Successes and lessons from mediation in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has witnessed a number of mediation processes. Some of these mediation processes were successful while others failed. The Nairobi 1985 mediation between the military government of Uganda and the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) was for example a failure while the 2008 Kofi Annan and the AU’s Panel of Eminent Persons’ mediation process of the Nairobi peace talks that culminated to the signing of the National Accord and reconciliation agreement and later Act of parliament that put a stop to violence was successful. Furthermore, whereas, Museveni’s Uganda government peace mediations with Joseph Kony-led Lord’s Resistance Army failed; the Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement mediated process can be argued to have been a success having ended the protracted civil war between the Southern and Northern Sudan.

The question in many pundits’ mind is what lessons can be drawn from some of the successful mediation processes in the Horn of Africa. While it is argued in this article that countries and regions are unique and replication of what works in the Horn of Africa might not be applicable to West Africa, for example, it is however pointed out that there are some common elements of mediation as a concept that if adhered to replication could apply. This article therefore focuses on successes and lessons of mediation processes in the Horn of Africa but first, we need to examine the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of mediation.

Conceptual framework

Mediation is considered a common response by the International community to violent conflicts in Africa and beyond. It is important to mention from the onset that mediation is not new to Africa, third party mediation is deeply rooted in African traditional Societies. A third party is usually involved in the facilitation of negotiations in mediation. This is basically a continuation of negotiation according to Gerner and Schrodt.1 Whereas mediation is increasingly used, it is important to point out that it is not usually successful in managing conflicts.2

According to Bercovitch and Houston there are three clusters of variables that may each determine the effectiveness of mediation.3 These clusters are: Context, process and outcome. These scholars further argue that each cluster

2 Ibid.
refers to characteristics that are specific to the party, the dispute and the mediator. They therefore conclude that outcomes are basically perceived as a result of the interaction of that particular context and the process variables whether the outcomes are successful or a failure. It suffices to mention that mediation has a better option of success if each disputant is accorded legitimacy, if the power differences between the parties are not significant, if previous relationships between the parties was cordial, if critical interests are not at stake, if the timing is right and if the parties feared losses are tolerable and if the mediator/mediating party is acceptable to the protagonists.

Although regional organizations may not be trusted because they might have their own agenda, neutral and acceptable leaders and representatives of regional organizations are perceived to provide the best mediation as regional organizations are always understood to mediate within the same cultural value system.4

Selected mediation successes and lessons from the Horn of Africa

Two mediations are selected for analysis in this article on the basis of their success with regard to ending violence and putting in place a process of instituting credible governance institutions in the focused countries, Kenya and Sudan. In the case of Kenya, immediate action was taken to stop violence. Modalities were put in place that stopped violence that had spread to one third of the country. Other measures that were put in place were: enhanced security to protect the population and property; restoration of the sanctity of human life; and restoration of respect for the freedom of expression including media freedom and right to peaceful assembly that had been drastically taken away by the state. Measures were also put in place to address the humanitarian crisis, promotion of reconciliation and healing. In summary, although the implementation of the National Accord and reconciliation agreement has been problematic, a lot of progress has been made worth learning from, especially when it comes to putting a stop to violence and restoration of some form of normalcy in Kenya.

One of the key lessons that can be learnt from this success in Kenya is that the mediator in Kenya, Kofi Annan had leverage and enjoyed significant esteem and respect from the protagonists in Kenya and the International Community. The mediator was a former United Nations Secretary General. The key principals President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila had reached a mutually damaging stalemate to the extent that the state security could no longer contain the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU) supporters from attacking each other in their different parties’ strongholds. This was after the declaration of Kibaki as the winner and the subsequent swearing of him as the president. What followed was civil strife and a political stalemate.

It is important to mention that many mediators expressed interest in the Kenyan mediation process starting with Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa; the Forum of Heads of States, led by Joachim Chissano; President John Kufuor in his capacity as Chairman of AU at the time; to the AU Panel of African Eminent Persons led by Kofi Annan, that eventually took over from Kufuor with the support of US, EU and UK. Others who tried were Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Concerned Citizens of Peace led by Bethuel Kiplagat and the Director of World Bank, Colin Bruce.5

Internally, the international community, civil society and the business community were exerting enormous pressure on both Kibaki and Raila to resolve their differences because the violence was hurting the economy and lives were being lost.6 It suffices to mention that the private sector suffered tremendously because goods could not move freely due to road blockades mounted by angry youth particularly party supporters. Basically, the legitimacy of Kibaki’s government was being questioned internally and internationally because he could only control one third of the country while the ODM could not force him out of power at the same time.7
Regionally, landlocked countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were affected and had to be involved and internationally. Kenya became a focus because of its strategic location in the fight against terrorism in Somalia by the US and protection of business interests of the EU and UK in particular. One major factor that is also worth mentioning that might have contributed to the signing of the peace accord in Kenya is the historical relationships between Kibaki and Raila. The relationship between Kibaki and Raila got constrained when Kibaki reneged on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that led to the formation of National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This was a coalition of two principal parties namely Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK).8

The MoU had stipulated a power-sharing mechanism between the two principal political parties. The NARC government had also promised to root out corruption and other historical injustices in Kenya once in power. It was this background relationship that informed the post-election stalemate and negotiations in 2008. In other words, it revisited what went wrong after the 2002 elections and Kibaki and Raila seemed to have partly agreed that they could after all share power to address what they failed to address after the 2002 elections.

