

44 Please refer to Annex II for a full list of all civil wars that were ongoing between 1989 and 2006.
Figure 9: Security Council resolutions by civil war, 1989-2006

Figure 10: Security Council demands by civil war, 1989-2006
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Figure 10 shows the number of demands issued by the Security Council between 1989 and 2006 relating to each of the twenty-seven internal conflicts that figured at some point on its active agenda. It reveals that the civil wars in which the Security Council most actively voiced demands to civil-war parties were not necessarily those to which it addressed the highest number of resolutions.

Between 1989 and 2006, Security Council resolutions spelled out 295 specific demands to the parties in the conflict in the DRC, more than in any other civil war. During this period, this war also took a higher human toll than any other armed conflict. By April 2007, the war had cost between 2.8 and 5.4 million human lives. Moreover, military interventions by numerous countries in the region turned it into a particularly prominent threat to international peace and security. Since 1999, the Security Council has been very intensely involved in trying to resolve this conflict. It issued numerous exhortations to the warring factions to settle the conflict peacefully, and it deployed the biggest UN peace operation in the organization’s history to that point (MONUC). Between 2005 and 2006, more than one-fifth of the budget for UN peace operations was allocated to MONUC.

The Angolan civil war figured particularly prominently on the Council’s agenda between 1996 and 1998, during the fragile peace process between the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). At the end of 1998, the Lusaka Protocol faltered and the end of the peace process led to renewed large-scale fighting until peace was finally restored in 2002. In total, the Security Council issued 263 distinct demands to parties to the Angolan civil war between 1992 and 2000.

In the early 1990s, the Security Council addressed more resolutions to the conflict in Bosnia than to any other ongoing civil war. But even after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in 1995, the Council continued regularly to adopt resolutions on this conflict, urging the parties, among other things, to implement the accord, to cooperate with the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIKH), the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and other international missions. In total, the Security Council issued 108 resolutions in the context of the Bosnian civil war, more than in any other civil war after the Cold War. These resolutions expressed 218 demands to the warring factions of this protracted ethnic conflict.

No civil war outside of Africa led the Security Council to issue more demands to warring factions than the separatist conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia. In 1994, a cease-fire between the Georgian government and the secessionist party led to Abkhazia’s de facto independence and defined a line of control monitored by peacekeepers of the Community of Independent States (CIS) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The majority of the resolutions and demands issued by the Security Council to the warring factions were adopted between 2001 and 2006, a period marked by rising tensions between the parties and the cyclical recurrence of security incidents. While the Security Council engaged actively in resolving the civil war in Abkhazia, Georgia, the international response to the simultaneous conflict in Southern Ossetia, Georgia, occurred primarily through the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

VARIATIONS BY REGION

Between 1989 and 2006, half of all the Security Council’s formal pronouncements on civil wars were addressed to conflicts in Africa. Forty-six percent of all resolutions addressing civil wars, and 55 percent of all demands contained in such resolutions, were adopted in response to conflicts in Africa. The Security Council’s focus on resolving civil wars in Africa became particularly strong between 1999 and 2006. In those years, more than 60 percent of all resolutions dealing with civil wars and almost two-thirds of all demands to civil-war parties expressed in Security Council resolutions were addressed to conflict parties in Africa.


Figure 11: Security Council demands to civil-war parties by subregion, 1989-2006

Source: IPS Security Council Compliance Database, v1.01
Figure 11 illustrates those trends. It contains two separate bar charts, both indicating the distribution of demands to civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions across various subregions. The figure displays the absolute number of demands relating to conflicts in each subregion, as well as the percentage of demands addressed to each subregion by the Security Council in any given year between 1989 and 2006.

In the first years after the Cold War, the Council shifted the regional focus of its civil-war resolution efforts several times. In 1989 and 1990, it spoke primarily to the three interlinked civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. In 1991, the Council’s focus shifted from Central America to Asia and the Middle East, where it addressed ongoing civil wars in Cambodia and in Iraq (which was intimately related to the UN’s enforcement action in Iraq in the same year and Iraq’s interstate wars with Kuwait in 1990 and Iran from 1980 to 1988). In 1992, the Security Council was more focused on the wars in the former Yugoslavia. After 1993, the largest group of resolutions and specific demands on civil wars addressed African actors, with the only exceptions being 1995 and 1997, when the Council was very actively engaged in ending the fighting, and dealing with its aftermath, in Bosnia and Croatia.

Of the eleven subregions that experienced civil wars between 1989 and 2006, the Council spoke most actively to the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. Between 1989 and 2006, 21 percent of all demands to civil-war parties dealt with conflicts in Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Nineteen percent of all exhortations to civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions addressed warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. Sixteen percent of its demands spoke to the parties in civil wars in Southern Africa, specifically in Angola and Mozambique. Fourteen percent of its demands addressed civil wars in the Caucasus, and 13 percent were adopted in response to civil wars in West Africa.

Overall, most of the work of the UN Security Council in relation to post-Cold War civil wars between 1989 and 2006 focused on Africa and Europe (including the Caucasus): roughly four in five resolutions on intrastate war adopted during that period addressed those two regions. Eighty-eight percent of all specific demands to civil-war parties aimed at influencing the behavior of governments and rebels in Africa and Europe. At the same time, Africa and Europe accounted for 59 percent of all civil wars, while the remaining 41 percent of all civil wars occurred in Asia and the Americas.

During the first eighteen years of the post-Cold War era, Europe and Africa were also the regions in which the Security Council took action most swiftly in response to the outbreak of internal strife. Figure 12 graphically depicts this pattern.

Between 1989 and 2006, on average the Security Council issued its first resolution in response to civil wars in the Americas and in Asia twelve and fifteen years respectively after these conflicts broke out. In part, the long time lapse can be explained by the fact that most civil wars ongoing in Asia and the Americas after 1989 had in fact started long before the end of the Cold War, at a time when the Security Council adopted few resolutions in response to internal conflicts.

In contrast, the Security Council responded much faster to civil wars in Africa and Europe. Figure 12 shows that, on average, it adopted its first resolution within seven years following the breakout of a conflict in Africa. Again, the longstanding conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda dating back to the Cold War started long before the Security Council started to regularly engage in the resolution of civil war, and its eventual formal response to these civil wars occurred much later than its reaction to more recent African civil wars, such as those in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. Clearly, the Security Council was quickest to adopt a formal position on armed conflicts in Europe. On average, it took its first resolution six months after the armed conflict reached the threshold of twenty-five battle-related deaths that indicates conflict onset. This fact indicates that the Security Council engaged much more actively in preventive diplomacy in European conflicts than in conflicts elsewhere.

The regional variations in the Security Council’s civil-war management efforts between 1989 and 2006 defy simple explanation. In part, they may reflect the different nature of connections between Europe on the one hand, and conflict regions in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa, Asia, and the
The Balkans, the Caucasus, and, to a lesser extent, conflict zones in Africa are economically, geographically, and culturally more closely linked to Europe than are Asia and the Americas. This closeness may have an impact on Security Council decision-making, because Europe is strongly represented on the Council. At any moment, five to six of the fifteen members of the Council are European, three of which wield a veto. The leverage of the Security Council’s European members in their own and other closely linked regions may have contributed to the relatively strong involvement of the Council in conflict-resolution efforts Africa and Europe between 1989 and 2006. European publics may also have been more sensitive to conflicts in their own or proximate regions, exerting pressures on their governments to undertake efforts to resolve internal strife. In Africa, at least, some of the Security Council’s permanent members may have looked to the Security Council as a high-legitimacy vehicle for their own conflict-resolution strategies, where in other regions they were more willing to work bilaterally or outside the framework of the Security Council.

