REPORT: Review of Tsunami Recovery

Tsunami Recovery Network

22 June 2005
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**Executive Summary**

The tsunami disaster claimed 280,000 lives, nearly two million people were displaced and more than five million people affected. There is no question that some areas were much more severely affected by the earthquakes and tsunami waves than others, or that the nature of these effects differed from place to place on the basis of local context.

This report covers eight of these countries, with varying levels of detail: India (both the mainland and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Maldives, Myanmar and Somalia. Countries such as Malaysia, the Seychelles and Tanzania were also affected to some degree, though they are not covered in this report.

We are now six months down the line and many of those most directly affected by the disaster, with all the suffering and trauma that entailed for those that have lost their family, homes and livelihoods, are still living without a roof over their head or any idea of what is going to happen to them.

The cost of the disaster is running at nearly $11 billion. The international response has been commendable, with around $8.5 billion pledged or committed through the international aid system. Around a quarter of this is being provided through NGOs and charities. Around $2 billion has already been spent, mainly on short-term humanitarian relief. The remaining $9 billion will be mainly spent on the longer-term rehabilitation process. The UK government has committed £75m to humanitarian relief and roughly the same to longer-term reconstruction.

In the UK, £350m in donations has been collected and distributed by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) through twelve charitable organisations1, with £152m committed in 2005 mainly for short-term relief. DEC has produced a ‘6 Months On’ report and required the same from each of these organisations for each of the countries they are working in. Although these country reports have been produced to a standard format it is almost impossible to compare them or even to total their content for a Tsunami region assessment.

A similar situation exists with the reports from the international co-ordinating bodies. With no simple and common framework for reporting, overall accountability is virtually impossible.

However, what is apparent from these reports and from the responses we have been receiving on our web site is that after six months there is little evidence of permanent accommodation having been built.

Government plans for physical and economic development are bogged down in bureaucratic and political procedures. Without these plans, government is not inclined to take any decision over longer-term investment and reconstruction. We cannot imagine this situation being tolerated in Japan, the USA or Europe.

The world needs a better system and to be better prepared for dealing with major disasters of this kind. Disasters are also a development issue. International agencies are geared to a quick response in terms of humanitarian relief but the international community has no strategy for dealing with the longer-term development issues. This does not bode well for current efforts by Western governments to co-ordinate their efforts for addressing the issues of poverty and development funding in Africa.

The impacts of major disasters of this kind are widely understood, as are good practices in terms of a response, including community involvement. We have learned from the experience of past disasters like the recent earthquake in Gujurat. The knowledge for planning and building settlements that respond to community needs while providing a more secure environment exists. There is

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1 British Red Cross £32m; Oxfam £25m; Save the Children £19m; Christian Aid £18m; ActionAid £13m; Care International UK £9m; CAFOD £8m; Concern £8m; World Vision £6m; Tearfund £5m; Merlin £5m; and Help the Aged £4m; Total £152m.
evidence of these practices being promoted by NGOs in the Tsunami area, but are often ignored by government.

Instead governments in the affected regions have quickly responded with knee-jerk planning policies. In Sri Lanka the government decreed a setback (exclusion zone) of 100-200m with projects to build new towns and apartment blocks up to 5 km inland. The Government of Indonesia responded initially with plans for a 2 km set back and rehousing of the population in military style barracks. India had plans for a 500m setback.

While poor communities live with continuing uncertainties about whether they can return home, the same constraints do not always apply to the tourist industry. There have been steady reports sent to our web site of disputes between government in Thailand, Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka between coastal communities with long traditions of sea edge living and self-organisation. Government is actively preventing their return and offering support to commercial investment on the grounds of 'tourist and economic development'.

In anticipation of this situation the Tsunami Recovery Network was established at a meeting in London in January 2005 to address concerns that the funds, so generously contributed, should be expended in ways that do not prejudice the real needs and rights of the people affected. Six months on, the Network, along with our member organisations in the region, through its website and this report, is dedicated to the independent monitoring of the long-term recovery process and relating the stories – both success stories and the hardships that the affected communities are having to suffer.

**Introduction**

The earthquake and consequent tsunami that occurred on 26 December 2004 was one of the most devastating natural disasters that has ever occurred. The epicentre of the first and largest earthquake (magnitude 9.0) was located off the coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia (USGS, 2005). It was followed by a series of after shocks and was the direct cause of considerable damage in the immediate vicinity and as far north as the Nicobar Islands. The subsequent tsunami created waves up to 17 metres high in the immediate vicinity, and causing significant damage as far away as Somalia. These waves were responsible for varying degrees of damage or devastation in ten countries in Southeast Asia, the Indian Subcontinent and East Africa.

The immediate response from many quarters has been generous. Unprecedented amounts of money have been made available for aid, and efforts have been made to meet the immediate and longer term needs of survivors everywhere.

26 June 2005 will mark a period of six months since the disaster, and at a time when concerns are beginning to emerge as to how the money is being spent (WER, 2005), it's appropriate to reflect on progress. This report aims to offer a brief overview of the efforts that have been made to mitigate the suffering of those who were affected by the earthquake and tsunami, and particularly to assess progress towards assisting communities to restore livelihoods and move towards a sustainable long-term rehabilitation.

The principles that lie behind the review are those established by the Tsunami Recovery Network, which relate to those elaborated by the Sphere Project, launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent (see Appendix) but are more clearly focused on the long-term recovery process and responding to the needs of communities.

The cost of the disaster from our analysis is currently estimated at around $US 11 billion (including $4.6 billion for Indonesia, $3 billion for India and nearly $2.8 billion for Sri Lanka). This is divided into humanitarian, short-term relief and long-term reconstruction. More than $2 billion has already been spent, mainly on short-term humanitarian relief. The remaining $9 billion will be mainly spent on the longer-term rehabilitation process.

2 More information on the Tsunami Recovery Network is available at http://www.tsunami-recovery.net/
Broadly, the estimated cost of the recovery is broadly matched by the funds pledged and committed to date with between $8 and $9 billion pledged or committed through the international aid system, and the remainder coming from governments of the countries, principally India which has pledged $1.44 billion to long-term reconstruction on top of the $735 million it has already spent on humanitarian relief.

International aid comes from donor governments through multilateral agencies, including the UN and development banks or directly to recipient governments through a bilateral arrangement. In Indonesia, for example around 16% of the total pledges and commitments of $4.6 billion are bilateral and 65% multilateral. This includes a unknown amount that has been reallocated from existing long-term development funding. The remaining 35% comes from NGO and private sources (www.e-aceh.org).

A number of organisations are attempting to monitor and coordinate the collection and disbursement of disaster funds, with the range of UN agencies and the Red Cross and Red Crescent contributing considerable effort in this regard. That core group was instrumental in establishing the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, which is in turn a part of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). ALNAP has assumed a role in accounting for immediate humanitarian relief aid. To that end, they have established detailed reporting guidelines and a knowledge management system (ALNAP, 2005).

There is much less universality in reporting on long-term rehabilitation aid and initiatives.

Many groups have solicited their own donations and undertook independent work programmes. One of the most comprehensive, though, is the Consolidated Appeals Process, managed by UN agencies and a number of NGOs, including the Flash Appeal mechanism that is part of the CAP. Officially, the Flash Appeal is an appeal for disaster-related funds that is coupled with a coordinated programme of humanitarian aid, involving the formulation of a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CAP, 2005, p.ii).

