DISPLACEMENT, RESISTANCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT:
FROM THE GRASS ROOTS TO THE GLOBAL

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I. INTRODUCTION: RESISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

The final third of the 20th century saw the weakening and eventual collapse of one challenge to the dominant western model of development and almost simultaneously the emergence of another based not on class conflict, although in some sense including it, but on the discourses of the environment and human rights. Challenging the current neo-liberal version of this model, voices articulating alternative approaches to development have appeared in the many regions of the world that have been forced to confront a wide variety of losses, costs and calamities brought about by the dominant models of development. For example, in the Philippines, development projects that convert the lands on which people live and work into dam created reservoirs, irrigation schemes, mining operations, plantations, recreation areas and other large scale forms of use favoring national or global interests have been referred to as "development aggression" by impacted communities and the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) working with them (Heijmans 2001: 5). Still, for much of the past 30 years most of the conversations about development have essentially taken place among elites, both pro and con. However, the counter discourse that has emerged in that same period comes from a substantially broader and more diverse base. To some extent both sides of the discussion share similar rhetorics of social justice and material well-being, but they differ markedly on the deeper philosophical meaning of development as a social goal and the means by which that goal should be achieved. The meanings, means, and implications of development in the discussion reflect the internal heterogeneity of both the development industry and those who propose alternative visions (Fisher, W. F. 1995:8). Emphatically, however, the discussion about development is no longer a top-down monologue by elites, but rather an argument, in which protest and resistance from many sectors, many regions are speaking out in many voices. Some have referred to this process as “globalization from below” (Brecher, Costello and Smith 1999).

One of the voices increasingly heard today is that of people displaced and resettled by development projects. Uprooting and displacement have been among the central experiences of modernity. In many ways, the experience of development has meant for millions of people around the world a separation of local life from a sense of place. Development induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) is, in many ways, a clear expression of the state with its monopoly on the management of violence and its ambitious engineering projects, freed from other constraints of non-political power or institutions of social self-management, and able to exert control over the location of people and objects within its territory (Bauman 1989: xiii). Conversely, to be resettled is one of the most acute expressions of powerlessness because it constitutes a loss of control over one's physical space. The only thing left is the loss of the body. As Margaret Rodman so cogently notes, "The most powerless people have no place at all"(1992:650). In the face of efforts to displace them, the poor, indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups are increasingly choosing to resist to DIDR in the hope it will prove more effective in protecting their long term interests than cooperation (Fisher, W.F. 1999).

Recently, the discourses of triumphant globalization have hailed the emergence of global spaces and the increasing irrelevance of local places (Kearney 1995). Interestingly, in the midst of the preeminence of the global, there is also an increasing incidence of social movements that maintain strong references to place and territory (Escobar 2001: 141). The uprooted and the social movements and organizations that have taken up their cause under the various banners of human rights, environment, indigenous peoples, and other related issues are now in the forefront of what some have referred to as an emerging transnational civil society.
(e.g. Fox and Brown 1998). Posited as an increasingly common feature of world politics, transnational civil society is composed mainly of nongovernmental organizations and social movements from the entire world that focus on a broad spectrum of issues such as trade, democratization, human rights, indigenous peoples, gender, security, and the environment often in opposition to the state and private capital (Khagram 1999). Development projects have increasingly become the sites in which these interests and issues are contested and played out through different models of development by individuals and groups from a variety of communities, both local and non-local. Thus, the people and organizations that resist DIDR include many more than the populations that will be or have been displaced and/or resettled. The uprooted and the resettled have been joined by allies at national and international levels from communities of activists from human rights, environment, gender and indigenous peoples organizations around the world. Indeed, corresponding to the wide array of activities undertaken in the name of development around the world, many of these issues interweave with resistance to development–induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), involving an extremely wide range of peoples, organizations, levels, contexts, and relationships that call for greater democratization and more participation of local populations in the decisions and projects affecting them. Their argument in its most radical form contends that large-scale development projects are basically designed to enhance the power of the state and private capital and are incapable of representing or serving the interests of the vast majority of the population.

The many and diverse forms of projects that involve resettlement and resistance inevitably thrust one into the midst of the debate on development itself. It is impossible to address the issue of resistance in any balanced fashion without also addressing the arguments regarding the appropriateness of past and current models and theories of development. Anthony Smith has noted that development models and strategies, grouped under the general rubric of modernization, have also come to constitute a legitimizing ideology for post-colonial states that justifies, indeed demands, that the state produce the institutional conditions and infrastructure for development (Smith, A. 1986 as cited in Smith, C. 1996: 27). The current trend toward privatization of infra-structural projects still looks to the state for institutional guarantees and frequently for financial guarantees. However, these assumptions and their legitimizing ideologies are being subjected as never before to serious critiques from participants essentially new to the debate.

I.A. Development and Democracy

Although in the last decade there have been calls for including social, cultural and political elements, development, as it has been generally and broadly conceived and applied, is the process through which the productive forces of economies and supporting infrastructures are improved through public and private investment. While the paths that this process follows at the ground level are numerous and varied, at the institutional level they can generally be subsumed into the two large scale transformative trajectories of increased integration into the state and the market. People who remain outside or only partially within the threshold of these institutions are considered underdeveloped, or, at best, undeveloped.

The transformative processes entailed by development do not occur without considerable cultural and social discontinuity and quite often conflict (Moore 1966; Wolf 1982). The discussion surrounding these necessary transformations has included the perspective that democratic regimes are not necessarily the most efficient means of achieving development (Khagram 1999; Haggard 1990). Since development requires investment of
surpluses into the construction of infrastructure, such expenditures preclude the use of funds to address immediate needs. A central proposition of democracy is that government policies and expenditures should reflect the public will. Democratic regimes are thus subject to pressures to allocate resources for consumption needs at the expense of investment for growth and development. For this reason, authoritarian regimes have been argued by some to be more efficient in allocating resources for growth since they are unhampered by pressures to distribute surpluses for immediate consumption needs. Authoritarian regimes are also freer to restrict the activities of opponents to their ideologies and policies (Khagram 1999; Haggard 1990).

Conversely, democratic regimes have been considered more favorable for other approaches to development such as those that favor public investment in human capital. Education, training, and health were often grouped under consumption by approaches favoring investment in infrastructure, but are now seen as important for development, even when narrowly defined in terms of economic growth (Khagram 1999: 36). However, the existence of democratic regimes does not guarantee that the development process will respond more directly to immediate human needs. Powerful interest groups within democratic societies have frequently been able to direct the development process toward ends that compete with immediate public needs, but there is, at least, greater room for debate over these allocations in democracies.

The question of development and democracy takes on considerable importance in relation to DIDR because the forms of development that generate projects that require DIDR are generally large-scale infrastructural projects that absorb enormous amounts of economic resources from national treasuries that might otherwise be employed to address immediate needs. Furthermore, the entire process of DIDR when undertaken despite the opposition of affected peoples, or when accomplished without participation and benefits for affected peoples, calls into question the entire relationship between this form of development and democracy, particularly as it is expressed through respect for human and civil rights. Furthermore, the capacity of people to protest, resist and influence DIDR policy may constitute an important test of the democratic character of a particular regime.

Current approaches to development still favor the frequently large-scale transformation of both natural and built environments through construction of such projects as dams, roads, irrigation systems, pipelines, and energy resources, aimed eventually at generating and supporting both agricultural and industrial growth, and with them, increased national and per capita incomes. Furthermore, with the newly appreciated value of biodiversity as a sustaining element of natural cycles of renewability, the development process also involves the establishment of national parks and reserves. Escobar has mordantly noted that biodiversity becomes a development issue when it is constructed as a sustaining element in the reproduction of capital (1999). Environments that have been previously seen as hopelessly remote and useless acquire value as the source of exchangeable commodities and are re-configured by both human institutions and human technology. These largely economic definitions and approaches to the development process are ideologically consistent with predominately western cultural models that privilege economic rationality and productionist goals. The expansion of infrastructure is considered virtually coterminous with development and a paramount goal of nations past and present seeking economic growth.

Until quite recently, infra-structural and productive development has been considered to produce benefits that far outweigh any costs that such processes might entail. In many ways,
any costs occasioned by infra-structural and productive development have been externalized, to be absorbed either by the environment in terms of resource exploitation and waste processing or by the general population when social, cultural and economic disadvantages occur.

The effects of the externalization of the costs of development are realized in serious impacts on the environment and in a transformation of people through the reduction of an enormous diversity of lifeways into a significantly reduced set of social, cultural and economic relationships that are compatible with the industrialized forms of production that form the basis of current development models. In some cases this transformation is imposed intentionally; in others it comes about as people necessarily adapt to their changed institutional environments. These changes are accepted relatively smoothly in some cases; in others they are tenaciously resisted, employing a variety of political, social and cultural means.

As socio-culturally diverse peoples around the world are subsumed into globalized forms of governance and exchange, their economies, societies and cultures are profoundly transformed. While such transformations may be welcomed in some cases, the ensuing monetization of life, the shift from diversified production for use to monocropping production for exchange, the sale of labor, the increased presence of the state in the form of regulation, control and taxation, and all the related cultural changes in values, consumption patterns, gender and power relations, and a myriad of other domains create internal conflicts and tensions that may be tenaciously resisted as a loss of resource base, culture, identity and autonomy and as violations of basic human rights. Indeed, while development, as both practice and ideology, emerged as a formal and generally unopposed goal of policy in the immediate post-World War II period, in the next quarter century it took on the form of a debate between a model of growth based on capitalist development and a model of revolution based on radical redistribution of power and wealth (Berger 1976). Both models, however, shared similar emphases on the expansion of productive and systemic infrastructure. One stream of the current discourse on development still contains important elements of this debate, but with important environmental and ethical considerations revolving around notions of sustainability, human and environmental rights. Indeed, this form of development discourse now questions the fundamental social, cultural and economic assumptions of development and purports to offer alternative conceptualizations that produce benefits and reduce costs at specific local levels as opposed to larger scale efforts for more generalized beneficiary populations who assume fewer risks and costs.

I.B. Global Norms and Transnational Civil Society

These critiques have been interpreted by some as constituting a shift in world politics away from struggles over power and wealth toward struggles over normative issues (Wilmer 1993: 40). Since the end of World War II, there has been a relatively continuous spread and institutionalization of global norms and principles of various types-regulatory, constitutive, practical and evaluative (Khagram 1999:23). Three domains in particular, human rights, the environment, and the rights of indigenous peoples, all directly related to DIDR, have seen particularly extensive growth and diffusion to many nations around the world. An analysis of 140 constitutions of independent countries in the century between 1870-1970 revealed a major increase in the number of states formally committed to ensuring a broad set of human rights, including: civil rights such as free speech and due process; political rights such as the vote; and social or economic rights such as unemployment insurance and social security. No similar research pertains to the constitutions that emerged from the wave of democratization since the 1970s, but an even greater enumeration of rights, such as those pertaining to gender justice,
indigenous peoples, and other ethnic minorities, is highly probable. Internationally, human rights norms were among the formative principles behind the organization of the United Nations. Before the founding of the United Nations in 1948 there were no human rights focused international organizations, but by 1990 there were 27 formally dedicated to furthering human rights (Khagram 1999:27). The diffusion of international human rights norms is critically linked to the establishment and sustainability of networks among transnational actors who can connect with international regimes to alert public opinion, particularly in the West (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 5).

Similarly, a global normative framework of principles and organizations has taken shape around the issue of the environment. National environmental agencies were virtually unheard of before the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm in 1972. Since that time environmental agencies, including ministries, have been forming rapidly. By 1988 approximately 60 had been created and roughly 40 more were developed in the period around the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. National legislation and regulation of environmental practice has expanded along with the growth of these organizations. Internationally, environmental norms have seen a similar expansion in the form of such organizations as the United Nations Environment Program, the Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OESA) of the World Bank, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, and the Global Environmental Facility (Khagram 1999: 25).

Organizations promoting the rights of indigenous peoples are far from new in specific nations, but the worldwide expansion of an indigenous movement only began to establish itself in the 1960s. The enormous challenges and problems faced by indigenous peoples around the world, including discrimination, confiscation of territory, violation of treaties, and exploitation and extraction of resources have given rise to literally thousands of organizations, particularly in the post war period of decolonization. The rise of civil rights issues to prominence and the resources to promote them in many of the industrialized nations have contributed to the emergence of a global indigenous movement, spreading from Europe and North America in the late 1960s to Latin America in the 1970s, Asia and the Pacific in the 1980s and in the 1990s in Africa and the former Soviet Union. There are now thousands of indigenous organizations, some of which have created national federations to address the problems that are faced at the national level. Indigenous peoples bring their concerns over rights to land and territories, social and cultural freedom of expression, the right to be represented by their own institutions and the right to consent and control over development into national and international fora, including the United Nations, the various continental associations such as the Organization of American States, and the International Labour Organization (Gray 1996: 113). Increasingly national legislation safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples is being added to national constitutions around the world. Consequently, it is in this broader context of an emerging transnational civil society, more specifically, in a transnational political economy of development addressing such issues as general human rights, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples that the people and organizations resisting DIDR act and in which the conflictive and cooperative relations they engage in are played out.

I.C. Organization of the Report

The perception that many of the most vulnerable are forced to share an unfair burden of the costs of development as constituting violations of basic human and environmental rights is the core substance of resistance. In that sense, this report, rather than being a simple
inventory of causes, forms and contexts of DIDR resistance, aims to address the cultural politics of resettlement policy and practice as constructed by its various participants. Moreover, this report does not accept as given that development that displaces people is both necessary and inevitable. Neither does the report accept that all people faced with displacement and resettlement necessarily resist. It does, however, assert, the fundamentally political nature of decisions to undertake such projects as result in displacement and resettlement and that, in addressing the politics of DIDR and resistance to it, the report is inextricable from the discourse that has emerged surrounding the core issues. In other words, in order to address in adequate fashion DIDR resistance, both the discourses and practices that favor resettlement as well as those that resist it must be engaged.

In describing and analyzing resistance to DIDR, the report will address a wide array of issues and problems, some of them several times. Some issues appear and reappear in different parts of the report. This seeming duplication is necessary as different facets of these issues and problems are manifested or developed differently in different contexts and from different perspectives. Consequently, the issue of cultural heritage resources, for example, will be addressed in the context of achieving economic compensation and reparations and also as an element of cultural discourses of resistance. Considerable complementarity with other reports in the larger project also emerges as, for example, the response of resisters to policy and project deficiencies (Rew and Fisher), legal options and instruments available to resisters (Barutciski) or the forms of impoverishment (Koenig) as focal issues in resistance campaigns are addressed.

The report will be organized in the following manner. Following this introduction, the second section of report will address the current state of research on DIDR resistance. The third section of the report examines what I have termed the problematics and politics of DIDR research. In this section, the report will discuss three problematic conceptual issues in resettlement research and practice as they pertain to DIDR resistance. These three issues are: defining development, the involuntary-involuntary distinction in migration, and the spectrum of thought and action encompassed by resistance. The section will also explore the human rights context of development as well as the political context in and through which DIDR resistance expresses its concern with those issues. The fourth section of the report will characterize the diverse, complex and dynamic qualities of DIDR resistance. The multiple causes of DIDR resistance, the diverse identities of participants and the dynamic character of identity, belief, and action in individuals, groups and organizations are crucial for an understanding of resistance.

The fifth section addresses the organizational forms of social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and grass-roots organizations (GRO) and transnational networks through which resistance is expressed. Next a political ecological approach to DIDR resistance is outlined addressing issues of vulnerability and risk as they relate to responses to DIDR. This approach is complemented by a scaled methodology addressing advocacy, stakeholder analysis and ethnographic methods. The seventh section addresses the question of who resists resettlement and explores the social dimensions of DIDR. This section engages the impact that the decision to resist resettlement has on individuals and communities. Issues of consensus and conflict, class and ethnicity and the struggles of resettlement categories as forms of entitlement are central to the social organization of resistance. The next section explores the environmental rationales for resistance to DIDR. The role of environmental issues in the formation of resistance and the environmental discourses employed by resistance organizations in their efforts to block or mitigate displacement and resettlement. The biophysical impact of development projects in generating conflict and social mobilization will attract special
The ninth section considers DIDR from an economic standpoint. Recent assertions of a lack of an economic perspective in resettlement planning underscore the importance of these issues for resistance movements. Special concerns for the problems of Cost-Benefit Analyses, compensation and reparations issues and the valuation of resources, both natural and cultural characterize resistance movement discourses on economic issues.

The cultural discourses of DIDR resistance are the focus of the tenth section. Included are the concepts of time and place and role of religion and ritual play central roles in constructing the symbolic expressions of resistance. The importance of language in the development of central cultural themes of resistance such as determination, urgency, persecution and martyrdom are analyzed. The political discourses of DIDR resistance are analyzed in the eleventh section, according to the scales of interaction and conflict that are engaged in by resistance movements, including community, project, national and international frames of action. Also addressed is the problem of negotiating modes, languages and contexts that resistance movements must deal with as well as the role of various forms of the media in disseminating resistance messages and information. Section twelve discusses the results of resistance. What may be lost and what may be gained through resistance will be explored before a final concluding thirteenth section that explores the policy implications of what DIDR resistance contends. The conclusion will also assess the role that resistance has played in developing larger discourses on human rights, the environment, and development and its contribution to improving both development policy and practice in ways that involve greater respect for cultural and environmental concerns. Each section will be complemented by one or more case study boxes that address the specific issues raised in that section.

II. RESEARCH ON DIDR RESISTANCE

An extremely wide array of participants, movements, forms, strategies tactics, and goals has emerged in resistance to development-induced resettlement over the last three decades. It is the purpose of this report to explore the ways the rights, claims and visions of the development process that are expressed in the complex and multidimensional forms of resistance to DIDR become not only means to refuse relocation or claim compensation or better conditions, but also help to initiate and become part of a multi-level and multi-sectoral effort to critique and reconceptualize the development process. Because DIDR resistance explicitly or implicitly addresses issues of development, this study itself must necessarily address multiple discourses within the politics of development, particularly as those discourses pertain to human and environmental rights.

As diverse as the sites, actions and people involved in DIDR resistance are, there is a remarkable imbalance in the existing literature toward studies of resistance to publicly funded hydropower projects, a fact that pertains to and has been remarked upon by the other desk studies. The centrality of dams, in particular, to resettlement studies in general has a lot to do with their perception as the finest expression of the western, technologically driven form of development as well as their widespread social and environmental impacts. These "temples of modern India," as Jawaharlal Nehru referred to them, are seen to express in profound fashion the aggressive, activist spirit of modern society, subduing and harnessing natural forces for the "greater good." Thus, their modernist cultural centrality and their dimensions and impacts have earned dams the vast majority of serious examinations of displacement and resettlement. These same characteristics have also generated significant resistance, producing over time large social movements and the most formally constituted resistance organizations. In like measure, then, the most detailed descriptions and analyses of resistance movements have been
similarly focused on those confronting dam construction, displacement and resettlement. Moreover, among dam resistance movements, one in particular, the Narmada Bachao Andolan in India, has garnered by far the most attention of any other around the world. Numerous studies, books, dissertations and articles, not to mention websites, listerves, films and videos focus exclusively on the NBA and the Sardar Sarovar Project, dwarfing in comparison the discussion of resistance in the rest of the world. Elsewhere the discussion of DIDR resistance to dams and other development projects is perhaps most developed in Latin America and, to some degree, Southeast Asia. While some documentation exists for Europe and Africa, the volume of materials on DIDR resistance in these sites does not compare with either India or Latin America, particularly Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Dams, in effect, have become one of the core issues in the entire debate over human rights and the environment in development. In some sense, dams and the anti-dam movement play an emblematic role for the entire resettlement problem, much as the rainforest has for the environmental movement. It is around the issue of dams that a formidable set of multilevel alliances has become organized, capable of creating institutions, challenging governments, and reforming multilateral development institutions. The expansion and success of the global anti-dam movement have led many to consider it as a model or prototype for other forms of resistance. While resistance to other forms of DIDR may learn much from the anti-dam movement, the symbolic and physical centrality of dams to the development process may have made social mobilization against dam construction easier than around other issues. That notwithstanding, dams share a number of core issues of human rights and the environment with other forms of infrastructural development around which social mobilization can be undertaken for resistance.

Other forms of development-induced displacement, such as conservation, urban renewal, mining, public use complexes, transportation, and pipelines, have received generally less attention as causes of resettlement, although urban renewal in the developed world have been closely examined since the 1950s (e.g. Gans 1962, Fried 1963) and more recently, conservation driven resettlement has received some attention. Generally, resistance to non-dam forms of DIDR has been consequently less carefully documented and analyzed. Therefore, there is considerable need for more research not only on other forms of development-induced displacement, but on resistance to such displacement as well. In particular, much greater attention should be paid to privately funded development projects that induce displacement and to the resistance movements that confront them. The significance of this form of research will only increase in the coming decade as privatization of previously publicly provided service increases. Indeed, privately funded development, as the outcome of market factor speculation, presents significantly different challenges to resisters as will be subsequently discussed.

Notwithstanding the imbalance in the contextual spread of resistance research, several bodies of work provide important insights and parallels into the nature of DIDR resistance. Most significantly, the growing body of literature on environmental movements, NGOs and social movements in general offers an array of conceptual tools with which to contextualize and analyze DIDR resistance movements within the broader framework of rights based mobilization and democratization. As will be more completely discussed later, DIDR resistance movements frequently become participants in a broader front of organized opposition to development as it has impacted peoples and environments. The publications of these movements and organizations themselves, often in the form of newsletters, bulletins, manifestos, and internal reports, produced to both inform the public and broaden their base, are a rich source of information and analysis. Electronic technology has also facilitated the
dissemination of information and analysis about DIDR resistance movements as well. List
servers and websites maintained by resistance organizations and allies provide almost same-
day coverage of activities and events in resistance campaigns around the world. This study has
drawn on all these resources, published and unpublished, including material sent out
electronically over list servers and websites.

Recently, confidence in the accuracy of much web-based material has been questioned
for its accuracy and analytical rigor. In such cases, where accuracy is a concern, attempts have
been made to confirm points or issues from other sources as well. However, the question of
the objectivity of much of the material associated with these struggles is in some ways
irrelevant; it is not intended to be objective, but to represent a distinctly political perspective
and thus serves as primary data for this study. By the same token, a great deal of research by
NGOs and other independent scholars has convincingly refuted both data and conclusions
arrived at by established authorities representing states and multilateral institutions, thus
casting serious doubt on the "objectivity," not to mention the analytical rigor, of the work
produced by such agencies. In that context, then, this report considers all information to be
inherently partial and political in nature, as must be the report itself. In so far as the discourse
of states, multilateral development banks (MDB) and corporations regarding DIDR rests on its
own self-validating authority, one purpose of this study is to provide a context for broadening
the legitimacy of the perspectives of local peoples with the development practice and policy
communities as well as the general public (Colchester 1999; Fisher, W.F. 1999,1995; Oliver-
Smith 1996). Indeed, this goal is also shared by a wide variety of NGOs, social movements,
academics, and other allies, including those within state administrations and MDBs.
III. THE PROBLEMATICS AND POLITICS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

Population removal has long been a much-employed strategy of conquest, pacification and territorial appropriation throughout history. The strategic displacement of peoples for purposes of various public policies sees documentation in historical sources as ancient as Herodotus and the Bible. The expropriation and appropriation of territory for economic goals has an almost equally antique tradition. The colonialist expansion of European societies in the modern period, to name just one, although probably the imperialist tradition with the most profound impacts, saw many examples of forced displacement of subordinated populations to further the expansion of market exchange and capitalist production. For example, much of the history of Native American-White contact and interaction deals with white land appropriation and resettlement schemes of violent and non-violent nature and subsequent Native American responses to these efforts (Fixico 1990; Levine and Lurie 1968). Certainly, for as long as dislocation has been an outcome of both public policy and private expansion, there has also been significant resistance. However, the kinds of DIDR resistance that most concern this report emerge and assume forms that are uniquely a part of the ideological, organizational and political climates and discourses of the late 20th century.

III.A. The Right to Develop and the Right to Development

It is only in the last half of the twentieth century that development emerged, fundamentally as an ideological debate between the capitalist and socialist worlds, to become a central theme in national and international political and economic discourse. Both sides adopted moral positions in their assertions that each model, as opposed to the alternative, provided for and guaranteed certain basic human rights. One camp privileged the political rights (freedom of expression, movement, congregation); the other foregrounded economic rights (freedom from want, freedom from exploitation and appropriation). Clearly, the emphasis on one kind of rights did not preclude attention to other kinds of rights, such as in the security of private or public property. In effect, each model claimed that following its dictates, both political and economic rights would be both protected and developed for the general well-being of national populations. In effect, each side justified its theoretical constructs and its practical strategies for the development of societies, particularly of the post-colonial world, on the basis of a concept of rights.

Out of these differing concepts of rights, and most especially out of the ideological struggle between the two interpretations, emerged a moral obligation to develop post-colonial societies in ways in which each form would enhance and develop human rights, particularly those privileged by each model. And from this moral obligation has emerged what James Ferguson has referred to as a "development industry" with major political and economic agendas to reproduce each idealized form of society (1990: 8). While, as mentioned earlier, the socialist model and agenda have, with some few exceptions, fallen by the wayside, the capitalist model of development and agenda is clearly ascendant with its agenda of transformation toward modern industrial market economies justified morally as the best means to combat poverty and raise standards of living on a global scale.

The moral agenda involves now not just the obligation to develop, but the right to develop as well. Both the obligation and the right to develop have been discourses that have been heartily embraced by the vast majority, if not in fact the entirety, of the post-colonial world elites. Adopting both the rhetoric and practice of the development industry, post-colonial nations have worked assiduously to expand the influence of both the state and the
market through major investments in infrastructure addressing national priorities based on the ideological constructions of a utilitarian nature, private property and a mass society based primarily on the identity of national citizenship. As a citizen of the nation one has the right to development through these institutions. Alternative constructions of the right to development stress smaller scale undertakings with lower environmental impact that address local priorities and respect local cultural autonomy and rights. As a citizen, one’s rights include participation in the decision making that impacts one’s life and community under this model.

At some fundamental level, DIDR resistance is a discourse about rights. DIDR pits the rights of the state and increasingly, private capital to develop against the rights of specific peoples targeted for resettlement. Article 1, Clause 3 of the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of December 4, 1986) established that "States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate natural development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well being of the entire population of individuals (as quoted in Dhagamwar, Thukral and Singh 1995). This concept is in some form replicated in numerous national constitutions around the world, establishing the state's right and duty to expand its capacity to serve the needs of its population. When the expression of national purpose involves infrastructural development that displaces people, the right belonging to the state of eminent domain allows for the acquisition of the necessary land with adequate compensation to the owners. There is an assumption that such development will produce benefits for all, not just a particular community or sector within the society. There is also an implicit expectation in these assertions that the state in activating its right to develop will act in an ethical fashion that respects the principles of democracy and the human rights of the people involved.

While the rhetoric that accompanies large-scale development projects frequently makes references to benefits for a general public, those who must suffer the costs that these projects entail tend to be quite specific communities. The costs that these communities are required to bear are often overwhelmingly heavy, at times, given current levels of expertise and competence, virtually unmitigatable. It is fundamentally the failure of the state and increasingly the private sector to undertake these projects in an ethical and competent fashion that produces conditions generating major forms of resistance. Furthermore, recently, the question of eminent domain has been receiving considerable scrutiny, as has the concept of "national purpose." National laws frequently determine compensation levels for land taken by eminent domain in ways both inadequate and inappropriate. Moreover, many indigenous groups consider themselves to be sovereign peoples whose prior rights over their territory exempt them from eminent domain or at least veto power over development projects on their lands (Colchester 1999: 13). Human rights groups have challenged the idea that national purpose can continue to be taken at face value. They question whether decisions arrived at through techno-managerial forms of Cost-Benefit analysis should set priorities rather than other standards of judgment such as distributive justice, the right to adequate livelihood, or the right to human dignity (Colchester 1999: 13).

Since resistance to development-induced resettlement essentially challenges the state and its hegemony over the territory and people within its borders, it may have profound implications for policy at local, national and international levels. In the sense that involuntary migration and resettlement are part of the means or outcomes of intentional, usually state driven development projects and strategies, the phenomenon of resettlement is, therefore, fundamentally a political one, a clash of contesting interests involving the use of power by one party to relocate another. Reigning development models, promoting large scale infra-structural
projects, transform social and physical environments, and espouse the concept of "the greatest good for the greatest number" rather than the rights of the less numerous and the less powerful. Although the record does not reflect it entirely, such a position assumes that the less powerful will benefit eventually, through the project itself or through a well-designed and implemented resettlement program. For some, within the framework of current economic structures and conditions, realism dictates acceptance of this development ideology. The opposing view tends to emphasize the rights of the less powerful and the significance of cultural diversity over what they consider to be ecologically risky and economically questionable projects.

III.B. Conceptual Ambiguities in DIDR

Despite the fact that population displacement and removal have been the focus of social scientific research and discussion for more than 30 years, there is still, particularly in the contemporary context, considerable ambiguity regarding a number of its basic conceptual features. This continuing ambiguity bears some significance for how the phenomenon of DIDR resistance is framed. A number of the other desk studies have broached these conceptual problems as well, but these issues are worth exploring again in the context of resistance.

III.B.i. Development: Economic Growth or Social Justice

Principle among these issues is the problem of what constitutes development in development-induced displacement and resettlement. The distinction between development defined in terms of economic growth as opposed to development defined in terms of the expansion of social, economic and political rights and power to broader sectors of the population has been mentioned. Development clearly involves a continuum of forms or expressions that includes the range between publicly funded projects designed to provide goods and services to a general public to national and state parks and reserves intended primarily to conserve publicly valued resources to the use of public funds to guarantee loans for private development of natural resources and environments, to wholly privately financed enterprises intended to reproduce capital. Moreover, the nature of a given development undertaking is inextricably entwined with the voluntary or involuntary nature of the displacement and migration.

III.B.ii. Voluntary and Involuntary Migration

A quick glance at the literature reveals that the vast majority of work in the field of DIDR has been focused on publicly funded, government driven projects the aim of which is to improve the economic and social conditions of variously defined groups of people. The resulting displacement from publicly funded projects is both voluntary in some cases and involuntary in others. When the public sector requires land or other resources for public purposes, it is conventionally bound by law to compensate or otherwise provide for those whose land and other resources are taken. The acceptance of compensation for losses does not necessarily warrant any conclusion about voluntary resettlement. Recently, the greater involvement of private capital in large-scale development projects, sometimes alone and sometimes in joint ventures with the public sector, has been noted and indeed, become the aim of much public policy at both international and national levels.

The involvement of private capital shifts the goal of projects from improving social and economic conditions to enhancing the reproduction of capital in the form of profit, which
is also considered to enhance the well being of the society. Such enterprises are primarily
intended to enhance the accumulation of capital by private interests, but constitute and are
interpreted and assisted administratively and fiscally by governments as a form of economic
development as well. The market and public administration have on occasion acted together to
force the displacement of populations. As land occupied by low-income communities
increases in value because of surrounding development, the tax rates increase as well.
Individual owners may find themselves unable to pay the increased taxes and become forced to
forfeit their land or sell to developers at reduced prices. The construction, for example, of
large-scale tourist resorts, oil exploration and extraction, pipelines, or mines in rural areas often
occasions the displacement and resettlement of numerous communities. Such enterprises
usually rely on the market to establish land prices that are to serve as compensation for those
displaced, although there are cases, such as the Rio Tinto Corporation, that have undertaken
resettlement projects for communities to be displaced by their mining operations (Rio Tinto
2001). Where communities are displaced by contamination or other unacceptable conditions
created by the enterprise, other forms of compensation may be provided, either voluntarily or
through legal mandate.

Generally, people displaced by private development are considered to be voluntary
migrants, having accepted a sum of money in exchange for their land. In the dominant
ideology, market transactions are seen as entered into voluntarily by free economic actors.
Market transactions have the effect of disguising the difference between voluntary migration
and involuntary displacement. Many factors may influence such a decision to accept payment
or other forms of compensation for land, not the least of which in both public and privately
driven displacement are various forms of coercion. Private enterprise projects, with or without
government assistance or collusion, may, without legal sanction, withhold crucial information
from rural dwellers, depriving them of making informed economic decisions regarding their
land. Also not infrequent are various forms of violence and other coercive measures that are
inflicted by private interests, often with the collusion or willful ignorance of governments, on
individuals and communities that display reluctance to surrender their land and resources to
these private undertakings. For example, a consortium made up of Unocal, Total of France, the
Petroleum Authority of Thailand and the Myanma Oil and Gas Corporation has employed the
military to forcibly relocate people who occupy land to completely control the region through
which a pipeline will be constructed (Free Burma Coalition n.d.). The fate of the displaced in
these cases is often identical to those displaced by publicly funded projects with little or
inadequate resettlement components. Such a fate is being increasingly resisted by local
community organizations in various localities around the world (see Hacienda Looc case
study). Other government organized resettlement projects, although generally better funded
than involuntary projects (Cernea 1999; Eriksen 1999), also reveal a variation of degree in
regard to the voluntary nature of resettlement. Major questions have arisen regarding the
"voluntary" nature of the transmigration project in Indonesia. The U.S. organized and funded
Zero Option project in Bolivia to combat coca production called for the voluntary resettlement
of the peasant population of the Chapare region to other parts of the country, the complete
eradication of all coca fields and the closing of the region to any further colonization (Sanabria
1993:190). In response, a national march was organized in 1994 by the five tropical
federations of Cochabamba from Villa Tunari in the Chapare to the center of La Paz to protest
the Zero Option Project (Contreras 1995:22). Clearly, resistance movements call into question
the voluntary nature of much of this "voluntary" displacement.

III.B.iii. Resistance and Protest
Therefore, the nature of the development project will lead to a construction of the displacement process as either voluntary or involuntary. I would suggest that the forms of resistance that are undertaken by communities be employed as one measure by which the voluntary or involuntary nature of the displacement process is considered. The conceptual issue to be addressed here is how resistance is to be defined. The phenomenon of resistance has emerged as a major interest of social science and humanistic research over the past twenty years. As Ortner notes, resistance at one time was a fairly unambiguous concept, connoting an oppositional response to the exercise of domination, which itself was seen unproblematically as a fixed and institutionalized form of power (1995:174). Foucaultian interpretations of less formalized, more pervasive and everyday forms of power and James Scott’s work (1985; 1990) on equally “everyday forms of resistance” have complicated the delineation of what is or is not resistance. Resistance, as will be shown, also involves a continuum of forms, ranging from passive foot-dragging, non-appearance at official sites and times, inability to understand instructions and other "weapons of the weak" so ably described by Scott (1985) to protest meetings, civil disobedience to outright rebellion and warfare. Indeed, such has been the popularity of resistance in the social sciences, history, literature, cultural studies, etc that some have been prompted to impute acts of resistance to a very wide variety of cultural expressions. For example, some have designated the large prison population in the United States as political prisoners because the acts for which they have been imprisoned are interpreted as forms of resistance against the injustices of the economic system rather than mere economic crimes. An important point to realize here is that between the poles of no resistance and active resistance a variety of motivations, goals, and actions may be present. The lack of overt resistance does not indicate that displacement is at all voluntary. Where governments have a history of abuse and coercion, displacement may be accepted as the only survivable alternative, but it is hardly voluntary. By the same token, there are instances in which active resistance does not always indicate a primary agenda of reluctance to relocate. In these instances, resistance becomes a tool of negotiation to increase the levels of compensation.

