Peace-Building, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

Technical Cooperation in the Context of Crises, Conflicts and Disasters
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Foreword

After 11 September, a set of conceptual guidelines for Technical Co-operation could barely be any more relevant than the present working paper. In the wake of the debate surrounding the implications and consequences of the terrorist attacks, development policy has assumed a new stature, and gained a fresh dimension. More than ever before, we are being called upon in our work to help improve the living conditions and prospects of people in our partner countries, and increase our efforts to prevent crises and defuse conflicts. The lack of prospects for young people is itself a fertile breeding ground for extremist views, and the will to use violence which they generate.

The German Government sees development policy as global peace policy. This is based on a broad understanding of security which goes beyond traditional security policy. Development policy is mandated to fight the root causes of poverty, injustice and the destruction of the vital natural resource base on which people depend, as well as to make direct inputs to the peaceful resolution of crises and conflicts rooted in poor development and social transition. Germany is thus one of many bi- and multilateral donors which increasingly see development cooperation as a contribution to crisis prevention and peaceful conflict management, and which are orienting their work accordingly. The present working paper seeks to conceptually underpin this new area of work in the specific context of Technical Cooperation. At the same time, it outlines GTZ’s existing services in this sector.

It also outlines the prospects for future tasks in this new work domain. TC possesses broad experience in implementing crisis- and conflict-related measures, as reflected in the activity areas and services outlined in the present paper. On the whole, however, individual approaches, instruments and services will need to be further developed on a continuous basis. In this context it will be necessary to continuously review and redefine the concrete potentials and limits of crisis prevention and conflict management.

The present working paper was written for a broad audience. First and foremost it is designed for all Technical Cooperation personnel. It is also intended for ministries, international institutions and non-governmental agencies. Finally, we also hope it will meet with keen interest on the part of all our many partners, from the consulting sector to the research institutions cooperating with us.

Our thanks are due to the author of the publication, Dr. Norbert Ropers of the Berghof Institute in Berlin, who in his capacity as our staff member in Sri Lanka is making a direct contribution to peace-building in that war-torn country.
Our thanks are also due to the research consultants, Dr. Brigitte Fahrenhorst and Professor Dr. Lothar Brock, and to all those whose suggestions and comments were so valuable to us.

Dr. Bernd Eisenblätter  
Director General

Bernd Hoffmann  
Director of Division
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU</td>
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<td>CPN</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Network</td>
</tr>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network</td>
</tr>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Civil Peace Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Development-oriented Emergency Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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1. Peace-building, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management – a Cross-cutting Theme for GTZ

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH operates as a federally-owned enterprise with the development-policy goal of helping improve the life opportunities of people in countries of the South and the East, and stabilise the natural resource base on which life depends. Its main client is the Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Within the framework of the German Government’s development policy guidelines and objectives, GTZ is commissioned to help design, plan and implement programmes and projects in partner countries. Other clients of GTZ include other Federal German Ministries, and institutions such as the European Commission, the World Bank, United Nations Organisations (UNO) (UN) organisations and regional development banks.

Technical Cooperation (TC) makes a key contribution towards strengthening the capabilities of people and organisations in partner countries. And its nature is now changing as a result: Whereas it used to identify solutions to clearly-defined problems, it now delivers complex inputs to help solve complex problem constellations. Having said that, any sustainable improvement in the living conditions of people in partner countries will be crucially dependent on the prevailing political, economic and social conditions in the country concerned.

As the 21st century dawns, living conditions are being significantly determined by the manner in which conflicts within and between states are being managed. Realistically, it must be assumed that for the foreseeable future, there will be a base of 20 to 40 serious violent conflicts at any given time. Furthermore, the emerging new socio-economic disparities and the global trends towards pluralisation and politicisation will ensure that the potential for conflict is more likely to increase than diminish in the future.

*Peace-building, crisis prevention and conflict management* have therefore become a major cross-cutting theme in Technical Cooperation during the last few years. The approaches and scope for action available to TC in this connection are discussed in the present working paper. Section 2 provides an overview of the
present development-policy debate, and sheds light on the con-
text of TC inputs to peace-building, crisis prevention and conflict
management. Section 3 deals with the points of departure, frame-
work conditions and key points of orientation for TC in this
activity area. Section 4 presents both the principles for action,
and the dilemmas associated with involvement. At the same time,
the two key strategies are outlined here: the promotion of struc-
tural stability, and the creation of human and institutional
capacities for the prevention and transformation of the potential
for violent conflicts. Section 5 is devoted to the relevant services
offered by GTZ. These services embrace both activity areas in
which GTZ already has many years of experience, and those
where GTZ’s service offering is currently being established and
developed.

The crisis-preventive orientation of TC is part of a general re-
orientation of German development policy towards a broader
understanding of “human security”. Having said that, it would be
inappropriate to expect too much of TC in this regard. Options
for bringing external influence to bear on acutely or latently vi-
olent conflicts, or their underlying social structures and processes,
are limited. The problems encountered in Germany in seeking to
overcome xenophobic tendencies are a good example of how dif-
ficult it is even for domestic actors under relatively privileged
conditions to respond effectively to social polarisation. TC’s
scope to influence such processes is also small, since in most
countries it does not make any significant contribution towards
the financing of official development activities. The options for
exerting pressure or offering incentives which influence decision-
making in situations of violent conflict are therefore limited.
Finally, it should be pointed out that TC constitutes only a small
segment of external relations as a whole. Efficient peace-building
and crisis prevention requires the coherence of all policy
domains, which includes arms control policy and foreign eco-
nomic policy.
2. Fundamentals

2.1 Terminology

Conflicts are a phenomenon associated with an inevitable corollary of co-existence in all societies, and to some extent are an inevitable and indeed a necessary corollary of social change. They are an expression of tensions and incompatibilities between different, mutually independent parties with regard to their respective needs, interests and values. These conflicts are liable to lead to crises and destructive escalations affecting whole societies primarily during phases of profound socio-economic change and political transition. In other words, such negative developments become likely in situations where life opportunities and opportunities for participation are being redistributed amongst various groups.

The problem is not the conflicts per se, but the way in which they are managed and resolved. The goal of development cooperation must therefore be to help prevent or transform violence as a means of pursuing conflicts, and to support constructive forms of conflict management. If we use the terminology of peace in place of the terminology of conflict, then the goal here could be reformulated as the pursuit of a state of “positive peace” in which the absence of violence (“negative peace”) is supplemented by the promotion of social justice, and thus placed on a sustainable and legitimate footing.

At the international level, both the terminology of peace and the terminology of conflict are used. A given preference for one or the other terminology is rather a reflection of the political context than a description of different spheres of action. Having said that, slightly different signals are sent, depending on whether the terms used are taken from the lexicon of peace-building, or from that of conflict management. It is therefore helpful to draw up a synopsis of the major terminological sub-categories (see Diagram 1 “conflict triad” and “peace triad”). Diagram 1 “Conflict Triad” and “Peace Triad”.

The two terminologies converge in devising a category defining the sphere of politico-diplomatic, objective conflict settlement/peace-making at the top level of leadership, also termed “Track 1”. Differences exist with respect to the emphasis placed
on “peace-keeping”, meaning the separation of the parties in situations of highly escalated crisis (e.g. involving blue helmets), as opposed to the emphasis placed on “conflict resolution”, which seeks to improve relations and communication between the parties (also referred to as “Track 2”). The terms “peace-building” and “conflict transformation” are largely congruent. Both emphasise the need for long-term work, the need to overcome the root causes of conflict, and the need to strengthen elements which link the parties to each other. In addition, conflict transformation also accentuates more the structurally-related measures, and peace-building more the process-related measures. “Track 3” embraces all levels of leadership, although it is increasingly being focused on activities at the grass-roots level (for further details on the “tracks” see sub-section 3.5).

In the political domain, the term “crisis prevention” has emerged as a key term covering both the terminology of conflict and the terminology of peace. It aims to emphasise the desired impact of the respective measures. In the present paper, the terms crisis prevention and conflict management will largely be used. The two terms designate two mutually complementary forms of exerting influence that both differ and overlap with respect to their points of departure and their range.
2.1 Terminology

**Conflict Triad**
(based on Reimann)

**conflict settlement**
at the politico-diplomatic management level (Track-1)

---

**conflict resolution**
by improving relations and communication between the parties (Track-2)

**conflict transformation**
by overcoming the causes of the conflict and strengthening conflict management capacities (Track-3)

---

**Peace Triad**
(based on Galtung)

**Peace-making**
through negotiation and settlement of objective disputes (Track-1)

---

**Peace-keeping**
by separating the parties and through “supervision”

**Peace-building**
by overcoming the causes of the conflict and strengthening elements linking the parties (Track-2, Track-3)
2.2 The Current Development-Policy Debate

There is a broad international consensus that the large number of violent conflicts within states remains one of the key problems faced as the new century dawns. In the course of these conflicts, millions of people have been killed, displaced or robbed of their life opportunities. Almost overnight, violent conflicts have destroyed the fruits of years of development work, and left the afflicted countries with an onerous legacy. Even where cease-fires have been achieved, many conflicts remain deadlocked, and constitute a key constraint to development of any kind.

Since the Brandt report was published in 1980, the interdependence of development and peace has repeatedly been acknowledged and underlined. Furthermore, during the early 1990s a heightened sensitivity to conflict-related issues became evident within the development community. This heightened sensitivity must be seen in the context of the shock generated by the massive escalation in ethno-political conflicts in preferred countries of western development cooperation, and especially the genocide which took place in Rwanda in 1994. It also reflects the growing orientation of development policy towards the vision of promoting pluralistic (i.e., potentially conflictual) democracy, which emerged alongside the vision of sustainable global development following the end of the East-West conflict.

Today, the relationship between development and peace is being debated primarily with respect to two questions:

- What contribution can development cooperation make towards the prevention, containment and resolution of violent conflicts?
- To what extent do development cooperation and emergency aid measures contribute inadvertently towards the exacerbation and/or prolongation of violent conflicts?

The kind of answers to these questions delivered to date differ somewhat, as demonstrated by the GTZ study “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical Cooperation. An Overview of the National and International Debate” (Mehler/Ribiaux 2000). On the basis of the experiences evaluated to date, more reliable recommendations can be provided for the prevention of undesired impacts that exacerbate conflicts, than for direct measures of peace-building, crisis prevention or conflict management.
An important role is played here by the community joint project launched by several aid organisations under the title “Do no harm”, and implemented by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) ‘Collaborative for Development Action’ (CDA). Through this project it was possible to identify more precisely the direct and indirect impacts of resource transfer in situations of crisis, as well as the “implicit ethical signals” associated with them which often enough at the same time act to exacerbate or prolong a conflict. In response to this, points of departure for mechanisms to counteract these inadvertently generated negative impacts were developed, which were also integrated into GTZ’s strategy for “development-oriented emergency aid” (DEA). Essentially, these mechanisms are based on the mobilisation of local capacities for peace to contain and overcome destructive attitudes and behaviours. In order to be able to identify those capacities early on and provide appropriate support, a participatory “rolling planning” of all measures is required.

Also significant were the experiences gained in political development cooperation, and especially the results to date of activities to promote democracy through elections, the formal rule of law, and pluralism in political party systems, civil society and the media. It became clear that these measures were not sufficient or not appropriate to prevent the advancing erosion of statehood, and the increase in the number of failed states. Furthermore, it was also argued that in many cases these measures were promoting the fragmentation rather than the integration of societies. The fact remains that the erosion of states goes hand-in-hand with the escalation of confrontational situations within states, accompanied by an advancing diffusion and privatisation of violence. To be able to counteract such developments, it is necessary to take into account all aspects of the political and social change process in its full complexity.

The aim of conflict impact assessment is to determine the impacts of measures on the structure and course of a conflict. Although this branch of research is still in its infancy, the conceptual debate surrounding it has already had a significant effect on the ongoing development of this activity area. The cross-section evaluation of the impacts of German development cooperation in six countries in conflict, commissioned by the BMZ, made a significant contribution to that debate. Other
development agencies have also now begun to systematically evaluate the conflict-related impacts of their projects.

