Iraq

Key developments since May 2005: Iraqi officials have continued to express strong interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Opposition forces have continued to use improvised explosive devices in great numbers, as well as antivehicle mines. Coalition forces have discovered many caches of antipersonnel mines. Reduced international funding for Iraq (down by half from 2004) plus deteriorating security significantly hindered mine action in all but the northern regions; some contracts and operations ended early. The National Mine Action Authority reported a sharp drop in mine clearance in 2005. The authority’s second director general in two years was replaced in October 2005. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey completed surveying 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in April 2006, but suspended survey in Tikrit and Diyala due to lack of security. As of May 2006, the survey had recorded 565 casualties in two years (over 20 percent were children) and 7,631 less recent casualties. In 2005, there were at least 358 casualties, an increase from 2004, and likely an underestimate as there is no effective casualty surveillance in Iraq.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Since 2004, government representatives have indicated on many occasions that Iraq is favorably inclined toward the Mine Ban Treaty and is studying the issue of accession."In early 2006, the Office of the Prime Minister provided the Iraq Campaign to Ban Landmines with an unofficial draft law regarding accession to the treaty."In a 1 March 2006 meeting, senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials assured Iraqi campaigners that Iraq would join the treaty and that preparations were underway."In November 2005, Iraqi officials attending the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty told the ICBL that Iraq would join the treaty once there is a permanent government."In August 2005, Iraq’s Foreign Minister wrote to Landmine Monitor, “The government of Iraq is about to carefully study the joining of the Convention.”"In June 2005, an Iraqi delegation stated, “Iraqi officials announced on several occasions that the Iraqi elected government will adhere to the conventions and treaties concerning international humanitarian law such as the
antipersonnel mines convention. It is now under thorough study so that Iraq will be ready for accession. Iraq participated in a regional seminar in Algeria in May 2005 regarding implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 8 December 2005, Iraq voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80, calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2004, Iraq voted for a similar UNGA resolution, the first time it had been eligible to vote on the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution since 1996.

Officials from Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) attended as observers the Mine Ban Treaty’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, but did not make any statements. Iraq attended the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2005, but was absent from the meetings in May 2006.

On 29 April 2006, the Iraqi Handicapped Society and other local NGOs, supported by Mines Action Canada, hosted a training session for Iraqi youth on the Mine Ban Treaty in Baghdad that opened with statements from representatives of government ministries.

**Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer**

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. All mine production facilities were destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign. In 2005, Landmine Monitor removed Iraq from its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines or reserving the right to produce them following the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities and the government’s statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor remains concerned that there have been no official statements regarding a prohibition on production of antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s, but the government has not made a statement regarding export of antipersonnel mines. There is no export ban or moratorium in place.

The total size of Iraq’s mine stockpile is not known, and will likely be difficult to determine. It is believed to contain mines manufactured by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured mines. Mines, along with a full range of ammunition, were dispersed to storage locations across the country and subsequently abandoned as the Iraqi Army disintegrated after the March 2003 invasion.

Iraqi government and Coalition forces continue to find landmines in arms caches across the country. On 30 May 2006, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) forces found 82 antipersonnel mines in northwest Baghdad. On 16 May 2006, the 506th Regimental Combat Team found 140 mines in the east of Baghdad. On 13 May 2006, the
Bulldog Troop found four antipersonnel mines.\(^{15}\) On 28 April 2006, MND-B soldiers found 25 antipersonnel mines.\(^{14}\) On 26 April 2006, eight antipersonnel mines were found in eastern Diyala province.\(^{15}\) On 20 April 2006, two antipersonnel mines were found in a cache.\(^{16}\) On 19 February 2006, an unknown quantity of antipersonnel mines was found near Al Quratiyah.\(^{16}\) On 14 February 2006, the US Army Corps of Engineers stated that it had demolished over 248 tons of stockpiled ammunitions including landmines.\(^{16}\)

On 8 November 2005, Kazakhstan Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Army experts claimed to have destroyed over four million landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).\(^{19}\) On 11 October 2005, the US Alaska Brigade found and destroyed a weapons cache in Rawah that included 10 landmines.\(^{20}\) On 28 September 2005, a total of 46 antipersonnel mines were found in a cache in Radwiniyah.\(^{21}\) On 18 June 2005, 24 landmines were found southwest of Baghdad.\(^{22}\) At the beginning of June 2005, Ukrainian peacekeepers in the province of Wasit found and destroyed 470 antitank and antipersonnel mines.\(^{22}\)

**Use**

In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying by Iraqi government military forces. Iraqi officials have been unable to inform Landmine Monitor about the instructions Iraqi forces receive regarding the use of antipersonnel mines.

There have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by any Coalition forces. Most members of the Coalition, though not the United States, are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty which prohibits them from using antipersonnel mines in any circumstance and prohibits them from assisting in any way the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of antipersonnel mines. In October 2005, a US Department of State official affirmed that US forces did not use antipersonnel mines during the invasion of Iraq and have not used them during the ongoing conflict.\(^{24}\)

The US and many Coalition members are party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which regulates the types of antipersonnel mines that can be used and defines the circumstances of their use until either their clearance or abandonment. The extent to which US and Coalition forces may exercise control of or utilize existing mined areas for military benefit, and therefore incur obligations under Amended Protocol II, is not known.\(^{25}\) Among those obligations would be to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from those mined areas.\(^{24}\)

**Non-State Armed Groups**

In contrast to the many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period (since May 2005), there have been no specific, confirmed instances of new use of
antipersonnel mines. There have been a number of reports of use of antivehicle mines by insurgent forces.

Opposition forces have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in great numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—that explodes from the contact of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detoned—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices in Iraq has often been in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted.

Armed non-state groups have used a wide variety of explosive devices to carry out attacks. Media reports most often cite use of command-detoned bombs and IEDs, but it appears victim-activated explosive devices have also been used, including booby-traps. In June 2006, Iraqi insurgent forces reportedly placed numerous IEDs in the area surrounding the bodies of two American soldiers who had been kidnapped and killed, in order to inflict additional casualties. In November 2005, four Georgian soldiers were reportedly wounded by a landmine explosion while on patrol in Baquba, Iraq. In October 2005, a British soldier was killed when “he went forward on foot ahead of his men’s Land Rovers to check for booby-traps.”

In November 2005, US General Michael Hagee characterized the threat of IEDs as the “biggest tactical challenge” in Iraq. The commander of US logistics efforts in Iraq said in August 2005 that there were approximately 30 IED attacks per week against supply convoys, a 100 percent increase from the year before. Between 1 January and 31 May 2006, 137 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks in Iraq. In 2005, 445 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs, a substantial increase from 238 killed by IEDs in 2004.

IEDs have also caused civilian casualties. In February 2006, seven civilians were wounded by a roadside IED explosion near a US military patrol in Baquba. A roadside IED was responsible for the injuries sustained by Bob Woodruff, an American journalist, and his colleague Doug Vogt in January 2006. Two South African members of a DynCorp International security team were killed in November 2005 when their vehicle was hit by an IED. A November 2005 IED explosion outside Baghdad resulted in the death of three Iraqi civilians and injury to four others.

An October 2005 Human Rights Watch report stated that since the March 2003 invasion, “armed opposition groups have purposefully killed thousands of civilians—men, women and children. Across the country, insurgents have used car bombs and suicide bombers ... to maximize the number of civilian injuries and deaths.” It said, “Some insurgent groups have used improvised explosive devices (roadside bombs), car bombs and gunmen to kill Kurdish politicians and journalists.” The report also cited a US security expert saying that insurgents pay up to US$200 to detonate an improvised explosive device.

Opposition forces have laid antivehicle mines on frequently traveled roads. In 2005, seven US military personnel were reportedly killed by
landmines, all of which appeared to be antivehicle mines. A US soldier from the 2nd Marine Division, II Expeditionary Force, was killed near Habbaniyah in November 2005 when his vehicle hit a mine. In October 2005, three Ukrainian soldiers were wounded when a landmine exploded near their armored personnel carrier. In August 2005, 14 US marines were killed when their vehicle hit a roadside bomb made from three landmines. Insurgents have also used antivehicle mine components as detonators in IEDs.

Reports have linked explosive materials used by Iraqi insurgents to the government of Iran. During a March 2006 speech, US President George W. Bush stated that “some of the most powerful IEDs we’re seeing in Iraq today include components that came from Iran.” The US Director of National Intelligence testified during a February 2006 US Congressional hearing that Iran was supplying Shi’a militants with the technology to build more effective IEDs. In an October 2005 briefing, an anonymous British official stated that there was evidence that a new device with the impact of three landmines was being channeled into Iraq from Hizbullah in Lebanon via Iran.

**Landmine and ERW Problem**

Iraq ranks high among the countries most severely contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), a legacy of internal conflicts, the 1980-1988 war with Iran, the 1991 first Gulf War after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the present conflict that began with the invasion of Iraq by US-led Coalition forces in March 2003. In the aftermath of the 2003 conflict, Iraq was affected by millions of mines and huge quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and unexploded ordnance (UXO). By June 2006, the three-year old Coalition Munitions Clearance Program had destroyed more than 450,000 tons of stockpiled munitions and Coalition troops continued to find substantial caches of weapons and munitions.

Iraq emplaced barrier and tactical minefields along its 1,400-kilometer border with Iran. Its southern provinces bordering Iran sustained further contamination by UXO during the Iran-Iraq war. Before the 2003 conflict, additional minefields were laid on the border with Saudi Arabia and around military positions. Extensive UXO contamination resulted from coalition air strikes and ground engagements in 2003; according to data provided by Coalition forces, this was most intense along main roads leading to Baghdad where most communities in those areas are located. More recently, attacks using car bombs and roadside IEDs indicate that huge amounts of AXO were left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently plundered, fuelling the ongoing insurgency.

A comment in 2006 summarizing the impact of this contamination observed that, “not only are civilians at risk of losing their lives or a limb due to mines and ERW, but contamination poses major challenges to the implementation of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and
development projects. Agricultural land remains unused and at risk to farmers and livestock. Construction of roads and residential areas must take into consideration the possible placement of mines. Water systems have been contaminated by depleted uranium, posing serious health threats for Iraqi civilians. ERW also hinders the safe return of internally displaced people and refugees, which contributes to the instability of individual lives and communities."

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented by Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), had completed work by the end of April 2006 in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates and had found more than 3,548 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) containing mines and/or UXO affecting 1,579 communities, some affected by multiple SHAs. It also recorded 565 recent casualties (within the two years leading up to the survey), virtually all of them (99.3 percent) civilians and more than two-thirds of them aged between five and 29 years. It is believed that many other casualties may have gone unreported. There is also substantial contamination in areas that do not affect any community, and which therefore do not feature in the ILIS.