III.C. The Politics of DIDR Resistance Research

One question that remains to be explored is that of research. One of the more difficult questions of social research involves the use of information that is gathered and compiled on the activities of individuals and groups. This problem has a long history, but it has become a significant element in contemporary social and policy research particularly since the early 1970s when a number of projects, such as the Thailand counterinsurgency research and the Camelot Project, pursued and revealed information about informant communities that proved highly damaging to them. Concerns about risk to informants were expressed by researchers exploring the politics of resistance among such groups as the American Indian Movement (AIM), particularly when potentially illegal acts of disruption were being considered as possible tactics in the struggle. Research among populations involved in various illegal economic activities such as drug production, distribution and consumption, smuggling, prostitution, or simple retailing without licenses in the informal economy has the potential of endangering informant communities with legal sanctions or worse. Such risks must also be recognized for research among resistance movements of various kinds, particularly DIDR resistance. Disclosure of movement formation, leadership, and strategizing carries with it the potential of both compromising specific individuals as well as providing information useful in co-opting, preempting or disarming DIDR resistance movements. Although most resistance movements are strategically public in their activities and transparent in their goals, in part to contrast with the often more covert agendas of projects, which frequently are unwilling to disclose important information relating to planning and schedules, great care must be taken in
the analysis of DIDR resistance movements to avoid disclosures that could compromise individuals and organizations. The avoidance of these kinds of disclosures should be balanced with the importance of DIDR resistance research. DIDR resistance research can contribute to our understanding of the development process by articulating the perspectives of people who are the objects, indeed, the victims of the development process to the policy and scientific communities that can alter and amend the destructive features of this process. DIDR resistance research displays and analyzes the important perspectives and critiques that are provided by resistance for a reworking of a development agenda that has deep and abiding problems. Resistance brings into high relief the serious defects and shortcomings in policy frameworks, legal options, assessment and evaluation methodologies, and lack of expertise in implementation that plague much of the development effort. However, the question of how we can explain movements without compromising them remains difficult and should be in the forefront of the research concerns.

IV. DIDR RESISTANCE: DIVERSITY, COMPLEXITY AND DYNAMISM

IV.A. Variation by Cause

The form and development of resistance will be shaped in part by the nature of the force or forces threatening a population with resettlement. Some forces are clearly resistible, others permit the possibility of resistance and still others preclude resistance altogether. For example, forced removal by wartime military forces is difficult if not impossible to resist for unarmed populations. Many environmental conditions triggered by natural disasters result in conditions that require relocation through sheer destruction or because the environment has been made more hazardous. Development projects, while frequently massive in scale and formidable in political support, however, present more variable contexts for the possibility of resistance. Development projects are not forces of nature and, at least initially tend not to resort to military force and violence to achieve their goals of resettling a population. Many tribal and peasant peoples generally interpret development projects as products of a larger society that is the source of a series of broad scale problems with which they have had to cope or resist for some time. In effect, development projects present as a form of gradual onset disaster that offers both time and space for contestation.

The involuntary resettlement of individuals, groups and entire communities of people who occupy land where physical infrastructure and production facilities are numerous and varied. The dams, industries, mining, commercial agriculture and mariculture, communication networks, irrigation systems, pipelines, road building, urban renewal, public use facilities (sports complexes, shopping malls, parks, museums, performing arts centers, etc) tourist resorts and gentrification as well as conservation measures like national parks and wildlife preserves that constitute the goals, infrastructure and outcomes of development, all generate the displacement of large numbers of people from their environments and their livelihoods.

The nature of the impact of each of these and other causes of resettlement will vary a great deal, each eliciting different kinds of responses and resistance goals, strategies and outcomes. For example, environmental impacts of projects will differ, and those impacts will affect different populations and subgroups of those populations differently producing different degrees and forms of resistance. For example, the same resettlement project may affect tribal peoples and peasants in different ways, eliciting varied responses of acceptance or resistance from each, depending on their experience of the project, their prior experience with the state, and the nature of the losses that each group suffers. Moreover, resistance to DIDR frequently
becomes the lead issue for the expression of protest over a complex of issues. As Acselrad and Da Silva note, the struggle against resettlement becomes a complex of struggles against losses of productive resources, against inadequate compensation, against changed relationships with the environment, against non-compliance with commitments made by project authorities, against violence from host populations, and against disrespect for local culture and knowledge (2000:11).

Although the state has been largely responsible and perhaps the most visible implementer of projects involving resettlement, increasingly the private sector is becoming a major initiator of projects that displace people. Private interests are taking a greater role in financing and developing large-scale infra-structural projects such as dams, mining, housing projects, tourist resorts and large urban public use complexes (stadiums, conference centers, etc) that frequently displace and resettle people. The involvement of the private sector in development projects that displace people parallels its role in industrial pollution and environmental degradation as side effects of industrial and agricultural development that also are increasingly displacing people (Eriksen 1994; Edelstein 1988; Levine 1982; Hewitt 1997). In the case of mining, for example, relocation is often necessitated because of the contamination caused by the operations as much as the actual construction of the mine itself. In the vast majority of cases of displacement by environmental causes, little assistance in the form of resettlement is offered and this lack frequently elicits considerable resistance. Much displacement also takes place as a form of indirect effect of public and private development, often in combination. For example, two outcomes of the construction of the Kariba dam in Zambia were increasing investment in commercial fishing along the northern shoreline of the lake, displacing local fishermen, and the creation of a large irrigation farm in 1985 that displaced more than 1600 people, more than 25 years after the construction of the dam (Johnston 2000:9-10). As diverse as the forms of development projects that occasion resettlement are, equally widespread and diverse are the forms of resistance such that a simple inventory of instances would be meaningless, apart from the basic numbers, if they could in fact, actually be compiled. In summary, different kinds of resettlement will evoke different responses, ranging from acceptance to resistance, and within resistance, very different kinds of strategies, tactics and goals.
IV.B. The Diversity of the Displaced

Although the pattern is not uniform, a significant percentage of those who face removal, whatever the cause, frequently come from the most disadvantaged sectors of society. The privileged or powerful of a society are rarely obliged to abandon their homes and communities because the land is needed for infra-structural, industrial or public use site development. Generally speaking, the political power of elites precludes the possibility of state claims of eminent domain and the market price of lands owned by the wealthy diminishes its attractiveness for purchase by private developments. Since dislocation resulting from development projects occurs first at the level of local community, the variety of peoples around the world facing this challenge is extremely wide, ranging from remote tribal groups, to peasants whose linkages with the state and market have considerably longevity, to the citizens of regional towns and large cities. Although not invariably the case, the communities that must confront the challenge of dislocation and resettlement are frequently from the ethnic and racial minorities of their nations.

Consequently, when development projects, generated by the state or private interests, displace people and communities, the protests and resistance evoked often comes from those sectors of a population least heard in a nation’s political discourse. Resistance to resettlement, however, is not limited to people whose lives are directly impacted by projects. In the last three decades, the cause of peoples threatened with or actually impacted by resettlement has been taken up on numerous levels by a wide variety of groups and organizations around the world. Local, regional, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements with a wide variety of missions and agendas have joined and assisted in the struggle of peoples around the world to resist development induced displacement and resettlement. From the channels accessed through these organizations, information and economic resources are generated and other allies, both sympathetic individuals and groups are contacted. The electronic media, including email list-serves and web-pages, are provided for the cause by these groups, disseminating information about important events in the struggles of people to supporters around the world within days, if not hours, of their occurrence. This cyberactivism is an essentially new and absolutely revolutionary feature of grass roots political activism. Electronic forms of communication are now an established feature of DIDR resistance. (see below).

IV.C. Complex Responses

The process of development has always met with mixed responses by those affected, ranging from enthusiastic participation, cautious compliance, begrudged acquiescence to protest and resistance. Indeed, the responses of people to resettlement are complex. It is not just an issue of reluctance to move, of place attachment or inertia. As resettlement is what I have called in other contexts, a totalizing experience in its capacity to impact virtually every domain of individual and community life, the responses and motivations for acceptance or resistance are as complex and diverse, spanning the spectrum from purely material considerations to the most deeply felt ideological beliefs and concerns (Oliver-Smith 1996). Equally as diverse, protests and resistance to resettlement by development projects and practices have taken many forms and expressions, ranging from passive obstruction, spontaneous protest, sabotage, rallies, sit-ins, construction site occupations, teach-ins, courses, films, videos, folk dramas, stories, puppet shows, media campaigns, training programs, list-serves and web pages, hunger strikes, suicide squads, road blocks, guerrilla warfare, fliers, law suits, restraining orders, lobbying, political party action, conferences and seminars,
declarations and many other strategies and tactics. Such actions take place in villages and towns, at project sites, in state and national capitals, at the offices of multilateral institutions and international organizations, in cyberspace, and at conferences and seminars in schools and universities around the world. Resistance to DIDR involves a diverse array of political forms, processes and actions of individuals, groups, communities, regions, nations and international organizations.

Resistance to DIDR also produces a complex array of purposes and initiatives blending environmental, social, cultural and economic concerns that may focus on resisting specific issues or broadly general models of development. DIDR is a multidimensional and totalizing phenomenon, impacting people in virtually every aspect of their lives and eliciting complex responses. Disentangling resistance to resettlement from resistance to other specific project impacts as well as from a more general form of resistance to development as currently practiced is a major challenge, but it may also be a false goal since resistance to resettlement often constitutes a first stage in the evolution of a broader offensive against development practice. DIDR is just one of the insults that people must endure when certain forms of development are imposed upon them. By the same token, as will become apparent, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between people displaced by development projects like dams that alter or destroy environments and those displaced by environmental degradation caused by private sector development (Liederman 1995, 1997). The line between someone displaced by the inundation of their home by a dam reservoir and someone displaced because their land or air or water has been made unusable by industrial or mining pollution can be a fine one. For example, the flooding of agricultural lands for shrimp cultivation by private enterprise in nations as diverse as Honduras, Indonesia and India has caused irreversible changes in landscape and displaced thousands with no resettlement plan at all provided (Stonich 1999; Chadha 1999). In industrial development, a petrochemical plant in the Raigad district of Maharashtra has so polluted the atmosphere that neighboring villagers have been forced to sell their lands and move into the slums of Mumbai (Chadha 1999:147). The constraints on livelihood practices imposed on peoples who reside in areas recently designated as national parks and preserves constitutes an imposed form of environmental change that can be envisioned as a form of structural displacement. Furthermore, people displaced by the expansion of export based production in Honduras into the fragile rain forest environment of La Mosquitia then become subject to further displacement for conservation purposes. As such, resistance to resettlement may contain or overlap with multiple agendas and priorities that embrace issues of national security, sovereignty, indigenous and other minority affairs, environmental destruction, human rights, land and property rights, religion and spirituality, cultural heritage and economic development, to name just a sample of the issues involved.

IV.D. DIDR Resistance Dynamics

Resistance to DIDR is also extremely dynamic, both changing with conditions itself and influencing as well those individuals, groups and institutions with which it intersects. Indeed, the relationship with a displacing development project is long-term and evolves over a long period of time. Resistance, in fact, has been known to appear often decades after displacement and resettlement have been accomplished (Jing 1999-see Yongjing case study). When resistance organizations encounter development projects, agencies and national policies, all participants may initiate a process of co-evolution, possibly altering the identities, definitions, categories, strategies and policies associated with resettlement primarily and ultimately the development project itself (Dwivedi 1998; Rapp 2000). Resistance may lead to important changes in resettlement policy and practice of institutions and states and ultimately a
reframing of fundamental questions in development. In effect, communities and organizations in resistance evolve in response to and in turn oblige national governments and multilateral agencies to evolve. Furthermore, people who resist resettlement and their allies are contributing to important reconceptualizations of the development process in general toward more sustainable, less disruptive, smaller scale notions of development. By the same token, these struggles in themselves contain and express all the complexities, contradictions and dilemmas that development presents in their emergence and evolution as they interact with both allies and opposing interests at a variety of levels.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS IN DIDR RESISTANCE

Resistance to DIDR in its most contemporary forms must be seen as taking place in an era in which an extraordinary growth of organized social action of a wide variety of identities and forms has evolved. There has been a virtual organizational explosion on a global scale that brings together in alliances and collaborations the widest possible varieties of peoples at differing scales and contexts, contending with a wide array of challenges and problems. This extraordinary expansion of activism has been in part a response by people of a vast array of identities to needs or challenges not met or presented by government. The expansion has unquestionably been facilitated by greater access to both transportation and communications technology. Resistance to resettlement in its contemporary forms takes its place as one aspect or dimension of an increasing grass roots activism in collaboration with non-local allies currently addressing a broad array of issues around the world. Resistance to resettlement thus occurs in multiple contexts and environments, ranging from the local project site to regional, national and international venues in which the issues of development, displacement, environment and human rights are debated as issues of policy and practice, culture and identity. The complexity of linkages and relations among collaborating and occasionally opposing parties brings to the fore problems of coherence, consistency, representativeness and competing agendas among cooperating entities. The details of these issues will be discussed in the ensuing sections of this report.

The efforts to resist resettlement thus involve people in pursuit of specific goals in organized action in multi-tiered levels or spheres of political action. While most social actors will have some kind of presence on the site of the development project that relocates people, all of them will establish links to other social actors at the national and international levels. Outcomes of specific actions to further local interests taken in one sphere or level may resonate in sites very distant from the local context. The levels are linked in complex relationships generating both cooperation and conflict within and among them, involving participants of widely differing identities and organizational forms. Generally these connections across levels of the social scale enable local resistance groups to access assistance in the form of financial resources, media campaigns, political pressure or other forms of aid. Employing the term “fractal” to describe them, Little indicates that these linkages are not organized or mobilized in any orderly fashion, but are most frequently irregular and volatile, varying by the historical moment relating to the issue and the strength and density of contacts (2000: 10). The term “fractal” has come to stand for a way to describe and think about shapes that are irregular, fragmented, jagged and broken up, but with an organizing structure that lies hidden within the complications of the shapes themselves (Gleick 1987: 113-4). The relationships that are established among social actors in struggles to resist resettlement do in fact take on an irregular and unpredictable character, but they are also joined by the effort to further the common interests involving human rights and the environment of the groups articulated across the different levels of scale. In that sense, while the relationships may be irregular and
unpredictable, the compatibility of those interests, whether involved in halting displacement, improving resettlement or urging more sustainable forms of development, helps to organize their interactions and channel their efforts toward goals that are similar or compatible. This compatibility is not inevitable, however. One of the challenges facing these interconnected organizations is articulating a coherent and consistent set of interests with such diverse constituencies. Notwithstanding the irregularity and unpredictability of activation of such linkages, resistance to DIDR joins local people to each other in grass-roots organizations (GROs) and to others in many other institutional formats such as social movements, NGOS, regional and national governments, multilateral organizations (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, etc), and international organizations (United Nations, European Economic Community, etc).

Resistance to development-induced resettlement in most cases takes place outside the context of formally constituted governmental or party structure in the organized collective action of people in communities and/or in groups both locally and extra-locally. Such organized activities involving a relative degree of continuity over time are designed to achieve a particular goal or set of goals and are manifested in four major forms that have played important roles in the various forms of expression that resistance to resettlement has taken. These forms are Social Movements, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Grass Roots Organizations (GRO) and Transnational Networks. In some instances, resistance to resettlement movements have become subsumed as aspects or dimensions of larger human rights oriented social movements. In other instances, DIDR resistance movements have evolved into social movements or NGOs themselves.

V.A. Social Movements

Over the past four decades, social movements have become a particularly important form of collective action for people to engage in to promote or resist change as they act on behalf of common interests or values to which they strongly adhere (McAdam and Snow 1997:xviii). However, the term social movement must be employed with caution. There are many kinds of organizational activity of a neighborly or communal character that do not automatically qualify as social movements, although in some cases they may form the base or provide the pre-conditions for the formation of a social movement. Social movements must develop a sense of collective purpose and the kind of political goals that involve interaction with other political actors. The political goals of social movements are expressed as claims to rights or on the extension and exercise of rights. The demands of social movements in specific situations thus call upon a common language of rights that contributes to the establishment of alliances among them. This language of rights provides the means to organize the elements of social struggle and has found broad application by many different movements in many different cultures. Since this language has shown itself to be very effective in mobilization, there is a kind of strategic economy in its the adoption and adaptation. The language of rights, thus provides a form of 'master frame' for promoting effective social mobilization (Foweraker 2001: 4). Since in the modern era, the power to grant or withhold rights is vested primarily in the state, social movements make demands on the state. In that sense, social movements seek to mediate the relationship between the individual and the state, particularly in the protection of the individual from state oppression by defending their rights (Foweraker 2001). Unlike NGOs or interest groups, social movements must also mobilize their supporters to pursue their goals, although they stop short of guerrilla activity or armed revolutionary insurrection (Foweraker 1995:4).
The number and scope of social movements increased in the late 1960s in Europe and the United States among groups, such as women, students and blacks, who were not formally represented by specific parties and fell outside of standard class analysis. Since that time, basically two approaches to social movements have predominated in the analysis of how social movements form and persist through time. Both schools have tended to focus on analyzing the reasons for individual participation in social movements and as such the debate has relevance to DIDR resistance. The earlier theoretical approach to social movements, the Resource Mobilization school, based on rational choice theory (Hechter 1987), holds that it is irrational, or at best non-rational, for an individual to contribute to a collective cause from which he or she will derive no benefit, either material or non-material. People are said to form or become members of solidarity groups because they judge that it is in their individual interest to do so. In sum, an explicit individual calculus of cost-benefit is said to exist in social movements. People will associate themselves with social movements when they calculate that individual benefits outweigh the costs of joining (Mayer, McCarthy and Zald 1988).

However, one of the most persistent issues in social movement research is the tension between the rational calculus of individual self-interest and the bonds of sentiment, affect and other gemeinschaft emotions in the formation of solidarity groups. Indeed, there is a distinct impression that in discovering or laying bare the rational basis individuals have for joining social movements, resource mobilization theorists establish the worthiness of such movements and give their members true scientific justification as rational human beings, meanwhile they consign those for whom no rational calculus of cost-benefit can be discovered a kind of emotional, immature, or primitive state of confusion. In this way, certain kinds of movements based on concepts of collective identity, spiritual values, or aesthetics, such as many DIDR resistance movements, can be dismissed as patently irrational and given short shrift by policymakers and other authorities.

However effective rational choice theory may be at explaining or imputing a rational calculus to some forms of solidarity, any understanding of the power of expressed affect, such as common identity, to motivate people collectively to action is lost in them. In a sense, there may or may not be a rational cost benefit equation for the mobilization of resources that accounts for solidarity, but such an equation also may or may not provide sufficient energy to coalesce individuals. Nor may such a calculation always move people to action. More fundamentally, rational choice may provide the reason for solidarity, but reason may not always move people to action. A recognition of this feature was reflected in the shift from the resource mobilization model (rational choice theory) toward "social constructionist" approaches which emphasize meaning, affect, cultural content and social context in research on social movements (Mueller 1992: 5). Although much of this new social movement research took place among middle class movements in the US and Europe, a significant amount of research also focused on urban, women’s, indigenous and peasant movements in Latin America. Failure to understand and factor into its analysis the power of emotion expressed through ritual, symbol and ideology to mobilize people undermines the explanatory power of RMA.

In many contemporary social movements, including resistance to DIDR, it is more than evident that some attempt at synthesis of these two approaches was needed. Material or practical issues mobilize people, but so do concerns of identity and affect. In attempting to explore how a collective actor is formed and maintained, Alberto Melucci asserted “only if an actor can perceive his consistency and his continuity will he be able to construct his own script of the social reality and compare expectations and realizations”(1988:340 as quoted in Hilhorst
2000). However, Hilhorst, recognizing the internal diversity of most social movements, sees a difficulty in assuming a unitary collective identity for everyone in a social movement. She suggests that the concept of identification is more helpful for understanding the highly situational and fluid quality of much adherence to contemporary social movements (2000: 36). This focus on identification, while not necessarily excluding the concept of identity, better captures the nature of affiliation of the diverse participants in social movements such as those dedicated to resisting development-induced displacement and resettlement.

Identification with a social movement is constructed around a shared set of meanings. Social movements carry, transmit, mobilize and produce meanings for participants, antagonists and observers. In “collective action frames” social movements structure campaigns in terms of meanings that have the power to mobilize because they are based on the multiple forms of experience of participants such as the economic costs, environmental destruction, and cultural losses that people experience in DIDR. These collectively held meanings, framed in a language of rights, serve to dignify and justify the movement (Snow and Benford 1988: 37). Movement leaders choose symbols that will resonate with the cultural values of the diverse groups they appeal to as well as the sources of official culture (Tarrow 1994: 122). Hilhorst, basing her contentions on James Scott’s concepts of “hidden transcripts” (1990) contends that the process of meaning formulation is much less carefully plotted by leaders and more non-linear, negotiated, multi-polar and not necessarily internally consistent or coherent. Those issues and concepts that provide meaningful symbols and actions to participants are more processual, instead of unitary phenomena. Scott’s “hidden transcripts” are the narratives that peers exchange in understanding their situation, and, according to Scott, provide the basis for much of the action undertaken by individuals and groups in political contexts (Hilhorst 2000: 37).

V.B. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

Many of the specific aspects of social movements in fact may take the form of what has been termed a “non-governmental organization” (NGO). NGOs are not generally social movements, but may become allies or parts of social movements. NGOs have become an integral feature of contemporary development policy and practice. Since the appearance of NGOs in significant numbers on the scene in the mid 1970s, they have been variously considered as the best means for the distribution of development resources, as the best providers of development expertise, as covert and not-so-covert agents of the Neo-liberal development agenda, as piratical profit-making parasites on both rich donors and poor recipients, as undemocratic, unaccountable, self-selected representatives who exploit their naïve constituencies for power and profit, and as enlightened organizations devoted to progressive environmental and human rights causes and development alternatives. They are all of these things and more. Indeed, the proliferation of NGOs devoted to an endless array of issues over the last quarter century virtually guarantees that they will be very difficult to characterize in general terms.

From the development perspective NGOs have frequently been seen as catalysts through which local people could become participants in rather than objects of development efforts. Characterized generally by specific activist agendas, NGOs in some cases have also been accused of manipulation of local communities to further their own visions of development. In other cases, however, NGOs have adopted local priorities and needs as their own and militated effectively for them. NGOs are generally beholden to two fundamental constituencies: donors and communities. They depend on donors for funding and they justify
their roles and actions by the claim that, as non-governmental organizations, NGOs can eliminate many of the problems of inefficiency and corruption inherent in the bureaucratic functioning of governmental agencies. NGOs depend on communities for legitimacy. Since their fundamental model is participatory, without the active involvement of local people, they lose their raison d’être and become simply top-down development professionals.

NGOs take different roles in resettlement work. Some NGOs work for the entity promoting the development project in the planning of resettlement communities. Others work to improve the conditions of those communities that have accepted or have already been resettled. For example, the NGO Arch-Vahini found total opposition to the Sardar Sarovar Project unrealistic and elected to improve resettlement policy of the Indian states involved and the resettlement conditions of the communities designated for relocation (Dwivedi 1998: 150). And still others work to assist those communities that have chosen to resist resettlement, providing information, media assistance, organizational capacity, networking and financial resources. The increasing importance of NGOs in development work, including their access to significant financial resources, has greatly enhanced their participation in the various problems in resettlement in general. The expansion of the number of NGOs working in DIDR resistance is largely among those devoted to environmental and human rights issues. (See International Rivers Network Case Study). The linkage of these two global movements, environmentalism and human rights, with the resistance of people threatened with relocation or suffering from poorly implemented resettlement entails a critique not only of the model of development that accepts the necessity of relocating people for national priorities, but also a questioning of the scale of development interventions that create major disruption for both people and environment.

V.B.i. Case Study: The International Rivers Network

The transnational anti-dam movement began in Europe and the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly as the environmental impacts of dams built between the 1920s and the 1960s began to be perceived and assessed by the growing environmental movement. The movement had considerable success in halting the construction of new dams, partially through its effective campaigns and partially through the dearth of good sites for new dams. The decline of big dam construction in the United States, however, signaled an intensification of dam building efforts in the developing world. Hydrotechnology had been portrayed to the third world as a source of clean energy and as an essential dimension of development. In effect, technology that was considered damaging and obsolete in the developed world was being exported to the third world without regard for the destruction and costs it implied. Resistance in the developing world to dam building and DIDR began growing simultaneously with project planning and construction, resulting in the cancellation of dams on the Silent River in India, the Franklin River in Tasmania and the Nam Chaon Dam in Thailand in the early 1980s (Williams 1998).

Among the many organizations involved in DIDR resistance, the International Rivers Network (IRN) stands out for the leadership role that it and its various staff and members have played in assisting peoples impacted by large scale water projects, especially big dams. Based in the United States with offices and staff in many areas of the world, the IRN began modestly. The increasingly active local, national and transnational struggles around the world against dams led a California-based hydrologist, Philip B. Williams, who had participated in the US anti-dam movement, to collaboratively establish a bi-monthly newsletter to chronicle and assist the efforts of "citizens organizations that are working to change policies on large dam construction throughout the world" (IRN 1985-86: 1). Produced by a volunteer group of environmental activists, concerned professionals and human rights advocates of different nationalities, the International Dams Newsletter highlighted in its first issue articles on the Bakun Dam in Malaysia, Three Gorges in China, the Silent River and Sardar Sarovar projects in India as well as recommended readings and an activists’ access section. With support acquired from the Tides Foundation and the NGO, Friends of the River, 1500 copies of the International Dams Newsletter were distributed to individuals and organizations in 56 different nations (Khagram 1999: 271).
Response to the newsletter was extremely positive. With the final issue of 1987, the newsletter became the World Rivers Review (WRR) and the group formally took the name the International Rivers Network (IRN). The WWR provides in six issues a year extremely current information on all water projects, but tends to focus on dam construction, funding, planning, and DIDR resistance movement developments around the world. With the change to the new name, a shift in focus was also adopted. "It is time for us to stop devoting all our energies to fighting individual projects and start developing and promoting a broadly focused alternative view of water management" (WRR 1987:2). The following year the IRN organized a global conference in San Francisco on the costs and failures of big dams, attended by 60 anti-dam activists and scholars from 25 countries (WRR 1988: 1).

The participants drew up the "San Francisco Declaration and a Watershed Management Declaration, the first of several key declarations on dam construction and DIDR the IRN was to play a role in developing. The San Francisco Declaration called for a moratorium on big dam building which failed to adhere to 17 conditions or provisos, such as veto power over the project for affected people and their inclusion in the planning process, free access to information on the project, guarantees that the project does not threaten protected or areas of scientific or educational importance, among others (WRR 1987:7). Other results of the San Francisco conference were to broaden the role of the IRN from information clearing house to international secretariat, to form an interim steering committee composed of 12 representative from nine regions, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, Middle/Near East, Europe and North America, to establish program priorities, and to establish a network contact in each region to improve communication between local activists and the secretariat.

Since the late 1980s the IRN has grown, developing a professional staff of activists with training in economics, biology, engineering, hydrology, anthropology, human rights issues and environmental sciences. The permanent staff now numbers more than twenty and it has created an international network of activists, supporters, funders, advisors and volunteers (IRN 2000a). Shifting its main offices from San Francisco to Berkeley, it also began to build an impressive library of published and unpublished materials relating to dams, river development and displacement and resettlement issues. That library now constitutes a major world resource for researchers and activists working on issues of human rights and the environment. The knowledge base represented by staff expertise and the library is fundamental to IRN strategies in combating dams. Since the IRN frequently engages in debate with institutions with vastly greater resources at their disposal, such as the World Bank, they take great care in getting their facts right. Indeed, the accuracy and completeness of IRN reports is often far superior to that of similar documents produced by much larger institutions. For example, the IRN critique (McCully 1997) of World Bank's review of dam impacts (1996) seriously questioned the data and arguments and overall quality of the review, faulting it for lack of data, unsubstantiated claims, lack of evidence, failure to deal with key issues and misleading statements. The critique proved so effective that it became a major factor in the eventual formation of the World Commission on Dams. Silenced Rivers by Patrick McCully (1996), the Campaigns Director of the IRN, has also been hailed as one of the most incisive critiques of hydropower development.

The IRN challenges large-scale water development projects on a wide variety of fronts. It cooperates with numerous other NGOs concerned with environmental issues in furthering campaigns for more sustainable forms of development. The IRN also works with other human rights NGOs in campaigns to redress violations of the human rights of displaced groups of people as well as individuals, often NGO and GRO DIDR resistance leaders who have been abused, detained or imprisoned. It coordinates numerous campaigns, interfacing with local organizations, providing consultation and training in organization and mobilization for local activists throughout all phases of a struggle against a dam (IRN 2000a). The IRN also participates in efforts to reform the multilateral development banks (MDB) that are key funders of dams. The pressures exerted on the MDBs include improving through public input the internal guidelines and regulations of the particular institutions to establish standards to which they may be held accountable, and providing information on negative outcomes of MDB funded projects to convince national governments to withhold funds to the MDBs for such projects. With the increasing privatization of funding for large infrastructural projects, the IRN has developed similar strategies to attack funding sources. A recent campaign calls for the boycott of the Discover credit card whose parent company is assisting the funding of the Three Gorges Dam in China. The campaign features a tourism-like brochure entitled "Discover Three Gorges," emblazoned with the logo and colors of the Discover credit card issued by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, one of the world's largest investment bankers (40 billion dollars in capital assets) and a key underwriter of bonds for the China Development Bank, a primary funder of Three Gorges. The brochure contains key information and photographs on the environmental destruction and the enormous displacement of people that the Three Gorges Dam will create in the Yangtze River Valley. In addition, the brochure contains a letter to the CEO of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter announcing the signer's intentions to boycott the Discover card until the company ceases to fund Three Gorges (IRN 2000c). The brochure is part of a larger campaign to stop investment
in the Three Gorges dam and to pressure investment firms to become more environmentally and socially responsible. The website for this campaign is called "www.floodwallstreet.org."

In slightly less than 15 years the IRN has succeeded in placing the issue of dams and other destructive river development projects in the center of global environmental debate. Although initially the IRN was mainly an environmental organization, it very rapidly began to appreciate the major human rights violations that accompanied certain forms of river development and soon integrated the human rights issues associated with water projects into its mission and agenda. In many ways, the IRN is among a few key organizations that stand at the intersection between the environmental and human rights movements, recognizing the important relationship between the two and working simultaneously for both. According to Philip Williams, “IRN had evolved into a structured organization and our vision had expanded and changed. While our analysis of the problem remained the same, we now understood that the destruction of rivers was as much a social and human rights issue as environmental. We started to see the importance of dams as centerpieces of an inappropriate development ideology and realized we could use dam fights as important weapons in a larger war against institutions like the World Bank or against dictatorial governments” (Williams 1997).

V.C. Grass Roots Organizations (GRO)

Grass roots organizations (GROs), also called “base groups,” “people’s organizations,” and “local organizations,” are membership organizations dedicated to the improvement of their own communities (Fisher, J. 1996: 60). GROs have deep social and cultural roots, many evolving from village councils, burial associations, water boards, religious brotherhoods and other traditional local organizations. Communal labor exchange institutions such as the faena of the Andes, Pana-Pana among the Miskito of Nicaragua, and torcapeon in northern Spain and others too numerous to mention also may provide the cooperative basis for the creation of more formalized organizations. In the last three decades there has been an extraordinary expansion of such groups over the world in response to the worsening social conditions associated with the widening disparity between the rich and poor, environmental destruction, the oppression of women and minorities, the debt crisis, and AIDS and the generalized uprooting of communities by both rural and urban development. Also associated with the growth of GROs are the more acute events such as wars, political oppression and natural disasters. Not always formed as reactions to calamity, many GROs have taken the form of migrant associations formed to assist the development of home communities. Over this period of time, tens of thousands of GROs have been created all over Asia, Latin America and much of Africa. For example, most of the estimated 30,000 Latin American squatter settlements have created their own GROs. Estimates put GROs at 12-15,000 for the Sahel countries of Africa alone (Fisher 1996: 60).

Frequently, new GROs are formed due to the inability of government to provide basic services such as health care, education, roads, or credit. In some cases GROs will address the needs of only a subgroup within a community and hence cannot always be assumed to represent every constituency. In recent years there has been a tendency particularly for successful GROs to expand their agendas to include larger, extra local concerns as well. An important element in the development of new GROs is the increase in numbers of migrants, perhaps the children of migrants, who acquire education and experience in larger contexts, and either return to home communities to found a GRO or assist an existing one to develop new resources and agendas. Often referred to as “Gramscian organic intellectuals,” these individuals play key roles as brokers or bridge people between local organizations and outside sources of support (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 43).

V.C.i. Case Study: CRAB TO MAB: From Local to National: the Movimento de Atingidos por Barragens
Due to the oil crisis of the early 1970s a great many oil-import dependent countries, Brazil among them, began to explore hydropower projects as a means to both relieve their import burdens and achieve energy self-sufficiency. The context for the beginning of Brazil’s hydropower experiments was an authoritarian military government that had been in place since a coup in 1964. The regime was run by an alliance of technocrats and military hardliners who believed that economic growth in the short run could not be achieved in an open political system. The economic model the alliance depended on for developing the nation was based on the centralization of resources in large state enterprises that would produce the infrastructure necessary to attract foreign investment capital. Enormous infrastructural projects such as the Itaipu dam, the Carajas mining project and the Trans-Amazon Highway were constructed, at the expense of social investments in health, education and housing and with grievous consequences for populations displaced or otherwise impacted by the projects (McDonald 1993:82).

Energy development, production and distribution in Brazil is the responsibility of a state agency, ELETROBRAS (Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.), which has regional subsidiaries such as ELETRONORTE (Centrais Eletricas do Norte) and ELETROSUL (Centrais Eletricas do Sul). In the late 1970s ELETROSUL, one of the earliest subsidiaries to initiate major projects, proposed a series of 25 dams for the Uruguai River Basin in the southern states of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. Initial estimates of population displacement were approximately 36,000 people from mostly small villages and rural areas. The citizens of the region put the estimate closer to 200,000. With assistance from the local university and a union, they further asserted that the dams were unnecessary because Brazil was still not consuming energy at the pace of current production levels. In the initial period, ELETROSUL displayed an extreme lack of consideration for local people, refusing to discuss the project with them and disregarding the stress that the prospect of displacement was generating (McDonald 1993: 85).

When it became clear to the people that ELETROSUL did not have the intention of resettling them, much less an actual plan, they began to organize meetings to discuss the problem. With the assistance of the Catholic Church, rural union leaders, and some university people who had access to information about the dam projects, roughly 150 meetings were held in communities in the region in 1978 and 1979 (McDonald 1993:86). The support of the religious organizations linked the protesters to NGOs in Germany, MISEREOR (The Campaign Against Hunger and Disease) and Bread for the World, that offered economic assistance. The meetings eventually coalesced in the organization on April 24, 1979 by 350 farmers and the allied representatives of the Catholic Comissao Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Land Commission) and Evangelical Lutheran church, the rural unions and the local university of the Comissao Regional de Atingidos por Barragens, CRAB (Regional Commission of People Affected by Dams). The collective identity of "atingido" was actively constructed and revised throughout the struggle to define who was a member of the affected population and who were allies (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 44).

Initially, the atingidos were not opposed to the dam. They simply wanted to receive fair compensation for their losses. However, ELETROSUL’s steadfast refusal to meet with or supply a minimum of information about the project to the people facing resettlement convinced them that further action was necessary. To keep the affected communities informed, CRAB began to publish A Enchente do Uruguai, (The Flood of the Uruguai), a newsletter that appeared irregularly. The newsletter ultimately proved to be an important organizing tool (McDonald 1993: 87).