### Box 1: Possible positive and negative impacts of development cooperation in conflict situations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible positive impacts/contributions</th>
<th>Possible negative impacts/contributions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eventual removal of causes of conflicts (regional disparities, employment opportunities, defusing of conflicts over resources etc.)</td>
<td>Direct support for and stabilisation of the government (through official development cooperation), which is itself a party to the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and social stabilisation in the short and medium term due to reconstruction efforts</td>
<td>Wrong signals sent to the government and opposition forces through “omission” (e.g. failure to seize opportunities during the policy dialogue) and “approval”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political openness, participation, democratisation and strengthening of capabilities to peacefully reconcile interests</td>
<td>Exacerbation of the conflict through the encouragement given to clientele systems and opportunities for corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural integration of the rule of law, democracy and political participation at all levels</td>
<td>Freeing-up of public funds for military expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of security and improved human rights conditions due to the presence of development cooperation personnel</td>
<td>Increased regional disparities caused by the promotion of certain regions to the ruling elite’s liking, which may exacerbate or even initiate conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and of clientele systems by means of economic reform programmes/structural adjustment</td>
<td>Violent countermeasures taken by the regime as a result of pressure for political reform (eventually, however, removal of potential for violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easing of the pressure exerted by development cooperation for action to deal with the causes of conflicts (“internationalisation” of government tasks)</td>
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Other problematic impacts:
- Possible exacerbation of conflicts caused by closure of project or withdrawal of personnel in acute conflict situations
- Increase in competitive behaviour within the public sector generated by economic reform programmes/structural adjustment
- Inability to influence measures of multilateral donors which exacerbate conflicts

The picture that is now emerging in this domain contains contradictory elements. Both positive and negative impacts have been identified, at both the macro- and at the project level.

These conflicting impacts of development cooperation clearly demonstrate that such cooperation cannot be neutral, but will inevitably impact on structures in partner countries. Consequently, Technical Cooperation must also:

- first of all take greater account of the socio-political context in project planning and implementation.
- Secondly, it should systematically develop further its options for direct crisis prevention and conflict management.

The “Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation” published in 1997 by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were an important milestone in development policy being steered towards these new tasks. The Guidelines emphasise different functions of development cooperation through the course of a conflict, and underline the fact that the comparative advantages of development inputs lie primarily during the phases before and after violent conflicts. At the same time, the Guidelines point out that a rigid approach should be avoided, as the aim is to utilise all possible opportunities to influence events and bring about constructive conflict transformation. According to the Guidelines, the humanitarian assistance phase may also be relevant under certain circumstances. Key conceptual categories in the DAC Guidelines are the promotion of “good governance” and a “vigorous civil society”, as well as a “civic spirit” embodied in attitudes, values and institutions.

Another major document in the development-policy debate was the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the “Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” (April 1998). Also important were various documents published by the European Union (EU) since 1995, in which a fresh development-policy emphasis on crisis prevention and peace-building was formulated.

Characteristic of the debate is the focus on a combination of structure-building measures which aim to overcome the underlying causes of peacelessness on a broad basis, and to strengthen specific conflict management capacities. A key concept in the former approach is that of “structural stability” (see sub-section...
3.7). With regard to capacity-building, there is a broad consensus that this is a major task both for NGOs, and for bi- and multilateral Technical Cooperation.

In its documents, the European Union gradually developed an integrated approach, in order to emphasise the need for a close networking of various instruments of development cooperation and political cooperation (see the Resolution of the European Council adopted in November 1998: “The role of development cooperation in strengthening peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution”). It remains to be seen how this declaration of programmatic intent can be put into practice. The fundamental restructuring of the EU under way since 1999, which has included the creation of the Office of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the establishment of a newly-designed Directorate-General for External Relations, has not made this task easy.

Two further features of the development-policy debate on conflict-related issues are the prioritisation of prevention rather than management or resolution, and the focus on the internal preconditions for the peaceful management of transformation processes. The first feature contrasts sharply with actual development cooperation activity in crisis regions, which is clearly focused on post-war situations. This reflects the fact that the development community is still seeking ways to overcome political, psychological and bureaucratic resistance to greater prevention of violent conflict. The second feature reflects the general trend towards viewing national institutions and elites as the key to all development progress.

As the new century dawns, operationalisation of development policy for conflict prevention and resolution is now on the agenda. This is reflected by the activities of the Conflict-Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Networks (CPR), and the Practical Guide: Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries produced by the EU Conflict Prevention Networks (CPN). The CPR network comprises representatives of bi- and multilateral donor organisations that attach importance to a regular exchange of experience and a coordination of future activities in situations of conflict. The CPN is a project of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin) which delivers advisory services to EU institutions on crisis prevention issues. Both the
CPR and the CPN initiatives aim to develop viable, practical instruments, along with quality criteria for their application.

Below the multilateral level, a number of bilateral development agencies are currently seeking to professionalise the crisis- and conflict-related components of their programmes. Scandinavian, Canadian and British institutions have demonstrated a particular commitment to this field (see Mehler/Ribaux 2000).

2.3 Peace Policy and Crisis Prevention as Strategic Elements of German Development Policy

The German Government, in office since October 1998, declared both German foreign and development policy to be core domains of policy for peace. At the same time, it underlined the close link between these domains, indicating that both should be oriented towards the principles of a just reconciliation of interests in the international, regional and national contexts.

Crisis prevention has been one of the expressly emphasised objectives of German development policy since 1997. At that point in time, however, the aim was not to develop new instru-

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**German Foreign Policy is Peace Policy**

“The new Federal Government will further develop the basic guidelines of existing German foreign policy: peaceful cooperation in partnership with our neighbours, cultivation of the transatlantic partnership, deepening and widening of the European Union, pan-European cooperation in the OSCE, special responsibility for democracy and stability in Central, Eastern and South East Europe and the promotion of lasting development in all southern countries the countries of the South. (…) It will do its utmost to develop and apply effective strategies and instruments for crisis prevention and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. (…) The new Federal Government advocates the establishment of infrastructure for crisis prevention and civilian conflict management. In addition to the funding of peace and conflict research and the interlinking of existing initiatives, this includes improving the legal, financial and organisational prerequisites for the training and deployment of skilled peace-workers and services (e.g. civilian peace corps). “the Civil Peace Service).”

ments, but to combine and deploy existing ones on a more targeted basis. The new German Government re-affirmed the following two domains as key areas of development policy, as defined by the previous government: reduction of the root causes of conflicts, and the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. The two domains were, however, broadened conceptually and incorporated into a comprehensive crisis prevention and civil conflict management programme. It was also decided to systematically professionalise the instruments of development cooperation so as to enhance their potentials to promote peace.

The major new aspects of BMZ policy in this domain can be summarised in five points:

- It is planned to survey crisis and conflict trends more systematically on the basis of an existing set of model indicators, set of model indicators, and on the basis of other information to be incorporated into the country concepts strategy papers and country working groups.
- It is also planned to use the results of the conflict survey to help select priority countries, and to identify ways of gearing development cooperation with these countries to the removal of the root causes of conflict.

"Together with foreign and security policy (…) German development policy is at the core of the German Government’s peace policy. (…) It is not the task of development policy to overcome ethno-cultural difference. Its tasks rather include for instance steps to reduce poverty and social inequality, as well as measures to improve the general political and social framework conditions in partner countries. In particular, it should help create structures and mechanisms for peaceful conflict management, and improve the legitimacy and effectivity of state bodies and institutions. Other constructive measures to help avert the emergence and outbreak of violent conflicts are the strengthening of civil society actors and legal institutions, the media, women and youth, and of election laws and processes, as well as the incorporation of the police and the armed forces into the rule of law, the demobilisation of combatants and the reduction of oversized armed forces, the preservation of the rule of law, and the development of opportunities for participation."

Official and non-governmental Technical Cooperation are required to systematically review and strengthen their instruments with respect to the goals of peace policy. Alongside the existing activities and instruments, a “Civil Peace Service” has been instituted as an instrument in its own right under the aegis of the BMZ.

It is planned to achieve more effective networking and cooperation among the German development organisations and NGOs operating in this activity area. Furthermore, it is planned in the medium term to integrate German institutions more closely into the international networks operating in this domain, and to help actively improve the corresponding global infrastructures and frameworks.

Finally, in view of the immense interdependence in this activity area, high priority is being attached to improving the coherence of all relevant spheres of German policy, and to achieving more effective coordination of German activities in crisis regions with those of other international actors.

Within Germany, this coordination involves primarily development cooperation’s relationship with the Federal Foreign Office. For its part, the latter has recently emphasised a number of aspects of crisis prevention, including the training of personnel for international OSCE and UN missions, and the provision of funds for civil society actors in conflict regions. This has also created some fresh opportunities for official Technical Cooperation.

"The tasks undertaken by the Civil Peace Service (CPS) differ from the traditional tasks of the development services in that they involve targeted measures to promote the non-violent handling of conflicts and potential for conflict. (...) Tasks under the framework of the CPS involve the following areas in particular:

- strengthening the potential for peace; confidence-building measures between conflicting parties; the development of structures and programmes for information and education to publicise and explain peace activities and to overcome prejudice and hostile images (e.g. peace education);
- mediation in conflicts between members of different interest groups, ethnic groups and religions; collaboration in promoting and monitoring human rights and democracy;
- contributions towards reconciliation and reconstruction (including support for administrative tasks at the local-authority level)."

Technical Cooperation is actively involved in both crisis prevention and conflict management. Technical Cooperation in the area of crisis prevention for instance includes programmes, projects and/or measures and instruments whose intended impacts are expressly designed to support peaceful conflict transformation.

These activities involve on the one hand traditional and proven areas of TC that are being planned and implemented in conflictual settings. These settings are characterised by a polarisation of the parties to the conflicts, and war economies. The traditional fields of TC create opportunities to influence the conflict such as to promote civilised conflict management through social change, and the creation of conducive frameworks. Examples of traditional TC for conflict transformation include the advisory services delivered to the Ugandan refugee agency, and a water study for the Near East (Israel, Jordan, Palestine, 1995 - 1998). In the former case the crisis prevention component comprised the thorough...
sensitisation of the agency staff to the latent and acute conflict potential falling within the scope of their work. In the latter case the multinational composition of the steering committee, and the strategy for coordinated management of all regional water resources, were conducive to social and intellectual rapprochement among the participating experts of all parties.

On the other hand, new areas of TC are being established which are designed to help transform conflicts directly. These are dealt with in more detail in Section 5. The same principle applies to both the old and the new fields of TC for crisis prevention: they must be designed such that they do not themselves inadvertently contribute towards the escalation or prolongation of violent conflicts. The “do no harm” principle mentioned at the outset must therefore also be systematically operationalised for TC.

Conflict management in Technical Cooperation comprises measures and instruments which, in the context of both violent and non-violent conflict, aim to:

- strengthen the capabilities of TC experts and local actors to manage conflicts, and
- facilitate processes of constructive conflict management.

The drawing of a distinction between crisis prevention and conflict management is designed to clarify the fact that development cooperation in general, and Technical Cooperation in particular, are called upon at several levels to address conflicts more sensitively and more consciously. The distinction is between “general prevention” on the one hand, and “special prevention” denoting specific interventions designed to address concrete conflicts on the other. Further, a distinction is drawn between the creation and promotion of structures, institutions and procedures which enhance capacities conducive to the peaceful reconciliation of interests (such as the rule of law, democracy or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms), and the support of individuals and/or processes within the framework of the given structures.

For practical implementation, this means that action must be taken on at least two levels simultaneously:

- At the level of overcoming the root causes of conflicts and promoting “structural stability” (see sub-section 3.7), the aim must be to generally strengthen the capabilities of states and civil societies to manage social change peacefully. As well as promoting a balance of socio-economic interests, this will involve working towards the reform and strengthening of state
and civil society institutions, such that they are enabled to con-
structively manage plurality and competing claims on political
participation.

At the level of concrete programmes and projects it is neces-
sary to broaden the instruments of TC to include approaches
that are particularly suited to strengthening conflict manage-
ment capacities and capabilities.

2.5 The Relationship between Crisis Prevention and
Conflict Management, and Development-oriented
Emergency Aid (DEA)

The close link with DEA results from the sharp increase in pro-
longed crisis and conflict situations such as those in Central
Africa, in the Near East and Central Asia, in the Caucasus and in
Southeast Europe. These situations are forcing the development
community to find fresh responses to the conflicting objectives
of short-term aid measures, and development cooperation
measures that seek to help bring about structural change. Fur-
thermore, emergency aid faces three specific challenges: the
unintended counterproductive effects of any aid delivered in pro-
longed conflict situations, its role within the framework of peace
consolidation, and the simultaneity of post-war reconstruction
and rehabilitation, and crisis prevention.

To achieve any positive effects at all, emergency aid must
deliver resources to the crisis region. Inevitably, however, this
creates a risk that the conflict situation itself may not remain un-
affected by this. Given the shortage of resources everyone,
including the parties to the conflict, have a vested interested in
utilising this transfer to their own advantage. This is compounded
by the fact that general conditions surrounding the aid measures
can be problematic (protection by militias, negotiations with war-
lords over rights of passage, different treatment of international
and national personnel). Consequently, this puts to the test both
the neutrality of emergency aid, the effects it generates which
might under certain circumstances prolong war, and the knock-
on effects that help stabilise the political system.