Sudan faces somehow the same experiences, especially with regard to Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) bringing to an end to the protracted civil war between the Northern government in Khartoum and the People of the Southern Sudan. The CPA also put in place mechanism that would lead to a referendum and eventual secession of the South from the North. Therefore, within this retinue of success, we can argue that the CPA has some lessons worth learning. The use of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brought into effect a sub-regional organization representing countries that share common values. One of IGAD’s mandates is to resolve conflicts within the Horn of Africa. The leadership of Kenya in resolving the Sudanese conflict was acceptable to both protagonists, the Sudanese People’s Liberation and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).

The context of the peace process in Sudan was negotiated within the Post-Cold War era in which increasingly there is demand from the International community for democratization process to take root in perceived autocratic states. Furthermore, the economic realities of the 21st century in which major powers are suffering from the threat of recession and the need to expand their economies for survival informed the growing interest on Sudan given their discovery of massive oil reserves.

In Summary, contextually, the civil society led by international non-governmental organizations such as the Carter Foundation which made several efforts to mediate in the conflict prior to the involvement of IGAD, the stalemate reached by both the SPLM/A and NCP brought about by the collapse of the Cold War and acceptance of IGAD, especially Kenya, to lead the mediation process gave the process legitimacy. It is also important to mention the military pressure mounted by Southern Sudanese since 1955 and the growing sub-regional interests of member states with regard to the potential business opportunity in the Sudan in terms trade and oil played a major role in making the CPA a success.

Conclusions and recommendations
Mediation context may not be replicated because circumstances and the personalities of the protagonists may differ in different countries. For example, the personal characteristics and perceptions between General Okello and the military council were completely different from that of Museveni. Museveni perceived General Okello and the Military Council as criminals who should be thrown into jail. The losses that Museveni’s forces had made in the Uganda civil war at the time of the agreement were intolerable and the ruling military council was perceived by Museveni as already weak and divided. The mediating country, Kenya was not mediating in its capacity as a representative of any regional body and therefore may have not been perceived as neutral. Therefore, the mediation process itself lacked
legitimacy and the lack of pressure from the international community did not make things look any better.

The outcome was a collapse of the Peace accord and eventual ceasing of power by force by Museveni’s NRM/A. The successes in the Peace accord in Kenya and Sudan on the other hand can be attributed to the credibility of the mediator, the understanding of the protagonists about the shift in the international system and the support of the international community. It is recommended in this article that the African Union’s Panel of African Eminent Persons needs strengthening and extensive dissemination of information on its existence ought to be given consideration by policy makers at AU member states. Introduction of its operations in the school curriculum would create the needed awareness. This panel should be composed of people who command significant respect in Africa.

The international community, the civil society and the private sector should be involved in the mediation process in a similar way that Kofi Annan did in the Kenyan situation. Finally, an adequate budget should be allocated to this panel to assist it in carrying out its responsibilities in preventing conflict and making peace.

Moses Onyango is a Lecturer and Coordinator of the International Relations Programme in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the United States International University in Nairobi. He can be reached at onyangom@usiu.ac.ke


Transitional to statehood

Challenges and opportunities for South Sudan

The recently concluded referendum to determine whether or not South Sudan remains united to Sudan as a coherent state or secedes as an independent state has provoked positive and cautious excitement in different parts of the world. The euphoria and excitement the South Sudan referendum has generated in different parts of the world is an indication of the sentimental support and goodwill of the different sections of the regional and international community for this overly embattled people and underdeveloped region. The successful conduct of
the referendum and the final results which indicate almost 99 per cent voters’ turnout and affirmation of secession have been seen by many commentators as a confirmation that the people of South Sudan deserve sovereign statehood.1

If all goes well as expected, South Sudan would be inaugurated as Africa’s 54th state in July 2011. Already, President Omar al Bashir of Sudan has publicly congratulated the people of South Sudan on the outcome of the referendum and pledged to honour the results, which would see the vast sprawling Africa’s largest state partitioned into two. This paper explores the challenges and opportunities of transitioning to statehood in South Sudan.

Did we really need a referendum to grant sovereign statehood to South Sudan?

The longstanding scepticism over whether President Bashir’s government in Khartoum would respect the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the long-drawn-out civil war between Sudan’s North and South, to hold the stipulated referendum in January 2011 has been replaced by an effusion of euphoria among South Sudanese and their numerous sympathizers that sovereign statehood has finally been won with an overwhelming affirmation.

Thinking about the protracted war between Sudan’s North and South, and the whole issue of the CPA-stipulated referendum in the South raises a question as to whether we really needed a referendum to grant sovereign statehood to South Sudan. Apparently not! What was probably only needed is a referendum to determine the status of the disputed oil-rich border areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, but not to grant sovereign statehood to the entire South. Sovereign statehood is at the heart of the struggle the people of the South have waged against the North since 1955. From the perspective of South Sudan, Northern domination, marginalization and violation were a continuation of colonialism, and perhaps a type of colonialism that was more virulent than the joint Anglo-Egyptian dominion. Northern politicians would have at best been naïve if they thought that after six years of implementing the 2005 CPA, a referendum in the South could result in a united and indivisible Sudan.