The consistent failure of ELETROSUL to deal with the public’s concerns led the legislative assembly of Rio Grande do Sul to organize a public forum to discuss the Uruguai River Basin project and its impacts. ELETROSUL’s representatives again failed to satisfy the queries of the delegates, provoking them to publicly express their opposition to the project. The lack of respect so evident in ELETROSUL’s refusal to discuss the project convinced CRAB to raise the intensity of the conflict. CRAB and its members refused to be rendered invisible. The public forum signaled a shift for CRAB from a position favoring negotiation of compensation to outright opposition to the dam. In October of 1983 they undertook a petition drive that eventually gathered over 1 million signatures of dam opponents. In the process they acquired other allies such as the Federation of Agricultural Workers (FETAG). They also began to develop contacts with the victims of the other dam projects of Itaipu, Passo Real, Salto Osorio, Salto Santiago and eventually Paulo Afonso, Moxoto and Itaparica in the Northeast. The terrible losses of the people affected by Itaipu and Itaparica helped to forge important alliances for CRAB. The video made about the experiences of the people displaced by Itaipu proved to be an important recruiting tool. The strategic posture adopted by CRAB appeared in A Enchente do Uruguai:

It is not enough to promote or participate in negotiations to guarantee our right to remain on the land. It is necessary to broaden the fight, occupying all of the possible spaces in the newspapers, radio, television,
local government offices, schools, in conclusion, to take our message everywhere of why we fight against the dams (as quoted in McDonald 1993: 89).

Over 100 meetings were held throughout the region to discuss the project and the implications of CRAB's involvement in the struggle. CRAB was intent on achieving a strong base of support through democratic means. A general assembly was held. More aggressive postures also began to be adopted by CRAB and its member communities in the mid 1980s. Reservoir markers were destroyed in ceremonial bonfires, a coffin full of protest signs was burned, people marched, and highways were blocked. On one occasion 50 farmers from the Ita Dam region entered the worksite of the dam and captured one of the chief engineers, forcing him to stop work for a week (McDonald 1993: 95). Further captures of ELETROSUL workers in the region took place after a deadline for a concrete resettlement plan passed without results in July of 1987. Later that month CRAB organized a mass meeting of 5-7,000 farmers who surrounded the ELETROSUL offices in Ereim, demanding that a meeting with the president be scheduled or they would burn the building down. A representative group of atingidos was allowed to speak to the president and a meeting was scheduled at which a resettlement agreement was eventually signed (McDonald 1993: 96).

Part of CRAB's success was based on the support it had begun to acquire from other peasant movements in the region and from national and international movements. Communication was established with the Movimento sem Terra (the Landless Movement), the Polo Sindical (a rural trade union consortium established to contend with the regional power company building the Itaparica Dam), and through these to the rubber tappers movement (National Council of Rubber Tappers) in the Amazon and the Environmental Defense Fund internationally (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 53). In establishing these ties and linking their class based land concerns to environmental issues, CRAB constructed their cause as part of a larger struggle of rural people for land, confronting the socially and environmentally destructive forces of capitalist expansion (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 41). CRAB took a major role in organizing the First National Congress of People Affected by Dams in 1991. It was at this meeting that the national movement MAB (Movimento Nacional de Atingidos por Barragens, National Movement of People Affected by Dams) was created. CRAB became one of five regional member organizations and was renamed MAB-Sul (Movement of People Affected by Dams-Southern Region).

Since its successes against ELETROSUL in the 1980s, CRAB (Now MAB-Sul) has taken increasingly important roles nationally and internationally in human rights and environmental issues. In 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, CRAB and other allies persuaded environmentalist organizations to allow organizations without explicit environmental agendas to participate in the forums, thus creating a context for the formation of further alliances between environmental and class-based organizations (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 54). In 1997 MAB and MAB-Sul collaborated with the International Rivers Network in holding the First International Meeting of People Affected by Dams in Curitiba in Brazil. MAB and MAB-Sul also participated in planning the World Commission on Dams public hearings that were held in Brazil in 1999(Rothman and Oliver 1999: 53).

Another key element in both the growth in numbers and the expansion of GRO agendas is the increasing availability of outside support from national NGOs and social movements. International aid from governments and multilateral organizations has also been available to support the growth of local organizations. The availability of outside economic support, for example, has made it possible for GRO leaders and members to participate in the many international conferences and meetings taking place about the problems of development around the world. The spread of computers has made it possible for local organizations to communicate what they have learned with each other throughout nations and across borders and oceans. Thus, DIDR affected people around the world can now share the knowledge they have gained in land and resource disputes with provincial and national governments with each other over the internet and their websites. Indeed, communication technology and support for travel have enabled regional networks of individual GROs to form, and, in some cases, such as the aforementioned MAB (Dam Victims Movement) in Brazil, these networks coalesce and form NGOs or national social movements. And, in turn, the new NGOs and social movements become parts of transnational networks, which constitute a fourth organizational form in which DIDR resistance is carried out.
V.D. Transnational Networks

The most recent DIDR resistance organizational form to emerge, networks are composed of dynamic, multiple, reticulated transnational linkages. The term "reticulated" is key here. A reticulum, deriving from Latin for network, is a biological term, referring to cells that form an intricate interstitial network, ramifying though other tissues and organs, connecting any point to any other point, not necessarily of similar identity (Kearney 1996: 127). Facilitated by the rapid expansion of information technology, networks include individuals, NGOs, GROs and social movements, and often blur the distinctions between the sub-national, international and transnational (Kumar 1996: 42). Networks are most easily formed on the internet and when they cluster around political issues, in effect, politics takes place in a new venue. The internet is a global "network of networks" and has become both means and context for non-state organizations to pursue their goals in what a Rand Corporation study has referred to as "netwar". Netwar, when it applies to efforts in conflicts between states to disrupt, damage or change what a population knows or thinks it knows about itself, is in some ways simply high tech propaganda. However, the Rand Corporation study also suggested that "it (netwar) may be waged against the policies of specific governments by advocacy groups and movements involving, for example, environmental, human-rights or religious issues. The non-state actors may or may not be associated with nations, and in some cases they may be organized into vast transnational networks and coalitions" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt n.d. as quoted in Kumar 1996). Individuals, interest groups, organizations, and national governments employ the internet to find each other, communicate information, discuss issues and press their political agendas and in doing so, they have helped, according to Rosenau (1991), to change the world system from a traditional "state-centric" world to a "multicentric" world in which governments no longer entirely control specialized information nor entirely set the political agenda. Particularly in the areas of environment and human rights, networks now play increasingly significant roles in policy discussion and formation.

Networks challenge efforts at formal definition or succinct delineation of characteristics. In some ways, it is helpful to try to define a network in terms of what it is not as much as in terms of what it is. To a certain extent, they resemble social movements in their abilities to mobilize large numbers of people on behalf of their goals. However, networks may include formal organizations and sometimes members of governments. Networks have been referred to as "social movement organizations," but since they lack any vertical structure, any hierarchy of officials or departments, the term is misleading. Networks are composed of horizontal linkages between their members, with no one node in the network having decision-making power over any other. Networks are not social movements either. Social movements generally work to change their society in some fundamental way as to alter the power structure. Networks, by sharing information and strategies among many people work toward maintaining a constant capacity for changing specific policies when the need arises. Networks cannot be defined as campaigns either. When such a policy debate arises, networks undertake campaigns to address the issues, but the network changes with the issue. Thus, networks cannot be defined solely as issue areas since issues also change (Kumar 1996: 23).

One significant feature of networks, particularly those associated with environmental and human rights issues, is the broad array of constituents that adhere to them. In particular, two different kinds of activists stand out. First, these networks draw upon a community of scholars and experts who employ the scientific and technical knowledge base to broaden the existing discourse on particular problems. Secondly, networks depend on grassroots activists, often members of social movements, NGOs or GROs, who take more challenging stands on
issues and confront power-holders more directly (Kumar 1996: 32). These two groups definitely overlap with members from each taking on the roles and functions of the other not infrequently.

Still following Kumar (1996), it may be best to define a network in terms of what its constituents are able to do politically. First, network constituents can develop information technology options to transmit information rapidly throughout the network. Second, network constituents can develop media visibility and policy relevance for their issues. Third, network constituents can maintain a coherent structure despite the lack of a hierarchical system of organization. Fourth, network constituents can promote agenda related changes in the discourses on key issues. And finally, network constituents can promote linkages among diverse issues nationally and internationally to build momentum toward their goals (Kumar 1996: 26-27).

VI. A POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO DIDR RESISTANCE

The multiplicity of phenomena and processes operating in varying dynamics in DIDR resistance, present the significant challenge of identifying all the different social actors, scales and levels, as well as the strategies and goal structures operating in such contexts and then describing the way they interact with each other in the complex processes of political struggle (Little 2000). In the sense that DIDR resistance involves conflicts over the complex relationships, involving sets of rights and risks that people have with a physical environment, this effort falls under the rubric of political ecology. Political ecology blends a focus on the relationship that people have with their environment with attention to the political economic forces characteristic of the society in which they live that shape and condition that relationship. Political ecology largely focuses on the conflicts that emerge over rights to access, ownership and disposition of resources and environments for which different social groups, often characterized by widely differing socio-cultural identities and economic adaptational forms, contend. In DIDR resistance, although the stakes maybe expressed in economic, social and/or cultural terms, the fundamental issue is the contestation over rights to a place or the resources of a place.

VI.A. Vulnerability and Risk

Within the framework of political ecology, an approach can be developed employing a number of concepts that have emerged over the last twenty years that offer means to both identify and analyze the participants, scales and action levels as well as strategies and goal structures of DIDR resistance. The core concepts underlying this approach are the linked ideas of vulnerability and risk. Vulnerability was initially employed in disaster research to understand the vast differences among societies in disaster impact from similar agents. Thinking about vulnerability was stimulated by the high correlation between disaster proneness, chronic malnutrition, low income, and famine potential and led to the conclusion that the root causes of disasters lie more in society than in nature. The alternative perspective on human-environment relations, emphasizing the role of human interventions in generating disaster risk and impact, found that these sets of relations coalesced in the concept of vulnerability (Hewitt 1983).

Vulnerability and risk, therefore, refer to the relationships between people, the environment and the sociopolitical structures that frame the conditions in which people live. The concept of vulnerability thus integrates not only political economic, but environmental
forces in terms of both biophysical and socially constructed risk. This understanding of vulnerability enabled researchers to conceptualize how social systems generate the conditions that place different kinds of people, often differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnic, gender or age, at different levels of risk. The concept of vulnerability and risk as socially distributed was further developed by Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992, 1995) to address the quality of emerging risks in modern societies.

VI.B. Risk Calculation in DIDR

At roughly the same time Cernea began to speak of the risks of poverty resulting from population displacement from water projects (1990). He subsequently developed his well-known Risks and Reconstruction approach to understanding (and mitigating) the major adverse effects of displacement in which he outlines eight basic risks to which people are subjected by displacement (1995; Cernea and McDowell 2000). Cernea asserts that the probability of these risks producing serious consequences is high in badly or unplanned resettlement. Cernea further suggests that the hardship of resettlement may be less responsible for resistance than the fact that policy and legal vacuums leave people little alternative (1995: 258). More recently, Dwivedi has significantly contributed several refinements to the approach, particularly regarding resistance, by elaborating on the social and political construction of risk. Drawing on Beck (1992), he approaches risk as "a subjective calculation of different groups of people embedded differentially in political-economic and environmental conditions" (Dwivedi 1999: 47). People in different structural positions define risk differently, but their risk calculations are also affected by cultural norms as well as legal and policy frameworks for compensation (Beck 1995:43). Risk is calculated on the basis of information which allows people to make judgements about relative degrees of certainty or uncertainty of outcomes. People facing DIDR very often spend a considerable amount of time under conditions of uncertainty in which a lack of information on what is going to happen hampers seriously their ability to assess conditions and act. The lack of information produces perceptions of high risk. Uncertainty and the lack of predictability heighten the perception of risk because without adequate information no calculations of losses and benefits are possible (Dwivedi 1999: 47). Most mandated resettlement projects deprive people of control over fundamental features of their lives and have generally been derelict in providing affected populations with the kinds of information necessary to reassert satisfactory control and understanding over the resettlement process or the changed circumstances of their lives. Understanding of and control over circumstances are fundamental for human beings to deal productively and positively with the forces of change. Therefore, if people find that their understanding and control are diminished, change will be characterized by conflict, tension and, perhaps, active resistance. The often extremely negative concrete impacts of resettlement projects on affected peoples compound the disorientation generated by the loss of control and understanding as motivations for resistance. Resistance is a reassertion of both a logic and a sense of control (Oliver-Smith 1996).

Mediating institutions, such as NGOs, also frame and may politicize uncertainties and risks and may be pivotal in the way people construct risk as well. Dwivedi asserts that when people feel that the risks associated with displacement and resettlement exceed cultural norms or when compensation is deemed inadequate, resistance will be forthcoming. Dwivedi's approach permits a disaggregation of populations facing DIDR according to the differential risks they perceive and their likelihood of resisting on the basis of those perceptions. The approach also disaggregates risk into project performance risks in terms of costs and benefits, financial risks in terms of adequate funds for implementation, environmental risks, such as reservoir induced seismicity, insect plagues or waterborne diseases, and distributional risks in...
which benefits, for example, are captured by the rich (Dwivedi 1999:45). When people assess risk to be more than what is culturally acceptable or when the interventions of action groups produce a redefinition of acceptable risk, he suggests that resistance will become acute and demands for compensations from the state will be sharp as well (Dwivedi 1997: 4). Informed largely by rational choice model approaches, his analysis of the responses of the various populations affected by the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam points primarily to risks associated with the loss of economic resources as key in the development of resistance movements (1999).

VI.C. Rights and Risks

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) links risk with the concept of rights in advocating that an "approach based on 'recognition of rights' and 'assessment of risks' (particularly rights at risk)" be elaborated to guide future planning and decision-making on dams (2000: 206). The global review of the WCD stressed the need to address the five values of equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making, sustainability, and accountability as justification for the elaboration of a rights and risks approach to dam construction. Rights that were seen to be relevant in large dam projects included constitutional rights, customary rights, legislated rights, property rights (of both landholders and developers and investors). These rights can be grouped by their legal status, spatial or temporal reach or their purpose. In the case of spatial or temporal dimensions, rights of local, regional or national entities or the rights of present or future generations can be perceived. In terms of purpose rights are cited that pertain to material resources such as land, water, forests, or pasture or to spiritual, moral or cultural resources such as religion, dignity, and identity (WCD 2000: 206).

In terms of risk analysis the contribution of the WCD global review lies in distinguishing between risk takers and risk bearers or the voluntary and involuntary assumption of risk. Criticizing the traditional interpretation of risk as being born solely by developers and investors in terms of return on capital invested, the WCD highlights the differences between these risk takers and those who have risks imposed upon them by others. These risk bearers typically have little voice in water or energy policies, the choice of projects or in their design or implementation. The risks they face affect their well-being, livelihoods, standard of living and their cultural identity and cosmology; in sum, their very survival as individuals and as communities (WCD 2000: 207). Thus, the WCD hopes that by combining the consideration of rights and risks in the same approach, the inadequacies and simplifications of traditional cost-benefit analysis can be avoided and better planning and decision-making can result, based on the complexity of the considerations involved and the values that societies place on different options (WCD 2000: 206).

The importance of a rights and risks approach to DIDR is that it allows for the inclusion not just of material concerns, but of the issues of the symbolic and affective domains as well. As such, it provides not only an approach to improving planning and decision-making for dam projects, but also the template for an approach to understanding and analyzing resistance to DIDR in general. A rights and risk approach to DIDR resistance may be developed through three possible perspectives: advocacy, stakeholder analysis and political ecology ethnography (Little 2000).

VI.D. Advocacy Anthropology
The advocacy anthropology approach is characterized by an activist stance that privileges a particular group’s perspective over competing or contesting positions. This approach has been shown to be particularly valuable in situations where groups, such as the Native Americans of Amazonia may be facing acute socio-political forces that may amount to ethnocide, to which DIDR as been likened (Bartolome and Barabas 1973) or even genocide. Little suggests that one limitation of an advocacy approach is that only one point of view of the many that may be present in resettlement issues is presented, eclipsing the possibility of presenting the view that each contesting social actor may have their own sources of legitimacy. Thus, advocacy anthropology may forfeit the analysis of positions taken, for example, by anthropologists within the World Bank on behalf of peoples affected by DIDR. Conversely, it can be equally argued that advocacy anthropology often articulates a view that otherwise might not be heard, thus promoting dialogue and negotiation.

VI.E. Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder analysis is an approach to environmental conflict that has emerged recently to resolve conflicts to reduce levels of environmentally destructive activities and processes. Stakeholder analysis employs methods of conciliation, negotiation and mediation for reducing levels of conflict and managing disputes. Such efforts at establishing truly effective methods for cross-cultural negotiation in DIDR could play meaningful roles in enhancing the capacity of local peoples to effectively represent their interests. On the other hand, stakeholder analysis frequently assumes that all actors have equal or symmetrical stakes in the conflict, something that is rarely the case. For example, while monetary values of the loss of home, land and community may allegedly be compensated at levels established by the project, they infrequently adequately reflect the true nature in terms of social, spiritual and emotional losses that are at stake for people facing DIDR. Moreover, stakeholder approaches also assume that all participants in the disputes hold and have the abilities to employ the rights of citizenship within the larger political space of the nation. Again, assumptions of this sort are far from warranted, especially in the case of ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples, whose position in national social and cultural hierarchies generally eliminates the exercise of such basic rights (Little 2000). In the view of Laura Nader, the “neutral” position of stakeholder approaches is largely fictional in that it is ideologically based on a kind of functionalist harmonics which is less about the representation and interplay of diverse interests than about pacification and hegemonic control (Nader 1996 as quoted in Little 2000).

VI.F. Political Ecology Ethnography

Political ecology ethnography is characterized by a focus that privileges research on environmental conflict to generate a social scientific approach that incorporates multiple perspectives. This goal is achieved by methods and tools that are aimed at inclusion of multiple groups at multiple levels to explore not only the political dimensions of these conflicts, but also to bring new participants into the political frame of action and initiate new approaches to viewing power relationships across multiple social and natural scales (Little 2000: 4). Importantly, this approach has the potential of creating concepts that may be adopted by the new participants to question established public policy and generate new alternatives for action. The methods that are employed in this approach focus on identification of all the different participants in the conflicts, a task that can be challenging in light not only of their numbers, but the diverse historical and cultural traditions that have helped to situate them in the dispute. Most essentially, the task must reveal the basic claims to resources and territory that are made by participant social actors and analyze the forms by which such claims are promoted and
defended within broader political spheres of action in ways that the competing discourses of cultural and political legitimacy are displayed (Little 2000:5). In this fashion the disputes over eligibility for DIDR compensation may hinge on the legitimacy of various kinds of claims to land.

All three of these perspectives have significant advantages and disadvantages in approaching resistance to resettlement. In point of fact, unlike Little, I tend to see them as nested, interacting and complementary rather than as exclusive. Each approach roughly corresponds to a level of action in resettlement politics. As in all research conceptual frameworks and methodologies, there are moments and places of inconsistency or less than perfect fit, even contradiction. In that sense, the methodological approaches reflect the tensions and inconsistencies of relations within and among the various levels of resettlement politics. Advocacy research, stakeholder analysis and political ecology ethnography, focusing on the rights and risks in DIDR resistance, correspond to the levels or scales of interaction and conflict. Advocacy anthropology is appropriate for work at the level of the community to be resettled. In some instances, applied social scientists have found themselves carrying out research in the midst of the crisis of resettlement when people are facing a virtually life-threatening process (Colson 1971; Oliver-Smith 1992). In these contexts, researchers adopting an advocacy stance fulfill a necessary function in assisting communities in their efforts to deal with the crisis and in articulating their views in non-local contexts.

Similarly, when communities employ resistance to enhance their bargaining position in negotiating the terms and conditions of specific resettlement projects with planners and other authorities, stakeholder analysis can prove useful both in assisting people in the negotiation process as well as in demarcating the issues and limits that are “in play” in the process. Enlightened stakeholder analysis can reveal the differentials in value positions that are being negotiated among very disparate participants. Stakeholder analysis that is culturally sensitive can frame the issues in ways that help to balance those situations where, as one historian put it, one party has “a continent to exchange and the other, glass beads.”

Finally, a political ecology ethnography of resistance helps to place resistance in the context of global conversations about development. The political ecological perspective reveals the commonalities that local resistance movements share with similar struggles elsewhere, contributing to the emergence of new forms of discourse in the shaping of alternative approaches to development that are less destructive to environments and human rights. By revealing the interplay of multiple interests across scales and levels, political ecology ethnography informs resistance movements of the dimensions and scale of their struggle and their role in the larger conversations and may enable them to expand their agendas, calling for more sustainable forms of development.

VII. WHO RESISTS? THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

When a development project of whatever stripe confronts a community with the prospect of dislocation, local responses will vary considerably. In resistance people are distinguished by their interests as well as their identities, although in many cases the two may be virtually the same. Identifying resisters basically constitutes identifying the interests and identities of those affected peoples who feel that their rights have been infringed upon and who feel that they are being forced to suffer unacceptable risks. Responses will also vary over time as the project and the struggle against it evolve, each in response to the other. Consequently, responses vary for the most part because not everyone in a community, much less a region, will
be impacted in the same way at the same time by either resettlement or by the alterations in the environment that the project will enact. Moreover, many development projects that displace people and communities are large and their impacts are felt over a variety of environments and among widely varying populations, with different economic and cultural patterns. Such large projects are inherently heterogenous, although elite constructions of impacts and impacted populations often assume an unwarranted homogeneity.

A variety of factors have proven to be significant in the development of DIDR resistance movements, including the social identity of individuals and the identity and organization of groups within the impacted population. Further, political variables such the general political climate of the nation and the history of state-local relations (see below), economic features such as degree of market integration or land tenure patterns (see below), and cultural issues focusing around language, religion and identity (see below) may influence who participates in resistance movements. In many senses, each of these sets of variables are interpenetrating and mutually constitutive of the identities and interests of individuals and groups among the population that will be impacted by a project and by resettlement, which are themselves factors (see below) that will influence in different ways the decisions to accept or resist resettlement.

Neither rural communities, whether or tribal, peasant or assimilated members of the national society, nor urban neighborhoods of minority or majority identity are ever entirely homogeneous. There are always differences of social, cultural, political or economic character. Thus, the degree of internal diversity, patterns of conflict and consensus, social racial, ethnic and class factors in an impacted population will play an important role in the development of and participation of local people in DIDR resistance movements. Within even small communities, some will resist while others may simply acquiesce and still others will willingly accept resettlement. Levels and forms of social solidarity and internal conflict may be changed. Such differences in response to both resettlement and resistance may have longer-term implications for the social organization of a community threatened or affected by DIDR.

VII.A. Risks and Losses as Indicators

In a series of recent articles Dwivedi addresses the question, "Why do some resist resettlement and others do not?" (1997; 1998; 1999). In answering that question, a similar question "Who resists resettlement and who does not?" may also be answered. Oliver-Smith has contended that internal differentiation, a multi-faceted relationship to the immediate environment and the state, the availability of local and non-local allies and the quality of the resettlement process itself are crucial factors in assessing why people resist DIDR (1991; 1994). Dwivedi builds upon this perspective to consider resettlement policies and implementation, action-group mediation, and internal differentiation as crucial to the formation of different perceptions and reactions to the risks of displacement and resettlement that underlie the formation of resistance. Dwivedi's approach, as mentioned earlier, is based upon the concept of risk. He contends that those who resist will come from the sectors of the affected populations who perceive that they are placed at greatest risk by the prospect of displacement, the resettlement plan and its implementation, or both. As discussed earlier, his approach asserts that risks are socially and politically constructed and thus will be perceived differentially by men, women, the young or elderly, rich farmers, landless laborers, indigenous peoples, peasants, outcast groups, and other minorities. Thus, within the area of impact of large development projects that occasion DIDR, the perception of risks that are to be run
because of displacement, resettlement or both, will be variously perceived and resistance to them will be a function of those perceptions.

However, actually predicting or establishing who resists resettlement is extremely complex. In general, human motivations are rarely unidimensional and the decision to resist DIDR is no exception. Furthermore, the task is made even more complex by the introduction of the factor of time. Resettlement projects evolve over time in interaction with mediating action groups and policy adjustments, both of which have the potential of changing the decision-making frameworks of people facing and/or resisting resettlement. In the context of the Sardar Sarovar project in India's Narmada Valley, Dwivedi largely frames the choices made by people in terms of risks of potential losses of economic resources, namely, loss of lands, both privately owned and encroached upon, and loss of livelihoods related to agriculture. In terms of displacement risks not all villages will lose the same amounts of land or the same kinds of land. Some may lose formally held "revenue" lands, others Nevad (forested) land, and still others homestead land. Depending on topography, some may lose land in a village and others will not. Moreover, government policy may create a skewed situation in which, for example, a farmer from the upper peasantry may lose more than 8 hectares of land, but compensation was limited to no more than 8 hectares. On the other hand, for those losing between 2 and 8 hectares (the middle peasantry), the risks of resettlement marginalization are minimized by the compensation of up to 8 hectares. However, these farmers' risk calculation must take into account the quality of the compensation land. Without adequate information on the quality of compensation land, middle peasantry farmers still risk impoverishment. For the Adivasis (tribals) loss of Nevad (forested and encroached) land is not compensated, meaning almost inevitable marginalization in resettlement. Pressures, however, from action groups and subsequent policy changes have provided the landless with possible gains in land entitlements. Resettlement acceptance varied by state among Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh according to policy changes for land availability, agency mediation and representation as well as the immediacy and threat of submergence. Thus, improving policy had the effect of reducing conflict levels and resistance. Improving policy may eventuate because of peoples' resistance and the intervention of action groups. The resistance dynamic, thus emerges as a "trialectic" among the people to be resettled, action group intervention and policy and project authorities.

In summary, in the Sardar Sarovar project it would appear that those who bear the most risk in terms of loss of resources and livelihood are actually the upper peasantry since the compensation package does not guarantee either the restoration of quantity or quality of land. In Dwivedi's scheme, then, those most likely to join resistance movements would be the well-off sectors of the peasantry. Conversely, those least likely to resist would come from those groups for whom the resettlement and compensation package actually improved upon previous holdings, namely the middle peasantry and the tribals. However, Adivasis have actually expressed their resistance to resettlement in an idiom that combines elements of cultural and religious identity (see Cultural Heritage). Dwivedi either discounts or ignores non-economic considerations as motivations for resistance or as a means of distinguishing resistors. In the case of the possibility of social disarticulation resulting from resettlement, perceived risks are seen as tempered by existing feuds and conflicts between villages, hamlets and kinship groups and even with households. The fact that the Adivasis have both a history of resistance to state intervention and little or no history of reciprocity with the state is recognized, but not seen as determining. Cultural discourses around issues of loss of identity, place attachment, loss of cultural heritage resources are also not seen as significant in Dwivedi's approach for distinguishing or predicting resistance.
VII.B. Resistance, Social Solidarity, and Internal Conflict

From the standpoint of social organization, resistance efforts often initiate a process of redefinition of a variety of internal and external relationships and institutions. The need to organize for resistance will exert a new form of pressure on the internal organization of a community. The organization of a resistance movement may sharpen both internal and external pre-existing conflicts. The existence of patterns of internal differentiation based on ethnicity, caste or class in a community may constitute obstacles to the formation of the necessary levels of solidarity and cooperation for effective resistance and may require efforts to alter local social structural patterns to enable the formation of an organized movement by isolating or banishing dissidents (Lawrence 1986). In addition, governments and project authorities may attempt to exploit or even create internal divisions within communities to reduce their capacity to organize and negotiate (Parasuraman 1999: 244). On the other hand, a successful record in defending local interests, usually based on a long history of internal coherence and solidarity, effective political structure, leadership and previously existing community organizations that may backstop a resistance movement, may also affect the community's ability to mount and ultimately institutionalize serious resistance efforts (Bartolome 1992; Wali 1989; Waldram 1980). In some cases, the threat of resettlement creates a culture of solidarity far more intense than what had existed prior to the project (Rapp 2000). In terms of external relationships, resistance, on one hand, requires the intensification of relationships with traditional allies and, on the other hand, the development of new relationships with others, often completely foreign to the local context. The downstream caboclos affected by the Tucurui Dam in Brazil acquired significant allies in a rural workers union and church organizations, articulating them with the larger community of Amazonian peasants and enabling them to assume new political roles (Magee 1989) (see Tucurui Dam Case Study).

Today many resettlement projects are taking place in situations of extreme asymmetry in social structure and power in which elites are the most capable of expressing their interests and needs. Basically, particular groups, whether defined by class and class alliances, race, ethnicity, religion or another differentiating factor, may find their interests furthered by certain features of a resettlement project while other groups will see themselves suffering great disadvantage. Furthermore, the state has been known to use the distribution of resettlement benefits to influence community opinion, channeling resources to village heads. This strategy may backfire when not everyone receives similar quantities or qualities of benefits. In the Sardar Sarovar project, "resettlement friends," targeted for benefits for a demonstration effect, became known as "dalals" (stooges) when benefit distribution to the majority proved unsatisfactory (Dwivedi 1997: 20). Land compensation may be seen by some to be an economic opportunity to some while formal sector housing, particularly in urban resettlement may draw interested people into a project area. Differential costs and benefits from resettlement projects may vary according to land and labor factor markets, social differentiation, or other local features, predisposing some groups to favor resettlement and others to oppose it. Indeed, policy changes by project authorities as well as what Dwivedi refers to as "resistance fatigue" (often due to state violence and oppression) may split villages into contesting factions (1997: 19). Therefore, some caution must be exercised in ascertaining whose interests are indeed being represented in resistance movements (Partridge 1992:9; Nachowitz 1988) (see below). Communities threatened with resettlement cannot be assumed to be homogeneous. In resistance movements all players have specific agendas that they attempt to further.
VII.C. Participation

One of the primary goals that many resistance movements seek to achieve is the greater participation of the affected people in the decision-making, planning and implementation of a development project that affects them directly or indirectly. The same requirement of full participation holds also for DIDR projects necessitated by the development project. The goal of participation is consistent with the emphasis on the recognition and restoration of the rights of affected peoples. Participation is a particularly thorny issue in many cases because if authentic participation is achieved, it tends to violate many if not all of the traditional forms of power relations and social interaction in most societies. Projects of whatever sort are characteristically initiated, planned and implemented by people from various strata of elite groups within the society. Although not without exceptions, those affected tend to be members of subaltern groups who are generally not considered by elites to have the social and cultural tools necessary for executive or even advisory forms of decision-making, planning and execution that pertain to development projects. For example, the Government of India did not bother to inform the tribal peoples of the Narmada Valley of the dam and the resettlement project because it was felt that they simply did not have the capability to understand the information (Parasuraman 1999). Even where their rights have been taken into account and participation is considered to be part of a project, affected people are often still expected to accept the wisdom and decisions of planners.

Since its inception the concept of participation has become a virtual sine qua non for all development projects. As Cleaver has recently noted, participation has “become an act of faith in development; something we believe in and rarely question,” yet there is little evidence, she claims, of any long-term effectiveness of participation in materially improving the lives of vulnerable people or as a strategy for social change (2000:597). Most development programs have largely been structured with a very particular understanding of participation in mind. Most resettlement programs in effect become extremely large bureaucratic technical organizations operating with specific models of development and progress. They have generally a clearly defined set of activities focused on quantifiable costs and benefits that are to be carried out under time and budgetary limits. Project goals customarily emphasize meeting practical (i.e. material) rather than strategic needs, instrumentality rather than empowerment (Cleaver 2000: 598). Although “empowerment,” as an outcome of participation, has also become as a development “buzzword,” its inclusion in the goals of development programs has fundamentally robbed it of its radical, transformatory edge (Cleaver 2000: 599). Rather than empowering community, there has been a neo-liberal reconceptualization of the idea in which the opportunities afforded by the development/reconstruction project are to be used by individuals to better themselves, thus contributing to the betterment of the group.

Furthermore, where collective interests are recognized, the goals of development/resettlement programs emphasize the creation of formalized community organizations that interface well with national bureaucratic structures. Such programs aim in many ways to remake the community along lines that are compatible with the larger system. There is little recognition that many community functions are efficiently and effectively carried out through informal social networks, daily social interaction, and the application of cultural norms (Cleaver 2000: 602). In these contexts, the true substance of strategies of participation, in which individual and community take or become part of or share in something becomes lost. The goal of participation should be to strengthen the self-sustaining capacities of the impacted community by means of the development of its local capabilities. When such programs,
instead of reinforcing these capabilities to increase autonomy and control of process, actually undermine or supplant such facets, the community’s abilities to control its own life is destroyed, creating dependency and increasing its vulnerability (Wilches-Chaux 1994).

The question of authentic participation has also been raised in regard to NGO and social movements. One of the persistent tensions in the relationship between GROs, NGOs and Social Movements is the degree to which grass roots level opinion is consulted and factored into decisions taken at higher levels in the struggle. NGOs claim to represent the interests of the community, but the question of how representative and participatory NGOs really are remains persistent and constitutes the core issue of one of the arguments leveled against them. Governments and MDBs have suggested that NGOs have not been elected by anyone and are misrepresenting themselves if they claim to represent the interests of the people. Indeed, the articulation of all the diverse claims and interests of extremely heterogeneous populations in a way that is still coherent with the NGO's own possible agenda regarding approaches to development is a major challenge facing NGOs assisting communities facing DIDR. NGOs depend on their relationship and credibility with the grass roots and generally must be careful not to misrepresent their interests. Nonetheless, the tension is a continuing issue. (See Narmada Bachao Andolan Case Study).

VII.D. Categorical Struggles

Since populations impacted by large scale development projects tend to be heterogeneous, one of the principal points of contention in DIDR resistance involves the definitions established most frequently by project planners of those people to be included as recipients of resettlement assistance. Projects, like states, categorize people as a means of control and containment (Kearney 1996; Scott 1998). In the case of DIDR affected people the categories that are established bring with them bundles of rights that are themselves attached to material and social benefits or costs. Consequently, how one is defined by a project will very often determine one's access to a set of entitlements. For this reason, to be formally defined as a PAP (project affected person or people), an oustee, an encroacher, a displazado (displaced), an atingido (victim), an afectado (affected) or other similar labels is to be scheduled for the receipt of compensations or benefits if the development project has a resettlement plan (Rapp in press). The frequently cursory nature of many social and environmental impact studies of projects has been responsible for the underestimation of both numbers and categories of groups to be affected by DIDR. Consequently, many struggles are undertaken by local groups as well as their non-local NGO allies to resist exclusion by category from resettlement benefits or compensation. The inclusion or exclusion of certain groups from beneficiary categories in DIDR has also been the source of internal disputes and conflicts. The relative "deservedness" of some groups for compensation is often disputed by others who see themselves as more deserving. The struggle to expand the definition of the affected, often to include many non-land based occupations in impact zones such as tailors, carpenters, shopkeepers, etc., is also a priority among many resistance movements.

A frequent focus of this form of dispute has been the tendency for planners to define project-affected peoples solely in terms of holding legal title to property directly impacted by the project. For example, ELETROSUL and CRAB (see case study) challenged one another continuously over the meaning of the term "atingido." ELETROSUL defined the atingido as an owner-operator with legally established titles to the land. CRAB on the other hand, wanted to include under the term various categories of landless agriculturalists, such as squatters, renters, sharecroppers, and indigenous peoples as well as the owner-operator's adult children.
Furthermore, the definition of what would affect people was debated. Atingidos would include those people impacted by not only water from the reservoir, but also transmission lines, workers living quarters, and the construction site. The new interpretations of atingido thus broadened the base of the CRAB from the ELETROSUL estimate of 14,500 families to 40,000 families or 200,000 people (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 50).