The process of consolidating peace after a long war creates a
particularly strong need for DEA. A large number of complex tasks
have to be accomplished: emergency aid, rehabilitation, recon-
struction, economic revitalisation, transformation from a war to a peace economy, reintegration programmes for refugees and ex-combatants etc. The “peace consolidation” process is crucially dependent on the political, social and cultural preconditions for lasting peace being created in parallel to the aforementioned measures. This cannot be brought about purely through “top-down” political initiatives. Sustainable peace-building is dependent on a comprehensive strengthening of “bottom-up” capabilities and structures for effective conflict management.

Many of the more prolonged conflicts are at risk of becoming cyclical. Emergency aid in (post-)war situations therefore also helps determine whether and to what extent a renewed escalation is successfully prevented. Does it help to deal with the traumata caused by acts of violence, the displacements and the shattered social structures? Is it conducive to joint problem-solving by the people affected by that violence?

Against this background and with a view to sustainable efficacy, it is therefore imperative that DEA systematically integrates aspects of crisis prevention and conflict management.

2.6 Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management – Challenges for Reform of the State, the Economy and Society

The tasks of crisis prevention and conflict management raise fundamental questions concerning the political content of development cooperation. Since 1996, the political themes of human rights, the rule of law and political participation have risen in status in the development cooperation context; having once been considered framework conditions (and as such subject to conditionalities), they have now become activity areas (involving positive measures) of TC. Generally speaking, the second half of the 1990s witnessed an increased willingness on the part of development cooperation to take on a more “political” profile.

This has created an important precondition enabling the development community to focus more strongly on the root causes of conflict, and actively pursue more long-term approaches to crisis prevention. At this level, the issue at stake is no less than that of how the structures of the state, the economy and society need to be changed, in order to increase the likelihood that strategies for
the appropriation and consolidation of power are peaceful and socially just. At the conceptual level, this issue is debated primarily in terms of “structural stability” (see sub-section 3.7). Within GTZ, key emphasis is placed on the promotion of “political participation” in the broadest sense.

As with DEA, the integration of objectives conducive to peace into measures to reform the state, the economy and society calls for a holistic perspective. It requires a systematic, country-based programmatic approach, to permit effective control of the highly ambivalent impacts generated by the broad array of reform measures. The latter will include for instance measures to promote political participation and democratic decentralisation. Both are absolutely essential in order to bring state structures closer to the needs of people at the local and regional levels. At the same time, however, they also create scope for highly particular interests, and therefore need to be complemented by parallel measures to promote a peaceful reconciliation of interests.
3. The Initial Context, and Approaches to Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

3.1 Crises and Conflicts within the Social Development Process

Since the 1980s in particular, the number of people facing a desperate struggle for survival has increased world-wide. In by far the majority of cases, the crises and conflicts in question have been generated by political and social factors, and not by the sudden onset of natural disasters. This increase in the number of violent conflicts, or exacerbation of existing conflicts, is attributable to a number of developments:

As the history of European development demonstrated, any economic or social modernisation can lead to an increase in the potential for conflict. Structural destabilisation can result, especially in situations where the benefits of economic development are being distributed on a highly inequitable basis, and the existing political and social institutions are at the same time incapable of reconciling the interests of the various (old and new) groups. This tends to bring about polarisation between privileged government elites on the one hand, and marginalised groups on the other.

By far the majority of violent conflicts occur in the poor countries of the world, where the livelihood of a large section of the population is under constant threat, or may at times be deteriorating dramatically, for instance in the face of economic structural adjustment measures. Other conditions conducive to conflict that are faced mainly by poor countries are the increased burdens placed on (and competition for) vital natural resources, the loss of farmland, the worsening conflicts over land use, the displacement of indigenous peoples as a result of land clearance and migration, water pollution and water scarcity. According to a World Bank study entitled “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy” (2000), a strong dependency on the export of raw materials is a high risk factor.

The (self-)definition of parties in dispute on the basis of ethnic or religious commonalities is now a characteristic feature of a good two-thirds of all the violent conflicts in the world. There is disagreement concerning whether and to what extent these allegiances are the root cause of conflict, or are being deliberately
manipulated for political ends. What is undisputed, however, is the fact that many disputes concerning collective identities have turned into protracted conflicts.

Developing societies are usually characterised by a combination of traditional, often authoritarian conflict management cultures on the one hand, and a variety of mechanisms of more or less poorly regulated political, social and economic competition on the other. Integrating these disparate elements to allow peaceful management of the growing pluralisation and politicisation is a difficult undertaking. Its success would be dependent on appropriate measures to strengthen the capacities of state institutions and civil societies.

Most of the conflicts in question involve disputes between groups, or between groups and state actors, within a country. Nevertheless, the regional and international dimensions do play a substantial role, as the coalitions and dynamics of a conflict can be influenced to a considerable extent by transboundary (e.g. ethnic or religious) loyalties and interests, or by interventions carried out by neighbouring states, industrialised countries or influential foreign pressure groups. These conflicts are therefore also termed “international social conflicts”. Furthermore, the massive increase in conflicts surrounding issues of greater political participation, minority rights and secessionist aspirations cannot be understood without taking into account the globalisation of the clash between two key principles of international law. In conflicts within states, there is now a growing tension between the principle of the sovereignty of the state and its territorial integrity, and the right of peoples to self-determination. One such example is the conflict in Sri Lanka. There, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been fighting government troops for years to gain an independent homeland for the Tamils of Sri Lanka in the North-East of the country. Both sides are at pains to legitimate their respective positions by appealing to the universal superiority of “their” principle.

In emergency situations the transfer of resources, and acceptance of the general conditions of conflict by those delivering the aid, can have undesired negative effects which prolong the conflict. This is most often the case in difficult crisis situations where long-term aid programmes distort local markets, increase material dependency on external inputs, weaken self-sufficiency, and are abused by the parties to the conflict in order to fuel and pro-
long the conflict. This is also the case where aid and development organisations (have to) accept the general conditions created by violent conflicts: armed escorts for transport runs, the diverting of aid consignments by parties to the conflict, elevation of the status of parties to the conflict by negotiation of these issues, special treatment and privileged status of expatriate personnel over local population etc.

The causal link between the aforementioned trends and the escalation of particular conflicts is, however, a highly complex one.

In the development-policy debate, there is a strong tendency to identify structural factors as key causes of conflicts. These factors are without a doubt important, though they should not be overestimated in relation to factors which trigger the outbreak or escalation of conflicts on a more short-term basis. The latter include, for instance, a change of regime, or reform measures impacting negatively on individual sections of the population, politically motivated assassinations (or assassination attempts) and economic crises of a cyclical nature. In the aforementioned EU CPN Guide, four root causes are identified in conjunction with 16 problem areas, to which the majority of factors triggering or escalating conflicts can be assigned (see Box 2).

A further category which has a substantial influence on the course of conflicts comprises the strategies and behaviours which the parties and other actors in the conflict adopt. Political elites for instance can pursue a strategy of exploiting ethnic identity as a mobilising factor in order to hold on to their power. To date, the significance of strategies and behaviours has often been underestimated, even though they themselves can in turn generate structures, especially in the case of prolonged violent conflicts. The following section will deal in particular with the strategies of those who profit from war, and the “markets and cultures of violence” which emerge as a result.

### 3.2 Markets and Cultures of Violence

The longer a conflict remains violent, the greater is the risk that “markets” and “cultures” of violence, “war economies” and “war constituencies” will form. This theory builds on the emphasis placed on the economic causes of the “new” conflicts within...
### Box 2:
**Root causes of violent conflicts and related problem areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root Cause 1: Imbalance of political, social, economic and cultural opportunities among different identity groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Root Cause 2: Illegitimate, undemocratic and inefficient governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root Cause 3: Absence of opportunities for the peaceful conciliation of group interests and for bridging dividing lines between different identity groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root Cause 4: Absence of an active and organised civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1: Socio-economic inequalities |
| 2: Exclusive government elite |
| 3: Violation of political group rights |
| 4: Destabilisation by refugees and internally displaced people |
| 5: Demographic pressure |
| 6: Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions |
| 7: Insufficient or declining public services |
| 8: Criminality, social and political violence |
| 9: Biased interpretation and enforcement of the law by judiciary and security services |
| 10: Absence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms |
| 11: Absence of pluralism/diversified debate |
| 12: Distrust among identity groups |
| 13: Weak or detrimental external engagement |
| 14: Weak institutions / civil society |
| 15: Absence of professional and independent media |
| 16: Lack of economic “peace interests” |

societies in developing countries and countries in transition, and develops it into a "political economy of war". A key role is played in this process by fairly easily transportable raw materials (such as diamonds, drugs, tropical timbers), the appropriation and marketing of which is a lucrative business in regions where there is no functioning monopoly on the use of force. To "entrepreneurs of violence", the active escalation of conflicts is an entirely rational strategy which enables them to generate profits and consolidate their power.

If a war is sustained over a prolonged period, or a situation of escalated conflict held in "stalemate" by peace-keeping troops, it becomes almost inevitable that the attitudes and behaviours of the actors will change. In the long run the forms of organisation, constellations of interests and values within the societies concerned will also change in many cases. In many societies afflicted by civil war, the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence generates in the first instance a "surplus of violence", which later turns into "violence as an everyday phenomenon" (Waldmann 1997). Grey and black markets, smuggling, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, arms dealing etc. also become everyday phenomena. Mafia-like structures infiltrate and determine more and more segments of economic and political life, and generate self-reproducing "markets of violence" (Elwert 1997).

Even where the use of violence is contained, as in the case of the "stalemated conflicts", there is a risk that the continued separation of the parties may further exacerbate the "friend-or-foe" mentality. This is compounded by the fact that the privations which for instance refugees or the victims of sanctions are forced to endure may cause their hatred of the other side to escalate – up to the point where they no longer see the enemy as human. In these cases too, de facto lawless spaces emerge in which Mafia-like structures and grey markets thrive.

The causes and effects of these developments are not confined to the respective region. The deregulation of the global economy for instance has without a doubt made the emergence of markets of violence and the globalisation of organised crime easier. Once they exist, is a risk that multinational enterprises will adapt to the new circumstances and exploit them in their own interests. An increasingly important role is now also being played by diaspora communities, and especially those which have fled or been displaced from their home countries, and now support their
compatriots or fellows in faith from a distance, either through political work, or by supplying money and arms.

For crisis prevention and conflict management these factors mean that the dead-weight of war-torn societies and economies, of markets of violence and their international links, must be taken seriously, and that international strategies must be developed that expressly relate to these factors.

3.3 Forecasting Crises and Mapping Conflicts

A key precondition for effective crisis prevention and conflict management is the availability of instruments for forecasting crises and mapping conflicts. Academics and consultants now possess a number of early warning systems and analytical models that can be used for this purpose (see Box 3: Approaches for mapping conflicts and actors). These instruments enable users to anticipate escalations in crisis situations, as well as to identify the causes and plot the trajectories of conflicts in detail. Less well elaborated to date, however, are operationalised and coherent programmes for crisis prevention and conflict management in concrete cases. A need exists here to strengthen the existing analytical instruments and capacities on an objectives-oriented and application-ready basis. First approaches in this direction are contained in the BMZ list of indicators (Spelten 1999), and in the “participatory action research” approach, as developed for instance in the war-torn societies project (see Box 4: Hypotheses on the causal relationships between current trends and the likelihood of future conflict).

However, the availability of reliable instruments for prognosis and analysis alone is not enough to be able to orient TC activities effectively towards the goals of crisis prevention and conflict management. Also present must be the will to actually respond to early warnings in the case of bad governance, or when a project is threatened. This is not always easy, especially in view of the pressure to succeed which all projects experience once they are launched. Without this will, however, there will not be any credible shift towards sustainable, effective crisis prevention.
### Box 3: Approaches for analysing conflicts and actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Intervention</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Practical</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Participatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Macro**             | Crisis indicators  
Conflict mapping  
Actor mapping | Crisis indicators  
Event data analysis | Root and proximate causes | Participatory expertise |
| **Meso**              | Conflict mapping  
Actor mapping  
Action oriented research | Participatory conflict mapping  
Action oriented research  
Community development approaches | Event data analysis  
Participatory conflict mapping  
Action oriented research  
Community development approaches | Participatory conflict mapping  
Action oriented research  
Community development approaches |
| **Micro**             | Participatory conflict and actor mapping  
Process oriented approaches  
Community development approaches  
PCM/ZOPP logical framework  
Stakeholder analysis | Participatory conflict and actor mapping  
Process oriented approaches  
Community development approaches  
PCM/ZOPP logical framework  
Stakeholder analysis | Participatory conflict and actor mapping  
Process oriented approaches  
Community development approaches  
PCM/ZOPP logical framework  
Stakeholder analysis |

Box 4: Hypotheses on the causal relationships between current trends and the likelihood of future conflict

1. The more a group actually differs or perceives itself to differ from other groups, or feels discriminated against, the more it will be willing to engage in collective action to protect its interests.

