



IDPS AND ELECTIONS IN SUDAN

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Presidential and Parliamentary elections are due to be held in Sudan from 11 to 13 April. These elections – and the January 2011 referendum to be held under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to decide on unity or secession for southern Sudan – are very tense moments for Sudan's fragile, partial peace. The various conflicts afflicting Sudan for the past 50 years, such as the north-south war and the more recent conflict in Darfur, among others, caused millions to flee their homes. These internally displaced persons (IDPs) fall outside easy categories for census-counting and electoral registration. Many IDPs resisted being counted and labelled resident of one area rather than another for fear of cutting links to their homeland and jeopardising claims to property. The census and election registration processes recently undertaken in Sudan are deeply flawed. The risk is these flaws add fuel to the fire, creating a vicious circle perpetuating violence and displacement. In some areas, in particular Darfur, the failure to count and register IDPs casts doubt on the legitimacy of any election held under the present register.

1. IDPs in Sudan

After some 50 years of intermittent internal armed conflict, Sudan has more than three million internally displaced persons (IDPs). They come from the south, west and east of the country. The migration patterns of Sudanese IDPs is relatively uniform – the tendency has been for IDPs to move to towns and settle on the outskirts of already-existing migrant or poor areas of towns, building makeshift dwellings. Many find jobs, assimilate and become indistinguishable from the long-term migrant population. Only in Darfur do large numbers of IDPs still live together in camps.

IDPs are particularly vulnerable to insecurity, unemployment and malnutrition. Except in Darfur, where there are more schools in IDP camps, IDPs are also characterised by a lack of access to education.

Total IDP populations, Sudan

Area	IDPs in camps or defined areas	IDPs living among the host population
Khartoum	400,000 in defined areas set aside by the government [United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR]	1.3 million in informal squatter areas [UNHCR]
Darfur	c.1.7m	c.1 million [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA]
"Marginal Areas"		200,000 from Blue Nile; 100,000 from

		Kordofan [end 2008, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, IDMC]
East		420,000 at end 2008 [IDMC]
South		267,500 [2010, OCHA]

Southern IDPs

Conflict waged by southerners against perceived northern domination started soon after Sudan gained independence in 1956 and continued until the south was given autonomy in 1972 under the Addis Ababa agreement. In 1983, partly as a result of the introduction of shari'a law, the peace broke down and fighting resumed until after the 2002 Machakos Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the armed wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The major conflict between the government and the SPLA was often fought by militias on both sides; on the government's side, northern militias kidnapped southerners of both sexes and brought them north to work as herders, labourers or servants.

Large areas of the south were depopulated and ravaged, whole tribes displaced, and some four million people fled Sudan across the borders with Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as refugees, mostly living in camps. Another two million southerners fled north where they now live mostly in Khartoum and other main towns such as Renk, Kosti, El Obeid, or work as cheap labour on the land. In Khartoum, they live in squatter towns that the Khartoum government has on occasion tried to destroy, moving the population to areas outside the city such as Al-Salam and Jebel Awliya Camp. Many southern IDPs live among the northern host population finding employment doing menial tasks. Others became IDPs within the south, mostly in Juba whose population is now more than four million.

Since the southern conflict lasted so long, many southern families have lived in the north for more than 30 years, blurring the line between internally displaced and economic migrant. Many displaced families of southern origin now have adult children born in the areas to which they have been displaced; these new generations lack the same connections and sense of home as their parents.

Of the two million or so IDPs from southern Sudan who came north, hundreds of thousands have returned to the south since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005¹. Some of these – perhaps around 10% – returned north again, finding life in the south challenging due to insecurity, the lack of a means of livelihood and poor basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and schools. Meanwhile, insecurity and continuing conflict in the south has led to new and secondary displacement on a large scale, especially over the past two years. In 2008, some 187,000 were newly displaced IDPs; in 2009 the figure more than doubled to over 391,000². Most of the newly displaced remain in the south.