Formal titles become particularly thorny when indigenous groups hold traditional use rights of land, but no formally recognized titles. Indeed, the social identity of "indigenous" may be the source of considerable dispute since such a category may be attached to specific benefits from the state or the project that are not provided to non-holders of that category. The cultural significance of indigenous identity has been heightened for both holders and non-holders of that identity by development projects (see below). However, indigenous peoples and other holders of traditional or communal use rights of land have been frequently omitted by virtue of lack of formal legal title to land from schedules of people to be compensated for losses of productive assets by development projects, thus inspiring significant protest and resistance. The lack of recognition of larger regional environmental impacts of projects has also led to the exclusion of people whose access to resources essential for livelihood are seriously affected by projects. Although populations living downstream from dams are often severely impacted by dam construction due to water pollution, species depletion, and other environmental damages, they have been excluded from receiving any form of compensation, thus inspiring protest. Numerous cases, such as the Tucurui Dam in Brazil (Magee 1989) or the Narmada Project in India (Dwivedi 1999) to mention only a few, have seen a great deal of protest and resistance organized about the failure to include the downstream populations structurally displaced by dam-induced environmental damage. Kinship categories have also proved to be important in determining the distribution of resettlement benefits as well. One of the principle features of an early resistance campaign in the Narmada Valley focused around the inclusion of first sons to be categorized as independent households and thus included in the distribution of replacement land (Dwivedi 1998).

VII.E. Resistance to DIDR and Social Change

DIDR resistance may create pressures for social change in a community. When a community decides to resist a DIDR project, that decision engages a community with a process that, even if successful, entails significant changes for that community both internally and externally. It is through the conflict engaged by challenge and resistance that communities themselves initiate changes, regardless of how conservative their reasons for resistance may be. Conflict is an important organizing principle of human behavior. Allies and opponents and good and bad, may become clearer in conditions of conflict. Conflict may clarify the ambiguity of changing conditions. Events may become easier to interpret within the frame of conflict. People may be able to articulate their sense of identity and their positions on issues more exactly (Marris 1986: 159). Resistance requires action and consciousness is generated in and changed by social action (Marshall 1983 as quoted in Fantasia 1988:8). In this sense, society is constantly in the process of reconstituting itself through actions of alignment and disengagement, along the axes of individual-group, ethnicity, age, gender, class, etc. activating a process of continual contestation and interpretation of culture. The threat of resettlement constitutes a crisis of enormous proportions for many communities. Crises are periods of time when customary practices of daily life are suspended and new possibilities of action, alliances, and values are created (Fantasia 1988: 14).
When communities resist the threat of forced resettlement, they become subject to a different set of changes that will come about through their resistance. The initial steps taken in resisting resettlement may have a galvanizing effect on people as they become aware of not only their own resources and capabilities, but the vulnerability of their opponents as well. Undertaking resistance to the Grand Rapids Dam by the Swampy River Cree of Manitoba, Canada began a process of political socialization that has enhanced their capabilities for future negotiations with the government (Waldram 1980). The actions of resistance groups as well as the changes in groups set in motion by the requirement of action in resistance often produce new kinds of alignments and coalitions that may have significant impact on the structure and organization of local social relations. Thus, it is in the social action required by resistance that consciousness and practice become changed.

VII.F. Why People Resist

Since protest and resistance are mobilized on a number of fronts and at a number of levels to confront a variety of opposing parties, a multiplicity of discourses must be called on to represent the concerns of people resisting DIDR. The protest and resistance furthermore may encompass critiques of project implementation, state development programs and strategies and the general global political economy of development. This diversity of idioms and meanings has been characterized as “syncretic” language, and is seen as essential for resistance movements to articulate support at different levels and in different contexts. Indeed, development projects that are backed by interest groups embedded in local and global systems necessitates a syncretisation of idioms (Dwivedi 1998: 160). While consistently based on a foundational concept of the defense of human and civil rights, individuals and groups resisting DIDR construct at least six fundamental themes from which they develop a wide variety of discourses, images, symbols and representations for the various allies and opponents they encounter at various levels. Depending on the characteristics of the project, the social and environmental context in which it is located and the risks and losses that affected people will be or are suffering, some themes may be emphasized over others. In other words, some DIDR resisters may argue on the basis of justice and human rights while others call on the spiritual values embodied in the environment to be destroyed and others still protest the lack of participation in project design and planning. Equally so, the discourses may change in the evolution of the struggle, beginning, for example, with an appeal to spiritual values, then changing to environmental destruction, economics and project participation. Different discourses may run simultaneously as well, activated by parties at different levels and contexts of the struggle. The seven themes through which the various discourses are developed are: 1) environment, 2) economics 3) culture 4) project risks, 5) governance and administration, 6) approaches to development, and 7) justice and human rights. Each of these discourses of resistance will be discussed in the following sections or subsections.

VIII. ECOLOGICAL UPHEAVAL AND RESISTANCE

At one level, all DIDR resistance constitutes one side of an environmental conflict. Resistance is a rejection of an attempt by certain interests to transform an environment in some way that requires the displacement of people. As such environmental conflict is at the center of grass-roots and NGO resistance to DIDR. Both the state and private interests, in undertaking large scale infrastructural development and conservation projects, base their decisions on culturally particular constructions of the environment. Because of the conflicts that such images of nature and the environment produce in their applications in such projects, a brief discussion of their basic tenets is in order.
VIII.A. Constructions of Nature and Society

The dominant western constructions, also frequently adopted by post-colonial states and elites, of the relationship between human beings and nature have over time fluctuated between opposition and harmony. For most of the twentieth century, nature and society were seen in opposition to each other. Although the opposition can be traced to the thought of classical Greece and Rome, many integrative or conservationist attitudes have also been part of western culture over time to the present, but a more utilitarian perspective toward the natural world became dominant in the 17th and 18th centuries (Redmond 1999: 21). Scientific and philosophical discourses of the time began to see humans as ontologically distinct from nature. Indeed, nature provided a contrasting category against which human identity could be defined as cultural rather than natural in the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The new ideological construction focused on the opposition of nature and society and ultimately domination and control of nature by society. It is important to note here that a category of human beings was characterized by its association with the phrase, “in a state of nature.” Now, as then, certain people get relegated into the “nature” category as the need arises. Those people put in the nature category frequently become the objects of development strategies and projects. Indeed, a frequent subtext of development projects is the acculturation of such people to majority held culture by obligatory participation, whether through forced displacement and resettlement or some other activity. In effect, the goal of such projects is often to “socialize” (read humanize) these "natural" people and bring them into the national fold.

In the west, nature has been constructed as a fund of resources into which human beings regardless of social context have not only a right to tap, but a right to alter and otherwise dominate in any way they deem fit. Along with the detachment of nature and society achieved by eighteenth century philosophy and political economy, the fortunes of humanity were specifically linked to a set of material practices largely structured by market exchange. The market became constructed as the principle vehicle for individual self-realization and societal welfare. Thus, individuals were now not only free, but virtually obliged to better themselves with the means that God had provided, namely the natural world. With the reduction of nature to the status of means to the goal of human welfare and the rapid expansion of market exchange driven by a productionist ethic, both the ideological justification and the institutional means were available for a relatively unfettered mastery over and unrestrained exploitation of the natural world. Furthermore, the mutually reinforcing pairing of ideology and science (economics) produced a set of institutionalized material practices through which human beings engaged the object of their domination for their new purposes of emancipation and self-realization.

The enlightenment ideal of human emancipation and self-realization (read "development") were closely linked to the idea of control and use (Harvey 1996:121-22). Indeed, it was considered that one of the tyrannies from which humankind would be emancipated was that of nature. The belief in social domination further specified that nature would also benefit from human action. Nature is basically seen as plastic, ultimately dominable or malleable to the purposes of humankind. The "plasticity myth", as Murphy has termed it, is based on the idea that the relationship between humans and their environments can be reconstructed at will by the application of human reason (Murphy 1994). The application of human reason is believed to impose order on a disorderly, but essentially malleable, nature, to bring it into line with human purposes. Thus, humans are "capable of manipulating, domesticating, remolding, reconstructing, and harvesting nature"(Murphy 1994:5)
Confronting these images and accompanying norms for action toward nature in DIDR resistance, are innumerable alternative constructions of nature held by the enormous variety of peoples around the world. There is no overall generalization that one can make about the vast array of understandings of the relationship between nature and society. However, it is generally accepted that many local cultures do not accept the dichotomy between nature and society that has undergirded western economic positions regarding nature. Moreover, local models are not seen to separate strictly the biophysical, human and supernatural worlds, but rather to pose a continuity among the three that is established through ritual, symbol and is embedded in social relations. In general, local models of nature are complexes of meanings- usages that cannot be rendered intelligible through modern constructions nor understood without some reference to local culture and place (Escobar 2000: 151).

VIII.B. Environmental Conflict in DIDR

The unrestrained exploitation of nature as the cause for DIDR runs the gamut from mining to manufacturing waste, from deforestation to oil spills. However, perhaps no other instance so epitomizes the subjugation of disorderly nature to human rationality as the "taming" of rivers by channeling and dam construction. The environmental consequences of large dam construction have been the focus of intense campaigns of opposition by environmental groups for several decades. Dam construction stands accused of the destruction of entire environments, including flora, fauna, landscapes, river systems, water quality, and shorelines as well as the creation of mercury contamination, greenhouse gases, water quality deterioration, downriver hydrological change, reservoir sedimentation, transmission line impacts, quarries and borrow pits (Ledec, Quintero and Mejia 1997). In addition, other suggested ecological impacts of dam construction include increased seismicity, spread of stagnant water borne disease, dam failure, water loss through evapotranspiration, and salinization. Furthermore, the environmental destruction created by development projects has deep spiritual repercussions for many peoples whose religions are based on the close relationship between the natural and supernatural worlds. Although the anti-dam movement essentially began as an environmental movement, it quickly found common cause with human rights activists who quite correctly realized that all the negative environmental impacts were experienced first and most directly by local people. Indeed, environmental issues have become one of the foremost elements in resistance campaigns by local people as well as local, national, and international NGOs in DIDR resistance. There are specific environmental issues that emerge from dam construction that displace people that enter powerfully into the discourse of resistance, both before displacement and after resettlement.
The Tucurui dam, the largest of the tropics and fourth largest in the world, is part of an overall plan of the Brazilian government to build eighty dams to reduce national dependence on petroleum generated power. Before the gates closed in 1984, flooding an area of 2,850 square kilometers of forest, including part of the Parakana Indian reservation, between 20,000 and 30,000 people had to be relocated. The Brazilian government and the administrating agency, ELETRONORTE, had a woefully inadequate resettlement policy which affected only a minority of those relocated upstream from the dam and obligated many to fend for themselves in settlements upstream and along the transamazon highway (Biery-Hamilton 1987). Even those who were included in the resettlement scheme were inadequately compensated for their losses. Environmental impacts both upstream and downstream of the dam became the motors for significant protest and resistance that eventually empowered local people for future negotiations with the state (Scudder 1996).

Upstream from the dam, an area that suffered severe environmental impacts, referred to as the Parakana Glebe, was located close to the bank of the reservoir. Many people displaced by the reservoir were relocated to the Parakana Glebe. In effect, the filling of the dam had transformed the Glebe from a forest fluvial environment to a lacustrine ecosystem. The reservoir area closest to the glebe had not been deforested prior to submersion and when the reservoir was filled in early 1986 the decaying and floating vegetation provided an ideal spawning habitat for mosquitos. The insects proliferated uncontrollably and soon became a virtual plague. They soon spread from the lakeside to secondary breeding grounds on roads and to certain trees in the forest whose foliage collects considerable water. Initially, the resettled communities attempted to endure the conditions, going about their normal activities, but the infestation became…

"…unbearable. Nobody could work anymore, or even sleep. . My wife went to the front of the house to swat the kids' bodies with clothes, but it didn't help. Then desperation came, we became really desperate. People abandoned their lots and went to look for some solution. The government should have helped people in that calamity (Interview with a Union leader/STR-NR, February/1996 as quoted in Acselrod and Da Silva 2000: 5).

Social mobilization began shortly after in 1987 with the organization of Committees of Expropriated People aligned with the Tucurui Rural Workers Union. People visited the offices of ELETRONORTE, the principle constructor and operator, to protest and demand a solution to the plague. The government response was to initiate an intense campaign of insecticide spraying, which temporarily reduced the plague, but people felt that their health and the health of their animals were seriously affected as well. The impact of the mosquito plague was to alter the nature of the struggle of the displaced communities. The focus of protest and resistance was no longer only the losses occasioned by the displacement, but by the environmental conditions that severely impacted daily life and health. The protest now became focused on the unhealthy nature of the relocation environment. Indeed, as people experienced the new conditions, their interpretations linking the lack of deforestation in the submerged area closest to them with the creation of ideal breeding conditions for mosquitos generally coincided with scientific assessments. However, scientific caution based on a lack of field studies in assigning direct causality enabled ELETRONORTE to challenge these conclusions and assign blame to the population itself. ELETRONORTE claimed that waste runoff from the communities themselves was creating conditions that allowed mosquitos to proliferate, thereby setting up an environmental debate between the resettlement authority and the people. However, in 1991 evidence was confirmed that mosquito larvae were present in the vegetation that emerged after the filling of the reservoir.

The lack of an effective policy to combat the plague, the problematic nature of the empirical information and the severe impact on health and living conditions led the people to begin negotiations with land-tenure agencies, ministries, local governments and politicians. The people also forcibly occupied the ELETRONORTE's premises in Tucurui. When the company obtained an injunction evicting them from the premises, the protesters camped outside the main gate to the company compound and remained there in protest for four years. They undertook a number of direct actions as well, such as blocking the SUCAM (the national public health organization) and ELETRONORTE vehicles as they tried to implement their ineffective insecticide operations. Although the mosquito plague was the main issue, the movement addressed several problems that the population had experienced since the start of expropriation. Furthermore, the movement succeeded in gaining allies from communities in the broader region, from the Catholic and Lutheran churches and among NGOs who obtained information and provided publicity for the struggle. They took their cause as well to Brasilia to confront the ministries, the national congress, and the president. In response to this pressure, the Brazilian government formed
an Inter-ministerial committee to negotiate with the movement and ELETRONORTE for a solution to the problem. From these negotiations a new settlement project was established. Although the new settlement brought with it new sets of problems, primarily with competing landlords and their hired thugs, the movement had attained legitimacy and had succeeded in taking the political action necessary to alter the conditions into which they had been forced (unless otherwise noted, this section is based on Acselrad and Da Silva 2000).

Downstream Water Pollution

In addition, approximately 40,000 caboclos (peasants) who lived downstream on the hundreds of islands between the dam and the mouth of the river began to suffer serious ecological and economic impacts. In the course of research undertaken by Magee four years after the close of the dam gates, it was found that traditional subsistence strategies of riverine peasants were totally disrupted. As Magee notes, 'if peasants above the dam suffered the loss of their land, peasants below the dam suffered the loss of their water' (1989:6-7). The water below the dam became seriously polluted by decomposing trees in the flooded area that were not cleared before the floodgates closed. In the four years since the dam began operation, the pollution of the water has caused a series of outbreaks of waterborne diseases of various sorts, ranging from serious vaginal infections in women to gastro-intestinal ailments, particularly among children, and skin rashes in the general population. Island crops suffered also from the polluted water. Cacao and acai palm production were crippled. However, the most serious consequence of the dam was the destruction of the river's shrimp and fish populations, the very base of the local subsistence economy and an important source of exchange value as well (Magee 1989).

Faced with the continuing destruction of their resource base by the dam, the riverine caboclos were left with two options: migration and resettlement or resistance to obligate the government both to recognize and compensate their losses and also to diminish the damaging impacts of the dam. In this effort, the Tucurui river peasants began to engage in new forms of political mobilization to defend their way of life. They acquired two extremely important allies; the Catholic Church and the Rural Workers Union. Both the Church and the Union had been active in the struggle to protect the interests of people flooded out by the dam. When the Church became aware of the difficulties and privations suffered by downstream peasants, it began to work with them in organizing and to get their interests represented in negotiations with dam authorities. One result was that the peasants won control of the union, which had traditionally been controlled by local elites with strong ties to the state and national governments. At the top of the agenda of the new union leadership was the commencement of negotiations with ELETRONORTE and its consulting companies to establish responsibilities for the effects of the dam (Magee 1989).

The Church and the Rural Workers Union at the local level have played a crucial role in disseminating information to all riverine peasants on the struggle with ELETRONORTE. At the regional level they have created a network of communication that transmits information over a large area of dispersed and isolated settlements. And they have functioned to articulate peasant concerns at national levels with a variety of organizations and institutions, such as CRAB (Regional Commission of Dam Victims), which began organizing resistance to dam construction and operation at a national level (Magee 1989). Any resistance movement that reaches national levels in a country as important as Brazil soon attracts international attention, thus projecting the struggle of the Tocantins river peasants onto the world stage.

Due to their own and the efforts of the Church and the Union, Tocantins island peasants have become part of the larger community of Amazonian peasants and the new political identity they are assuming. They have become aware that other groups such as the rubber tappers and Indian groups have suffered and have successfully organized to defend their interests. The Church is also encouraging some island communities to search for outside funding from the Canadian government and the Dutch Catholic Church to address their problems of health care and nutrition (Magee 1989). This strategy is important in two ways: one, the peasants are seeking solutions on their own, and two, they are appealing to entities beyond their national borders, not only internationalizing their struggle, but expanding their own capacities and skills for communication and negotiation.

Undoubtedly, the assumption of a political identity and the acquisition of a voice by the Tocantins river peasants have been facilitated by the recent political abertura (opening-democratization) in Brazil. Their political identity and voice have developed because of their losses caused by the Tucurui dam and because of their acquisition of significant allies who have represented them in negotiating with dam authorities and articulated them with broader contexts and information networks. In the process, the peasants have begun to acquire the political skills that will enable them to represent their own interests themselves. However, as Magee (1989:10) notes:
it remains to be seen whether the Tocantins Islanders can muster the international support they may need to survive on the islands or whether they will join the ranks of the other disenfranchised groups competing for scarce land on the mainland.

The Tucurui experience is emblematic of the inferior environmental planning that has characterized many large dams around the world. The deficient planning and implementation regarding the environment reveals environmental change as a moment of social struggle for land. That is, the new environment as created by the dam becomes the object of the protests and resistance of the affected populations.

VIII.D. Conservation Based Dislocation and Resettlement

Although the integrationist or conservationist perspective toward nature occupied a distinctly inferior position for much of the modern era, the late twentieth century, partly due to the extraordinary destruction and transformation of many natural features (air, water, soil) as well as entire environments, has seen a resurgence of environmentally sensitive positions regarding the society-nature relationship. This new conservationist trend holds serious implications for issues of displacement and resettlement. For example, in the period between 1900-1950, roughly 600 protected areas were established around the world to conserve treasured environments (Ghimire 1994). In 1995 there were almost 10,000 protected areas, encompassing roughly 5% of the earth's surface and conservationists hope to double that amount soon (Stevens 1995). The model that has informed the formation of these protected areas was originally enacted in the United States to create Yellowstone National Park. A national park was considered to be a large area generally unaltered by human exploitation and occupation, whose flora, fauna and geomorphology are of great scientific, educational or aesthetic value, all of which are the responsibility of the highest national authority to conserve and safeguard. In the creation of Yellowstone the claims of Indian residents of the area were simply erased and their "local, informal set of rules and customs relating to the natural world (was replaced) with a formal code of law, created and administered by the bureaucratic state" (Jacoby 2001).

In 1980 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature published the World Conservation Strategy, challenging the national park model and advocating the incorporation of local people into the conservation process. The World Bank followed this initiative with a program called Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), intended to integrate local people into projects to enable them to benefit economically. This process has often been referred to as co-management. Although in the last several decades, the majority of conservationists have worked with a model that includes participation of the people living within parks and other protected areas, actual practice has fluctuated between generally uneven local participation and conservation by administrative fiat backed up by force.

More recently, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of such projects has generated a more exclusionary strain within the conservation movement, recently dubbed the "protectionist paradigm." Based in part on a model of nature that repudiates integrationist perspectives, the new protectionist paradigm returns to the old oppositional perspective regarding humans and nature (Brechin et al. in press). The uneven results of ICDP strategies have convinced the authors of several recent influential publications to explicitly militate for the resumption of top-down conservation, requiring a radical transformation of nature, namely the removal of all human inhabitants from environments deemed endangered (Terborgh 1999, Oates 1999). Notwithstanding the well-documented fact that human beings have been integral parts and active shapers of "nature" throughout time, top-down conservationists are currently calling for the displacement and removal of long resident populations from a wide variety of environments in which floral and/or faunal species are considered endangered. Referred to as "greenlining" or "ecological expropriation," this strategy entails the forced removal of people
from their homelands, often without notice or consultation, producing another variety of environmental refugee (Geisler and Da Sousa 2001, Albert 1994). Barring outright displacement, the "new protectionist paradigm" advocates radically restricting resource use practices employed by people resident in reserves and parks. Although criticized for misunderstanding the dynamics of local systems, not to mention its authoritarian tendencies (Dove 1983, Guha 1997, Peluso 1993), the new protectionists have called for radically limiting local usages and practices in protected areas. Such restrictions constitute a form of structural displacement in that while people have not been geographically moved, the norms and practices with which they have engaged the environment in the process of social reproduction become so altered as to effectively change their environment from one that is known to one that must be newly encountered with new norms and new practices if social reproduction is to continue.

While some might argue that conservation is the exact opposite of development, others may equally argue that conservation is an enlightened form of sustainable development, particularly in light of the trend of valorizing resources and environments in terms of their contribution to the sustainability of natural cycles of renewability as well as their economic value. The realization that the unlimited capitalist exploitation of natural environments undermines the actual material source of value, basically destroying its own conditions of production and reproduction, referred to by O'Connor as the second contradiction of capitalism (1998), has enlisted many ardent developers into the ranks of environmentalists. By the same token, the real and potential use value of plant and animal species is now appreciated as a source for new drugs, genetic banks for agricultural crops, environmental services such as flood control, as well as non-use values of an aesthetic and recreational sort (Brechin et al in press). Sustainable development is a discourse intended to resolve the contradiction between nature and capital, moving capitalism into an ecological phase, in which nature is valorized and therefore must be protected. However, according to Escobar, sustainable development discourses frequently lay the blame for environmental destruction not on capitalist development, but on its victims, the urban poor, the rural swidden agriculturalists, the few remaining hunters/foragers, often marginalized by development into fragile areas where they struggle to survive (1999).

VIII.E. The Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve and the Zapatista Rebellion Case Study

Roughly seven years ago in the Mexican state of Chiapas, the Zapatista rebellion, named after one of that nation's peasant revolutionary heroes, was launched to combat the abuse and neglect of that region by both local elites and the state itself. From their bases hidden in the Lacandon rain forest, the rebels have emerged periodically to attack military and state targets as well as to mount an extremely effective public information campaign designed to inform the world of the condition of Chiapas' indigenous peoples. In February of 2001, the Zapatista leaders met with newly elected President Vicente Fox to negotiate a peaceful settlement. However, one of the most difficult issues to resolve in the conflict is the fate of the Lacandon jungle and within it the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve which forms the core of the rain forest. The Lacandon jungle is the site of North America's last tropical rainforest and home to an enormous diversity of plant and animal life, exceeded only by similar locations in Brazil and Indonesia. Montes Azules, established in 1978 as Mexico's first UNESCO biosphere reserve, contains more than half of the nation's bird species, and 25% of its mammals, including many endangered species, such as harpy eagles, tapirs, white tortoises, jaguars and ocelots. It is Mexico's most important national park.

The forest is also the home of thousands of indigenous peasants whose cause is embraced by the Zapatista uprising. The focus of the tension between social justice for the people of Chiapas and the integrity of the environment are twenty-two "illegal" communities that have emerged in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve during the seven-year rebellion. These communities are partly made up of peasants, already marginalized by large landowners who control a majority of the land in Chiapas, whose communal ejido lands on the borders of the reserve had proved insufficient to sustain their families. Other residents are refugees from the conflict itself,
fleeing the abuses of the military and the right-wing paramilitary squads engaged with the Zapatista combatants. However, the peasants are not the only invaders of the reserve. Only 30 years ago the Lacandon forest was relatively untouched and extended for 3.5 million acres. In the ensuing three decades the Mexican state opened the forest to immigration and exploitation of lumber and oil, shrinking the forest to its current 1.6 million acres, half of which are contained in the biosphere reserve.

For the Zapatistas and their allies, Montes Azules is a central issue in their struggle. One of their chief complaints is that the agrarian reform, the crowning achievement of the Mexican Revolution (1910-17) omitted Chiapas. Rather than break up the large haciendas for redistribution to the peasantry, as was done in the rest of the country, in Chiapas the government resettled landless peasants from the fertile highlands into the jungle and promptly forgot them. In 1972, in a cynically manipulative move, the government relocated 6,000 of these mostly Tzeltal and Chol speaking Indians and ceded 1.6 million acres of the forest to 66 Lacandon Indian families, whom they soon convinced to accept a cash payment for large scale exploitation of lumber, oil and hydropower. Subsequently, in 1991 changes were effected in the agrarian reform law to permit Mexico's entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), dooming any hopes the peasants had of receiving land distributions. It is hardly coincidental that the Zapatista rebellion began on January 1, 1994, the day that Mexico formally entered NAFTA.

Montes Azules officials have offered the peasants a less than modest 12 acres, new homes and agricultural extension services outside the reserve, but 22 of the 29 communities, totaling roughly 1000 persons, have refused resettlement. The town of Ricardo Flores Mogon in a public letter posted on the internet declared, "We do not accept coordination, we are not going to permit relocation, and we do not accept the lie of the bad government. We have had 70 years of (the government's) economic programs, of seeing that they do not work, that they do not meet our needs, that others benefit from them, that they do not see our cultures, that after a while the support is withdrawn, in a few words, that they always fail. Our communities and our people are in resistance against the bad government."

The local resistance movement as well as the government have acquired national and international allies in the dispute. On the government's side, international organizations such as Conservation International and the World Wildlife Fund have supported efforts to remove the peasants from the reserve. They are fearful that, among other things, the swidden (slash and burn) agriculture of the peasants will prove devastating to the forest. The discourse on swidden agriculture has fluctuated a great deal over time. In the 19th century it was seen as destructive of valuable commodities such as teak. Anthropologists have established that swidden systems as traditionally operated with vertical overlapping layers of different crop species, small settlements, widely scattered gardens, were actually minimally disruptive of the forest eco-system (Bodley 1994:50). Today swidden agricultural systems seem to have fallen into disrepute again. In the Montes Azules reserve it is feared that the practice of swidden agriculture by the resisting peasants will result in large-scale deforestation as well as perhaps start large-scale forest fires. Park officials are fearful of fires that might completely consume the forest, although there are contesting claims that previous fires were due to military campaigns against resisting villages (Bellinghausen 2000). Certainly the increasing population of the marginalized, growing from 60,000 in 1960 to more than 400,000 currently, is contributing to these fears of environmental destruction, but Jose Ignacio March, Conservation International's director in Chiapas, has stated that the number of people is less significant than the swidden system. "We can deforest the whole forest with the current productive systems, and everyone will still be in poverty."

Despite the Indians' deep distrust, the government in collaboration with Conservation International operates a number of programs in the forest, including organic shade coffee, ornamental palm frond and vanilla cultivation, indigenous handicrafts, and sustainable forestry and farming methods involving composting and crop rotation that will eliminate the need to slash and burn. However, the industry that has the greatest potential for halting the destruction of the forest, according to the Montes Azules director, Alejandro Portillo, is eco-tourism. USAID has commissioned Conservation International to come up with a management strategy for the entire Lacandon region, but especially the dozens of Mayan ruins, the indigenous cultures and the great aesthetic value of the rain forest itself.

Opposing the conservationist position are the human rights groups that have allied themselves with the peasants resisting resettlement. Such groups as Food First and the Mexico Solidarity Network in the United States maintain that until appropriate land reform measures are taken to assure marginalized peoples access to sufficient land, there will be no solution to the invasion of reserves, not only in Mexico, but in the rest of the world as well. The Zapatistas assert that the park authorities exaggerate the danger of fire as a pretext to forcibly remove the villages and also to allow the army access to sufficient terrain in the park to surround the rebel army. An official
communiqué of the Zapatista rebellion contends, "But those who are today wrapping themselves in the green flag of saving the Montes Azules Biosphere are also strangely forgetting about the irresponsible and incoherent manner in which the reserve has been administered over the last thirty years." Indeed, such protectionist policies are even contradicted by the military reforestation efforts that are focused on non-native commercially exploitable species such as eucalyptus, cedar and mahogany in monocropping schemes that ignore the complex diversity of the forest eco-system. The continued oil exploitation and the construction of as many as 43 hydroelectric dams planned by the Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) for the Lacandon forest region are also hard to define as ecologically sustainable development (Osun 1999).

The resolution of the problem seems distant still as the government proposes relocation, and the Zapatistas and their allies are reluctant to discuss the issue. Despite great optimism for the talks held between the government and the Zapatista National Liberation Army held recently in March of 2001, outcomes were disappointing as the bill for constitutional reforms of the law of indigenous rights and culture were considered a betrayal of the original agreement to approve the 1996 San Andres Accords backed by the Zapatistas. The National Indigenous Congress, in addition to the Zapatistas, is planning organized protests over the law that they allege denies the rights of indigenous peoples. In Chiapas, thousands of indigenous people marched and demonstrated in protest over the congressional version of the law (Mexico Solidarity Network 2001).

(Except where otherwise indicated, this case study is based on Wehner 2000)

The issue of marginalized peoples and protected areas is one that most likely will continue to draw the attention of the conservation movement. Until more equitable forms of land distribution are developed, many protected areas will be seen as the solution to survival for those people marginalized by agribusiness. In turn, there will be attempts at forcibly relocating such communities because of their impact on the environment. Such people become double losers to the demands of commercial agriculture and the conservation movement. Indeed, one can almost predict that within a short time, Honduran farmers marginalized to steep hillsides first by the expansion of cattle ranching, shrimp mariculture, commercial melon and banana production, and subsequently to La Mosquitia by the ecological devastation of Hurricane Mitch, will once again be uprooted as they encroach upon indigenous reserves and protected areas of that rainforest region. These unfortunate communities will thus become triple losers.

IX. ECONOMIC DEBATES: EVALUATING RISKS AND COMPENSATING LOSSES

If the decisions to displace and resettle people are fundamentally political, the purposes of development projects that displace people are most often economic. In economic terms DIDR resistance involves a conflict between the needs of a local society and the needs of a regional or national one. Infrastructure, facilities, services, resources of various sorts are determined to be essential to the economic development process and deemed to override the rights and needs of people who occupy the terrain necessary for a project. Even in cases where the purported goal is conservation of a natural environment, the discourse of complementarity between good ecology and good economics created by the concept of sustainable development provides an economic subtext to such projects. The discourse of biodiversity underscores the importance of conservation in economic terms by evoking the necessity of maintaining a basis for genetic diversity for the preservation of robustness and resistance of commercially valuable species. Secondary economic goals of selected forms of resource exploitation are also often revealed subsequent to reserve demarcation and displacement as well (see Montes Azules Case Study).

As has been stressed a number of times in this report, DIDR is a multidimensional, totalizing phenomenon, impacting virtually every aspect of the lives of the displaced. Thus, between a project that is justified on purely economic grounds and a community's multifaceted existence there is a fundamental analytical disjuncture. The data, rationale and basis for projects are generally unidimensionally quantitative and economic. Economic planners and their methods
and tools cannot address the multidimensionality that is presented by DIDR. Characteristically, that which economics cannot address is dismissed as external to the problem, statistically insignificant or unimportant. This idea of multidimensionality, so fundamental to any clear understanding of resettlement, is therefore rarely factored into the planning process of projects that will displace people (Cernea 1999:21, 23). Thus, the format in which the vast majority of DIDR producing projects is conceived is almost inevitably inadequate from the perspective of the project affected people and equally inevitably provides the rationale for resistance. Indeed, such is the hegemony of economics in development that the only option left to DIDR affected people is protest and resistance (Cernea 1999; Chambers 1997).

Therefore, the rationale for projects is fundamentally economic and the decisions to move ahead with projects are made on economic grounds. Thus, even before the people to be displaced are aware of a project, the nature of the decisions that have been made and the plans that have been drawn up come from a perspective that in most cases has markedly different value orientations and rationalities from those of the people to be displaced. In many, if not the majority of cases, the bases on which these decisions and plans have been elaborated are derived from a set of value positions and perspectives that are almost inevitably going to provoke resistance. It is not just uprooting that sparks resistance, but, as Cernea (1999) notes, the disaster of resettlement is deeply embedded in both the rationale and the method by which the project is conceptualized and designed, making resistance virtually inevitable.

However, it is not only the value orientation or basis of those decisions and plans that evokes such immediate resistance. Cernea recently has severely criticized the form and method of economic analysis that have been employed in resettlement projects as responsible for the almost uninterrupted string of failures around the world (1999). As Chambers wryly notes, "Economists tend to take a Pavlovian view of human nature which sees people as subject to reflexes which respond to economic incentives. The danger is that assuming that other people are economic maximizers makes economic maximizers of those who make the assumptions" (1997:50). Moreover, much of the economic data on which such economic decisions are made can be seriously flawed by culture bound elite notions about peasants, farmers, women, Indians or other minorities or subgroups that may be threatened with resettlement. For example, the assumption about rural dwellers as a single set of farmers with a uniform set of needs and requirements completely elides the class and ethnic distinctions that will generate important differences in economic and social resources, forms of tenure, amounts and kinds of land farmed, crop choices, credit access, and common resource access, all of which will determine the effect of resettlement as well as the intensity of resistance.
IX.A. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Thus, many of the core disputes fueling resistance movements are economic in nature. They are disputes about both price and value. The proponents of the reigning models of development that emphasize large scale transformations of the social and physical environments, espouse values that elevate “the greatest good for the greatest number” over the rights of the less numerous and the less powerful. How the concept of “good” and how the numbers are arrived at are issues of some discussion. However, since most proponents of large scale development, particularly nation-states and the multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and its companion regional development banks as well as the private sector, are operating under primarily economically derived definitions of development, their approach to defining “good” is, largely based on economic measures. In that effort, they are generally consistent with a western cultural perspective that evolved in close relationship with the expansion of the market in social life. Indeed, part of that cultural perspective involves a close linking of the idea of economic quantification with rationality and science, allegedly allowing for precision and banishing the ambiguity that plagues decision-making through political discourse (Espeland 1999). Thus, the concept of value embodied in the word “good” is fundamentally an economic one based on income and other quantifiable benefits. The means by which such a position is derived is a calculus known as Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), often hailed as a means of clarifying and rationalizing societal choices and minimizing social conflict. CBA itself has become the model from which a form of discourse emerges that purports to remove or replace other forms of discourse, such as politics, from debates about social and environmental projects. Originating from economics, CBA provides policy makers and politicians with a method for making decisions about social and environmental projects that is purportedly objective, fair and democratic, the decisions and outcomes arrived at scientifically. The essence of CBA is expressed by its name. Basically, the analyst measures the costs and benefits associated with a project and then adds them up to see which is larger (Adams 1996: 2). If the value of the benefits outweighs the value of the costs, an objective basis for proceeding with a project has been provided the policy maker.

But in order to carry out this calculus, some prior operations become necessary because the costs and benefits of a project will be of various orders: that is, some will be economic, some will be social, some will be environmental and some will be cultural. In order to carry out a Cost-Benefit analysis, some common standard of measurement must be established for the appropriate calculation to yield the quantitative, objective result that will produce a decision unaffected and essentially impermeable to political interference to take place. That is, there has to be a single property possessed by all things, conditions or states of affairs that is considered to be the source of their value (O’Neill 1996: 98). This single property provides the strong commensuration that is required by Cost-Benefit analysis.

“The only basic principle is that we should be willing to assign numerical values to costs and benefits, and arrive at decisions by adding them up and accepting those projects whose benefits exceed their costs. There is absolutely no need for money to be the numeraire (i.e. the unit of account) in such valuations. It could equally be bushels of corn, but money is convenient.” (Layard and Glaister 1994 as quoted in Adams 1996).