Throughout Africa and the rest of the Global South, independence from colonial domination, especially after prolonged war of national liberation and self-determination was rarely subjected to a referendum. Independence negotiation was invariably about drawing up a transition timetable and agreeing on related activities and terms and conditions. This was how virtually all the African countries became independent. Similarly, most states that have either disintegrated or been partitioned into separate sovereign entities in recent international history, such as former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union have not followed the referendum trajectory.

Possible fallouts

I argue that any possible fallouts, negative externalities and some of the most immediate challenges (discussed in the subsequent section below) in South Sudan’s transition to sovereign statehood cannot be dissociated from the unnecessary anxiety, tension and population movement related to the referendum. In the six months ahead to the referendum, about half a million Southerners living in the North left their jobs and homes, and closed down their businesses to return to the South. About half of these people are still homeless and unsettled in the South and will be dependent on relief aid in the months and perhaps years ahead. South Sudan already had over a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the South Sudan Peoples’ Movement (SPLM)-led liberation war and the recurrent inter-ethnic feud that have occurred in the region since the inauguration of the semi-autonomous regional “government of South Sudan” (GoSS) in 2005.2 The GoSS have not shown they have the capacity and resources to deal with this voluntary population movement and aggravated IDP situation.

In the Sudanese North, the impact of the mass migration of Southerners is unsettling for their economy. There are expectations that tens of thousands of South
Sudanese domiciled in the North would join the return exodus in the months ahead for fear of identity-based violence. It is probably only after the impending phase that the full impact of the mass migration on the Northern economy (especially in Khartoum and the environs where Southerners are mostly engaged in petty trading, casual labour in construction and service industries, commercial transportation, artisanry and, to a lesser extent, government civil service) could be determined. The anxiety and fear of outbreak of armed hostilities was particularly heightened by the inflammatory campaign rhetoric in the run-up to the referendum.

Southern leaders, activities and populace in general largely constructed the referendum and its prospect for secession as emancipation from collective slavery, oppression, exploitation, second class citizenship and marginalization by the Arab-dominated North. The Khartoum government in the North and the bulk of the Arab public insidiously portrayed an infantilist image of Southerners, a construction that depicted the black African populations as a people incapable of self-rule. Consequently, the pro-unity referendum campaign of the Arab-Islamist North was propelled by panic and anxiety over the economy of Sudan should the oil-rich South secede.

All of these aggravated conflict fault-lines, humanitarian emergencies, and economic dislocation could have been clearly avoided if sovereign statehood was not predicated on an unwarranted referendum. Similarly, the hundreds of millions of Dollars spent in conducting this avoidable referendum whose outcome was almost predictable could have been better channelled to a more constructive transition plan. A more constructive transition plan could have, among other things, stipulated a referendum for the Abyei region alone, sensitized Southerners not to radically uproot themselves from the North and vice versa, promoted confidence-building measures on both sides, etc. If, for instance, the 2005 CPA had agreed on a six year transition plan to independent statehood with a multi-party election as opposed to a referendum as basis for forming a new sovereign government in the South, then the results of the April 2010 general election would have been sufficient platform to inaugurate a new independent state and government in the South in July 2011. The huge resources committed to the referendum less than a year after the general elections could have been better utilized in tackling other essential needs like institution-building and human security governance within the six-year transition framework.

A more constructive transition plan could have, among other things, stipulated a referendum for the Abyei region alone, sensitized Southerners not to radically uproot themselves from the North and vice versa, promoted confidence-building measures on both sides, etc. If, for instance, the 2005 CPA had agreed on a six year transition plan to independent statehood with a multi-party election as opposed to a referendum as basis for forming a new sovereign government in the South, then the results of the April 2010 general election would have been sufficient platform to inaugurate a new independent state and government in the South in July 2011. The huge resources committed to the referendum less than a year after the general elections could have been better utilized in tackling other essential needs like institution-building and human security governance within the six-year transition framework.

A more constructive transition plan could have, among other things, stipulated a referendum for the Abyei region alone, sensitized Southerners not to radically uproot themselves from the North and vice versa, promoted confidence-building measures on both sides, etc. If, for instance, the 2005 CPA had agreed on a six year transition plan to independent statehood with a multi-party election as opposed to a referendum as basis for forming a new sovereign government in the South, then the results of the April 2010 general election would have been sufficient platform to inaugurate a new independent state and government in the South in July 2011. The huge resources committed to the referendum less than a year after the general elections could have been better utilized in tackling other essential needs like institution-building and human security governance within the six-year transition framework.

Immediate hangovers, challenges and opportunities

There are a number of immediate hangovers and challenges from the fractured past that a new sovereign state of South Sudan needs to confront. Foremost in the front burner is how to determine the status of Abyei by negotiating the terms and modalities of the Abyei referendum. The referendum, which was originally scheduled to hold at the same time as the January 2011 referendum in South Sudan is presently deadlocked. As an effort to end the stalemate, South Sudan leadership needs to soften their legalistic hard-line position that, in line with the 2005 CPA, the Misseriya Arab nomads should not be allowed to vote in the Abyei referendum. The fact is that if the Misseriya Arabs are disenfranchised then there is no need for a referendum over Abyei because everybody knows the position of the Ngok Dinka on which side of the border Abyei should belong.