Overall, landmines have proved the biggest cause of casualties, according to survey data so far. They accounted for three-quarters of casualties in northern Kurdish governorates and over half the recorded casualties in the south. However, the types of contamination and their impact vary significantly between the regions. The Kurdish governorates, one of the most contaminated areas of the world with 1,428 affected communities, contend with thousands of tactical minefields on the borders with Iran and Turkey and further contamination along the Green Line, the former frontline between Kurdish forces and Saddam Hussein’s army, as well as UXO across all three governorates.

Southern-central governorates bordering Iran are also contaminated by minefields, but many communities near the border are abandoned and cluster munitions used by Coalition forces in their 2003 advance towards Baghdad are the main source of recent casualties. Similarly, unexploded Coalition ground and air ordnance, including rockets and cluster munitions, together with huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Iraqi army, have been the major cause of most recent casualties in the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and Missan.

The south also contends with old minefields along its borders with Iran and some newer mines laid by Saddam Hussein’s army before the 2003 Coalition invasion in al-Muthanna governorate along the border with Saudi Arabia. Combined, they have caused half the total casualties recorded by the survey. In contrast, the southernmost Al Fao peninsula is highly contaminated by mines but communities there live by fishing, not by raising crops or herding livestock, and have not sustained any recorded mine casualties.

Mine Action Program
National Mine Action Authority: The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set up the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in July 2003, exercising its mandate under UN Resolution 1483 and positioning it within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. The NMAA was given responsibility for planning, coordinating and managing the budget for mine action and for donor relations. It was also made responsible for setting national mine action standards and maintaining a national database.

The NMAA has four main divisions: Administration, Public Affairs, Legal and Technical (which includes departments for planning, operations, mine awareness, victim assistance, computer and training). An interministerial coordination and cooperation committee was set up including representatives of the ministries of oil, industry, electricity, human rights, culture, education, environment, health, interior and defense to ensure mine action was coordinated with broader development priorities. The committee had little scope to act, however, pending the formation of a new government to set the policy direction. A technical coordination meeting took place in June 2006; further monthly meetings were planned.

Political turbulence and the unpredictable security situation in Iraq have constrained development of the NMAA and mine action. In this environment, mine action has not been a government priority. The first director general of the NMAA, Siraj Barzani, resigned in June 2004 and in July 2004 took over as director of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center in Erbil. His successor, Moaid Saber Al-Alatrakche, was reportedly dismissed by the government in October 2005 and replaced by Hyder Al-Mosawi, its third director in little more than two years. In July 2006, Iraq’s Integrity Authority announced that the NMAA Director General Al-Mosawi and Technical Director Hayder Al Wardi were under investigation for corruption and that the former Director General Al-Alatrakche was "on the run."

As of June 2006, Iraq’s new Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation, Ali Khalib Baban, had ordered a review of the NMAA’s structure and role. Among the options for the NMAA under discussion in 2006 were to keep it in the Ministry of Planning but reporting directly to the minister rather than to the deputy minister for technical affairs, or to move it to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior.

The NMAA is supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) through the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and by the US Department of State’s Humanitarian Mine Action in Counterinsurgency–Iraq (HMAC-I) Program. UNDP support focuses on developing national management capacity and establishing sustainable operational mine action capacity in Iraq. Deteriorating security led UNDP to relocate its mine action support for Iraq from Baghdad to the Jordanian capital Amman in 2003 and to Cyprus in 2005 before returning to Amman in January 2006. Two Amman-based mine action advisors continue to provide technical advice to the NMAA and the
regional mine action centers (RMACs). UNDP also provided the team leader for the IIIS through Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). In March 2006, UNDP deployed a full-time national technical advisor to Iraqi Kurdistan and as of June 2006 considered providing an international policy advisor to the NMAA in Baghdad. [68]

Under HMAC-I, RONCO Consulting Corporation, under contract to the US Department of State (DoS), provided 13 technical advisors to Iraq in 2005, but subsequently reduced the number as a result of funding constraints in the DoS. [70] As of June 2006, four RONCO staff were assigned to work with the NMAA in Baghdad. A senior technical advisor was assigned to the NMAA’s Regional Mine Action Center-South. RONCO’s three other technical advisors worked with the Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization. [71]

Mine Action Centers: Three mine action centers were set up under the NMAA: the Iraq Mine Action Center (IMAC) based in the capital and responsible for overseeing mine action in the Baghdad area, a Regional Mine Action Center-North, headquartered in Erbil, and another RMAC-South, based in Basra. The RMACs’ responsibilities included coordinating mine action in their operating areas, collecting and analyzing data, preparing plans and assigning clearance tasks, and monitoring quality assurance. [72]

In 2004, the Kurdish regional government took over responsibility for mine action in the three Kurdish governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah and RMAC-North was reformed in November 2004 as the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center (IKMAC) based in Erbil. [73] IKMAC took over management of mine action in Erbil and Dohuk governorates and engaged many of the staff who had formerly worked in the mine action program managed by the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) until November 2003 when it was handed over to the CPA or four local NGOs that were active in 2004. [74] At the same time, Kurdish authorities set up the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA) to manage mine action in Sulaymaniyah governorate. [75]

IMAC did not become operational because the previous director general decided to merge the structure within the NMAA. Plans to establish two more RMACs in Mosul, covering northern-central governorates, and in Hilla, covering the southern-central governorates, were not implemented because of the high level of insecurity in those areas. [76] RMAC-South was based in Basra covering the governorates of Basra, al-Muthanna, Thi Qar and Missan; as of June 2006, it had a total staff of nine including a senior technical advisor from RONCO, and was coordinating the demining and EOD operators working in the area. [77]

National mine action legislation and standards: The NMAA drafted a concept law intended to provide a legal framework for mine action and submitted it to the Planning Minister in 2005. The draft law clarified the roles of mine action entities and provided for the establishment of an interministerial council intended to strengthen the coordination of mine action with the work of other government ministries. The draft law was reportedly under legal review as of June 2006. [78]
The NMAA also drafted 29 national mine action standards based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) which, as of June 2006, were awaiting ministerial approval.\[79\]

The Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation approved regulations governing accreditation of mine action operators in 2005. Four organizations received accreditation in 2005, but these were suspended “due to legal requirements.” The NMAA started applying the new regulations in January 2006 but suspended them again pending the formation of a new government. In mid-2006, the NMAA resumed reviewing applications for accreditation and as of June was considering six applications.\[80\]

**Strategic Planning and Progress**

The momentum developed in mine action in 2003-2004 with the creation of new institutions and programs stalled in 2005. Further development of mine action institutions and enabling regulations halted amid political uncertainty pending the December 2005 election; the protracted formation of a new government and deteriorating security severely constrained progress in clearing mines and ERW.\[81\]

In October 2004, the NMAA adopted the Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for Mine Action 2004-2020 that aimed to “effectively eliminate and control the impact of landmines and UXO on Iraqi society.”\[82\] By February 2006, the NMAA was no longer actively pursuing the plan.\[83\]

In Vision 2020, the NMAA anticipated that mine action needed $355 million funding for the period from 2004 to 2008,\[84\] but against the background of political uncertainty and the insurgency the NMAA was able to spend only a small proportion of the funds reportedly available from the national budget for mine action. In 2005, the Iraqi government’s budget for demining was $20 million but most of the budget was returned to the Ministry of Finance unused.\[85\] The government earmarked 17 percent or $3 million of the budget for demining operations under the Kurdish Regional Government.\[86\] Actual expenditure by the NMAA in that year was estimated at about $1 million.\[87\]

The NMAA reported that it had achieved about “five percent” of its targets in 2005 as a result of constraints on mine action resulting from the insurgency and the lack of legislation formalizing its status.\[88\] Achievements included capacity-building through attendance at training courses and workshops by some NMAA staff and improved coordination with some ministries. Goals it had not been able to achieve included increasing Iraq’s mine clearance and battle area clearance capacity, accelerating the pace of demining, reducing mine/UXO-related casualties, strengthening RMACs, putting in place a system for destroying stockpiles and setting up training centers.\[89\]

In 2006, the NMAA reported the budget available from the government had been reduced to $15 million because it had not fulfilled the objectives of the previous year. The NMAA identified its priorities in 2006 as: persuading the government to enact legislation formalizing the
NMAA’s status and role; increasing coordination with other government departments and integrating mine action into broader economic and social development planning; developing a database for mine action; improving the skills of NMAA staff; increasing the amount of land cleared of mines and UXO and returned to productive use; and increasing public awareness of the dangers of mines and UXO.\[90\]

The NMAA, however, had not formulated a plan of specific projects to be implemented under the 2006 budget.\[91\] Government investigations into bureaucratic corruption and attempts to regulate expenditure also appeared to inhibit the NMAA’s willingness to authorize any expenditure, according to sources in the Iraqi demining community.\[92\] A 2006 workplan was drafted for the NMAA by UNDP with a mine action budget of $45.1 million, but due to political uncertainties pending the formation of a new government the plan was not activated.\[93\]

Iraq and Iran agreed to set up joint committees to work together on security issues, including clearing mined areas on their common border, according to Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani after talks in Tehran in July 2005 with the Defense Minister in the Iraqi Transitional Government, Saadoun al-Dulaimi.\[94\] The two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 12 December 2005 in which they agreed to provide documentation and maps of contaminated areas, to set up a bilateral committee to oversee demining activities (to involve the national capacities of both countries and international capacities to implement clearance activities) and to open border crossings.\[95\]

Demining

In 2005, most of Iraq’s mine and UXO clearance capacity continued to be concentrated in northern Iraq. IKMAC managed, planned and coordinated demining in the Kurdish governorates of Erbil and Dohuk, and by the end of 2005 also employed nearly 800 operations staff in 61 mine action teams.\[96\] In Sulaymaniyah governorate, GDMA performed a management role, coordinating and tasking mine action, including issuing contracts for clearance to commercial companies.\[97\] Two international NGOs were also engaged in mine action in the north: Mines Advisory Group, one of the biggest demining operators in Iraq, works in all three Kurdish governorates as well as Kirkuk and Ninewah, where it is the only demining agency active; and Norwegian People’s Aid, present in the country since 1995, worked in Sulaymaniyah and Khanqin district of Diyala, and is the only demining agency working in that governorate.

