UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA’s engagement in fragile and post-conflict states
Study of UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA’s engagement in fragile and post-conflict states. - FINAL REPORT (November 2010)
Commissioned by: The Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN in New York (MFA)

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Photo: Danida og Thorsten Overgaard
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<td>Aus Aid</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)</td>
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<td>BDP</td>
<td>Bureau for Development Policies (UNDP)</td>
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<td>BSF</td>
<td>Basic Services Fund (Southern Sudan)</td>
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<td>Budget Sector Working Groups (Southern Sudan)</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>CBTF</td>
<td>Capacity Building Trust Fund (Southern Sudan)</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Community Driven Recovery</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISS</td>
<td>Coordination for International Support for Somalis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia and Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAC</td>
<td>Community Security and Arms Control (project in Southern Sudan)</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency (MFA DK)</td>
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<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct Execution</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>DOCO</td>
<td>UN Development Operations Cooperation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary General</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commissions Department for Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency Response Unit (under Liberian National Police)</td>
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<td>EU HoM</td>
<td>European Union Heads of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVAL</td>
<td>Dept. for Evaluations (MFA DK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
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<td>FMU</td>
<td>Fund Management Unit (UNDP Sudan)</td>
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<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit</td>
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<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (Sudan)</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>GSO</td>
<td>Dept. for Global Cooperation and Economy (MFA DK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Action Committee</td>
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<td>HACT</td>
<td>Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HCO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinators Office</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<td>HUC</td>
<td>Dept. for Humanitarian Action, Development Policy and Civil Society (MFA DK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICPD</td>
<td>International Conference on Population and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Integrated Task Force (UN)</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>JDO</td>
<td>Joint Donors Office (Southern Sudan)</td>
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<td>JPLG</td>
<td>Joint programme on Local Governance (Somalia)</td>
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<td>LEGF</td>
<td>Liberia Emergency Governance Fund</td>
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<td>LISGIS</td>
<td>Liberian Institute of Statistics and Geo information Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRTF</td>
<td>Liberian Reconstruction Trust Fund (World Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M/E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MDTF-S</td>
<td>Multi Donor Trust Fund – South (administered by the WB in Southern Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MoHSW</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Sanitation and Welfare</td>
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<td>MoP</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPAN</td>
<td>Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network</td>
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<td>MSTP</td>
<td>Medium Strategic Plan (UNICEF)</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Mid Term Plan (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>Naymote</td>
<td>Liberian NGO</td>
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<td>NEX</td>
<td>National Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transitional Initiatives (US State Dept.)</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy (Liberia)</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RBA</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Africa (UNDP)</td>
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<td>RBAS</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Arab States (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>RCO</td>
<td>Resident Coordinators Office</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army</td>
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<td>SRF</td>
<td>Sudan Recovery Fund</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative for the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SSS</td>
<td>Somali Support Secretariat</td>
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<td>STAB</td>
<td>Dept. For Stabilisation (MFA DK)</td>
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<td>STEREP</td>
<td>Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance (typically Personnel Support)</td>
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<td>UN Habitat</td>
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UNCDF  United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT  United Nations Country Team
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG  United Nations Development Group
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA  United Nations Populations Fund
UNHAS  United Nations Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children Fund
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS  United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPOS  United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSAS  United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy
UNV  United Nations Volunteers
US-Aid  United States Agency for International Development
WASH  Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFP  World Food Programme
WHO  World Health Organisation
ZANU PF  Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZIMDAT  Zimbabwe Statistics Database
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The present study of UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA’s engagement in post conflict and fragile situations assesses challenges and opportunities for on-the-ground delivery, drawing on findings from the organisations’ programmes in Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia. The Study follows the line of the UN Secretary General’s Report on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict, in the sense that focus is on the UN’s significance and implementation: Comparative advantages as well as systemic and contextual challenges. Assessments of country-specific issues are beyond the scope of the Study, and are only featuring with a view to place organisation-specific topics in context. The purpose of the Study is to feed into the ongoing dialogue and cooperation between Denmark’s Permanent Mission to the UN and the three organisations.

Findings

In the recent years an increasing number of new players have entered international aid, ranging from different branches of donor governments, large numbers of new NGOs, private companies providing aid management as well as huge systems of private security providers.

- Still the UN is perceived to continue playing the key role, in this developing aid architecture. This is based on its comparative advantages in bridging humanitarian, peacekeeping and long term development efforts, clear mandates, its intergovernmental governance and a solid presence of staff on the ground. In addition respondents stress the important role that the UN can play as a “proxy” or “broker”, when direct bilateral cooperation between donors and recipient governments is not an option.

The diversity of the UN organisations engaged in Fragile and Post Conflict situations produces a host of “systemic challenges” when working towards common ground as well as coherent and / or joint approaches. This includes:

- The aim of the UNDAF, i.e. trying to get the UN to focus on (a limited number of) key national priorities, is crucial. It could be considered whether the existing modalities for an UNDAF are always appropriate in all fragile and post conflict contexts including. Specifically it could be considered how to further adapt the UNDAF to accommodate the needs for increased flexibility in fragile contexts.

- To consider whether interagency coordination and coordination within the UN and with other development partners can be strengthened e.g.by revisiting the system of incentives for country offices to work together

- To consider whether recruitment and retention of good staff can be strengthened through revisiting overall HR policies; e.g. improved access to in-service-training, and revised career systems.

- How to strengthen the cooperation with civil society organisations beyond one of being an “implementing partner”.

UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA’s potential roles in post conflict and fragile settings are considered to be uneven, but they are all, within their mandates, perceived to have important roles to play.
• For UNDP the overall finding is that the organisation has the key role to play in fragile and post conflict states, particularly when it comes to the international community’s engagement in governance and state building. As such UNDP’s role is closely interlinked with the “Political realm”, and this gives the organisation a unique position, at both national and local levels. As a result its achievements are typically measured with a high level of scrutiny against donors’ stated political objectives, and respondents providing more detailed feedback on UNDP (BCPR) than on the other organisations.

• The general feedback from respondents is that UNICEF is a highly valued partner in fragile and post conflict settings. This is largely linked to confidence in capacity and ability to deliver, and an internal flexibility between humanitarian and development interventions allowing for continued relevance. Furthermore it is important that UNICEF’s agenda is linked to a clear mandate and less directly linked to political reform agendas.

• UNFPA’s global experiences on the humanitarian scene are relatively limited and the organisation is a small player in fragile and post conflict settings. Still feedback from respondents indicates that in the countries covered by the Study, the organisation operates in relevant areas that are linked to the overall development priorities.

The overall feedback on challenges is, that it is important for all three organisations to continuously revisit and strengthen their operational capacities (types of programmes, staffing, and modes of interacting with national, local and international partners), as well as elevating the engagement in fragile and post conflict settings into the overall strategic frameworks of the organisations. Comments on organisations-specific challenges include:

**UNDP**

• UNDP and donors need to revisit what should be expected from UNDP and introduce a stronger agenda for focussing UNDPs activities

• Consolidate and scale up its capacities in Post Conflict and Fragile states, e.g. by elevating BCPRs strategic role within the organisation

• Strengthen BCPR’s role as a body hosting the practical understanding of “Best Practices” and developing its role in supporting the development of programme management tools for fragile contexts

• Draw on BCPR in identifying (providing?) staff with better skills-mix and inputs to more “innovative interventions”, in order to complement UNDPs development profile with recovery and transition skills

• Assess whether BCPR could host a roster of seasoned staff to send out on longer term assignments

• Revisit the role and support from UNDP Headquarters and the Regional Bureaus, when country offices are confronted with serious management challenges

• In countries UNDP could expand the cooperation with / inclusion of Government in the selection and the implementation of activities

• UNDP could improve on “Monitoring and Evaluation” e.g. by increase the use of M/E staff in the country offices

• At times there is room for improving UNDPs communication with partners.
UNICEF

- Maintain and develop the approach of mixing humanitarian and development interventions
- Work towards improving the balance between policy, advocacy and capacity building and direct service delivery, and to be better at including government
- Work towards strengthening capacity building guidelines and best practice references for transition from humanitarian to development
- Strengthen ongoing efforts to continuously ensure optimal “skills- mix” in country offices, including working on staff development of staff whose skills is particularly specialised from working mainly in either development or humanitarian contexts
- UNICEF manages 4 humanitarian clusters. Country offices express that at times the role as provider of last resort can involve a need for improved support from the Headquarters, or from regional offices
- Feedback on M/E differs from country to country. In Zimbabwe and Liberia it is mentioned that there is a need for a more systematic approach in monitoring and evaluation. In Somalia and Sudan feedback on M/E is much more favourable
- In countries with rapidly growing programmes, the core funding becomes insignificant in terms of supporting the office. UNICEF could examine possibilities of internal pool mechanisms to address some of the challenges
- It is a widespread perception that UNICEF often “go-it-alone”. There are also good examples of the opposite; still UNICEF could work on becoming a stronger partner in sector coordination, and in the coordination of overall aid responses

UNFPA

- UNFPA does not have a fragile state approach. If the organisation is going to continue working in these contexts, then UNFPA should work towards developing a framework as well as strengthen the internal strategic discussions on approaches of how to operate in fragile contexts at country level
- UNFPA should probably revisit operational procedures and introduce a larger degree of flexibility in the rules and regulations, e.g. possibilities of cash to partners
- In Sudan the work on the Census has drawn a lot of attention. Feedback is that technically UNFPA did a good job. However there is criticism of how the organisation handled the political aftermath. Respondents are very vague in outlining what UNFPA could have done, but given the risk of “blame games” UNFPA could consider summarising “lessons learned” from the census process, for the broader aid community
- Respondents note that UNFPA could take a stronger role as leaders on the work on maternal health
- UNFPA could work on strengthening its M/E function
- UNFPA could consider strengthening its engagement in coordination with international actors within as well as outside the UN
- UNFPA could work on improving the organisations visibility in fragile and post conflict settings.
During the study it was found that the role of donors and donor behaviour are perceived to be important elements when assessing the UN in Fragile and Post Conflict states. Findings include:

- It is crucial for donors to maintain reason and realism when defining objectives for international interventions. Pursuing too much compared to existing funding or capacity may eventually create disappointment and frustration – and end up doing harm.