The South Sudan government should probably be more concerned with how to ensure that fraudulent agents do not hide under normadism to import more
Misseriya Arabs (than are ancestrally domiciled in Abyei) from the outlying northern communities to swing the referendum results to the advantage of the North. Further, the Southern government needs to use strong confidence-building diplomacy to ensure that war does not break out between the North and South over Abyei. The 2005 CPA should not be treated as an inflexible legal document; it is foremost a political document a fortiori - a document articulating the political settlement between two bitterly divided adversaries.

Other hangovers that a sovereign national government in the South needs to grapple with include (and they are already working towards most of them):

1. **Asset and liability sharing**, including what to do about oil revenue sharing between the North and South in the short-term. Sudan’s external national debt is about $38 million and there is yet no agreement on whether an independent South Sudan should partake of this liability and to what extent.¹

2. **Terms and conditions for continued export** of South Sudan’s oil through the 1,000km pipeline from Southern oil fields to Port Sudan in the North.

3. **Terms and conditions for South Sudan using Northern refineries** to process and supply oil to the South in the short to medium term.

4. Feasibility of **constructing an alternative, complementary or competing oil pipeline** through Kenya or Ethiopia/Eritrea to a sea-bound export harbour that landlocked South Sudan could conveniently use.

5. **Boundary demarcation** and how to settle all the associated border disputes; disputes over borderline areas that have human settlements could be settled by a plebiscite while disputes over borderline areas without human settlement could be ultimately sent by the two parties to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague for a binding decision. A soft border is recommended, especially in areas that involve pastoral activities or splitting of ethnic communities across the two sides of the border. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which ends on 30th April 2011, should be extended for at least 10 years and the capacity of the force expanded for trans-border monitoring, among other important functions.

6. **Communal violence, inter-ethnic feud** and complaints of domination of the state apparatuses by the majority Dinka at the expense of diverse ethnic communities has been a recurrent feature since the instituting of the post-CPA government in Juba. A constructive federal arrangement with regard to distribution of power, resources and appointments can help to forge an inclusive state system and address the fears of minority ethnic groups.

7. **State capacity** is exceedingly weak both institutionally and functionally in various strategic areas, especially institution-building (public service), public infrastructure (roads, education, health services, power generation, portable water, etc), as well as security services and provision of law and order. Strong investments are required in these areas to systematically improve and expand state capacity.

8. Some of the **security issues such as illegal acquisition, trafficking and use of firearms** require both a national and regional approach. Besides security, a regional framework will also be beneficial to South Sudan from the standpoint of trade and investment, development, and labour mobility. Hence, it is expected that an independent South Sudan would effectively join such regional bodies as Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU).

9. Like many extractive resource-based economies, South Sudan would need **external technical assistance** in strengthening of its capacity to manage its oil resources and revenue base. Already, there are talks of engaging a reputable international firm to help audit the oil revenue and how it has been shared between the North and South since 2005. There might also be the need to engage an international financial institution such as the African Development Bank to help in coordinating and regulating the oil industry, overseeing revenue receipts and their disbursements, auditing oil accounts, etc To promote transparent accountability.
in the oil sector, it is further recommended that Southern Sudan signs up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and implement its protocols and guidelines with due diligence.

10. In the medium to long term, South Sudan would need to have a practical strategic plan of how to diversify its economy away from primary commodities (namely oil and agricultural produce) so as to avoid the syndrome of natural resource curse characteristic of many countries with similar economic base.

11. A final note on opportunities is that given the tortuous circumstance of their independence (developmental neglect, marginalization and prolonged war of self-determination), there is likely to be massive regional and international goodwill and development assistance towards South Sudan, especially during the next 5 to 10 years. The more the state is seen to be proactive, intolerant of corruption, and committed to the overall wellbeing of its people, the greater the likelihood of support from the international community. However, the state would need to be assertive in regulating in-coming support and channelling them to areas of greatest need. An independent statutory body, suitably staffed and equipped, is required to coordinate and regulate international development assistance and agencies. Effective state regulation of international development assistance would, among other things, help to avoid the tendency of international agencies concentrating their projects and activities in a few convenient urban locations or issue areas.

Kenneth Omeje is Professor of International Relations at the United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi, Kenya and holds a PhD in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford. He can be reached at: komeje@usiu.ac.ke


Peace education in East Africa and the Horn

The Young Peace Ambassador Program

The Young ‘Peace Ambassador’ Program (TYPAP) started in 2003/4 in Tanzania as part of the Global Network of Religions for Children- GNRC’s Education for Peace Program initiative in Africa. It was partially a response to the violence following the irregular 2000 elections in Zanzibar and Pemba. By 2006/7 TYPAP was introduced in Somalia and parts of northern Kenya. This paper focuses on TYPAP in these areas.