In effect, in this mode of discourse, money is considered to be a convenient means of representing the relative values that society places on different resources and practices. Thus, for Cost-Benefit analysis to be carried out, the costs and benefits in all their diversity have to
be expressed in some uniform, quantitative format, conveniently and preferably in money prices. Money values or prices are usually arrived at by the modified or unmodified intersection of supply and demand in a marketplace. Using prices thus presents a problem for arriving at the price of costs and benefits from a project that are not the result of the intersection of supply and demand in a market. Since Cost-Benefit Analysis normally requires that everything be expressed in money value terms, a method must be devised to access how people would monetarily value non-market items. Such a method is known as contingent valuation, and although, to be fair, its validity is still a much-debated issue among economists, it is integral to Cost-Benefit Analysis (Bishop, Champ, and Mullarkey 1995). In Contingent Valuation, people are asked how much they would be Willing to Pay (WTP) for the things the analyst is seeking to value if they were for sale (Adams 1996:2). WTP works best when people are asked about benefits. However, in cases of DIDR, the question for people who are being impacted is more frequently one of costs. In the case of costs, the question then revolves around how much money would a person be Willing to Pay to prevent losses or Willing to Accept (WTA) as compensation for losses. These questions are not simply inversions of each other. They elicit manifestly different responses. On the one hand, asking a person how much they would be willing to pay to prevent a loss is constrained by that person’s ability to pay. One the other hand, asking a person how much they would be willing to accept as compensation for a loss elicits what economists have characterized as “unrealistically high answers” (Adams 1996). WTP is generally preferred, for reasons of sound economy.

“Consider the case of an environmental degradation in the form of a dam construction which will flood a valley. One old man who has lived in the valley for all his life will be forced to move if the dam is constructed. His equivalent variation, or the amount by which one should reduce his income in order to expose him to an equivalent worsening of welfare, is bounded upwards by his income (WTP). On the other hand, his compensating variation is not bounded upward and can be quite substantial. Although the two measures are radically different in this case, they both give valid measures of the welfare changes of the old man. The problem appears when we compare the welfare of this individual with the welfare of others, i.e. all those consumers of electricity who will gain by the construction of the dam. If we want to put special emphasis on the old man in the valley, we should choose to use the compensating variation (WTA), while if we want to treat him on an equal footing with the electricity consumer, we should use the equivalent variation.” (Dasgupta and Maler 1989: 232).

The goal of such an analysis is to provide a basis on which a set of benefits can be compared with a set of costs. Using dams as an example, benefits include such things as power generation, irrigation water, and flood control for estimated populations groups. Costs normally include the cost of design and construction, perhaps mitigation of environmental impacts and/or compensation for people who must be relocated from land to be inundated. The method is intended to provide an objective, neutral, transparent basis for making decisions about the viability of projects, essentially immune from the wrangling and influence of political interest groups. Martin O’Connor has described CBA as driven by the political desire to escape politics (1999).

As Cernea points out, Cost-Benefit Analysis justifies a project economically on the basis of benefits that are greater than costs in terms of total sums. However, CBA does not account for either distribution of costs or benefits. It cannot ask who pays the costs, suffers the losses or reaps the benefits. Moreover, CBA establishes aggregate costs and benefits when it is individuals who incur the costs and absorb the losses (Cernea 1999: 20). CBA also is
inadequate for assessing costs that are real, but difficult to quantify such as the losses experienced in the breakdown of community or the loss of cultural or spiritual resources. Other critics of CBA (Adams 1996; O'Neill 1999; Espeland 1998) contend that CBA distorts the values that people attach to both and natural and cultural resources.

IX.B. Natural Resource Valuation

The multiple costs and losses incurred by subsets of individuals are often distinguished along class, ethnic, gender or age lines. One of the main points of dispute in DIDR resistance is the appropriate means to measure or account for these costs and losses. The valuation of natural resources in terms of money, for example, is not problematical in societies that have an established principle of individual property in nature. Many natural resources in such societies are customarily measured in terms of quantity or volume and valued in terms of money. However, the standard by which they are priced for compensation in DIDR is an issue of considerable debate. Traditionally, and particularly in the first world, the standard by which people removed for projects by eminent domain were compensated was basically market value. The market price was expected to reflect both quantity and quality of resources lost and gained. However, a great deal of protest has emerged where this standard has been employed to compensate people for land, for example, because market value for land in the home context may be greater than the market value of land in the region of resettlement due to both availability and quality. Hence, many people engage in protest and resistance activities to militate for the use of replacement value as the standard for compensation in the case of land. Thus, in many cases, money may be entirely acceptable as a means of compensation, but the standard at which the price of land is established may be very contested.

However, rights in property are rarely completely clear-cut. In many contexts in which DIDR has taken place, formal titles to land are more the exception than the rule. People may have resided on and exploited land for generations without having formal titles for a variety of reasons. Some may exist as renters or tenants. Others may occupy land belonging to others informally as squatters. Moreover, they may also depend on resources that exist on land that is considered to be either government or common property. Thus, when people are displaced, the issue of whom to compensate as well as how to compensate is central in the demands resistance movements put forth. A frequent issue of contention between DIDR project authorities and resisters revolves around the requirements for compensation. Project authorities often restricted compensation to holders of formal titles, thus condemning sometimes the majority of the displaced to total loss. Where the idea of individual ownership of property in nature is essentially alien, access to resources becomes the crucial element in compensation. The pressure of resistance movements for the recognition of other forms of tenure and ownership has led in recent years to a modification of this position by many projects in many regions. However, even efforts to compensate for lost communal holdings, pressures to conform to dominant society legal constructions of individually held land are strong.

IX.C. Loss of Access to Resources

Thus, from an economic standpoint the basic motivation for resistance lies squarely in the fact that resettlement projects consistently impoverish people (see Koenig's companion desk study on impoverishment). While resistance may be seen superficially as a rejection of the loss of economic resources that only have to be enumerated for compensation, it is by no means a simple matter to ascertain where and in what aspect of their lives people lose resources and become materially impoverished to establish the economic bases for DIDR resistance.
Indeed, a simplistic approach toward this issue is largely responsible for much of the economic injustice, impoverishment and resistance that DIDR projects generate. The loss of access to resources that are fundamental to the maintenance of life, whether in the rural or urban context, can provide the basis for mobilization of resistance. People generally are not compensated for less tangible assets than land such as access to markets, communal property resources and social networks (Fisher, W. 1995: 32). In urban contexts, resettled people frequently organize resistance movements over loss of accessibility of employment. Slum clearance and urban renewal have frequently resettled people far from sources and sites of employment, and often even distant from regular transportation routes and facilities (Perlman 1982). The costs of transportation to work, not to mention the time, are also seen as an economic hardship that is cause for resistance by urban resettlers. One study found that traveling to work from a housing project for the displaced took two hours a day and cost one third of the minimum salary in fares (Perlman 1982: 233). Resettlement can distance both rural and urban people from essential access to markets from which they either derive all or part of their livelihoods or the basic material necessities of life. Furthermore, loss of access to markets also deprives people of access to those sources of social, cultural and political capital that tend to accumulate in markets. Such losses may be actively resisted because they impoverish people in diverse ways.

For many people, the arrival of large-scale development projects represents the intrusion of a set of economic institutions and practices with which they have had little experience and the long-term outcome of such an intrusion eventually involves their increased integration in this institutional complex. The shift to a monetized economy from a use value reciprocity based economy has rarely been smooth (Moore 1966), but when those profound cultural changes are coupled with the threat and/or trauma of resettlement, social disarticulation, cultural disintegration and resistance become likely.

**IX.D. Cultural Resources Valuation**

Cultural resources become particularly problematic to CBA. Cultural resources are increasingly being addressed by projects through the methods of CBA and contingent valuation, but in order to work, the requirements of CBA oblige a form of commodification of everything. Everything from fixed capital resources to cultural identity must be expressible in terms of a single common denominator, a money figure. In some instances the market has already effected the conversion that CBA purports to carry out in placing money values on non-market items. The commodification of local rituals for tourist consumption in many nations has accomplished surreptitiously what CBA attempts in Contingent Valuation, namely, to put a price tag on Cultural Heritage resources and inject them into the market (Garcia Canclini 1992; Greenwood 1977). However, where the market seduces, often co-opting dismay and protest, CBA and contingent valuation are far more blunt. What is the consequence of asking someone what he or she would be willing to pay to prevent the inundation of the burial grounds of the ancestors? The outrage that frequently results from such a query represents an intractable problem that increasingly confronts the discourse of Cost-Benefit Analysis that has been termed Constitutive Incommensurability (O’Neill 1999). Constitutive incommensurability refers to an unresolvable plurality of values. That is, there are some objects, places, conditions or states of affairs that resist being reduced to a single uniform measure. They are essentially constituted by particular kinds of shared understandings that are incompatible with market relations on moral or ethical grounds. The right to practice one’s religion in the appropriate shrine, the right to speak one’s own language, or the right to bury one’s dead and respect one’s ancestors in sacred ground as well as the loyalties of kinship, custom or a way of life are generally constituted by the refusal to treat them as commodities to
be bought and sold (O’Neill 1999). The suggestion that payment would be appropriate is insulting, even morally repugnant. Such a construction challenges even the most well-meaning efforts at compensation. Appropriate forms and levels of compensation clearly cannot be arrived at by outsiders employing some ostensibly “objective” method such as CBA, but only in consultation with the affected people (Fisher, W. 1995: 32).

IX.E. Reparations Issues

Recent work carried out for the World Commission on Dams points to the overwhelming need for reparations for people displaced by dam construction whose losses have never been appropriately compensated (Johnston 2000). Both research and the voices of the displaced have urged that claims of past injustices be heard by national and international human rights commissions (McCully 1999). Reparations for uncompensated damages that have been experienced in both displacement and resettlement have been recommended by the WCD. Reparations are defined as actions or processes that repair, make amends, or compensate damages. Legally, there are basically three forms of reparation: restitution, indemnity (or compensation) and satisfaction. Restitution is defined as a return of the offended state to its former condition prior to alteration. Such action might include restoration of a damaged eco-system or lost resources such as water or fisheries by removing dam structures. Indemnity, also referred to as compensation, involves the payment of money to the injured party for losses experienced by illegal acts, including property or opportunity lost (profit for example). In the case of community as opposed to individual losses, indemnity payments can be used to fund improved resettlement plans or develop projects that address community needs. Satisfaction addresses primarily non-material damage through formal apology for losses sustained or the discipline of responsible individuals. In terms of development projects that violate human rights in DIDR satisfaction might include public acknowledgements of wrongdoing and formal apologies to those who suffered as a result of those actions. Satisfaction might also include damage awards for hardships experienced as outcomes of long-term effects of the original violation (Johnston 2000).

Resistance and opposition movements have made payment of reparations to dam affected peoples a central issue in their campaigns. The 1994 Manibeli Declaration calls on the World Bank to establish a fund to provide reparations to the people displaced by bank-funded dams. The fund would be managed by an independent, transparent and accountable institution and is to include training and assistance for affected communities in the preparation of claims. This demand was reiterated at the first international meeting of dam-affected people in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997. Dam reparations call for a variety of remedies, including monetary and such non-monetary measures as dam decommissioning, official recognition of injustices committed and the restoration of eco-systems (IRN 2000). For example, in the late 1970s the World Bank helped fund the Chixoy Dam in collaboration with the government of Guatemala, which at the time was engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign that became a virtual genocidal war on the indigenous highland Maya population. The Mayan village of Rio Negro, among others, refused to relocate to make way for the construction of the dam. In 1982 the Guatemalan army and paramilitary forces entered the villages and massacred approximately 400 people, mostly women and children. In effect, the DIDR resistance of Rio Negro provided the pretext for the military to continue its genocidal war against the indigenous population. Despite numerous construction monitoring visits by World Bank personnel during the period, not much was known of the massacre until 1996 when human rights groups began to investigate. An internal investigation by the World Bank eventually denied any culpability or responsibility for the crimes. The World Bank now considers the issue closed because most of
the communities affected by the dam have now reached pre-dam (1976) standards of living. However, the survivors of the massacre and their allies are demanding reparations for the 20 years of deprivation, fear, and the murder of their families. The reparation demands include replacement land of equal quality and quantity, the construction of a monument to commemorate the 400 victims and seeking out and initiating legal proceedings against those responsible for the massacre (IRN 2000).

IX.F. Private sector approaches to DIDR

As indicated previously, private sector approaches to DIDR are in the vast majority of cases simply non-existent. However, some private sector interests, such as the Rio Tinto Corporation, have developed resettlement policies and attempt to work with the affected people to implement them. However, most private sector development relies on the market mechanism to assess adequate compensation for people displaced its expansion. In the developed world, the market mechanism is customarily employed to assess value and compensation in land transactions. The expansion of many private enterprises in urban areas such as hotel and tourist facilities, shopping malls, stadiums, and many other structures is enabled by straightforward purchase of property and the departure of residents. As indicated earlier, the market with its scenarios of choice and contracts freely entered into by autonomous and equal economic actors provides the appearance of voluntary relocation by participants. Indeed, private sector driven DIDR often involving large numbers of people, often passes simply as "unrecognized" (Appa and Patel 1996). However, the voluntary appearance is often deceptive. In some cases involving urban renewal in cities in the developed world, resistance movements have developed to oppose dislocation by "gentrification," the process in which real estate interests and/or private individuals surreptitiously purchase properties in urban neighborhoods to upgrade, thereby raising property values and by extension taxes, forcing long term lower income residents to sell. Economic boom can also create the conditions for wholesale restructuring of neighborhoods. The recent explosion (and subsequent implosion) of the so-called "dot com" economy in northern California has impacted property values in the entire region. New internet companies flush with invested funds began locating offices in the traditionally residential Mission district of San Francisco, driving up property values and taxes and forcing many long-term residents to relocate. An anti-displacement movement was formed in late 2000 and rallies were held at which computers were smashed as symbols of resistance to dislocation. The subsequent implosion of the "dot com" economy has reduced the pressure somewhat, but residents are remaining vigilant (National Public Radio 2001). Similar movements have emerged in other urban neighborhoods in the US and elsewhere. The symbolic importance of the neighborhoods encompassed by Harlem in New York City as a major site of African American cultural heritage has attracted many people from middle and upper income brackets, some of them African Americans, to acquire and improve properties in that sector of the city (Smith, N. 1996). The "gentrification" process by outsiders, albeit of the same ethnic or racial group, has sparked a resistance movement in which "dislocation free zones" have been declared in areas in Harlem (Jackson 2001).

In rural contexts, private sector expansion, particularly in the developing world, has often adopted informal and frequently violent methods of expulsion. In Brazil the government sponsored colonization of 13,000 families and the incursion of roughly 400,000 squatters from the impoverished northeast and other areas in the 1970s in the Goias-Para-Maranhao nexus of the Amazon region produced conflicts with the expansion of cattle ranching and land speculation in the context of increasing land values. Despite legislated protection for squatters' rights, the new economic interests purchased land and began a period of land expulsions. The
violence in the region became so intense and widespread that in 1975 the Catholic Church established the Pastoral Land Commission to assist the squatters in these conflicts (Sanders 1991: 5). Government responses to the violence included the establishment of military control of the region and a procedure to pursue and settle land claims. Although settlers were able to win some of these judgments, many were lost because of a lack of funds to hire lawyers. The area is now largely deforested and has converted to brush and pasture for cattle (Sanders 1991: 5). Schmink has also documented similar forms of expulsion in other regions of the Amazon (1992).

The expansion of the private sector tourist economy has seen the displacement of many traditional residents as well. Along the coasts of the states of South Carolina and Georgia in the United States, the barrier islands were traditionally the homes of African American populations who were only marginally integrated into mainstream economies and societies. They established a diversified pattern of economic survival strategies based on hunting, gathering, fishing, small-scale agriculture, and occasional wage labor. Their economy enabled them to live on the margins of the dominant society, both excluded from its economic growth and somewhat insulated from the daily, if not the structural, effects of its racial prejudices. Their economy focused primarily around social reproduction and did not produce much monetary income. In the late 1970s foreign capital, much of it based on increased petroleum earnings, began investing in tourism development on the islands, focusing on golf course and vacation housing complexes. With investments, the taxable value of the land increased, straining the capacities of local people to meet these new cash obligations. With increasing taxes local people found themselves forced to sell their land to developers or forfeit it to the county for unpaid taxes. They then moved to the mainland into low income housing and mobile home communities far from familiar coastal environments and entered the mainstream economy as maids, gardeners and other low paid labor, commuting to the vacation communities on the islands they once inhabited (CBS 1991).
IX.G. Case Study: Tourism Development and Resistance in the Philippines

The rapid growth of commercial sport and tourism development has resulted in increasing demand for land on a global scale and has brought it into conflict with both the human and natural environment (Pleumarom 1994). With this development, the environmental and human rights impact of the expansion of sport and tourism facilities have become the focus of considerable debate. At the center of this debate is the issue of golf course development. In the 1980s, in the wake of the considerable economic growth in the new industrialized countries of Asia in particular, golf became extremely popular. Investment in golf resorts expanded enormously. As with other sports today, golf is the central axis around which a constellation of extremely lucrative development activities including golfing clothes and equipment, golfing holidays, hotel chains, airlines, and real estate investment revolve (Pleumarom 1994). An average 18-hole golf course requires a minimum of 89 acres of land and consumes 6,500 cubic meters of water a day. A typical golf course constitutes the equivalent of approximately 40 peasant farmers who produce half a million kilos of rice a year and its water consumption is enough to irrigate 65 hectares of farmlands (www.geocities.com/kmp_ph/strug/looc/looc.html). However, since most new golf development is taking place in the developing world, the courses are generally part of larger packages that involve luxury hotels, chalets, condominiums, marinas, and other recreational features, which can enlarge the total as much by as much as a factor of ten (Ling and Ferrari 1995: 8).

The golf craze has driven a demand for land that has affected indigenous peoples, farmers and communities throughout Asia, as well as in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other European countries. At the start of the 1980s Asia as a whole had only a few courses, but by the mid 1990s Thailand alone had 160 and Japan, already pressed for available land, had 2,000, although several hundred have stopped operating due to local resistance (Ling and Ferrari 1995: 8). Resistance to golf course development took place first in Canada when the Mohawk Indians stopped the entry of developers by blocking the road into their land. The Canadian government responded with soldiers and tanks. Since that time, many other communities around the world have joined this struggle in defense of their lands and livelihoods.

The Hacienda Looc extends over 8,500 hectares in a coastal region of farming and fishing villages in the state of Batangas in the Philippines. The terrain is extremely varied, including coastal plains that local farmers plant in rice, corn, vegetables and sugar cane. There is a sizeable portion of the land area in hills and mountains in which fruit trees such as mangoes, bananas, jackfruits and star apples, wild rice and root crops like cassava and sweet potato are grown. The coastal area gives access to the rich fishing grounds in the China Sea. This resource base has enabled the roughly 10,000 local farmers and fishers to live in relative self-sufficiency for the roughly four generations since the area was settled (www.geocities.com/kmp_ph/strug/looc/looc.html).

At one time Hacienda Looc was part of a large plantation owned successively by several elite families. One of the families used the land to pay off a loan to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). In 1973 the PNB transferred full ownership to the DBP. Under the Marcos regime roughly 1,300 hectares were distributed to 831 farmers under the land reform program. In 1987 the DBP transferred the entire hacienda to the Assets Privatization Trust (APT), the government agency charged with placing government assets for sale or lease to private interests. In the same year, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the Aquino government, a total of 5,218 hectares of the hacienda were organized into cooperatives. However, at the same time, the APT in collaboration with USAID was conducting a feasibility study for a land use plan to turn the hacienda into an agro-tourism complex.

In 1993 APT put the remainder of the hacienda up for public bidding, bringing in a horde of land speculators offering to buy farmers out even of agrarian reform lands. Eventually the land was obtained by the Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), which in 1995 entered into a joint venture with Fil-Estate Properties to develop 1,269 hectares into a world-class tourism and leisure complex called Harbortown Golf and Country Club. The deed of the sale states that MSDC purchased the entire 8,650,7778 hectares in contrast to the bidding terms that stated that only the 3,248.24 hectares not covered by the land reform were to be sold. Raising the question of collusion and fraud, a crucial and highly questionable clause is contained in the deed that allows MSDC to circumvent the land reform law and expand its ownership, ultimately acquiring the whole hacienda for the price it paid for only 3,432 hectares. Both national and local governmental authorities support the project. Indeed, the owners and boards of directors of both MSDC and Fil-Estate are deeply intertwined with key figures in Philippine national and international politics. It is widely thought that the reason Fil-Estate has become the nation’s leading developer is based on close political ties with the presidency. According to its prospectus, the club will have four golf courses, a 120 room luxury hotel, vacation chalets, and a yacht marina. The project will cover roughly 1,270 hectares of land currently held by farmers in 13 collective cooperatives. The first phase of
the project is underway (www.geocities.com/kmp_ph/strug/looc/looc.html) and Tiger Woods was brought in for a
celebrity golf clinic to publicize the project in 1998 (Schradie and DeVries 2000).

In 1996 the residents of the villages of Hacienda Looc founded an organization called Umalpas Ka which
means "Break Free" to fight the evictions that they were facing. They hired sympathetic lawyers to represent their
interests against MSDC and Fil-Estate. Their legal counsel wanted to bar Tiger Woods from entering the country,
but a peasant farmer said, "I learned the news that Tiger Woods is coming to the Philippines, but it would be
better if he came to Hacienda Looc to find out for himself how the people strongly oppose the golf course"
(Schradie and DeVries 2000). Local residents and their attorneys have filed a series of law suits accusing local
officials of taking property on behalf of Fil-Estate fraudulently, having peasants sign blank documents and
producing contracts from dead people (Schradie and DeVries 2000). They publicized the issue, exposing the
military’s participation and holding rallies and media projects to protest the militarization of the region. When
bulldozers began contouring the hills for the golf courses, women from Umalpas-Ka climbed the hillsides and
formed a human barricade to protect the land, forcing a stand-off with the Philippine national police, the military
and Fil-Estate security forces (Schradie and DeVries 2000). However, their resistance provoked serious attempts
at suppression. Certain local authorities invested in the project maintain security forces that have been used to
intimidate the members of Umalpas-Ka. Fil-Estate and MSDC also maintain a force of 134 security guards,
deployed as combat units throughout the two central villages of Calayo and Papaya. The security, it is
maintained, is necessary to safeguard construction equipment, but their stations throughout the area suggest that
Fil-Estate is more concerned with control over the populations. Two farmers associated with Umalpas-Ka were
shot to death without provocation by members of the Fil-Estate and MSDC security forces who were arrested and

Members of Umalpas Ka believe that the two peasants were killed because they were opposed to the
project. The killings mobilized the participation of the New People's Army (NPA), the Philippine guerrilla force
that was instrumental in the defeat of the Chico Dam. Carl Roger, an NPA leader has stated their position: "If they
will continue these unnecessary killings, the NPA will be forced to launch a military operation against anybody
responsible for these killings" (Schradie and DeVries 2000). Thus far, the NPA has not intervened in Hacienda
Looc, but their statement of support was a turning point in the villagers' resistance to the project, reducing the
harassment from the government and Fil-Estate. The peasants of Hacienda Looc have also acquired the assistance
of several NGOs working in the region.

In the face of the resistance of the peasants of Hacienda Looc Fil-Estate and MSDC have initiated a dual
campaign of repression and co-optation. Project authorities have undertaken a census of the communities in
order to award titles to home lots to residents who have been living there for generations. To offset the assistance
of NGOs, Fil-Estate has created its own NGO to generate employment projects for the communities. They have
also attempted to buy off the leaders of Umalpas Ka, offering the chairman two million pesos for one hectare of
his land if he would support the project (www.geocities.com /kmp_ph/strug/looc/looc.html). Attempts are also
being made to form a joint venture between farmers and MSDC-Fil-Estate, in which control of the land remains
with the corporations and the farmers become workers on the enterprise and earn dividends on their shares in the
land. Such an arrangement would put to rest any questions about the illicit maneuvers between the corporations
and the agrarian reform in the acquisition of the land. Recently, news of a property glut in the Philippines has
shaken the confidence of investors in tourist resorts and Hacienda Looc has yet to see its first golf course
(www.geocities.com /kmp_ph/strug/looc/looc.html). However, the recently indicted President Joseph Estrada
refused to return the lands to the people and they are still on alert against the incursions of Fil-Estate bulldozers.
And the NPA is also still watching events and conditions carefully under the new Arroyo-Macapagal
administration (Schradie and DeVries 2000).

X. CULTURAL DISCOURSES OF RESISTANCE

There is a barely hidden cultural politics in many development projects that seeks to
further a general expansion of the control of the state over local territories and people (Scott
1998). In expanding its physical control over territory, the state also strives to impose a process
of standardization and simplification on inhabitants, including common measurement,
language, codification, and mapping. In reducing local cultural, social and economic
complexity to a format dictated by the state, control and rationalization of local systems in
accordance with state priorities can be achieved. Nation building involves the creation of a
comprehensible unity out of an incomprehensible diversity (Anderson 1983). In many nations the not so covert goal of development is the actual disappearance of diversity and the goal of their development projects is the assimilation and absorption, if not the outright eradication, of tribal peoples or peasants constituted of local identities into a mainstream of agricultural bourgeoisie and workers of national identities (Smith 1996). Indeed, completely eliding the entire issue of choice or rights, Vidut Joshi asks, "Why should anyone oppose when tribal cultures change? A culture based on lower level of technology and quality of life is bound to give way to a culture with superior technology and higher quality of life. This is what we call development" (1991: 68 as quoted in Fisher, W.F. 1995: 33).

While the reasons people resist DIDR are often assumed to be economic in nature, the concerns that people express in resistance movements are generally more complex, embracing economic, social and, particularly, cultural issues. Indeed, project planners frequently err in supposing that people have only economic motives in mind when they undertake resistance to DIDR. While violation of economic rights has proven to be a powerful motivator in resistance, a great deal of the moral content of resistance discourse derives its power from explicitly cultural issues pertaining to the rights to persist as cultural entities, of identity, of spiritual links to land and the environment, of loyalty to both mythological and historical ancestors. On the other hand, in their campaigns to raise funds and resist certain forms of development, many NGOs have tended to romanticize the bonds to land held by many indigenous and peasant groups facing DIDR, when their actual concerns focused more on just compensation (Aryal 1995). It is reductionist to attribute resistance solely to economics or for that matter, cultural concerns. Human motivations in general are complex and positions and actions in resistance to DIDR are adopted out of many interwoven concerns rather than one overriding issue.

That notwithstanding, cultural issues play major roles in the constructing of discourses of resistance to DIDR. Actually, development projects provide contexts in which cultural issues become highlighted and especially significant in resistance. There is a great deal at stake socio-culturally and socio-psychologically in resettlement. What does it mean from a socio-cultural standpoint to be dislocated and resettled? How do we develop a language to speak of what is experienced socio-culturally and psychologically in DIDR? What is the impact on individual and cultural identity and integrity? Why has separation from a place so frequently resulted in cultural disintegration?

X.A. Place Attachment

There are two core concepts in resistance to DIDR. One is power and the other is place. One expression of political power is the ability to move people and things about the landscape in any way you see fit. The loss of a home territory constitutes not only the loss of a specific dwelling, but also the loss of a home ground, in some cases, the very ontological grounding of a culture. Place attachment refers to the bonding of people to places. Brown and Perkins offer the following definition of place attachment:

Place attachment involves positively experienced bonds, sometimes occurring without awareness, that are developed over time from the behavioral, affective and cognitive ties between individuals and/or groups and their socio-physical environment. These bonds provide a framework for both individual and communal aspects of identity and have both stabilizing and dynamic features (1992:284).
Place is then much more than mere context for cultural and social action and behavior. It is itself socially constructed and contested in practice. In effect, although the relationship with place is often only partially expressed or cognized, it is created through the actions of specific individuals and groups invested, physically and symbolically, in the environment. Consequently, places themselves acquire multiple meanings, expressive of physical, emotional and experiential realities.

Thus, place attachment processes involve the behavioral, cognitive and emotional embeddedness of individuals in the relationship between their socio-cultural and physical environments, providing a form on ontological stability. Altman and Low (1992) assert that place attachment is an integrating concept that incorporates affect and emotion, knowledge and belief and behaviors and actions and their interplay in reference to a place. A place may become the matrix in which a repository of life experiences becomes embedded and therefore, becomes in some sense, inseparable from the feelings associated with them. The nature of the attachment may involve biological processes of evolutionary and physiological adaptations to a particular environment or, in other words, the ecological fit between a local population and a place. These adaptations involve not only biological processes, but develop as well through the culturally mediated interaction of technology and environment.

Attachment to places may transcend the unique experiences of individuals and involve the constellation of social relations, and the cultural values that inform them, of entire groups or communities. Places come to signify relationships between people, and may take on greater importance in the strength of the bond than their physical qualities. Both as the repository of such relations as well as its physical properties, place plays an important role in the formation, maintenance and preservation of individual, group and cultural identities. The feelings, memories, ideas, values and meanings associated with everyday life in some setting come to constitute a dimension of a person's or group's self identity. From a socio-cultural perspective place attachment is based on the historical experience of a group's experience in a particular setting. Paraphrasing Munn (1990 as cited in Rodman 1992), a place in the world is not given, but lived. Places are essential to the encoding and contextualization of time and history and become identified with the geneology and continuity of families and groups through history. Economic ties of individual or collective ownership, inheritance or other forms of appropriation are fundamental to many place attachments. Other cultural factors such as the intimate connections between environment and religion, cosmology and world view, especially as enacted through rituals and celebratory cultural events, as narrated in folklore, or expressed in place names play significant roles in the relationship of a society to its land base and general environment. Ultimately, such ties lie at the core of both individual and collective constructions of reality. In effect, the ties between people and place lie at the ontological ground of culture itself. As Rodman notes, "Place then is both context and content, enacted and material. It is the lived world in physical form (1992: 650). One's place along with one's body are thus the most basic physical dimensions of existence. Places are not simply containers of behavior, but are constructed, representative and embodied by people.

However, the psychological and socio-cultural centrality of place as physical space cross-culturally needs to be tested further. Liisa Malkki cautions against the application of what she refers to as a western "sedentarist metaphysic" that "incarcerates the native" in an ecological or territorial identity, presenting the rooting of peoples as "not only normal it is also perceived as a moral and spiritual need (1992: 30-31). Her work with Hutu refugees in Tanzania reveals that the true Hutu nation was imagined as a deterritorialized moral community formed by the refugees while the land expanse called Burundi was merely a state
Hansen's work with Angolan refugees in Zambia demonstrates a far greater sense of dislocation among refugees who were settled in camps than among those who self-settled among co-ethnics in villages. In effect, the people who fled across the border but settled with co-ethnics never felt themselves to be refugees (Hansen 1993). Brown and Perkins present the view that human experience may also be seen as separable from context. Following a rational choice approach, people may be presented as disengaged and objective observers of settings, carrying out rational economic analyses of places, specifying the costs and benefits of places, and willing to move from one place to another according the perception of advantage (1992: 283).

Removing people from their known environments separates them from the material and cultural resource base upon which they have depended for life as individuals and as communities. Moreover, a sense of place plays an important role in individual and collective identity formation, in the way time and history are encoded and contextualized, and in interpersonal, community and intercultural relations (Low and Altman 1992; Maalki 1992; Rodman 1992; Escobar 2000). "Geographical experience begins in places, reaches out to others through spaces, and creates landscapes or regions for human existence" (Tilley 1994: 15). Resistance to resettlement reveals how important a sense of place is in the creation of an "environment of trust" in which space, kin relations, local communities, cosmology and tradition are linked (Giddens 1990:102 as cited in Rodman 1992: 648). Removal from one of the most basic physical dimensions of life can be a form of removal from life. The disruption in individual or community identity and stability in place, resulting in resettlement in a strange landscape can baffle and silence people in the same way a strange language can (Basso 1988 as cited in Rodman 1992: 647). Culture loses its ontological grounding and people must struggle to construct a life world that can clearly articulate their continuity and identity as a people again. The human need for "environments of trust" is fundamental to the sense of order and predictability implied by culture, and threats of removal from these physical and symbolic environments have generally elicited some form of resistance.

X.B. Identity and Resistance

Although always at risk in uprooting, the durability and flexibility of cultural identity throughout the extensive migratory history of humanity is impressive. The frequency with which cultural identities are sustained, reinvented and mobilized after migration to new environments is testament to the adaptability of human beings to change. However, the same modern era has also seen the demise of hundreds, if not thousands, of ethnolinguistic groups who have virtually disappeared through disease, exploitation, and assimilation into dominant cultural groups. This is particularly the case for indigenous and minority cultural groups that are small in number and frequently isolated spatially. When contact in the form of private or public economic expansion into their territories takes place, the result has frequently been cultural extinction. However, for some of these endangered groups, local efforts, combined with allies in the indigenous rights, human rights, and environmental movements have developed new political stances, often in response to development projects that include DIDR (Bilharz 1998; Waldram 1980; Salisbury 1989; Turner 1991; Schkilnyk 1985; Gray 1998).

In the conflict of resistance, particularly for small, relatively isolated groups, more precise definitions of cultural identity are often worked out and conceptions of the community in broader national and global contexts may be developed. For many small peasant or indigenous societies, traditional worldviews construct a sense of identity that is almost coterminous with the sense of being human. With the increasing presence of the state, such
small societies often lack an awareness of the political meaning of their own culture in the larger context in which they are becoming subsumed (Turner 1991a). This lack of awareness, particularly of their minority status and its implications for their subordinate status within the larger society, can lead to an erosion of identity and cultural collapse when confronted with dominant group power and exploitation.

Development projects that include DIDR carry with them the potential for a virtually total undermining of local identity. Resettlement imposes forces and conditions on people that may completely transform their lives, evoking profound changes, in environment, in productive activities, in social organization and interaction, in leadership and political structure, and in world view and ideology. Resettlement may mean that people may be relocated in a new place, where they may have little first hand knowledge and experience. Uprooting people from the environments in which the vast majority of their meaningful activities have taken place separates them from the context on which much of their understanding of life and their sense of identity are based.

Resettlement not only relocates a people in space; it also remakes them. When a community is relocated, it is not reproduced whole in a new site. In most cases the community is reconfigured in specific ways. As mentioned earlier, most development projects, especially those that occasion the large-scale resettlement of populations particularly in rural areas, directly or indirectly further two fundamental processes, the expansion of the state and integration into regional and national market systems. Neither of these processes of inclusion are particularly simple or straightforward, but, in most instances, they initiate a re-structuring of social, economic, and political relationships toward resembling those of the larger society. In many respects, the process of resettlement, insofar as it is oriented by development goals, is designed to change local cultures. In that sense, resettlement will not necessarily destroy "local cultures" but it will appropriate them and restructure them in terms of values and goals often originating from far beyond the local context. Such a process of development must involve the reduction of local culture, society and economy from all their variegated expressions to a narrow set of institutions and activities that make them compatible with the purposes of the larger society (Garcia Canclini 1993).

On the other hand, development projects can also in an inadvertent oppositional process provide a context for developing forms of social consciousness that are more appropriate to the minority position of small communities within an inter-ethnic social system. In effect, development projects can catalyze a shift in cultural consciousness from an ahistorical and acultural sense of identity to that of an ethnic group with a culture and identity to protect in confrontation with a national society (Waldram 1980). The struggle to resist the Ralco Dam on the Bio Bio River in Chile has reunited Mapuche Indians, who have come to the region to reconnect with their communities. People who had hidden their indigenous identity began to reclaim their cultural heritage with pride (Evans 2001: 6).

Although many small societies face total assimilation and cultural disappearance, ethnocide as Bartolome and Barabas (1973) have termed it, others have become conscious of their minority status and have constructed it in terms of active defense of cultural identity and concerted political action. One such group is the Kayapo of the village of Gorotire in the Brazilian Amazon (Turner 1991a). Although initial contact occurred in 1938, the Kayapo in their adjustment to their new situation, had not conceptualized their new situation as an ethnic minority within the larger Brazilian society. Their sense of their own culture and identity continued to be based on certain institutions, the extended family household, the men's house,
the age set system and naming and initiation rites of passage that were key in the reproduction of traditional social relations.