- “Staying engaged” is crucial, if trust between aid partners and local communities is to be built up and consolidated. This is a challenge, when funding priorities shift from one country to another (e.g. a sudden onset crisis). It is important that donors accept that continuity and patience are as crucial in fragile states as in “traditional development contexts”.

- It is important for donors to recognise the links between political, security and development objectives, and to be loyal partners in alleviating the tension that at times come out between humanitarian, development, political, and security agendas and approaches. Examples from Somalia and Zimbabwe illustrate the risks and the need for caution when trying to push political agendas through (multilateral) development assistance.

- There are needs for stronger Donor-presence in the four countries including stronger donor coordination. This would allow donors to have a more coherent and strategic dialogue with Government as well as to hold the UN partners to task.

- It was found that there is room for donors to increase the cooperation with the UN system in developing common positions and approaches. In some instances Donor representations at country level had a relatively limited background for working with UN partners. An increased focus on governments strategies with– and commitments and obligations towards the UN system could perhaps be useful.

- A particular set of comments relate to Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) and the World Bank. Feedback on the experiences from particularly Liberia and Southern Sudan indicate that there still is some way to go before the obstacles that have reduced the efficiency of MDTFs are solved. At the overall level it seems that there is a need to revisit designs and architecture of MDTFs and at country level this may imply a stronger engagement from bilateral donors. At the same time it underlines the importance of maintaining some level of direct funding to UN organisations, UN Joint programmes and NGOs to ensure a continued delivery of peace dividends, to avoid loss of momentum and relapse into conflict.
INTRODUCTION

Since 2005 the responsibility for Denmark’s cooperation with UN Funds and Programmes has been decentralized from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the respective multilateral missions. The Permanent Mission to the UN in New York (“the UN Mission”) is responsible for Denmark’s cooperation with UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA.

Fragile states and countries coming out of conflict have increasingly become part of the debates on international relations and international policy. Within the international aid debates, this has increased focus on how to bring about cooperation between humanitarian, recovery, development-oriented and diplomatic approaches, as well as issues of addressing national, regional and global security by strengthening international engagement in fragile states.

Given that Denmark has a relatively limited direct presence in fragile and post-conflict settings, its engagement in this field is largely being carried out in close cooperation with multilateral partners, including the UN-system. This increased attention to the role of the UN system in fragile and post-conflict settings therefore has a direct bearing on the cooperation between the UN Mission and the New York-based Funds and Programmes.

OBJECTIVE

The specific objective of the present Study is to assess the engagement of some of Denmark’s key partners; providing international assistance within the relatively broad umbrella of post conflict and fragile states. The Study assesses the engagement of UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA, based on their programmes in Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia.

The purpose of the study is to provide input for the UN Mission, in its ongoing dialogue and cooperation with the three organisations, including to the UN Mission’s participation in the work of the Executive Boards, informal donor coordination and the day to day cooperation with the three agencies. The Study findings and information may also assist the UN Mission in its contributions to strategic considerations on the role of the UN in interventions in Post Conflict situations and Fragile States. This will assist the UN Mission in its contributions to the continued development of Denmark’s cooperation with the UN in fragile and post conflict settings.

Specifically the Study provides the UN Mission with practical references illustrating the strengths and the challenges that the organisations are faced with in implementing policies and programmes at field level in Post Conflict and Fragile States. Focus is on the three organisations and on “on-the-ground-delivery”. Broader discussions on the many cross cutting issues of international engagement in fragile and post conflict settings, e.g. different approaches to supporting governance, human rights, gender issues etc. In these contexts, are only included in the sense they have been referred to on an agency specific basis by respondents.

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1 The UN Secretary General’s report on ”Peace building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict” from 2009, outlines some of the key challenges involved in the increased focus on interventions in fragile and post conflict settings and the role of the UN.

2 In September 2010 the Danish Government launched its new strategy for engagement in Fragile States (in Danish): “Fred og stabilisering Danmarks politik for indsatser i skøbelige stater: 2010-2015”. The strategy highlights i.a. the importance of Denmark’s engagement with – and support to multilateral partners in developing more efficient interventions in fragile states.

3 The Terms of Reference are attached to the Study in annex no. 1
METHODOLOGY

The major part of the Study consists of feedback from face-to-face interviews. The interviews were qualitative and participatory, and lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions along lines of “Advantages” and “Challenges” of the organisations’ engagement in the respective countries⁴. In addition the study draws on online survey of data and literature, and relevant documents⁵.

The format of the interviews aimed at allowing the respondents to comment on their own perceptions of “Advantages” and “Challenges”, within a set of overall questions. This allowed for relatively free replies rather than leaning towards a model of pre-defined options. As such the findings of the study draw on an interpretation of the “perceptions” of the respondents, rather than on quantifiable data reflecting the relevance and effectiveness of the organisations.

The feedback from the interviews forms the basis for four country papers structured along the above mentioned lines of “Advantages” and “Challenges”. The organisation-specific findings are drawn from these four papers. Respondent quotes are included to illustrate specific points-of-view provided on a given issue. To the extent possible, the findings presented in this report have been – if not triangulated then “double-checked” - by restating questions and issues to different stakeholders.

The main limitation of the approach is that it is based on a survey of “perceptions” and not an actual analysis of the behaviours, systems and procedures. As such the findings can provide a picture of advantages and challenges; but not a deep insight into the different dimensions of organisational effectiveness.

The Study presents findings and - where possible - recommendations linked to the findings, particularly emphasising challenges and opportunities for on-the-ground delivery. The findings of the Study are outlined in individual chapters per organisation. Some additional comments are included in the last chapter on “Findings and Comments”.

Respondents to the Study includes representatives from the three organisations in the four countries as well as in New York, UN officials in the four countries, donor representatives in the four countries as well as representatives from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen and New York, NGO and civil society representatives in the four countries, and Government officials in Liberia and Southern Sudan.

The respondents were identified as individuals or representatives of institutions that would have an expert opinion or a stakeholder interest in the organisations in the target countries. In practice the sampling of the respondents was based on feedback from the Danish embassies or representations in the four countries, from the organisations Headquarters in New York, from the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, and from additional persons met during the study in the four countries.

Most respondents in the field requested, that quotes and statements could not be attributed to them personally in the final report, this has been respected throughout the Study’s reference system⁷. The presentation of findings therefore

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⁴ An outline of the line of questioning is attached in annexes 6 and 7
⁵ Documents have been provided by the three organisations, MFA in Copenhagen, the Danish UN Mission in New York and relevant embassies. A list of references is attached in annex no. 8
⁶ The four country studies are attached in annexes 2,3,4 & 5
⁷ A list of respondents are attached in annex no. 10
tends to be finding common ground between the feedbacks received. It is acknowledged that this is a limitation on the findings, as it does not allow for distinguishing between different categories of stakeholders and how they may differ in their perceptions of the three UN agencies' work.

The study included interviews in New York over the period 17.05 – 28.05. Field visits to Monrovia, Nairobi, Juba, and Harare were undertaken over the period 30.05 – 28.06. According to the Terms of Reference Somalia was to be covered as a desk study, but as it became possible to include interviews with key stakeholders involved in international assistance to Somalia in Nairobi, this was included.8

CONTEXT

Introduction
The Study assesses the engagement of the three organisations in four countries: Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The choice of countries reflects a continued and growing interest of developments in Africa in the Danish aid debates. The four countries constitute different types of the transitional environments characterising post conflict and fragile states.

Liberia
Focus is on the gradual transition from peacekeeping, recovery and peace-building to development and the possible contribution, comparative advantages and future roles of the three organisations.

National strategies
The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) is the national development framework. The present strategy covers the period 2008 – 2011. The PRS is based on four pillars: Enhancing Security, Promoting Economic Recovery, Strengthening Governance and Rule of Law, and developing Infrastructure and Basic Services.

UN Strategic Framework
The UN operated in a humanitarian mode throughout the crisis, under a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). A Post-Conflict Needs Assessment was made in 2003 by UNDG and the World Bank. Since 2007 the UN has been operating under an UNDAF, which is linked to the PRS.

UN Country Structure
The UN is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). UN is working under an integrated framework with good examples of cooperation between the “UN-Mission” (UNMIL) and the UN Country team (UNCT). The UN framework is well functioning. UN in Liberia is working towards becoming a “self starter” under the “Delivery as One” umbrella. There are examples of pooled funding and joint programmes, but the organisations are mainly working with separate funding.

Somalia
Focus is on the continuous attempts of stabilisation in a situation characterised by ongoing conflict and humanitarian interventions, with a particular view of how the organisations are engaging with other key international actors.

National strategies
In the absence of a national development strategy, the “Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)" was drafted as the main framework for the international support for Somalia. The RDP was envisaged as the key document for a possible international donor conference for Somalia; however such a

8 An outline of meetings and itinerary is attached in annex no. 9.
conference has not yet taken place. The RDP is presently in the process of a midterm review.

**UN Strategic Framework**
The UN has been exempted from developing an UNDAF in Somalia. In 2008 the “UN Transition Plan for Somalia” (UNTP) became the UN’s plan for supporting the RDP. In parallel the UNCT aimed at utilising the UNTP development process to adopt aspects of the UN’s “Delivering as One” agenda. The results were mixed, and the UNTP is presently being revised into becoming the United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy (UNSAS), which will link to the revised RDP.

**UN Country Structure**
The head of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) serves as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. The UN country team in Somalia is headed by the Resident Coordinator, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator and Designated Official for Security. The relationship between the DPA led UNPOS and the UNCT is reported to be complicated, and Integration appears to be “a sure point”. The UNSAS is developed jointly by the UNCT and UNPOS, and may be a step towards an Integrated Strategic Framework. There are examples of pooled funding and joint programmes, but the organisations are mainly working with separate funding.

**Southern Sudan**
Focus is on the ongoing Post Conflict interventions in the south, with a particular view to how the three organisations are engaging in the very volatile situation at present.

**National strategies**
There is not a PRSP or another overall strategic frame that’s commonly respected by all partners in Southern Sudan. The main document guiding development planning and international aid is still the report that was produced by a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in 2005. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) is in the process of producing a development plan (*the Growth Strategy*); with a view to provide a stronger medium-term strategic focus.