This review makes considerable use of the data regarding donations and disbursements through the CAP. This covers both the Flash Appeal and a wider survey of funds through the UN's Financial Tracking Service (FTS, 2005).

Where possible, information on funds disbursement outside of the FTS is also included, though it must be noted that this data is not comprehensive.

India

Summary

The Government of India acted swiftly in the aftermath of the tsunami, declining most offers of immediate relief aid and assuming full responsibility for coordination. Overall, the Indian efforts have received considerable praise for their efficiency and coverage.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands experienced the most severe effects as they were closest to the epicentre of the earthquake. Some apparently significant complaints from NGOs relate to the central and Island governments’ reluctance to allow foreign agencies to operate outside the surrounds of the main population centre, Port Blair. Reports are also surfacing with some persistence of dissatisfaction amongst Islanders with the levels of compensation being offered by the Government, with some indication that vulnerable groups on the Islands are being particularly marginalised.

On the mainland, the most vociferous complaints appear to relate to the treatment of dalit (previously known as ‘untouchable’) communities, both at an official level and from the meenavar fishing communities, who were worst affected and have taken on significant responsibility for the distribution of aid. In addition, persistent concerns have been expressed that community level councils (panchayats) are being excluded from decision-making processes, with the effect that community identification and prioritisation of issues is made more difficult.
DFID India has prepared a proposal for a ‘Post-Tsunami Social Equity Audit’, designed “... to ensure that recovery programmes increase accountability and social inclusion” (DFID, 2005). Should this audit be completed, it would assist significantly in gaining a picture of the degree and effectiveness of participatory processes and equity in relief and rehabilitation programmes. DFID express similar concerns to those detailed below in terms of exclusion of dalits, women and children.

As well as dealing with the problems outlined above, many recommendations for improving the long-term welfare of those affected centre around the introduction or extension of microfinance programmes in affected areas, with a brief to finance shelter creation and to purchase replacement fishing boats and nets and agricultural equipment (DMI, 2005, p.16 and Ganguly, 2005, p.42).

**Overall Needs Assessment**

Initial damage assessment was undertaken by Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur. Six assessment teams were formed, with each assigned to a specific area, and required to undertake a review of damage in that area over a period of 8 days, to fall between January 1 and 13.

The areas covered were:

- **Andaman and Nicobar Islands**
  - Port Blair and environs
  - Islands south of Port Blair
  - Islands North of Port Blair
  - Car Nicobar Island

- **Indian Mainland**
  - Cochin to Chennai coast
  - Ichchapuram (Andhra Pradesh) to Chennai coast (Jain, 2005)

The most recent official figures indicate that 12,405 people were killed by the tsunami and tremors in India (Singh, 2005), with at least 647,556 displaced (ADRA, 2005). Estimates place the number affected at over 2.7 million in 1,089 towns and villages, with the destruction of 235,000 homes (Ganguly, 2005, p.5 and Singh, 2005).

In addition to substantial loss of life, the tsunami has resulted in a substantial increase in poverty levels. The Asian Development Bank estimates that 645,000 households (approximately 3.2 million people) on mainland India have been affected, with one third of those from the fishing sector, a quarter involved with micro-enterprises, and the remainder drawn from agriculture and livestock sectors or seasonal/intermittent employment (ADB - India, 2005)

**Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination**

The Indian Government has retained a high level of control throughout relief and rehabilitation phases to date – largely attracting praise for effective coordination, though also some criticism, which is elaborated below (Narrain, 2005).

India rejected early offers of relief aid from bilateral donors, on the basis that they had sufficient capacity itself. They did, however, request assistance from the Asian Development and World Banks with infrastructure reconstruction (BBC News, 2005b).

An initial sum of Rs5,000 million (US$115 million) was committed by the Government of India for relief efforts on 27 December, with an additional Rs27,000 million (US$620 million) announced in mid January (BBC News, 2005b). In June the Prime Minister's office announced a Rs98,703 million (approximately US$2,270 million) plan for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the affected areas (Singh, 2005).

This latest package is to be spent as follows:

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3 Indeed, India has provided cash and in-kind aid to Sri Lanka (US$23 million), the Maldives (US$1.15 million), Thailand (US$500,000) and Indonesia (US$1 million) (Singh, 2005).
o Rs37,735 million (US$867 million; 38% of the total) on reconstruction of roads, bridges, ports and other transport, communications and tourist infrastructure;

o Rs32,987 million (US$758 million; 34%) on housing, water, power distribution, roads and sewage;

o Rs15,194 million (US$349 million; 15%) on livelihoods programmes;

o Rs8,286 million (US$190 million; 8%) on coastal protection and environmental measures; and

o Rs1,250 million (US$28.7 million; 1.3%) on unilateral development of an Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System4 (all figures, Singh, 2005).

Of this package, Rs36,104 million (US$830 million; 36.6%) will be financed by multilateral donors, including:

- World Bank (US$529 million);
- Asian Development Bank (US$200 million);
- IFD5 (US$30 million);
- Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (US$7.5 million); and
- either subject to further negotiation (US$38.8 million) or unspecified (US$25.2 million).

Of the Rs98,703 million total, the remaining Rs62,599 million (US$1,438 million) which will be financed domestically (Singh, 2005).

A number of external donors have made contributions to relief and rehabilitation. On 14 June, the UN Financial Tracking Service listed external donor payments from multilateral sources totalling US$70.8 million, the bulk of which covered short-term relief activities (FTS - India, 2005).

Episcopal Relief and Development is undertaking a long-term, three-phase rehabilitation programme in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Pondicherry plus the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The programme is currently in its second phase; a nine-month rehabilitation project. Phase 1 lasted for three months and focused on immediate relief, while Phase 3 is anticipated to last up to three years, with a focus on long-term development. ERD’s total budget for India currently stands at over US$5 million (ERD - INDIA, 2005).

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Needs Assessments

The two island groups were severely affected; both by the waves and by the seismic activity that caused them. The effects of the latter extend to marked uplift and subsidence. In Port Blair, sea water level has risen by approximately 1 metre as a result of subsidence, while the Middle Andaman Islands have experienced significance uplift, indicated by the creation of new beaches (Jain, 2005).

Of the 37 inhabited islands in the two groups, fifteen were affected by the waves and resultant flooding, with thirteen of those located in the Nicobar group to the south (Ganguly, 2005, p.7). While, most damage to infrastructure in the southern islands was caused by the waves (especially on Little Andaman, and Great and Cap Nicobar), most damage in the Andaman Islands to the north of Port Blair was caused by the earthquake (Jain, 2005).

4 The PM stated explicitly that “... we will [sic] not like to be part of the consortium of other countries setting up a Tsunami Early Warning System in the Indian Ocean” (Singh, 2005).

5 It is unclear from the PM’s speech whether ‘IFD’ refers to the Jaipur-based and DFID-supported Investment for Development project (which seems unlikely, given their relatively small budget) or some other entity.
Waves were up to 10-12 metres high in the southern islands, washing away most structures on lower ground. The military base at Car Nicobar was severely affected, but the airstrip and operational area survived and were used for relief work. In the northern islands, wooden buildings survived the seismic activity fairly well, while concrete structures generally did not (Jain, 2005).