In contrast, the Security Council’s smaller—and slower—engagement in managing civil wars in Asia and the Americas may also have been affected by the more marked tendency by many governments in those regions to consider intrastate political violence as a matter to be handled strictly within the jurisdiction of the state in which the violence occurs. David Malone provided an insightful account in 2004 of some of the reasons why the Council had not yet spoken to the civil wars in Colombia and Myanmar:

Colombia remained off the Council’s active agenda (although it was much discussed in the corridors, and the Secretary-General fielded several high-quality special envoys on this violent and complex nexus of conflict) because Latin American countries generally supported Colombia’s

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48 Ibid.
reluctance to see its problems “internationalized.” Burma (also addressed by the Secretary-General through the widely admired Razzali Ismail in his role as Annan’s special envoy) has never made it to the Council’s agenda due to a preference by Asian states for noninterference in internal affairs and fears that the Council might become the cockpit for ugly international clashes over the future of Burma between India and China.  

**VARIATIONS BY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL-WAR COUNTRY**

The first part of this section analyzed the question of where the Security Council most actively engaged with civil wars between 1989 and 2006. The following part of this section outlines in which types of civil-war situations the Security Council undertook efforts to resolve major internal conflicts.

The data collected by the Correlates of War project allow a comparison of the socioeconomic characteristics (such as military expenditures, total population, and national energy consumption) of countries experiencing civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions with those of states undergoing civil wars that did not figure on the active agenda of the Security Council. The Correlates of War project designed these variables as approximations of the distribution of power in the international system.  

On average, the national capabilities (a term defined by the Correlates of War project) of countries undergoing civil-wars with which the Security Council did not engage by issuing resolutions ranked 19 percent higher than those of states experiencing civil wars with which the Security Council did so engage. Figure 13 illustrates this difference by comparing the relative national capabilities of civil-war countries during the year before the start of the civil war. This finding echoes prior studies that have found that UN peacekeeping operations are less likely to be deployed when the war-torn country is a major power.

Similarly, the data suggest that the Security Council may have been less inclined to engage with civil wars between 1989 and 2006 where they took place in more populous countries. In comparison to all states, the population size of countries experiencing civil wars that were not addressed by Security Council resolutions ranked 21 percent higher than the population size of countries undergoing civil wars the Council did speak to (see Figure 13). This finding reflects the absence of a formal response by the Security Council to the civil wars in populous countries such as Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines, Russia (Chechnya), and Turkey.

While civil wars on the active agenda of the Security Council occurred in states with lower military expenditures than 58 percent of all other states, the governments confronted with civil wars that the Council did not engage with spent more resources on their armed forces than 57 percent of other countries (see Figure 13). This finding parallels the findings of earlier studies of UN peacekeeping that observed a negative correlation between the likelihood of the deployment of blue helmets and the size of the armed forces of the government involved in a civil war. Our analysis suggests that the conclusions in these earlier studies might be applicable beyond the field of UN

49 David Malone, “Conclusion,” in The UN Security Council, edited by David Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 625. Three years after Malone wrote this analysis, the Security Council addressed a presidential statement to the situation in Myanmar. However, as of August 2010 it has refrained from adopting a resolution in respect of this conflict.

50 David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers, edited by Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972). Two of the variables depicted in Figure 12 represent socioeconomic characteristics that typically change slowly over time (national capabilities and total population), while the other two are more prone to strong fluctuations (military spending and total energy consumption).

51 The Composite Index of National Capabilities Score is a composite variable that is derived from the following component variables: energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population. See Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War.”

52 It would be problematic to compare the absolute numbers for some variables used in this section for countries that experienced civil-war outbreaks at different times. For instance, data on economic development during the year before the conflict starts tend to be lower for conflicts that had already started during the Cold War. Therefore, all comparisons in this section use the percentile of each country’s rank among all countries, rather than absolute numbers, in the year before the armed conflict started. When data were missing for the year before the conflict onset because the civil war broke out in the same year in which a country attained independence, data for the year that marked the conflict’s onset was used.


peacekeeping to other forms of conflict management efforts by the Security Council. States with strong armed forces may tend to have a higher ability to militarily defeat rebel groups than those with weaker armies, thus having a smaller incentive to permit mediation and peacekeeping by the United Nations.55

In a similar vein, the Security Council may have been more hesitant to engage in the resolution of civil wars that occurred in countries with a relatively strong economy than in those with weak economies. Countries experiencing civil wars to which the Council spoke in the form of a resolution had a weaker economy than 58 percent of all other countries (measured by their total energy consumption), on average (see Figure 13). In contrast, the typical state undergoing a civil war that was never formally addressed by the Council had a stronger economy than 56 percent of all other states.

In contrast, on average, countries undergoing civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions displayed only a marginally lower level of economic development than those undergoing civil

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55 Mullenbach, "Deciding to Keep Peace," p. 537.
wars which were not so addressed (see Figure 14). The difference in the rank, among all states, of their energy consumption per capita amounted to merely 6 percent.\textsuperscript{56} This may indicate that, between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council was not biased for, or against, intervening in civil wars in developing countries or those in economically developed countries. This conclusion seems to resonate with earlier findings that the probability of the deployment of peacekeeping operations in countries suffering from civil war is not correlated to the level of economic development in the conflict theater.\textsuperscript{57}

During the first eighteen years of the post-Cold War era, the Security Council tended to be more active in issuing resolutions on civil wars in states with autocratic political systems than on those that afflicted democratic countries. This finding is based on the assessments of political rights and civil liberties in the year prior to conflict onset by Freedom House.\textsuperscript{58} The finding is confirmed by a separate analysis that uses the Polity IV project’s “polity2” score, which envisions a spectrum of governing authority ranging from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed or incoherent regimes of authority to fully institutionalized democracies.\textsuperscript{59}

Figure 15 shows that, between 1989 and 2006, civil wars that were not addressed by Security Council resolutions tended to occur in states that were more democratic than those countries that

\textsuperscript{56} We compare energy consumption per capita (a commonly used approximation for the level of economic development) in the year prior to the outbreak of the civil war.

\textsuperscript{57} Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?” p. 281. Fortna did observe a positive correlation between the likelihood of peacekeeping and higher levels of economic development during the Cold War era.

\textsuperscript{58} Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). The political-rights score encompasses measures for the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of each country’s government in a given year. The annual civil-liberties score consists of separate measures of freedom of expression and belief, association and political rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy, and individual rights in a country.