**UN Strategic Framework**
The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan covers the period 2009 – 2012. It is formulated in line with the Five Year Strategic Plan of the Government of National Unity (2007-2011) as well as the Government of Southern Sudan’s three-year Budget Sector Plan of the (2008-2010). Neither of these plans is assessed to have any practical bearing in Southern Sudan. Stakeholders note that the UNDAF as well as the national strategies will be less and less practical or useful as the referendum in 2011 is approaching.

**UN Country Structure**
The UN is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Since the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN has been working under an Integrated Mission. UNMIS and all UN entities and agencies are operating in Sudan on the basis of “one country - two programmes”, with their country Headquarter in Khartoum and an office for Southern Sudan in Juba. It is the impression that full integration of the UN (between UNMIS and UNCT) has not been achieved. A shift in the UN structure must be expected after the referendum on the future status of Southern Sudan in 2011. There are examples of pooled funding and joint programmes, but the organisations are mainly working with separate funding.

**Zimbabwe**
Focus is on the gradual transition from humanitarian crisis to recovery, with a particular
view on how the three organisations are engaging in a difficult political environment.

**National strategies**
The Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was set up to be an interim programme mainly targeting the stabilisation of the economy. The programme was designed to cover the period February to December 2009. Its successor, the Mid Term Plan (MTP), is still in the process of being finalised.

**UN Strategic Framework**
It was reported that the UNDAF (2007 – 2011) was largely overtaken by events as the crisis accelerated, and subsequently has become less relevant. The UN and the Government cooperates on developing a new UNDAF (2012 – 2015), in which UN interventions are increasingly following the government’s budget priorities. In terms of the timing of the preparation of the new UNDAF, it was however noted, that respondents felt that it would be preferred if the preparations of the new UNDAF could be postponed, so that it could be aligned with the preparation of the Mid-Term-Plan.

**UN Country Structure**
The UN in Zimbabwe is headed by the Resident Coordinator (RC). The UNCT appears to be generally well functioning, however with some disagreements between humanitarian and development partners, and the UNCT does not appear as if it has a very strategic approach. A number of UN agencies have moved to the same “office park” in Harare – but there are very few other common services. There are examples of pooled funding and joint programmes, but the organisations are mainly working with separate funding.

**UNDP**

**Introduction**
In UNDP’s Strategy for 2008-2011 four strategic outcomes; poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development, forms the basis for the implementation of its mandate, working towards the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore UNDP plays a key role in coordinating the UN’s development system through the Resident Coordinators.

The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is the lead for UNDPs engagement in crisis prevention and recovery. BCPR’s overall mission is advancing peace and development by strengthening capacities to prevent and recover from crisis. Since its establishment in 2001, BCPR has grown significantly in response to a growing demand on UNDP and the UN system in general, for improved support to preventing and responding to crises. Under the humanitarian reform UNDP has the cluster lead on “Early Recovery”.

**Mandate**
*Activity portfolio compares with mandate and organisational strategies in conflict states*
UNDP is perceived to “stick to the mandate”. Its programme portfolio in all four countries falls within the organisations global approaches to post conflict interventions and interventions in fragile states. A broader outline of the portfolio is included in the country annexes.

As such there have not been any comments on UNDP trying to expand activities beyond the mandate. It is acknowledged that the organisation often take on responsibilities as a “provider of last resort”. In Southern Sudan UNDP is administering various pooled funds (i.e. the Sudan Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)) through the “Fund Management Unit”, and in
Zimbabwe – and to some extent in Somalia – UNDP is being asked to undertake highly politicised activities: In Somalia through a strongly donor driven cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government, and in Zimbabwe UNDP appears to be under an extraordinary pressure from donors in taking on an additional role as the channel / the broker for the international community’s political dialogue with Zimbabwe.

Advantages and Relevance

An important partner
The overall finding is, that UNDP plays a key role in fragile and post conflict states, and that the organisation should further consolidate and scale up its capacities in these states.

UNDP’s presence in all four countries predates the present crises, and the organisation has been present and operational in the countries since. In situations where bilateral government to government aid partnerships are not an option; UNDP and the other UN organisations are key partners in the country. The UN has access in a way that no other international actor has, and main donors including bilateral, the European Commission, and the World Bank, draw on UN-implementation of assistance. In the absence of functioning government institutions, UNDP has been the main development actor in all four countries, for instance in Somalia, where UNDP is presently the only organisation that can take on the role on supporting Governance programmes, e.g. basic support to civil service development in Mogadishu.

In general UNDP are perceived positively by relevant line ministries and other Government representatives.

Based on context and aligned with national strategies and UN priorities

State building and taking the context as a starting point

Respondents acknowledge that UNDP’s role is more interlinked with the “Political realm” than other UN agencies, and that the organisation therefore has unique role in building governance - at national and local levels - in post-conflict countries. As such, UNDPs program profile is particularly important when it comes to the international community’s engagement in political and governance aspects. Consequently UNDPs work is typically measured more directly against donors’ stated political objectives than other UN partners; hence UNDP is subject to a different level of scrutiny. This has proven important in all the countries, where the direct donor interaction often is with individual donor representatives - where the political brief at times is more important than the aid brief.

Overall UNDPs strategic framework in the four countries is assessed to be relevant a) by focusing on needs and priorities as defined by the government and b) by developing pragmatic operational modalities allowing for development-aid to be implemented. For instance: In all four countries UNDP operates through Direct Execution (DEX) ⁹, while trying to link as much as possible to the governments or local priorities and implementing agreed components, but doing it by funding service providers directly. This includes modalities (e.g. in Somalia) where UNDP enters into Letters of Agreement (LOA) with Governments and Regional authorities. This is perceived as a pragmatic form of support to State-building.

Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts

The four countries offer different types of national strategies and different modalities through which international partners can align with national priorities. General feedback is that

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⁹ UNDP Executes directly rather than through national counterparts (national execution or NEX).
UNDP is pragmatic, which enables the organisation to align its programmes with the relevant instruments, in the different contexts\textsuperscript{10}. In Liberia UNDP’s programme is aligned with the Poverty Reduction Strategy and a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

In Somalia UNDPs programs and projects draw on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)\textsuperscript{11}, and on the UN Transitional Programme (there is no UNDAF in Somalia).

In Southern Sudan the Government is in the process of producing a development-plan (the Growth Strategy). For the time being it is the Joint Assessment Mission report from 2005, which forms the basis together with the UNDAF – and with which UNDP aligns.

In Zimbabwe a Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was set up to be an interim programme mainly targeting the stabilisation of the economy. The UN and the Government are cooperating on developing an UNDAF for the period 2012 – 2015. UNDP’s programme is largely aligned with these.

**Challenges and Effectiveness**

*Perceived effectiveness in interventions*

*Engagement with Government and execution*

In all four countries it’s reported that there is a good dialogue with Government, and in all four countries UNDP has a role as a proxy in the collaboration between Government and donors.

It is noted that UNDP could expand this cooperation throughout programming.

- UNDP could work towards more Government participation in the selection of activities, the implementation and as part of the ongoing monitoring and evaluation.

Overall budget support is not an option in the four countries, and it is well understood and considered appropriate among respondents to be working through a DEX-modality. However, it is the feedback from stakeholders, that there is a need to gradually increase government involvement, in order to achieve sustainability.

- UNDP could continue developing the modalities for an incremental shift from DEX to NEX.

- It will be important that such a shift ensures appropriate elements of efficiency and accountability. UNDP could probably benefit from producing basic information material underlining these concerns towards stakeholders, notably donors.

**Implementation**

Given relatively weak government capacities and the typical aid architecture in Fragile and Post Conflict States, the study shows that there is a high risk for UNDP to be seen as “a provider of last resort” and will be expected from Government as well as from donors to undertake a very broad portfolio. This can include a wide range of interventions, including politically charged interventions as well as the management of broad funding mechanisms:

In Somalia UNDPs engagement in “Democratic Governance” and “Security Sector Reform” are heavily impacted by UNDP’s role as administering stipends to cover TFG costs. UNDP has been asked by donors to cover TFG costs. This has involved serious accountability problems as well as security problems for UNDP in Somalia as they are associated with support for the TFG. Donors report that the problems encountered are not UNDPs fault.
“They have done it, they were the best to do it, it was not voluntary; they were forced / pushed by donors. It is a challenge for UNDP to be provider of last resort”12.

The feedback on UNDP’s “Fund Management” differs between stakeholders. In Southern Sudan the donors criticise UNDP’s management of the Sudan Recovery Fund for being slow, whereas the NGOs receiving the support appears to be less critical. NGOs acknowledge that the Fund steering modalities often are flawed with unclear responsibilities between Government, donors and the Fund Manager – and that “…the donor criticism of UNDP is connected to the problems of being the provider of last resort…”

Whereas the study does not make an argument for UNDP to disengage from these activities;

• it makes a case for UNDP and donors to revisit what should be expected from UNDP and introduce a stronger agenda of focussing of UNDP’s activities.

In Liberia and Sudan UNDP receives positive feedback on its attempts of “capacity building” through temporary engagement of Diaspora and regional experts. “It’s practical and linked to reality (context)”. But its temporary; and it’s important to focus more on strengthening national capacities. In all four countries it is noted that capacity building interventions often focus at a strategic level (e.g. drafting overall policies and plans), even if at times more hands on support could be more useful.

• UNDP could develop its approaches to increasingly also include practical public sector management tools.

Respondents, particularly donors, noted that capacity building should be time-bound. This, it was argued, could ensure better coordination with government and place national development priorities at the centre of the work. It will also give meaning to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action.

• The case was made for concrete timelines and exit strategies to be drawn up, already in the very early stages of the recovery, to allow fragile states and post-conflict countries to assume greater responsibility for managing national affairs.

• It was however also noted, that there is a need that timelines as well as exit strategies take into consideration not only the technical capacity of national governments, but also mechanisms in national systems for maintaining transparency and efficiency in the use of national and donor resources, thereby ensuring that capacity building initiatives are designed to strengthen and promote accountability and efficiency.

Donors express concern whether UNDP has been strong enough in making a stand against governments in connection with issues of human rights or needs for political reform; “They are not brave enough”13. UNDP on their side reports that the dialogue with governments (in all four countries) is intense “and tough”, but that there is a need for them to work closely with the Government, to be cautious, and not to be seen as taking sides, i.e. criticism has to be given “quietly”.