The most recently announced official death toll in the Islands stands at 3,513, with 356,000 people affected, and an estimated 21,100 dwellings destroyed (Singh, 2005).

Most jetties and harbour facilities were damaged, as was much of the communications infrastructure, meaning that access to affected areas was initially only possible by helicopter or plane into the Car Nicobar airstrip (Singh, 2005). The majority of drinking water sources in affected water were also contaminated (ibid).

A representative for Episcopal Relief and Development noted, after visiting the Islands, that “three out of the twelve previously inhabited Nicobar Islands are no longer habitable”, though she did not indicated the numbers of those affected (ERD - INDIA, 2005).

Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination

An Integrated Relief Command unit was set up immediately after the tsunami to coordinate all activities on the Islands (Singh, 2005). However, there have been complaints both from within the Island communities (see ‘Degree of local community influence ...’ below) and from external sources. The government has refused to allow foreign access to some islands, citing military and ‘tribal’ sensitivities (Ganguly, 2005, pp.7-8), which at the very least has offered fertile ground for accusations of secrecy and unfair distribution of aid. There were initial delays securing access to the Islands as a result of their isolation and damage sustained to transport and communications infrastructure (Guardian, 2005). However, even once these challenges had been addressed, complaints regarding official refusal of access were quick to surface from NGOs and others. For example, Oxfam and Médecins sans Frontières both experienced early difficulties undertaking relief work, with Oxfam complaining that the policies delayed provision of essential supplies, while Médecins sans Frontières provided medical which then sat on the wharves for some weeks (BBC News, 2005a).

It is not altogether clear how this situation is impacting rehabilitation and long-term development. Some of the complaints from Islanders summarised below offer some insight, though it is also apparent that the limited levels of access to the Islands impede the flow of information on progress. The Indian Government lists 61 NGOs and other agencies that have undertaken tsunami-related relief work in the Islands. They include seven international organisations: Oxfam, Action Aid, UNICEF, International Red Cross, Save the Children, Friends Society for Social Service and Adventist Development Relief Agency (National Informatics Centre, 2005). It is notable that, of these, only UNICEF, the Red Cross and ADRA were involved on islands or areas outside the capital, Port Blair.

This official list only covers relief work, and there is very little indication amongst the descriptions offered of anything more than that – Save the Children are listed as providing school books, and Indian organisations Calorex Foundation and Radhaswami Satsang are listed as having been given ‘clearance’ to build new school buildings (National Informatics Centre, 2005).

Save the Children refer to 'long-term' work in association with UNICEF (Save the Children, 2005a) and provide very slightly more detail in their own press releases and web-based progress report. Specific mention is made of a survey they are undertaking with UNICEF to identify education needs in the Islands, as well as work with fishing communities to recover lost livelihoods for parents (Save the Children, 2005b). UNICEF note that they are providing “... refurbished equipment in health centres” and 500 new water tanks in the Islands alongside relief work such as emergency food, medical supplies and latrines (UNICEF, 2005).

Episcopal Relief and Development, who note that they are one of the few external NGOs allowed access to many islands, are involved in relocating residents of the three previously inhabited Nicobar islands which are no longer habitable. This support includes provision of 500 new homes, 200 new boats, four reconstructed pig farms and four poultry farms. They also assisting with school construction and are introducing a women’s micro-finance scheme aimed at assisting with the establishment of handicraft cooperatives. The total value of the first two phases of this programme (now in Phase 2) is US$1,375,787 (ERD - INDIA, 2005).
Writing in May, Ganguly notes government intentions to build new, planned villages with health clinics, playgrounds and other facilities, although she also notes concern that residents may be displaced to enable the construction of tourist resorts (Ganguly, 2005 p.8).

Data on levels of expenditure on many rehabilitation projects is unavailable.

**Local community participation and knowledge sharing**

There are signs of dissatisfaction from Islanders, especially with regard to recent complaints about ‘joke’ aid payments. In May, one woman reported that she had rejected an offer of Rs2 (US$0.05) compensation for tsunami damage from the local government. In more recent weeks, other complaints have surfaced:

- A resident of Champin village, Nancowrie Island was offered Rs2 (US$0.05) for damage to her coconut trees;
- 47 villagers were each offered Rs184 (US$4.23) for three acres of water-damaged farmland;
- 21 villagers were offered Rs238 (US$5.47) for water-damaged farmland; and
- 24 residents of Chouldhari village were offered Rs118 (US$2.71) for six acres of water-damaged farmland which local officials value at between Rs250,000 and Rs500,000 (BBC News, 2005c).

Ganguly notes that a government investigation into the early BBC report (the Rs2 compensation in May) concluded that the report had been mistaken and that the Rs2 sum had been an ‘additional payment’ after a recalculation (Ganguly, 2005, p.9), though she was writing before the additional complaints had been reported.

As early as February, The Hindu newspaper also reported dissatisfaction from the Andaman Chamber of Commerce at the level of aid that was being made available. They noted that levels of fishing-industry compensation were to low to enable rehabilitation at higher-than-normal island prices, while there was no rehabilitation plan covering trade and industry or tourism (The Hindu, 2005a).

ActionAid has also highlighted the discrimination experienced by workers, who have been brought over from mainland India as labourers in the past. Known as ‘encroachers’, after their need to find land on which to live once their initial labouring employment has ceased, this group has been systematically excluded from relief aid, with local government officials periodically evicting them from the land on which they are living. The government is resistant to NGO efforts to establish cash-for-work schemes, on the basis that this would reduce labour availability for other reconstruction work (ActionAid, 2005).

**Mainland India**

**Needs Assessments**

Most damage was caused by the waves. Fishing communities were the worst affected. Tourist facilities were the next most significantly affected. Of mainland sites, infrastructure in Nagapattinam District, Tamil Nadu was worst hit. Compound walls up to 300m inland from the shoreline suffered significant damage, as did other structures, including bridges, railways tracks and telecommunications facilities (Jain, 2005).

A total of 2,260 km of coastline was affected, with 8,009 deaths in Tamil Nadu and lower numbers in other states (107 in Andhra Pradesh, 599 in Pondicherry and 177 in Kerala – Singh, 2005). An estimated 150,000 marine fishing households lost their livelihoods in Tamil Nadu, with some 70-80% of all mainland deaths coming from fishing communities (Ganguly, 2005, p.6). Estimates indicate that women and children account for approximately 75% of deaths amongst fishing communities (Singh, 2005).
An estimated 214,277 dwellings were destroyed in mainland India, of which 190,000 were in Tamil Nadu, 13,735 in Kerala, 10,061 in Pondicherry and the remaining 481 were in Andhra Pradesh (Singh, 2005).

**Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination**

Of the recently announced Rs98,702 million government rehabilitation package, Rs40,848 million is intended for Tamil Nadu, Rs14,705 million for Kerala, Rs1,381 million for Andhra Pradesh and Rs4,874 million for Pondicherry, while a further Rs7,752 million is earmarked for shipping rehabilitation (Singh, 2005).