\textsuperscript{59} This project uses the Polity IV Data Series v.2007. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007 (Center for Global Policy of the School of Public Policy at George Mason University and Center for Systemic Peace, 2009), available at www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf. In Figure 15, a score above fifteen designates a democracy, while a score below five is the common characteristic of autocracies. Intermediary scores are associated with mixed regimes.
experienced civil wars that did figure on the active agenda of the Security Council. Five of the forty-four post-Cold War civil wars broke out in countries assessed by Polity IV as “democratic,” and none of these five conflicts was addressed by a Security Council resolution. At the same time, eleven out of the fourteen civil wars that took place in states with “autocratic” governments did figure on the active agenda of the Security Council. These findings echo earlier research findings that robust Chapter VII missions are more likely to be deployed to authoritarian countries than to democratic ones.  

Figure 15 also shows that the civil wars the Security Council spoke to in the form of resolutions tended to take place in countries that granted fewer political rights and fewer civil liberties to their citizens than states experiencing civil wars the Security Council did not formally engage with. Freedom House qualified the majority of the countries that experienced civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions as “not free” in terms of political rights and civil liberties. At the same time, it characterized the status of the majority of states confronted with a civil war the Council did not formally engage with as “partly free.”

The higher proclivity of the Council to intervene in nondemocratic civil-war countries, both by issuing demands to conflict parties and by deploying robust Chapter VII missions, may indicate that the Council’s conflict-resolution efforts were linked to the broader strategy of encouraging democratization in war-torn countries that was pursued during the first eighteen years after the Cold War. In that context, it is interesting to note that, in 2005, the UN Secretary-General identified “steady progress achieved in building peace and democracy in some war-torn lands” as one of the successes of collective action in recent years.

VARIATIONS BY CIVIL-WAR ONSET

Of the forty-four civil wars that were ongoing between 1989 and 2006, only twenty-four started after the Cold War. Some 45 percent of all post-Cold War civil wars were “legacies” remaining from the Cold War era. The oldest intrastate armed conflict that continued through the post-Cold War era, the ethnic conflict in Myanmar, started in the earliest days of the Cold War in 1948. Seven further civil wars that continued through the post-Cold War era broke out as early as the 1960s, and six others had persisted ever since the 1970s.

During the first fifteen years after the Cold War, between 1989 and 2003, there was a noticeable difference in how the Security Council handled these civil wars that began during the Cold War and the civil wars that broke out after the Cold War had ended. During that period, the Security Council issued resolutions on two-thirds of all civil wars that broke out after 1989. At the same time, the Council issued resolutions on fewer than half of the twenty civil wars that had started before 1989. Between 2003 and 2006, this difference diminished when the Security Council formally engaged, for the first time, in the resolution of civil wars in the Sudan and Uganda, which both commenced prior to 1989. The adoption of resolutions addressing civil wars in Nepal and Chad in 2007 and the adoption of a presidential statement on the conflict in Myanmar during the same year confirm this recent trend toward Security Council engagement with longstanding and previously not formally addressed civil wars, although these events fall outside the temporal scope of this study. The Security Council took the decision to formally engage in the conflicts in Nepal and the Sudan in response to the conclusion of peace agreements requesting international military observers and peacebuilding support. The adoption of resolutions dealing with the Cold War-era legacy wars in

61 Freedom House classifies the status of political regimes in each country as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” It conducts this assessment by aggregating its political rights and civil liberties scores.
63 In 2006, the Security Council engaged in the civil war in Uganda under the agenda item titled “the situation in the Great Lakes Region,” which also addressed the internal wars in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda (see UN Security Council Resolution 1653 (January 27, 2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1653).
Chad and Uganda appear to have been motivated, in part, by the Security Council’s concerns over negative ramifications of the situation in these countries on the conflicts in the Sudan and the DRC, respectively.

The end of the Cold War is often associated with a major increase in United Nations efforts to settle proxy wars that the superpowers were eager to resolve during the late 1980s. Therefore, it may be surprising that, between 1989 and 2003, the Security Council more actively engaged with civil wars that broke out after the Cold War than with those civil wars that were continuing after having emerged during the Cold War era. Clearly, the Security Council’s formal involvement in the resolution of 47 percent of Cold War-era legacy civil wars between 1989 and 2003 was a huge departure from its near-total silence on civil wars during the Cold War. But it is overshadowed by the Security Council’s even greater willingness to engage in efforts to resolve civil wars that started after the Cold War.

In the immediate post-Cold War period, the Security Council was actively involved in ending intrastate conflicts that had been fueled by antagonism between the superpowers in Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. However, it did not adopt resolutions on other long-standing civil wars, including those in Colombia, Myanmar, Peru, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, limits to the overstretched conflict-management capabilities of the United Nations and its partners may have prevented the Security Council from expanding its new agenda of resolving internal conflicts even more vigorously than it actually did. After not having addressed Cold War-legacy civil wars for years, Security Council members may also have found it difficult to convince themselves, the warring factions, and the wider UN membership that those wars should now be considered potential or actual threats to international peace and security requiring a response by the Council. The Security Council did not face these obstacles with regard to new civil wars. Even more than changes in its response to civil wars from the Cold War era, the Security Council’s response to new civil wars can thus be said to demonstrate changes in the way it applied its mandate to maintain international peace and security.

VARIATIONS BY CIVIL-WAR DURATION AND FATALITIES

The expansion in activity by the Security Council after the Cold War has been convincingly ascribed, in part, to the Council members’ increasing desire to help those in life-threatening distress resulting from armed conflict. This warrants a closer look at the question of whether civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions between 1989 and 2006 were more or less severe than others in terms of their duration and number of fatalities.

Civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions between 1989 and 2006 ended, on average, more than five years sooner than those that were not so addressed (see Figure 16). One reason for this difference is that, between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council less frequently engaged with civil wars that continued from the Cold War era than with new conflicts that broke out after 1989. The long duration of these Cold War-era legacy civil wars strongly increases the average duration of the conflicts that were never added to the active agenda.

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Figuere 16: Security Council attention to civil wars by duration, 1989-2006 (aggregate)

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of the Security Council. Yet further analysis is needed to identify in which direction the causality runs: did the Security Council intervene more often in those civil wars that looked likely to end soon? Or did its engagement actually shorten these civil wars? These questions will be addressed in the next phase of this project.

Another way of examining the question of the severity of the civil wars that the Security Council addressed is through the lens of conflict fatalities. At least between 1989 and 2006, the civil wars that were on the active agenda of the Security Council caused almost 9 percent fewer direct fatalities per conflict than those to which the Council did not speak. When this figure is disaggregated into battle-related fatalities and deaths from one-sided violence, it becomes apparent that, on average, a civil war addressed by Security Council resolutions involved 16 percent fewer battle-related deaths and 86 percent more deaths from one-sided violence than the average civil war not addressed by the Security Council. The absolute numbers for battle-related deaths and fatalities from one-sided violence are shown in Figure 17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil wars explicitly addressed by Security Council resolutions</th>
<th>Civil wars not explicitly addressed by Security Council resolutions</th>
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<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Chart" /></td>
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**Figure 17: Security Council attention to civil wars by number of deaths, 1989-2006 (aggregate)**

66 A separate analysis compares the mean duration of civil wars addressed by Security Council resolutions with the corresponding value for civil wars to which the Council did not speak, but only between 1989 and 2006. Thus, the analysis excludes the portion of a civil war’s duration that dates back to the Cold War era because the Council only rarely engaged in civil-war resolution in that period. This analysis shows that, on average, civil wars that were not on the active agenda of the Security Council lasted two years longer between 1989 and 2006 than those in which the Security Council did formally engage.