“Not brave enough” would seem as a relevant criticism of UNDP, if the organisation is not taking on the responsibility of upholding international conventions and agreements. However, it must be noted, that this has not been a prominent issue during the study.

12 Donor representative in Nairobi. Similar feedback was received from several donors.

13 Donor representative
On the other hand, there is a need to be cautious when it comes to issues of “pushing” UNDP as “an ally” with donors on political issues, e.g. pushing the reform agenda in Zimbabwe, or supporting the TFG in Somalia with stipends. The donor argument for doing so is that the UN actually has access to the Government. The opposite argument would be that it is in the interest of the international community, that the UN maintains this access, by maintaining its neutrality and by interpreting its role carefully. The issue of donor approaches is discussed further in the last chapter on page 29.

Where-ever the balance is on these issues; it appears that there is room for improving UNDPs communication with donors on such issues.

- UNDP could revisit its communication strategy at country level, maybe by including communications posts.

In Zimbabwe the situation has been aggravated by a general donor mistrust to the previous UNDP representative and RC. As a consequence donors also have concerns whether UNDP is responsive towards their sensitivities and represent donor views correctly in the dialogue with government – whether UNDP is an “honest broker”. It could seem as if UNDP Headquarters in New York could have played a different role in solving the issue of the RC in Zimbabwe, at an earlier stage, thereby helped in preventing the negative situation in escalating.

- UNDP could look at developing a stronger outreach / dialogue with the country offices on matters like this, e.g. through the Regional Bureau for Africa or BCPR.

UNDP has relatively strong strategic frameworks, in early recovery, (e.g. economic recovery, extension of state authority, support to local authorities, the rule of law and security, etc) as seen in Zimbabwe where the organisation has produced very good analytical documents on early recovery. There are also very good examples of Conflict Prevention and Recovery Interventions, e.g. the “Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC)” in Southern Sudan.

However, UNDP experiences and approaches are reported to typically be based on development work in more stable circumstances. The overall feedback is that UNDP, in addition to its ongoing work in conflicts, still needs to strengthen its capacity in transition / recovery. It is the perception that there could be a need for UNDP to develop more flexible and innovative approaches. This could assist in developing activities that better addresses needs in post conflict settings.

- UNDP could work towards more flexible guiding- and financial principles when developing community-based recovery programs, while maintaining acceptable standards of accountability.

In addition to approaches and procedures, this is also a question of “staffing”. Country offices have concerns of understaffing in a context of increasing expectations, but capacity challenges are also linked to experiences among existing staff.

- UNDP could strengthen its focus on whether the skills-mix in the office is geared to accommodate the types of interventions that the situation requires in fragile and post conflict settings.

“Monitoring and Evaluation” continues to be a challenge. It must be noted that monitoring is challenging in all four countries due to security rules and limited access. Still donors note that

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14 Some respondents note that the latest set of Fast-Track procedures for crisis response, may be a good step in this direction.
UNDP typically report on output level. It is also the impression that UNDP should be better in reporting or in sharing information when there are problems.

- UNDP could improve on this, e.g. by including specific M/E staff in the office.

**UNDP Headquarters and BCPR**

It is noted that following a Strategic Review of BCPR earlier this year, the Bureau is presently in the process of implementing a series of recommendations from the Review. It is acknowledged that these transformations very likely will address a number of the challenges identified in the study, including strengthened programming and policy advice towards post conflict and fragile states. Still, as the implementation of these changes had not yet commenced in any measurable scale at country level at the time of the study (the new structure is scheduled to be effective by January 2011), the key findings of the study are summarised in the following.

UNDP’s Headquarters / regional offices should be better in assisting country offices in developing transition / recovery interventions. It is the impression that the support from the “Bureau for Development Policies” (BDP) is mainly geared towards “traditional” development programmes rather than fragile and post conflict settings.

The “Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery” (BCPR) is reported to be good at sending missions with a view to analyse needs and situations. Still BCPR is perceived as being largely a HQ entity, with no core staff in the field. Even if BCPR has been involved in proposals, projects, and strategies and have provided seed funding, it is noted that BCPR still need to improve on assisting country offices in operationalising the analysis into policy and action.

This is the case under the Rule of law programme in Somalia, where UNDP Headquarters face problems supporting the engagement: Somalia is NOT a priority for UNDPs development branches, and UNDP Somalia receives limited support from the regional office. Somalia is a priority of BCPR; however BCPR needs to have stronger hands-on experts that can support and guide in transforming programme concepts into activities work. The same challenges are faced in transition contexts, notably in Zimbabwe, where respondents found that BCPR could be more visible and assist the UNCT in developing a more UN wide approach to Transition.

There is some criticism among (particularly) NGOs of UNDPs Global Cluster Lead on Early Recovery. It is described as not so strong in the field, and essentially Headquarter based.

Enhanced roles of BCPR could involve:

- BCPR could strengthen its role as a body hosting the practical understanding of existing “Best Practices” on e.g. Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law, and perhaps being able to assist UNs challenges on dealing with “Impunity”.

- BCPR could play a stronger role in supporting the development of programme management tools for fragile contexts, e.g. basic baselines, practical “peace indicators” from the outset in the results framework as well as allowing for flexible monitoring system that caters for changes in the context.

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15 BCPR is currently working with Zimbabwe as a priority country. A Multi Year Framework is being designed to assist the CO and the UNCT, in the implementation of recovery and governance priorities, to be aligned with the new UNDAF

16 The strategic review of BCPR from March 2010 offers a range of important suggestions for improvement. Whereas these suggestions form part of the background for the present Study, the findings reported are as mentioned earlier based on the feedback received during interviews.
• Situations, like for instance Southern Sudan, require presence over some time: There is a need to better understand the drivers of local conflicts, this takes time. BCPR could work on having a roster of seasoned staff to send out on longer term assignments.

• BCPR could play a role in identifying (providing?) staff with better skills-mix and inputs to more “innovative interventions”, to insert into offices in order to complement UNDPs development profile with recovery and transition skills.

The overall feedback is that the role of BCPR is crucial for UNDP to be able to pursue its global strategic outcomes in crisis prevention and recovery. It’s the perception among respondents, that within UNDP there is a need to further clarify how to integrate / mainstream the role and mandate of BCPR into the organisations work in fragile and post conflict settings.\(^{17}\)

Planning of aid aiming at peace building in the complex dynamics of conflicts in countries like Somalia; is a strong example of the importance of understanding - and addressing – the local level challenges / crisis drivers. A strengthened BCPR – and an increased clarity of how UNDP can use the capacities of BCPR in conflict settings - could lift the quality of UNDPs interventions in crisis.

• UNDP should clarify roles and mandates, including elevating BCPRs strategic role within the organisation, if UNDP will consolidate, scale up, and develop its role in Fragile and Post Conflict States.

Aid coordination and UN cooperation

**Participation in aid coordination**

Generally UNDP participates in relevant coordination efforts; this is particularly done through the RC. UN representatives and donors note, that there is a need for additional resources for the RC-function. For instance in Somalia, where a strengthened RCO is i.a. required for continued support to the field based RCO’s in Somaliland and Puntland. In Zimbabwe the recommendation of support to better communication has been made.

**Cooperation with UN security and political actors, incl. on “Integration”**

In Liberia UNDP is committed to work towards increased cooperation with other UN partners including UNMIl, and has been supportive towards UN Integration

In Somalia the relationship between the DPA led UNPOS and the UNCT is very complicated. UNDP works closely with UNPOS, but like most UNCT partners do not work towards, in the short or medium term, a structural integration of the UN in Somalia. There are concerns that in case of an accelerated Integration of the UN in Somalia, UNPOS is not geared to expand its role further beyond policy analysis. An Integrated Task Force (ITF) on Somalia is presently working on recommendations for the UN’s future work in Somalia, including on integration.

In Southern Sudan respondents commented that increased integration of the UN (understood as further consolidating the linkages between UNMIS and UNCT including UNDP in Southern Sudan) has been a challenge. It is the impression among several donors, that there has been some level of competition between UNMIS and UNDP, but that it is being addressed.

\(^{17}\) The ongoing process of concentrating BCPR functions in New York also reflects that these issues are acknowledged within UNDP.
Whether this is more pronounced in Southern than Northern Sudan is not clear. There are weekly Security Management Team meetings, organised by UNMIS, still UNCT members mention that UNMIS should be more visible in other parts of UNCT cooperation.

There is no DPA / DPKO mission in Zimbabwe

Approach to joint programming and UN coordination (e.g. DaO)
In Liberia UNDP is active in pursuing the Delivery as One Agenda. UNDP is committed to participating in the Joint Programmes and the UN Representative (and RC/DSRG) is instrumental in pursuing the agenda. UNDP is actively participating in several joint programmes.

In Somalia UNDP was instrumental in developing the UN’s Transition Programme for Somalia – i.e. the UN’s plan for supporting the RDP. In parallel the UNCT aimed at utilising the UNTP development process to adopt aspects of the UN’s “Delivering as One” agenda, whereby UN Agencies, Funds and Programs in Somalia would work more closely together. UNDP is also very active in the joint programme on Local Governance.

Somalia represents a particular set of challenges for UNDP in UN coordination: UNDP implements various programs in support of the TFG, including administrating and dispersing stipends for police officers and civil servants. This direct support to the TFG has generated a divide between some humanitarian agencies and UNDP and made a divide in the UNCT along lines of Humanitarian – Development. At the same time UNDP works well with humanitarian agencies in regions outside TFG control and in a number of programmatic areas.

In Southern Sudan the discussions in the UNCT in Southern Sudan are reported to be cordial, but very often focussed on “turning out fires”. It is reported that the relationship between the RCO in Southern Sudan and the UNMIS Office in Southern Sudan is strained, and that there is a need to improve the cooperation between the two. Delivery as One is not in the plans in Southern Sudan. Through its Fund Management Unit, UNDP manages several joint funds, incl. the CHF and the SRF.