As noted above, ERD are currently engaged in a second phase project, focusing on livelihoods recovery, housing construction, orphan care and water and sanitation provision. They plan to construct 550 dwellings and to provide fishing nets, 375 catamarans and 198 fishing boats. They are also establishing a micro-finance facility, caring for 200 orphaned children and establishing health clinics in communities that have not previously received aid. The value of Phases 1 and 2 in southern India amounts to US$1,420,000 (ERD - INDIA, 2005).

Save the Children, in association with UNICEF, are carrying out an assessment (similar to the one they are undertaking in the Islands) of long-term education needs in Tamil Nadu. They are also planning a permanent Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) centre in the area, and intend to cooperate with the Indian Academy of Paediatricians to assess health and nutrition needs for women and children to enable targeted interventions in the future. Finally, Save the Children have been working extensively with fishing communities in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh on livelihoods restoration or replacement. These activities have focused on providing a cash-for-work scheme aimed at rehabilitating 36 acres of salt pans and distributing tools for fishing boat repair and construction (Save the Children, 2005b).

**Local community participation and knowledge sharing**

At this stage, the rehabilitation process has only officially been underway for a brief period, so it is difficult to ascertain the degree of effective participation that is occurring. Relief projects such as the Disaster Mitigation Institute’s Temporary Shelter Programme made explicit use of the minimum standards established by The Sphere Project. DMI have now produced an informative report detailing their experiences, extending to provision of 1,383 housing units in 15 villages in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry (DMI, 2005). There were no equivalent reports found relating to long-term development or rehabilitation projects.

Human Rights Watch expresses concern that in some cases panchayats have been sidelined by politicians or officials, whilst in other instances, panchayats have directed assistance solely to members of their own caste or religion (ibid, p.10). They feel that women and girls, dalits and the disabled have been particularly disadvantaged.

The issue of caste discrimination has been widely highlighted, and is discussed at greater length below, in relation to the implications for long-term rehabilitation.

**Implications of current practice on long-term development**

**Coordination:** Some problems with NGO/state coordination of activities were identified during the relief phase (Kumar, 2005), with indication that some issues remain unresolved now that rehabilitation has begun. Human Rights Watch recommend strengthening governance at every level, including enhancement of the role played by panchayats. They also note that, currently, policy and decisions taken at higher levels within state institutions are not implemented at a village level (Ganguly, 2005, p.45).

Indian-based ‘networking NGO’, Citizens’ Alliance for Sustainable Living (SUSTAIN) has established a ‘Civil Society Coalition for Disaster Abatement’ office based in the UN-HABITAT office. The aim for that office is to provide some coordination for relief work undertaken by NGOs and government. They have organised two consultation workshops to date and are engaged in ongoing efforts to extend linkages and cooperation (Devasahayam, 2005).
Permanent Shelter: The Disaster Mitigation Institute offer specific recommendations on the basis of their work in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry. In common with the Temporary Shelter Programme, they recommend that a high level of participation from affected communities be maintained, along with an incremental approach to village redevelopment. In line with Sphere principles, they emphasise the importance of maximising utilisation of local labour and ensuring that new dwellings are located close to livelihoods (DMI, 2005).

Human Rights Watch is concerned that title to permanent dwellings is issued in the name of both husband and wife, and that women are explicitly included in consultation processes. In addition, they note that a number of temporary shelter programmes (both NGO and state-led) have failed to ensure that dwellings are suited to local conditions. They therefore call for this to be rectified as permanent dwellings are constructed. Finally, they note the need for reasonable compensation to be paid where land is acquired for housing programmes (Ganguly, 2005, p.44).

Anti-Dalit Discrimination: Amongst affected communities in Tamil Nadu, a number of writers have noted high levels of discrimination against those of the Dalit caste, particularly on the part of the Meenavar fishing communities in Nagapattinnam District (Jain, 2005, Narrain, 2005, Ganguly, 2005 etc). Dalits have traditionally worked alongside the Meenavar, though in strongly segregated roles, with the Meenavar tending to maintain the view that dalits are ‘untouchable’ (Narrain, 2005). This situation has been exacerbated by the fact that local government in affected areas has had to rely heavily on fishing community organisations to assist with the distribution of relief aid (Sreenivas, 2005). The Indian Express reports a range of stories emanating from a large number of the relief camps set up in the area, including dalit exclusion from camps, denial of access to food, drinking water and other supplies and so on (ibid). Although these stories relate to relief aid rather than development initiatives, it seems very likely that these experiences will be repeated with respect to longer term assistance. NGOs in the area had quite quickly been forced to deal with dalit groups separately, establishing camps and distribution programmes exclusively for those affected (ibid). The Citizen’s Initiative for Tsunami Victims notes specifically that medium-term food security and livelihoods restoration amongst dalits have been set back by these discriminatory processes (Narrain, 2005). The same report describes the situation in Nadukalampete (near Karaikul) as “alarming” (ibid, p.3).

Human Rights Watch has expressed similar concerns, including the lack of recognition by government and other agencies of livelihood loss amongst dalits and other landless groups (Ganguly, 2005).

Indian NGOs note specifically that government policy at a state level has failed to account for the needs of dalit communities. The problem extends back to the definition of ‘livelihood affected persons’, which largely excludes dalits: emphasis is placed on the losses of property owners (Narrain, 2005 and Revathi Niruj, Deepu and Clifton, 2005). In addition, they consider that the deliberation that the relief phase had been completed was premature. With respect to non-government activities, they note that the NGO Coordination Centre in Nagapattinnam, who coordinated NGO activities in the area, focused largely on apparently homogeneous fishing ‘communities’, ignoring dalits, who tend to provide ancillary services within those communities (ibid).

The rehabilitative recommendations of the Citizen’s Initiative are that:

- urgent attention be paid to re-categorisation of ‘livelihood affected persons’ to include dalits, with declaration of the whole of Nagapattinnam and Karaikal Districts as ‘tsunami-affected’ to account for the damage to livelihoods amongst those for whom property was not lost;
- long- and short-food security issues amongst dalits be assessed immediately, with particular attention paid to the needs of women, children and the elderly;
- introduction of a food/cash-for-work programme allowing non property-owners access to basic employment in the medium term for a minimum of 15 days in each month;

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6 Villagers in Keelavanchor blocked the Nagapattinnam – Karaikul road on 24 January in protest against what they felt was the premature declaration that the relief phase had ended (Revathi, Neju and Clifton, 2005).
o activation of the national Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana food-based work-creation programme in the affected districts; and

o introduction in the affected districts of the ‘Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravida Housing Corporation’ (TADHCO) scheme, in which one acre is made available to landless agricultural workers, alongside an appropriate training programme and finance for livestock purchase (Revathi Niruj, Deepu and Clifton, 2005 and Alternative Law Forum, 2005).

The Alternative Law Forum has expressed concern in a number of papers that neither the relevant state nor national governments appear to have taken seriously prior rulings by the Indian Supreme Court that they have a constitutional duty to ensure access to basic food needs for all citizens (Revathi, Niruj, Deepu and Clifton, 2005 and Narrain, 2005).

Protection of Children: Human Rights Watch express concern at the potential for children to be unduly disadvantaged. Specifically, they call for the current programme aimed at reuniting tsunami orphans with family members and note the potential for children to be prematurely placed for adoption. They also note the potential for children to fall victim to trafficking and forced labour as a result of tsunami-induced or exacerbated poverty (Ganguly, 2005, p.43).