In 2005, demining and EOD operations in central and southern Iraq were severely restricted by donor funding shortages and by the deterioration in security, which prompted some organizations to leave the country. As a result of the conflict, no humanitarian demining took place in 2005 in the northern-central governorate of Tikrit or the large western governorate of Anbar.\[98\] Limited demining and EOD took place in the southern governorates of Basra, al-Muthanna and Thi Qar.
Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO), set up in 2003 as a national NGO with financial support from the US Department of State and training from RONCO, has operated in many parts of Iraq. It initially undertook humanitarian mine clearance and EOD but in 2005, as security deteriorated, it shifted more to clearance around infrastructure, operating with protection provided by the Iraqi army.[99]

The German NGO HELP conducted EOD in Baghdad. The remaining NGOs active in mine action, Danish Demining Group and INTERSOS, worked from the southern city of Basra. INTERSOS, after a 17-month suspension of activities prompted by the security situation, resumed operations in September 2005 in the southern governorates of Basra, Nassiriya and Thi Qar, but ceased work again on 31 May 2006 because a minimum level of security did not exist for international staff.[100]

MineTech International, present in Iraq since 2003, continued working in the first half of 2005 on a project in which it had trained and equipped 15 national EOD/battle area clearance teams. At that time, these represented half the clearance capacity in the south. The project was terminated in June 2005 due to lack of donor funding and the teams were laid off; efforts to find donor support to revive these teams proved unsuccessful.[101]

An Iraqi commercial company, Al Doha, also emerged as an operator in 2005 when it was awarded a contract by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals to clear land near Fallujah, but the project was not completed because of the security situation. No other Iraqi NGOs or commercial organizations were engaged in mine or UXO clearance in central or southern Iraq in 2005 or the first half of 2006.[102]

RONCO, under a contract with the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), trained Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Bomb Disposal Units in EOD and IED disposal (IEDD), to respond to threats imposed by insurgents and terrorists. In 2005, under RONCO’s first contract with MNSTC-I through the US Department of State, the Bomb Disposal School graduated 350 students, making up six Iraqi Army Bomb Disposal Companies, trained in EOD Levels 2 and 3. RONCO employs IMCO instructors at the school, who were originally trained by RONCO. In December 2005, RONCO augmented its training facilities and staff under a new contract to conduct both EOD and IEDD, and also to conduct EOD/IEDD instructor training at the school.[103]

Destruction of abandoned ordnance and munitions stockpiles continued under the three-year-old Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, managed by the US Army Corps of Engineers and employing multiple contractors. These included ArmorGroup, which supported stockpile destruction under a contract that ran from July 2004 to the end of February 2006. It also undertook two contracts with explosives dog detection teams providing site entry point security and response services to potential EOD threats.[104]

**Mine and ERW Surveys**
A number of surveys of mine/ERW contamination in Iraq were undertaken before and since the start of the present conflict. These included a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) impact and technical survey in all Kurdish areas above the green line from 1992, an impact survey in the three Kurdish governorates by UNOPS in 2002, an emergency survey undertaken by VVAF, MAG and MineTech for UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and UNOPS from June 2003 to February 2004.\textsuperscript{[105]}

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, the first comprehensive national survey of mine/UXO contamination, started in 2004, working from two regional bases in Erbil in the north from June 2004, and Basra in the south from August 2004.\textsuperscript{[106]} By the end of April 2006, the ILIS had completed surveying 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates and it expected to complete the remainder of Iraq by August 2006, with the exception of areas that could not be accessed due to insecurity.\textsuperscript{[107]}

Eight Kurdish data collection teams completed surveys of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyyah, four Kurdish and four Arab teams surveyed Kirkuk, and eight Arab teams completed surveys of the four southernmost governorates (Basra, al-Muthanna, Thi Qar and Missan) by the end of May 2005. Survey of the five other governorates south of Baghdad (Karbala, Najaf, al-Qadisiyah, Hilla and Wasit) was completed by April 2006. As of mid-May 2006, three Arab teams were surveying Tikrit, three more were working in Diyala and recruitment was underway of four Arab teams to survey Mosul. However, survey operations in the Sunni areas were suspended in late May due to insecurity.\textsuperscript{[108]}

By the end of April 2006, the ILIS had documented 12,883 communities and visited 12,003 of them, locating 4,270 SHAs and “spot” UXO hazards, affecting an estimated 1,718 square kilometers of land.\textsuperscript{[109]} The survey identified 2,117 communities affected by landmines or ERW and recorded 577 recent casualties. Of these, 244 affected communities were not surveyed as their only SHAs were shared with other communities. Limited, visible UXO contamination was recorded in spot UXO reports in 251 communities, some of which were also surveyed, but not all.\textsuperscript{[110]} According to the ILIS, the contamination it recorded understates the real extent of the problem, especially in the south, because of inhabitants’ suspicion of surveyors and reluctance to disclose information.\textsuperscript{[111]}

In the three Kurdish governorates, the ILIS found the heaviest contamination but the lowest level of casualties. It reported 3,024 SHAs and 1,126 affected communities in these governorates, half of which were in Sulaymaniyyah governorate. They accounted for more than half the total number of affected communities and 71 percent of the SHAs found in the 13 governorates surveyed so far. Yet the number of recent casualties was recorded as 159 (including 60 people killed), little more than a quarter of total recorded casualties. The total area covered by SHAs was estimated at 776 square kilometers.\textsuperscript{[112]}

Casualties were heaviest in the southern four governorates, where much of the contamination was more recent and communities had less knowledge particularly of the dangers posed by mines and ERW from
the latest conflict. Although the number of affected communities and SHAs was smaller in the south, at 335 and 399 respectively, they recorded 307 recent casualties (including 116 people killed), more than half the total casualties so far. The contaminated area was estimated at 854.5 square kilometers in the four southern governorates, where 90 percent of SHAs blocked the use of pasture.

In the five south-central governorates, the ILIS identified 118 affected communities and 125 SHAs, and recorded 99 recent victims, including 46 people killed. The total contaminated area was estimated at 87.6 square kilometers.

The ILIS re-survey of the Kurdish governorates found 330 mine-affected communities that were not in the IKMAC database, which was based on results of the 2002 UNOPS survey. Many of these were along the Turkish border in areas never previously visited by survey or mine action teams. Of 5,029 communities visited by ILIS teams in the three governorates, 541 said they were no longer contaminated, including 139 still reportedly listed as contaminated in the IKMAC database. Another 88 communities reported as contaminated in the database were found to be abandoned.

Despite the hazardous environment created by the present conflict, by the end of April 2006 ILIS teams had completed the survey of every district and subdistrict of 13 governorates, except for two districts in Hilla governorate, close to Baghdad, and 346 communities, where access was not possible due to lack of security or because they were too remote. With these exceptions, the areas completed constituted the entirety of three of the NMAA’s four mine action regions, plus Kirkuk governorate, part of the fourth, northern-central region. By June 2006, it was apparent the ILIS would not be able to complete the survey of this region, which included Iraq’s most highly conflicted and Sunni-dominated governorates of Tikrit, Diyala, Mosul and Anbar.

Working closely with local authorities and adapting their approach to local environments, survey teams completed the first three governorates without encountering specific threats to their security or sustaining injury. However, in May 2006, an ILIS team leader working in Tikrit governorate was injured at a roadblock set up by Coalition forces when an IED being defused by US soldiers exploded. The survey of Tikrit and Diyala governorates was suspended in mid-May 2006. By then, ILIS teams had already visited nearly 100 villages in these governorates. Although teams said the reception in every village was welcoming, the survey determined that the travel required to conduct the survey was too dangerous, as the roads were the main focus of conflict between Coalition forces and insurgents. As of mid-June, the ILIS management remained committed to surveying Tikrit, Diyala and Mosul if security permitted, but it was doubtful that it would be possible to survey contaminated areas of Anbar.

Mine and ERW Clearance
Demining in Iraq in 2005 suffered disruption as a result of political uncertainties and funding problems as well as from the hazardous security environment outside the three Kurdish governorates. The NMAA reported that 24.2 square kilometers of land was cleared of mines and/or ERW in 2005, little more than one-third of the 61.4 square kilometers it reported cleared in 2004. Data compiled by Landmine Monitor from information provided by operators showed a total of just over 25 square kilometers cleared or area reduced.

**Area (square meters) Cleared and Mines/ERW Destroyed in Iraq in 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mine clearance</th>
<th>Battle area clearance</th>
<th>Mechanical clearance</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines</th>
<th>UXO</th>
<th>Area reduced or cancelled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKMAC</td>
<td>533,273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>368</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>1,972,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDMA</td>
<td>85,913</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>508</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>1,245,925</td>
<td>2,568,800</td>
<td>223,247</td>
<td>5,452</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>26,978</td>
<td>5,706,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>262,915</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELP</td>
<td>107,779</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>535,930</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,708,864</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>6,339,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MineTech</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,663,956</td>
<td>14,728,443</td>
<td>223,247</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>60,063</td>
<td>7,678,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In northern Iraq, IKMAC operated 28 manual clearance teams, three EOD teams, three survey teams, seven mine detection dog teams with two dogs each, and mechanical assets that included an excavator and four Bozena mini-flails. It also had 10 supervisors, six internal and eight external quality assurance monitors and operated eight mine risk education teams. IKMAC began demining operations at the end of May 2005, and in the remaining seven months cleared 533,273 square meters of land and cancelled 1,972,000 square meters. IKMAC reported that casualties in the north are falling and as a result its clearance priorities are now shifting from purely humanitarian tasks towards projects that support economic growth. Accordingly, operations in 2005 mostly supported Kurdish Regional Government development projects, including laying powerlines, water and sanitation projects, building communications towers, irrigation canals, and land needed for crops and tourist sites.

Demining operations in Sulaymaniyah tasked directly by GDMA started from 20 July when a new system of competitive tendering for clearance contracts came into effect. By the end of 2005, it reported total clearance by contractors of 309,160 square meters, much of it mechanical clearance. GDMA, responding to clearance requests from ministries, gave priority to infrastructure-related tasks, followed by clearance of minefields identified by the database as having the most impact on the population. Tasks are added to its priority list after assessment by a general survey team, and then submitted for technical survey prior to clearance.
Among the contractors working for GDMA, Khabat Zangana, which was set up in 1998, designs and produces demining machines; it employs 79 people split between two manual teams and four mechanical teams. These operate with a range of clearance assets, including flails, an armored bulldozer, front-end loaders, excavators and vibrating sifters. In 2005, Khabat started operations in August and reported clearing 141,739 square meters of land by the end of the year. 

Of the two international NGOs operating in northern Iraq, Mines Advisory Group employed a 593 staff as of June 2006 (373 operational), with mechanical assets and mine detection dogs. In 2005, MAG deployed 21 multipurpose mine action teams, 12 based in Sulaymaniayah and nine in Erbil, some of which worked part of the time in Dohuk. The teams undertook manual, mechanical and battle area clearance, as well as conducting survey and EOD. MAG also operated 10 combined community liaison and mine risk education teams which undertook impact surveys and helped identify clearance tasks. These were coordinated with IKMAC and GDMA.

MAG manually cleared 1,245,925 square meters of mined land in 2005, visually checked a further 2,292,327 square meters, and mechanically verified 1,638,674 square meters. It also manually searched 484,300 square meters of battlefield and visually checked 2,084,500 square meters. In the process, it destroyed 5,452 antipersonnel mines and 26,978 items of UXO.