2. The weaker the legitimacy of the state and the functionality of state institutions, the stronger the need for groups to organise themselves to protect their own interests.

3. The greater the external support for the use of violence, the more likely that groups willing to use violence will actually do so.

4. The more the economic, political or social status of one or several groups may be changed by impending events (e.g. land reforms, elections etc.), the greater the incentive for a group to protect or raise its own status by violent means.

5. The more a current situation that is close to conflict is collectively perceived as resembling an actual conflict situation in the past, the more likely the actors are to fall back on established responses in their choice of conflict management strategy (the self-fulfilling prophecy effect).

6. The more that joint fora (institutions, as well as social events) at which members of competing groups are able to communicate with each other on potentially common interests, are dismantled, the less likely a peaceful solution becomes, and the more likely an escalation in violence becomes (...).

7. The more aggressively the parties to a conflict put forward their demands (and possibly attach threats of violent consequences to them), the more difficult it becomes for them to agree to negotiated solutions that fall short of their maximum demands.


Key questions

The following questions are of key significance in determining more precisely the potentials and limits of external support for crisis prevention and conflict management:

- Who are the actors, the winners, the stakeholders and the losers of the conflict, and who are the potential partners when it comes to bringing influence to bear from outside?

- What are the root causes of the conflict and what factors triggered the escalation in violence? Which strategies have the actors and other stakeholders adopted in engaging in or avoiding the conflict? What dynamics have emerged within the conflict, and what influence is the outside world having on events? What options exist for bringing about change at these various levels?
What points of departure and experiences are available with existing conflict management efforts on the ground?

Where and how do Technical Cooperation measures influence (positively or negatively) the conflict situation? Can points of departure be identified for targeted interventions to influence the behaviour and attitudes of the parties to the conflict, and the root causes?

### 3.4 The Phases of a Conflict and the Time Frame of Interventions

The schema most frequently used to classify conflict management measures is based on the phases of the conflict. One argument in favour of this approach is the fact that the willingness and ability of the parties to steer their behaviour vis-à-vis the conflict change considerably in the course of escalation processes before, during and after a violent conflict. It must be added, however, that all phase models are based on idealised conflicts. Many actual conflicts involve several stages of escalation simultaneously, depending on the geographical location and section of the population concerned. In situations of permanent crisis, sporadic outbreaks of violence are not infrequent. Where measures to regulate the conflict prove unsustainable, conflict cycles may arise in which the post-war situation is at the same time a potential pre-war situation.

In contrast to the “continuum” model which prevailed in the early 1990s (which saw emergency aid, reconstruction and development as separate phases), the prevailing view today is that interventions targeting individual phases should be viewed as elements of an overall strategy embracing both the temporal and the territorial dimensions. This approach, referred to as the “contiguum” approach, also applies to crisis prevention and conflict management. It usually needs to take into account several phases simultaneously. In this context the strengthening of groups and structures which play a de-escalating, conciliating or mediating role is of key significance.

Notwithstanding the above qualification, the division of a conflict into phases does make it easier to identify high-priority activity areas and key strategies, and sheds light on the issue of...
which approaches are best combined in which situation. It is helpful to distinguish five phases:

- The phase of *latent conflict to political crisis*, in which competition between groups is demonstrable, but is managed at the political level; groups have not yet polarised to the extent that they are raising mutually exclusive claims.

- Polarisation is the defining feature of the *confrontational phase*. The confrontation can still be managed on a non-violent basis, however, either through compromise, or through a state of deadlock, or for fear of the consequences of further escalation.

- The third phase is reached once actors begin to *use violence to achieve their own objectives* on a systematic basis. Although there are many intermediate stages here (ranging from isolated attacks through to organised warfare), the crucial aspect is that the use of violence as such creates an additional dynamic of its own. People become the victims of a spiral of violence and counter-violence. Power shifts from political to military leaders. The longer this process continues, the greater the risk that “markets of violence” and “cultures of violence” will emerge, which proceed to overlay the original conflict.

- In many cases the “*end of war*” must be seen as a phase in its own right, as it may take place over a prolonged period characterised by cease-fires failing to hold and a regionalisation of the use of violence. During this phase, the state should already be initiating measures of post-conflict preparedness. This means measures designed to prepare the state structurally for the post-war period, thus making lasting peace possible. Key elements are the reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, reconciliation and trauma healing work, issues of public safety, food security, infrastructural rebuilding, basic social services, and above all reform of government structures and macro-economic structural adjustment measures. Post-conflict preparedness activities are basically preparatory measures taken by the state which need to be continued during the final post-conflict recovery phase.

- Only when an effective and lasting end to violence has been achieved does the fifth phase of *post-war conflict management or peace consolidation* begins.
### Box 5: Conflict phases, strategies and measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict phase</th>
<th>Priorities for crisis prevention and conflict management</th>
<th>Measures and partners</th>
<th>External actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latent conflict to political crisis</td>
<td>Twin strategy to overcome the root causes of conflict, and create a constructive conflict culture legitimated by the state</td>
<td>Structural stability; strengthening of groups within society that are strategically significant for the development of “peace constituencies”</td>
<td>Bi- and multilateral development cooperation; NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontational, though non-violent conflict</td>
<td>Strengthening of communication and interaction between the parties at all levels, and creation of elements to counterbalance polarisation</td>
<td>Structural stability; promotion of local and regional institutions and mechanisms for crisis prevention and conflict management</td>
<td>Diplomacy; bi- and multilateral development cooperation; NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
<td>Putting an end to or minimising the use of violence; crisis management; monitoring and control of unintended impacts of aid measures that are exacerbating the conflict</td>
<td>Planning and implementation of emergency and refugee aid programmes, designed to shift the situation away from destructive conflict</td>
<td>Diplomacy; international mediation missions; humanitarian assistance organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of war</td>
<td>The often protracted process of cease-fires that do not hold and attempts made by the parties to obtain maximum advantage: establishment and development of islands of peace</td>
<td>Combination of all three of the above measures.</td>
<td>Diplomacy; blue helmets; humanitarian assistance organisations; bi- and multilateral development cooperation; NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-war conflict management</td>
<td>Peace-keeping; political reconstruction/creation of new “inclusive” political structures; physical reconstruction; „civilising“ of society; working through and coming to terms with the past.</td>
<td>Rehabilitation and reconstruction; reintegration of refugees; demobilisation of combatants with a view to promoting “peace constituencies” reconciliation and trauma healing</td>
<td>Bi- and multilateral development cooperation; NGOs; diplomacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crisis prevention and conflict management measures must be based on these phases. Their time frame, however, should extend beyond this cyclic phase model. Given the long-term nature of macro-social processes, it is helpful to imagine this prospect in terms of a time frame embracing several stages. Based on the peace-building model developed by John Paul Lederach, at least four such stages can be imagined.

Crisis management, which may also contain elements of conflict management, delivers an immediate response to situations of escalation or emergency. Though it often has to be implemented within a time frame encompassing only a few months, the presence of visions of the future does increase the likelihood that it will be successful. Short-term activities are best realised through person-centred training programmes, and in the form of preparedness and pilot measures for developing and launching crisis prevention and conflict management strategies in cooper-
ation with local actors. Having said that, programmes in this field will require a longer time frame of three to ten years if they are to generate sustainable impacts. Achieving the goal of structural stability will in any case often only be feasible across the generations.

3.5 The Levels of Social Leadership and their Regional Differentiation

A further important aspect of crisis prevention and conflict management is the distinction between various levels of social leadership: From which level do measures proceed, and who are those measures aimed at? It is helpful to draw a distinction between three levels, i.e. a top, a middle and a lower level.

The top or upper level of leadership (encompassing both the state and non-governmental groups) is usually responsible for overall representation of the respective collective concerns, and for official negotiations. The middle level of leadership is comprised of influential persons in individual sectors and regions. These include religious, traditional and other leaders who enjoy high prestige, as well as important officials in the administration, media, education and the arts. The lower level of leadership includes influential individuals such as local leaders, representatives of national NGOs, teachers and other multipliers.

Experiences to date with protracted and deep-rooted conflicts demonstrate that the involvement of the middle and lower levels in crisis prevention and conflict management is an essential prerequisite to sustainable results. This is the case for instance where an agreement reached at the top level (and especially so where it was reached under foreign pressure) meets with massive implementation problems and resistance. Unless actors at the middle and lower levels are mobilised, political directives are doomed to failure. Experiences with the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina bear this out. There is also the converse case: the positions of the parties to the conflict at the top level are so polarised that processes of communication can only be generated through steadfast initiatives at the middle and lower levels, and all practical issues of cooperation then need to be addressed at these levels due to the stalemate at the top.
This distinction between different levels of social action also has consequences for the involvement of external actors. It has become standard to distinguish between at least three “tracks” linking internal and external actors, although on closer inspection these tracks prove to represent more or less broad activity areas and types of cooperation (see Section 2.1):

**Track 1 level**

Track 1 is the level of official bi- and multilateral diplomacy at which objective conflicts are resolved, cease-fires agreed and peace accords signed. Third parties can perform “good services” here, as for instance Switzerland offered to do in many conflicts that arose in the course of decolonisation. They can also perform tasks of brokering and mediation, as Norway did in Sri Lanka, or mobilise power in order to achieve certain solutions (such as the USA in the Dayton Accord = power mediation).
Track 2 is where unofficial diplomatic activities take place – primarily at the middle and lower levels – which aim to improve the preconditions for peace-building at the Track 1 level. One example would be the achievements of the Saint Egidio Community, a Catholic lay organisation, in laying the groundwork for resolution of the conflict in Mozambique.

The term “Track 3” is used less consistently. However, it is emerging as a term used to denote all those activities which aim to bring about a transformation of the root causes of a conflict. It encompasses all the levels of leadership, but places emphasis on long-term, grass-roots measures such as trauma healing and reconciliation work with sections of the population directly impacted by a war, and empowerment of disadvantaged groups – especially in majority-minority situations – or the promotion of conflict management institutions.

Key to sustainable peace-building is coherence between these tracks. It is therefore necessary to maintain close coordination between the governmental and multilateral actors, political foundations, churches, NGOs, and the actors of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation that operate in this field. The guiding principle here should be to optimally utilise the comparative advantages and scope for action of all these actors.

A key segment of Technical Cooperation is certainly encompassed in Track 3. Given its access to and experiences with the middle and lower levels of leadership, however, TC is also an appropriate instrument for identifying, supporting and facilitating Track 2 measures. Finally, TC also maintains contacts at the Track 1 level through political development cooperation. Its potential here should be seen in the delivery of advisory and support services to the actors concerned, rather than in the direct facilitation of corresponding processes.

The role which official Technical Cooperation is to play in relation to other actors will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis. TC does possess one comparative advantage with respect to the regionalisation of conflict management measures. It is a characteristic feature of many protracted, destructive conflicts that the conflict becomes highly regionally differentiated. In such cases it is essential to protect, strengthen and where possible enlarge those local and regional “islands” of low escalation or successful conflict management. The regional expertise of Technical Cooperation is of key significance for this work.
3.6 The “Partisan Allegiances” of Target Groups and Partner Organisations

Horizontal distinctions

As well as drawing vertical and regional distinctions between the actors involved, successful conflict management also needs to draw horizontal distinctions. In reality, the parties to a given conflict are by no means as homogeneous as superficial appearances might suggest, for instance in ethno-political conflicts where individuals’ loyalties are automatically claimed by the parties to a conflict purely on the basis of those individuals’ ethnicity or other external characteristics. Nor does assigning people by force to one or other of the parties to an escalating, violent conflict turn them into homogeneous units. If their viewpoints, attitudes, concerns and various other factors are taken into account, then they can be seen to display considerable differences.

Understandably, aid measures in regions of crisis often focus on the most vulnerable groups. To obtain a comprehensive view of the crisis prevention and conflict management context, however, it is necessary to take into account all the groups that are either shaping the conflict, or being affected by it:

- the political and military actors involved in the confrontational, violent conflict;
- those whom leaders are seeking to mobilise politically, or recruit as soldiers and fighters (for instance unemployed youth);
- moderate representatives of the parties to the conflict, as well as other “semi-” and “non-partisan” actors in the crisis region;
- all those attempting to evade the confrontational/violent conflict (without thereby assuming an active role in the dispute), and
- finally, those directly affected by the violence, either as displaced persons, refugees, trauma victims or (ex-)combatants. (Not infrequently, individuals belonging to the latter group are both perpetrators and victims at the same time).