However, in the 1980s with the onslaught of a number of activities undertaken by the state and its citizens in their territory, they had to adjust certain features of their worldview to see themselves as an ethnic group among many other indigenous peoples in common confrontation with Brazilian society. In their confrontation with both public and private economic development initiatives, the Kayapo have come to define their very survival in terms of successful resistance to the destruction of their natural environment by the Brazilians. Development aggression against their culture and environment began in the 1980s with gold mines illegally opened in their territory and the dumping of radioactive waste on their borders. These assaults were met with skillful manipulation by the Kayapo of Brazilian fears of savage Indians, resulting in a successful recapture of the gold mines. A sit-in at the presidential palace in full regalia halted the radioactive dumping. Perhaps the greatest triumph among many has been the leading role the Kayapo of Gorotire played in the great inter-tribal rally at Altamira to protest the project to construct a dam in the Xingu River Valley, eventually contributing to the forestalling of a World Bank loan that would have made the project financially possible. Subsequently, through an international campaign led by the Kayapo with the assistance of international allies, including media figures like the rock star, Sting, the demarcation of a large new reserve for Kayapo communities who lacked formally constituted territories was achieved. Basically, in their resistance to the incursions of Brazilian society, the Kayapo have made their culture a political issue. Moreover, they have found that their culture is important to others and have discovered the importance of having control over how their culture is represented to others. They recognize that control over the power of representation is a means of conferring value and meaning on themselves in the vision of the larger world. The great rally at Altamira to protest the Xingu River dam project was organized by the Kayapo as a demonstration of their culture and the political solidarity between all Kayapo and their allies. The Kayapo encampment at the rally was designed to be a model Kayapo village with traditional houses, artifacts and family groupings, all of which was avidly viewed by the hundreds of journalists, photographers and videographers in attendance. The Kayapo astutely reasoned that the more national and international witnesses they had, the less likely the Brazilian state was to undertake any violent retaliations for the demonstration, in which they very forcefully demonstrated their resistance to the project and their scorn for the Brazilian authorities (Turner 1991a).

Development projects, particularly those that involve resettlement, can inadvertently catalyze a shift in cultural consciousness among small subordinated groups, bringing about a process of political socialization that enables them to articulate more clearly their interests and identities for themselves and for others in the defense of their culture. Although the damage they inflict can threaten the existence of subaltern groups, development projects, even those that fail economically, given a degree of accountability, can sharpen local identities through the oppositional process and resistance and further the political development of subaltern groups. As such, development projects can produce inadvertent positive outcomes when they stimulate the development of civil organizations that are able to resist state excesses in its efforts to transform local systems (Smith 1996: 47).

X.C. Cultural Heritage Resources

Cultural heritage refers to the historical memory of a community, to that which links people to others throughout time. Cultural heritage is constituted in objects, resources, and
practices that locate a people in the universe, giving them a sense of identity through time. Places where events of historical or sacred importance have occurred; objects such as shrines, cemeteries, or ancient ruins that express local identity; resources such as rivers, springs, lakes, forests that not only provide material sustenance, but also express or nurture the spiritual life of the community, speaking one’s native tongue, practicing one’s religion, all constitute elements of cultural heritage. Such elements play a signal role in individual and collective identity formation, in the way that time and history are encoded and contextualized, and in interpersonal, community and intra-cultural relations. Anthony Giddens (1984) speaks of the creation of environments of trust in which space, kin relations, local communities, cosmology and tradition are linked. For example, in Brazil, the Catholic Church and CRAB (see Case Study) developed a powerful discourse about the losses that the people would experience if they were displaced by a dam. The threat to homes, churches and cemeteries was deeply felt and nourished the spirit to defend these community institutions (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 49). Consequently, it is not just “place” in the sense of geography, that is significant, but the relationship between people and place as encoded in objects, socially constructed places, and historically derived cultural practices.

Previous discussion of Cost-Benefit analysis emphasized the need to establish a discourse of commensurabilities among the various losses and gains for that approach to be applied. The discourse of people who are the objects of the policy and discourse of CBA, namely those who must respond to such questions and those who must be relocated by projects may respond to distinctly different cultural values. If CBA arrives at its conclusions through an objective calculation based on a constructed commensuration of values across a wide spectrum of costs and benefits, the cultural models or values that energize the discourse of those impacted come from different sources.

“You tell us to take compensation. What is the state compensating us for? For our land, for our fields, for the trees along our fields. But we don’t live only by this. Are you going to compensate us for our forest?…Or are you going to compensate us for our great river—for her fish, her water, for vegetables that grow along her banks, for the joy of living beside her? What is the price of this? How are you compensating us for fields either?—we didn’t buy this land; our forefathers cleared it and settled here. What price this land? Our gods, the support of those who are our kin—what price do you have for these? Our Adivasi (tribal) life—what price do you put on it?”


This is a letter written to the Chief Minister of the State Government of Gujarat by a tribal person from the Narmada Valley in Western India who was being displaced by the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam. The issue of compensation is also clearly of concern to this individual, but in this case, he or she is incredulous that the government could conceive that compensation could begin to address their losses. Such things as “our forest…our great river…the joy of living beside her…the land…our gods…the support of our kin…our Adivasi life…” cannot be thought of as having prices. This person is plainly arguing from a completely different premise, one which clearly differentiates between a set of values in which price is seen as a neutral measuring rod and a set of values that are based in the socially constructed relationship between a community and its environment. The suggestion that people in exchange for a price will be willing to abandon a cultural heritage to which they are committed constitutes a form of bribery, a corruption of the relationships that are constitutive of a culture (O’Neill 1996: 99). Indeed, clearly what is at stake for this individual is not a
States that a bundle of material resources that can be valued in a market, but a set of relationships that link a people to each other, to their environment and to their culture. Their value cannot be expressed monetarily. The existence of “spheres of exchange” in which categories of goods are incommensurable and separated by moral boundaries, prohibiting transactions among them, is widely documented in many cultures (Bohannan 1959).

Some of the major points of contention voiced in the discourse of the displaced revolve around issues of property. Compensation suggests that environmental goods can be subsumed into a liberal conception of property rights with rights of exclusivity and alienability. In this understanding land is a commodity that can be exchanged in the market. Threatened with relocation by the proposed construction of a dam, a Yavapai Indian from Arizona suggested that...

“Indian people view the land as a gift from God, that they’re only temporary and that God gave them the use of the land to live on... to take care of the earth... They don’t really own the land. There’s no one big title and a deed and stuff, and they pay off the land and they say, ‘This is mine. Nobody else can take it.’ An Indian doesn’t view the land that way... The Indian knows that his land and life is intertwined, that they are one unit. Without the land, the Indian cannot survive and without the Indian, the land cannot be land, because the land needs to be taken care of to survive life.” (Espeland 1998:201).

The land is sacred and basic to the core of Yavapai identity. Essentially, land is an incommensurable entity, and it is morally repugnant to commoditize it. The suggestion that money could express its value or compensate them for its loss is to distort the relationship they have with the land. As another individual from the same group put it, “Land is like diamonds, money is like ice” (Mariella 1989). Land and money are being compared to two things that are similar in appearance, but different in substance. And it should be noted that land is like diamonds, not for their monetary worth, but for their lasting qualities. Diamonds and land are forever. Ice and money melt.

Clearly the necessity for strong commensuration in CBA and its equally strong rejection by dam impacted people, particularly regarding cultural heritage resources, present a thorny problem. But it is a problem of politics, not economics. Economics cannot resolve issues of value. It can only resolve issues of price. And prices do not in many instances reflect peoples’ values. In dam projects the attempt through contingent valuation to reflect in monetary terms the values people hold regarding cultural heritage resources in order to set compensation levels settles nothing. Indeed, the attempt simply sharpens political dispute.

**X.D. Time, Cultural Memory and Uprooting**

The events and processes associated with DIDR, much like wars and natural disasters, have a way of cleaving time into before and after periods. A major challenge for the uprooted is to formulate a sense of meaning for their loss and its integration into some context consistent with the values and beliefs of their culture, bridging "time before" with "time after." Meaning can be imposed on suffering if it serves some purpose, and if that purpose and the experience of suffering are recognized as significant by others (Lifton 1967; Oliver-Smith 1986). Resistance to uprooting, whatever the cause, provides individuals and communities a means of reaffirmation of both of personal and cultural identity by demanding recognition of their losses and a means to reassert control over lives that have been disempowered. It has been suggested
that the process of individual and cultural recovery and re-empowerment is encoded in the reconstruction and repossession of objects of cultural significance (Parkin 1999).

X.E. Case Study: Displacement, Loss and Cultural Resistance in Yongching County of Northwest China

The development strategies of the People's Republic of China since 1949 have included construction of large hydroelectric projects, resulting in the displacement of 10.2 million people (Human Rights Watch/Asia 1995:10 as quoted in Jing 1999). Estimates of resettled people associated with the current mega-project of Three Gorges Dam will add between 1.2 and 1.6 million to that total. In the early period the vast majority of these people were resettled involuntarily, resulting in major economic losses that were largely concealed by a government policy that glorified the benefits of large dams. The case of Yongching County in Northwest China fit clearly into this pattern. A major government plan to build 46 dams on the Yellow River included Yongching. The dams were intended to control flooding, provide irrigation and produce 110 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year. Three of those dams were constructed in Yongching province, the last being completed in 1975. A total of 101 villages were affected and 43,829 people were displaced after 7,900 hectares of farmland were submerged.

The original plan for the region was to resettle people in remote areas, but the affected villages protested. Government officials realized that resettling people in distant regions would be too costly, and consented to relocate people in the local area, but on lands that were of lesser quality and with less access to water. When villagers realized that resettlement entailed serious declines in welfare, they protested again, but they were quickly silenced. Those who complained were ejected from the Communist Party and one leader was sent to a labor camp. All overt resistance was suppressed during the "big manhunt of 1958" (mid August to mid September). Resistance to resettlement became equated with resistance to the Great Leap Forward and 855 people, including landlords, leaders of descent groups and organizers of religious societies were preemptively arrested. Public executions of 21 people took place, effectively ending overt resistance. The county government employed the militia to evict the villagers. The terror of the big manhunt of 1968 suppressed resistance for several decades.

The peasants who were resettled lost their homes, ancestral tombs and religious monuments, their lands and their spiritual and economic well-being. Even after post-Mao economic reforms began to improve the economic lives of people in rural China, the resettled peasants of Yongching continued in poverty because they had been resettled on inferior land and had received no compensation for their losses. However, after the dissolution of collective farming and greater local autonomy and personal freedom in Yongching, low levels of protest and resistance to the state began to emerge. People refused to pay taxes in groups or interest on loans they had received from state-run banks. The peasants ironically employed the Communist practice of the "recalling bitterness tradition" that was used to generate hostility toward the old pre-Communist system to voice their complaints with the Communist authorities.

In 1981 a memorial movement was formed, commemorating the losses and persecution the people suffered in the displacement and resettlement and transforming them into a force for collective recovery. The memorial movement aimed to force the authorities to acknowledge their losses and suffering and to demand reparations. The movement employed three basic forms of collective action: the staging of public, frequently ritualized protests to evoke the grievances suppressed in the past, the circulation and submission of petitions insisting on more adequate compensation for the loss of the means of agricultural production, and the documentation and reconstruction of lost temples and tombs of the families of the displaced. The kinship and lineage system frequently provided the organizational basis for the development of resistance networks that carried out these strategies of collective action.

The staged protests often consisted of carefully orchestrated narratives of suffering. The protests emphasized and compressed two separate events, the dismantling of homes and the flooding of villages, into one sudden, unexpected assault. These cataclysmic narratives were designed to rewrite the history of the period of resettlement, obliging the authorities to recognize that the people had sacrificed a great deal in the name of national development and that the state had both failed to acknowledge their pain and loss and had not fulfilled the promises made to them. They further rejected the bureaucratic label, shuiku yimin (reservoir relocatees) applied to them by the government, employing but altering through tonal change the local term of kumin, meaning reservoir people, to mean "embittered" or "embittered people."
The movement addressed the material losses through petitions to the government for economic reparations. Even twenty years after the resettlement, villagers were still so poor that they were dependent on emergency food rations. The villagers organized sit-ins at government offices and submitted 322 petitions for financial restitution. One of the organizers of the sit-ins was arrested and a group of young men retaliated by taking the chief administrator and party secretary of the township hostage. Two hundred protesters marched to the county seat and demanded the exchange of the sit-in organizer for the hostages, to which the authorities acceded. Although the government refused to pay reparations, it did provide low interest loans and free irrigation equipment in an effort to address the need for poverty alleviation.

The recovery of religious tradition and identity as elements of a search for transcendental meaning in the trauma of political persecution and loss was accomplished through two strategies: the creation of memorial texts and new genealogical records and the reconstruction of village temples. The displacement had destroyed 100 village temples and 44,000 family tombs. Temple reconstruction and reconstructed temples became focal points of unofficial, sometimes secret, networks of religious association. The re-building of mosques was equally impressive. In Yongjing 63 mosques were rebuilt for a population of only 20,000 Muslims. Plaques appeared on temples with written references and criticisms of Maoist policy on resettlement. Texts were written memorializing the importance of deities’ statues to community. Memorializing texts were part of monastery reconstruction, which was a project that provided people of one village, for example, now actually split into four different settlements, with a means of commemorating their lost village.

History and memory become the means by which community members obliged authorities to recognize their losses and injuries and to redress them in forms of reparations and reconstruction. As material losses are recognized and validated, people are validated and social reconstitution is enabled. It is not only land and buildings that are repossessed. It is one's history and identity as a community as well. Protest and resistance, even twenty five years after the displacement and resettlement process, enabled people to create a politics of identity and to undertake processes of recovery that are meaningful in terms of fidelity to local cultural tradition.

The Yongjing case indicates that the social reconstruction of memory and the assertion of relevance of that memory through resistance play crucial roles in recovery after displacement. In Yongjing individual memories of suffering that had been suppressed by government, were transformed into a collective consciousness of rights that provided a moral justification for resistance and protest of old and new grievances. However, the movement was careful not to embrace open rebellion. Even in the newly opened political spaces in China, villagers were realistic about what they could achieve. They negotiated, made compromises, altered tactics, and awaited new opportunities for political action. Their main goal was to hold government to its word. They argued that the government had reneged on its promise to compensate the losses they suffered in the name of national development. Their movement combined invoking rights of public expression, the "speaking bitterness" tactics, and open but controlled confrontation with government authorities for recognition of their losses.

The memorial movement publicly undermined the notion of people's indebtedness to the Party. By commemorating the experiences of resettlement, hunger and political persecution in demonstrations, petition drives, temple reconstruction, and records of the destruction of family tombs, the villagers were able to reconstruct the official doctrine of popular indebtedness to the party, by demonstrating that the Party was indebted to them. The path chosen by the villagers of Yongching is increasingly seen elsewhere in China as village religious life and organization are emerging as an alternative base of power and authority precisely because it is closely linked to the re-emergence of kinship organizations, temple associations and village autonomy.

Part of the impact of DIDR is measureable in terms of resources and income lost and failure to recognize and compensate those losses is seen as causal in generating resistance. However, such processes may have profound effects that undermine the ontological ground of culture itself and victims must struggle with the reconstruction not only of material circumstances, but of their culture itself. Material compensation or reimbursement may be insufficient to enable people to reconstruct culture and lifeway after resettlement. Central to the ontological basis of many cultures are the notions of time and place. People are linked to places by residence in time as well as space. Long histories in a place in which family and community roots are deeply embedded, tie generations to each other in a "community of memory." It is through such communities of memory that people come to know themselves "as members of a people, as inheritors of a history and a culture that we must nurture through
memory and hope" (Bellah et al 1985: 138). Lack of understanding or acknowledgement of the symbolic importance of place and time by relocation authorities limits the probabilities of successful transition among resettled peoples and, as the Yongching case, among others (e.g. Gray 1996: 102; Conuel 1981; Greene 1985; Bilharz 1998; Jeffrey 2000), illustrates, the power of memory as a mobilizing force for resistance and protest long after resettlement remains strong.

X. F. Languages of Resistance

The languages of protest and resistance to DIDR develop a wide array of themes, images and symbols. As mentioned, since resistance movements themselves exist on a multiplicity of levels and encounter development projects that are articulated with local and global interest groups as well, the discourses must be equally multivocal. Moreover, their discursive styles must fit the particular context, idiom and problem area they are addressing. The broad discursive styles associated with two domains, human rights and science, play key roles in the campaigns of resistance movements. For instance, if one is arguing that construction of a dam increases the seismic potential of an area, a scientific discourse and style based in geology and seismology and emphasizing canons of objectivity and evidence are appropriate. If one is arguing that DIDR is a violation of spiritual rights, another form of discourse and style based on values and cultural heritage, appealing to emotion and sensibility is called for. Weeks has recently argued that both these discursive strategies may be characterized as "Jeremiad discourses" (1999:20). Taken from the prophet Jeremiah, who chastised the Jews for breaking their covenant with God, Jeremiad discourses criticize the listener (or reader) for a particular failure, evoke appropriate sentiments or actions, indicate the way to redemption and resolve the tension between seeming opposites. Further, Jeremiad discourses rely on two possible strategies: evocative and implementational. Evocative strategies elicit emotions with a poetic and metaphoric language. Implementational strategies offer guides to action as opposed to sentiment (Weeks 1999: 20). DIDR resisters rely on both strategies to both draw support for their cause and to reject and refute the arguments of developers.

Since the discourse of developers relies heavily on a scientific approach and discursive style, resisters are extremely careful about the accuracy of both their data and the factual basis for their arguments. NGOs have developed their own cadres of scientific experts, who often volunteer their services, from a diverse array of scientific fields to research generate both data and perspectives to confront the arguments displayed by developers and their funders. The critiques that NGOs and networks have developed to refute the positions held by governments, private developers and their funders minutely dissect both the adequacy of the databases and the theoretical perspectives of their opponents. Consistently calling attention to the lack of adequate research, faulty methodology, the shoddiness of actual data collection, and the inconsistency and incompleteness of studies, the NGOs assume a position of scientific rigor as opposed to the politically compromised, biased and inferior science of the developers. McCully's critique of "The World Bank's Experience with Large Dams,"by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the bank, which was an instrumental factor is the eventual creation of the WCD, exemplifies this discursive style.

"The OED review does not assess the actual performance of the projects it covers, is based on flawed methodology and inadequate data, and displays a systematic bias in favour of large dam building. Its conclusions must be rejected as untenable....The extremely poor quality of the OED review strongly indicates that OED is not a
suitable body to entrust with the task of undertaking a comprehensive, un-biased and competent review of World Bank lending for large dams—and also casts doubt on the competence and independence of the work of OED on other areas (McCully 1997:2).

The themes developed by local people and their allies in the area of human rights are based on fundamental concepts of sacrifice and justice to question the morality of development projects that displace people. The pronouncements and publications of resistors, whether local people in a march on government offices, NGOs in their publications to enlist support, or a network appeal protesting the arrest of an activist, generally reflect the themes of sacrifice and justice. The listener or reader is called upon to recognize the sacrifice that people are forced to make in the name of development, and the injustice inflicted in inadequate compensation and non-existent and faulty resettlement. The dishonesty and hypocrisy of governments that call upon the poorest to sacrifice for the benefit of the richest are themes that commonly appear in both the spoken and written discourse of resistors.

Selections from a recent mail campaign of the IRN against the San Roque Dam reflect both the issues and the emotional and metaphoric discursive style:

A social and economic crisis is brewing....186 families have already been moved to the Camanggaan resettlement site. Many have sunk into despair as the reality of their new lives finally hits them. They have no land to grow food or graze animals and are forced to live in small concrete houses. Most are still waiting for the small amount of compensation promised to them.....Promises of livelihood projects have not been honored.....From the beginning, people affected by the San Roque Dam have been lied to and shut out of the planning process....'Like cows in a corral' San Roque oustees battle to survive....Take action to stop this social and economic disaster! Sign and mail the attached postcards today! (Cordillera Peoples' Alliance and International Rivers Network 2001).

A leaflet distributed at a CRAB organized rally against the Tucurui Dam denounces the actions of the project authorities in simple yet powerful poetic style:

On the first day they came, they spoke to us of progress…
They measured our lands and we said nothing…
On the second day they came, they invaded our houses…
They expelled our children and we said nothing…
On the third day the water covered everything…
And because we said nothing we will never be able to do anything…
Are we going to let this happen again?

(Comissao Regional de Atingidos de Barragem, Leaflet: 12 October 1988.

Apart from clearly expressing their sense of violation and outrage, the peasants displaced by the Tucurui Dam are describing a peculiarly one-sided conversation in which some people speak of progress and others say nothing. Part of the reason that the conversation is so one-sided is that at the core it is a conversation about value and the peasants, in citing what they have lost, are basically saying that their values mean nothing to the government. That is why they are not heard and they did not speak. They vow to speak in the future and never to go unheard again.
Another key theme in the human rights discourse involves an evocation of fidelity to a cultural heritage. Abandoning one's land means separation from and the loss of the right to express one's identity and practice one's religion. Accepting resettlement is equated with betraying one's ancestors and everything that one stands for.

This is where we were born and where we grew up....The roots of our grandparents are here. The land that is ours, the culture, the wisdom, the native earth—all this is sacred. (Nicolasa Quintreman quoted in WWR 2001: 6).

Persecution, determination, martyrdom and finality are also themes that run through the human rights discourse. People consistently affirm their intentions to perish either by drowning in reservoirs, or at the hands of oppressive authorities before they abandon their homes. In project after project, from dams to pipelines to golf courses, martyrdom is a consistent theme evoked by the people to be resettled. When in Manibeli, the first village in Maharashtra facing submergence from the Sardar Sarovar dam in 1991, fifty families who had rejected resettlement, activists and people from other affected villages awaited Jal samadhi (to drown in the reservoir's rising waters) in defiance of the government's decision to continue construction (Parasuraman 1999: 244). Hunger strikes by both people and leaders of the NBA represent another form of this discourse of martyrdom and finality.

XI. THE POLITICS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

In the vast majority of cases, involuntary migration and resettlement are socio-cultural and/or economic processes that are inflicted upon people as the intended or unintended outcomes of particular economic goals and processes. In this sense, while the actual resettlement project may be defined in social or, more commonly, economic terms, the phenomenon of resettlement is fundamentally a political one, involving the use of power by one party to relocate another. These power relations are conditioned by the climate of the various political contexts in which they are engaged. As has been discussed earlier in this report, DIDR resistance involves a form of "fractal" politics in which the different participants, as allies, opponents or mediators interact across various scales of space and time (Little 2000). This interaction among the transnationally allied activities of GROs, NGOs, social movements, lawyers, courts, corporations, and multilateral organizations both affects and is affected by both global and national politics dealing with normative issues of human rights and the environment (Oliver-Smith 1996: 96).

A recent study by Khagram (1999) of transnational struggles for power and water, focusing especially on the Narmada Project, suggests that the transnational politics of NGOs directly or indirectly helps to form new arrays of norms that are propagated globally through conferences and other international events and publications. International organizations and international epistemic communities also contribute to global norms by codifying, validating and conferring authority to norms as adopted in formal institutions and practices. The closer a state is connected into the global network of states that accept and validate these norms pertaining to human rights and the environment, as well as the international actors and organizations that contribute to their creation, the likelier it is that those norms will inform the institutions of that state. The assimilation of global norms by states can produce new political spaces for NGOs, GROs and social movements to further their goals by holding states accountable for conformity with their own normative principles and rules. On the other hand, states and their institutions and practices may be resistant to changes even after formal
acceptance of international regimes of norms and principles. State institutions and practices are also embedded in local structures and are susceptible to pressure from domestic actors such as dominant classes and class coalitions, social mobilization of particular local interest groups or the interests of political elites (Khagram 1999:29-31).

Thus, states may respond both to internationally accepted norms and principles pertaining to human rights, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples and to domestic institutions and practices that may not necessarily share the same philosophical, political or social values. Nonetheless, Khagram suggests that a political climate that permits organized and sustained social mobilization in the context of democratic institutions is critical to the formation and success of both local and transnational collective action that further the acceptance of global norms in the political economy of development in the Third World. Khagram further asserts that local and transnational resistance to large-scale development projects will have the least success in states with authoritarian regimes and local actors with little or no capacity or political space to organize (1999:32).

A number of basic conditions common to democratic regimes are essential to the efforts of GROs, NGOs and social movements seeking to halt DIDR. The free flow of information both nationally and internationally is absolutely essential for NGOs and their lobbying efforts for changing environmental and development policies (Khagram 1999:40). Under democratic regimes, NGOs, GROs and social movements are freer to gather and make public information in the attempt to alter public opinion. They are more able to lobby government and bureaucratic actors regarding their positions on development issues. Since leaders in a democracy are generally more responsive to public opinion, the existence of a free press, including other forms of media such as radio, television and the internet, have proven to be crucial for NGOs and GROs working in DIDR resistance for the acquisition and dissemination of information. In a democratic regime in which political parties vie for the votes of the electorate, DIDR resistors can take advantage of the competition among parties to further their agendas, particularly regarding forms of alternative sustainable development as well as other social justice issues such as gender, indigenous peoples or environment that relate to DIDR (Khagram 1999:40-41). However, by the same token, when resistors come from the traditionally marginalized in a society, their lack of political power may make them less appealing to politicians (Bilharz 1998).

In regard to dams, Khagram argues persuasively that transnational NGOs allied with grass roots organizations and social movements have changed the terms of debate and significantly affect both policy and practice in the political economy of development in the third world. Moreover, these changes have been enabled by the expansion and institutionalization of norms and principles regarding human rights, the environment and indigenous peoples. The success of these coalitions in changing development policies and practices is contingent on the existence of democratic regimes in which they are able to mobilize grass roots organizations and support (Khagram 1999: 44).

**X.A. Negotiation between unequals**

Barring immediate outright and open conflict between people facing DIDR and the state and project authorities, most resistance at some point involves dialogue and negotiation among the various parties over such points as alternative sites, resource valuation methods, compensation levels and quality, timetables and benefits eligibility, to name only a few key issues. DIDR resistance movements face considerable difficulty in their discussions with state
or corporate authorities due to the great imbalances of power that are usually based in the structure of the national political economy and socio-cultural context (Davidheiser 2000). While there is little explicit analysis of DIDR negotiations specifically, the literature on negotiations and conflict resolution provides some useful perspectives for understanding the problems resisters face when they encounter state or corporate representatives across the table. As previously discussed, most people facing resettlement have little power or influence in national or even regional contexts. Often as members of minority groups or the poor who live at the margins of national societies, they lack the economic, social and political capital necessary to affect decisions beyond the local level. Even where those threatened with resettlement are not minorities or the poor, as in the case of the Nimad Plains upper peasantry in the Sardar Sarovar Project (Dwivedi 1999), they enter negotiations with project authorities at a clear disadvantage, although by virtue of their status, their position may get a better hearing than that of the landless or the tribals. The cultural gaps among the parties entering into negotiations in which participants are not familiar with the cultures, values, norms, or conventions of ordinary behavior regarding issues of conflict and communication can reduce the possibility of fair and just outcomes.

The James Bay Cree, for example, contend that the negotiation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975 took place under the pressure of the ongoing destruction of their lands and the refusal by the courts and the Canadian government to recognize their aboriginal and constitutional rights. To substantiate their contention, they cite articles in the agreement that were insisted upon by Hydro-Quebec at the time of negotiations that decree that the Crees forfeit their right to raise sociological impacts on their people as arguments against future hydroelectric projects in their territory (Colchester 1999: 35).

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement has been described as “a forced purchase.” According to the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Problems and Alternatives:

it would be most difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Aboriginal parties …were repeatedly subjected to inappropriate, unlawful coercion and duress…These actions were incompatible with the fiduciary obligations of both governments and substantially affected the fundamental terms of the “agreement” reached (as quoted in Colchester 1999: 35).

The balance of power and relative power status of the participants is a crucial variable in negotiations, seriously affecting the possibility of establishing fair and equitable interactions and outcomes among them (Berkovitch and Houston 1996). One of the leading authorities on alternative dispute resolutions, Laura Nader considers overcoming the power differential virtually impossible and counsels that weak parties should seek recourse in formal legal systems rather than modes of negotiation to achieve just and equitable solutions (1994; 1997). However, options may be limited there also since many marginalized groups have customarily been ignored or discriminated against by formal legal systems (Little 2000). Power disparities may actually reduce the likelihood of undertaking negotiations since there is little to be gained by the stronger party in compromises that substantively address the interests and needs of all participants (Ott 1972). Berkovitch and Houston's review of research demonstrates that power imbalances correlate highly with lower rates of success in negotiations (1996).

There has been some discussion of factors that can offset power imbalances. Fisher and Ury (1983) have argued that "principled negotiation" employing "objective criteria" in
presenting one's position and arriving at group decisions can reduce the role of "raw power." Despite the difficulty of establishing truly "objective criteria" much less principled negotiation free of self-interest, if some criteria can actually be agreed upon, they can support the position of the weaker party by bestowing the symbolic power of legitimacy when the criteria are met and can increase the possibility of successful outcomes by establishing some clear measures for making decisions (Davidheiser 2000). The chance of successful negotiations for weaker parties can also be improved if decision-making is relegated from a central bureaucracy to regional or local institutions, thus possibly reducing the social distance between local communities and the state representatives (Pensich, Thomas and Wohlgenant 1994).

Another way to address the question of power imbalances in negotiations is the formation of alliances (Pendzich, Thomas and Wohlgenant 1994). Allies help to offset disparities in power, particularly if they occupy higher social and political status. Particularly today the acquisition of allies from national and international contexts contributes greatly to strengthening the negotiating position of local communities. Such allies provide a variety of significant resources including negotiating experience, material resources and, perhaps most importantly, information. People impacted by DIDR frequently are forced to operate in novel contexts with a serious lack of adequate information, placing them at a severe disadvantage in negotiating positive outcomes with project authorities (Dwivedi 1998). It is extremely difficult to further one's interests in negotiations on incomplete or faulty information on the situation at hand or on one's opponent. A lack of knowledge of the state and its agencies is a serious disadvantage in such negotiations since weaker parties are unable to take advantage of internal factions, potential alliances, or opportunities for cooperation (Davidheiser 2000). Alliances with national and international NGOs have enabled local level resisters to achieve enough knowledge and while not total parity, enough leverage in these novel circumstances to engage the planners, administrators, and funders of development projects in debate and negotiations. From these interactions, some development agents have realized, albeit reluctantly, that they cannot ignore the rights of those affected by their projects. For example, ELETROSUL in Brazil (see Case study) has admitted after the fact that had they sat down to discuss the project with protesters, outcomes would probably have been more positive for both parties in the long run (McDonald 1993:99).

DIDR resistance may start as a spontaneous, ad hoc response to the unexpected presence of development project advance personnel at the local level. This ad hoc kind of resistance, expressed in the form of passive obstruction or active harassment of project personnel and their activities, may last for considerable lengths of time. Indeed, local communities may gain some leverage in negotiations through threats or actual subversive activity. If the state or corporate interests refuse to negotiate and local communities feel that the dominant power structure does not serve their interests, they may see no alternative to violent or peaceful disruptive action at any point in the negotiation process. Generally, with greater and more constant project presence and action, resistance tends to become more formalized eventually, establishing features that are associated with local or grass roots organizations or eventually social movements. The potential of these external parties to offset the great disparities in power in negotiations between local communities and the national or corporate forces that seek to relocate them offers resisters some opportunity for gain in such contexts.

XI.B. Scales of Interaction and Conflict
When resistance movements develop, they tend to generate contacts and linkages with social actors that operate at four levels: the local community, the project, the national political context and the international or global context. Initial contacts, whatever their character, eventually may generate contacts and relationships with social actors in the three other levels: the project that requires their relocation (at both design and construction phases), the national political economic context and international political economy and political culture. These four levels, community, project, national and international, all contain or possess different features that are separate, and at times internally contradictory or opposing, but interacting also. That is, contradictions are found both within levels as well as between them. In addition, actions are not discrete to one level; that is, they can occur simultaneously on multiple levels. In some contexts the project may provide a means through which local interests articulate with national institutions perhaps for the first time. The organizational capacity of the movement to operate effectively at both the local and national level will prove important as the movement develops (McAdam et al 1988: 697). However, it is important to maintain the distinction between internal and external actors in a local DIDR. If the focus becomes too trained on external actors and their resources, it becomes easy to see local movements as only the outcome of external resources (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 43). Local activists are anything but passive recipients of external aid. The relationship between internal and external actors is reciprocal, composed of exchanges of resources, influence, information and validation.

**XI.B.i. The local scale of action**

The majority of resistance movements emerge in response to a specific project in a specific local context. That local context may vary in size from one community or even part of a community to a very large region such as the Narmada Valley. In many cases, the first news that people receive of a project consists of the appearance of surveyors or other advance personnel. Their initial reaction is usually disbelief. Their credulity is strained by the idea of resettlement itself. It is basically unthinkable (Scudder and Colson 1982: 271-272; Wali 1989:74). Their surprise that such an act would be contemplated may be an indication of their lack of interaction with the external authority of the state. As state expansion and intervention continue and communication networks among peoples facing similar dilemmas become more intense, it is likely that levels of disbelief will diminish. Recent reports, however, still indicate that many people are taken quite unaware and remain incredulous over long periods of time, even after being informed of project intentions (Aguirre, 2000 personal communication).

First encounters between local communities and a project may take place upon the arrival of surveyors or other early reconnaissance teams who signal the beginning of a project. Confrontations of varying intensity may result from these encounters between local people and initial project personnel, ranging from puzzled reactions to physical assaults. Communities, as their first quasi-organized response once they are aware of the nature of the mission, have been known to uproot survey markers after dark or destroy campsites when engineers and surveyors are in the field in these initial confrontations. However, in most cases responses by local people are quite reasoned and frequently take the form of request for dialogue and information. The response of project personnel to these requests is often so abrupt or evasive that resistance can move quickly to more activist stances.

However, the idea of resettlement, once the implications are fully realized, may constitute such a threat to both physical survival and cultural identity that it mobilizes communities rapidly.
Resisting resettlement often stimulates people to engage in innovative forms of behavior, producing changes in social relations and organization as well as creating or changing the nature of linkages with external individuals and organizations. When the decision to resist is taken and formalized, such action often evolves into the formation of grass roots organizations, in many instances, initiating efforts and attracting new participants that may eventually produce changes in the way the local community interacts with power structures at various levels in the hierarchy of state institutions (Ghai and Vivian 1992). Furthermore, the speed and intensity of communications linking areas remote from each other establish contact between groups with similar goals in other regions of the world creating networks of resistance movements that share information and other resources. Joining networks can improve the resource base and strategic potential of local resistance movements. For example the experience of people resettled by the Itaipu dam greatly influenced the development of resistance by communities facing resettlement by the Santo Capanema project in Brazil (Bartolome 1992:10). The networking and sharing of these experiences by resettled people with those threatened with resettlement resulted in the formation of the Regional Commission of Dam Refugees (CRAB) and eventually the nation-wide organization, Movement of Dam Affected People (MAB), in Brazil, composed of many regionally and culturally diverse local populations facing resettlement (Rothman and Oliver 1999) (See Case Study). MAB’s broad national power base enables it to negotiate effectively with ELETROBRAS, the Brazilian power company and its regional subcontracting affiliates (Bartolome 1992; Serra 1993). MAB is also affiliated with numerous other organizations, including the Landless movement in the broader struggle to change development models and processes. Thus, changes initiated by the decision to resist often link local communities into regional and national networks, affording them of important resources for furthering their struggles.