MAG also undertook two training programs, in humanitarian demining and in EOD. Under the first program, from March 2005, MAG trained 54 personnel from an engineering company of the 4th Division, 2nd Brigade, Iraqi National Guard engineering company, in humanitarian demining according to IMAS. This included on-the-job training clearing mined land in Sulaymaniayah. Under the second program, conducted from October 2005 to l March 2006, MAG provided EOD training and equipment to personnel assigned by Dohuk governorate administration to set up a regional unit to respond to EOD tasks.

Norwegian People’s Aid, which started work in northern Iraq in 1995, had a total staff of 121, undertaking manual clearance supported by mechanical assets, EOD and mine risk education. NPA’s teams were deployed mostly in the Sharbazher and Halabja districts of northern Sulaymaniayah governorate but it also had a 10-person team in Khanqin district of Diyala, where it was the only demining agency active. In 2005, NPA cleared 11 minefields covering 262,915 square meters of land, destroying 1,241 mines (including two antivehicle mines) and 513 items of UXO.

In Baghdad, HELP undertook battle area clearance of UXO with a 43-person Iraqi EOD team managed by two Amman-based international staff, working on tasks received from the NMAA.

IMCO had 13 teams equipped for manual mine clearance, battle area clearance and EOD, and 11 dog teams trained in mine and submunition detection, which are used for area reduction and quality assurance. It also had an operations team undertaking reconnaissance,
planning and setting up sites for clearance. IMCO additionally runs training centers in Baghdad and Basra with 30 instructors providing training in mine clearance and EOD to the Iraqi army and police and Iraqi staff recruited by international organizations. From the start of its operations in 2004 until 15 May 2006, IMCO reported having cleared a total 10.5 square kilometers of land and over 137,000 mines and UXO. Its tasks ranged from clearing 7,205 square meters of farmland to clearing a million square meters of land around the Rumaila oilfields and 3,965,800 square meters at Al-Zubair in Basra governorate.

In southern Iraq, Danish Demining Group, funded by the Danish government and UNDP, operated in Basra governorate with five EOD teams, each with five operators, and five battle area clearance teams of 10 operators each, with support staff. Tasks, selected on the basis of information received from local communities by DDG’s operations and mine risk education teams, have concentrated on freeing agricultural land.

The Italian demining agency INTERSOS returned to southern Iraq in September after a 17-month suspension to resume work building up local NGO capacity to manage and implement an EOD program. INTERSOS was working with 32 staff in four EOD teams in the area of Nassiriya (Thi-Qar governorate). No details of its operating results were available.

MineTech International, working for UNOPS, trained 66 people in mine action, including 15 team leaders, 36 EOD specialists and 15 medics. In the first half of 2005, MineTech cleared 106,519 mines and UXO and recovered more than 6.5 million square meters of land before the project was terminated because of a lack of donor funding.

Demining Progress in 2006

Mine action increased momentum in northern Iraq in the first months of 2006 but in central and southern Iraq continued to be limited by the lack of security; also, UNDP reported a lack of donor support. GDMA issued tenders to clear 78 mined areas covering 1,649,677 square meters of land. In IKMAC’s area of operations, demining operations started on 1 April and by the end of June had completed clearance of five minefields on a total area of 116,092 square meters, destroying 191 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and 673 UXO. EOD/battle area clearance teams checked a further 270,000 square meters of land, 18,588 square meters were mechanically prepared and 3,400 square meters were permanently marked.

In 2006, MAG reconfigured its teams, deploying 10 teams in Sulaymaniyah, four in Soran (Erbil governorate) and three in Dohuk, and attaching four smaller teams to mechanical units to increase their operational flexibility. In the first three months of the year, MAG manually cleared 202,554 square meters of mined land and 483,600 square meters of battlefield. It also visually checked 36,408 square meters of mined land and 465,000 square meters of battle area. Total items
cleared included 370 antipersonnel mines and 2,676 UXO. NPA also cleared 59,964 square meters of mined area and 6,300 square meters of battlefield area, removing 111 antipersonnel mines and 177 UXO.

In the south, DDG reorganized and strengthened its international team by adding three more technical advisors. In the first six months of 2006, DDG cleared 10,583,500 square meters of battle area and 43,370 items of UXO, more than in the whole of 2005. However, INTERSOS terminated its program at the end of May due to insufficient security and the future of its four EOD teams remained unclear. Options under discussion included transferring the teams to DDG.

In March 2006, the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program completed destruction of 248 tons of munitions, its last major stockpile, including mines, rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades and larger munitions. However, in January 2006 the US Corps of Engineers issued a three-year contract worth at least $538.5 million to the US company, Tetra Tech ECI, to operate roving EOD teams clearing surface and subsurface UXO.

Mine Risk Education

The NMAA is in charge of the overall coordination of mine risk education (MRE) in Iraq. Organizations involved in 2005-2006 included the Iraqi Red Crescent Society with support from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local Iraqi NGOs such as the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO). Since January 2005, Mines Advisory Group, INTERSOS and Danish Demining Group have been the only international NGOs implementing direct MRE programming in Iraq, reaching a total of at least 85,000 people. UNICEF Iraq continued technical and financial support through institutional capacity-building on MRE, mine risk education in schools and communities, and direct MRE for high-risk populations. It also initiated a victim surveillance system.

In 2006, UNICEF, in collaboration with the NMAA and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), organized a three-day workshop in Amman (Jordan) on communicating MRE in Iraq. The workshop agreed upon a plan of action for the remainder of 2006, elaborating the needs of the northern, central and southern regions. Around 30 participants from the government, national and international NGOs, and UN agencies participated. UNICEF planned to recruit a consultant in June to review all the educational and training materials used in Iraq, analyze gaps and relevance according to the needs of the different target groups, and develop a complete package of MRE materials for Iraq.

The NMAA ran a national media campaign, which included TV and radio spots. The TV spots were broadcast on Sharquiyah, the national Iraqi television station, and on the Arabic children’s channel; the radio spots were awaiting broadcast on local stations.
In central Iraq, IHSCO provided MRE and data collection in six governorates including Baghdad, Babel, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna and Thiqar. IHSCO, whose staff were trained by MAG and other organizations, provided MRE training-of-trainers workshops to Ministry of Health officers who will then train health workers from primary health care centers to provide MRE. IHSCO regularly uses television and radio to disseminate safety messages. Its activities are coordinated with MAG and INTERSOS.

In 2005, MAG made MRE presentations to over 43,000 people during over 3,700 visits. This included specific activities for targeted high-risk groups, including nomads and shepherds, returning and static displaced people, refugees and officials in refugee camps. MAG also conducted direct MRE for returnees to heavily mined areas and, in the summer, to picnickers and those visiting family members in mine-affected areas. It provided MRE training-of-trainers workshops to teachers and international and national staff of various organizations.

MAG conducted community liaison and MRE in the north of Iraq with 10 teams of two people (one male and one female). Six teams were based in the Erbil sector (Erbil, Ninewah, Kirkuk and Dohuk governorates) and four are in Sulaymaniyah sector (Sulaymaniyah, Diyala and Kirkuk governorates). The teams collected information from villages about dangerous areas and their impact, and forwarded the information for clearance operations. In 2006, this capacity was cut to six teams to increase capacity for training and monitoring MRE programs with the ministries of education and of religious affairs and endowments.

MAG continued erecting billboards informing of the dangers of mines and the procedure for reporting suspected contaminated areas. In coordination with local authorities, MAG has established reporting focal points in 22 locations across the three northern governorates, and local authorities have been trained to complete dangerous area forms. A village risk-taking form was piloted and formally adopted by the NMAA in mid-2005 to provide more detailed information on specific behavior, but also on mine/ERW contamination.

In 2005, MAG trained 1,500 teachers in 750 schools across the governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk and Diyala, reaching 22,000 pupils each year. The MRE curriculum was updated and new exercises were introduced regarding safe behavior and unusual items of UXO such as fuzes and capsules. In addition, 98 teacher trainers in five teacher training institutes in Sulaymaniyah and Diyala were provided with the capacity to instruct trainees in MRE. In 2006, this program was to be extended to Ninewah and Kirkuk for approximately 2,000 teachers from 1,000 schools, if security permitted.

MAG also trained members of the Women’s Union, 902 mullahs and 46 Christian clergy. A teaching aid based on verses from the Koran on personal safety in general was developed in consultation with the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments, and distributed in Sorani and Arabic languages.
INTERSOS implemented two projects in the south, funded by UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF. The project with UNHCR, which started in 2003, continued in the transit center on the Iraq-Iran border and in communities receiving most of the returnees. The INTERSOS team (three women and one man) reached 2,242 returnees at the transit center, 758 spontaneous returnees at the Shalamsh border and 740 students from three schools. Thirty-nine community volunteers (21 from Al Ammeryia area and 18 from Bani Assad area) who had attended an MRE training-of-trainers spread MRE messages to 2,700 people. Twenty-five members of the Civil Defense from 14 different locations provided MRE to another 6,000 to 7,000 people. INTERSOS staff provided direct MRE sessions to an additional 3,000 people (farmers, students and teachers) in mine/UXO-affected villages.

In November 2005, INTERSOS started a one-year MRE project supported by UNICEF in three governorates of southern and central Iraq, which was expected to reach 10,000 women and children, establish a network of 160 MRE community volunteers, and train 2,000 teachers in MRE in order to reach 300,000 primary and secondary schoolchildren. By April 2006, 28 local staff had been selected and trained, and three needs assessments had been conducted.

In 2005, ICRC continued its financial and technical support for the MRE program of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. MRE materials were distributed in Fallujah and other areas affected by violence.

DDG performed MRE and community liaison with four three-member teams in Al-Zubair district in Basra region, focusing on children. In 2005, 25,793 people (17,997 children and 7,796 adults) were reached in direct MRE sessions in schools and house visits, with materials distributed.