## Indonesia

### Summary

The relative extent of the area affected in Indonesia was not vast, but the degree of devastation within that area was enormous. The fact that most of the affected area has been subject to long-term civil conflict has resulted in significant, though inconsistent, efforts by the Indonesian Government to limit access to the area by foreign agencies and NGOs.

While the level of relief aid to the area has been extremely generous (indeed, sufficient for emergency requirements) it has been beset by accusations of inefficient delivery. Both Government and UN work has been so criticised, and it is notable that the Government’s long-awaited Reconstruction Plan is yet to be widely distributed. Detailed rehabilitation spending plans from the UN and other agencies have also been delayed in the absence of this plan.

Considerable hope has nevertheless been generated by the recent appointment and early performance of the new director of rehabilitation in the area, Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, who has embarked on an anti-corruption campaign and professes to welcome NGOs and rehabilitation agencies to the area.

There is no doubt that the political tensions in Aceh and the consequent low level of trust between Government and locals have hampered efforts at improving the voice of communities in rehabilitation efforts. There is also a lack of data to assess the true situation.

### Needs Assessments

Official figures for NAD (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) and North Sumatra Provinces, released on 6 March, indicate 125,866 people dead and a further 94,494 missing, presumed dead (CAP, 2005). In Aceh, an estimated 1 million people were affected in 14 of NAD Province’s 21 Districts (ADRA, 2005c). The number of those displaced has been revised upwards a number of times, with the current (June) figure standing at 595,000 (ADRA, 2005f).

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7 A recent and scathing attack by UK Minister for International Development, Gareth Thomas on the efficiency of the UN’s rehabilitation efforts has been widely reported (Aglionby, 2005).
Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination

The Government of Indonesia formally requested that the UN coordinate international relief assistance. Consequently, the Joint Disaster Management Centre was established, physically sited within the Office of the Vice-President. By June, this joint group, together with a number of major donors, were developing a longer-term Reconstruction Plan (CAP, 2005). To that degree, the transition from relief work to development and rehabilitation had not been completed, though a UN spokesperson has recently (14 June) noted that the Plan is now being circulated (Aglionby, 2005).

The Government’s initial assessment valued the damage caused by the tsunami at Rs41.4 trillion (US$4.3 billion), requiring estimated imports of Rs3.8 trillion (US$395 million) to enable reconstruction (CGI, 2005). Detailed estimates of the amount of international aid requested for long-term rehabilitation will be offered as part of the Reconstruction Plan that is now underway.

The UN’s Financial Tracking Service lists payments to date from bilateral and multilateral donors, totalling US$660 million. The bulk of these funds have been spent on short-term relief work (FTS – Indonesia, 2005).

The UN coordinating team note that funding for immediate relief work was generous, and has largely enabled initial needs to be met. However, funding for work with a longer term focus has not been so forthcoming. The Consolidated Appeals Process mid term report, expresses particular concern with regard to livelihoods programmes: “... relatively poor funding of these programmes has limited their capacity to assist people in livelihoods activities” (CAP, 2005, p.44).

A very recent (14 June) announcement from the UK and Indonesian governments confirms that Britain is to raise its own aid contribution from US$18.4 million to US$92 million (Jakarta Post, 2005).

Reports of problems with coordination of aid persist. A recent (31 May) example involved the Governor of Aceh discovering 1,400 containers of relief supplies on the wharf at Belawan Port, Melan. Initial reports suggested that the containers had been “… stranded because of bureaucracy …” (Indonesia-Relief, 2005), but more recent reports suggest that the recipient NGO did not have the funds to arrange for transport to Aceh (ibid). Kuntoror Mangkusubroto, newly appointed head of the Indonesian Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (see below), has also criticised both local and international NGOs for engaging in ‘turf wars’. He cites examples of active non-cooperation amongst groups constructing housing, in which one party attempts to prevent access to a rival (Norton, 2005).

UK International Development Minister Gareth Thomas has also joined the fray, complaining that, while the initial relief effort was “well run”, UN work on longer-term rehabilitation has been badly coordinated and is plagued by inadequate funding disbursement, insufficient competent staff and poor communication. The UN’s spokesperson has denied these charges, noting that the UN in turn has been delayed while the national Reconstruction Plan was prepared (Aglionby, 2005).

Local community participation and knowledge sharing

Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto was appointed director of the Indonesian Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, or BRR) on 30 April, with a specific brief to ensure the rehabilitation process is “… a community-driven programme, with particular attention paid to respecting local values and beliefs” (BRR, 2005). Encouragingly, reports indicate that he has indeed embarked on a tough anti-corruption drive and is making significant efforts to coordinate the work of NGOs and government agencies (ADRA, 2005f). The degree to which Aceh communities are genuinely involved in the decision-making process is less easy to ascertain.

There is no doubt that the longstanding tensions in Aceh have had an impact on the degree of influence that affected communities have had on tsunami-related interventions. There have been numerous reports of Indonesian officials barring access to NGOs or specific individuals, and setting deadlines for the withdrawal of foreign workers (for example, Moore and Farouque, 2005). It is also notable that official documents offer little if any profile to issues related to this conflict, and a number of human rights groups have questioned this stance (for example, Aguswandi, 2005). However, it is difficult to assess the scale of nature of this impact with any accuracy. Ongoing talks between the Government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki offer cause for hope. Current plans for a fifth round of talks in July are intended to lead to a deal (Branchereau, 2005).
However, a number of commentators, including former US President, Bill Clinton on a recent (end of May) visit to the area, have expressed concern at the effect the conflict is having (Kassim, 2005 and Norton, 2005).

Sri Lanka

Summary

While Sri Lanka was quite some distance from the epicentre, a remarkable two-thirds of the country’s coastline was affected to some degree by the tsunami. Damage was therefore extensive. Many of the worst affected areas were in the north east – an that has, like Aceh in Indonesia, long been subject to civil conflict. Although a ceasefire had been in place for some two and a half years prior to the tsunami, much infrastructure had not been repaired, and the political tensions behind the conflict have led to Government paralysis. The situation has now become even more serious with the withdrawal from coalition of one the Government’s key partners. This political background has led to significant problems in relation to the distribution of aid.

A policy-related issue which has assumed great national profile is the intention of the Government to enforce a 100m or 200m exclusion, setback or ‘no construction’ zone, measured from the mean high-water mark and within which no reconstruction would be permitted. Critics have noticed that this zone affects a large number of poor fishing communities and small businesses, and they point out that large tourist facilities already appear to be receiving permission to be excepted from this policy. Meanwhile, significant numbers of displaced people remain in temporary accommodation as a result of the debate over the policy.

A 24-month UN Transitional Strategy for Sri Lanka was due to be published by the end of May, though it was not available at the time of writing this report.

Needs Assessments

The most accurate assessment of the damage caused by the tsunami seems to be the official figures released on 15 February. They list 30,959 deaths, 5,644 missing, 500,668 displaced and 103,789 households were directly affected in 12 coastal districts (ADRA, 2005c). It is estimated that between 1 and 2 million people may be indirectly affected. The tsunami struck a 1,000km stretch of coast; approximately two-thirds of the country’s coastline, including a substantial section of the west coast (ADB – Sri Lanka, 2005).