In Zimbabwe coordination in the UNCT has been turbulent. This reflects the challenges stemming from the drastic change in the UN’s agenda towards more and more humanitarian activities in line with the deterioration of the economic downturn and political polarization, hence a between the relative role of humanitarian and development partners. Furthermore the former UNDP Resident Coordinator and Resident Coordinator was under severe criticism from the donor community: That he was seen as being too close to the Government. Respondents stressed that this argument has to be balanced against an argument of the need for the UN senior official to try to keep a continuous dialogue between the ZANU-PF and the donor community, in what has been a very critical and difficult environment. Zimbabwe does not have a UN mission nor have the UN worked on Delivery as One. UNDP is participating in various Joint programmes, including the Expanded Support to HIV and AIDS Response.

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19 These programs are strongly donor driven, ref. also P. 29 of the Study

20 The crisis culminated with the violent elections in 2008. Following the “Global Political Agreement (GPA)” that was signed in September 2008, and leading to the Transitional Inclusive Government being inaugurated in February 2009, the country has since gone through a slow and gradual shift from humanitarian crisis to recovery.
UNICEF

Introduction
UNICEF’s mandate contains a development and a humanitarian “pillar”. Under its overall framework, the Medium Term Strategic Plan (MSTP), the development pillar aims at supporting the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, and ensuring an effective contribution to poverty reduction, particularly targeting sustained investments in children’s survival, development and protection. Under the humanitarian pillar UNICEF is involved in emergency and humanitarian interventions, targeting immediate emergency response as well as protracted emergency interventions. Under the humanitarian reform, UNICEF has the cluster lead on 4 clusters: Nutrition, Education (with SCF) WASH and Child protection.

UNICEF does not have a specific policy, strategy, or in-house structure with a particular mandate for interventions in fragile and post conflict states. The organisations approach to these contexts consists of a mix of the two pillars, underlining that focus on social sectors is an essential part of peace building.

Mandate
Activity portfolio compares with mandate and organisational strategies in conflict states
UNICEF has focus on children, youth and vulnerability throughout the programmes in all four countries. The country programmes places emphasis on education, protection and health, and as such they fall within UNICEF’s global approach and mandate.

Whereas UNICEF increasingly is working “upstream” in all four countries, by assisting administrations and communities in strengthening policy development and planning, the organisation has managed to maintain its strong humanitarian capacities to provide response in line with how the situation develops.

Advantages and Relevance
An important partner
The general feedback from donors and governments is that UNICEF is a highly valued partner in fragile and post conflict settings. Several donors mention that this is linked to a general feeling of capacity and ability to deliver, and that internal flexibility between humanitarian and development interventions allows for continued relevance. It comes out, that it is important that UNICEF’s agenda is linked to a clear mandate and less directly linked to political reform agendas.

UNICEF was present in all four countries before the crises erupted, and the organisation has been continuously active in the countries since then. In Somalia UNICEF is the international organization with the largest presence. In Sudan the importance of the humanitarian interventions before and after the CPA should not be underestimated, in particular UNICEF’s leadership of the Operation Lifeline Sudan.

Given that direct implementation of bilateral assistance in the four countries is not an option, the presence of UNICEF – and its UN partners – is crucial for the international community’s ability to deliver support. The Government counterparts express general satisfaction and appreciation of UN presence and programmes, and UNICEF is perceived positively in the various line ministries.

Based on context and aligned with national strategies and UN priorities
State building and taking the context as a starting point
It is a general feedback that UNICEF’s work in education gives it a particular strength within the state building that is so crucial in fragile and post conflict states. Within education UNICEF is typically involved in rehabilitation and
reconstruction of classrooms, building up of quality in the primary education sector through teacher training and provision of teaching and learning materials as well as in supporting Ministries of Education e.g. in developing their management systems and sector policies. UNICEF has a special focus on girls, and is also involved in addressing issues of reaching those out-of-school and the most marginalized (nomads, IDPs, etc.).

In Liberia it was repeatedly noted that given the organisations involvement in the educations sector throughout the crisis, there is a good knowledge of the challenges, and interventions are appropriate. In Sudan UNICEF’s “go back to school campaign” receives strong support from donors and other stakeholders. It is the “main peace dividend that UNICEF has provided; it’s at scale – it’s nationwide”. In Zimbabwe UNICEF and the Ministry of Education has designed an Educations Transition Fund, allowing for international support to large scale, national interventions in the sector. This is considered a pragmatic and effective approach to state building.

State building in Somalia is particularly challenging. UNICEF has reportedly success in implementing long-term rehabilitation and development efforts together with the two administrations in the North, including support to the establishment of public-private partnerships within water supply, between local authorities / village councils and private entrepreneurs. In the South / Central areas where local administrations are much weaker, UNICEF implements more humanitarian projects in close collaboration with local and international partners and in conjunction with local communities.

Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
The four countries have different types of national strategies to align with. In all the countries UNICEF has a recent history of relatively large scale humanitarian interventions, where alignment with national strategies has played a lesser role. Whereas there is room for increased “upstream” interventions in UNICEF, with more focus on policy, strategy, and support to authorities, it’s noted that UNICEF receives positive feedback from line ministries; that the organisation is developing and strengthening its cooperation with governments.

In Liberia UNICEF receives high marks on its alignment with the Ministries. UNICEFs country programme is agreed jointly by the Government and UNICEF; it is based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy as well as on the UNDAF.

In Somalia overall planning (national as well as international) is weak. In Somaliland and Puntland the feedback is that UNICEF does align with the priorities of the regional administrations and the local communities, and in the South and Central areas UNICEF is reported to be strong in identifying, prioritising, and pursuing the most important / urgent needs. It is reported that UNICEF gets positive feedback from Somali authorities.

In Sudan UNICEF’s strong humanitarian past in OLS has meant that there have been good dialogue with the then SPLM – now GoSS, but that essentially it was UNICEF driving the aid agenda. This is reportedly changing and there is much more dialogue, generating strong ownership to the outcomes. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation explain that whereas UNICEF has facilitated the process of drafting and finalising the policy on water, “it’s the Ministry and its partners that have formulated the strategy”.

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In Zimbabwe; UNICEF and various ministries have developed a “National Programme in Support of Orphans and Vulnerable Children”. The programme involves a Pooled Fund which allows for channelling donor support to vulnerable children without access to education, thereby providing an arrangement of ‘shadow alignment’ with government priorities and systems.

Challenges and Effectiveness

Perceived effectiveness in interventions
Engagement with Government and execution

In the recent MOPAN analysis the main criticism of UNICEF is that the organisation has an inadequate use of country systems, i.e., the extent to which the organisation uses government systems for procurement, audit, financial reporting, and other procedures.

This viewpoint is reflected in part of the feedback during the study. In Sudan some donors emphasise that the bulk of basic social services are still delivered by international partners and linking this to comments that UNICEF led OLS, and has had problems getting out of the humanitarian mode. It’s noted that UNICEF could work harder on including Government in e.g. supervision, monitoring and implementation. On procurement Governments acknowledges limited capacities, but they would like to hear more about specifications, prices and what is actually done.

But this is not fully descriptive of the feedback: The Education Pooled Fund in Zimbabwe is reported to have improved government - donor collaboration, which has helped the Ministry of Education to undertake Sector Reviews and policy revisions as well as providing the Ministry with funds to construct and equip education facilities. As such this capacity to develop pooled funding modalities can be seen as one way to move towards more sector wide approaches.

Similarly in Liberia where UNICEF supports the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare with staff and recurrent costs – often in the form of projects that are being implemented by ministry staff.

Whereas this allows some degree of “testing the government machinery”, without bilateral donors being involved in direct budget support, some donors in Liberia raise concerns of the sustainability of such arrangements: They note that there are risks that the ministries will not be able to sustain the staffing and activity level this generates.

Feedback from ministry representatives in Liberia and Sudan recognises that there are major capacity-problems in government, that there will be a need for external technical assistance for several years to come: “UNICEF has proven pragmatic, flexible and adaptable to the changing environment – more so than larger donors, this is important in transition”.

It appears that there are two lessons:

- In the context of fragile and post conflict states, Government execution is a challenge, and the use of the country systems may not always be a feasible option.
- There is room for UNICEF to work towards improving the balance between policy, advocacy and capacity building and direct service delivery, and to be better at including government.

Implementation
UNICEF receives very positive feedback on its mix of humanitarian and development interventions. This approach of direct service delivery in a humanitarian mode as well as upstream support to governance at local as well
as central level; is well suited and relevant in addressing the transition from humanitarian assistance to basic nation building. It is noted that some interventions remains humanitarian and life saving in nature, may have limited longer term sustainability, but continues to be important in the present situation in the four countries.

- Whereas a few donors expressed concern whether the mix of humanitarian and development interventions meant that UNICEF is spreading too widely, the overall feedback is that UNICEF should maintain this approach.

UNICEF recognises that their capacity building of authorities in transition contexts needs to be strengthened. At times it appears that it can be a difficult balancing act when a country office is prioritising between implementation of direct service delivery and embarking on longer term capacity building interventions with national authorities and partners.

This may simply reflect that interventions may be developmental, but that given a very low level of capacity among national partners; interventions sometime have to be implemented as humanitarian activities. It may also reflect that there is a need for clearer internal guidelines or best-practice references available. Thirdly it may reflect the composition of staffing in countries coming out of conflict, following a strong humanitarian intervention: It is a challenge to transform the work that goes on in clusters to sector wide approaches, and it requires different staff profiles. UNICEF country offices express that at times there is room for more support from Headquarters.

- UNICEF could work on strengthening capacity building guidelines and best practice references for transition from humanitarian to development.

- UNICEF Headquarters / Regional offices could strengthen its ongoing efforts to continuously ensure optimal “skills- mix” in the country offices, including working on staff development of staff whose skills is particularly specialised from working mainly in either development or humanitarian contexts.

Under the humanitarian reform UNICEF manages 4 humanitarian clusters. As such UNICEF has major responsibilities of coordination of humanitarian interventions; it may at times be too much for the local capacity. UNICEF Headquarters does not perceive this as a drain as such, it’s strategically important for the organisation, even if the role as “provider of last resort” requires resources.

The interviews with the country offices indicated that perhaps the role as provider of humanitarian support may involve a need for improved support from the Headquarters, or from regional offices. In Zimbabwe there were experiences from the recent Cholera outbreak, where it took a very long time to get equipment delivered.