"Marginal Areas"

The so-called Marginal Areas are those on the borders between north and south: the southern Blue Nile province and the south Kordofan Province and Abyei. The people of these areas – Dinka in Abyei, different Nuba groups in the Nuba Mountains and Maban groups such as the Uduk in southern Blue Nile – feel more closely linked to the south than the north. These areas were particularly depopulated during the wars. Many of those displaced from the marginal areas (especially those from Abyei and South Kordofan) fled within Sudan, taking the same routes and seeking the same havens as the southerners. In the area of Abyei, the CPA requires a separate referendum to be held to enable the population to decide whether or not to become part of south

¹ See IOM Tracking of Spontaneous Returns Project: Total Returns to South Sudan post CPA to June 2009

² OCHA Humanitarian Update Southern Sudan, Issue Number 1, 17 February 2010.

Sudan. In Blue Nile and South Kordofan the April 2010 elections are meant to be followed by popular consultations with the people regarding the CPA.

Darfur

Darfuris have been fleeing famine and conflict, coming to Kordofan, Khartoum and the East over the past 30 years. It is estimated that tens of thousands moved east as economic migrants. There is a large Darfuri labour force in the east, for example in Gedaref. Waves of Darfuris came east during the great famine of 1984-5, when nearly half the population may have fled their homes. Beginning in 1987, partly as a result of drought, relations between nomads and the mostly sedentary and semi-sedentary population – the main groups being the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit – grew more strained in competition for land. Displacement followed the Fur-Arab war of 1987-9 and the crushing of the Masalit from 1999-2000. However, the greatest displacement of Darfuris took place after April 2003 when attacks on government posts by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and later the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were met by systematic attacks on Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit villages. These attacks were typically carried out by a proxy militia known as the Janjawid, backed up by the Sudanese army and air force. Villagers who resisted were killed and raids on a village would continue until the residents fled. Unlike southerners and those from marginalised areas, Darfuri IDPs mostly live in camps within the region; in 2010 there remain 2.6 million in IDP camps, including some camps in areas under the control of the rebel groups and one camp near Nyala containing displaced Arab communities. Another million displaced people live often with family members or people from the same community, in towns or elsewhere in Darfur. Many more have gone to Kordofan, Khartoum and Port Sudan.

Eastern IDPs

The east has also seen armed conflict by the Beja and Rashaida groups against the government. For a long time the area around Hameshkoreb was under the control of rebel groups. As a result of the conflicts that accompanied these revolts, thousands of people from these groups were displaced, mostly to towns within the region, such as Port Sudan and Kassala, or as refugees to Eritrea. An agreement was signed in October 2006 between the government of Sudan and the Eastern Front, but the plight of the IDPs, who are usually without the international assistance given to IDPs from Darfur, was not addressed.

2. The Census

The CPA negotiated between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan entered into force on 9 January 2005. It set out a timetable for the holding of a referendum on unity or secession of the south after six years, preceded by a population census and parliamentary elections.

Article I.8.1 of the Power-sharing Protocol of the CPA states that a population census should be completed by 2007 and that the representation of north and south at the national level should be based on this census.

Thus the balance of power between north and south is dependent on the census. In addition, the constituencies for the elections were to be drawn on the basis of the population distribution shown by the census. Therefore the census also affects the distribution of resources between north and south and among different regions of Sudan.³

However, this extremely important enumeration took place a year later than the date laid down in the CPA, and its results have been heavily questioned. There were two census boards, one each

³ For a detailed examination of the census, especially in Darfur, see *5th Housing and Population Census in Sudan: An Incomplete Exercise* Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva, February 2010,

for the north and south. The SPLM in the south had already set up a census commission (the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, SSCCSE) to deal with its own census in 2003. The north used the already-existing Central Bureau of Statistics. Assistance came from the United States Central Bureau of Statistics and the French *Génie Informatique et Statistique*, which helped train enumerators and provided oversight for the census.

The delay to the count came from mutual agreement. The Government of South Sudan asked that the count be delayed for many reasons, including the non-return of refugees and IDPs. The atmosphere of tension in the south and the northern peripheries before the count foreboded ill for the future. The count was finally conducted between 22 April and 7 May 2008 and was accompanied by riots and irregularities, especially in Darfur.

In the south there was serious under-counting. This can be attributed to recent conflicts that led to new displacement, along with the fact that many IDPs had not yet returned to their homelands or, having returned, found their homelands occupied by others and so moved elsewhere. Further, the lack of infrastructure in the south made carrying out the census a logistical challenge due to often impassable roads. Conducting the enumeration during the rainy season only compounded this issue.