Shortly after the tsunami, the Government of Sri Lanka requested that the Asian Development Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the World Bank conduct a joint assessment of damage and needs. That task was undertaken between 10th and 28th January. The working group estimated that the country had sustained direct damage valued at US$1 billion (4.5% of GDP) and would need between US$1.5 billion and US$1.6 billion to undertake an effective recovery programme (on top of the US$200 million that had already been spent by the Sri Lankan Government). The sectors which were worst hit were fisheries and tourism, though above all, it was the loss of housing stock that has affected the greatest number (ADB/JBIC/ WB, 2005).

The North East region was the most severely affected, partly due to pre-existing vulnerabilities arising as a result of the prolonged period of conflict in the area. Although a ceasefire had been in place for two and a half years by the time of the tsunami, much infrastructure had not been rebuilt and landmines remain prevalent (ADB/JBIC/WB, 2005).

Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination

The UN’s Financial Tracking Service lists payments to date from bilateral and multilateral donors, totalling US$440.2 million. The vast bulk of these funds have been spent on short-term relief work (FTS – Sri Lanka, 2005). Indeed, the Mid-term Review of the Consolidated Appeals Process notes that “while humanitarian emergency operations have been in general well funded ..., sectors such as
critical infrastructure/environment, shelter/NFIs, restoration of livelihoods, agriculture and capacity building remain under funded” (CAP, 2005, p.115).

The substantial support received in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami has enabled the Government to offer a relatively generous compensation package for housing damage. Households for whom housing was destroyed (ie repair would cost more than 40% of the cost of replacement – Hague, 2005) were eligible for a payment of Rs250,000 (US$2,500), while those whose dwelling was damaged were eligible for a grant of Rs100,000 (US$1,000). In addition, all who claimed these grants could also borrow up to a further Rs500,000 (US$5,000) at a concessionary rate. Finally, those not permitted to rebuild in newly introduced ‘exclusion zones’ (see below), were offered a new home of at least 500 square feet (ACHR, 2005).

There has been considerable criticism from a range of sources about inefficient distribution of aid (Forum-Asia, 2005). World Bank VP, Praful Patel, has expressed his dissatisfaction at slow distribution, blaming lack of capacity to cope with the quantity of money donated and the magnitude of the challenge. Patel listed the controversy over the coastal exclusion zone as another contributing factor (Mika, 2005). An estimated total in excess of 45,000 new homes will need to be built to accommodate households relocated from the exclusion zone. In May, UN-Habitat assumed responsibility for coordination of the required housing construction, though they noted then that over 50% of the land needed had yet to be acquired by the state (UN-Habitat, 2005).

Local community participation and knowledge sharing

Over the years, civil society in Sri Lanka has been ethnically divided and undermined by political patronage and the protracted civil conflict in the north (Orjuela, 2003). Nevertheless, many CBOs and NGOs did rapidly become involved in the relief effort. In a measure that holds out some hope for future relations, even the Government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been forced to cooperate, albeit somewhat grudgingly (ADB/JBIC/WB, 2005). Local NGOs such as SEVANATHA (Jayaratne, 2005) and Sarvodaya (Sarvodaya, 2005) were quick to start to mobilise resources.

However, the Government has been heavily criticised over plans to create an exclusion, ‘no-construction’ or ‘setback’ zone of 100m from the mean high-water mark in the more densely populated south and 200m in the north in which no reconstruction would be allowed (ACHR, 2005). A number of NGOs and community groups from the tsunami region met in Colombo in March, drawing up a ‘Declaration for a People-Centred Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Process’, in which they explicitly called for governments to permit tsunami-affected communities to rebuild in established locations (ACHR et al, 2005).

The rationale behind these exclusion zones is that much of the destruction resulted from settlements built very close to the shore (Withanage, 2005). However, there is considerable scepticism, with many believing that the zone will be used for the construction of tourist facilities (sources within the Tourism Ministry have been quoted as saying the exclusion zones will not apply to tourist hotels – Rajepakse, 2005). The Government appears to have retreated somewhat: judging by some early statements, their initial position appeared to favour a 300m exclusion zone (Senewiratne, 2005), while there are some recent suggestions of a selective application of the rules. The ADB/JBIC/WB’s ‘Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’ itself notes that “even if [the no-construction zones are] ... not implemented as a blanket rule, but only applied in specific high risk areas, there will be considerable relocation of people” (ADB/JBIC/WB, 2005, p.11).

This issue seems to have developed into something of a stand off between displaced communities on one side, and the Government and environmental lobbies on the other. One of the major problems lies in the fact that the current policy position is unclear (de Alwis, 2005).

Many of the other complaints relating to inefficient aid distribution also have longer term consequences for local communities. The World Bank’s Praful Patel notes the effect that the surge of arrivals of international NGOs has had on local organisations: over 100 INGOs established offices in Sri Lanka immediately after the tsunami, with many offering several times local salary levels. “Local NGOs were losing staff, so their complaint was: instead of helping us build capacity, they are actually weakening us” said Patel (Mika, 2005).
Implications of current practice on long-term development

A 24-month UN Transitional Strategy for Sri Lanka was due to be published by the end of May (CAP, 2005), though it does not yet seem to be available publicly. The Government of Sri Lanka’s own long-term ‘National Reconstruction Plan’ is also not yet finalised (ibid). The lack of speed with which much post-tsunami planning has progressed does seem to be limiting rehabilitation progress.

As discussed above, the issue of setback or exclusion zones has also become highly charged (ACHR et al, 2005). Lack of clear policy, along with widely held perceptions of inequity are causing significant problems. Some whose dwellings were previously located within the coastal exclusion zones remain in tent or other temporary shelters, while the controversy continues (Forum-Asia, 2005 and Perera, 2005). There is clearly a need for much greater clarity and urgency in this area.

Looming over all of these issues is the ever-present issue of political instability. While there has been genuine progress relating to the northern conflict, with the Government agreeing terms for cooperation with the LTTE, this has in turn led to protest from other parties. The Government’s coalition ally the People’s Liberation Front (JVP) has just (15 June) announced that it will leave the government in protest against their accommodation of the LTTE. This development will prevent the government from implementing a range of policies, though they could conceivably continue until the budget is due in November (Gardner, 2005). This is clearly not a situation conducive to improvement in priority setting and the efficiency of rehabilitation efforts.

Thailand

Summary

Relief and rehabilitation efforts in Thailand receive a remarkably consistent level of praise. A number of areas have been identified in which improvement is possible, including development of a comprehensive national disaster preparedness plan and protection for vulnerable groups, the general consensus seems very positive.

Needs Assessments

A joint assessment of damage and recovery needs was conducted between 11 and 24 January by the FAO and Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, noting that the vast majority of damage in the agriculture sector was sustained by the fishing industry. That assessment valued damage to fishing capacity at US$47.2 million – 99% of damage to all agriculture, which was valued at US$47.8 million. A total of 5,467 fishing boats were damaged, along with an estimated 6,000 fish and shellfish farms and extensive other damage. The majority of this destruction occurred in and around Phang-Nga, Phuket and Ranong (FAO/MOAC, 2005). The tourist industry has also been substantially affected with about 120,000 people having lost jobs in tourism alone (UNDP, 2005a).