Different peace strategies

Different peace strategies are required for all these target groups. The comparative advantages of Technical Cooperation lie in work with groups outside the political and military camp, groups which TC can support in their efforts to evade the pressure of polarisation.
A further aspect of conflict management work is the fact that it deals not only with conflicts between groups. In protracted conflicts, often enough the confrontations within groups are fought out almost as bitterly as the conflict with the other side. Israeli-Palestinian relations are a particularly striking example of this. It is therefore important to take precise note of the differences in degree of partisan allegiance, and to study the dynamics of confrontation within the respective parties to a conflict: With which groups can a process of communication most probably be successfully launched? What relations exist between those groups and the more radical elements? How can accusations of “betrayal” within parties be addressed most effectively? In many cases, conflict management within parties divided by disputes is a key prerequisite for any kind of constructive engagement with the other party.

3.7 Promoting Structural Stability as a Basis for Sustainable Development

Any conceptual approach to crisis prevention and conflict management must include, as one of its elements, structures which by their very nature help to prevent violent escalation of conflicting interests and tensions within a society. The goal is to build up and consolidate over the long term the sort of sustainable capacities within societies and states which encourage constructive and civilised management of potential conflicts and crises. The respective states and their societies bear the main responsibility for this task.

Generally speaking, in the international debate the term “structural stability” (as used by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, for instance) denotes the realisation of the mutually complementary and interdependent goals of social peace, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and sustainable social and economic development. Against this background, it is envisaged that dynamic and representative political institutions will be able to bring about change, and resolve disputes within society on a non-violent basis.

The concept of “structural stability” is based on a broad understanding. Though it is therefore difficult to specify a concrete, unequivocal and tangible meaning, the term is broad and inclu-
sive enough to capture the complexity of the conditions required for sustainable peace. Experiences with both violence and peace around the world demonstrate that the causal factors leading to these two states are complex. A strategy which incorporated only one dimension (for instance participation), without taking other factors into account, would therefore run the risk of falling to capture that complexity.

The core idea expressed by the term “structural stability” is therefore the permanent stabilisation of fragile and unstable phenomena within societies and states. Civil societies and states must be enabled to develop constructive and non-violent mechanisms to manage and resolve fundamental and acute conflicts of interest. Key preconditions for “structural stability” are:

- a state that is sufficiently legitimate,
- a constructive will on the part of the state, which at the same time presupposes that the state is sufficiently able to set standards, and
- a capable state that is able to constructively apply those standards.

In view of the large number of “weak” or “failed” states, however, this means first of all working towards the construction or reconstruction of correspondingly legitimate statehood. This in turn points to the importance of integrative structures in society which are able sufficiently to integrate and incorporate the state and its representatives into society - achievements which can usually only be accomplished in the course of a long process of political community-building.
Strategies for crisis prevention and conflict management in Technical Cooperation embrace three components:

1. promoting structural stability to underpin sustainable development (see Section 4.2),
2. strengthening the crisis prevention and conflict management capacities of groups within society, and local and regional institutions (see Section 4.3), and
3. systematically incorporating crisis prevention and conflict management issues into traditional and proven fields of Technical Cooperation (see Section 5.1).

These three elements are mutually complementary, and overlap partially at the level of activity areas and measures (see Box 6: GTZ Activity Areas for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management). Security-sector reform plays a special role in this context. It is located at a strategic interface, between the promotion of structural stability and the strengthening of peace constituencies. It is dealt with in Section 5.9.

Work connected to any of these components must satisfy the five key criteria for German development-policy instruments as formulated by the BMZ:

- respect for human rights;
- broad-based participation in political decision-making;
- rule of law and legal certainty;
- creation of a social market economy;
- governance for development.

The various components will be implemented through a broad and flexible range of services, developed in cooperation with the partner organisation on a process-oriented and subsidiary basis. This service offering has to some extent been proven in practice, and is available in fully elaborated form, for instance with respect to reform measures for structural stability. These aspects are therefore not dealt with at any greater length in Section 5 (“GTZ’s Service Offering”). Other aspects are still in the planning and development phase.

These inputs can be delivered in principle via two routes: firstly within the scope of projects which incorporate aspects of crisis prevention and conflict management, and secondly as pro-
Before the service offering is described in more detail, the next section will outline the key general principles of action, and provide an outline of the first two components. It should also be pointed out that when designing crisis prevention and conflict management strategies, a number of open questions and dilemmas will be encountered. These are due in the first instance to the fact that this activity area as a whole is not yet that highly developed. Secondly, they are also due to the ethical and moral decisions that need to be taken in the face of complex and equivocal considerations of peace, justice, truth and reconciliation.
4.1 General Principles of Action for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

The explicit incorporation of crisis prevention and conflict management into development cooperation is a relatively new area of work. Implicitly, development cooperation programmes and projects in areas such as emergency aid always had to pursue an approach that was as conflict-sensitive as possible. However, there has been little systematic analysis of these experiences to date, and the number of professional evaluations remains limited. The methodology of conflict impact assessment is also in its infancy. Nevertheless, it is already possible to formulate several general pointers for improving crisis prevention and conflict management within TC.

TC for crisis prevention must take careful note of, and translate into practice, the insights gained by the aforementioned “Do no harm” project concerning the unintended effects of aid in conflict regions. To achieve this it must monitor the content and operational aspects of development activities, in order to identify their relevance to conflict issues, their risk of inadvertently exacerbating or prolonging conflicts, and their actual impacts. Conflict impact assessment makes no attempt to be a precise science. It is designed to provide a project team with guidance in better understanding the interrelationships between the project and the conflict, and to prepare corresponding adjustments to the project work. The key question concerns the extent to which the problem is likely to increase, or reduce, the likelihood of peaceful conflict management. Placing strong emphasis on the “do no harm” principle, conflict impact assessment seeks to identify, prevent or cushion possible negative impacts on the conflict (Leonhardt 2001).

Structure-oriented measures and programmes for crisis prevention and conflict management must be harmonised with corresponding process-oriented activities, and the two implemented on a coordinated basis. In this context it is important to formulate strategic objectives, and to contextualise all projects with reference to those objectives, though without attaching disproportionate peace-policy relevance to micro-projects. Rather, the aim must be to formulate realistic, interim objectives, and to raise awareness of the interdependence of structure- and process-oriented measures.
Crisis prevention and conflict management can only help bring about lasting peace if measures to promote structural stability and frameworks for good governance within a given crisis region are complemented by measures to strengthen institutions and mechanisms for peaceful conflict management at the various levels of government and society. A key aspect of such peace-building is the creation and development of so-called “peace constituencies”. This means that political actors and civil society elements which are actively committed to non-violent solutions, and which take into account the interests of all actors in the conflict, are networked, and thus mutually strengthened. Wherever possible, a network of this kind should include not only civil society groups, but also state institutions. Cooperation and networking with external actors such as NGOs, political foundations, churches and development cooperation institutions, should serve the same objective, namely the establishment of “alliances for peace”.

Technical Cooperation inputs can only be one element of a comprehensive strategy for crisis prevention and conflict management. Overall success can only be achieved if the use of the various instruments has been coherently planned and harmonised by the relevant political decision-makers. It is also important to establish coordination between national, multilateral and non-governmental initiatives. There now exist for instance a number of conflict-sensitive TC programmes and projects, although in view of the overwhelming number of projects that are not sensitive in this respect, the effectiveness of those that are limited. Situations can also be counter-productive in which various incentives to conflict transformation are created through development cooperation at the micro and meso levels, whilst development and foreign policy at the macro level continue to promote the conflictual status quo. However, it must be remembered that in partner countries there may be many groups in government circles aspiring to prevent this kind of external, conflict-sensitive coordination on the grounds that it constitutes “political interference”.

Many conflicts encountered by Technical Cooperation have causes that are deeply rooted in the socio-political history of the country, and possess such a degree of complexity that even in the best case scenario, the means available to TC can be of only limited impact, and even then only in the long term. This also
applies in post-war societies which are so traumatised by the scale of the violence experienced that a persistent “culture of silence” takes hold, as in Rwanda, which counteracts all efforts to openly address the conflict. Under these conditions, realism is called for in all respects. Nevertheless, the significance of TC should also not be underestimated. In crisis regions in particular, it can exert considerable influence on local power relations and structures. Using this potential influence responsibly means above all designing and facilitating programmes and projects systematically in accordance with a conflict-sensitive strategy. Finally, it is also important to identify forms of conflict management which are appropriate to the respective cultural setting. This should not, of course, lead to an undesired consolidation or revitalisation of authoritarian mechanisms. In such situations, options should be carefully considered in close consultation with all those affected at the local level, which also means those individuals or groups so far excluded from such traditional mechanisms.

The gender mainstreaming approach aims to systematically incorporate the specific situation, the priorities and the needs of women and men into all policy fields. The need to complement crisis prevention and conflict management projects with a gender-sensitive approach results from several factors:

- A gender-specific analysis first of all makes it easier to identify precisely the various identities, roles, needs and interests in and with which people participate in conflicts, or are affected by them. At the same time, this kind of analysis can build a bridge between the different perspectives obtained, depending on whether the issues are considered at the individual or at the structural level.

- Secondly, gender equality is a key dimension of social justice as a whole, and as such a key precondition for structural stability and successful peace-building.

- Thirdly, both the violent conflicts themselves, and crisis prevention and conflict management measures, constitute forms of social action that are highly gender-specific. This is due to the fact that there are very great differences in the way women and men participate in structures of power and domination, as well as in their access to resources.

- Fourthly, women are playing an increasingly active role in conflicts, both as combatants, and as members of interna-
tional organisations or women’s movements. To date, however, this development has not been reflected at the level of peace accords.

In practice, gender mainstreaming means on the one hand designing programmes and projects in which the gender dimension is key, and on the other hand systematically reviewing and adjusting all other projects with respect to their impacts on women and men. The former approach plays an important role in gender-specific empowerment of strategic groups to create peace constituencies, for instance multi-ethnic women’s organisations in crisis regions. Yet this should not be confused with an exclusive promotion of “activities specific to women”. The aim is rather to address the roles of both women and men in the transformation of conflicts.

The second approach (gender as a cross-cutting theme) embraces the following aspects:

- It is first of all important to make visible the gender dimension (relative numbers of women and men involved in identifying, planning, managing, implementing and evaluating projects), and to ensure appropriate and balanced levels of participation and co-determination by women and men.
- It should be ensured in all projects that they do not consolidate or even reinforce unequal gender relations, but help reduce them.
- Furthermore, the specific needs, interests and experiences of women and men in situations of conflict and conflict transformation should be taken into account, and integrated appropriately. Follow-on measures can also include for example the empowerment of women, who in time of war have to take on traditionally male roles.
- Finally, there is a need to identify ways of changing traditional male (and complementary female) stereotypes, which often make a major contribution towards the destructive escalation of conflicts.

The skills required of personnel working in crisis prevention and conflict management are new to many in TC, even though those individuals may already possess a great deal of experience in political development cooperation and emergency aid. Consequently, there is a need both for training measures to increase general skills in conflict situations, and for specialised courses on specific conflict intervention methods. Individuals
working in a conflictual setting for protracted periods should also be given regular opportunities to reflect on their work in a setting of professional supervision and coaching. These measures are designed inter alia to:

- enable staff members to review the further viability of their own motivation structure on a periodic basis;
- strengthen an individual’s ability to cooperate within a team, even under high levels of stress;
- develop an individual’s skills in dealing with extreme situations, for instance when encountering traumatised counterparts and target groups.

One of the fundamental problems of Technical Cooperation in crisis-prone regions is that, when circumstances dictate, it must leave the country at the very moment when its partners are most dependent on external support, because a crisis situation is coming to a head. Within the scope of emergency aid, a range of responses can now be delivered to match these security risks. Yet those risks remain a basic problem, just at the moment when crisis prevention and conflict management need to be stepped-up. It is therefore necessary to hold a comprehensive dialogue with all affected partners, and wherever possible identify consensual solutions based on the do-no-harm principle.

4.2 Promoting Structural Stability to Underpin Crisis Prevention and Sustainable Development

Through its promotion strategies, Technical Cooperation can help support structural stability. To this end it is imperative that an array of approaches and instruments be brought into play. Isolated elements or measures are of little help. The promotion of structural stability rather requires a package of coordinated activities of both an operative and non-operative nature.

This process must therefore begin with appropriate country strategies, joint efforts involving all development actors or as many as possible, and targeted bi- and multilateral policy dialogue. First steps will need to include the elaboration of a coordinated approach by the institutions of each donor country, coupled with corresponding coordination among the various bi- and multilateral donors. This applies not only to the mix of
approaches and instruments to be selected at the local level, but also with respect to a coherent overall strategy at the national level. Since the local and regional manifestations and conditions of conflicts are usually highly diverse, a diversified overall strategy will be required.