The opposition to the census and the call for a boycott was strongest among IDPs in Darfur. Large areas of Darfur had been emptied of their population. Nearly half the population are IDPs living in camps or among host populations in towns. Some areas of Darfur, such as Wadi Saleh, whose Fur population had fled, had been resettled partly by groups of Arab nomads entering from Chad. At the least, the census would record the fact that the Darfuris, now in IDP camps and scattered elsewhere, had lost their lands. In many cases, these lands were held by Arab groups at the time the census was taken. By recording this in the census, it was felt that it might endorse this loss.

Even in areas where IDPs lived among the population, they were often not enumerated, both as a result of their own antipathy and through what was perceived as bias by the census takers. One resident of Kabkabiya said: *"I was very close to the enumerators. They were welcomed and worked very well as enumerators among the Arabs. In other areas they were not welcomed by the people who did not believe in the process so they did not enumerate them. As for the IDPs, they were neglected by the enumerators"*⁴. Census enumerators faced protesters in many places; in some towns and IDP camps, the protests turned violent. Many of the IDP camps that resisted the census were not counted at all. Two people died in Kalma camp in South Darfur on 22 April, 2008, and on the same day a meeting of representatives of the major IDP camps declared a boycott of the census. On 4 and 5 May, police surrounded IDP camps near Nyala, Zalingei and Wadi Salih in order to prevent IDPs from leaving the camps and protesting. In many places enumerators were threatened and in Umm Baru two enumerators were abducted for a time.

The result of the count was only made public more than a year later on 21 May, 2009. The population of Sudan had risen to more than 39 million. The population of the north, including Darfur, was over 30 million, giving the north nearly 79% of the total population while the south had just over 21%, much less than the third share allotted under the power-sharing and wealth-sharing parts of the CPA. The census organizers were accused of under-counting the population in the south, under-counting the southern population in the north and over-counting the Arab population, in the north. The Government of South Sudan initially accepted the results of the census but later rejected them. Three days later the South Sudan Parliament also rejected the census figures.

The census was particularly criticised and harmful to the rights of the IDP population.

⁴ This and other quotes are from telephone interviews conducted with IDPs in February and March 2010.

In the north, the number of southerners (many of them of IDP origin) was only just over half a million for a population generally thought to be closer to two million. IDPs from all regions appear to have been under-counted throughout the north, including in Khartoum. A Darfur Relief and Documentation survey "*among cross-sections of IDPs from Darfur in Khartoum and Khartoum North*" stated that 95% of the households were not counted.⁵ In the south also, IDPs were under-counted.

In Darfur the population was given as 7,515,445 – a large population given that many areas, including IDP camps and areas under the rebels, were not covered by the census. Opponents again claimed that the Arabs were over-counted and that IDPs were almost missing from the count. IDPs in areas held by the rebels, in particular Jebel Marra and north-west Darfur, were not counted at all in the census. Many areas – Jebel Si, Dar Zaghawa – were almost empty. Nevertheless, the Darfur population increased by 62% and accusations were rife that this increase was from the Arab population, through counting non-existent people and newly-arrived groups of Chadian nomads who had settled in lands vacated by the displaced sedentary population.

3. Registration for the Elections

The constituencies for the future elections are based on the distribution of the population shown in the deeply-flawed census. Thus the registration of voters cannot correct the mistakes of the census. The registration of electors was carried out six months after the results of the census were published, from 1 November until 30 November, 2009. At the request of the Government of South Sudan, the period of registration was prolonged for a further week to 7 December, to give more time for voters in outlying areas to register. The National Election Commission (NEC) was headed by the respected former head of the autonomous south during the 1970s, Abel Alier. On the other hand, the fact that President Omar al-Bashir appointed all the members (the Government of South Sudan could object to names, but not suggest alternatives) made the membership of the NEC in general biased towards the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).