It was argued that lessons learnt in Tanzania can be used to try to improve the lives of youth and children in Somalia, Somaliland and Kenya. Peace building and training workshops have been held in the Kenyan northern towns of Isiolo, Garbatullah, Wajir, Garissa and Mandra. Other workshops in Bosasso, Hargeisa and Mogadishu have also been undertaken. Over 60 peace clubs have been formed mostly in schools and orphan centers and over 1000 peace club members have received the TYPAP training on peace and ethics education. In 2008 TYPAP incorporated an ethics education radio program in Nairobi and Hargeisa as a component of its program. TYAPA also uses a UN approved manual called learning to live together (LLT) for its peace building training activities.
Structure and methodology

TYPAP works with children and young people with a model of intervention being more “preventative” rather than “curative”. The program involves children (below 18 years) in grassroots dialogue on peace (within the school based peace clubs) as a strategy of creating a peaceful culture. The assumption is that with the debates and peace building training within the peace clubs and a peace radio program that the children themselves are key participants, use of a UN approved ethics education training toolkit and guidance from elders a child/youth network that values a peaceful ethos will emerge.

The long-term goals are thus to have a strong child/youth network for peace that will benefit from joint activities like visits to places like the Rwanda genocide museum, regional peace building workshops, debates and involvement in a peace education radio program within the Horn of Africa. TYPAP methodology is geared at providing space for exchange, interaction, encounter, discovery, critical thinking, reflection and action.

Approaches and strategies

TYPAP approaches its goals employing four key strategic components:-

a) Use (and application) of elders, mentors and role models in the program.

Elders, mentors and role models are identified and encouraged to have constant contact with the children and the youth.

b) Use and application of media in passing the message of peace.

Currently, radio programs in Kenya and Somaliland use children’s voices, religious leaders and elders giving comment with the LLT tool kit sometimes providing broad ideas of discussion. These ideas are presented to the child in form of simple questions such as; what is peace? What is violence? What is good in the world?

These ideas generate discussions. The radio program has reached approximately 200 000 families in Somaliland and from reports it is said to be well received by youth whose voices are a primary content of the program.

c) Creation of Peace clubs and conducting peace building workshops.

The peace clubs form the backbone of TYPAP by providing the building blocks for information sharing, training and networking among the children and the youth. Youth who complete school are encouraged to mentor their colleagues who are still in the school based peace clubs.

d) Use of the LLT manual/toolkit for peace building.

In these workshops trainers in peace building are hired but the LLT manual is used to train the children and peace club members. The LLT approach strives for intercultural and interfaith learning for ethics education, affirms diversity, promotes dialogue and communication. It upholds, nurtures, and enables the growth of shared values in children and young people where they live together peacefully, respect others and appreciate human dignity.

The LLT manual is divided into two parts. The first part discusses several ideas such as Children and Ethics education, Ethics and Ethics Education, A common humanity and Spirituality, religious and cultural diversity, human rights and spirituality. These ideas underscore common religious beliefs and teachings that take towards working for humanity’s concerns that are common across the religious divide. The second part of the manual provides practical guidance for an intercultural and interfaith programme for ethics education featuring and highlighting various tools and techniques to achieve this such as skills for conflicts transformation, interfaith cafés, debates, stories, roundtables, using role playing, field visits and cultural evenings among many others.

The methods employed in the LLT manual places the individual in a self-driven learning process conducted in relation to others. Some of the methods espoused in the LLT manual include, Experience-based learning, Cooperative-based Learning
Problem-based Learning, and Introspection-based learning. TYPAP main objectives of TYPAP are to plant the seeds for collaboration between, and peaceful co-existence among, children and young people from diverse background of Somali/land and Kenya and to promote peace as a value within public discourse in Somalia/land and Kenya.

Conceptual framework; a peace discourse
To conceptualize TYPAP, this paper employs Galtung’s peace discourse (which he contrasts with a security discourse) to elucidate conflict, peace and ultimately view peace education. The peace discourse addresses issues more comprehensively by addressing the root causes of conflicts. It focuses on contradicting goals rather than on violence. The peace discourse makes use of tested conflict analysis techniques which broadens the scope of actors and stake holders, takes into account basic needs and assumes that solutions must be based on legitimate goals. While conflict is a situation where two or more individuals or groups have incompatible goals or share the same goal but have different means on how to achieve the goal, it is not necessarily negative, and may not necessarily lead to violence. Any change in the world can be understood as a conflict with the status quo; and change if dealt with constructively can have positive effects.

Other ideas promoted by Galtung include the ideas of a “positive peace” – an absence of physical structural and or cultural violence, where unjust social structures that marginalize or limit human potential are transcended, and “negative peace” which is simply the absence of overt physical violence. Thus a peace discourse believes that positive change is within our power and that there are alternatives to violence. This theoretical approach help us better understand the issues around peace and violence.

Though this analysis is coming from a western context it may be useful in any conservative African political hierarchy where the authorities are in many respects an extension of the western metropolis. It is perhaps suffice to say thus that TYPAP and similar such peace education programs can be seen as initiatives designed to change the discourses and frames in order to transform the world for the better by promoting justice and a more peaceful vision. These are the values and capacities that that TYPAP seeks to develop in children as they develop into adults.

Strengths and challenges
GNRC’s TYPAP program is a unique initiative that strives to combine an interfaith and intercultural approach to peace education focusing on children and the youth. Several methodologies, teaching aids and strategies are employed to enable LLT facilitators effectively deliver the contents and intended information to the children and young people.