Funding and Assistance

In 2005, a total of $27.8 million was donated by 14 countries for mine action in Iraq, a decrease of over half from 2004 ($58.7 million donated by 13 countries). The 2005 total includes donations to NGOs and international agencies operating in Iraq, and some in-kind contributions. Donors reporting funding in 2005 were:

- Belgium: €490,180 ($610,225) to MAG for mine action in northern Iraq;
- Denmark: DKK5 million ($833,987) to DDG for mine clearance and MRE;
- Germany: €612,554 ($762,568) to HELP for demining and capacity-building in Baghdad region;
- Iceland: $1,500,000 for victim assistance;
- Italy: €242,500 ($301,888) to UNDP for mine action;
- Japan: ¥59,080,264 ($536,557) to UNMAS/UNDP for employment of Japanese staff in mine action and for capacity-building;
Netherlands: €1,386,958 ($1,726,624), consisting of €386,958 ($481,724) to HI for victim assistance, and €1 million ($1,244,900) to MAG for mine clearance and MRE;[176]

Norway: NOK6,500,000 ($1,009,129) to NPA for mine action in northern Iraq;[177]

Slovakia: €4,882,000 ($6,077,602) as in-kind contribution of Slovak Armed Forces for mine/UXO clearance with NATO in Operation Iraqi Freedom;[178]

South Korea: $1 million to the UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund for demining operations;[179]

Spain: €129,000 ($160,592) for training Iraqi army in humanitarian mine clearance;[180]

Sweden: SEK10 million ($1,338,509) to MAG for mine clearance;[181]

Switzerland: CHF125,000 ($100,329) to NPA for mine action;[182]

US: $11,840,000, consisting of $9 million through the Iraq Rehabilitation and Relief Fund and $2,840,000 through the Department of State.[183]

In addition, Adopt-A-Minefield reported funding of $54,002 to Assistance for Marsh Arabs and Refugees (AMAR) to relocate essential staff to the Basra Rehabilitation Clinic.[184]

VVAF provided NMAA with five technical advisors during 2005, including three IMSMA technical advisors, through US Department of State and UNDP funding.[185]

By far the most significant decrease in funding for 2005 was from the US, which provided some $24 million less than in 2004 (a 67 percent reduction). Other significant reductions came from Italy, which gave $3.4 million less (92 percent) than in 2004 and Denmark, which provided half of its 2004 donation. Of the nine donor countries reporting funding for mine action in Iraq in both 2004 and 2005, seven countries provided less funding in 2005.

In February 2006, Greece contributed €1.9 million ($2,365,310) for mine action in Iraq to the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund for demining operations through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI); the funds had been pledged in July 2005.[186]

**Landmine/UXO Casualties**

Landmine Monitor estimated, conservatively, that there were at least 358 landmine/UXO casualties in 2005, which is an increase compared to 2004 (estimated 261 casualties).[187] However, this is likely to be a considerable underestimate.

As of May 2006, there was no data collection mechanism for new mine/UXO/IED casualties in Iraq. This was largely due to the security situation, a lack of funds and capacity at the NMAA, frequent staff changes and the larger political context in Iraq.[188] In principle, the NMAA
through the regional mine action centers is the collecting and controlling body for landmine casualty data. A data-sharing system was established in the second half of 2004 with all stakeholders, including the Ministry of Health, and some information was handed over to the NMAA. However, several sources told Landmine Monitor in 2006 that the system was not operating and that there was very little coordination between authorities and operators. Although some NMAA staff were trained in IMSMA and Epi.Info database software, the NMAA did not have the capacity to collect data, or to enter, analyze and disseminate data collected by others. UNICEF, with facilitation from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) organized several workshops with the aim of revitalizing data collection efforts, which resulted in a draft unified common “victim” form.

As of mid-2006, the only reliable information on casualties in Iraq was the ILIS, but this does not reflect the total number of casualties, as it only records casualties living in contaminated communities and does not record nomads or displaced people.

In Sulaymaniyah, the General Directorate for Mine Action receives casualty data from mine action operators. GDMA reportedly records casualty data from its 14 first-aid posts, police stations, surgical centers and mine action operators. GDMA worked on establishing a new casualty database and reviewing information on previous casualties, as data was missed by UNOPS and lost in the data transfer. GDMA has not collected data in IMSMA, using its own forms until the new form is approved. In 2005, it recorded 34 new landmine casualties in Sulaymaniyah, including five killed and 29 injured. All were civilians, including 10 children, 30 casualties were male and four female. However, this information has not been exchanged between GDMA and the NMAA.

In Erbil and surrounding areas, 172 new mine/UXO casualties were reported to IKMAC, mainly by the Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center (DPLC) in Erbil and the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center (PLCD) in Dohuk.

During its operations in northern Iraq, MAG recorded 68 new mine/UXO casualties in 2005, even though this is not the focus of their activities. This is a small decrease compared to 72 new mine/UXO casualties reported by MAG in 2004.

Until May 2005, the Italian NGO Emergency recorded the mine/UXO casualties who came to their surgical centers in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah; in May the hospitals were handed over to the Ministry of Health in Kurdish Iraq. From January to April, the centers admitted 16 mine casualties and 43 UXO casualties in Erbil, and 16 mine casualties and 47 UXO casualties in Sulaymaniyah as of the end of April. In 2004, Emergency recorded 140 new mine/UXO casualties, including 48 people killed and 92 injured, in 112 incidents in Erbil (30) and Sulaymaniyah (82). Statistics were not available after April 2005.

The Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization, founded in June 2004, set up a war victim surveillance system in mid-2004, with technical
support from external experts. Due to technical, security and staff capacity issues, the information collected relating to 2005 was not considered to be “technically reliable enough” to use. However, in the second half of 2005 staff were trained, the new uniform victim form was adopted in February 2006, and the “new case” definition was restricted to mine/UXO casualties after March 2003. The initial focus of IHSCO casualty data collection was retroactive to fill the gap since March 2003 in six governorates (Baghdad, Karbala, al-Muthanna, Babel, Thi Qar and Diyala) to facilitate planning of mine action activities, including victim assistance. IHSCO gathers information through 28 field officers and coordinating community visits, Ministry of Health hospitals and rehabilitation centers. Between March and May 2006, IHSCO gathered approximately 160 forms according to the new case definition; around 90 records have been entered into the database. Preliminary analysis of the 90 casualties recorded between March 2003 and May 2006 showed that 56 people were killed and 32 were injured (2 unknown); 78 were male and 12 female. At least 16 casualties occurred in 2006 and eight in 2005. Eleven casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, one by an antivehicle mine, 75 by cluster munitions and three unknown. Children between 10 and 19 years are the largest casualty group (28 casualties; two girls and 26 boys), followed by people between 20 and 29 years (24; four women and 20 men), and children between one and nine years (12; two girls and 10 boys). Most casualties occurred in Baghdad (26), Thi Qar (17), Karbala (16), al-Muthanna (15), Diyala (10) and Babel (six). The major activities at the time of the incidents included farming, herding, traveling on foot and playing; others were scrap trade, military activity, self clearance and traveling in a vehicle.

In 2005, Landmine Monitor identified at least 115 new mine/UXO casualties reported in the media, including 67 killed and 48 injured; most of the casualties reported were foreign military and demining casualties (67) mainly from the US, but also from the UK, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa. In 2005, seven US soldiers were killed and at least 19 injured by mines in Iraq; four soldiers were killed by UXO. In 2005, the CNN US Forces and Coalition Casualties database counted 12 soldiers killed by landmines in Iraq. These figures are a large increase from 2004, when landmines killed at least two US military personnel and injured 18.

Landmine Monitor believes the actual number of mine/UXO casualties to be much higher, as media reports do not accurately distinguish between landmine and IED incidents and increasingly refer to IED casualties instead of mine/UXO casualties. Media do not report on all the conflict casualties occurring daily in Iraq, and focus on foreigners rather than on Iraqis. On 26 April, seven family members, including one child, were injured when their car drove over a landmine in Al-Dujayl. On 6 July, in Basra, two children aged four and six years, were killed in a cluster bomblet explosion. Foreign civilians have also suffered landmine casualties. In April, a Turkish truck driver was killed by a roadside mine. One engineer from the Philippines was killed and two of
his compatriots killed in August when their car drove over a landmine near Baghdad.\[^{207}\]

The Iraq Body Count identified 389 civilian UXO casualties in Iraq between March 2003 and March 2005, the vast majority being unexploded cluster munitions, killing mostly children.\[^{208}\]

In Greece, on 4 April, an Iraqi migrant was injured by a mine in the Evros minefields bordering Turkey.\[^{209}\]

Many more casualties resulted from IEDs, most of which appeared to be command-detonated, but some of which were victim-activated and therefore de facto antipersonnel mines. IEDs have been the main cause of death and injury among US soldiers.\[^{204}\] In 2005, 445 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs according to US Department of Defense casualty reports. Of those, 32 were the result of vehicle-born IED attacks.\[^{206}\] Media reported that, as of the end of April 2006, there had been 781 fatal IED casualties among US soldiers since the beginning of the war. Since mid-2005, a monthly average of 40 fatal IED casualties per month was recorded. Reportedly, IEDs are responsible for 57 percent of the 17,800 injuries suffered by US soldiers. In 2005, the military counted 10,593 IED incidents (compared to 5,607 in 2004).\[^{205}\] In December 2005, a Newsweek journalist was injured in an IED incident near Fallujah.\[^{207}\]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. GDMA in Sulaymaniyah recorded 12 casualties until 15 May 2006, including four killed and eight injured.\[^{204}\] MAG recorded 15 new mine/UXO casualties until 22 May 2006.\[^{209}\] In the southern and central parts of Iraq, IHSCO recorded at least 16 casualties occurring by 1 May 2006.\[^{210}\]

Media reports included a shepherd killed near Kirkuk in March, after stepping on a cluster bomblet from the 2003 war.\[^{211}\] In May 2006, an Indian civilian was killed by a landmine on the Iraq-Kuwait border.\[^{212}\] On 28 April 2006, at least four people, including one child, were killed and nine, including five children, were injured in four separate IED incidents.\[^{213}\] Foreign military personnel have suffered landmine casualties. In March, five US soldiers were killed and two injured when their vehicle hit a landmine near Habbaniyah.\[^{214}\] In May, a marine was killed when his vehicle hit a landmine south of Fallujah.\[^{215}\]

Between 1 January and 31 May 2006, seven US military personnel were killed in vehicle-born IED incidents in Iraq; including these, 137 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks during this time period.\[^{216}\]

Based on the limited information available, it would appear that there has been a considerable decrease in landmine/UXO casualties compared to 2003, when a significant spike in casualties was reported in the aftermath of major hostilities. At least 2,191 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded in 2003, including at least 149 people killed and 1,089 injured; the status of 953 casualties was not reported.\[^{217}\] At the First Review Conference in November-December 2004, Iraq stated that “tens of people per day get hurt because of mines; on top of that people
get hurt by mines used in terrorist acts.” This would indicate more than 7,000 casualties per year. However, this information was not deemed to be credible, as at least the Kurdish areas of Iraq have seen a “massive reduction in casualties since 2003, this is due to a number of reasons, such as increased knowledge of the local people, reduced access to hazards, and reduced population movements.” Analysis of limited data collected by MAG, IHSCO and from media, indicates that casualty rates indeed seem significantly lower than the number recorded in 2003; however, casualties seemed to be increasing in 2005 from 2004 levels.

The total number of mine casualties over the years in Iraq is not known. MAG recorded at least 8,037 in northern Iraq since 1993.