67 The data on battle-related deaths are extracted from the Battle Deaths Dataset 3.0 compiled by the Peace Research Institute, Oslo. See Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,” *European Journal of Population* 21 (2005). The data on one-sided violence are extracted from the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v.1.3 1989-2007 compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. See Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “Violence Against Civilians in Wart,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007). The measure for one-sided violence counts direct and deliberate killings only, and it does not take into account secondary fatalities such as from famine or disease. This analysis excludes the Rwanda genocide as an extreme outlier in terms of the number of one-sided fatalities. Since the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s dataset on one-sided violence does not extend to the Cold War era this analysis only accounts for one-sided violence and battle-related deaths inflicted between 1989 and 2006. The Glossary of this report contains a definition of the term battle-related deaths.
This analysis does not indicate whether differing fatality rates are caused by, or are instead the cause for, intense Security Council efforts to resolve a civil war. In some situations, UN peacemaking and peacekeeping have had the effect of minimizing casualties. But in other situations the Security Council may have been hesitant to take on resolving the most longestanding, most complex—and most deadly—civil wars. However, this latter proposition is questionable in the light of previous research on UN peace operations, which tend to be deployed to the most difficult cases rather than the easier ones. Still, if the Council’s response to certain civil wars indeed saved lives, it would be more likely that this effect was caused not by issuing the resolutions per se, but through specific actions taken by virtue of those resolutions, such as the authorization of the deployment of a peace operation or the imposition of sanctions that reduced the payoffs of further belligerence for the warring factions. The third part of this report addresses the role of such incentives and disincentives in greater detail.

The Security Council’s Civil-War Response Strategies and Tools

The first two sections of this report analyzed broad trends in the Security Council’s response to post-Cold War civil wars and addressed the question of which civil wars the Security Council engaged with. This final section describes the tools and strategies the Security Council used when it did engage with civil wars.

THE COUNCIL’S EVOLVING CIVIL-WAR RESPONSE REPERTOIRE

In adopting 617 resolutions in the context of twenty-seven different civil wars between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council pursued a wide range of strategies. Since these resolutions represent the results of political compromises among Council members it is problematic to ascribe a unifying logic to any given set of these resolutions. However, it is possible to identify broad objectives that the Security Council appears to have pursued in different cases and at different times. In some situations, the Security Council’s primary focus seems to have been limited to the containment of spillover effects to other countries or to the provision of humanitarian aid to civilian war victims. In other instances, the Security Council pursued more far-reaching strategies to end hostilities and address the underlying political or economic conflicts that provoked them. In yet other cases, the Security Council may have been motivated primarily by the desire of some members simply to be perceived as “doing something” in response to a mounting crisis.

Of course, the Security Council’s strategy for dealing with a given civil war often changes over time, both in response to the internal dynamics of the civil war and external power shifts. In Bosnia, for instance, an adjustment in the Security Council’s approach is discernible in the summer of 1995. Prompted by the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, the withdrawal of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops from areas of acute vulnerability, and the opening for peace resulting from the weakening of the military position of the Bosnian Serbs, the Security Council moved from its focus on containment and harm minimization to a more proactive pursuit of conflict termination.69 Additionally, every year, one-third of the Security Council’s members are newly elected, bringing fresh perspectives to its internal discussions and strategy development.

For all these reasons, it would be difficult, if not futile, for the Council to develop templates for dealing with different conflicts. The Security Council instead has an evolving repertoire of strategies that it can draw upon, combining different tools drawn from a diverse and expanding “toolbox.” In recent years, multidimensional peacekeeping, targeted sanctions, and international criminal prosecution have been added to its arsenal.

The Security Council has amassed considerable experience in the use of these tools. On occasion, it has moved to commit to paper some of its collective thoughts on its crisis-response strategies. For instance, in 1994 the Council listed six specific factors it would take into account when considering the establishment of new peace operations, “without prejudice to its ability … to respond rapidly and flexibly as circumstances require” and “on a case-by-case basis.”70 It has also adopted, and updated, an aide-memore to assist Council members in considering including the protection of civilians in armed conflict in mandates for peacekeeping operations.71 The annual “Hitting the Ground Running” workshop hosted by Finland for newly elected and current members of the Security Council aims at assessing lessons learned, and it usually stimulates broad discussion of the Council’s repertoire of crisis-response strategies.72

UN Secretaries-General have also prompted informed reflection by the Security Council on the development of its repertoire of crisis-response strategies. Secretaries-General have issued reports,

often at the Security Council’s request,73 and convened panels whose findings inspire and guide the Council’s crisis-response strategies.74 Initiatives driven by the wider UN membership have also had major impacts on the Security Council’s repertoire of crisis-management strategies. For instance, the Interlaken Process, the Bonn/Berlin Process, and the Stockholm Process, all addressing aspects of the imposition and implementation of financial sanctions, arms embargoes, and travel- and aviation-related sanctions, have all had a significant impact on Security Council practice in this area.75

The following parts of this section focus on four particular aspects of the Council’s repertoire of responses to civil war. In turn, they address the adoption of Security Council resolutions to reinforce existing or emerging peace processes between conflict parties, to authorize peace operations, to establish mechanisms monitoring compliance with the Council’s demands to civil-war parties, and to employ various incentives, threats, and sanctions. Future outputs of this project will provide insights about the impact of these various strategies on civil-war parties’ compliance with Security Council demands.

REINFORCING EXISTING PEACE PROCESSES—BOTH DURING AND AFTER CIVIL WAR

The IPI Security Council Compliance Database suggests that the Security Council’s engagement in the resolution of civil wars often takes the form of an iterative process designed to reinforce the bargaining under way between civil-war parties and to support the implementation of agreements they conclude. The language used in Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars reflects a strong linkage between the Council’s work and ongoing peace processes. Between 1989 and 2006, some 44 percent of all demands the Council addressed to civil-war parties merely requested that they behave as some or all of them had already formally committed themselves to do in an earlier peace agreement. Thus, almost half of the Security Council’s demands repeat specific stipulations in accords concluded by the civil-war factions. Those prior commitments include truces, agreements on cessation of hostilities, cease-fire and armistice, preliminary agreements, pre-negotiation agreements, framework agreements, interim agreements, sub-agreements,76 comprehensive agreements, and implementation agreements.77

As with other patterns in the Security Council’s responses to civil wars between 1989 and 2006, the emphasis on reiteration of parties’ prior commitments has not been uniform over time. Figure 18 shows that between 1990 and 1995, four in ten Security Council demands to civil-war parties reiterated prior commitments. Between 1996 and 2000, 55 percent of such demands repeated stipulations in earlier peace agreements. During this period, a significant amount of the Council’s civil-war-related work focused on Angola, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Georgia after peace agreements—however precarious—had been concluded. On the contrary, between 2001 and 2006, the percentage of demands requiring conduct to which parties had already committed reverted to 1990-1995 levels, with some annual variation.