The LLT toolkit used as the primary peace education content is quite flexible in terms of its target group, i.e. it can be used by human rights advocates to provide human rights education or and peace building educators for peace building giving recommendations to facilitators who might be faced with challenges during workshops or trainings.

TYPAP also shows viability by incorporating a peace education radio program to its peace clubs in school strategy. In a final report on the TYPAP peace radio program there is indication that the peace radio programs managed a listenership of approximately 200 000 people in Somaliland. TYPAP use of elders and role models also portrays strength. This has helped the program establish informal local links and ownership and at the same time helping connect the community knowledge, culture, history and wisdom with the youth.

At the very least therefore TYPAP creates and to some extent catalysis awareness on peace, justice, reconciliation, forgiveness and related issues. A peace club in Mandera out of their own initiative and inspired by the TYPAP program started a
In marginalized areas

TYPAP operates in some of the most difficult and marginalized areas in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. In addition to the ongoing crisis in Somalia and it is easy to see the challenges facing such a program. The prolonged conflict and the war against terrorism waged by western powers have made residents of the country understandably quite suspicious of anything new. Coupled with this the poor state of education in the areas under TYPAP also poses a challenge in peace education by limiting its impact to the wider community.

An interesting observation is that TYPAP does not seem to incorporate in their manual any material that discusses the historical and socio-political genesis of the conflicts in the region being addressed in a direct manner. The TYPAP LLT manual has also been criticized by local East African facilitators for not having enough African input in terms of local African religious and cultural traditions cited in the manual. This is limitation is overcome by use of elders within the TYPAP approach.

Conclusions: Towards a viable peace education discourse in the Horn of Africa.

The need among the young people and children in East Africa and the Horn of Africa for a sustainable involvement in a viable peace-building discourse cannot be over stated. The historical and socio-political realities of the conflicts in Kenya and the Horn of Africa have their genesis in disputed colonial boundaries, inter-state tensions, governance challenges, marginalization, politicized clannism and ethnicity and vested foreign strategic interests. As such, the conflicts are colored in collective narratives and pronounced inequalities.

Any viable peace education initiative in East Africa and the Horn Region will have to integrate or encompass an aspect of the historical lessons of earlier failed or successful efforts to resolve the conflicts in the region so as to ground the educational encounter with historical and present day socio-political realities. Peace education manuals may consider having a brief section that highlights the historical and socio-political struggles and processes that have been going on in the region.

The long term stability of the region will definitely depend on the fundamental issues or the root causes of conflict being addressed but peace education initiatives like TYPAP that (are inter-cultural in approach) can help change the mind frames and tilt the discourse to one that is “peace” focused but the historical and socio-political exegesis of the conflict areas must themselves be part of the educational encounter for it to be more viable.

Multi-faceted and inter-cultural peace education initiatives like TYPAP with local partners’ show potential not just in awareness creation on peace issues but more so in cultivating the seeds for a culture of peace but to make them more viable cultural resources must complement them so as to make their discourse ontologically, more valid. TYPAP acknowledges the use and role of elders and role models in its program; who may as well be the entry point for infusion of greater cultural resources on traditional methods of peace building.

Methods, traditions and philosophies such as the Gachacha courts of Rwanda, the Mato Oput reconciliation system of the Acholi of Northern Uganda or the Guurti of Somaliland (which is a council of clan elders and is already incorporated in the Somaliland legislature) may form and occupy special mention in any peace education strategy in Africa.

Said Abdalla is a master’s student with the South African Research Chair in Development Education at UNISA. His area of study and research include peace, civil society and development. He can be reached at gnrkenya@gmail.com


4. See for example Arigatou Foundation 2008 “Learning to Live Together: An Intercultural and Interfaith Programme for Ethics Education”, Geneva, ATAR Roto Press SA. pg11. According to my respondent the perception created here is that this is acceptable across all traditions yet this is only the story in Jewish and Christian traditions. (Author’s interview 5/5/10 Nairobi)

5. See generally C.O Hoppers 2005 “Traditional Methods of Peace building and Peace Making in Africa” peace notes for The Hague Appeal for Peace, for more details on these methods.

Reference:


Daniela Kroslak and Andrew Stroehlein June 15th 2009 “When It Comes to Somalia, Inaction Is Not an Option”, *The Globe and Mail*.


Magnus Haavelsrud *Education in Developments Volume 2* St Maartenslaan Shaker publishing 2010.


---

**NEWS AND RESOURCES**

**SUDAN**

**Christian relocation and the dilemma of church property**

An overwhelming majority of southern Sudanese voted for secession to break away from the north in the independence referendum that took place in January 2011. The Sudanese government accepted the preliminary results of the referendum even before the announcement of the final results. Churches and Christian faith institutions are closing doing following massive relocation of followers from the north to the south. Religious learning institutions have also experienced a massive drop of students.
The relocations are believed to be voluntary according to the Roman Catholic Auxiliary Bishop of Khartoum Archdiocese. They are concerned of their safety after independence and the viable option is relocation. Religious leaders pre-empt that adoption of Sharia will dwindle Christian visibility and presence in the north. It is projected that the transition period to South Sudan government inauguration in July is going to be marked by more immigration. Some faith institutions are pondering on what to do with the property that is left behind while the Catholic Church has resolved to merge parishes that remain in the north.
Source: ENI News

Calls for peaceful transition to an independent South Sudan
Following the announcement positive self determination result for South Sudan regional organizations praise the conduct of the two parties thus far. The African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) appreciated and implored the Sudan president to continue the positive gesture towards the affirmation and respect of the South Sudanese verdict for secession. The AU is hopeful that both parties will amicably resolve outstanding issues as outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It affirmed support to further enhance mutual relations for the two states for the sake of peace, interdependence and betterment of their countries.