The Thai Ministry of the Interior’s 8th June figures indicate 5,395 dead, of whom 1,972 were Thai, 2,248 were foreign and the remaining 1,175 have not been identified. A further 2,817 are still officially missing (UNCT, 2005). The tsunami struck the west coast of the country, affecting 308 villages in six provinces. A total of 12,068 households were directly affected (ADRAc, 2005).

Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination

The UN’s Financial Tracking Service lists payments to date from bilateral and multilateral donors, totalling US$23.9 million. The vast bulk of these funds have been spent on short-term relief work (FTS – Thailand, 2005).

The emergency phase is now considered to have ended (UNCT, 2005).

Within the UN system, UNDP has undertaken a number of tasks, including restoration of livelihoods with a budget of US$3.5 million; disaster preparedness and mitigation US$300,000; environmental
rehabilitation US$1.6 million; and coordination of international assistance US$652,000. To June, UNDP had spent a total of US$6 million (UNDP, 2005b).

NGOs such as Episcopal Relief and Development (housing construction, livelihoods recovery and trauma counselling through two phases with a budget of US$215,000 – ERD – Thailand, 2005) and World Vision (emergency supplies with a budget of over US$220,000 – World Vision, 2005) have also been active in the affected areas.

The Thai Government itself reported spending of approximately US$9 million on emergency assistance (UNCT, 2005).

Thailand’s Government has largely been praised for its response to the tsunami, with some noting that the highly centralised system of Thai government is likely to have helped with effective and rapid coordination (Richburg, 2005).

Local community participation and knowledge sharing

There is a considerable level of local discomfort at the prospect of a future tsunami, with local area drills being carried out from time to time and other preparations at various stages. Thailand’s new National Disaster Warning Centre was opened on 30 May (UNCT, 2005).

ThaiTogether (originally the Thailand Tsunami Recovery Group) was established shortly after the tsunami with the intention of helping to coordinate NGO efforts, and to enhance knowledge sharing between relief and recovery organisations. The group is funded by the private Annika Linden Foundation. The original meeting held to establish the organisation attracted 85 participants from a range of NGOs, while more recent meetings continue to draw 50 or so. Participating NGOs include World Vision and Red Cross as well as a number of others (ThaiTogether team, 2005 and ThaiTogether, 2005).

While Thailand’s response has received largely positive assessments, a number of areas have been identified in which improvement could be achieved:

- development of a comprehensive national preparedness plan;
- improved emergency resource management systems;
- improved financial and volunteer management;
- protection for vulnerable groups; and
- greater involvement of affected communities.

(UNCT, 2005)

A major workshop is scheduled to have taken place in Medan 13-14 June, at which best practices will be shared and documented, with progress in land entitlement, tourism rebuilding and housing provision noted for special attention (UNCT, 2005).

Maldives

Summary

The Maldives are in the appalling position of having seen the tsunami wipe out a large percentage of the national economy. In all other countries, the tsunami affected a small percentage of the total population/economy, making it much easier for them to marshal resources for relief and rehabilitation. The low-lying Maldives experienced damage worth about 62% of GDP, with almost one third of the total population affected.

Against this background, it is perhaps not surprising that the recovery process has involved far reaching change. In fact, the whole system of government seems set for more rapid reform than might have been the case had the tsunami not occurred. Immediately after the tsunami, the government announced the introduction of multi-party democracy, and the relief and rehabilitation process has been remarkably transparent to date. To that degree, the calamity may have positive outcomes.
Initial funding commitments slightly exceeded the estimated requirement, but to date only 21.6% of the sum committed has materialised. The country therefore still faces a huge challenge if it is to rebuild itself.

**Needs Assessments**

The Government of the Maldives moved fast to assess the damage from the tsunami, establishing a Ministerial Taskforce within hours (World Bank, 2005), and circulating a detailed report listing damage assessments for 200 islands within a few days of the disaster (Office of President, 2005). A number of other agencies have subsequently completed assessments, with the most comprehensive that of a joint working group from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UN (World Bank/ADB/UN, 2005).

The low average altitude of the Maldives islands – an average 1.5 metres above sea level – meant that there was no altitude protection once the tsunami waves struck. The waves were up to 4.3 metres high by the time they reached the Maldives. Of the 198 inhabited islands, 39 were severely damaged by the waves and nearly one third of the total population of 300,000 were severely affected. Fourteen previously inhabited islands were rendered completely uninhabitable, approximately 12,000 people had to be evacuated from their islands, and a further 8,500 had to be relocated within their islands of domicile. 83 people have been confirmed dead, while a further 25 are missing, presumed dead (World Bank/ADB/UN, 2005).

The main industries in the Maldives are tourism and fishing, both of which were impacted significantly. The total assessed value of the non-environmental damage caused by the tsunami was US$470 million, or almost 62% of national GDP, resulting in a slow down in the economy of approximately 1% for 2005. Rebuilding is expected to result in a doubling of the current account deficit in 2005 from a projected 12% to 25% (World Bank, 2005). The Government’s initial assessment was that US$304 million would be required to fund recovery and reconstruction (World Bank, 2005), though this has since been revised upwards to US$375 million (MoFT, 2005c).

**Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination**

According to a recent (7 April) summary from the Ministry of Finance and Treasury of the Government of the Maldives, a total of US$84.6 million aid had been received from all sources (domestic and foreign; cash, loan and in-kind). This represents 21.6% of the total committed. The breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>all US$ (000s)</th>
<th>Cash Grant Funds</th>
<th>Loan Funds</th>
<th>In Kind by Value</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>committed</td>
<td>received</td>
<td>committed</td>
<td>received</td>
<td>committed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>62,586</td>
<td>23,624</td>
<td>40,186</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>29,180</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>106,442</td>
<td>6,242</td>
<td>112,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs/foreign</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total International</td>
<td>93,452</td>
<td>25,390</td>
<td>146,628</td>
<td>6,242</td>
<td>150,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Domestic</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>94,918</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,856</strong></td>
<td><strong>146,628</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,242</strong></td>
<td><strong>150,689</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(MoFT, 2005a)

Total funds committed by bilateral and multilateral donors amounts to US$366 million and now comes close to the official estimate of requirements (US$374 million). However, a subsequent Government calculation of funds committed suggests that bilateral and multilateral commitments...
amount to only US$260 million, leaving a gap of US$114 million (MoFT, 2005c). The reason for this discrepancy is unclear.

The Government has established an 'Island Livelihood Revitalisation and Development Programme', which commenced its start-up phase on 15 March. It consists of grants and 5-10 year loans designed to enable the local population to reactivate livelihoods (MoFT, 2005d).

**Local community participation and knowledge sharing**

The Government appears to have put a great deal of effort into ensuring that relief and rehabilitation programmes have been transparent. Full and frequent financial accounts and plans have been published promptly online.

Indeed, the tsunami seems to have been a catalyst for remarkably broad reforms: shortly after the disaster, the President announced an amnesty for political prisoners, and has also introduced plans for multi-party democracy (BBC News – Maldives, 2005).

**Myanmar**

**Summary**

The damage and casualties sustained in Myanmar were much more limited than other countries reviewed. Initial relief activities met with a reasonable level of support from Government agencies, although problems have since surfaced with regard to coordination and access. Agencies have been particularly critical of the lack of consistency in assessments of damage, the lack of a disaster preparedness programme, and also of the apparent exclusion of non-Myanmar speaking communities from some services.