Figure 19 shows how the Security Council’s reiteration of parties’ existing commitments varied by civil war, reflecting a wide range of civil-war settings and Security Council conflict-resolution strategies. Most of the resolutions addressing the civil wars in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador called on the civil-war parties to swiftly implement the peace agreements that had previously been

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76 Sub-agreements are stand-alone agreements on a particular issue that are part of a larger and more comprehensive agreement. They are usually negotiated separately and after the framework agreement has been established. See, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, “UN Peacemaker,” 2009, available at http://peacemaker.unlb.org.
Figure 18: Security Council demands reiterating prior commitments by civil-war parties, 1989-2006

Figure 19: Security Council demands reiterating prior commitments by civil-war parties by civil war, 1989-2006 (aggregate)
mediated by the Contadora Group, the Group of Eight, and the Friends of El Salvador, as well as Alvaro de Soto, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Salvadoran Peace Process. The Security Council deliberately left an extremely light footprint on the design of the Central American civil-war settlement, choosing instead to use its weight to lend ballast to settlements negotiated outside the Security Council. The Security Council’s efforts during the civil wars in Yemen and Iraq in the early 1990s are examples of the opposite tendency. In both situations, the Council intervened by issuing resolutions in the absence of a peace process between the parties.

The Security Council’s emphasis on reiterating existing commitments was only slightly higher after civil-war termination than during the civil war. Both during and after the end of civil wars, between 44 and 45 percent of all demands in Security Council resolutions reiterated the parties’ prior commitments. This similarity might seem counter-intuitive: during the postconflict period, the Security Council might be expected to call primarily for the implementation of peace agreements being put in place by the parties. In fact, the Security Council’s postconflict activities are often represented in that light. Its resolutions on ongoing conflicts are sometimes described as instruments calling for cease-fires, respect of international humanitarian law, and access for aid groups and other actions that many civil-war parties would only consent to as hostilities wind down. The finding presented here contradicts those perceptions, suggesting that the Security Council was almost as likely, between 1989 and 2006, to look to parties’ existing commitments during civil wars as it was to refer to them after a civil war had terminated.

This finding can be explained in three ways. First, even in the midst of civil war, warring factions often make formal commitments in cease-fires and interim agreements. The Security Council then uses these as building blocks for a broader push toward peace, reminding the parties of their pledges. Second, in recent years Security Council resolutions have played an important role in postconflict peacebuilding processes, which extends beyond urging compliance with peace agreements. As explained in the first section above, in many postconflict situations the Security Council has addressed matters of governance and internal political relations in ways that may go beyond the terms of any peace settlement, even if its goal is to reinforce the peace process between the parties. The Security Council seems at times to have helped the parties fill gaps in peace agreements or restructure the peace process in response to shifts in the situation on the ground. Third, this finding may be due to a selection effect.

If the parties commit to a cease-fire but do not honor it, such that the civil war remains active, the Security Council will issue additional demands during the active civil war that the parties cease fire. If the parties commit to a cease-fire and do honor it, the Security Council need not issue further demands repeating their previous commitment to cease fire but can move on to addressing other aspects of parties’ behavior in the early recovery period.

Given that almost half of the Security Council’s demands to civil-war parties do not entail any new obligations, what is their added value? The added value of such pronouncements by the Council may manifest itself through four causal mechanisms.

First, the reiteration of existing commitments in a Security Council resolution raises the reputational costs of deviating from those commitments, because of the public, high-profile nature of such a reiteration and political—if not legal—force such a reiteration places on compliance. Civil-war parties

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79 See UN Security Council Resolution 924 (June 1, 1994), UN Doc. S/RES/924, and UN Security Council Resolution 931 (June 29, 1994), UN Doc. S/RES/931, which called on the parties to the civil war in Yemen to cease fire. Also refer to UN Security Council Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991), UN Doc. S/RES/688, UN Security Council Resolution 706 (August 15, 1991), UN Doc. S/RES/706, and UN Security Council Resolution 712 (September 19, 1991), UN Doc. S/RES/712, which addressed the civil war involving the Iraqi government, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).


81 The authors thank Virginia Page Fortna for sharing this analysis with them.
eager to signal—to each other—their commitment to implement a peace agreement can seek the adoption of a Security Council resolution endorsing the agreement as a way to show their willingness to raise the cost of later noncompliance.

Second, the Security Council’s seal of approval on a peace agreement might also send a positive signal to providers of external political, military, and financial assistance to peace processes, opening the door to greater benefits from compliance. Often, the Council attaches an appeal for external support for peace processes to a resolution calling on civil-war parties to live up to their commitments. Council resolutions reiterating prior commitments may increase the expected benefit for civil-war parties from implementing the agreement.

Third, the highly visible endorsement of the settlement terms of a peace agreement through a Security Council resolution may give potential spoilers additional incentives to participate in the agreement. It signals that the international community considers certain settlement terms that were reiterated in the resolution as forming the basis for peace. Actors who are sitting on the sidelines of a peace process may fear being left behind by the “departing train” if they do not get on board the peace process.82

Fourth, Security Council resolutions reiterating prior commitments of the parties may sometimes reduce the domestic political costs incurred by them in the course of implementing hard compromises. Their constituencies may find it easier to make difficult policy changes in response to demands by the Security Council rather than in direct response to a deal with previously vilified adversaries.

PEACE OPERATIONS: A CENTRAL BUT CHANGING ROLE

The deployment of blue helmets has long been a key instrument in the Security Council’s civil-war response repertoire. During the Cold War, the Council deployed three peacekeeping and enforcement missions in the context of intrastate conflicts. Since 1989, it has dramatically increased its use of peace operations in the context of internal conflicts, sending blue helmets to twenty-four civil-war theaters so far.

Between 1989 and 2006, almost four out of five Security Council demands to civil-war parties were issued at a time when a UN peace operation was mandated for or deployed in the conflict theater, on average. Even in 1999, when the number of

uniformed UN personnel deployed in civil-war theaters reached its post-Cold War low point, almost six in ten demands addressed civil-war theaters where UN peace operations were stationed. Figure 20 depicts this trend.

UN peace operations often constitute a powerful tool for the Security Council to entice civil-war parties into complying with its demands. Peace operations also offer comparatively objective information to the civil-war parties about compliance with cease-fires, other agreements, and Security Council demands. Thus they can mitigate the fear, uncertainty, and mistrust pervasive among civil-war parties. Peace operations therefore may make it easier for civil-war parties to comply with the Security Council’s calls for cease-fires and for conflict settlement. Peace operations that are authorized to use force in defense of their mandates, may also be able to raise the cost of noncompliance, deterring and confronting aggressive spoiler tactics. Enforcement operations may be particularly capable of fulfilling this task, but Chapter VI peacekeeping operations may also make aggression more costly for civil-war parties. By monitoring troop movements, peace operations may make surprise attacks more difficult. Chapter VI missions can also serve as a trip wire that potentially leads the Security Council to assign a more robust mandate to the mission or to authorize enforcement action to counter hostile acts. Peace operations may also offer various forms of “peace dividends” by launching quick-impact projects (QIPs), providing direct benefits to ex-combatants, supporting reforms of national security and justice sector institutions, delivering humanitarian aid, offering employment, and attracting media attention and international aid. When UN peace operations use their capabilities strategically, they can buy off potential spoilers while also strengthening peace-oriented forces within civil-war factions.