The Episcopal Church of Sudan House (ECS) of Bishops also echoed similar sentiments and called for unity, democracy, justice and peace, and urged armed groups in Darfur to consult in order to end the violence. The Religious leaders also pleaded for a resolution of conflict between Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan government sighting that the conflict has adverse social and political repercussions on South Sudan. They also urged people of different religions to embrace coexistence and the governments to guarantee freedom of religion.
Source: African Union, IGAD and ECS

KENYA
Support for delay of ICC prosecution
The African Union (AU) supports Kenya’s request to delay the ICC prosecution of the 2007-2008 post election violence. The AU summit urged the UN Security Council to grant Kenya the one year deferral request. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Security has also endorsed their support.

The support by regional bodies was after intense lobbying of the member countries through the countries presidents.

The Kenyan government affirms that it takes institution legal measures that will enable it to carry out the trials internally. The Kenyan president affirmed that the new constitution is the foundation for ‘justice, peace and reconciliation’ hence the efforts skip the International Criminal Court prosecutions.
Source: Daily Nation, February 1, 2010

SOMALIA
Piracy increases – but not the prosecution of pirates
Despite increasing piracy cases in the Gulf of Aden that result high costs prosecution of pirates is minimal. This is due to lack of appropriate legal system that has led the United Nations to propose establishment of special courts to prosecute suspected pirates. In 2010 alone the pirates captured 1,016 hostages, held 31 vessels and 713 crew members from different countries. Yet even with this alarming number of cases nine of out ten pirates are released due to lack of an appropriate judicial system and capacity internally.

Before the establishment of the court, the interim extraterritorial jurisdiction in neighbouring Tanzania will nonetheless be under Somali jurisdiction. It is presup-
posed that setting up of the court will enhance prosecution of pirates who have previously escaped justice due to absence of legal system. In addition prosecution will put to an end military force as a strategy to deal with the menace; “if created, the special court will provide an alternative non-violent means for dealing with pirates”. The process will conform to international human rights procedures and obligations.

The cost of setting up a prison, court and the judicial system is estimated at $25 million. In order to realize the establishment of the court it is proposed that the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and other organizations should contribute.

Source: Peace and Security Report – 28/01/211

**African Union wants attack mandate for Somalia force**

The African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping force in Somalia is considering to engage as combatants as a strategy to overcome militant groups in support of the government. The new role is subject to approval by the United Nations even as African leaders deliberate on whether formally request for change of mandate – from peacekeeping to offensive. The proposal is based on the fact that the country is laden with militant groups who control large sections of the country. Some of the groups are also targeting regional countries particularly al Shaabab militant claimed responsibility for the bomb explosion in Uganda. Internally civilians have fallen victims in cross fire between aggressors.

In order to equip the peacekeepers (AMISOM) the AU has requisitioned five helicopter gunships to boost AMISOM’s stockpile. In addition the AU also seeks to increase the number of troops with Uganda that has the largest number of peacekeepers willing to contribute additional if called upon. Analysts in the region attribute the minimal government presence to AMISOM troops.

Source: AlertNet

**UGANDA**

The Electoral Commission of Uganda has declared the incumbent as the winner of the elections held on 18th February 2011. The president who ascended to power after a coup has ruled Uganda since 1986. After the coup he held the first elections in 1996 and with the re-election is therefore set to begin a fourth five year term. The announcement was made in the midst of election malpractices. Observers noted that the campaign and voting process was marred with irregularities notably was unlevelled playing field where the incumbent campaign benefited from state structures, a high presence of security personnel, intimidation of voters and voters bribery. The opposition leaders have disavowed the results and are set to consult amongst themselves on the way forward.

Source: Daily Nation

**RESOURCES**

New book

*Religion, Error, Terror*

How should the United States deal with the challenge of religious terrorism and other forms of identity-based conflict that permeate today’s geopolitical landscape? *Religion, Terror, and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement,* the latest book from ICRD, argues that it will require rethinking old assumptions, expanding the scope of policymaking, and departing from past
practice. An effective strategy of cultural engagement will also be needed, backed by a deeper understanding of how religion informs the world views and political aspirations of those who do not separate “church” and state. How all of this can be achieved is the subject of this book.

In his foreword to the book, General Anthony Zinni, Former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command and Special Envoy to the Middle East, writes, “This is a visionary approach that goes beyond the whole-of-government effort and which expands the current definition of smart power”. From my two decades of experience in the Islamic world, I am convinced that the vast majority of Muslims would embrace this approach as a means of clearly expressing their beliefs and enabling them to understand ours.”