Local culture may frame resistance in highly traditional terms, but it still may change the ways a community interacts with outsiders, including project personnel. People may reorient their central cultural symbols to construct interpretations of the threat of resettlement in very traditional forms. The Chinantecs and Mazatecs of Mexico recontextualized the threat of resettlement in mythological symbols, generating a resistance movement expressed largely in messianic terms (Bartolome and Barabas 1990:76-77). The messianic resistance movement revitalized local culture, producing an activist posture regarding regional and national authorities. The "incipient messianic movement accomplished what politicians, engineers, businessmen, and false mediators have tried to prevent: the unity of the Chinantec people"(Bartolome and Barabas 1973: 15). Local unity in opposition to the state suggests both an alteration of traditional relationships and pressure for adjustment of relations on both sides of the conflict. However, the internal changes in communities set in motion by the decision, organization and actions of resistance do not inevitably bring about changes in policy in the sense of establishment of new public goals at any but the local level. Indeed, depending on the reigning political climate, mobilization for resistance at the local level may provoke a hardening of some policies at the regional or state level.

Regional levels of social and institutional development in local contexts also affect the action and organization of DIDR resistance movements. Local leadership structure and organization and linkages to similar structures at the regional level are important. The degree to which local structures are articulated with state structures, procedures and goals will affect how DIDR resistance relates to external resources as well as strategic and tactical selection. For example, resisters aware of or affiliated with a national union may elect to establish a local chapter to tap into a larger resource pool for their struggle (Wali 1989:85). Local DIDR
resistance movements, however risk becoming pawns of local and regional political parties if they tie their fortunes to closely to them (Baviskar 1992).

Since resistance in effect constitutes a challenge to the state, the politics of state-local relations in all their complexity come to the fore. This sort of challenge constitutes "news" and attracts the attention of the power structure as well as the media (and, I might add, the academic community) quickly. When brought into broader public contexts, resettlement of this type becomes then the forcing ground for basic policy questions of development and the extension of state hegemony over territory and population as well as majority-minority relations, state versus local determination, national development priorities, and human rights issues.

XI.B.i.a. Local and National Leadership

Although there is scant discussion of leadership in the research material, it appears that the established leaders of the community, if they favor resistance, are chosen to lead local movements. However, if they prove unsatisfactory or unequal to the task, new leadership may emerge in the context of the conflict. For example, the James Bay Cree in response to the unfair negotiations with Hydro-Quebec voted out three chiefs who were enthusiastic advocates of discussions with Hydro-Quebec and replaced them with three who were opposed to the proposals (Colchester 1999: 37). In many instances, the government or the project has devoted considerable resources to co-optation of local leaders, affording them special rewards for their acceptance of the project (Parasuraman 1999). The enhanced contact with others brought about by resistance combined with more precise definitions of community or ethnic identity may lead to more sophisticated understanding by local power holders, particularly those that are based on ethnicity, class, gender, or religion in contrasting relationship to that of the group controlling state power. Indeed, success at leadership at the local level has led to important leadership roles at national and even international contexts. Kayapo leadership, for example, has been composed of both traditional authorities and younger members of communities with greater experience of the outside world who have been particularly astute in their understanding and use of local, national and international sources of power for resisting the Tucurui Dam and other Brazilian government and private initiatives affecting their land (Fisher, W.H. 1994). Kayapo leadership has become knowledgeable about and has taken advantage of the relatively progressive statutes in the 1988 Brazilian constitution which enables them to seek legal counsel and take legal action independently of the Brazilian Indian Foundation (Posey 1996: 125). In 1988 two Kayapo leaders, Paiakan and Kube-i, who had worked closely with a multidisciplinary research project in their region traveled to the United States where they informed several academic and political gatherings, including four Executive Directors of the World Bank and representatives of the US state department of violations of World Bank resettlement guidelines by the Altamira-Xingu complex (Posey 1996: 126).

The leadership of other Grass Roots resistance organizations has generally arisen from within the ranks of the membership. For example, the leadership of CRAB in southern Brazil largely came from the ranks of the farmers facing DIDR. So successful were some of these local leaders that they have subsequently assumed positions of responsibility in MAB (see case study) and in the evolution of the struggle at international levels (World Rivers Review 1988). As has been mentioned, the role of "Gramscian organic intellectuals," those individuals who have left the community for economic or educational purposes and then return to assist with the struggle have been key in movement leadership (Rothman and Oliver 1999). In one case, a
trained anthropologist who is also a member of one of the Nahuatl communities that were threatened with DIDR by the San Juan Tetelcingo dam became a spokesperson, activist and an analyst of that resistance movement (Celestino 1999). While leadership of grass roots resistance movements may originate in the community, many such movements have profited by the presence of involved outsiders, such as physicians, public administrators, merchants, and others who are knowledgeable about the affected communities. These individuals adopt the struggle as their own, invest their own personal and economic resources and have advocated extremely effectively in defense of the peoples' rights. Often these individuals have little experience in either advocacy or protest, but are simply moved to respond to the threat of DIDR facing the people out of a sense of morality and conscience. Such individuals become invaluable to protest and resistance movements because of their personal contacts and knowledge of the larger administrative and political system. For example, the Yavapai Indians received great assistance from a local neighbor, a Mexican American, in their struggle with the United States Bureau of Reclamation over the construction of Orme dam. Mrs. Caroline Butler helped the Yavapai in correcting public officials' and newspaper misstatements about their acceptance of the dam project. She also explained to them their alternatives to selling their land to the government. Throughout the resistance, Mrs. Butler was a constant source of advice and information regarding governmental and bureaucratic procedures and she was able as well to contact government officials at all levels to urge them to consider the tribe's perspective. She also was key in smoothing over internal dissension and helping the Yavapai to reach community decisions in the struggle (Khera and Mariella 1982: 171).

XI.B.i.b. Women in Participation and Leadership

Women have played important roles in organizational leadership and in spearheading movement activities. Often called upon to assume the high moral ground and question the morality of development, women have been in the forefront of voices condemning DIDR. The women of the Yavapai tribe in the southwestern United States, facing DIDR because of dam construction, effectively questioned the morality of a government that would disregard the basic rights of a community that had lost many men in World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. As spokespersons for particular movements, women have been eloquent orators, often dramatically making their points in debate with project authorities. The participation of Tuira, a Kayapo woman, who denounced Jose Lopes, a director of ELETRONORTE, at the great protest meeting at Altamira, as a liar, waving a machete in his face, left an indelible impression on the assembled crowd, including 200 journalists and 200 NGO representatives (World Rivers Review 1989: 3, 7). Women have also taken leadership roles in local level resistance movements. Just recently, the resistance of the Pehuenche against the construction of the Ralco Dam on the Bio Bio River in Chile has been led by a contingent of five women who head the organization Mapu Domuche Newen (Women with the Strength of the Earth) (Evans 2001: 6). As both leaders and participants, women have taken important roles in specific resistance actions. In the case of the protest against DIDR from the Yacyreta dam in Argentina, women are represented as one of a number of affected constituent groups. The Inter-Neighborhood Commission was composed of six gender specific occupational groups, representing the interests of the marginalized urban poor before the Entidad Binacional Yacyreta (EBY-The Yacyreta Binational Entity), local authorities, and specialists from the MDBs funding the dam (Rapp in press). In the struggle against the Maheshwar Dam on the Narmada River in India, women have been major participants in resistance actions. They have laid down on the access roads, in relays, over months to prevent construction materials from arriving at the dam site, despite the fact that their husbands thought such behavior was indecent (Black 2001: 16). The women of Hacienda Looc formed a human
chain to block bulldozers that were sent to level the hills surrounding their community for a
golf course that would displace thousands of villagers (see Case Study). Women's
participation and leadership in fighting the Kinzua dam relocation among the Seneca provided
the necessary experience with local and national administrative systems for them to take more
active leadership roles subsequently in local, state and national politics (Bilharz 1998: 131)
Women who battled to save their neighborhood from redevelopment in Chicago in the 1960s
began a trend in which a whole new generation of women moved into leadership roles in
community organizations (Squires et al 1987:135).

Without question one of the most notable leaders of a resistance movement today is a
woman. Mehda Patkar, the charismatic leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, has taken a
major role along with the well known champion of India's tribal peoples, Baba Amte, not only
in the development of that organization, but in the transnational anti-dam movement and the
evolution of the discourse on sustainable development as well. Trained in the physical
sciences, with graduate study in the social sciences, Medha Patkar was a member of the faculty
at the prestigious Tata Institute of Social Sciences before becoming involved in 1985 in
organizing the Sardar Sarovar project affected villages in the state of Maharashtra. Resentful
about being required to move even before any resettlement plans were even outlined, the
people, with Patkar's assistance, organized the Narmada Dharrkarsta Samiti (Parasuraman
1999: 237). In addition, to her earlier work in helping to organize the affected peoples of the
Narmada Valley and in founding the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada
Movement), she has also assumed the role of spokesperson and leader of the movement, while
Baba Amte at 87 is venerated as the spiritual leader of the struggle. She has launched marches,
hunger strikes, drowning team vigils, and law suits, arguing tirelessly for the restoration of
both rights and resources to the project affected peoples. She has militated for the withdrawal
of funding for the project from international sources. She has also endured arrests and
detainments at the hands of outraged authorities and had to go into hiding at one point when
authorities attempted to interrupt one of the drowning team vigils. She has testified before
numerous inquiries, including a U.S. Congressional committee, on the failures of the project to
inform the people, to plan adequately for resettlement and its overall lack of sustainability. She
also became a commissioner when the WCD was formed and in the final report claimed the
right to make a final comment in which she continued to challenge the reigning model of
development as leading to the marginalization of the majority despite any precautions that
might be recommended by the commission (WCD 2000: 321-22). In many ways, even though
she herself is not threatened with displacement and resettlement, through her commitment to
the struggle, including her promise to drown in the rising reservoir if the dam is completed to
its planned height, she has come to symbolize resistance to DIDR around the world.

Despite Patkar's and the centrality of women in general to the NBA leadership in the
struggle to halt the Sardar Sarovar Project, women's issues have not been foregrounded in the
movements efforts. The central issue of the plains farmers' resistance to DIDR is land
marginalization. Cash compensation for land loss goes to male rather than female family
members. Land is given primarily to males, particularly in Gujarat and Mahdya Pradesh, the
exception being in certain circumstances in Maharashtra. These provisions tend to concentrate
resources and decision-making power in men's hands. According to Dwivedi, this focus on
largely male concerns overlooks the impact on women. Women, while certainly invested in
land issues, in fact may have greater concerns about social disarticulation given their greater
dependence on kinship and neighborhood networks. However, the NBA, in mobilizing women
against the dam, has not chosen to politically construct women's perceptions of risk as a
strategic resistance factor (Dwivedi 1999: 57, 57fn).
The active roles taken by many women in DIDR resistance movement organization, leadership and action is both the result and a contributing factor to increasing changes in the status and roles of women in societies all over the world. Much NGO activity has focused on empowering women and improving the economic conditions of women and children within their societies. Out of this general movement the participation of women, particularly as voices calling on the conscience of the developers to consider the impact of projects on the least powerful sectors of society, has been one of many social changes that DIDR resistance has both gained from and furthered.

**XI.B.ii. The project scale of action**

The quality of the resettlement project itself may play a major role in the decision to accept or resist DIDR (Chambers 1970). DIDR projects are really about reconstructing communities after they have been materially destroyed and socially traumatized to varying degrees. Reconstructing community is an idea that needs to be approached with a certain humility and realism about the limits of our capacities. Such humility and realism have not characterized the planners of DIDR projects to any major extent to date. Communities do not construct or reconstruct themselves; they evolve. Even purposive communities, self-organized around a common ideology and possessing a high degree of homogeneity do not have an impressive record of success or longevity. Reconstructing a community means attempting to replace through administrative routine an evolutionary process in which social, cultural, economic and environmental interactions arrived at through trial and error and deep experiential knowledge develop, enabling a population to achieve a mutually sustaining social coherence and material sustenance over time. The systems that develop are not perfect, are often far from egalitarian, and do not conform to some imagined standard of efficiency. However, when people are faced with the risks and uncertainties of DIDR, these imperfect but working arrangements have the enhanced appeal of the known and the predictable.

The kind of community that sustains individual and group life, never perfectly, is not a finely tuned mechanism or a well-balanced organism, but rather a complex interactive, ongoing process composed of innumerable variables that are subject to the conscious and unconscious motives of its members. The idea that such a process could be the outcome of planning is ambitious to say the least. Many DIDR resisters maintain that adequate and just resettlement is impossible from the outset, leaving total opposition to the project as the only strategic option. Other resisters do admit the possibility of adequate and just resettlement and commit themselves to achieving that goal. One of the best outcomes that might be imagined for DIDR projects is to work out a system in which people can materially sustain themselves while they themselves begin the process of social reconstruction. However, if the level of impoverishment experienced by most resettled peoples is any indicator, even adequate systems of material reproduction are beyond either the will or the capabilities of most contemporary policy makers and planners. Projects almost inevitably have generated high levels of impoverishment, dissatisfaction and often resistance, even after resettlement has taken place.

When national resettlement policy is inferior or non-existent, DIDR resistance at the project level may become a means to improve policies at a national level. The support of international allies will be crucial in such cases (Cernea 1993: 32). In a sense, the project constitutes the projection of state ambitions into the local context, restructuring it toward government priorities and goals. Moreover, people facing DIDR projects often consider the project as an expression of what their government thinks of them. The poor, the marginalized,
and ethnic minorities harbor few illusions about their place in the scheme of things, but DIDR projects and the often disparaging attitudes of personnel toward the people to be resettled simply confirm to them the disdain in which they are held. An Adivasi villager protests the way the tribal peoples are being treated by Sardar Sarovar project:

> We cannot be treated like monkeys on trees, who will simply climb up to a high plane when the water rises. We demand land—for all the families. It is no use talking in the middle of nowhere in these mountains. We will not be heard. We must organize, get out of these mountains and let the outside world know that we are also human beings and we must also get our due before you flood our lands, our homes (Patel 1995: 185).

After resettlement by the Bargi Dam on the Narmada River, Mrs. Ram Dai, an Adivasi woman who now lives in a slum spoke of the way she feels the authorities see her:

> Why didn’t they just poison us? Then we wouldn’t have to live in this shit-hole and the government could have survived alone with its precious dam all to itself (as quoted by Roy 1999).

Although difficult to assess exactly, it is not farfetched to attribute a significant proportion of DIDR resistance to the appallingly bad baseline research, planning, and implementation of resettlement projects. Much of this social and environmental research has been purely pro forma, designed to validate decisions already taken at the political level to proceed with the project. Even where the research is sound, if design or implementation is faulty, resistance will probably result, as well as a confrontation with the state that may ultimately extend to its assumption of the right to shape local priorities. In other cases, when local interests so dictate, the goal of resistance is more limited in scope, seeking to improve the terms and conditions of the project rather than altering policies at the national level. Here DIDR resistance rejects a bad resettlement project and produces strategies of negotiation to improve the terms and conditions of resettlement, such as better replacement land, increased compensation for losses or increased housing allowances. However, resistance to specific projects can prove to be important not only to improve projects. Where policy-makers are sensitive, DIDR protest and resistance can lead to the improvement of poor policy. There is little question that protest over and resistance to specific projects is responsible for the increased attention to the deficiencies in resettlement policy by national authorities, and has lead to the adoption of guidelines for resettlement projects at the World Bank and other multilateral organizations (Morse and Berger 1992; Gibson 1993; Cernea 1993; Serra 1993; Guggenheim 1993). However, resistance movements that produce policy and project improvements differ from conflicts that emerge during consultation with relocatees during implementation. For example, resistance to government plans to resettle communities for the Aguamilpa and Zimapan projects in Mexico did change national policies, partly because of international pressure, and created the conditions in which participatory planning of resettlement could develop. The participation of community members produced unforeseen problems and conflicts that, in confronting them, stimulated improvements in the planning and implementation processes (Guggenheim 1993).

Projects that do not provide relocatees with important roles in design and implementation, which increases their understanding and control over the process, tend either to reduce people to mere dependent pawns or ignite resistance. Vague or poorly organized resettlement plans that are not sensitive to local economic, social, political and cultural patterns will further fuel negative responses and resistance. Despite any authentic quality a resettlement
plan may contain, bad implementation in DIDR clearly provokes resistance (Serra 1993). Sound policy and good planning are rare, but where they have occurred, they have often been undermined by poor implementation. In this context DIDR resistance serves as a fund of important information for a specific project and for resettlement policy in general. The record of broken promises, unfulfilled plans, destructive environmental impacts, inadequate or inappropriate compensation, inferior replacement land, or cultural violations in settlement or residential patterns constitutes a tragic litany of error and corruption that has produced profound misery and justifiable anger and resistance (Wali 1989; Serra 1993). Staunch resistance to DIDR will result after resettlement is underway if schemes oblige people to radically alter culturally important aspects of their lives. In the final analysis, resettlement projects must be well designed and communicated, affording resettlees with some control and understanding of their circumstances if they are to have any chance at effectively reducing the impacts of DIDR (Cernea 1988a: 15). As discussed previously, resettlement projects have generally been poorly and inappropriately designed and implemented, and responsible in part for the frequency and intensity of resistance. Some, in fact, argue very convincingly that positive, productive resettlement schemes are extremely difficult to achieve, even under the best of circumstances, and inevitably promote cultural disintegration (Chernela 1988: 20). The record of resettlement projects offers little to contradict that argument and tends to vindicate the protests and resistance of resettlees.

XI.B.iii. The national scale of action

The national scale of action involves the two major institutions that develop projects that require DIDR: the state and the private sector. In confronting each of these institutions, DIDR resistance movements that are project or locally specific have been known to evolve into national entities themselves. In the cases where the state initiates the project, and seeks political support and financing, it generally contracts with the private sector for actual construction. In the case of the large infra-structural projects that require DIDR, the corporations that undertake construction may be either national or multinational. In either case, they are large enterprises and must be so to handle the tasks assigned them. And some of them, particularly those involved in dam building figure among the world’s most powerful economic interests. As such, they have an important stake in seeing the continuation of policies that require such projects and may be relatively insensitive to arguments to the contrary.

When the state initiates, finances and constructs development projects producing DIDR, resistance movements very often come into contact with state institutions for the first time. Their first reactions may be somewhat tentative since the state has traditionally been absent or an infrequent presence in local affairs in the more remote areas. In less remote areas the presence of the state is more constant. In urban areas, informants report that pressures to relocate from both the state and the private sector can be fairly constant for slum dwellers. Moreover, ethnic or class differences between state and project personnel and local people often complicate the relationship between local contexts and the state in resettlement contexts (Colson 1971; Zaman 1981; Wali 1989; Bartolome and Barabas 1990; Oliver-Smith 1991). In some cases a secondary and somewhat covert goal of resettlement is actually the control and integration of ethnic minorities and resistance will be expressed in terms of defense of ethnicity as well as territory (Zaman1982). However, it is important to recognize that the state is not a monolithic structure. It is composed of different agencies, departments, and ministries that may have competing agendas. Similarly, the personnel of those state entities are not always of uniform class and ethnic origin. Some state officials may have ties to affected regions and be sympathetic to the concerns of resisters. DIDR resistance may find that there are alliances both
with sympathetic individuals and supportive entities to be made within the apparatus of the state. For example, state governments in Brazil supported the resistance to dams to be constructed by ELETROSUL and the Environmental Ministry Working Group sided with the NBA against the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.

The degree of freedom of expression, and the availability of other political rights, such as that of assembly in a nation condition the possibility and kind of political space for DIDR resistance (Magee 1989; Bartolome 1992; Robinson 1992). Brazil in the 1960s had a repressive military regime that provided little opportunity for resistance during the construction of the Sobradinho and Itaipu projects. In the late 1970s and 1980s the Brazilian political system “opened” and with the return to electoral politics strong national level resistance movements were created and captured sufficient political power to negotiate with relocation authorities alternatives to or cancellations of projects requiring DIDR (Bartolome 1992:21; Fisher, W.H. 1994). DIDR resistance in Brazil by MAB negotiated a reconsideration of national resettlement policy, developing new environmental initiatives and new relationships between the power sector and affected populations. The resistance movement both locally and nationally provided one of several pressures on the Brazilian power sector, requiring more rigorous environmental scrutiny. International funding agencies, national and international environmental and human rights NGOs and academics also militated for more stringent requirements on resettlement and environmental issues from the power sector. Brazilian DIDR resistance movements with national and international allies have broadened their agenda to include a critique of overall development policy, urging more sustainable alternatives (Turner 1991; Fisher, W.H. 1994; Rothman and Oliver 1999). The goal of all these interest groups was the recognition of previously unperceived socio-cultural, socio-economic and environmental"costs" experienced by affected populations impacted by projects. The new plan provides for better information on projects as well as formal representation of all interest groups (Serra 1993: 68-71). Adequate implementation of this plan has not been as forthcoming as hoped.

The Narmada Bachao Andolan in India has also expanded its goals to include critiques of the lack of sustainability in urban culture and, in the process, has called into question the entire nature of the development process in that nation (Bandyopadhyay 1992: 276).

DIDR resistance generally is part of a broad national front of human rights and environmental movements that exert pressure for change in civil and political rights policies. However, in India the recent intolerance exhibited by the dominant Hindu fundamentalist party may have a dampening effect on the achievement of these changes. This new climate of Hindu nationalism may signal a period of diminished governmental effort on behalf of non-Hindu tribal peoples displaced by the Sardar Sarovar Project. In effect, expressions to the effect that the disappearance of “inferior” cultures is an expected outcome of the development process are not uncommon (Fisher, W.F. 1995).

DIDR resistance movements among different groups facing resettlement in Mexico have openly confronted the national government and the Comision Federal de Electricidad with questions regarding inhume policies toward indigenous peoples. Although Mexico has relocated thousands of people, many of them of indigenous cultures, primarily for dam construction, recent victories by the resistance movement of the Nahuatl people in achieving the cancellation of the San Juan Tetelcingo Dam may signal a change in this practice. Particularly significant in this context was the importance of the media campaign undertaken by the Nahuatl communities threatened with DIDR. These DIDR resistance movements in various locations in Mexico are part of an array of pressures for more transparency, greater governmental accountability and increasing governmental responsiveness that have resulted in
what can only be described as an epochal change in national politics with the defeat of the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI) that ruled for more than 70 years.

XI.B.iii.a. Print Media

The importance of the role of the media to movements resisting DIDR in documenting and publicizing both the processes through which much DIDR is carried out and the impacts that it has on the lives of people cannot be understated. Accurate and timely information, as has been stated throughout this report, is essential to the struggles of people to resist DIDR in order to formulate appropriate strategies and tactics, but communicating the challenges they face and the conditions they suffer to others is as important for the long term success of their campaign. In this effort, the role of the print and visual media is indispensable, as the case of the San Juan Tetelcingo Dam struggle illustrates.

XI.B.iii.b. Case Study: San Juan Tetelcingo

In the late 1980s, as part of its overall hydropower development strategy, the Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) of Mexico, initiated plans to build a large dam on the Balsas River near the village of San Juan Tetelcingo in the state of Guerrero. The dam was projected to produce 1,300 gigawatt hours of electricity annually for the central region of the nation. In addition, it was hoped that the new dam would catch some of the silt that was filling the reservoir of the Caracol Dam downstream, rendering that dam useless in 20 years (Scott 1990: 3). The CFE estimated that between 18,000-20,000 people would have to be relocated because their lands would be flooded by the 100 kilometer long reservoir the dam would create.

The estimates of the CFE were criticized by both local officials and anthropologists working in the region. Catherine Good, an anthropologist from the Universidad Ibero-Americana in Mexico City, estimated that somewhere between 30-32,000 people would be directly affected and another 15,000 would be indirectly affected by the loss of farmland and the disruption of family, religious and economic ties (Scott 1990: 3). Moreover, the society to be relocated was unique. The 22 villages that would have to be relocated were Nahuatl, an ethnolinguistic group resident in the region since 1250AD, before both the Aztecs and the Spanish arrived. The Nahuatl people, unlike many other indigenous groups in Mexico, were economically successful as farmers, artisans and merchants, selling their bark paintings, wooden masks and clay crafts to tourists. They were also successful at maintaining their language and culture while interacting with the outside world. In addition to the losses the Nahuatls would endure, the reservoir would also inundate important archeological sites, among them Copalillo, an Olmec site dating to back to 1400 BC. The Olmecs are considered to be the founders of the "mother civilization" of Pre-Columbian America (Crossley 1986:1).

People in the region first learned of the CFE plans for a dam near San Juan Tetelcingo in August of 1990. The municipal president of Copalillo lodged a protest with the government, referring to the fact that the project would mean the disappearance of 30 indigenous communities (Rodriguez 1990a:1). On October 21 the communities formed and ratified the constitution of the Consejo de Pueblos Nahuas del Alto Balsas (CPNAB) to mobilize their population to resist the construction of the dam. They began their resistance movement with a march of more than a thousand people from 22 communities to the Guerrero state capital Chilpancingo, parading through the streets of the center of town and arriving finally at the steps of the Palace of Government, where they pledged to stay until their demands were heard by the authorities (Rodriguez 1990b: 2). One member of the CPNAB said, "It is a lie that the energy (from this dam) will serve Mexico. It will be exported to the United States and they have already given money up front in exchange for the entombment and disappearance of our towns"(Cervantes Gomez 1990). The government committed to creating a commission to review the project and the demonstration is terminated. On that same day the CPNAB also sent a letter to the International Labour Organization (ILO), informing them of the problem of the dam (Garcia 1999). A short time later, just before Christmas the Nahua people organized an "informational roadblock" on the highway between Mexico City and the tourist resort of Acapulco, stopping cars to hand out fliers, briefly discuss the dam and accept donations for their struggle. The cars were only briefly stopped and there was no conflict or disturbance (Rodriguez 1990a:1).

The past experience of other resettled communities was important in the way they approached the dam. One CPNAB representative said, "If they resettle us, we are aware that we won't be able to recover again. Even though they say that this (project) is in the name of development and progress, we know that we will lose the
Forms of resistance included 20 marches on state and federal capitals, 12 information campaigns, letters to the press rejecting government claims of adequate resettlement plans, hunger strikes, a complaint to the National Commission on Human Rights, the elaboration of a series of plans of alternative projects, an academic forum in the Universidad Iberoamericana, attendance of representatives at the Earth Summit in Rio, meetings with state officials, letters to the president and numerous CPNAB meetings and declarations of unceasing resistance to the dam project. The CPNAB quickly acquired allies from the academic and other professional communities and among the press corps. This group was soon formalized with the creation of a Committee of Support. Eventually the group was composed of lawyers, environmentalists, social scientists, agronomists and journalists of both national and foreign origin. The division of labor was clearly demarcated. CPNAB would work on mobilizing the Nahuatl grass roots and organizing local activities and the Committee of Support would work on political issues, press coverage and the logistics of expanding the political struggle beyond regional borders (Garcia 1999:1).

The Committee of Support worked on two principle fronts: the academic community and the media. They organized forums and symposia focusing on the problem of dams and resettlement in universities and other institutes of higher education as well as the National Museum of Anthropology. In collaboration with the press corps they began a photographic archive of the struggle. They wrote and translated documents relating to the struggle to the International Labour Organization, the World Bank, and the Interamerican Development Bank. The struggle of the Nahuatl peoples of the Alto Balsas is perhaps most distinguished from other indigenous struggles by the press campaign that the CPNAB and the Committee of Support launched. Thanks to their efforts, the entire struggle over the roughly 28 months between the first protest in August of 1990 and the cancellation of the dam in December of 1992 was carefully documented in 49 articles in 15 newspapers and journals, two of them foreign (Garcia 1999). The campaign took major advantage of the fact that the struggle of the Nahuatl peoples of the Alto Balsas coincided with the much disputed and discussed celebration of the 500th Anniversary of the “discovery” of America. Indeed, much of their discourse was couched in terms of their continuity with 500 years of indigenous resistance to cultural annihilation. Importantly, the vast majority of the coverage of their struggle in national newspapers was on the cultural pages of the newspapers with only occasional appearances in political sections. The struggle, as depicted in the national media, was framed in terms of indigenous cultural survival. The local newspapers tended to cover the struggle on the political pages. The success of the media campaign was categorical. Not one local, national or international newspaper wrote unfavorably of the struggle, despite the efforts of the government to influence coverage in its favor. The positive coverage of the struggle by the newspapers influenced favorably the postures regarding their struggle adopted by politicians running in the 1992 elections, although the CPNAB went to considerable lengths to avoid any identification with particular political parties (Garcia 1999).

The CPNAB has not disappeared with the success of the resistance movement and the cancellation of the plan to build the San Juan Tetelcingo Dam. They have continued to press forward with the alternative projects of sustainable development that they proposed in lieu of the dam in 1990. They have also become part of the worldwide struggle against dams. However, their victory over the dam may have come with a political price. Despite their continuing efforts to obtain support for their communities, they have been left without government assistance, despite the fact that their jurisdiction is included in a federal program of aid to marginalized zones (Garcia 2000).

XI.B.iii.c. Video and Film

Other resistance movements have also made great use of the media in struggles against DIDR. The Kayapo became acquainted with visual media when the anthropologist Terry Turner in his long-term fieldwork with the Kayapo had made a number of ethnographic films for the BBC in the 1970s (1991). Turner continued this work with two films in the Disappearing World series with Granada Films in the 1980s. Thus, representational media (photography, audio recording, film and video) became important means through which Kayapo culture was portrayed to the outside world in the 1970-80s. The Kayapo themselves became aware of the importance of the power of representation in the political culture of their
relations with the outside world. In a sense, through being portrayed as a significant culture in
the representational media to others, they felt validated and confirmed in their own eyes as
well. They further understood that if they had some control over how they were represented,
their own power in dealing with the outside world would be greatly enhanced. Thus, Kayapo
individuals have become skilled videographers of their own culture and of their interactions
with Brazilians. The Kayapo planned the great inter-tribal meeting at Altamira to protest the
dam on the Xingu River to be optimally represented by film, video and television. In addition
to the hordes of media representatives from the outside world, Kayapo videographers also
filmed the proceedings of the meeting at Altamira. The purpose was not only to make an
independent record of the meeting itself, but also to demonstrate, as Turner says, that "the
Kayapo are not dependent on the outside society for control over the representation of
themselves and their actions, but possess to a full and equal extent the means of control over
the image, with all that implies for the ability to define the meaning and value of acts and
events in the area of inter-ethnic interaction" (1991:307). Whether made by the people
themselves or by others, film and video in particular have become important tools in the
struggles against DIDR around the world, depicting the destruction visited upon people and
their struggles to resist both projects and displacement and disseminating those images and
facts widely. Films and videos documenting DIDR struggles and disasters have been made in
Mexico (Robinson n.d.), the Philippines (Schradie and DeVries 2000), India (Singh Foundation
nd), and Brazil, as well as several addressing multiple national situations (IRN n.d.) to name
but a few examples.

XI.B.iii.d. Information Technology

Information technology, greatly facilitating the dissemination of both the printed word
and still and moving images, has become an essential feature of the DIDR resistance. The
increasing access of wider publics to the internet has made the websites of NGOs, social
movements and GROs, as well as the networks formed among them and their constituents a
key feature of struggles of those resisting DIDR. Websites offer visitors prepared information
and visual packages about DIDR struggles in specific countries (e.g. India, Thailand), around
specific development forms (e.g. dams, pipelines, conservation) or involving specific
institutions (e.g. the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank). Visitors can find out
how to contribute support for these struggles, influence policy, send letters to appropriate
authorities, order more information and offer their own ideas through bulletin boards (Weeks
1999:20).

Moreover, the internet becomes not only a medium for the communication of
information, but also a means for participation. One of the most significant aspects of
information technology for "electronic politics" or cyberactivism is the speed with which it
transmits information and consequently the speed and level of organization of response that the
information elicits globally. The capacity for activists to learn of developments around the
world has been vastly increased and the speed with which they can respond to them has been
vastly reduced. Events in the Brazilian Amazon or the Narmada Valley that take place today
do not have to wait for tomorrow's local newspaper or the following day's national newspaper.
Events can be learned of and responded to on a global level sometimes within hours. For
example, events in the protest against the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand in late 2000 were
communicated through the website of the NGO, Friends of the People, and subsequently
through the helpAsia and IRN list serves to people connected to those sites and list serves all
over the world within hours of their occurrence. Indeed, such is the speed with which
information is now disseminated that central governments are sometimes among the last to
learn of events and are forced into a reactive posture by national and international DIDR allies who have learned of events and processes and developed initiatives to counter them long before government has even become aware of what has transpired. Often the initiatives developed by these allies take the form of "cascades," a term borrowed from the study of chaos and complexity that refers to a single event in a large and seemingly random series that occurs at the right time and place in such a way as to cause open and turbulent systems to change form (Kumar 1996: 20 fn). In network activity, cascade indicates a strategy in which an action taken by one member of a network is rapidly communicated through the internet to all others who reproduce it, initiating a virtual wave of events and messages that can overwhelm the policy process (Kumar 1996:20). The linkages among websites and listservers representing many different interests enable a single individual or group to connect with and inform many thousands of people over the entire world with one message.

The recent campaign to respond to the World Bank's proposed changes in resettlement guidelines serves as a good example. When the World Bank posted on the web in March of 2001 its proposed changes in resettlement guidelines, shifting from Operational Directive 4.30 to Operational Policies 4.12, it stated that the posting was for information rather than public comment. The staff expected to forward the posted draft to the full Board of Executive Directors for approval. However, examination of the draft convinced many people in the various networks concerned with DIDR that some of the provisions in the draft would seriously weaken the rights of the communities to be affected, especially those of indigenous peoples who lacked formal title to their lands and other resources. An internet campaign was mobilized by a relatively small number of individuals and institutions that produced thousands of letters from individuals and institutions expressing concern that were sent to the bank. Ultimately, the bank had to step back from the revisions. As a result of this "cascade" President James Wolfensohn and Vice-President Ian Johnson have publicly state that the bank is completely committed to its safeguard policies and will not weaken them. On April 26, 2001 the draft was returned for revision after which it will be sent to the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE), a subcommittee of the Board of Directors.

Authoritarian regimes with diminished freedom of speech and the press generally reduce the amount of political space available for presenting resisters causes to the public (Khagram 1999). National and regional authorities, usually appointed by the executive or, at best, rubber stamp legislatures, tend also to be less responsive to constituents’ interests, particularly if they run counter to national agendas. Furthermore, the relatively unrestrained capability in the use of force in authoritarian regimes also reduces the strategic options of DIDR resistance groups. In the case of the authoritarian Marcos regime in the Philippines, violent methods and the alliance of resisters with a guerrilla movement became necessary because of the unresponsiveness and oppressive tactics of the government when local peoples protested the planned construction of a series of dams on the Chico River (Drucker 1985; Hilhorst 2000).

XI.B.iii.e. Case Study: Chico Dam Resistance in the Philippines

In 1973, partially as a result of increased world oil prices, the Philippine government proposed to build four dams (Chico I, II, III and IV) on the Chico River, the longest river in the Gran Cordillera mountain range. A World Bank financed feasibility study recommended that construction be scheduled to begin with Chico II in Sadanga Province in 1978. As has often been the case, the people to be affected by the dam only learned of the project when teams of surveyors entered their region. It was not long before the people understood the implications of the dam for their future and, given a tradition of local village based resistance to intrusions, their initial response was to tear down the surveyors’ camps. The government sent a military escort in to establish the
third camp. The military forces abused local people in an effort to intimidate them. The people were further disturbed by damage done to crop and fruit trees by the surveying teams.