Figure 21 displays the variations in the size of civil-war-related UN peace operations after the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1993, the number of troops, observers, and police deployed under UN command in the context of civil wars quickly jumped from 380 to 72,000. Thereafter, the trend reversed. By 1999, UN peace operations were scaled back to a total size of 2,200 civilian and military personnel. Within the following three years, a new

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84 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? p. 88.
generation of UN peace operations led to a twelve-fold increase of this number to almost 28,000 in 2002. In 2004, this figure nearly doubled to almost 50,000, before it further increased to 65,000 in 2006.\(^\text{85}\)

In early 1995, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali famously reported to the Council that “neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command, and control operations for [enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression], except perhaps on a very limited scale.”\(^\text{86}\) Increasingly, the Council turned to regional security arrangements for the enforcement of its decisions in Haiti, Bosnia, and in other conflict theaters.\(^\text{87}\) In the wake of the sometimes overwhelming difficulties encountered by UN peace operations in Bosnia and Rwanda, the Security Council also decreased the number of blue helmets in consent-based peacekeeping between 1995 and 2000. Over the same period, peace operations led by regional organizations significantly increased in scope, particularly in Africa, the Caucasus, and the former Yugoslavia. Figure 21 shows that the overall number of personnel deployed in all UN-authorized peace operations in civil-war countries, including those led by the UN and those under the command of regional organizations, has remained relatively stable since the early 1990s. In terms of the number of deployed staff, the increase in non-UN-led peace operations largely offset the temporary decline in the size of UN peace operations in the mid- and late 1990s.

The Council also reshaped its approach to deploying peace operations after 1993 by gradually shifting the scope of the mandates for UN peace operations deployed in the context of civil wars. As Figure 22 shows, multidimensional peace operations increasingly replaced traditional peace operations.

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\(^{85}\) As of June 2010, the total number of uniformed personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping in the context of civil wars, international wars, extrastate wars, and other armed conflicts amounted to over 100,000 persons. See, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Background Note; June 20, 2010, available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm.


operations as the Security Council’s default civil-war-response tool. While traditional peace operations are typically positioned between conflict parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or no-man’s land, the tasks of multidimensional peace operations involve the implementation of complex peace agreements, and they regularly perform various police and civilian tasks aimed at building the foundations of a self-sustaining peace. The Security Council added multidimensional peace operations to its crisis-response repertoire during the early 1990s. In the aftermath of the peacekeeping debacles in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia, it largely refrained from establishing new multidimensional peace operations for the next few years. The surge of UN peacekeeping in the early 2000s saw the establishment of a number of large multidimensional peace operations, including MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUC (DRC), UNMIK (former Yugoslavia), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMIS (Sudan), and UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire). As Figure 22 shows, between 2000 and 2006 almost six in ten Security Council demands to civil-war parties were issued in the context of multidimensional peace operations, twice as many as those in relation to civil wars where traditional peace operations were deployed by the United Nations.

**MONITORING MANDATES: SURPRISINGLY UBIQUITOUS?**

The **IPI Security Council Compliance Database** also provides some interesting insights into the adoption of mandates for the monitoring of civil-war parties’ compliance with demands issued to them by the Security Council. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, between 1989 and 2006, more than 90 percent of all demands issued to civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions were connected to some compliance-monitoring mandate. In each case, the mandate to monitor compliance with the specific demand was either included in the Security Council resolution issuing the demand, a previous resolution or presidential statement, or another UN document. Figure 23 shows the prevalence of compliance-monitoring mandates in each year. It says nothing, of course, about whether such mandates were used effectively and how they were discharged. The impact of monitoring on compliance by civil-war

![Figure 23: Security Council demands to civil-war parties and the use of compliance-monitoring mandates, 1989-2006](source: IPI Security Council Compliance Database, v1.01)
parties with demands by the Security Council will be analyzed in the next phase of this research project.

Most compliance-monitoring mandates were assigned to UN field personnel, particularly UN peace operations and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. International organizations other than the UN formed the second largest category of mechanisms monitoring civil-war parties’ compliance with Security Council resolutions. In relation to one in five demands in Security Council resolutions addressing warring factions, compliance monitoring was delegated to another international organization. For instance, compliance with Security Council Resolution 1199 by all parties to the civil war in Kosovo was monitored by the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) created by the OSCE.\(^8^9\)

Other compliance-monitoring mandates were assigned to the following: Security Council committees, expert panels, the Secretary-General, various other UN bodies, and individual states. In the context of the civil war in the DRC, for instance, the Council established a panel of experts to monitor compliance with its demand to cease illegal exploitation of natural resources that were exploited to finance the conflict in the country.\(^9^0\) The Council authorized all states to monitor and ensure compliance with the naval blockade imposed against Haiti.\(^9^1\) In case of the demilitarization of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, which was required under an agreement between Croatia and the local Serb community as well as under Security Council decisions, the Security Council announced that it would review parties’ compliance itself at a specific point.\(^9^2\)

The diversity of monitoring mandates is notable, given that it was not until the early 1990s that monitoring civil-war parties’ compliance became part of the Council’s standard civil-war response repertoire. Figure 23 shows that during the first three years after the Cold War ended, the Security Council assigned monitoring mandates for fewer than half of the demands it issued to civil-war parties. Yet in each year between 1992 and 2006, it tied more than four out of five such demands to a specific compliance-monitoring mandate.

Assigning mandates to monitor the civil-war parties’ responses to the Security Council’s demands to them may have significant impacts on their behavior. At the least, it would seem to signal the Security Council’s commitment to following up on the demand. If a demand is strongly worded, and noncompliance is reported back to the Security Council, the Council might be expected to take action to avoid hurting its credibility vis-à-vis the civil-war parties and vis-à-vis other demand addressees. The “shadow of sanctions” cast by such demands may deter civil-war parties from adopting courses of action contrary to the Council’s request.\(^9^3\) Of course, the opposite might also be true: the Security Council’s lack of response to reports of noncompliance may signal the body’s inclination to turn a blind eye to noncompliance.

It is also notable that both mandatory and hortatory demands to civil-war parties were frequently linked to compliance-monitoring mechanisms between 1989 and 2006. The Security Council’s interest in reports on the parties’ response to mere recommendations shows the significance its members assign to nonbinding requests as a way to engage in iterative dialogues with civil-war parties. Obviously the Council’s response to reports about noncompliance with hortatory demands can be expected to be rather different from its reaction to the parties’ failure to comply with mandatory requests. In many cases, the Council will enter into a political dialogue with the demand addressees in the course of which the demand may be repeated or reformulated to restructure the process of negotiation among the Council, the demand addressee, and other interested parties. While noncompliance with

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91 The monitoring and enforcement task was fulfilled by ships of Argentina, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See UN Security Council Resolution 875 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/875, para. 1, for the authorization.


hortatory demands is much less likely to trigger sanctions by the Security Council, it may impose reputational costs on recalcitrant civil-war parties. It may also lead donors and external supporters to grant less aid and backing to them.