- The lesson appeared to be that there is a need to expand the capacity of having prepositioned stocks.

One donor reported that it was the impression that UNICEF has regular changes of rules and procedures, which makes it difficult for implementing partners to work with the organisation. This was not mentioned by any other partners that were met, including the government ministries.

In a UNICEF review from 2009 in Zimbabwe, it is mentioned that there is a need for a more systematic approach in monitoring and evaluation. This is echoed by UNICEF in Liberia, reporting that Monitoring and Evaluation is not good enough. In both
countries this is an issue that the organisation is working on.

In Somalia, on the other hand, there is general agreement that UNICEF has a good Monitoring and Evaluation system in place: “UNICEF does well, they are good at getting useful feedback from beneficiaries – which is an indication of strength - and they apply various degrees of triangulation”. In Sudan UNICEF reports that they do have a strong Monitoring and Evaluation system, but that it makes requirements for Implementing Partners more complicated.

Donors have different feedback on reporting, some donors are pushing for improved reporting and flows of information, others comment that UNICEF good in reporting and communication.

UNICEF is decentralised, with a lot of authority delegated to country representatives. This was mentioned during meetings in New York, but was not a major issue during meetings in the four countries. This is bound to have implications on the workload on internal regulation and accountability frameworks, but this was not raised as an issue either.

In Zimbabwe the rapid increase of the country programme budget has created funding challenges. UNICEF Harare receives approximately 4% of its funding from core resources, this is linked to UNICEF’s “allocation key” based on seize of population and under-5-mortality. The experience is, that in cases like Zimbabwe where the programs have grown extremely fast, then the core funding becomes insignificant in terms of supporting the office, it creates a major burden in terms of fundraising and creates a challenge in terms of retaining staff if funding is insecure. This is further exacerbated by the relatively short-term grants provided by donors (between 6 – 12 months). That is a serious problem for planning in a transition context.

- Perhaps it could be useful to revisit thoughts of an internal UNICEF pool (e.g. based on some form of revolving modality) that can allow for commitments beyond one year.

A particular issue was raised in Southern Sudan with regards to UNICEF’s involvement in procurement. The issue probably transcends Sudan and UNICEF, but is mentioned in this chapter as it was raised specifically with regards to UNICEF Sudan:

Donors report that UNICEF is undertaking major procurement tasks (e.g. schoolbooks, medicines and mosquito nets). But distribution is a problem, the goods are not getting into the countryside, and NGOs will eventually have to transport the items in a somewhat ad-hoc manner. Donors raise the question whether the UN is the better placed to undertake these assignments, or whether a private solution may be better. NGOs comment that UNICEF can deliver the goods, that the supply chain is there, but mention that there is a problem in terms of planning of procurement and securing the pipeline.

- It will be useful to assess experiences with procurement in Sudan (and other fragile and post conflict countries), with a view to establish a strong knowledge based foundation for future planning.

Aid coordination and UN cooperation

Participation in aid coordination

UNICEF’s strong engagement in cluster coordination receives positive feedback.

Some donors mention that UNICEF could be a stronger partner in sector coordination, and in the coordination of overall aid responses. In Liberia there is generally a positive feedback on
UNICEF’s participation in coordination with donors, and it appears that there is an ongoing dialogue with other stakeholders on programming. In Southern Sudan NGOs mention that UNICEF is not good at providing consolidated data, even if NGOs are submitting data regularly.

Cooperation with UN security and political actors, incl. on “Integration”
It does appear that in the discussions at Headquarter level on integrated missions, UNICEF are active, even if it at times is the impression that UNICEF at top management level may have some reservations on how far integration should go.

In Liberia UNICEF participates in the dialogue and cooperation with UNMIL.

In Somalia UNICEF participates in the ongoing dialogue between UNCT and UNPOS, realising that the relationship between UNCT and UNPOS is strained, and progress on the integration agenda is slow. UNICEF expresses some concerns of the “triple-hating” of a possible DSRSG / RC / HC.

In Southern Sudan full integration of the UN (between UNMIS and UNCT) has not been achieved. At Juba level it appears to be less of an issue in UNICEF’s work. There are weekly Security Management Team meetings, organised by UNMIS, but UNICEF and other UNCT members mention that UNMIS should be more visible in other parts of UNCT cooperation.

There is no DPA / DPKO mission in Zimbabwe.

Approach to joint programming and UN coordination (e.g. DaO)
Despite a widespread perception that UNICEF often “go-it-alone”, the organisation also receive positive feedback on cooperation. The Child Health Days organised by UNICEF and WHO are positively described as a kind of Joint programme, even if “it is still not engrained in the system to work in joint programmes, organisations will rather work together in aligned forms, than enter into formalised joint programmes”.

In Liberia UNICEF is the administrative Agent on the Joint Programme on Youth Empowerment and Employment. The World Bank has included Liberia in the “Catalytic Fund” under the “Fast Track Initiative”. Due to its “perceived impartiality and the strong sector knowledge” UNICEF has been chosen by Donors and the Ministries of Education to be “lead donor”, i.e. the communications link between the Government, the Local Donors Group and the Fast Track Initiative Secretariat.

Within the UN family, it was noted that in the past UNICEF had been somewhat slow in coordination, and “slow in moving towards Delivery as One”. But it was noted that this is improving. It was also noted that “now there is general support and interest within UNICEF Headquarters for participation in Delivery as One”, which impacted positively on the field missions engagement.

In Somalia UNICEF has been seen as the broker in supporting dialogue between the humanitarian organisations (particularly WFP) and UNPOS. It has also been underlined by several interlocutors that UNICEF was instrumental in pushing the UNCT “they were in the driver’s seat” when the Country Team tried to make a “Self-starter Delivery as One”.

In Somalia donors have tried to push for a new body to provide health system analysis (Health Systems Analysis Team): “Like the Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit (FSN:AU)”. This will involve a new partnership between i.a. UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, and FAO. Donors report that it has been difficult to find agreement between particularly UNICEF and
WHO about the structure of the Team, including where to host it, and in this connection UNICEF is being criticised as being too strong and individualistic. UNICEF on their side has explained that it has been difficult to find agreement between all the health partners in general (donors, NGOs and UN agencies), and that UNICEF's position has been to ensure that the new “Health Team” is sufficiently linked to other ongoing health interventions.

In Sudan it was mentioned that UNICEF still operates very “independently” and needs to be much better in participating in the large coordination meetings.

In Zimbabwe UNICEF’s internal review mentions that UNICEF could improve on UN partnerships in a more strategic manner. E.g. with UNESCO on education, WHO and UNFPA on maternal and newborn health, WFP and FAO on nutrition security, the World Bank on water and sanitation, and UNDP on governance, youth and constitutional reform issues. This was not referred to during interviews in Harare.

UNFPA

Introduction
The donor representatives interviewed for the study typically had limited direct dealings with UNFPA and they expressed limited awareness of the performance of the organisation. The same applies for the UNCT members interviewed. The organisation is not very visible in the aid community, and donors typically explained that UNFPA is not a recipient of funding administered by the embassy. The government officials from the Ministries of Gender and Health in Liberia and Southern Sudan were clearly familiar with UNFPA.

The relatively limited data received due to such limited feedback, inevitably has a bearing on the basis upon which the findings in the study are made.

Being the lead agency for advancing the Programme of Action of the ICPD (International Conference on Population and Development), is at the core of UNFPA’s mandate. The organisations Strategic Plan 2008-2011 sets out three focus areas towards the Millennium Development Goals: Population and Development, Reproductive Health and Rights, and Gender Equality. UNFPA is a development organisation, its major direct interlocutors and partners are governments, and support for national capacity development is at the core of the UNFPA Strategic Plan. But as part of its implementation, the organisation is also working with and through NGOs.

UNFPA is relatively new on the humanitarian field, and does not have a fragile state approach – but feedback from UNFPA Headquarters indicate, that the organisation is working towards developing one.

Mandate

Activity portfolio compares with mandate and organisational strategies in conflict states

UNFPA’s country programmes are aligned with Government priorities in the four countries, and by targeting gender, reproductive health, and population and development data, the programmes falls within UNFPA’s global mandate.

Given that the situation in the four countries makes its very difficult to channel funding through government counterparts, UNFPA has developed cooperation with different types of local partnerships in all four countries.

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21 This has now been resolved, and the structure will be hosted by WHO.
Advantages and Relevance

An important partner
UNFPA’s global experiences on the humanitarian scene are relatively limited, and the organisation is a small player in fragile and post conflict settings. In Liberia and Somalia UNFPA has experienced interruptions of its programmes for shorter or longer periods of time due to the conflicts in the countries, in Liberia between 1987 and 1991 and in Somalia between 1991 and 2006.

Still feedback from donors and Government indicate that in the countries covered by the Study, the organisation operates in relevant areas that are linked to the overall development priorities. In all four countries UNFPA has been a practical funding channel for donors to work with civil society organisations as well as governments in situations where bilateral donors could not engage directly.

Based on context and aligned with national strategies and UN priorities
State building and taking the context as a starting point
Maternal Mortality and Reproductive Health are important challenges in all four countries - that are also confronted with problems with sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). UNFPA has supported the development of a number of policies and strategies in all countries, and been a solid interlocutor for its main government counterparts, being it Ministries of Gender, Ministries of Health or Ministries of Justice.

In Liberia rape and other types of SGBV are widespread, and it has been clear for international observers that neither the national health system nor the legal system have been in a position to tackle this. UNFPA’s programme targets the medical aspects as well as legal and institutional aspects of the problem. In terms of legal and institutional aspects, UNFPA is providing training of judiciary, prosecution and lawyers in how to respond to SGBV, including an innovative support to a newly established criminal court solely focussing on SGBV. This is perceived to contribute to the reconciliation process in the country.

UNFPAs work with population data, in particular census, has played a particular role in Sudan, where the population census has been an integrated part of the peace agreement. The census should partly generate data for development planning and partly form the basis for the implementation of the CPA agreements on power and wealth sharing, elections and the 2011 referendum. UNFPA has provided technical support to organising the census, and as such has been instrumental in delivering essential support to the implementation of the peace agreement. Similarly UNFPA’s work with a Population and Housing Census in Liberia addressed some of the challenges linked to the almost total lack of population data in post conflict Liberia.