It is fundamentally important that structural stability be duly considered in the normal course of development measures (project cycle). Appropriate quality standards (indicators etc.) must therefore be introduced and incorporated into procedures for project identification, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Various elements can be identified in the promotion of structural stability. These elements are closely linked, and sometimes overlap. The objectives and key activities of the various elements and their interaction can only be assessed in light of the specific country situation. It should also be emphasised that these strategic elements are for the most part general elements that play a role in other development contexts. Attention should therefore be paid to incorporating the various elements into an overall strategy.

Sustainable social and economic development is an element of structural stability. Sustainable development is the material base that underpins a society’s ability to deal constructively with tensions and conflicts. “Balance” and “equitability” are key dimensions of this.

Universal and democratic participation in political decision-making processes is essential for any society seeking to build sustainable peace. It should be emphasised that this is not
about transferring specific models (such as European models of democracy). It should also be emphasised that participation in this context means not only participation at the national level, but also at all other levels as well. The local and regional levels and their institutions are often especially important to groups in rural areas. Activities at all levels should also focus on the promotion of parliamentary bodies. These objectives can only be achieved if the gap between “modern” state institutions and the respective “traditional” contexts is successfully reduced.

Functioning legal systems and adequate legal certainty are integral components of structural stability. Where interests collide and conflict results, an efficient and independent legal system, including public confidence in the judiciary, is a key precondition for constructive conflict management. This is the case for instance concerning land law, which in many societies is an explosive issue. GTZ’s experience to date indicates that progress in this field is crucially dependent on reducing the aforementioned gap. This means that approaches need to be identified through which legal systems can be better incorporated into existing cultural frameworks.

The protection of elementary civil rights is prerequisite to any stable and just peace. At the same time, it is a needed in order to enable individuals and groups to assert their interests without fear, and to work for peaceful change. The positive promotion of human rights requires an array of approaches, and not least a coherent strategy which takes full account of all existing political and social conditions in the country concerned.

In the current debate concerning the role of the state and its reform, the issue of good governance is an important one. The term good governance encompasses all the capacities and mechanisms which enable an administration to solve the problems of a society involving the distribution of resources, life opportunities, rights and obligations. Good governance is based on the one hand on several of the aforementioned key elements of structural stability, such as respect for human rights, participation and the rule of law. On the other hand, this term emphasises key areas of state efficiency such as fiscal policy (e.g.: Are there plans to sufficiently tax higher income groups?), public expenditure policy (e.g.: How high is military expenditure compared to public expenditure in other sectors?), or the will to fight corruption.
Decentralisation can contribute to structural stability. Transferring competences and responsibilities, and therefore personnel and finances, away from the national (or another higher) level down to the regional and local levels creates numerous points of departure within states and societies to broaden opportunities for participation, increase the accountability of public institutions, and reduce disparities of various kinds. This can create conditions and options that are more conducive to constructive and sustainable conflict management. However, under certain circumstances decentralisation initiatives may also have problematic consequences. For instance, governments can use this instrument to extend the reach of their mechanisms of control, and by pursuing a decentralised approach thus consolidate their apparatus of repression. Decentralisation can also be abused by former locally-based ruling groups to revive traditional hierarchies. These dangers must be borne in mind.

A further dimension of decentralisation is the opportunity to help manage ethno-political conflicts by creating federalist state structures, or by applying models for autonomy, power-sharing or devolution. This constitutional reform approach may be an appropriate option for offering separatist groups in multiethnic states an opportunity to integrate into the state, without sacrificing their identity. The earlier such an offer is prepared, the more likely it is to actually have a “preventive”, i.e. peace-building effect.

The term “civil society” is used here to denote that sphere located beyond the private individual, the state and the market, where a substantial influence is exerted on political events that is independent of party politics. This understanding of civil society embraces a social sphere that is independent of the state, includes self-reliant social networks, acknowledges broad-based values of “civil participation”, and offers opportunities for individuals and groups to defend the interests of the disadvantaged in the public sphere. The strengthening of civil society structures is one component of structural stability. With regard to ethno-political conflicts, promoting this sphere creates a special potential for establishing links between mutually hostile groups. Having said that, measures to strengthen civil society should always be conceived within the wider context of the given political frameworks and specific local conditions. It
would for instance be problematic to create a static and self-contained subculture of exclusively externally-financed NGOs, tenuously integrated into the local setting.

The media play a role in moulding the way the relationships between different groups are perceived and interpreted, and in creating more or less peaceful “cultures of dispute” within a society. A sufficiently free, independent and pluralistic media sector is also absolutely essential for providing checks and balances against the power wielded by the state and others, and for enabling diverse interests and opinions to be fairly articulated. Finally, media fora can also be utilised to help identify and disseminate constructive options for conflict management.

4.3 Strengthening the Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management Capacities of Societal Groups, and Local and Regional Institutions

The second, more process-oriented pillar of crisis prevention and conflict management, alongside structural stability, is capacity-building amongst societal groups, and local and regional institutions. The two pillars are mutually complementary. Consequently, some of the practical programme and project activities should involve both pillars.

One point of departure for process-oriented activities is the observation that, in many crisis regions, the poorly developed peaceful conflict management capacities of groups and institutions have contributed significantly to the hardening of positions, and an escalation of violence. This is the case particularly where conflicts have been fought out using military means over a protracted period. War constituencies, markets and cultures of violence are the result. These societal and economic structures, which are often independent of the original causes of the conflict, are conducive to the continued use of violence. Key actors in war constituencies are the winners of protracted armed conflicts: arms manufacturers and dealers, the leaders of assorted militias and security services, and sometimes also the army and political hard-liners. Other key actors include all those who profit from the redistribution of land, capital and political positions, at least for as long as their gains do not appear permanently secure. Potential war constituencies also include groups recruited by
leaders to fight in return for an income, such as unemployed youths and members of their families. Process-oriented crisis prevention and conflict management might begin by assisting members or potential members of war constituencies either to leave, or not to enter, that milieu.

At the other end of the spectrum, the peace constituencies constitute another, equally significant point of entry. Peace constituencies include local and regional networks of individuals, groups and institutions which have a lasting interest in preventing violence and bringing about consensual conflict resolution. They also possess the capability and influence to translate that interest into concrete results. A strategically important role in the emergence and development of a peace constituency can be played by all those individuals, groups and institutions who must expect to lose influence in the event of (further) violent conflict, and/or which play a multiplying role within society (local authorities, NGOs, religious communities, media, educational institutions etc.).

Promoting a peace constituency means strengthening the capacities and resources of local and regional partner organisations for sustainable peace-building. The primary objective here is to identify and carefully support the existing potentials within those organisations, such as to increase their influence and encourage others to imitate them. This is not easy – particularly in post-war situations – but experience does show that such potentials are present almost everywhere, albeit on a limited scale. Additional capacities can be created, for instance by activating disadvantaged or strategically important groups through empowerment programmes or training measures.

The actor-oriented capacity-building approach should from the start be designed and realised in close connection with the strengthening of institutions and procedures for peaceful reconciliation of interests. In many cases, as for instance with media work or in the youth and education sector, it is definitely virtually impossible to separate the two. Training teachers to work with children traumatised by war for instance usually also requires scope for activities outside the classroom that allows the skills acquired to be put to good use. It should also be taken into account that the support of particular groups without regard to the cultural context or socio-political framework conditions can have counter-productive effects. The isolated support of refugees,
for instance, can cause dissatisfaction and aggression close to their camps amongst all those who do not benefit from it.

Such contextualised capacity-building for societal groups, and local and regional institutions, requires a number of measures:

- strengthening societal groups of strategic significance for building a peace constituency (see 5.2);
- promoting local and regional institutions and mechanisms for peaceful conflict management (see 5.3);
- promoting a media contribution to crisis prevention (see 5.4);
- developing education and youth promotion measures to provide education for peace and conflict prevention (see 5.5);
- post-war trauma healing (see 5.6);
- coming to terms with the past, and reconciliation work, after violent conflicts (see 5.7), and
- training measures as an activity in their own right, and within the scope of Technical Cooperation (see 5.8).

### 4.4 Challenges and Dilemmas for the Design of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management Processes

All acutely or latently violent conflicts involve highly complex and rapidly changing constellations which usually can only be influenced from outside to a limited extent. Although such situations have many common denominators, each conflict requires a combination of measures tailored to its specific features. Experience to date demonstrates that a number of challenges and dilemmas arise, each of which requires a specific solution.

Many conflicts are rooted in an inequitable distribution of power and resources. This may be a cause of conflict, for instance where individual groups are the victims of massive economic, cultural or political discrimination. For conflict management, the question then arises of how they can be empowered without the risk of violent escalation being created. At the same time, the enlightened self-interest of the privileged groups or the state in integrating the disadvantaged groups needs to be promoted. One example of this is the support provided to indigenous groups in Latin America in organising themselves, coupled with integration projects targeting the majority society.
One key to the “civilisation” of conflicts is the strengthening of the capability and the will to act on the part of all those grass-roots groups who would profit most directly from peaceful management of the conflict or, conversely, would be worst affected by the conflict running a violent course. This is especially true in situations where this development leads to a range of overlapping social allegiances, counteracting the risk of a political mobilisation along ethnic or religious lines. At the same time, it is also necessary to strengthen the capability of state institutions to deal with growing complexity and rising demands for participation. Otherwise there is a risk that the one-sided promotion of civil society will undermine the authority and the conflict settlement capabilities of the state. Attention should also be drawn to the problem of NGOs that are oriented primarily to foreign donors’ priorities not shared by the local society, and to the existence of those non-governmental actors who profit either directly or indirectly from the spread of violence and its markets.

All peace-making activities in situations of acute conflict face pressures from different directions. On the one hand they face the question of whether they should incorporate or support a physical separation of the parties, in order to reduce the risk of violent conflicts. On the other hand they face the task of seeking rapprochement involving encounters, dialogue and cooperation that is more viable in the long term. These conflicting pressures are present throughout in work with refugees and displaced persons, and are always particularly acute in the planning and implementation of reintegration programmes. In the long term, only the path of encounter and dialogue is likely to safeguard peace. In the short and medium term, however, it may be necessary to select a combination of measures appropriate to the particular case in hand, involving physical separation for a limited period.

In post-conflict situations, TC is called upon to make a comprehensive contribution through reconstruction, rehabilitation, demobilisation and (re-)integration programmes. In this context, conflict management means both working through or healing the wounds of the past, and seeking a common, sustainable future. Traumatised individuals need therapy; justice demands that war crimes be investigated, and even that the perpetrators be brought before a court of law and punished; a government of “national reconciliation” can only be achieved at the cost of a general...
amnesty – in other words, many imperatives to act compete with each other. In this situation of conflicting pressures, there is no list of measures that is free of inconsistencies. The aim must rather be to identify solutions which match the people affected, their respective cultures and the given scope for practical action on the ground. It needs to be taken into account here that this is a long-term task which will often affect more than one generation. It requires the “heirs” of the conflict to identify their own ways of integrating the past. The example of post-war Germany, with its chequered history of “working through the past”, demonstrates what a long, drawn-out and laborious process this can be.

External actors operate in most regions in crisis or conflict: donor institutions, multi- and bilateral agencies, private enterprises and NGOs, foundations, “friendly” and “unfriendly” governments, military advisors, secret services, arms dealers and representatives of organised crime. These actors pursue what are sometimes highly divergent interests. What scope is available for development cooperation to help prevent crises and manage conflicts within this framework can only determined on a case-by-case basis. What is important here is that development cooperation’s involvement be based on sound analysis, and that needs to be identified on a participatory basis as much as possible. It should also be remembered that its roles and functions need to be clearly defined – with respect both to its own capabilities and to those of other actors with complementary interests. Only in exceptional cases for instance will it be possible simultaneously to support the “empowerment” of disadvantaged groups, and to adopt an “omni-partisan” role between parties in dispute. A division of labour with other actors is required here.

In all crisis prevention and conflict management activities undertaken by Technical Cooperation, it should be remembered that TC can ultimately only ever make a limited contribution. Its strength lies in its complementarity to many other activities of conflict settlement, resolution and transformation, and the underpinning it provides for those activities. Its success must therefore be measured primarily with reference to the strengthening of national “peace constituencies”, to the promotion of bonds and links between the parties to the conflict and those affected by it, to reforms of the security sector as well as of other strategically important institutions, and not primarily with respect to the conclusion of spectacular peace accords.
5. **GTZ’s Services**

GTZ is able to offer professional expertise for all aspects of structural stability. Furthermore, GTZ has already identified key activity areas involving capacity-building for groups and institutions in crisis prevention and conflict management. Publications are available in the majority of cases. The following summary will outline:

- the objectives and strategies,
- the partners and target groups, and
- the contours of the top-priority measures in the respective activity areas.