**INCENTIVES, THREATS, AND SANCTIONS: MORE STICK THAN CARROT?**

The 1990s have famously been described as “the sanctions decade,” referring to the frequent use of economic or financial sanctions, arms embargoes, and travel and aviation restrictions by the Security Council. This report provides further evidence for this observation and extends its applicability until 2006. As Figure 24 shows, 41 percent of the demands issued to civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions were adopted at a time when binding United Nations sanctions were in place against those warring factions. This included 13 percent of all demands to civil-war parties that were issued in resolutions that imposed new sanctions on the factions. Beyond that, 11 percent of demands were included in resolutions that threatened the imposition of additional sanctions in case of noncompliance, with the vast majority of those being issued where sanctions were already in place (10 of the 11 percent).

It is important to add a caveat to this analysis. Obviously, Security Council resolutions are not the only way for the Council to communicate threats to impose sanctions to civil-war parties. This analysis only captures the most public and formal threats, while it omits those transmitted through presidential statements, Security Council missions and mission reports, and even more-informal means of communications, such as press releases and stakeout statements by the Security Council’s president, or even more discreet channels.

The frequency with which the Security Council imposed sanctions against civil-war parties suggests that one of its preferred strategies to obtain leverage over civil-war parties was to impose sanctions and then use their removal as an incentive for civil-war parties to meet Security Council demands to end the fighting and reach a sustainable settlement. Sanctions not only became a bargaining chip in and of themselves, but also increased the difficulty and cost of civil-war parties accessing the materiel, finance, and political support they may need to wage war, thereby

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Figure 24: Security Council demands to civil-war parties and the use of sanctions, 1989-2006

increasing their incentives to make peace. This connection to war-fighting capabilities is borne out by Figure 25, which shows that almost half of all Security Council demands to civil-war parties were adopted at a time when an arms embargo was imposed against them. Twelve percent of all exhortations to civil-war factions in Security Council resolutions were issued when they were forbidden to import or export petroleum or petroleum-related products. Such sanctions raise the material costs of fighting, and they can constitute a powerful leveraging tool in the hands of the Council. Moreover, one in six Security Council demands to civil-war parties were issued at a time when travel restrictions were in place against some of the warring factions’ leaders. Clearly, civil-war parties that were eager to have the sanctions lifted, or who feared being added to the long list of sanctions targets, could have been expected to listen more carefully to the Security Council’s demands than they otherwise would.

Conditional promises may constitute another avenue for the Security Council to incentivize war parties to end fighting and reach a sustainable settlement. The Security Council may offer to deploy a peace operation, to remove sanctions, and to provide various forms of financial support and technical assistance. In the context of the Liberian civil war, for instance, the Council “declare[d] its readiness if significant progress in the peace process [...] is achieved by 15 September 1995 to consider restoring UNOMIL to its full strength [...] as well as to consider other aspects of post-conflict peace-building.” In relation to the conflict in Croatia, the Council “affirm[ed] that the full normalization of the international community’s position towards [the civil-war parties] will take into account their actions in implementing all relevant resolutions of the Security Council.”

Yet such “conditional promises” were in fact rather unusual, at least between 1989 and 2006. Less than 6 percent of all demands to civil-war parties were issued in resolutions that contain such promises of benefits. Of those that were, two-thirds were linked to the removal of sanctions, more than half of which were those imposed against UNITA in Angola. One explanation would be that the Security Council and its members may have found it more effective to use less-formal channels to transmit conditional promises to civil-war parties. Another

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possible explanation is that the Security Council did not feel itself empowered to make certain conditional promises, since access to and control over material benefits such as development resources primarily resides in the international financial institutions and national capitals—and to a lesser extent in the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and various other UN agencies, funds, and programs. The Security Council itself has no authority over the budget of the United Nations or that of UN agencies, funds, and programs.

While the Security Council seldom made conditional promises, it was not averse to including in its resolutions threats relating to the loss of benefits (especially the withdrawal of a peace operation) and threats of enforcement action. Between 1989 and 2006, 19 percent of demands to civil-war parties were issued in resolutions that expressed such threats to them. Half of those threats created the prospect of a loss of benefits. The threat to terminate a peace operation deployed to the civil-war-affected country was the most common threat of a loss of benefits, but the Security Council also strategically leveraged a range of other benefits to civil-war parties. In Cambodia, for instance, the Council threatened to withdraw support to recalcitrant civil-war parties by instructing the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to “ensure that international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction from now on benefits only the parties which are fulfilling their obligations under the Paris agreements and cooperating fully with the [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia].”

Nine percent of demands to civil-war parties were related to threats of enforcement action that were expressed in the same resolution with the demand—even if virtually all of those threats were posed in somewhat abstract terms.

Should we conclude, then, that the Security Council was more prone to use sticks than carrots in its civil-war responses between 1989 and 2006? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the Security Council did indeed turn to threats of additional sanctions and uses of force more frequently than formal promises of additional material benefits. And no, in the sense that the Council’s engagement with the management of a civil war may offer the parties added value that goes beyond conditional promises of specific benefits. By reiterating prior commitments by civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions, the Council attaches the legitimacy of the United Nations to the agreement. The authorization of a peace operation brings collateral benefits—such as objective information about the other parties’ actions, as well as capacity-building and other forms of assistance—and constitutes one of the most important incentives the Security Council can offer to civil-war parties who are eager to settle their conflict.

The Security Council typically collaborates with a number of regional actors and others as a means to gain leverage on civil-war parties through incentives, threats, and sanctions. The Security Council—however unique and authoritative—does not necessarily control access to a range of sources of leverage over civil-war parties, such as conditional promises of economic aid, which is often in the hands of other UN bodies, member states, other international organizations, and even the private sector. Yet, between 1989 and 2006, the salience of these kinds of leverage may have become increasingly important as the Security Council became more engaged with matters of postconflict peacebuilding, the governance and international political relations of civil-war parties, and the in-conflict and postconflict political economies in which civil-war factions operate. Consequently, partnerships with regional and other international actors have become an increasingly important component of the Council’s repertoire of civil-war response strategies.
Conclusion

At the end of the Cold War the United Nations Security Council started to systematically engage in the resolution of internal conflicts, which make up more than seven in ten armed conflicts since 1945.98 During the first two decades after the Cold War, the Security Council gradually—yet comprehensively—changed the way it applied its mandate under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. Between 1989 and 2006, the Council adopted 617 resolutions on twenty-seven out of the forty-four civil wars that were ongoing during this period.

This report shows how the Security Council’s reasoning that “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security”99 translated into practice. The report is the first publication produced by IPI’s research project on Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars. Drawing from the new IPI Security Council Compliance Database, it examines how the Security Council’s approach to civil wars has evolved since the end of the Cold War. The report shows how the Council gradually adjusted its repertoire of crisis-response strategies to confront the unique challenges posed by internal conflict. The report demonstrates that the Security Council’s movement from disengagement to engagement in civil wars after the Cold War did not develop evenly over time. The report also depicts considerable variation in the Council’s engagement in different civil wars, which resonates with the wide discretion of the body under the United Nations Charter.