Approximately 75% of the population accounted for in the census registered as voters. In the north registration was 71%, in the south 98%. This reflects the under-counting of southerners during the census, as those not counted in the census could still register as voters. In one or two areas of the south there was more than 100% registration; this was the result of political pressure on groups that missed the census to ensure they had the vote. There were reports of fraudulent registration: especially in the north there were complaints that under-age and non-qualified residents were registered and that registration vans had only gone to NCP areas and not visited IDP or opposition areas. However, the fact that identity documents were often waived, and individuals whose identity was vouched for by chiefs and heads of clans or quarters were registered may have helped IDPs who lacked their documents to register. On the other hand, the criterion requiring electors to have been residents in the constituency for the past three months excluded recent IDPs in south Sudan.

There was under-registration in areas with large numbers of IDPs. This was most prevalent in Khartoum, where, as an urban area, registration should have been straightforward and the numbers of IDPs in the population would be likely to register many non-NCP members. However, the numbers of those registering were diminished by the fact that in many poor areas police stations or army bases were used as registration centres. Sudden changes of place of registration also diminished registration numbers.

This was also the case in the South, in areas where there were insecurity and livelihood difficulties. In Jonglei Province armed conflict between and within Murle, Dinka and Nuer groups

⁵ *5th Housing and Population Census in Sudan: An Incomplete Exercise* Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva, February 2010, p.14.

was rife, hundreds died and thousands were displaced, also affecting registration numbers.

In Darfur, where most of the IDPs were not counted in the census, the inflation of numbers and the alienation of the Darfur non-Arab population, particularly IDPs, led to a much lower registration. In some camps, some voters were registered. In Abu Shouk, at least one Sheikh provided lists of the people from his areas who were accordingly registered – but registration overall was weak or non-existent. In Kalma it was different, as one IDP describes: *"We did not think of registering as we are displaced and have no land"*. There were reports of assaults on NGO representatives observing the registration process. There were also reports of confiscation by the NCP of IDs or receipts proving registration. *"The IDPs were not in the census or registration except that some who lived within Nyala who registered. But people were confused and did not know what was going on and after registration they gave their card with their number and name to people waiting outside. Now these people can vote for them"*. [Woman with IDP links in Nyala] There was no registration in Kass and Kalma Camp (c90,000 IDPs) and residents in the three biggest camps in North Darfur: Abu Shouk, Zamzam and al-Salam, were only registered on 7 December. In Kassab Camp, Kutum in North Darfur, an IDP records that *"the government wanted to come to the camp, but the Sheikhs of the camp refused, with the agreement of the displaced"*.

4. Elections

The elections that, according to the CPA, should have been held in July 2009, will now be held from 11-13 April 2010. The present parliament was nominated in 2005 under the terms of the CPA by political parties, who each were allotted a fixed proportion of the 450 members (52% for the NCP, 28% for the SPLM, 14% for other northern opposition parties and 6% for other southern opposition forces). The elections for the previous parliament and for the Presidency, which took place in 2000, were boycotted by opposition parties. The last elections which can be said to have been largely free were held in 1986. According to a report by the Rift Valley Institute, *"repeated elections have not succeeded in remaking politics because ... the process itself has repeatedly been flawed"*.⁶

The problems relating to IDPs in the present elections are acute throughout the country. In Darfur they are critical to such a degree that they must make all elections with the present voters' list and constituencies illegitimate.

As regards southern IDPs, the present elections are also the precursor to the referendum of 2011 on unity or secession. This will be not only important to IDPs remaining in the south, but also to southern IDPs located in the north. Both groups are under-represented in the census and under-registered in the elections.

Southern IDPs in the north may be so under-represented by the census and registration that they will not have the voice within Parliament that their large numbers within Khartoum would warrant.

In relation to the referendum, southern IDPs in the north, like other marginal populations (including IDPs in other provinces of the north) might in general prefer unity based on the perception that it could afford them greater protection in an area where for years to come they are likely to be a discriminated minority.

Thus in the north there is a serious question as to the legitimacy of elections or a referendum based on such flawed figures.

IDPs in the south

Many IDPs in the south have not been counted in the census and have not been registered. They

⁶ *Elections in Sudan: Learning from Experience*, Rift Valley Institute Report, May 2009.

do not form a homogeneous interest group in the south, so the fact they are unable to vote is unlikely to greatly affect the general validity of any elections. On the other hand, peace is fragile or non-existent in many parts of the south, tensions are high and the absence of many groups from political power increases the fragility of the situation and is likely to cause more conflict.