Implementation of the approaches presented requires a combination of inputs from a variety of institutions, disciplines and specialisations. These must be harmonised for crisis prevention on a situation-specific basis. Relevant activity areas within GTZ include law and public administration, rural development, organisation and communication consultancy, economic and social policy, environmental protection and natural resource management, and health and education.

5.1 **Implementation Strategy**

GTZ bases its strategies for orienting development cooperation more specifically towards conflict management and peace-building primarily on the results of the BMZ cross-section analysis of the impacts of development cooperation in conflict situations (Klingebiel 1999). At the same time, it is building on its many years of presence and experience in GTZ Offices, programmes and projects in cooperating countries. In concrete terms, this process involves a three-stage approach: adjustment of TC country portfolios, focusing of ongoing projects and programmes, and the initiation of new TC projects specifically for crisis prevention and peace-building.

Recognising that the current composition of TC programmes and projects in individual countries does not take (full) account of existing or emerging conflicts, and that in some cases the intended impacts of projects are mutually contradictory, GTZ has entered into a dialogue with the BMZ. The objective here is to harmonise at country level both the individual components of
TC, and the composition of the overall development cooperation portfolio, such as to create a compatible structure. The individual components of this overall structure should then per se make a positive contribution towards constructive conflict management and/or preventive action.

The openness to criticism and in some cases one-sided positioning of TC inputs needs to be reviewed. Examples: Structural policy advisory services delivered by a TC project to a governing party at the central government level, and simultaneous empowerment – supported by a TC project – of disadvantaged groups in rural regions led by the opposition, can lead to rapid escalation. The one-sided support of particular sections of the population, ethnic groups or production sectors by TC can promote imbalances, and challenge those disadvantaged to take countermeasures.

This portfolio analysis, together with the adjustments to the composition of the overall development cooperation package, should be conducted within the framework of the present intensive focusing of development cooperation on a small number of priority domains, focusing on those countries with a major potential for conflict. Some experiences with this process and its design are already available. Examples include Sri Lanka, Uganda and Malawi, where this portfolio adjustment process was successfully initiated. Similar processes are currently being launched in several countries.

One of the key tasks of TC in the coming years will be to orient projects and programmes in countries affected by or prone to crisis/conflict more closely and explicitly towards the respective situation. Situations must be avoided in which TC interventions – as has often been documented – fail to take account, either consciously or unconsciously, of existing conflictual situations or even (through one-sided prioritisation of certain sections of the population, pressure groups, regions, party interests, key persons etc.) exacerbate clashes of interest and add fuel to conflicts in ways that are objectively verifiable. Secondly, projects must be positioned wherever possible such that a positive contribution is made to situations of crisis or conflict. Particularly relevant in this context are traditional activity areas of TC such as modernisation of the state in the broadest sense, rural development, environment protection and natural resource management, and economic and employment promotion.
Projects in the activity areas specified below which have crisis prevention and/or conflict management at their core, will only be pursued and implemented where the process of political consultation with the project country makes explicit provision for such activities, and where the structures necessary for such interventions are in place. Of course this form of TC will only be adopted in certain special cases. Priority will be attached to integrating the methods and content of a crisis prevention/conflict management orientation into the sectoral and multisectoral projects and programmes of TC.

Alongside the project approaches listed below, another option would be the establishment of an open fund, such as those created in Colombia and Malawi, to support crisis prevention/conflict management initiatives. These funds established at country level allow rapid and targeted measures, cover a broad spectrum of content and methodology, allow cooperation with a wide variety of partners and target groups, and offer the current TC portfolio of a country needed opportunities for complementary action. Participatory mechanisms involving the state and civil society are necessary for decision-making on the allocation of these funds. At the same time, these mechanisms serve to support what is often a less than perfect dialogue process.

5.2 Strengthening Civil Society Groups of Strategic Significance for Building a Peace Constituency

In principle, strategic groups for crisis prevention and conflict management can be supported through two strategies:

- Direct promotion of a peace constituency by identifying peace initiatives, human rights groups, women’s and youth associations, religious or traditional authorities, pressure groups and other groups which directly influence conflicts such as to reduce violence, or which work to help peacefully reconcile interests.

- Indirect promotion of a peace constituency by supporting peaceful transformation processes of potential or existing war constituencies, such as youth promotion for crisis prevention, or demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society.
The strategies, methods and instruments of support must be determined in the respective country context. This process first requires a precise analysis of the general socio-political conditions under which the concerned groups are acting, as well as the profile of these groups and their own potential for development. On this basis, the conflict management potential of strategic groups can be supported through a number of measures.

**Measures**

- Funds for internal and external community-building processes.
- Training in issues of conflict management, self-organisation and organisation development, especially for multi-ethnic and multi-religious associations.
- Flexible promotion of ad hoc initiatives for acute conflict management already launched by such multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups.
- Advice and assistance in the coordination and networking of initiatives.
- Initiation and promotion of exchange measures with individuals and institutions from other conflict zones who possess relevant experience.
- Promotion of sector-specific fora to which key representatives of the respective sectors are invited, in order to discuss their options and their responsibility to constructively influence the respective conflict.

The empowerment of groups is a traditional activity area of Technical Cooperation. In the present context, groups should be promoted where possible which are already active in the country, which possess appropriate strategies and which are not “partisan” actors in the respective conflicts. It must also be taken into account, however, that this strengthening of groups is taking place in a politicised and conflictual setting. The possible escalating and de-escalating impacts of such work must therefore be carefully considered. The balance between short-term and long-term impacts also needs to be considered. Although for instance the mobilisation of traditional authorities can be helpful in bringing an acute conflict to an end, this very mechanism may in the long term clash with the (conflict-transforming) objective of securing political participation for other groups, e.g. women.
Given its experiences to date, GTZ has a considerable competitive advantage in the promotion of indirect measures, i.e. the transformation of war constituencies. Today, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants is already an established activity area of GTZ. At the same time, existing or planned youth promotion measures might still be oriented even more specifically towards crisis prevention than they are at present. Direct measures are an option most obviously in cases where, due to its presence on the ground, GTZ possesses comparative advantages as regards its close relations with groups. This is also the case where the particular circumstances of the conflict and the situation in general make a “political profile” of this kind for official TC possible or even desirable.

### 5.3 Promoting Local and Regional Institutions and Mechanisms for Peaceful Conflict Management

The growing number of violent conflicts within states is, amongst other things, a consequence of weak or failing nation states. The rebuilding of statehood (for good governance), and the strengthening of local and intermediary institutions and mechanisms for peaceful conflict management are therefore key peace-building tasks. This activity area is closely linked to the promotion of structural stability: sustainable peace-building requires in particular the strengthening within a society of institutional capacities for conflict management.

In this context, four levels need to be distinguished:

- the local level, at which people are directly confronted with the consequences of conflict in their everyday lives;
- the intermediary, intra-statal level (for example involving regions and district administrations);
- the “national” or state level, and
- the inter- and supra-national level.

It is necessary to establish and strengthen institutions and mechanisms for conflict management at all these levels. Here, a key role is played by the development and socialisation of norms and rules of conduct governing both interactions between citizens, and interactions between citizens and governments. Whilst these are traditionally institutionalised at the level of the nation state as an expression of the rule of law, they cannot take
effect unless they are institutionalised socio-culturally at a society’s grass roots.

In this context, GTZ is able to exert influence at various levels. The weaker or the more “de-constructed” the national level is, the more crucial it becomes that measures be taken at the local and intermediary levels to reconstruct the state. Similarly, measures are also required to strengthen other, non-governmental institutions and mechanisms which can both help establish and promote civil society structures, and can contribute towards the peaceful reconciliation of interests.

GTZ’s access to all the aforementioned levels also enables it to perform important coordination and networking functions. This has two main dimensions:

- Vertical coordination involves the development of coherent country programmes, and pressing ahead with their implementation at all levels simultaneously.
- With horizontal coordination, one possible point of departure is the presence of various external actors, each of which is involved in crisis prevention and conflict management at one particular level. In order to make use of their various comparative advantages, continuous coordination between the actors is required.

5.4 Promoting a Media Contribution to Crisis Prevention

The significance of the media in the emergence and escalation of conflicts has now been amply demonstrated by those broadcasting hatred in Rwanda and other conflict regions. By contrast, the potentials of the media to promote peaceful conflict management are far from exhausted. Amongst other things this would mean that, especially in times of crisis, the media would need to be measured by the standards of fair, accurate and complete reporting.

But there are numerous other direct contributions they could make towards better understanding and communication, such as documentaries on the background to a conflict, or light entertainment programmes on everyday forms of peaceful coexistence. In divided societies, the media can also play an important role in transferring information between the two divided groups. This might involve either radio programmes
being produced for both sides that can be received on both sides, or print media being specially produced for distribution on both sides.

Partner agencies for these activities would be the state steering and supervisory bodies, radio and TV stations, print media associations, journalists’ associations, and NGOs dealing specifically with the theme of media and conflict.

### Measures

Specific measures might include:

- Advice and support in the liberalisation and decentralisation of media structures, and corresponding support of supervisory bodies.
- Training of journalists (professional reporting and sensitisation to conflict-related issues).
- The staging of media fora at which the role played by this sector in the emergence and management of conflicts is jointly discussed by journalists and others.
- Advice and support in the development of codes of conduct for the work of journalists in conflict regions.
- The promotion of media and media forms which seek specifically to pursue constructive conflict management and reconciliation in war-torn societies.

The following can be considered as criteria for the promotion of peaceful conflict management by crisis media:

- integration into the local cultural tradition;
- use of target group languages;
- cooperation with nationals;
- cooperation with national media;
- high proportion of “participatory media”;
- independent of security apparatus;
- networked with youth and community work, and with training measures incorporated into the media mix as a method of social learning.
Youth and education are amongst a society’s key resources and investments in the future. Young people are the driving force behind future developments, and education is considered an engine of personal development and social change. This is especially relevant to development cooperation with countries where, as is often the case, half the population is under 16 years of age. There, the situation of children and youth acts as a seismographic indicator of social development. Education becomes the key factor for active participation in the development process.

In order to harness the special potential of youth, it is necessary amongst other things to promote peaceful co-existence. In this context, in its Report on Education for the Twenty-first Century the UNESCO Delors Commission emphasises the ideals of “learning to live together” and “learning for your life” as pillars of future education work. Education work should therefore be concerned not only to transmit knowledge about democratic principles, human rights and global risks, but should also promote attitudes and practical skills. The overarching and common goal is to educate youth to form their own judgements, and to consciously participate and assert their interests in society. With respect to the needed qualities of dealing constructively with conflict, both basic personal and social skills, and conflict-specific skills can be identified and transferred.

To influence the course of conflicts, education and youth work for peace is needed most in moments of latent conflict, as well as in post-war phases and phases of peace. There is very little scope to influence events during phases of actual violent conflict.

The key educational activity areas covered by GTZ’s service offering are:

- Reducing segregation and developing an integrated education system;
- Promoting mother tongues and foreign languages, and establishing bilingual schools;
- Developing new teaching aids and revising examination curricula to incorporate positive models for conflict management;
Incorporating peace-building and conflict prevention work into curricula;

- Promoting participatory structures and opening-up schools through peer-to-peer education;
- Supporting recreational activities for streetchildren, child refugees and children traumatised by war;
- Supporting recreational and other integrative activities that make young people less susceptible to “markets and cultures of violence”;
- Integrating crisis prevention and reconciliation into community work;
- Training education specialists for the aforementioned activity areas.

A second key area of GTZ’s service offering is the promotion of international exchange measures – especially with a view to strengthening regions -, the promotion of encounter initiatives between countries with similar conflict constellations, and awareness-raising concerning the North-South relationship.

### 5.6 Post-War Trauma Healing

Traumatised population

In situations of war, people become the victims of violence, destruction and displacement. Some have experienced violence personally, others have lost friends and relatives, but when a war has ended all must continue to live in an environment that still bears the stamp of war and its consequences. Post-war situations are characterised not only by destruction of the physical infrastructure, but also in many cases by a collapse of individual and collective abilities to come to terms with extreme experiences of violence and loss. In such cases, the term used is traumatisation. Both the local population and the staff of international aid organisations are at risk.

After a war, the affected region must not only be physically reconstructed, but also the political and social structures of a society must reform. However, traumatisation entails feelings of loss of control, powerlessness, mistrust and depression. This prevents active participation in reconstruction, and an optimistic view of the future in the thoughts and actions of both individuals, and entire sections of the population. If international assistance is not to remain assistance for sheer survival, but is to be oriented
towards criteria of sustainability and participation, then traumatic individual and collective experiences must be addressed.