This report does not speak to the impact of the Security Council’s engagement in post-Cold War civil wars, but only to the extent and modalities of that engagement. Future analysis within this research project will seek to answer two questions: To what extent do civil-war parties comply with demands issued by the Security Council? And what explains the variance in the level of compliance—conflict settings, conflict-management strategies, and/or political dynamics within the Security Council?

Recent studies show that, over the last few years, the decline in the number of armed conflicts witnessed since the early 1990s has stalled. In 2008, the number of armed conflicts in the world was approximately one quarter higher than five years earlier, in the year with the lowest number of armed conflict since the 1970s.100 An increasing percentage of these conflicts occur in a relatively small number of countries that frequently experience conflict relapses after emerging from mass violence. Some of these states find themselves in a “conflict trap” as they struggle against the persistent impact from the previous conflict and unresolved root causes of social tensions.101 This trend poses new challenges for the Security Council as it seeks to mitigate the hazards from armed conflict to international peace and security.

Increasingly the Security Council is also confronted by new conflict drivers, with organized crime becoming increasingly intertwined with armed conflict in venues from Haiti to West Africa to Afghanistan, and with climate change threatening to produce new social tensions that may spill over into mass violence. An understanding of where and how the Security Council has found ways to influence conflict parties’ behavior in the recent past will be crucial for strengthening the effectiveness and legitimacy of its efforts to deal with the challenges yet to come. We hope that IPI’s Security Council Compliance Database, and the future work of IPI’s project on Understanding Compliance with Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars, will prove useful in developing such insights.

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Annex I:
What is a Civil War? And What is Not a Civil War?

WHAT IS A CIVIL WAR?
For the purpose of IPI’s project on Understanding Compliance with Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars, a civil war consists of one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that (1) concern government and/or territory in a state; (2) are causally linked to the use of armed force, resulting in at least 500 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict; and (3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several nonstate opposition organization. This definition is closely based on the definition of the term “armed conflict” used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. To distinguish civil wars from minor armed conflicts, we use a threshold of 500 battle-related deaths during a single conflict year. This threshold follows the argument presented by Nicholas Sambanis in favor of a more fine-grained analysis of civil war that includes armed conflicts in small countries that are unlikely to surpass the commonly used threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths.

Simultaneous disputes over government and/or territory in the same state are not counted as separate civil wars since the Security Council generally takes a holistic approach to the situation in a country, adopting a single conflict-response strategy that does not address them separately. For instance, while the civil war in Bosnia could be conceptualized as three separate incompatibilities, doing so would lead to double-counting demands by the Security Council. We treat the civil war in Bosnia as one civil war.

WHAT IS NOT A CIVIL WAR?
An armed conflict between two states is not a civil war. Additionally, armed conflicts between an occupying power and nonstate actors are considered extrastate, rather than intrastate, armed conflicts. While civil wars are fought between the government of a state and nonstate opposition groups, extrastate wars are fought between a state and nonstate groups outside its own territory. Thus, extrastate conflicts in East Timor, Namibia, Southern Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza, and Western Sahara were not included in the civil-war dataset.

This distinction reflects a fundamental difference between the legal and political framework for Security Council interventions in civil wars and those involving occupying powers. UN intervention in wars in occupied territories is typically inspired by the organization’s desire to attain a specific substantive outcome—the withdrawal of the occupying forces—as evidenced by General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on East Timor, Namibia, Southern Lebanon, Western Sahara, and the West Bank and Gaza. While individual member states may also have strong views on the substantive outcome of specific civil wars, the United Nations is typically willing to endorse a variety of substantive outcomes of civil wars as long as they hold the promise of sustainable peace. Thus, the logic of the Security Council’s response to both categories of war is fundamentally different, necessitating a clear distinction between the two in this study.

In several armed conflicts the question of whether the governing authority is an occupying power or a legitimate government may be at the heart of the dispute (e.g., in case of the East Timor). While the warring factions may disagree on the answer to this question, the United Nations took an unequivocal position in each of the aforementioned situations, condemning the occupation and demanding an end to it. Since our study focuses on

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the relationship between the United Nations Security Council and civil war, we take the UN’s characterization of the conflict as determinative for our purposes.

Wars between two armed groups not engaging the government are also not treated as civil wars for the purpose of this study.

Below are listed all those civil wars that were ongoing at any time between 1989 and 2006. The start and end dates for all civil wars are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.\(^1\)

Civil wars are listed by the date of their onset—the earliest being Myanmar in 1948. Civil wars which were addressed at any point during the conflict cycle by at least one Security Council resolution between 1989 and 2006 are in **bold**. Those not in bold were ongoing after the Cold War had ended, but were not addressed by Security Council resolutions between 1989 and 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start-End Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1961-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1948-2005</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1966-1995</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1973-1999</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1967-1998</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1964-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Angolan</td>
<td>1975-2007</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>1965-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1977-1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1964-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1978-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1969-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1979-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1971-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1984-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1983-1989</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>1988-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1987-2007</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1989-2004</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1992-ongoing (as of 01/2010)</td>
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<td>Libera</td>
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<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>SFR Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
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2. This civil war has to be distinguished from the international wars between Iraq and Iran on the one hand, and between Iraq and Kuwait, the United States, and its allies on the other.
3. The civil war in Uganda never officially figured on the agenda of the Security Council. However, the Security Council has been considering it under its agenda item "the situation in the Great Lakes Region," alongside the civil wars in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda. In 2006, it adopted Resolution 1653 (2006) on the situation in the Great Lakes Region. As of the end of July 2010, it had adopted two resolutions on the situation in the Great Lakes Region.
4. The Security Council addressed its first resolution on the civil war in Nepal in 2007, beyond the temporal scope of this study. As of the end of July 2010, the Security Council has issued seven resolutions on the civil war in Nepal.
5. The secessionist conflict on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was considered to have ended with the termination of the last conflict in one of the newly independent republics (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
Annex III:
Types of Demands Issued to Civil-War Parties
by the Security Council

IPI’s project on *Understanding Compliance with Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars* groups demands made in civil-war contexts into five broad categories based on the type of conduct concerned, as follows:

**Military and Law Enforcement**
1. Military conduct, including orchestrated political violence
2. Police and other law-enforcement conduct

**Humanitarian Actions**
1. Humanitarian access and assistance, including provision of security to humanitarian personnel
2. Protection of civilians or protection of specific groups (beyond humanitarian access)
3. Freedom of movement of local populations

**Governance and Internal Political Relations**
1. Implementation of peace agreements
2. Internal political/organizational reconfiguration of local or national government structures
3. Dialogue/reconciliation with internal political actor, including release of political prisoners
4. Conduct related to elections or referenda, including election campaigns
5. Economic and social policy, including preservation of natural resources
6. Media relations and operations, public declarations
7. Transitional justice, including truth and reconciliation commissions

**External Relations**
1. Dialogue/reconciliation with another state
2. Provision of political, financial, or military assistance to resolution of conflict
3. Respect for sanctions
4. Monitoring of behavior of other actors

**Cooperation with the United Nations**
1. Provision of security and freedom of movement for UN mission or peacekeeping force
2. Cooperation with UN actor (e.g., peace operation, International Atomic Energy Agency, or UN Security Council, or one of its subsidiary organs)
3. Report to the Security Council or advise the Security Council
4. Report to the Secretary-General
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