Attempting to avoid further direct conflict, the villagers sought out the intervention of the president, sending six petitions in 1974 that requested the withdrawal of the project on the basis of the destructive impact it would have on local people. Indeed, the early petitions expressed only local level concerns, some even supporting the dam as long as it was built in the area of another village. The petitions were personally taken by commissions of village elders, financed by the village, to Malacañang palace, but none succeeded in actually meeting with the president. In response to the first delegation President Marcos wrote a letter in which he characterized their arguments as sentimental and advised them to “sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation.”

The failure of their efforts led to more coordinated efforts to resist the dam project, which were assisted by predominately church based outsiders. Themes stressed in the resistance efforts focused around the dire effects the dam would have on them, their modest request for a hearing, their willingness to “play by the rules,” the symbolic and material importance of land (“land is life”), and a none too subtle suggestion that failure would lead to violence. The Bontok and Kalinga peoples of the area had a historical tradition of headhunting that was evoked in indirect fashion in one Catholic bishop’s letter to the president. Furthermore, they institutionalized their resistance in 1975 with the establishment of a multi-lateral peace pact, a traditional means of regulating relations among normally contentious villages. One hundred and fifty villages and many outside supporters attended a church sponsored conference in which the peace pact was created and signed, consolidating their resistance against the government.

The government responded to the peace pact among the villages by suspending work on Chico II, but shortly thereafter, hoping to divert the opposition, it began work on the fourth dam at another site in Kalinga. The strategy was ill advised, however, as villagers from the area to have been affected by Chico II continued to oppose the project in support of those to be affected by Chico IV. To fragment the opposition, the government sent the Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) to the region to hand out goods such as money and rice. PANAMIN, in an effort to exploit competition among communities and further fragment organized opposition, also distributed arms to a village that was in conflict with two villages in the resistance movement. These efforts had little effect as villages continued their obstruction of surveying work and their petitions to the president. The government responded by intensifying military activities in the area, raiding villages and detaining approximately 100 villagers, mostly women, in an unknown camp. As village representatives attempted to locate the detainees, they expanded their network of supporters, including several senators and NGOs in Manila.

The villagers recognized, however, that their capacity to resist the military was limited and when their efforts gained the attention of the New Peoples’ Army (NPA), they welcomed their offer of assistance. The New Peoples’ Army was the armed branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which had adopted a Maoist strategy of guerrilla war in the countryside as a spearhead for revolution. Although CPP cadres were from the region, they were drawn from Manila based, educated activists who had been influenced by increased interest in indigenous Philippine cultures. The NPA cadres gained great popularity among the villagers opposing the dam when they attacked military forces stationed in the area. This popularity led both men and women from the affected villagers to join the NPA and form local contingents.

In addition to military support, the NPA spent its time in education and organization. NPA cadres linked the peoples’ local struggle against the dam to their broader issues of combating the feudal structures of Philippine society on a national level. They also assisted in establishing local organizations and planning strategies for legal aspects of the struggle. The villagers also continued to have the support of the churches whose respectability enabled the struggle to acquire wide support among groups with diverse political orientations. The exposure to both groups influenced the nature of villagers’ arguments, tying the primary focus of opposition to the dam to larger issues. In addition to themes of loss of land and cultural destruction, specific linkages to class based interests were made between the electricity to be produced by the dam and its wealthy industrialist beneficiaries. Resisters were quick as well to tie the dam and the destruction of their culture to their minority group ethnic identity, asking if they were not “being considered non-Filipinos? Or are we third class?”

By the same token, NPA cadres were also influenced by the villagers. The Kalinga NPA chapter thought that the dam was more important than the struggle against feudalism and wanted to include indigenous ideas in the organizing efforts. To this end they proposed the creation of an Anti-Dam Democratic Alliance (ADDA) to include a broad array of anti-dam activists. The regional secretariat of the CPP rejected the proposal, fearing that ADDA would actually eventually replace the NPA in the struggle. The debate pivoted around the issue of the feudal character of the dam. If the dam was simply a regional issue, then there was little need for national
mobilization against it. If, however the dam were an expression of the feudal character of Philippine society (in the case of the dam, with the government as landlord), then the regional opposition could be legitimately integrated into a nation-wide and centrally coordinated resistance movement. In effect, the dam resistance produced debates of an ideological character within the CPP and the NPA, particularly among those members from the regions to be affected by the dams. In many senses, these individuals became what Gramsci characterized as “organic intellectuals,” that is, people from the original community who hold positions in the larger society who are committed to and work for local issues.

The protest movement expanded considerably between 1980-86, aided by the addition of another related issue, a government sponsored timber exploitation initiative in nearby Abra province. The movement acquired an increasingly regional character and further assistance through legal organizations at both local and regional levels. The Cordillera Peoples’ Alliance (CPA) emerged out of the coalescence of a core of 25 collaborating resistance organizations in 1984 and in a year the membership doubled, bringing together village organizations, NGOs, and other support groups involving human rights, anti-dictatorship groups, and the media. The major emphasis of the CPA was Cordillera regional unity and self-determination. The struggle attracted considerable international support, whose lobbying efforts finally led to a suspension of financial support for the dam from the World Bank. Within a short time, the Aquino government that had replaced the defunct Marcos regime, officially cancelled the Chico Dam projects.

The exposure of Cordillera activists to international discourses on indigenous rights also strengthened the regional movement’s concerns with differences between highland and lowlands. Post-Chico agendas began to be increasingly focused on indigenous rights and regional autonomy. The evolution of the movement produced a variety of competing discourses, all with urban elite leadership with varying legitimacy based on ties to local village agendas. The dilemma of the movement was found in the fact that the government’s agenda for the region, including the dam, provided a common ground for resistance, but not a common identity that could encompass the differences within the region. The identification with the region provided the basis for resistance to the ambitions of the government, but did not produce an overarching regional identity and the unity of the movement fragmented.


Increasingly today, national and state governments are giving way to private sector development interests in the planning, financing and construction of large infra-structural projects. Private sector development interests can be national, international or multinational. The very mobility and anonymity of private sector capital make it difficult to isolate as belonging to national or international levels of action. Furthermore, private sector driven DIDR presents a different set of challenges to resistance movements because corporations are not subject to the same restraints and guidelines imposed by multilateral lenders that states are. That is, resistance movements can challenge the state to live up to guidelines for resettlement agreed upon as terms of the loan. With private sector development, despite apparent attention to guidelines, there is generally little evidence that corporate compliance with international human rights standards and development policies and procedures is forthcoming, despite intense media campaigns pledging respect for environments and cultures (Feeney 2000). NGOs and DIDR resistance movements have undertaken selected campaigns to boycott the products of companies involved directly in DIDR projects or indirectly through funding guarantees (see International Rivers Network Case Study).

XI.B.iv. The international scale of action

DIDR resistance movements have participated increasingly in global dialogues on development policy as well as changes in practice in specific institutions. DIDR resistance movements and their NGO allies were among those who pressured successfully for the establishment of the World Commission on Dams, the final report of which vindicated a great many of the claims made by resisters over the years. In this sense, DIDR resistance
movements are important contributors to what many see as a fundamental transition in the terms of global development discourse.

For many years, in the World Bank and other development institutions financing large infrastructural projects involving resettlement, the costs of large scale development projects were calculated in economic terms and the resettlement associated with the projects was generally under-funded, poorly-staffed and haphazardly planned in the borrower nations constructing the projects. Social impacts of such projects were deemed to be negligible or unavoidable. In the 1970s poor planning and implementation as well as staunch local resistance in the Bank assisted Sobradinho project in Brazil and the Chico Dam in the Philippines underscored the need for the formulation of explicit resettlement policies within the Bank (Cernea 1993: 19-20).

Greater interest in the Bank in projects addressing the alleviation of rural poverty emerged as well (Shihata 1993). This shift was due to the intensity of rural protest and resistance as well as the public embarrassment of the bank at catastrophic consequences of resettlement by development projects it had funded. Large multilateral development banks are not monolithic structures. Like national governments, MDBs are complex, internally diverse organizations, composed of individuals and groups with particular specialties and interests. DIDR resisters at all levels can find sympathizers and allies in their struggles within MDBs. Individuals whose concerns within MDBs focus on indigenous peoples or the environment frequently militate behind closed doors on behalf of the rights of people to be affected by DIDR. The results of the efforts of individuals within MDBs can be seen in the creation of guidelines for resettlement of such MDBs as the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Although these guidelines recommend that DIDR be avoided where possible, they are developed clearly within the framework of the model of development that necessitates such large-scale projects. In the final analysis, MDBs are in the business of lending money to fund projects. The model of development adhered to by MDBs and the internal incentive structure within MDBs tends toward favoring larger projects because they involve larger loans (Rapp in press).

The exposure of these failures and the portrayal of resisters as Davids going up against the Goliaths of the state and the World Bank in the media created pressure for the formulation of a set of resettlement policy guidelines within the Bank (c.f. Rich 1994). The result was Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement (World Bank 1990). O.D. 4.30 called for minimizing resettlement, an improvement or restoration of living standards, earning capacity and production levels, resettlee participation in project activities, a resettlement plan, and valuation and compensation for assets lost (World Bank 1990:1-2). Although these guidelines were hailed as an important step toward the reduction of damages, costs and losses incurred by resettled peoples, their implementation in borrower nations has been consistently problematical. The Bank’s response to this problem was to advocate the formulation and implementation of resettlement legislation in borrower nations, producing policy changes in several developing nations, such as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, as well as other development agencies such as the OECD, and the IDB (Cernea 1993: 32; Shihata 1993). However, a number of nations have seen the O.D. 4.30 guidelines as an infringement on national sovereignty. Furthermore, adoption of formal policies, either by the World Bank or borrower nations, is no assurance of adequate implementation. Furthermore, the degree to which projects financed by private capital must adhere to these and now modified guidelines and procedures established by the bank is far from clear. The World Bank commissioned independent report on Narmada Sardar Sarovar project in India (Morse, Berger and Associates
1992) recommending cessation of the project pending major improvements in environmental and social monitoring and implementation, resulted in rejection of further World Bank funding of the project by the government of India. The government insisted that the project would proceed with even higher standards in the areas of environment and resettlement than those mandated by the Bank, but that has not proven to be the case, according to resisters (see Narmada Case Study Box). Recent efforts to alter the guidelines of O.D. 4.30, seen by human rights and environmental groups as attempts to weaken safeguards, particularly for indigenous peoples, were responded to with an internet and letter campaign of protest that obligated the bank to reconsider its position and return the new draft to committee.

DIDR resistance has influenced change within the World Bank. Resisters and their allies in NGOs and social movements have succeeded in communicating their position, backed by solid documentation, through declarations at numerous international meetings and conferences for many years, including most recently the Manibeli declaration of 1994, the Curitiba declaration at the First International Meeting of Dam Affected Peoples in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997 and the Walker Creek Declaration at the International Seminar on Strategies for Dam Decommissioning in 1998. NGOs also continue with their Multilateral Development Bank Campaign, putting pressure on national donors of funds to banks to withhold funds for the dams and other projects that displace people against their will.

These and many other earlier efforts have been aimed in part at revealing some of the disastrous consequences of multilateral funded development projects and obligating these institutions, especially the World Bank to become more responsive to the specific concerns of DIDR resistance and to social and environmental concerns generally. NGOs have severely criticized the performance of MDBs and other international agencies in DIDR projects with the aim of reforming their internal guidelines and policies to which they can then be held accountable. Activists and scholars keep close watch on policy formulation in these institutions to guard against the dilution or weakening of any policy relating to DIDR. Responding to the trend in privatization that has been seen by many to threaten the gains made in strengthening World Bank resettlement policy, Peter Bosshard of the Swiss NGO called The Berne Declaration, said:

The guidelines on the environmental analysis of IFC (International Financial Corporation) and MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) projects are less strict and comprehensive than the World Bank’s Operational Directive. The assessments can be done later in the project cycle, when critical decisions about the project have been taken and the analysis of alternative options does not make sense (Khagram 1999: 307)

Grass roots organizations, NGOs and social movements involved in resistance to DIDR have also acquired or developed legal personnel, expertise and general knowledge that enable them to sue projects for violation of national civil and human rights law as well as international accords. The aforementioned growth of international human rights norms supplies a series of conventions and covenants that, while difficult to enforce in local circumstances, can be used to portray projects as in violation of internationally accepted standards. The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights to Development, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, the articles of the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples all provide articles and protocols that can be used to portray projects in violation of human rights on the
international stage. There are now much more active efforts to use these and other documents as means to achieve reparations for past injustices as well (Johnston 1999).

XI.B.iv.a. Case Study: The Sardar Sarovar Dam and the Narmada Bachao Andolan

Like many of India’s tribal groups, the people of the Satpuda ranges, which include the Narmada Valley, have a tradition of resistance to any attempts by outsiders to compromise their autonomy and their resource base. Their villages are isolated and little governmental infrastructure or services were provided (Parasuraman 1999:232). After independence in 1948, the region was generally ignored by the state government, but the idea of damming the Narmada river dates as far back as 1946. Initial studies for the project were carried out promptly, but the project was stymied because the provinces that eventually became the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh fell into disputes about sharing the waters. The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal was established in 1969 to deal with the conflict, submitting its final report in 1978 (Baviskar 1992: 232). Soon thereafter, the government of Gujarat started the planning process for the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP).

The Sardar Sarovar Project is but one part of Narmada Valley Project (NVP) which projects the construction of ten major dams on the Narmada and twenty others on its tributaries. The project also plans another 135 medium and 3,000 minor dams (Fisher, W.F. 1995: 13). The Sardar Sarovar dam will be the second largest of the project in terms of submerged area and displaced population (Baviskar 1992: 233). The dam is projected to provide irrigation water for 1.8 million hectares of land. The dam is also intended to provide drinking water for 4,720 villages and 131 towns, while generating 1,450 MW of electricity. The damming of the Narmada will submerge roughly 37,000 hectares of land and displace an estimated 163,500 people (Parasuraman 1999: 179; Fisher, W.F. 1995: 13). Preliminary work actually began in 1961 under Prime Minister Nehru who considered dams to be “the temples of development.” Construction was considerably accelerated after the World Bank decided to fund part of it in 1985.

The estimates of benefits to be generated and costs to be incurred by construction of the dam are hotly contested by a variety of people representing many interests. Economic costs are criticized for being grossly underestimated. Estimates of the human and environmental costs are argued to have been vastly miscalculated and have been based on low estimates of people to be affected and a lack of understanding of the nature of the cultural disruption that the tribal people in particular will suffer in dislocation. The alleged benefits in the form of irrigation and drinking water are also said to be vastly unrealistic (Fisher, W.F. 1995: 17). Critics also argued that there were no provisions for appropriately informing the people to be affected, much less any remotely adequate plans for their humane and constructive resettlement.

Protest against the dam appeared shortly after the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal final report in 1978. Organized by a leading Congress party politician, major protests and rallies protested the issue of displacement in the region of Nimar in Madhya Pradesh, where large numbers of people were facing resettlement. The Nimar Bachao Andolan (Movement to Save Nimar) was largely supported by merchants and farmers and worked through the established structures of party politics. However, a Congress party politician essentially used the movement to further his own political career and after election in 1979, he abandoned the organization and it collapsed (Baviskar 1992: 237). However, in 1980 two voluntary organizations started working with the populations to be impacted. Arch Vahini began efforts to improve resettlement conditions and Rajpipla Social Service Society helped in legal actions related to land. Although they had only some limited successes, they constituted the initial steps toward the formation of a people’s movement (Parasuraman 1999:236). A second stage of resistance developed in 1987 after the Indian government gave clearance for accelerating work on the project and slightly more than 2000 families were displaced and resettled. The government neither informed nor consulted the affected people because it believed that the tribal peoples would not understand the issues even if they had the information (Parasuraman 1999:237).

In 1985 Medha Patkar, a social scientist and activist from the Tata Institute for Social Studies in Bombay, began living and working the project-affected villages of Maharashtra. She helped the people to form an organization and shortly after activists in the Nimar region re-organized the non-tribals in the Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti (Narmada Riverbank Renovation Committee) in Madhya Pradesh. At the same time the people of Gujarat organized the Narmada Asargrasta Sangharsh Samiti (Narmada Struggle Committee). The activists framed the issues in development terms based on the absolute lack of basic services that the villages suffered. They began to organize village committees and taught committee members some basic literacy skills. They instituted adult education programs, convinced the government to provide teachers for schools and established
health care programs. They provided information to the villages on the dam, including submergence levels, the numbers of people who would face dislocation, the resettlement and rehabilitation programs, and other issues (Parasuraman 1999:238). The villages themselves began to collect comprehensive household data on landownershio, cattle and trees owned, the amount of produce from land, forests and rivers, house size and materials to inform the government for adequate compensation levels to be set. Furthermore, the people supported by the activists demanded that the government provide: the right to information on all aspects of the dam, more comprehensive land surveys for adequate compensation, a comprehensive resettlement plan, the right to resettle within their own state, and the extension of resettlement and rehabilitation benefits to all those affected by the subsidiary projects of the dam such as the colony, canal, sanctuary and compensatory afforestation programs (Parasuraman 1999: 239).

These demands essentially fell on deaf ears. The government claimed that the tribal peoples could not possibly understand the project planning process nor the technical aspects of the land assessment or cost-benefit analysis. They further disputed some of the terms for adequate resettlement and land acquisition procedures demanded by the people. By the late 1980s it was clear that the government of India and the state governments were not willing to establish a coherent policy for compensation for a variety of losses to be incurred by the people. There was little certainty regarding the availability of adequate land for those to be resettled and the visible misery of those that had already been resettled and little prospects of resolving the issues led to the evolution of a position of total opposition to the SSP (Parasuraman 1999: 240-1). In late 1988 the local organizations working with affected villages held rallies in several towns and total opposition to the SSP was declared. The organizations and the people were determined to stop the dam citing as their reasons the need to save the environment and the economic and social well-being of the people to be resettled and to work toward sustainable forms of development. The local organizations united and formed the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement). Their opposition was voiced in the slogan "Koi nahiin hatega! Baandh nahin banega!” (No one will move! The dam will not be built! (Baviskar 1992: 238).

The NBA initiated a campaign of resistance on a broad front. In addition to efforts to mobilize the villages in the valley, the NBA has established linkages with NGOs and social movements in both rural and urban areas in India. Urban NGOs participate in the NBA by carrying out media campaigns and disseminating information, fundraising and solidarity events. Rural NGOs send their members to participate in NBA events. The NBA has also established cooperative relationships with international NGOs in order to pressure the international financial community to withdraw economic support from the project. In 1989 the Environmental Defense Fund, the Environmental Policy Institute and the National Wildlife Federation urged the US Congress to require the World Bank to stop funding the SSP. Their pressure convinced the bank to undertake an independent review of the environmental and displacement aspects of the project, producing a report that was highly critical of the project (Morse and Berger 1992). The NBA also brought suit in state courts against the SSP charging improper land acquisition and forcible eviction, state repression, and the denial of constitutionally guaranteed right to life (Baviskar 1992: 239-40). Another more comprehensive case was brought by the NBA against the project to the New Delhi supreme court in 1994. The rejection of that case in 1999 has led the NBA to call for yet another satyagraha and renewed efforts at resistance including “save or drown squads” awaiting the monsoon swollen waters behind the partially completed dam in villages below the expected submergence lines.

The NBA has gained the support of celebrities, including rock stars, prize winning authors, and supreme court justices and has also won a number of international environmental awards. Mehta Patkar has assumed the leadership of the movement and has also won international acclaim for her tireless efforts on behalf of the people and the environment. With their increasing international fame, tensions between the local priorities of people in the valley and the broader agenda of the NBA have appeared. Amita Baviskar, a dedicated opponent of the dam, has noted that the NBA often makes decisions without consultation with the people in the valley (as quoted in Patel and Mehta 1995: 404). Other NGOs have criticized the NBA for speaking of fair compensation in the villages and of environmental hazards, foreign debt, earthquakes, and other reasons to stop the dam in the cities (Dwivedi 1998: 167). Some people within the valley consider the NBA to be as filled with empty promises as the dam authorities. Others have felt that the NBA has exploited them, urging them to resist rather than accept resettlement in order for the NBA to gain political capital in their struggle against the dam (Dwivedi 1998: 167). Nonetheless, the NBA appears to have the support of most of the people in the valley and they have continued their opposition in the form of meetings, marches, demonstrations, petitions, strikes, public confrontations with authorities, road blocks, hunger strikes, refusals to move and “save or drown squads.” The NBA has adopted Gandhian resistance strategies, including the satyagraha, a non-violent mass social action event. They have also acquired a voluntary support group, Friends of River Narmada, which provides a sophisticated web site chronicling the history of the movement.
and up to date information on the struggle as well as information on opportunities to contribute resources and participate. There is as well a Narmada Solidarity Network composed of six organizations from various cities in the United States.

As it has evolved the NBA has widened its agenda beyond resistance against the SSP or even dams in general. As its original goals included the pursuit of sustainable forms of development, the NBA has joined with other organizations against destructive state and corporate development projects throughout India (McCully 1996: 306). On the strength of her charismatic leadership and knowledge Mehta Patkar was chosen to be one of the 12 commissioners of the World Commission on Dams in 1998. Characteristically, when the final report of the WCD appeared in November of 2000, Patkar wrote an appended comment in which she forcefully noted that some basic issues inherent to the unjust and destructive development model, of which dams were just a symptom, were not given the importance they deserved in the final report (WCD 2000: 321-322). While the final outcome of the Narmada struggle remains to be decided, there is no question that the formation of the NBA has profoundly affected the form and nature of resistance, as well as the future of dam construction on a worldwide basis. The global impact of the NBA has raised consciousness around the world about the potential for change when grass roots movements link with global agendas for change. The global recognition of the NBA and the struggle of the people of the Narmada Valley, as evidenced in the awards won by Mehta Patkar, were major factors that led to the eventual creation of the World Commission on Dams. The WCD, whose composition reflected the entire spectrum of perspectives on dams, largely validated the arguments forwarded by the NBA and other dam resisters for many years. The conclusions of the WCD indicate that the NBA and other dam resisters have altered the terms of discussion and changed the way decisions about dam construction will be made in the future.

DIDR resistance movements have emerged in an era of extraordinary organized social action. In many ways less dramatic, but far more organized than the counter cultural and radical activism of earlier periods of the 1960s, DIDR resistance has been part of an expanded activist agenda that is much more issue focused. The emergence of non-governmental organizations and electronic information technology have been two important vehicles by which DIDR resistance as well as many other social and environmental concerns have been able to make inroads into the development agenda. Through multiple organizational forms and operating at multiple levels from the local to the wider regions of global political discourse, DIDR resistance has been able to insert its concerns into more public venues, drawing of greater support and developing greater influence in wider venues of power. The concerns that these organized forms of resistance address range from the defense of local rights to the rejection of development measured purely in economic terms to questions of global human rights and environmental sustainability. Each level may focus on particular concerns but is capable of action to address all concerns inclusively as well. The multiplicity of organizational forms and levels of action inevitably involve tensions and problems of coherence, consistency, and contradiction for all participants in the struggles against DIDR as a number of the case studies have shown. However, thus far, the coherence between grass roots communities, cooperating NGOs, national social movements and transnational networks has been sufficient to gain the rights to sit at the negotiating table for many projects of national scale and enough political and social power to influence the policies of multilateral development organizations.

**XII. THE RESULTS OF DIDR RESISTANCE**

Just as any action produces a reaction, resistance to DIDR produces outcomes. Regardless of whether the resistance succeeds or fails in halting or at least improving resettlement, there are outcomes that bring consequences for the community or region that has confronted the development project. The outcomes or results of resistance may or may not fall within the original agenda or goals of the movement. Although for reasons made clear in the economic section of the report there is some hesitation to refer to these outcomes as losses or gains, or costs and benefits, references of this order do not seem inappropriate as long as there is no attempt to render a balance sheet as to whether resistance is a viable option from an
economic standpoint. Further, since outcomes are abstracted from the array of DIDR resistance experiences, they can be considered only as potential or possible outcomes in any given situation.

Since DIDR resistance movements frequently confront vastly more powerful forces, either the state or major concentrations of private capital, there may be considerable costs involved. At the most basic and most profound level, there can be serious personal risks in resisting. DIDR resistance can be very dangerous. Resistors and their leaders risk death and bodily harm in certain circumstances. DIDR resistance leaders have been murdered by both agents of the state and private mercenaries. In Guatemala in 1982 about 400 Maya Achi men, women and children from communities resisting resettlement for the Chixoy Dam were killed by military and paramilitary forces (Colajacomo 1999:68). Peaceful demonstrators, including women, have been grievously abused and beaten (Black 2001). Detentions for indeterminate periods of time without due process are also one of the risks of resistance. Although authoritarian governments, with fewer legal restraints, may be more likely to employ violent methods, they are not unheard of either in ostensibly democratic regimes. Regardless of constitutional safeguards, neither formal nor informal security forces at the local level may be particularly constrained in their treatment of resisters. Ethnic, religious, caste or class prejudices may also buttress the ideological justification for such abuse.

There may also be considerable economic costs to resistance. Resistance has opportunity costs. Economically, resistance requires the mobilization and expenditure of labor and other resources in novel ways, diverting time, energy, and resources from other important tasks and stressing communities that may already be pressured to meet normal needs.

Resistance requires human and economic resources for organization, communication, and mobilization, few of which may be actually present in sufficient surpluses in project-affected regions to underwrite the costs of resistance. The time, energy and resources necessary for organizing resistance movements can strain both household and community capacities.

Urban people have jobs or work with regular time requirements they must attend to in order to support themselves and their families. Rural peoples at certain periods of time in the year may have time to devote to meetings, organizing activities and demonstrations and other resistance activities, but it is usually limited and at some point, under the pressure of producing their own subsistence, they must return to normal activities. Diverting time and labor from normal activities thus brings the costs of not producing sufficiently and the risk of impoverishment and marginalization. Such costs can be reduced or avoided if resistance activities are spaced or occur within slack times in the agricultural calendar. Where resettlement is already underway, resisters may run the risk of exclusion from benefits that people who have accepted resettlement receive, thus prolonging their period of indeterminacy long after other people have been resettled and are on their way to reconstructing their lives. Again, these risks have to be balanced against the abysmal record of resettlement projects in actually restoring lives to pre-resettlement standards, much less improving them. However, being the last in line or excluded from bad resettlement projects may place people in very difficult circumstances. People who have participated in failed resistance movements may find themselves even further behind and with fewer resources than those who accepted resettlement from the beginning, no matter how poorly implemented the resettlement project may be. Differential experiences and benefits between accepters and resisters may also bring the cost of social disarticulation in resettled communities. Resisters can become scapegoats for inadequate state support.
Successful resistance may appear to have some political and economic costs in terms of long-term relationships with sectors that supported the development project. Resistance may create problematic relations with local and regional elements of local power and/or authority structures that might have benefited from the project’s success. As seen in the case of San Juan Tetelcingo, the defeat of the dam planned for that region of Guerrero has assured the Nahuatl people of remaining on their land. One of the important features of their resistance campaign was an alternative agenda of locally prioritized development projects for which a much more modest expenditure than the cost of the dam could be employed. However, now almost ten years later, it would appear that one of the costs of their victory is forgoing future state development assistance. Despite the fact that the 22 communities that formed the vanguard of the resistance movement fall within a zone targeted for federal aid for the marginalized, they have received no federal assistance (Garcia 2000).

The success or failure of resistance movements is not the only measure by which positive outcomes can be assessed. Failure to halt a development project does not always mean that positive outcomes are not forthcoming. Failed resistance efforts can be successful if they succeed in improving the terms and conditions of resettlement. Many resistance movements at the local level initially ask for no more than recognition of their rights to adequate compensation for their losses and reasonable conditions of resettlement. The reluctance or inability of the state and/or private capital to dignify or implement these quite reasonable requirements is very often responsible for the escalation of tensions and outright resistance to projects. When resistance escalates, it begins to increase project costs, in direct outlays, in delays, in bad publicity and political credibility with donor agencies. Thus, even if movements fail, if their activities threaten to increase the costs sufficiently, they can gain bargaining space to improve the terms and conditions of resettlement.

In effect, mere participation in resistance movements can bring clear benefits. Particularly resistance movements that emerge from local responses and require the participation of local people provide invaluable experience in dealing with outside agencies and institutions. For groups that have historically been ignored or marginalized by the state and its agencies, resistance movements provide a form of political socialization in which local people become much more acquainted with state agencies and bureaucracies and their procedures. Moreover, they become much more aware of their rights as citizens and the means to defend those rights within the framework of national constitutions and international accords. They may also acquire allies that will continue to work with them after the DIDR dispute is over. The acquisition of allies such as NGOs may make available other resource pools, injecting new skills, technology and access to specialized economic resources into the local context. These allies, skills and resources all may prove useful in future dealings with the state. For example, several people in the national leadership of MAB emerged from local contexts in the early days of the struggle and have become very skilled in organizing and negotiation at national and international levels over the years. These kinds of skills at the local level become very important for continued dealings with the state. In effect, because of their participation in resistance movements, whether they succeed or fail, people become much more knowledgeable and much more skillful in dealing with local and national agencies and bureaucratic structures. Regardless of whether the project is completed or halted, the state and/or large-scale private enterprise become larger presences in the local context than prior to the project. With the expansion of these institutions, and their increasing impact on local lives and communities, the skills and resources in dealing with them acquired in resistance will prove valuable to local people in the future.
If resistance is successful in at least helping to stop a project, retaining control over land and remaining in one’s home environment are major positive outcomes for the local group. However, the validation of the perspective and effort that project cancellation signifies for the resisting group takes on special significance as well. Since those most subject to resettlement are frequently from indigenous or other minority groups, successful defense of homeland can take on great significance to a group that has historically been ignored or oppressed by the dominant society. The successful defense of human rights of self-determination, of rights to land, or rights to religious freedom that may be embodied in resistance to resettlement constitutes a form of self-affirmation that can serve as a stimulus leading to a florescence of local culture and greater local autonomy. The demands that resistance movements voice for greater citizen participation in decision-making, for access to information and for respect for civil and political liberties can also signify progress toward a more responsive and representative society in which the opinions of the less powerful are heard. Moreover, successful DIDR can add credence for arguments for more sustainable, more appropriate models of development, emphasizing projects that focus on benefits for local populations.

From the perspective of NGOs, social movement allies and transnational networks, stopping the project is a major goal in itself, but not the end of the game. Stopping the project is just one battle in a war with many fronts against certain models or approaches to development and the institutions associated with them. Once a project is halted, local NGOs may continue to work with the communities, while international organizations may move on to tackle the next case of DIDR. Most certainly, national and international NGOs will continue to employ both the example and the perspectives gained in each case to struggle for MDB reform, greater transparency and more sustainable forms of development. The experience of the anti-dam movement over the last thirty years, but of particular intensity in the last ten has proven instructive in the struggle to alter approaches to development. The milestone meetings of dam affected people from around the world and their declarations of Manibeli and Curitiba representing a global mobilization through networking and external support as well as the validation of many of its arguments and contentions by the Morse Report and the World Commission on Dams will serve as major examples for resistance to other forms of unsustainable and undemocratic development.

XIII. CONCLUSION

Resistance to DIDR in most cases constitutes a clear expression of a sense of real or potential injury and loss of rights. In any given context, there may be individuals who attach themselves to resistance movements because they see the potential for personal gain, but most participants associate themselves with resistance movements for more complex motives. People resist resettlement for a wide array of reasons; quite practical, material issues like land, resources, property, livelihood, or more ideologically oriented concepts such as tradition, ethnic identity or religion or a combination of all of these issues. Regardless of the specific issues being contested in a given case, behind these concerns lies a concept of rights. People resist because they recognize that certain basic rights that they consider legitimate are being abridged. Resistance is often a demand that rights be recognized. Principle among these rights is the right of self-determination, the right, as defined and as it exists within local conditions, to control one’s own life and future. Even if we cannot establish that such a right exists as a cultural universal, it seems ethically dubious for us to claim such a right for ourselves and not accord it to others. The threat of DIDR amounts to the potential loss of the right of self-determination, in effect, the loss of relative control over self and community (Scudder 1982). Although the degree of control over
conditions is always partial in the best of circumstances, DIDR creates a "...community which
does not effectively control its own affairs...and in which a feeling of powerlessness is pervasive"
or, as Kushner terms it, "an administered community"(1988: 29).

Resistance to DIDR then must be considered as a form of legitimate expression of the
defense of the right of self-determination as well as a defense of land, religion or identity. People
also reject the loss of autonomy and the extreme form of political domination that resettlement
both signifies and enacts and their resistance questions whether resettlement can ever be
development or empowering. Their resistance is, in some fundamental form, an act of self-
empowerment, however permanent or temporary that may be.

In that process of self-empowerment resisters at all levels speak directly to power holders
and policy makers. The messages they seek to communicate are not difficult to understand, but
do require a perspective that is capable of re-evaluating often deeply embedded suppositions about
the nature, quality and scale of the development process, forms of governance and power sharing,
and minority-majority relations.

- The legitimacy of the right of the state to relocate people and appropriate property with or
  without compensation, must be re-examined.
- Appropriate and just forms and levels of compensation must be determined in consultation
  with affected people. Outside standards employed to establish levels and forms of
  compensation will not be appropriate unless approved in full consultation with the people
  to be resettled.
- If development is to become a democratic process, local rights must be recognized.
- Development projects are felt first at the local level. Development must be defined
  qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Development defined qualitatively includes the
  freedom to define local priorities democratically. Development projects must therefore
  include the authentic participation of local people in strategic planning and
  implementation.
- Resistance speaks of local needs and priorities.
- People with deep local knowledge are often better at predicting DIDR outcomes than
  external experts. Respect local knowledge as a source for viable, less destructive
  alternatives.
- Resistance speaks clearly about project deficiencies. Project problems do not originate
  with people and are not the resettled people’s fault.
- The method and focus of decision-making must shift from purely economic criteria to
  more dialogic forms of participatory decision-making.
- Resistance is a rejection the dominant society’s cultural construction of the poor, of
  ethnic minorities, of peasants as incapable, powerless and unworthy of consideration.
- Resisters join with others in seeking to democratize their societies.
• If national purpose is the justification for development projects, then national purpose has to be defined pluralistically and projects have to be demonstratively inclusive. A national purpose that is not inclusive is not democratic. A national purpose that requires only sacrifices from the least able to absorb them for the benefit of those who least need them is authoritarian, regardless of the supposed democratic character of the regime.

• Resistance in effect is a demand for accountability and responsibility from government, from development agencies, and from multilateral development banks for actions taken in the name of social policy and development.

The role DIDR resistance movements are now taking in the broader realms of global political discourse may start at local levels, but in many cases soon becomes part of a larger, movement for both redressing the human rights abuses that occur in DIDR as well as altering contemporary development policy and practice. There are obvious points of tension that can occur between a population threatened with resettlement that resists to gain a better negotiating position for better resettlement conditions and allies at other levels who may have more systemic goals, reaching beyond the local context to question the dominant models of development. For local communities involved in resistance, embracing such far-reaching goals requires the realization of a coincidence of interests and the construction of a shared meanings, a common ideological basis for undertaking action in collaboration with others, often distant socio-culturally, economically, and geographically from them. Local resistance dramas "in the shadow land...at the outer edge of the realm of politics..." thus may become internationalized and participants in the changing arena of global political culture (Falk 1983: 25 as quoted in Wilmer 1993: 39; Fisher 1994). The major challenge within DIDR resistance is maintaining the coherence between the agendas, goals and discourses of the participants at all levels of the struggle. There will never be perfect coherence or perfect articulation, but enough political consistency has been achieved thus far to significantly alter the terms of debate in the field of international development toward greater recognition of human rights and environmental sustainability. When the local dramas of resistance to resettlement are cast in national debates attracting the attention of national and international NGOs and multilateral and international institutions, they become active participants in a larger global dialogue. In effect, resistance to resettlement is helping to reframe the entire contemporary debate on development, the environment and human rights, a debate that shows considerable signs of expanding and of gaining increasing relevance to both national development and human rights policy as well as international standards.
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