VVAF’s ongoing Iraq Landmine Impact Survey is expected to provide more information than previously available. As of May 2006, the ILIS had recorded 565 “recent” casualties in the three northern governorates (159), southern-central region (99), and four southern governorates (307); at least 217 people were killed and 348 injured. Survey in the northern-central region was ongoing in 2006 and is not included in the totals; as of 1 May 2006, 43 recent casualties were recorded in this region.

Only four of the recent casualties were military (0.7 percent), 58 were females (10.3 percent), most casualties were aged 15-29 years (258 or 45.7 percent) followed by children between five and 14 years (135 or 23.9 percent). More than 80 percent of people were injured or killed while carrying out livelihood activities (including 2.3 percent in the scrap metal trade), 50.3 percent were herding (284) and 109 farming (19.3 percent); playing caused 7.6 percent of casualties (43) and tampering 4.8 percent (27). Unemployment after the incident was high at 44.2 percent. Families’ main income-earners made up 43.9 percent of casualties. Of the recent casualties, 51 percent were caused by mines, 17 percent by cluster munitions and 24 percent by other UXO/AXO.

The ILIS also recorded 7,631 “less recent” casualties. In the southern governorates, 1,929 less recent casualties were recorded, including 602 people killed and 1,327 injured; the majority (362 killed and 1,136 injured) were recorded in Basra. In the northern governorates, 5,552 were recorded, including 2,443 people killed and 3,109 injured; Sulaymaniyah recorded 3,964 casualties, Erbil (939 casualties) and Dohuk (649). In the southern-central region, 150 less recent casualties were recorded (80 killed and 70 injured).

Efforts were undertaken to revitalize and strengthen data collection capacity in Iraq. UNICEF, in coordination with UNDP, ICRC and the World Health Organization (WHO), has worked to establish a national casualty surveillance system and database; WHO in collaboration with the Ministry of Health worked to integrate the core questions on mine casualties in the disability and the war injury surveillance systems.

The Ministry of Health has registered 43,600 war-injured with a disability of 60 percent or more prior to 2003, and approximately 80,000 amputees of whom some 75 to 85 percent reportedly were caused by mines or UXO. There is some ongoing data collection of war casualties.
Survivor Assistance

Iraq's national mine action strategy to 2009 is said to include survivor assistance. The NMAA's victim assistance objectives were reported as: “assess existing victim support capacities and develop additional capacity if required” and “establish a nationwide victim surveillance system and map existing victims.” However, various actors repeat that Iraq does not have survivor assistance activities in its national mine action program due to the political and security context, even though the assistance program in the Kurdish part of Iraq is functioning well “considering the circumstances.” At central level, no money from the NMAA budget has been spent on victim assistance in 2006. Activities at the NMAA have been delayed by possible staff changes in the wake of the December 2005 elections and uncertainty about whether the NMAA will remain under the Ministry of Planning. Coordination between the Ministry of Health and the NMAA has not progressed as planned; NMAA staff have not proactively engaged in victim assistance planning. There are national victim assistance officers in Erbil (IKMAC), Sulaymaniyah (GDMA) and Basra (RMAC), and one at the central level at the NMAA; however, only in the north were assistance activities actually being implemented. In 2005-2006, there was no coordination between the NMAA and the northern areas; additionally the NMAA stated that it does not have executive authority, only a supervisory capacity.

The UN mine action strategy has focused on re-establishing cooperation between mine action centers, capacity-building and technical advice to the NMAA and the regional centers, which have the responsibility to coordinate survivor assistance with implementing partners such as relevant ministries and NGOs. In November 2005, a technical advisor filled the gap left by the previous advisor in May 2005, but by May 2006 the position (funded by UNDP through VVAF) was vacant again, with no immediate replacement expected.

Since the December 2005 elections and the subsequent unified government in Kurdish Iraq, progress has been made in reinforcing government capacity to provide survivor assistance. Shared responsibility between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs was agreed in principle to start in 2007. The Ministry of Health will support the medical and physical rehabilitation components, whereas the Ministry of Social Affairs will be in charge of the socioeconomic services provided in the nationalized rehabilitation centers, as well as having overall financial responsibility. A body unifying GDMA and IKMAC, preferably under the Council of Ministers will carry out monitoring of the services, as well as advocacy for resource mobilization. In March-April 2006, a mine action needs assessment including a small victim assistance component was carried out in northern Iraq by a UNDP-contracted VVAF staff member; this was expected to identify the training
needs at IKMAC and GDMA, and plan capacity-building. The results of this assessment have not been released.\textsuperscript{[239]}

The health system in Iraq was once among the best in the Middle East, but more than a decade of economic sanctions and ongoing conflict reduced it to a state of disrepair: poor quality services, lack of management capacity, equipment and medicines, degraded or disrupted electricity supplies, sanitation and communications, and particular neglect of rural and poor areas. The current security situation in the central and southern regions prevents people from reaching hospitals, with the result that people only go to the hospital in very serious cases, mostly involving women, children and the elderly.\textsuperscript{[240]} Some health personnel have left the country (although Iraq provides salary incentives to keep skilled staff); those remaining are sometimes targeted in the conflict or kidnapped.\textsuperscript{[241]} The Ministry of Health estimates that 25 percent of the 18,000 medical staff have left the country, and approximately 250 staff have been killed since 2003; 65 doctors were killed in 2005 alone.\textsuperscript{[242]}

Many facilities were damaged and looted in the conflict, and have been forced to close; newly constructed or renovated centers have been damaged and reconstruction projects postponed for funding and security reasons. The renovated Children’s Teaching Hospital in Baghdad was seriously damaged in an attack in January 2006.\textsuperscript{[243]} Reportedly, only four of the 180 health clinics that the US scheduled to construct by the end of December 2005 have been completed and none have opened.\textsuperscript{[244]} Reconstruction efforts funded by international donors have been delayed as security expenses consume a significant proportion of the budget (up to 43 percent for the US-sponsored projects and 35 percent for UK projects).\textsuperscript{[244]} The ongoing conflict has also decreased the ability of Iraqis to afford medical and rehabilitation services; an estimated 20 percent of people live below the poverty line.\textsuperscript{[246]}

The Ministry of Health is responsible for a relatively large network of hospitals and primary health clinics, and some specialized services for people with disabilities. There are also private hospitals, mostly in Baghdad. The Shahid Adnan Karalla hospital in Baghdad specializes in complex war surgery.\textsuperscript{[247]} Also in Baghdad, Al-Yarmouk medical complex has surgical capacity and Al-Wasiti hospital provides corrective surgery and medical physiotherapy.\textsuperscript{[248]}

The Ministry of Health developed a 2004-2007 Rehabilitation and Care for the Disabled Strategy that aimed to ensure health and rehabilitation services for all people with disabilities, to increase the rehabilitation centers in Iraq and to carry out disability prevention activities. It planned to establish seven rehabilitation centers, build five rehabilitation hospitals, conduct a needs assessment and establish national criteria for disability services, coordinate with other ministries, train specialized staff and participate in the establishment of the Iraqi Authority for the Care of the Disabled.\textsuperscript{[249]} This strategy is part-financed by the $25 million-Emergency Health Rehabilitation Project (EHRP) of the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund.\textsuperscript{[250]}
In northern Iraq the healthcare situation is generally better than in other regions, due to a better security situation and a relatively smooth handover of NGO-operated health facilities to the regional Ministry of Health. However, according to the ILIS, in three northern governorates 78.8 percent of mine-affected communities do not have medical facilities, with the least facilities in Dohuk (84.9 percent of communities lack facilities). In the four southern governorates, the ILIS found that only 12.6 percent of mine-affected communities had medical facilities, with more than 90 percent of communities having no government-run health services; in Missan governorate only 2.6 percent of surveyed communities had medical facilities. In the southern-central area 90 percent of communities (106 out of 118) did not have healthcare facilities.

In 2005, ICRC continued activities on a limited scale due to the security situation, with a team of about 300 national staff supported by 35 expatriates based in neighboring countries, and with the help of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. ICRC reported that “it was able to carry out a wide range of activities, albeit at a level far below the needs of those it sought to serve and its own emergency response capacity and overall objectives.” The health authorities assisted ICRC in providing supplies to 19 health facilities with acute needs in Baghdad, Erbil, Haditha, Hilla and Tal Afar, for a total value of CHF620,973 ($498,413). It also completed several renovation and construction projects including primary healthcare centers in Basra and in Qandil in Erbil governorate, al-Khalis General Hospital in Diyala governorate, and a hospital in Tikrit. However, in January 2006 ICRC further downscaled its operations for security reasons and canceled approximately 20 rehabilitation projects. It focused on cooperation and capacity-building of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society to better respond to emergency situations.

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ renovation of the Baghdad surgical hospital and equipping of Kut hospital was scheduled for completion in the second half of 2006. The Iranian Red Crescent Society also provided emergency medical supplies to Iraq.

The two surgical centers for civilian war victims in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, which Emergency handed over to the regional Ministry of Health in May 2005, were reported to have continued functioning at the same capacity and with a comparable quality of services, without waiting lists or shortages in medical supplies. Construction of a third Emergency surgical center, Salaam, next to the al-Husayn Hospital in Karbala, has remained on hold since November 2004 because of the security situation.

Other international NGOs and agencies providing medical relief and support to casualties of conflict include the International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières and Merlin.

The Ministry of Health estimated that there are approximately 80,000 amputees requiring prostheses in Iraq. There often are long waiting lists as rehabilitation centers lack capacity, some have been damaged during
the conflict, and most centers cannot function to capacity due to security constraints and a lack of trained staff and components.\[261\]

In southern and central Iraq there are nine government-run rehabilitation centers with the capacity to assist about 200 people per day; there are long waiting lists due to a lack of materials and trained staff. As of February 2006, three centers (Thi Qar, al-Ghadir and al-Salam) were functioning at limited capacity. There were not adequate rehabilitation services in Wasit, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, al-Qadisiyah, al-Muthanna and Missan. In some centers, services are free of charge for people with a 60 percent or more disability (determined by a government medical committee); for others, services cost $1-$5. In other centers, some people (police, army, students, children and war victims) receive treatment free of charge. Several specialized hospitals also provide rehabilitation services, such as the Ibn al-Kuff Hospital (Baghdad), al-Kanat Center for Medical Rehabilitation (Baghdad) and Dijlah Hospital (Tikrit, Salah al-Din governorate); all three centers receive support from international partners and function adequately. Services are free of charge apart from Dijlah hospital, but costs never exceed $2; all centers lack supplies and staff needs refresher training. Since January 2004, Ibn al-Kuff received more than 500 conflict-injured people. Limited rehabilitation services are provided by al-Shumoukh City Medical Center and al-Dhura Medical Center; these centers have a smaller capacity and serve those living in the government complex for people with disabilities (150 families); both centers function well and provide social and psychological rehabilitation. [262]

In northern Iraq, rehabilitation services in Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja are run by national and international NGOs in cooperation with the regional Ministry of Health; in general, the services are more accessible and of higher quality than elsewhere.