This book accomplishes three important tasks. It (1) shows how religious considerations can be incorporated into the practice of U.S. foreign policy, (2) offers a successor to the rational-actor model of decision making that continues to constrain our practice of international relations by failing to accommodate non-state actors and “non-rational” factors like religion, and (3) suggests a new paradigm for U.S. leadership in the multi-polar world that awaits. In describing how the United States should realign itself to deal more effectively with the causal factors that underlie religious extremism, the book explains how existing capabilities can be redirected to respond to the challenge and identifies additional capabilities that will be needed to complete the task.

This work completes the trilogy of Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 1994) and Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik (Oxford, 2003). These groundbreaking books have been required reading at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute and incorporated as course texts in numerous colleges, universities, and seminars around the world. They have also received highly favourable reviews in more than 60 prestigious journals and periodicals, including Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the International Herald Tribune, and the London Financial Times.


The other side of gender

Including masculinity concerns in conflict and peacebuilding

The United States Institute of Peace has released a report that expounds on the issue of Gender in conflict. The report urges a shift in gender paradigm that equates gender to women and instead urges for a comprehensive inclusion of gender which ideally implies men and women in conflict analysis. This comprehensive approach will enable a broad-based and inclusive approach for effective peacebuilding. Of essence is the role of both men and women in conflict that leads determines policy recommendations and interventions.

The report draws on an important element of the multiple roles that both men and women can assume. It affirms that not only is one gender perpetually victims but they may also be perpetrators of sexual and gender based violence that is increasingly becoming a weapon in conflict. In addition sexual and gender based violence extends to post conflict situations having an impact on different aspects such as economics and psychosocial further leading to violence.


World report 2011: A facade of action

The 2011 human right report has faulted the United Nations approach to dealing with human rights. The report alleges that the Secretary General has shied away from implicating some nations that are involved in human rights violations. As last year’s reports focused on oppressive regimes effects on human rights individuals and structures. The current report focuses on the failure of multilateral institutions
such as the UN have a global mandate yet fail to adequately respond to human rights violations particularly perpetrated by governments. Yet it is assumed that they global institutions have the capacity to intervene in such situations. Additionally the dialogue approach adopted to deal with countries involved in human rights violation is not appropriate to institute the desired results.

In last year’s World Report, Human Rights Watch highlighted the intensifying attacks by abusive governments on human rights defenders, organizations, and institutions. This year it addresses the flip side of the problem—the failure of the expected champions of human rights to respond to the problem, defend those people and organizations struggling for human rights, and stand up firmly against abusive governments.


Disarming states

The international movement to ban landmines

The book provides a historical description of global efforts to address the issue of buried explosive devices which are a security threat in many post war situations. It focuses on popular movements particularly their accomplishments with the intention of informing similar movements. Drawing from a compilation of photographs, literature review, personal notes, formal interviews as well as unpublished correspondence from all over the world and real life experiences, the ten year project is a cross-fertilization of theory and practice. The author apparently is a survivor who lost his limbs in Somalia.

Source: Centre for International Stabilization and Recovery http://maic.jmu.edu/

The need for conflict-sensitive land policy governance in Africa

Land conflict occurrence in Africa engendered the drafting of land policies in the respective countries. Land is a source of livelihood for many communities in Africa and a source of food security whether as pastoralists or agriculturalists. A report on the need for conflict sensitive land policy and governance in Africa affirm that sustainable food security can be achievable through ‘coherent and comprehensive approaches to land rights, land policy and governance.’ The report further emphasizes the importance of people productivity and proper utilization of natural resources but at the same time ‘minimising the risk of violent conflict.’.


The Go Between

— exploration of international mediation

The book affirms that the success in international mediation hinges on the skill, style, and methods of the mediator through exploration of international mediation from the perspective of a successful global mediator the Swedish Ambassador Jan Eliasson. The authors Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen maintain that international mediators’ styles vary in four dimensions — scope, method, mode, and focus — and that the mandate mediators receive strongly determines the style they adopt. By analysing the approach in six different mediation cases the authors brings out successes and lessons for mediators and mediation process from the experiences of Eliasson.

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Website http://kroc.nd.edu/research/books/strategic-peacebuilding/699

Mass atrocities and armed conflict:

Links, distinctions, and implications for the responsibility to prevent

A report on mass atrocities indicates that policies intended to prevention of violence are may undermined by the conflation or overlap in armed violence and mass atrocities. The challenge is to establish which of the two a causal factor and what is the
underlying cause. These situations make it difficult to delineate whether the aggression signifies the beginning of violence or the existent of fully blown violence whose approach are different. In effect this affects decisions on what actions to be taken to deal with the violence; there the action should be to prevention or to management or better still transformation.

Nonetheless not all conflicts result to mass atrocities and in some cases mass atrocities have occurred in absence of armed struggle. A policy brief by the Stanley foundation considers the dynamics of relationship between conflict and atrocity prevention. In order to prevent atrocious activities the policy proposes the use of lens that will enable detection and subsequent decisions that will establish systems and activities to deal with the situation.

http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=445

Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 23, No. 1, February 2011

Editorial information
The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECLHHA). The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Shamsia Ramadhan, shamsia.ramadhan@life-peace.org.
For subscription matters contact: Tore Samuelsson, tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org
For a link to HAB and more information see www.life-peace.org
This publication is produced with support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Bread for the World and Church of Sweden. The donors are not involved in the production and are not responsible for the contents of the publication.

Editorial principles
The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECLHHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.