Processes of psycho-social traumatisation always relate to a specific social, political and cultural context, and can only be understood and addressed in that context. Consequently, an appropriate, culture-sensitive approach to people and institutions can only be achieved by gaining an understanding of their specific traumatic experiences, and their culture-specific responses to those experiences. Understanding and addressing processes of psycho-social traumatisation takes time. Trauma-healing work is therefore always a long-term process.

**GTZ’s activity areas for trauma healing are:**

Addressing a trauma presupposes a relatively stable psychological state on the part of the traumatised subject(s). In post-war situations, people’s current, immediate cares and concerns must therefore be addressed first. An encounter centre offers people an opportunity to exchange experiences with others. The discovery that other people have the same or similar concerns and problems is helpful in itself, and has a stabilising effect. At the same time, a centre of this kind can offer counselling services on specific problems areas, such as medical care or schooling for children.

Although it is not possible in a post-war situation to identify and treat all the traumatised individuals, group and individual therapies can be used on a targeted basis. Steered discussion groups on experiences of war help those affected see the burden of their own experiences within the context of a social disaster. Groups can be formed to address highly specific traumatic experiences such as rape, the loss of relatives, or war invalidity. Discussion groups are also an appropriate way to identify those individuals who require one-to-one therapy. These individuals can then be given targeted psychotherapy by trauma experts.

It may be appropriate to first allow trauma experts from the international arena to do this work. In the long term, however, local experts (psychologists, psychiatrists, doctors, youth and community workers, social workers) will need to be trained in trauma work. To avoid creating a parallel care delivery system, it should be ensured that the training is provided for individuals working in government institutions.
To prevent GTZ personnel becoming traumatised, staff members should be given a regular opportunity to talk about the highly stressful experiences they had to endure while working in a post-war zone.

Identifying and networking existing initiatives to address psycho-social problems at the regional and community levels is another important activity area. Networking of this kind promotes professional exchange, and thus helps professionalise trauma work.

It is in principle desirable that aid workers and advisers coming into contact or working with traumatised groups be informed and sensitised to the nature of the psycho-social trauma processes in question, and their effects on the attitudes and behaviours of those affected. This information and sensitisation work on traumatisation processes is particularly relevant in the following areas:

- health
- education
- social affairs
- legal advice
- human rights work
- project administration (Head Office)

5.7 Post-Conflict Reconciliation and Coming to Terms with the Past

The goal of reconciliation work in the wake of violent conflicts is to help create general conditions or frameworks that are more conducive to post-conflict reconciliation. Express emphasis is placed on the creation of these frameworks, as reconciliation itself cannot be performed directly either by state institutions, or by development cooperation. It remains the responsibility of the individuals concerned to decide whether they wish to be reconciled or not. The question also arises as to whether it is too much to ask of the victims of severe human rights violations that they be reconciled with their tormentors.

It is therefore necessary to see reconciliation work in the broader context of a society as a whole coming to terms with its past and addressing past wrongs. The main reason why both working through the past and reconciliation work are considered
important is that past wrongs can quickly lead to a renewed outbreak of violence. This can occur either if no attempt is made to address the past wrong, or if in the view of the parties to the conflict the effects of the injustice are still being felt even after the cessation of armed hostilities. However, it should be remembered that a premature, radical approach to dealing with perpetrators might destroy an initiated peace process before the necessary degree of stability has been achieved.

GTZ’s support for processes of working through the past and reconciliation work is aligned with BMZ development-policy objectives for crisis prevention. It is also in line with the obligations recognised by the international community under international law to investigate human rights violations, bring the perpetrators to justice and compensate the victims.

During the immediate post-war phase, support measures for reconciliation work should first pursue a minimalist, basic needs-oriented approach. The first priority is protection against immediate violence. Only when a degree of stability has been established, should past wrongs be addressed; and the legal, political and social aspects should be dealt with in parallel.

GTZ work to help societies come to terms with their past and achieve reconciliation may include in particular the following five activity areas:

1. **Advisory services for legislation and administration to address past wrongs**
   Technical Cooperation can provide legal advisory services to help partner countries in solving the sort of typical problems that occur after violent conflicts and systemic upheavals. These include advisory services on issues concerning amnesty, reparation and (land) restitution legislation, and on issues involving the rehabilitation of victims of injustice, or the investigation of government officials.

2. **Support for truth and justice commissions.**
   For various reasons the traditional instruments of justice, such as criminal justice, possess only limited scope to deal with past wrongs and prevent new ones occurring. TC must therefore seek to support other structures and institutions for investigation and conflict management. In particular these include investigation, truth and reconciliation commissions, as well as national consultative processes of various kinds.
German development cooperation can offer supporting measures here, such as the preparation of information materials, and the training of truth and reconciliation commission staff in methods for conducting hearings and national consultative processes. It can also help to secure feedback into the political process (design of policy recommendations, lobbying of the government and other relevant actors, monitoring the implementation of policy recommendations etc.).

3. **Supporting prosecution for past wrongs under criminal law, and promoting alternative dispute settlement institutions**

Parallel to the efforts to address past wrongs through legislation and administration, or through truth and reconciliation commissions, it is important that crimes are investigated and lead to prosecution under criminal law and, where appropriate, that swifter and more effective dispute settlement institutions and procedures are developed, and preparations made for the reintegration of released convicts, the acquitted and those granted amnesties. TC can help facilitate these processes through an array of measures, e.g. by supporting the investigative activities of public prosecutors, supporting key prosecutors or central investigation units, training judges and lawyers, supporting structures which provide all sections of the populations with (easier) access to formal investigative, complaint and legal institutions, trial monitoring by national and international NGOs and human rights organisations, supporting alternative conflict resolution institutions and procedures, and through the monitoring of alternative conflict resolution institutions and procedures by local and international NGOs and human rights organisations.

When working with truth commissions and other dispute resolution institutions, it should be ensured that activities are compatible with accepted cultural practices, without either favouring one party to the conflict one-sidedly, or cementing patriarchal structures which fail to comply with the principles of the rule of law.

4. **Supporting ombudspersons and measures designed to bring about civilian assimilation and control of the police and armed forces**

If work to address past wrongs and bring about reconciliation is actually to prevent further crises, then it must also address
those elementary structures which play an especially important role in regulating intra-societal conflicts, or which can be the source of fresh discord. The civilian assimilation and control of the police, the armed forces and ex-combatants is therefore important, as is support for ombudspersons, local police-citizen fora and police training measures.

5. Supporting the reconciliation initiatives of local civil society

State initiatives and institutions have structural limitations. It is therefore desirable that they be complemented by civil society initiatives. This applies not only to working through the past and reconciliation work, but above and beyond that to the dissemination and consolidation of reconciliation processes, and the stabilisation of post-conflict situations. Although the scope for official German Development/Technical Cooperation here is limited, the attempt should be made to promote civil society initiatives in cooperation with the governmental partner organisation, and/or involve them in coordinated cooperation activities.

5.8 Training Measures for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

An important, though not absolutely the most crucial, factor in the sustainable creation of peace constituencies are people who are motivated, qualified and strong enough to shoulder the burden of effort and disappointment associated with protracted conflict management. This by no means refers only to those individuals who work to achieve a rapprochement between the parties, but also those whose work towards conflict resolution is conducted within and for the benefit of the parties. Finally, it involves all those engaged in this task within development cooperation.

To support these people in their work, two broad categories of measures need to be distinguished:

Firstly, training in conflict management skills, ranging from various negotiation techniques including facilitation, mediation, conciliation and reconciliation, through to the design of crisis prevention and conflict management procedures. In this field, the large number of curricula and experiences have now led to a
relatively high level of professionalisation, and to the incorpora-
tion of interculturally appropriate measures. The evaluation
studies currently being carried out by various NGOs and inter-
national organisations are likely to increase this trend. Through
its many years of experience in training for conflict management
in the environmental sector, GTZ possesses broad experience.

Secondly, the ongoing support and professionalisation of indi-
viduals working in crisis prevention and conflict management.
Similar to many professional groups working in demanding –
mainly social – professions who improve the quality of their pro-
fessional activity through coaching and supervision, in conflict
management, community building and the like there is a need to
provide these individuals with in-service support. They need to
be offered opportunities for internal exchange, networking and
mutual support, and opportunities to reflect on their work, their
successes and failures, their strategies, and their disappointments
and frustrations (facilitated self-reflection). Without these oppor-
tunities there is a risk that they will at some point withdraw in a
spirit of disappointment, meaning the loss of one of the most valu-
able potentials for creating peace constituencies.

A distinction can be drawn between the following types of
training programme:

- A training programme for external experts (i.e. experts
  whose homes are outside the crisis region), comprising a
  standardised basic course, various specialised courses, and
  induction programmes for specific regions or project con-
  texts.

- Training and workshops for internal actors, also comprising
  basic and specialised courses, plus elements of at least
  indirect conflict management: problem-solving workshops
  with training elements, and planning and capacity-building
  workshops with training elements.

- A “train-the-trainer” programme, designed to achieve effective
  multiplication of conflict management skills in crisis regions,
  and to create training capacities for culturally appropriate
  methods.

- Continuous support of external and internal conflict man-
  agement experts (through super-/intervision, coaching and
  professionalisation).
Security-sector reform is closely linked to crisis prevention and conflict management. The armed forces, the police, the judicial system and prosecuting authorities become a theme of development cooperation when these bodies fail to fully discharge their original mandate, i.e. to create and guarantee security, and instead themselves come to pose a threat to the security of citizens. This sector often turns into a “state within the state”, and evades all civilian control. In particular, favouritism and corruption within state institutions, or human rights violations committed by those institutions, often contribute to the escalation of conflicts. In settings of this kind, efforts to achieve good governance, i.e. the rule of law, participation and democracy, are doomed to failure.

The goal of security-sector reform is to create an appropriately-sized, professional security sector based on an appropriate deployment of resources, with a precise mandate and subject to democratic control. A security sector structured along these lines can contribute to a country’s development (Wulf 2000).

TC’s involvement with this sector to date has taken place within the scope of demobilisation and reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, and mine clearance measures, and has thus focused on post-conflict problems. To incorporate a stronger emphasis on crisis prevention, TC needs to be supplemented by additional activity areas. Given the large number of conceivable measures for security-sector reform, priorities need to be set. In this context, rather than cooperating with military units, German development cooperation will be strengthening elements of civil society, enabling them to monitor and increase the transparency of those military institutions. Activity areas will include:

- Political level: support of government and parliament as monitoring, decision-making and control bodies
- Level of economic development: legal and macroeconomic advisory services for budget planning and control, and for the efficient use of funds for the security sector (defence budget), taking into account the economic situation of the country as a whole and the population.
- Societal level: strengthening of civil society in its supervisory function, promotion of professional expertise on issues of security and military policy, including arms transfers, for civilian agencies (research institutions etc.).
Controlling the spread and misuse of small arms

Recognition of the fact that development is not possible without peace and security means that, alongside institutional reforms in the security-sector, measures are also required to control the spread and misuse of small arms. This is because weapons in that category – pistols, revolvers, rifles, machine guns, hand grenades and rocket launchers – are not only the main weapons of choice for rebels and army units in today’s violent conflicts, but are also available in sheer inexhaustible quantities. According to the most recent estimates, over 550 million of these tools of violence exist world-wide, many of them in developing countries. According to UNICEF estimates, their use not only in civil wars, but also in the course of criminal and/or domestic violence, costs over 800 people their lives every day, with most of those being civilians. The resulting destabilisation of societies and states is a severe constraint to development for the societies concerned.

Yet it is not the small arms themselves that kill or destabilise. In the hands of professional, appropriately-sized security forces with a precise mandate and subject to democratic control, small arms can even be a precondition for the creation of a secure environment. The real problem with small arms is rather that they stray around the world largely uncontrolled. Due to their long lifespan, they can be recycled from conflict to conflict over decades – provided that the continued supply of ammunition remains operational. So the problem of small arms needs to be tackled not by getting rid of them all, but by reducing their numbers and destroying surplus stocks, as well as by establishing effective control of their manufacture, distribution and use.

Technical Cooperation can support partner countries in their efforts to control and reduce small arms at several levels:

- Institutional level: security-sector reform; support for arms law reform;
- Technical level: micro-disarmament, secure storage and/or environmentally-sound destruction of surplus weapons; training of arms “destruction experts”;
- Human level: demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society, creation of alternative income-relevant options, psychological care of ex-combatants, programmes to raise public awareness, measures to break down cultures of violence.
- Institutional level: professionalisation of armed units, precise separation of mandates, introduction of codes of conduct, especially for respect for human rights whilst on active duty.
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6. Bibliography

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