There are eight government-run prosthetic and orthotic workshops in Baghdad, Basra, Babylon, Najaf, Tikrit and Anbar; those in Babylon and Najaf were not working to capacity in 2005-2006. The Iraqi Red Crescent Society has an orthopedic workshop in Mosul but it is small in relation to the area’s needs and lacks raw materials. [263]

The Institute of Technical Medicine in Baghdad provides training for prosthetic and orthopedic technicians, but also provides rehabilitation services.

ICRC provided technical and material assistance to eight physical rehabilitation centers, the Institute of Technical Medicine and the crutches production unit of al-Salam center, with implementing partners including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Higher Education and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. ICRC runs the Erbil center without partners. The centers are monitored by ICRC expatriate staff from neighboring countries, but close monitoring was impossible due to the security situation; several centers were closed for some periods of time during 2005. The ICRC-supported centers assisted more than 30,000 people in 2005, produced 2,529 prostheses (999 or 40 percent for mine survivors),
5,374 orthoses (132 or two percent for mine survivors) and 515 pairs of crutches, and distributed seven wheelchairs.\(^{[264]}\)

Coalition forces set up a small prosthetics workshop, the al-Bidaya al-Jadida Prosthetic and Rehabilitation Clinic, in the convention center in Baghdad. The center uses the most advanced technology, such as computer-aided design and manufacturing of prosthetics and components. As of April 2006, the center had assisted approximately 275 people and produced 175 prostheses. Services are open to everyone and free of charge, but access is limited because the center is located in the green zone which most Iraqis cannot or prefer not to enter; moving the center to another part of Baghdad was under consideration.\(^{[265]}\)

Emergency supports the Center for Rehabilitation, Prostheses and Social Reintegration in Sulaymaniyah, which provides physical and social rehabilitation programs, vocational training, and support to establish small businesses and cooperative workshops. Employees include former patients. In 2005, the Emergency-run Sulaymaniyah center provided 1,926 physiotherapy treatments, fitted 486 prostheses and 34 orthoses, repaired 1,579 mobility devices, distributed 135 crutches and 14 wheelchairs, and modified 15 houses of mine survivors. In the first two months of 2006, 73 prostheses, one orthosis and 18 mobility devices were delivered; 140 devices were repaired. The cooperative workshops were put on hold in the first five months of 2005, but between June and December there were 60 direct and 226 indirect beneficiaries (including at least six mine survivors). At the end of training, participants are assisted in setting up cooperatives or workshops.\(^{[266]}\) The Ministry of Health through GDMA allocated $350,000 to the center, Mercy Corps provided $120,000 and Emergency covered remaining costs. It is estimated that five percent of the new patients treated in Sulaymaniyah are new mine survivors, and 75 percent of the total number of people treated were mine/UXO survivors. Approximately five percent of patients come from southern or central parts of Iraq, fewer than in previous years due to the security situation.\(^{[267]}\)

The Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center (DPLC) in Erbil and the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center (PLCD) in Dohuk are financed solely by the regional Ministry of Health. They provide comprehensive physical and socioeconomic reintegration services; PLCD receives a significant number of patients from other governorates in the northern-central region.\(^{[268]}\) Following the international handover to the Ministry of Health, the centers functioned without paying salaries between January and March 2005, which were later repaid by the ministry, but it could not retain all the staff and capacity reduced from 110 employees to 30 at DPLC; as a result only the orthopedic workshop continued functioning. Also, government salaries are lower than those paid previously by international organizations, so some staff sought employment elsewhere. DPLC outreach posts in Sidakan and Choman were also closed due to lack of funds; the Akre outreach post was handed over from DPLC to PLCD. In June 2006, DPLC received raw materials (ordered in June 2005) for one year of operations.\(^{[269]}\) In 2005,
DPLC assisted 3,615 people including 934 mine survivors. DPLC and PLCD together assisted 2,825 people with physical rehabilitation in 2005, produced 176 prostheses and 122 orthoses.

The Kurdistan Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (KORD) runs two orthopedic and rehabilitation centers in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, started by Handicap International in 1991. In December 2005, HI stopped technical and material support to KORD, and handed over the three satellite units in Penjwen, Kalar and Raniya; an HI desk officer provides some ad hoc support. An external evaluation of KORD and the transition was carried out in May 2006. KORD provides mobility devices and operates mobile teams to ensure adequate follow-up in isolated villages. It also provides income generation projects, home adaptation, support to disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), and conducts awareness-raising and advocacy activities on disability rights. Social workers are available to provide psychosocial support. In 2005, the centers assisted 10,734 people including 30 mine survivors with 6,060 physiotherapy sessions and produced 378 prostheses and 667 orthoses, repaired 2,302 devices, and distributed 24 wheelchairs and 1,303 walking aids. KORD also translated booklets on disability, participated in media events on disability and conducted capacity-building workshops. The main challenges for KORD are human resources management, the need for managerial and technical training, and resource mobilization. As of June 2006, it was estimated that KORD had sufficient funds to operate at full capacity until mid-2007. In its strategic plan for 2006-2007, KORD sought ongoing funding to continue its ongoing projects, to expand with an outreach post in Kirkuk and to conduct more disability rights activities. Other goals were increased transparency and managerial capacity.

The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC), in cooperation with ICRC, supported two prosthetic centers in the cities of Erbil and Mosul in northern Iraq. Due to the security situation, a handover planned for 2003 has remained on hold indefinitely. Due to difficult working conditions, especially in Mosul where a military camp is located near the center, activities have been scaled down; only Iraqis worked at the centers. ICRC provided supplies and regular technical assistance through visits, follow-up and training by the ICRC delegation in Erbil, Amman and Damascus. In Erbil, patients can stay on the premises during the one-week fitting period. In 2005, ICRC trained local staff in the adaptation and use of orthoses and provided appropriate materials; this enabled the Erbil center to assist people with upper limb amputations for the first time. During 2005, the number of patients assisted through these two centers reduced considerably, from 85 per month in 2004 to 55 per month, mainly due to deteriorating security. As a result, only 495 adaptations of prostheses and orthoses were done in both centers during 2005. Between 50 and 60 percent of people assisted were mine/UXO survivors.

In April 2005, Iceland allocated $1.5 million to the prosthetics company Ossur Inc. for a project providing prosthetic feet, follow-up for 600 Iraqis, and training for prosthetic and orthotic technicians. Ossur Inc.
will run the 12-18 month project in cooperation with the Swedish prosthetic company Skaraborgs Ortopedservice and Iraqi prosthetic specialists in Dohuk. This financial contribution is the last part of Iceland’s pledge of $4 million for emergency relief and reconstruction in Iraq.\[276\]

Community-based rehabilitation programs have not been available in Iraq and there was a lack of psychosocial support programs; only a small number of psychiatrists were available in hospitals in Baghdad. There were very few trained social workers, psychologists and nurses available to provide psychological support to mine and other war casualties.\[277\] The Iraqi Red Crescent Society ran psychological support centers in Basra and Sulaymaniyah governorates and in Baghdad city.\[278\] In July 2005, the Red Crescent developed a program assisting children suffering from conflict-related trauma but the program had stopped by the end of 2005, due to lack of funding.\[279\]

Unemployment of 30-40 percent and continuing conflict reduced the standard of living, making socioeconomic reintegration for mine survivors and other people with disabilities more difficult. In northern Iraq, it was anticipated that the sharing of rehabilitation and reintegration responsibilities between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs would increase the funds spent on socioeconomic reintegration from 2007. The government started the Social Safety Net program in early 2006 to assist the growing number of poor families; it replaced the earlier welfare system that was limited to war widows and disabled. The Social Safety Net will provide higher monthly assistance to a larger group of people; the government allocated approximately 500 billion Iraqi dinars (some $330 million) to the project, but it cannot cope with the high number of people who have already applied for the benefits (more than 241,000 families). However, most people have not received benefits and experienced difficulties providing the necessary supporting documents.\[280\] On 3 June 2006, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the World Bank signed an $8 million grant agreement to reform the Social Safety Net to better assist poor and vulnerable people. The World Bank estimated that the project should benefit up to one million families, six times more than previously, and will cost $330 million per year.\[281\]

Mercy Corps projects addressed the needs of people with disabilities in three southern governorates (Wasit, al-Qadisiyah and Missan) and two northern governorates (Tameem and Salah al-Din).\[282\] The main progress in 2005 was the increased capacity to let people with disabilities, especially women, talk about their disabilities, but security issues remained a serious concern.\[283\] Mercy Corps also established al-Jihad internet and resource center for people with disabilities in Kut (Wasit governorate). In 2006, Mercy Corps started two new programs, a small grants project and a peer empowerment training program, funded by USAID.

The Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund developed by the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) aimed to alleviate suffering by noncombatants as a result of the war through the repair of
homes, medical care and income-generating projects. On 9 June 2006, it received additional funding of $5 million as part of the US administration’s emergency supplemental funding bill providing a total of $50 million for humanitarian assistance in Iraq. CIVIC also facilitates medical care and other services for children injured in the conflict and who cannot receive adequate treatment in Iraq.[245]

Rozh Society, which provided referrals to medical and rehabilitation services, psychosocial support, socioeconomic reintegration and awareness-raising in 12 branches, has been funded solely by the regional Ministry of Health since the end of 2005, leading to reduced resources. It has 45,000-50,000 members. In April 2006, it put on a festival for people with disabilities, including music, theater and sports.[256]

The NGO Life for Relief and Development continued to provide emergency support to Iraq, but did not focus on people with disabilities.[256]

One mine survivor from Iraq participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005 and the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006.

## Disability Policy and Practice

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for issues relating to people with disabilities. Facilities are also provided by the ministries of health, defense and education. The 1980 Iraqi Social Welfare Law No. 126 recognized the right of all people with disabilities to rehabilitation services, and other medical, educational and economic rights.

In 2006, the government expanded and increased its benefits system.[287] In areas under the control of the Kurdistan regional authorities, people with disabilities are eligible for a monthly allowance of approximately $20, under Bill number 113, dated 10 August 2003. In 2005, the government promised to improve accessibility by making all new buildings accessible for disabled people; the next priorities were creating income-generating and employment opportunities, and leisure activities. [296] However, most victim assistance actors and disability organizations stated that the government has not made progress in accessibility of buildings.[298]

[1] At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in November-December 2004, Iraq’s then-Deputy Minister of Planning expressed Iraq’s great interest in joining the treaty. On 8 December 2004, then-Prime Minister Ayed Alawi told a disability group associated with the ICBL that he is in favor of joining the treaty, as soon as Iraq is legally eligible. In February and June 2004, Iraqi diplomats attending the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva informed the ICBL of their support for the treaty and desire for Iraq to accede. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 992; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 734.
2006. However, the Iraqi Transitional Government, which replaced the Iraqi Interim Government on 3 May 2005, had the power to enter into international treaties and agreements. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which temporarily administered Iraq after the invasion, transferred authority on 28 June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government. Iraq's permanent constitution was approved in a 15 October 2005 constitutional referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of Representatives was held in December 2005, with the Shi'a-led United Iraqi Alliance winning most of the seats.