The political crisis in Zimbabwe generated a dramatic shift from development to humanitarian needs; where UNFPA experienced increasing challenges in making alignment to constantly changing national development frameworks. As a consequence UNFPA had to take on more downstream activities (service delivery projects) at the expense of upstream work (policy advice, capacity building, etc). The perception is that the organisation has managed to adapt to this changing context, by entering into cooperation with national civil society organisations.

Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
Issues of family planning and reproductive health are not always the highest priority in fragile states and in the immediate aftermath of
conflict, and the four countries offer different types of strategic priorities.

In Liberia UNFPA receives positive feedback from government; the interventions are perceived to align with Government priorities of Maternal Mortality, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health. The focus on the role of women and combating SGBV both have high priority, and the work on the census is seen as a key support to government planning, incl. to the Poverty Reduction Strategy. Feedback from government partners is that there is a good and regular dialogue between the ministries and UNFPA, and that: “UNFPA understands that the ministry is in charge”

In Somalia UNFPA’s country programme is based on priorities identified in the United Nations Transition Plan (UNTP) for Somalia for 2008-2009, as well as the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for 2008-2012.

In Sudan feedback from donors and Government indicate that UNFPA operates in areas of high relevance and directly linked to the GoSS development priorities: The role of the Census in the implementation of the CPA are highlighted and capacity development and governance is pursued in the cooperation with the Ministry of Health e.g. through the work with legislation on maternal health.

In Zimbabwe the dialogue between donors and the Zimbabwe government is weak. As such the UN acts as a broker between the two, and UNFPA is the interlocutor e.g. on issues of Reproductive Health.

**Challenges and Effectiveness**

**Perceived effectiveness in interventions**

*Engagement with Government and execution*

The feedback on how UNFPA cooperates with government on implementation differs from country to country. In Liberia the cooperation is viewed positively; the modality of cooperation is Ministry implementation of activities with support from local and international NGOs.

In Sudan the situation differs. Donors mention that UNFPA needs to be better in supporting the ministry counterpart (notably the Ministry of Health). Whereas UNFPA is reported to have good technical staff, it’s perceived that they are focussed on projects, not on supporting the national partners in working at a strategic level. As a consequence the Ministry is told what is to be done, rather than being involved in the decision.

**Implementation**

In general, donors had little substantial comments on the effectiveness of UNFPA’s interventions. One general feedback is, that it seems not to be clear to donors and other stakeholders whether UNFPA has had thorough internal strategic discussions on approaches of how to operate in fragile contexts.

In Somalia it is the perception that the organisation could benefit from such an internal strategy process: UNFPA’s training of midwives is reported to be very good. However, it is a problem that there isn’t an employment component afterwards. UNFPA maintains the importance of interventions being sustainable, and therefore would not engage in such short term employment activities.

- Whereas sustainability off course is important, then UNFPA also has to be able to compromise on this if the organisation increasingly is going to be operating in transition / fragile state contexts.

UNFPA’s experiences, its guidelines, procedures and processes are all geared towards development efforts and partnerships. In Zimbabwe UNFPA’s rules and regulations did not allow the organisation to pay salary top ups
to ensure continued service delivery (this was an urgent priority in Zimbabwe during the period of during the period with hyper inflation). Government entities in regions throughout the country did have capacity to deliver, but there were no salaries.

- UNFPA should probably revisit this and introduce a larger degree of flexibility in the rules and regulations, e.g. possibilities of cash to partners.

In Sudan UNFPA’s work on the Census has drawn more attention among donors than other parts of the organisations work. Feedback is that technically UNFPA did a good job. However, several donors also mention that whereas UNFPA did well on the actual census – the organisation did not do so well in the political aftermath. It is noted that donors were very vague in outlining what UNFPA could have done after the result was published, just as it is noted that the funders (EC, DFID, Denmark, and the US) have all accepted the progress reports.

- UNFPA could consider summarising “lessons learned” from the census process, for the broader aid community.

Donors report that UNFPA appears as small and focussed with a narrow mandate and a strong technical capacity. At the same time it is mentioned that UNFPA could take a stronger role as leaders on the work on maternal health.

One donor commented on Monitoring and Evaluation, describing it as focussing on scope of problems and outputs rather than on outcomes or impact, adding that it has “a weak gender based approach”

- UNFPA could work on strengthening its M/E function.

UNFPA is in the process of developing a global approach for how the organisation will be working in fragile and conflict states. The organisation is presently working on developing better assessment tools for fragile and conflict states. Some respondents have reported that there are challenges within UNFPA in ensuring that this type of Headquarter strategy development is shared with and absorbed by field offices and subsequently incorporated in programs at country level.

- If this is the case, then UNFPA will have to work on overcoming such challenges.

**Aid coordination and UN cooperation**

*Participation in aid coordination*  
Given that UNFPA is a relatively small organisation, it has problems in the aid architecture that comes out of political crisis, with a plethora of humanitarian and development coordination meetings.

Donors, UN partners and NGOs mention that UNFPA is considered a relatively “weak player” in the interagency set-up, and has very limited inputs into developing either overall aid approaches or sector policies. In Sudan it’s reported that this includes the cooperation on Reproductive Health, where UNFPA, despite the importance for the organisation’s programme profile, often are referred to as “not very visible”.

- UNFPA could consider strengthening its engagement in coordination with international actors within as well as outside the UN.

**Cooperation with UN security and political actors, incl. on “Integration”**  
It’s reported that in the discussions at Headquarter level on integrated missions, UNFPA plays a very insignificant role.
Feedback during interviews in Africa did not provide any specific input on UNFPA as participation in these issues.

**Approach to joint programming and UN coordination (e.g. DoO)**

UNFPA is participating in various joint programmes in all four countries, including in the UNs work on streamlining the international efforts of HIV/AIDS programming in Southern Sudan. This includes technical support for a unified M&E system, surveillance, operational research, surveys and reviews and programmatic monitoring. UNFPA is the Administrative Agent for UN’s Joint Program on Gender in Liberia.

UNFPAs engagement in interagency coordination and the strategic work towards “Delivery as One” is as mentioned limited. This may not reflect on interest or commitment on the side of UNFPA staff or the organisations overall policies, but it does reflect on priorities.

- UNFPA could work on improving the organisations visibility in fragile and post conflict settings.

**FINDINGS AND COMMENTS**

**Introduction**

In the following some of the overall findings from the Study are summarised. This includes comments on the UN as a system in fragile and post conflict settings, as well as findings from the assessments of the individual organisations.

Respondents provided a vast number of insights and findings beyond the feedback on the UN and the three organisations. The role of Donors is clearly perceived as crucial when assessing the advantages and, perhaps in particular, the challenges of the UN in the four countries and in other transition and recovery settings. Some of this feedback is briefly outlined.

Finally, respondents had many country specific comments. These are as such beyond the scope of the Study. Still, the chapter is concluded with highlighting four issues that respondents perceived to be important when “looking ahead” on the future of the UN responses in the countries.

**UN - an important partner**

Fragile states and countries coming out of conflict are increasingly becoming a part of the international aid agenda. In the recent years this has introduced a number of new players in international aid, ranging from military branches of governments, a large number of new NGOs, private companies providing aid management as well as a huge system of private security providers.

Still, it is an overall finding of the Study that the respondents, i.e. donor representatives, government officials, civil society representatives and UN staff, maintains that in this developing aid architecture, the UN still plays a key role within its mandates in countries coming out of conflict and other fragile states.

**Advantages and relevance**

Respondents note that the UN system is perceived to have strong comparative advantages in bridging humanitarian, peacekeeping and long term development efforts. This perception is based on clear mandates, the UN’s intergovernmental governance and a solid presence of staff on the ground, before, during and after conflicts. Governments and donors have also underlined the important role that the UN can play as a “proxy”, when direct bilateral cooperation between donors and recipient governments is not an option.
The UN’s role in avoiding parallel structures and of ensuring as much coordination and proximity with government as possible, is also underlined. NGOs and other private actors have been a major partner in recent years, in particular with a view to provide humanitarian assistance and relief, but the general feedback from governments and donors is that when moving towards transition, aid cooperation has to be lifted “upstream” from the local / regional level that NGOs typically work on. The UN is still seen as being the best to do that.

For UNDP the overall finding is, that whereas donors and other partners find that in some instances there are needs for a revised approach – and perhaps a changed type of staffing – the overriding conclusion is that the organisation has a key role to play in fragile and post conflict states, and that UNDP should consolidate and scale up its capacities in these states. This reflects on UNDPs overall profile, will have strong financial / budgetary implications, and would eventually be an issue for the Member-states and UNDP’s Board.

The general feedback from donors and governments is that UNICEF is a highly valued partner in fragile and post conflict settings. Several donors mention that this is linked to a general feeling of capacity and ability to deliver, and that internal flexibility between humanitarian and development interventions allows for continued relevance. It comes out, that it is important that UNICEF’s agenda is linked to a clear mandate and less directly linked to political reform agendas.

UNFPA’s global experiences on the humanitarian scene are relatively limited, and the organisation is a small player in fragile and post conflict settings. Still feedback from donors and Government indicate that in the countries covered by the Study, the organisation operates in relevant areas that are linked to the overall development priorities.

**Challenges**

The diversity of the UN organisations engaged in Fragile and Post Conflict Situations is a challenge across the UN. The organisations are designed with different purposes and different guiding principles and this does at times make it difficult to find common ground as well as coherent and / or joint approaches. This is also a challenge for the three organisations under the Study: The findings in the report acknowledge UNDP’s closeness to the “Political realm”, and UNICEF’s and UNFPA’s relevance both in terms of the capacity and flexibility in delivering high quality services in post conflict situations. There is therefore, a need for the agencies to continue developing complementarities and synergies in the use of their comparative advantage in addressing issues of fragility and development in different post-conflict situations.

It is noted that donor’s feedback on UNDP (BCPR) has been more detailed and / or engaged; than the responses on UNICEF and UNFPA (in that order). It is the impression that this reflects that UNDP simply is closer to the “political realm” in its role and interventions than the two other organisations and that donors in fragile and post conflict settings typically have a strong political engagement / interest.