IDPs in Darfur

*"He who lacks a livelihood, lacks the power to take decisions"*⁷ [IDP in Abu Shouk Camp]

As we have seen, most of the Darfur IDPs refused to be counted in the census, fearing that acceptance of the census would legitimise their expulsion from their lands. The result of the census was an immense under-registration of IDPs and a perceived over-registration of Arabs. Since constituencies are based on the census, the areas around the SLA-held area of Jebel Marra have lost constituencies while Arab areas have gained them. New purely Arab constituencies were created (for instance, al-Waha [the oasis] in North Darfur). IDPs were particularly bitter about the purported registration of immigrants occupying their lands as Sudanese citizens. It is alleged that Chadian nomads in Wadi Saleh and other incomers brought in from Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger were registered as Sudanese for purposes of the census and voter registration.

The alienation of the IDPs from the whole process of census, registration and elections is a result of their profound distrust of the government. As one IDP said: *"We would not accept any idea from the government, even if it were for our own benefit"*. IDPs in Darfur feel that they are dropping everywhere off the agenda: the census, the elections, the future, as these further quotes illustrate:

"The same government which made the people flee their country is the government which is organizing the elections, therefore we do not accept them"
[IDP from Kassab Camp, Kutum]

"Elections have no importance for us. We have been driven from our lands and lost everything" [IDP from Kabkabiya]

"They have held a festival, but left us without even a handful of nuts" [IDPs in Abu Shouk and Kalma Camps]

"None of the political parties helped the IDPs" [exile from Kabkabiya]

Those standing for election in Darfur are from the NCP and the old political parties: the Umma Party (now split into two factions); the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, also split into two factions). However, the alienation of the IDPs is not only from the government, but from all political parties and the whole political process in Sudan. There may be some candidates supported by IDPs such as Ibrahim Suleiman, NCP candidate for al-Fasher North, which includes Abu Shouk Camp. Suleiman was formerly the North Darfur Governor, arrested Janjawid militia leader Musa Hilal in 2002 and tried to bring reconciliation to Darfur before he was dismissed by the government in 2003. But IDP Action knows of no IDP standing for election in Darfur.

IDPs have no confidence that, even if they had registered, there could ever be a fair election process under this government. They also feel that the election is bound to lead to increased violence. In the words of one, *"if the IDPs had registered, the government would take action against them"*. Stories of non-existent people on census and voter rolls and those under age and thus technically ineligible to vote having been registered anyway are rife. *"Even if we did vote the*

⁷ *"Man la yamluk qutuh la yamluk qararuh"*; IDP from Abu Shouk Camp [literally: "he who does not own his livelihood does not own his decisions"].

government will falsify the elections and change the ballot boxes. Other parties cannot do anything. If the NCP candidate wins it will be peaceful. If not, the government will cause violence” [IDP in Kabkabiya].

The failure to count Darfuri IDPs in the census, the strong evidence of widespread falsification of census results and registration, the effects of this on constituency populations and the inaccuracy of the voters' register means that no elections in Darfur can have any legitimacy. In talking by telephone to IDPs and others in El Fasher, Nyala, Jeneina, Kabkabiya, Zalingei and the camps of Abu Shouk and Kalma, the opinion was unanimous: IDPs knew that they would not be fairly represented in the elections.

“The MPs who come now will not be our MPs – those who win will not represent me as I did not elect them” [IDP from Kassab Camp, Kutum].

“There may be elections in the secure areas of towns, but there will be no one to speak in the name of the IDPs as we did not participate” [IDP from Zalingei].

Even conversations with members of the present provincial government revealed their scepticism about the equitable representation of Darfuri IDPs in a Sudanese government elected in the present circumstances.

When asked about the future, Darfuri IDPs are uniformly pessimistic. *“There is no future for IDPs”*; *“The IDPs have no future and no fate”*; *“Whatever happens, the IDPs will be the losers”*; are representative of the replies from every IDP questioned. There was also a general feeling that in Darfur at least, the election should be postponed; there could be no free and fair election without peace and a return to their lands.