[9] Landmine Monitor (HRW) interview with Mowafak Ayoub, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 10 February 2004. Confidential Iraqi and American sources indicated that the Aloa‘aa and Huten factories in Alexandria, and Aloudisie factory in Al Youssfiz were destroyed. Iraq previously manufactured a copy of the Italian Valmara 69 bounding antipersonnel mine, at least one antipersonnel mine developed with Yugoslav assistance, one former Soviet model and two older Italian mine designs.


[24] Email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 4 October 2005. One press article reported interviews with Iraqi citizens claiming that US personnel have laid mines

[25] The US has never reported in its annual national reports submitted under CCW Amended Protocol II any measures to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from known mined areas under its jurisdiction or control during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Protective minefields from the Soviet era are incorporated into the perimeter defense at locations US forces occupy in Afghanistan.

[26] Media reports of Coalition units engaged in operations along Iraq’s border with Iran frequently highlight the visible threat presented by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in border minefields, but do not mention any effort to secure, mark, fence or provide education to civilian populations. In November 2004, it was noted that the positions of South Korean troops stationed in Erbil in northern Iraq were ringed by 680 explosives devices, but the unit “is known to have removed only one land mine so far.” “Zaytan Beefs Up Security Following Emergency Declaration in Iraq,” Korea Times, 9 November 2004.

[27] “Missing U.S. soldiers killed,” St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 21 June 2006. A military statement said, “Coalition forces had to carefully maneuver their way through numerous improvised explosive devices leading up to and around the site.”

[28] “Four Georgian soldiers wounded in Iraq,” Agence France-Presse (Tbilisi), 9 November 2005. From the account, it is not possible to be certain if the device was victim-activated, and if so, when it was planted.

[29] Michael Georgy and Ian Bruce, “Arab envoy opens Iraq peace quest; First post-war visit aims to reconcile rival communities,” The Herald (Glasgow), 21 October 2005.


Mail (UK), 6 October 2005.


[47] Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war (ERW) are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.


[50] Staffan de Mistura, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP Resident Representative, cited in UNDP, “Peril and progress: mine action awareness day in Iraq,” 4 April 2006.


[56] ILIS, “Monthly Activities Report–April 2006,” pp. 9-15. The figure includes 1,126 communities which the ILIS teams surveyed, 68 communities with limited, visible UXO contamination and 234 communities that shared an SHA with one or more other communities.


[58] Ibid.

[59] The ILIS found that in the Al Fao district of Basra governorate, 46 of 138 communities (33 percent) are impacted by 70 recorded SHAs, but had no recent victims. In contrast, al-Muthanna governorate’s Al Salman district on the Saudi border, where nine of 40 communities (23 percent) are impacted by 12 recorded SHAs (all new mined areas), 30 recent victims were recorded. ILIS, “The causes of death and injury in Iraq due to ERW,” in email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 17 May 2006; telephone interview with John C. Brown, VVAF, 8 June 2006.

[60] Interview with Hyder Al-Mosawi, Director General, NMAA, Baghdad, 15 June 2006.


[65] “Three senior officials referred to prosecution for corruption,” Kuwait News Agency (Kuwait), 9 July 2006


[67] Email from Chris Tierney, Chief of Party-Iraq and Senior Advisor to RONCO/NMAA, 15 June 2006.


[70] Email from Lance J. Malin, Operations Advisor, RONCO/NMAA, 2 June 2005.

[71] Email from Stacy Smith, Communications Manager, RONCO, 23 June 2006.


[73] Ibid.

[74] Email from Niazi Khalid, General Director of Technical Affairs, IKMAC, 2 May 2006. The four local NGOs were Tiroj Demining Organization, Pirmam Demining Organization, Bawaji Demining Organization and Aras Demining Organization.
The NGOs were set up in 2004 funded by the US Department of State but ceased operating when funding ceased at the end of 2004. [75] Interview with Dlear Yacoub, Technical Advisor, RONCO, Amman, 11 April 2006.


[77] Interview with Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, 15 June 2006.


[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid


[83] Interview with Salomon Schreuder, UNDP, Amman, 10 April 2006.


[90] Ibid.


[92] Interviews with officials of mine action organizations working in Iraq, speaking on condition of anonymity, April and June 2006.


[94] "Iran-Iraq to cooperate in military, anti-terror fields," Xinhuanet, 8 July 2005.


[96] Email from Niazi Khalid, IKMAC, 2 May 2006.

[97] Email from Twanna Bashir, Operations Manager, GDMA, 20 April 2006.


[99] Interview with Mike Hartling, Task Leader, IMCO/RONCO, Amman, 10 April 2006.

[100] Emails from Pia Cantini, MRE officer, INTERSOS, Kuwait, 6 May and 19 June 2006.


[103] Email from Stacy Smith, RONCO, 23 June 2006.


The NMAA identified 12 demining/EOD organizations operating in Iraq in 2005, but reported the area cleared by only seven, totaling 18.4 square kilometers.

The table was compiled by Landmine Monitor from data provided by operators. Operators: Iraqi Kurdish Mine Action Center (IKMAC), General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA), Mine Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO), and Danish Demining Group (DDG).

This includes suspected mined areas that were visually checked (2,292,327 square meters), visually checked by EOD teams (3,272,157 square meters) and checked by mine detection dogs (141,616 square meters).

Results for 12 months through 1 March 2006.

Email from Niazi Khalid, IKMAC, 2 May 2006.
Email from Twanna Bashir, GDMA, 20 April 2006.
Email from Khabat Zangana, Manager, Khabat Zangana Company, 24 April 2006.
Email from Llewelyn Jones, Middle East Project Coordinator, MAG, 16 June 2006; MAG, “Iraq Programme Donor Update,” May 2006.
Email from Mark Buswell, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 24 April 2006; email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 16 June 2006.
Emails from Mark Buswell, MAG, 24 April and 2 July 2006.
Emails from Sherko Rashid, Program Manager, NPA, Iraq, 12 April and 15 June 2006.
Fax from Frank McAreavey, Program Manager, EOD Team, HELP, 15 June 2006.
IMCO briefing document, received by email from Mike Hartling, Task Leader, IMCO/RONCO, 6 June 2006.
“Operation achievement,” email from Mike Hartling, IMCO/RONCO, 6 June 2006.
Email from Brian Nelson Smith, Program Manager, DDG, Iraq, 13 April 2006.
Email from Pia Cantini, INTERSOS, Kuwait, 12 May 2006.
Email from Salomon Schreuder, UNDP, 30 June 2006.
Email from Twanna Bashir, GDMA, 20 April 2006.
Email from Niazi Khalid, IKMAC, 11 July 2006.
Emails from Mark Buswell, MAG, 24 April and 2 July 2006.
Email from Sherko Rashid, NPA, 12 April 2006.
Email from Pia Cantini, INTERSOS, Kuwait, 19 June 2006.
Press release, US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Support Center, 3 January 2006. The contract was subject to availability of funds which the Corps had not yet received.
Ibid.
Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2006.
2005.

[151] Email from Marion Libertucci, HI, 31 May 2006; email from Yasser Al-Najar, Technical and Data Manager, IHSCO, 18 July 2006.

[152] Email from David Horrocks, Program Manager, MAG Iraq, forwarded by Tim Carstairs, MAG, 16 May 2006.


[154] Email from David Horrocks, MAG Iraq, forwarded by Tim Carstairs, MAG, 16 May 2006.

[155] Ibid.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Ibid.


[159] Email from Pia Cantini, INTEROS, 12 May 2006.


[161] Email from Pia Cantini, INTEROS, 12 May 2006.


[171] Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006.


[177] Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459, used throughout this report.
[185] Email from Shanti Kaphle, MRE Officer, UNICEF, 2 March 2006; telephone interview with Dr. Oleg Bilukha, CDC, Atlanta, 25 April 2006.
[187] Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 12 April 2006.
[188] Email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 3 April 2006.
[189] Information provided by Siraj Barzani, IKMAC, Erbil, 2 March 2006.
[191] Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 23 June 2006. MAG’s data was transferred into iMSMA and handed to RMAC for distribution. MAG only collects data it encounters during other activities and does not collect data from the Emergency Surgical Hospital in Sulaymaniyah. MAG recorded 40 casualties in Erbil, but these statistics have not been included in the total of new casualties in 2004.
[196] Landmine Monitor media analysis from 1 January 2005 until 31 December 2005, incidents identified as IED or roadside bomb incidents were excluded, but this analysis is not comprehensive due to the large number of articles reporting various conflict-related casualties in Iraq.
[205] This figure is accurate as of 7 June 2006; figures derived from an
examination of US Department of Defense casualty reports.


[209] Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 23 May 2006.


[212] “Blast victim’s body to be brought tomorrow (Iraq),” *The Hindu* (India), 3 May 2006.


[216] Figures derived from an examination of US Department of Defense casualty reports.


[219] Email from Mark Buswell, MAG, 17 March 2006.


[221] Information provided by John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006. “Recent” casualties normally refer to incidents in the 24 months prior to the survey, but in this case from September 2002 to end-2005.


[225] “Less recent” casualties refer to incidents more than 24 months prior to the survey. Information provided by John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 and 27 May 2006.


[228] Information provided by John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 and 27 May 2006.

[229] Information provided by Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, 27 April 2006.


[234] Email from Chris Tierney, RONCO/NMAA, 6 June 2006.


[236] Email from Jilan Salem Mohammed, MRE Officer, RMAC South, 23 March 2006; email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 3 April 2006; telephone interview with Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006.

[237] Information provided by Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, 27 April 2006; email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 3 April 2006.


“Baghdadis say curfew prevents access to medical care,” *IRIN* (Baghdad), 17 April 2006.


“KORD Strategic Plan for 2006 & 2007,” (internal document) provided by...
[275] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Mette Bucholz, Regional Coordinator Middle East and North Africa, Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo, 9 May 2006. The 2005 statistics for these two centers are included in the total ICRC statistics for Iraq.


[279] “Children’s mental health affected by insecurity, say specialists,” IRIN (Baghdad), 7 February 2006.


[285] Interview with Noori Sheikh Razza Koyek, Director, Rozh Society, 3 April 2006.


[288] Email from Sardasht Abdulrahman, Assistant to the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Sulaymaniyah, 16 August 2005.