**Needs Assessments**

The destruction caused by the tsunami was more limited than in some other locations. Available data (15 February) indicates 61 deaths and 2,592 homeless. Between 5,000 and 7,000 people in 23 villages were directly affected, while between 10,000 and 15,000 are expected to experience a long-term detrimental effect on their livelihoods (ADRA, 2005c).

**Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination**

Because of the more limited extent of the damage, relief organisations were able to act relatively quickly (CAP, 2005).

The UN’s Financial Tracking Service lists payments to date from bilateral and private donors, totalling US$1.4 million. Donors are limited to China (US$200,000), the Hong Kong Red Cross (US$524,996), Ireland (US$678,426) and domestic private donors (US$17,393). Most of these funds have been spent on short-term relief work (FTS – Myanmar, 2005). The relief phase is now largely complete, with a transition to longer term rehabilitation, which is being undertaken “... by organisations and agencies already involved in those sectors”. No further funding is being sought under the CAP system, with funds already allocated sufficient for operations until the end of 2005 (CAP, 2005, p.93).

However, in spite of the more limited scale of the response required, the Consolidated Appeals Process still noted “... a lack of disaster preparedness” and “... inherent complications linked to coordination between international partners and national authorities” (CAP, 2005, p.93).
Local community participation and knowledge sharing

UNICEF is working closely with members of non-Myanmar-speaking minorities, in an effort to try and reduce the exclusion of these groups from services such as education in the affected areas (CAP, 2005).

The Mid-Term Review conducted under CAP notes the following:

“One of the main complications in the early stage of the emergency was the lack of consistency in the assessment of the situation in reports from different agencies and in the media. This contributed to tension with local authorities in some of the affected areas as well as confusion about the accuracy of the various assessments, including those of the UNCT [UN Country Team]. As a result, the UNCT is looking at ways to strengthen the public information strategy in future disaster situations.”

(CAP, 2005, p.94)

Somalia

Summary

Somalia’s Puntland coast was the most distant area significantly affected. Problems there primarily related to a lack of Government capacity to provide relief or coordination. More than this, though, however bad the damage caused by the tsunami, many tens of thousands of Somalis elsewhere in the country face a humanitarian crisis that is many times worse. For this reason, country staff at the UN/NGO Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) have decided to withdraw Somalia from the Flash Appeal process, in the hope that they will not detract from the financial resources available elsewhere for Somalia but within the CAP system.

Needs Assessments

A number of agencies conducted damage or needs assessments of one sort or another: from the site-based information gathering missions of WHO (Clarke, 2005) and others to the desk-based assessment of UNEP (UNEP, 2005). The affected area is remote, and the regional government in semi-autonomous Puntland is subject to severe capacity constraints. Consequently, data regarding damage and needs is subject to variation. Most reports suggest approximately 150 deaths, 4,000 displaced (WHO, 2005 and ADRA, 2005c). Some indicate as many as 300 fatalities (UNEP, 2005).

The tsunami hit a 640km stretch of coastline between Xaafuun in the north and Garacad, further to the south (CAP, 2005).

Funds commitment, disbursement and coordination

The UN’s Financial Tracking Service lists payments to date from bilateral and multilateral donors, totalling US$7.9 million. The vast bulk of these funds have been spent on short-term relief work (FTS – Somalia, 2005). In spite of the logistical issues related to delivery and distribution of relief supplies in such a remote area, a number of agencies have been active in the area, and have been able to provide much of the basic relief required (CAP, 2005).

Although most assessments have highlighted an urgent need for improvements in water supply in the area, no funds were identified under the FLASH Appeal for this purpose. However, UNICEF did identify some funds from a separate source to improve water provision to a limited extent (CAP, 2005).

Local community participation and knowledge sharing

Although Puntland has attained a relatively high level of security, relative to areas in the south of Somalia, the government fundamentally lacks capacity to provide even the most basic services to its
population, especially outside the main towns (WHO, 2005). Therefore, most relief efforts have been undertaken by agencies working directly alongside local communities, or by the communities by themselves.

**Implications of current practice on long-term development**

The paradox in Somalia’s case is that the tsunami-related problems pale into insignificance in comparison to the problems faced by many other communities throughout the country (UNICEF, 2005). This situation is so extreme that, while immediate relief needs for tsunami-affected people have largely been met, funding for the overall emergency requirements of Somalia, as identified under CAP, have achieved only a 3% coverage. The UN Somalia Country Team have therefore ceased to pursue continued funding under the Flash Appeal as they fear this would only detract from funds available for more urgent requirements elsewhere in the country (CAP, 2005, p.112).

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**Myanmar**


**Somalia**


Appendix

Sphere Project Standards

The minimum standards set by the Sphere Project, guiding humanitarian response to disasters are as follows:

- **Participation**
  - all people receive information on assistance and the opportunity to comment on it
  - written plans and objectives reflect the needs, concerns and values of disaster-affected people, including vulnerable groups
  - programming is designed to maximise the use of local labour and skills

- **Initial assessment**
  - Information gathering is standardised, allows for input on the part of disaster-affected people, and considers all sectors, including local and government capacities and responsibilities
  - Whenever possible, data is disaggregated by gender and age and externally validated and cross-checked
  - Assessment includes the operating environment, including personal safety, in which local people and humanitarian workers must work
  - Assessment findings are made available as widely as possible

- **Response**
  - Preservation of life is prioritised over other requirements
  - Interventions are designed to promote the livelihoods of the affected population
  - The activities of humanitarian agencies are effectively coordinated and information exchange is promoted, while agencies work to ensure that gaps in their own capacity are highlighted so that others might assist

- **Targeting**
  - targeting criteria must be based on vulnerability and clearly defined, with priorities agreed by the affected population
  - targeting mechanisms should not undermine the dignity and security of individuals or increase vulnerability to exploitation
  - distribution systems are effectively monitored to ensure targeting priorities are met

- **Monitoring**
  - information collected for monitoring must be timely, useful, accurate, transparent and systematic
  - women, men and children from affected are involved and consulted regularly
  - systems are in place to ensure that monitoring information is disseminated amongst humanitarian agencies, affected populations, local authorities and other actors, as needed

- **Evaluation**
  - programmes are evaluated against stated objectives and agreed standards, measuring appropriateness, efficiency, coverage, coherence and impact on affected populations
  - evaluations take account of the views of affected and host populations
  - information collection is impartial and independent
  - evaluation results are used to improve future practice

- **Aid worker competencies and responsibilities**
  - humanitarian workers are technically competent, possess appropriate experience and are familiar with humanitarian principles
• workers are knowledgeable about local conditions, including potential tensions and sources of conflict
• workers are able to recognise abusive, discriminatory and illegal activities and refrain from engaging in them

o **Supervision, management and support of personnel**
  • managers are accountable for their decisions and for ensuring adequate safety precautions and compliance with relevant regulations and codes of conduct
  • technical and management staff receive appropriate training and support
  • staff understand programme objectives and methods, receive appropriate monitoring and feedback on their performance, and have clear, written job descriptions and understand lines of authority
  • staff understand relevant health and safety practice and receive appropriate security training
  • the capacity of national and local authorities is enhanced with a view to improving long-term sustainability
  (Sphere Project, 2004)