One overall feedback is that at a policy level there is a need for all three organisations to further elevate the engagement in fragile and post conflict settings into the overall strategic frameworks of the organisations. It is therefore also important to repeatedly revisit and strengthen the operational capacities (types of programmes, staffing, and modes of interacting with national, local and international partners) in these settings.
Organisations specific challenges are referred to in the chapters on the organisations and the annexes with the country studies.

The following provides brief outline of additional issues raised by respondents regarding the UN as a system in fragile states.

**UNDAF**

The aim of the UNDAF, i.e. trying to get the UN to focus on a few (3-5) national priorities, is crucial in terms of bringing the UN system together and in aligning its activities with national priorities. The framework for the UNs engagement in the four countries is the UNDAF (with the exception of Somalia that has been exempted from developing an UNDAF). It is, however, being questioned whether the prevailing modalities for an UNDAF is appropriate in all fragile and post conflict contexts. In Sudan the UNDAF is perceived as having limited value as it is linked to national strategies that are assessed to have had limited practical bearing in Southern Sudan in the past, and will be even less useful as the referendum in 2011 is approaching. In Zimbabwe, it seems that more importance has been given to actually having an UNDAF, disregarding that it will be out of sync with national priorities. There is a perception that the planning process therefore at times is too generic – “too much off the shelf”.

There are new UNDAF guidelines available that are more flexible, and it could be considered how to include such new thinking in terms of adapting the UNDAF to accommodate the needs for increased flexibility in fragile contexts.

**Coordination**

The 4 key partners in Early Recovery are normally perceived to be UNDP (BCPR), WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR. In the host of material on coordination between the key UN agencies, it is often mentioned that the normal modality is to “go-it-alone”. Whereas there are good examples of the opposite in the Study (Liberia being the strong case), there are also examples of this in the four countries.

Many respondents have noted that problems with UN coordination could be linked to: a) That the UN system does not provide incentives for the country offices to work together – e.g. it’s not in the performance indicators in staff assessments of heads of offices. b) It may reflect on donor funding modalities as well as whether donors (the funding stakeholders) are actually engaging and holding the UN agencies accountable towards overall strategies and reforms of increasing cooperation.

In Somalia it was noted that a particular Joint Programme (the JPLG) is a good example as to how “joint-ness” can work. Respondents explain the success largely by the fact that there is priority, focus and attention, including a full time staff attached.

There are references to “harmonised business practices” – but they are relatively few. The joint logistics system (UNHAS), the agreements on harmonised cash transfers HACT), and joint offices in Liberia and Somalia are the main ones.

**Staffing**

Getting good staff to the hardship conditions that are normally the situation in fragile and post conflict settings can be difficult. Challenges with staffing can also involve large turnover of staff and loss of institutional memory in the organisations.

The problem is partly linked to questions of salaries, other incentives, living conditions and security. But respondents note, that whereas security is an issue, salaries and other economic benefits are not the main obstacle. It is rather that there is a need to revisit the overall HR policy and career systems, as there appears to be
a risk that once embarking on postings in post conflict and fragile states, then it can have implications for career prospects. It could be considered to improve overall UN HR-policies in Fragile States. One respondent suggested that perhaps it could be possible with advance access to upcoming vacancies and targeted career support.

A general feedback from UN country offices (from all three organisations) was that HR management at Headquarter level is too slow and at times unpredictable. It takes a very long time between vacancy and placement. The country offices also expressed that at times they are competing with other country offices in getting the staff they need, and that is an impression that HR management to some extent is driven by some degree of opportunism where “sexy”/donor prioritised operations get priority.

**Link with NGOs and civil society**

Respondents noted the importance of strengthening the cooperation with civil society organisations. International and National NGOs clearly would want a relationship beyond one of being an “implementing partner”, with contractual responsibilities towards the UN. It is noted that in some instances NGOs are larger than some of the UN organisations and may be the only route into implementation of activities in troubled areas of countries. Southern Sudan offers an interesting case where the presence of strong alternative funding modalities for NGOs to the UN appears to have created a basis for more “equal partnerships”, which is useful as it does mean that there is “more listening and learning on both sides” as one UN official put it.

**Donors**

During the study it was found that the role of donors and donor behaviour are perceived to be important elements when assessing the UN in Fragile and Post Conflict states.

Donor funding in fragile and post conflict settings often originates from humanitarian funds, or “experimental” recovery pools, and it is typically relatively short term (annual) and earmarked. Whether the four countries in the study are sufficiently funded is not assessed here. The feedback from respondents is rather that it is crucial to maintain reason and realism when defining objectives for international interventions. Pursuing too much compared to existing funding or capacity may eventually create disappointment and frustration – and end up doing harm.

Another set of comments are linked to the importance of “staying engaged”. This is crucial, if trust between aid partners and local communities is to be built up and consolidated. This is a challenge for UN organisations in their planning, some areas shift from being “sexy” to being “less sexy” (e.g. a sudden onset crisis in another area), and then it is important that cooperation continues - despite this change of international focus. This appears to be much more of a donor challenge. It will be important that donors accept that continuity and patience are as crucial in fragile states as in “traditional development contexts”.

A third set of comments reflects the importance of recognising the links between political, security and development objectives, and the tension that at times come out between humanitarian, development, political, and security agendas and approaches. In Somalia and Zimbabwe UNDP experiences this particularly in their cooperation with donors. In both countries key donors have very strong political engagements, and in both countries the UN’s political system is not very strong. UNDP is seen by key donors in both countries as an important vehicle for the political agendas: In Zimbabwe it is political reform and in Somalia it
is support to the government. Feedback from respondents – outside the main donor constituency – indicates that this is very risky and that there is a need to be cautious when pushing political agendas with development assistance through multilateral partners, in situations where the potentials for bilateral support / pressure are not present.

Respondents note that the donor-presence in the four countries, is not strong enough. With the exception of a few countries, donor representations are very often relatively small, often one person with responsibility for the political as well as the aid portfolio. Coordination among donors is also mentioned as a challenge. It’s a feedback from all four countries, that there is a need for stronger donor coordination, for donors to have a more coherent and strategic dialogue with Government as well as to hold the UN partners to task. In the absence of strong national counterparts, it’s important that the international aid community can deliver some direction.

It was also noted during the Study, that donor representatives often have a relatively limited background of working with UN partners. “Holding the UN to task” therefore can be a difficult balancing act, if the donor representation only has a relatively very vague sense of the “double-hating” of acting as a donor in a given country context, while also representing a Member State of the UN with national commitments and obligations towards the UN system. Firstly this has implications for the level of awareness of the UN system as such, hence for the donors’ inclination to work with the UN system in developing common positions and approaches. Secondly it also has implications for donor representatives’ awareness of their own national policies towards the UN organisations as partners. This may be the reason why Joint Donor-Strategies on cooperation with UN organisations did not feature as an issue that was being discussed by the donor group in any of the four countries.

A particular set of comments related to Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) and the World Bank. Feedback on the experiences from particularly the LRTF in Liberia and the MDTFs in Southern Sudan indicate that there still is some way to go before the obstacles that have reduced the efficiency of MDTFs are solved. At the overall level it seems that there is a need to revisit designs and architecture of MDTFs and at country level this may imply a stronger engagement from bilateral donors. At the same time it underlines the importance of maintaining some level of direct funding to UN organisations, UN Joint programmes and NGOs to ensure a continued delivery of peace dividends.

Countries
In Liberia there are major concerns among donors as well as within the UN of what will happen after the Drawdown of UNMIL. Its questioned whether the agencies and the Government are sufficiently planning for the transition following the drawdown. A planning process for the transition has been initiated and UNMIL has produced an overview of the tasks and assignments that the mission presently within security is undertaking, in order to assist GoL in gradually taking over. A joint planning group has commenced work, consisting of UNMIL and GoL. Still Donors and parts of the UN feel that there is a risk that UNCT is still not “taking the planning for Drawdown and Transition seriously enough”. Focus on increased cooperation through a pilot Delivery as One is not considered as a sufficient strategy to deal with these challenges. If the transition is not handled appropriately, it can lead to collapse of ongoing support.

In Southern Sudan the referendum on the future composition of Sudan (the possible split
into two countries) is scheduled for 2011. Without pre-empting the result of the referendum, the post referendum situation in Southern Sudan will pose the challenge to the international aid engagement of accelerating the shift from humanitarian interventions towards transition and basic nation building, and supporting the GoSS dealing with two major challenges: Promoting legitimacy and promoting effectiveness. Whereas a shift in the UN structure must be expected after the referendum; it has not been clear in meetings with UN partners, to what extent there are preparations for this in the UNCT or within the individual organisations.

In Somalia the relationship between the DPA led UNPOS and the UNCT is clearly very complicated. In 2007 an Integrated Task Force (ITF) was established with a view to formulate an integrated strategy for Somalia, including thoughts of a Joint Policy Planning Unit between UNCT and UNPOS. This has not yet been set up, and earlier in 2010 the ITF undertook a new assessment of the overall UN engagement in Somalia, assessing whether or not a new strategic approach is needed, including the formulation of recommendations including on integration. The final report from the assessment is still in the making. Several UNCT representatives expect that in the short or medium term period there will NOT be a structural integration of the UN in Somalia, but rather more joint planning. There are concerns of UNPOS capacity and of the potentials to maintain a pragmatic approach to Somalia, in general the feedback from the UNCT is, that if “Integration” shall work, there will be a need to have a broad approach to the challenges in Somalia, “beyond perceiving TFG as carved in stone”.

In Zimbabwe international aid is highly politicized, and closely linked to political reform. Key donors acknowledge that this is the overriding political agenda, and that at times it means, that they assess particularly UNDP’s relevance on how they “…become better in supporting this (the reform) agenda”. But in the group of bilateral donors there are different interpretations of the implications of “reform” - ranging from support to the consolidation of a broad-based government to the promotion of an outright regime shift. The choice of interpretation has immediate implications for the prospects for the UN to deliver in Zimbabwe and subsequently for donor’s assessment of the performance of the UN, particularly UNDP. There will have to be a clearer agreement on the UN’s role in the country: Donors and the Government of Zimbabwe will have to be better accepting the UN’s neutrality - and to define expectations to the system accordingly.