Fuel to the fire – violence and the elections

In all areas, south, north and especially in Darfur and the marginalised areas, there is a danger that increasing violence will disrupt the elections altogether, in addition to creating new IDPs:

- Within the south, local violence is not only causing loss of lives and livelihoods, but is also increasing the antagonism between north and south, as many believe that the NCP is encouraging violence in order to delay both elections and the referendum, which is almost certain to lead to separation of the south.
- IDPs in Darfur believe that election of a non-government candidate will not be accepted by the government and will lead to violence.
- In Darfur, there is a fear that the probable NCP victory in the elections will bring new attacks on IDPs and areas under the insurgents in an attempt to end the “Darfur problem” (a ceasefire agreement with JEM in February 2010 was immediately followed by Sudan Armed Forces aerial bombing and land attacks on SLA areas of Jebel Marra, causing more than 50 deaths and several thousand more displaced).
- Darfur IDPs predict that the embittered and frustrated youth of IDP camps, who see no future, may also become more violent. *“There will be violence as a result of these elections. The new generation are filled by the soul of aggression”*. [IDP from Abu Shouk]

Recommendations

Elections

Notwithstanding serious flaws in the census and registration in many areas, including in the

under-counting of IDPs, IDP Action does not propose any postponement of the timetable for elections outside Darfur. The need to democratise the present non-elected National Assembly and the importance of adhering as much as possible to the CPA timetable of a referendum in 2011, preclude any delay in elections.

Freedom of Speech and Movement

Members of Sudanese non-government organisations (NGOs) working in relation to the elections have already suffered arrests.⁸ Marginalised members of society such as IDPs are more likely than others to suffer indiscriminate violence or arrests at the hands of the security services for engaging in campaigning in relation to the elections. Freedom of speech, freedom from censorship for news media, freedom of association and freedom of movement for Sudanese must be guaranteed.

Election Monitoring

The presence and free movement of national and international election observers is vital in order to monitor the elections as widely as possible. Sudanese NGOs who plan to monitor the elections should be supported and ensured freedom of movement and freedom of speech. As regards international election observers, the Sudanese Government should cooperate with international bodies monitoring elections by facilitating visas and ensuring freedom of movement.

Darfur

In Darfur, the census, constituency drawing and registration has been so deeply flawed that around half the population – the vast majority of 2.7 million IDPs – have no vote. As a result IDP Action recommends that a solution be found for the under-representation of IDPs in Darfur by organizing an election of IDP representatives who may represent Darfur IDPs in the National Assembly. A group of elected IDPs could also play an important part in a peace process. An election by all IDPs in Darfur, if the IDPs themselves consent to this, would be relatively easy to arrange since nearly all IDPs are registered by the World Food Program.

Under-registration of southern IDPs

The elections were a chance to renew political life in Sudan through the election of members truly representing the diversity of Sudanese society. Unfortunately, those marginalised within society will again be marginalised in their access to Parliament. In view of the under-registration of southerners, especially IDPs, in both south and north Sudan an additional registration of voters should be carried out in the second half of 2010 in preparation for the 2011 referendum.

Violence

The lack of security leading to violence and conflict has already disrupted the census and election registration in many areas and is in danger of disrupting the elections. The Government of Sudan and of south Sudan have a duty to ensure unbiased security to electors. In addition, IDP Action calls on all parties to the election to make a clear statement before the election calling on their followers not to engage in violence during the election period and to ensure a free and fair election.

The role of the international community

The international community, especially the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, the African Union, the United States, United Kingdom, Italy and Norway⁹ should:

- support independent monitoring of the elections by Sudanese NGOs and international observers;

⁸ *Sudanese Authorities and the NEC React to Peaceful Elections Campaigns through Arrest and Circumscribing Civic Rights* African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 5 March 2010.

⁹ The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) is an East African regional development association whose members are Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Sudan. IGAD, the United States, United Kingdom, Italy and Norway were all sponsors of the CPA.

- press the government of Sudan to address gaps in voter registration prior to the January 2011 referendum and to organise a separate election in Darfur to select IDP representatives for the National Assembly;
- put pressure on the government to prevent an eruption of violence in Sudan during and / or after the elections and to respond appropriately in the event that violence does occur.