ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON THE GREAT LAKES AND GENOCIDE PREVENTION

Visit to Democratic Republic of Congo 2nd - 6th August 2001

Facilitated by Oxfam GB, Christian Aid, Save the Children, Tearfund and International Alert
PARTICIPANTS OF THE VISIT

MPs from the three main parties were approached to take part in the visit. The four MPs able to participate were:

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Mr Eric Joyce MP, Labour, Falkirk West

Accompanied by:
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For the full itinerary, see Appendix 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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In particular, we would like to thank Oxfam GB, Christian Aid, Save the Children, Tearfund and International Alert for funding the trip, and for the facilitation and support provided by their staff and partners in the field and in the UK. Without their help this visit would not have taken place.

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A humanitarian disaster in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is unfolding on a vast scale. Since 1998 the conflict has claimed the lives of 2.5 million people. A further 18 million people have no access to services of any kind. We urge the UK Government to broker a substantially increased aid package to provide basic healthcare, nutrition, shelter and education for DRC, via NGOs and UN agencies.

Peace in DRC has been frustrated by a cycle of violence involving several domestic militias and six neighbouring armies. Internal civil conflict in the countries of the Great Lakes Region has become enmeshed with external cross-border conflict. It is impossible to resolve conflict in one of these countries without looking at the causes and implications of conflict in the others. A regional approach must be taken. We recommend that the UK government produce a Regional Strategy Paper on the Great Lakes Region.

The demobilisation and resettlement of armed groups is critical to the success of the Lusaka Peace process. Without demobilisation, insecurity in the East and along DRC’s borders will persist. If the UN is to fulfil its Lusaka commitment to ‘track down and disarm armed groups’, then the UN mission (MONUC) must be expanded. Given the vast size of DRC, if the UN deployed the same density of troops-to-land as it did in Kosovo, it would require 10 million UN peacekeepers! Whilst this is wildly unrealistic, so too is the proposed deployment of 5,000 UN soldiers.

We urge the UK government to push for:

i) an expansion of personnel and resources available to MONUC.

ii) faster demobilisation and resettlement (in line with the UK Quick Start programme).

iii) a UN embargo on arms exports into the Region.

iv) a credible study of the threat posed by armed groups operating in DRC.

The inter-Congolese dialogue presents key groups, including political and civil society figures, with an important opportunity to make their voices heard. These groups face the huge challenge of agreeing a new political settlement for the country. We recommend that greater support is given to the office of the ICD facilitator, Sir Ketumile Maisire.

Attacks on Rwanda between 1995-1998 by Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias based in Eastern DRC, and the failure of the DRC Government to prevent them, justified Rwanda’s initial intervention in DRC. However, Rwanda’s security justification is now in doubt. Rwanda’s military bases – in common with all other foreign armies in DRC – appear to be more closely linked to the positioning of mineral mines than rebel forces. British and European bilateral aid policy in the Great Lakes Region must be linked to cessation of illegal exploitation of natural resources and implementation of the Lusaka Accords. Certification schemes should be introduced, where appropriate, to address the exploitation of natural resources.
The visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in August 2001, was planned jointly by the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention and Oxfam GB, Christian Aid, Save the Children, Tearfund and International Alert. For the purposes of this report, the Great Lakes region refers to DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.

The objective of the visit was to facilitate a fact-finding mission by British MPs to evaluate the response to conflict in DRC. This involved investigating the political and humanitarian aspects of the crisis, specifically:

- how the Lusaka Peace Agreement is being implemented on the ground.
- progress and participation in the inter-Congolese dialogue.
- exploitation of mineral resources.
- the humanitarian situation and levels of funding.
- Department of International Development (DFID) and Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) funded projects, including civil society and peace-building.

The All Party Group has been encouraged by the Prime Minister’s mention of three million conflict-related deaths in Congo at his Party Conference speech on October 2nd 2001. If the deaths of 7,000 innocent civilians in America warrant the enormous response of the international community in the military and economic sphere – and they do – then surely the deaths of 2.5 million civilians in the Congo warrant an equally vigorous response.
3.1 THE CONFLICT

3.1.1 Recent background (1998-2001)
The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is Africa’s most complex conflict. It involves six foreign armies from neighbouring countries and several domestic militias, and has been described as Africa’s First World War. Its roots are embedded in the history, both recent and distant, of the Great Lakes Region. Whilst we cannot do justice to that history in the confines of this report, a brief chronology of DRC’s history is outlined in appendix 2.

Current conflict in DRC stems from the wave of violence and mass-displacement unleashed by the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Over 2 million Rwandans, predominantly Hutu, sought refuge in DRC (then Zaire), Burundi and Tanzania. Among the refugees were members of the armed groups responsible for genocide – the Hutu militias, known as the Interahamwe, and the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR). Between 1995-97 the ‘gendocidaires’ launched renewed attacks from Eastern DRC on Rwanda. Rebels supported by the Sudanese National Islamic Front regime also attacked Uganda from Eastern Zaire. In 1996 Rwanda and Uganda backed a Tutsi-led rebellion to overthrow Zaire’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, and install Laurent Kabila.

Following the deterioration of relations between Laurent Kabila and his former allies, Rwanda and Uganda occupied parts of DRC and backed rebel attempts in August 1998 to overthrow the Kabila regime. The DRC Government called on troops from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola to repel the attack. The Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels were halted, but all the countries involved retain troops in DRC. In Eastern DRC, the post-1994 influx of Rwandan refugees has stretched local economies to breaking point and exacerbated long-standing ethnic tensions. The conflict since 1998 has precipitated a humanitarian disaster estimated to have claimed 2.5 million lives.

3.1.2 Who controls where? The DRC is split into three zones of control (see map below). The DRC government, recognised by the UN, controls one-third of the country, including parts of western, central and southern DRC and is backed by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The Rwandan sponsored RCD* in the East is led by Adolphe Onusumba. The RCD-Goma forces control parts of North and South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga provinces, and most major towns in parts of eastern, central and south-eastern DRC. The allied Congolese armed opposition groups (the RCD-MLC† and the FLC) control much of north-eastern and north-western DRC. This movement, known as the FLC/MLC, is led by Jean Pierre Bemba and backed by Uganda.

Despite increased ethnic conflict, Congolese nationalism is evident. In both Eastern and Western DRC people share an overriding sense of being Congolese, although the territory of Congo covers a landmass equal to the size of Western Europe. The distance from Kinshasa to Goma is the same as London to Sarajevo.

3.1.3 Rebel groups Within Congo’s territory a myriad of local armed groups operate freely, such as the Mayi Mayi, Ugandan rebels‡ and the Interahamwe/ex FAR and Burundian rebels FDD§. Rwandan Hutu fighters in Eastern DRC include members of the former Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe. Others were recruited from the refugee camps set up in Zaire after the genocide and during and after the 1997-98 insurgency in the Northwest of Rwanda. It is thought some Congolese Hutu have now been recruited.

Medame Hasa, Chief of the Mantanda Community Health Network, Masisi: “Before the war Hutu and Tutsi lived together in harmony. Politicians from Goma and Kinshasa created this division. They divided tribes and made each one have a political allegiance. Now there are Tutsi and Hutu parties, even armed movements such as the Hundo and Mayi Mayi. Problems started in 1994, when Rwandan refugees arrived. They destroyed our cattle and sold weapons to local tribes.”

3.1.4 The political players

3.1.4a DRC government
Since the death of President Laurent Desire Kabila on 16 January 2001, and the instauration of his son Joseph 10 days later, there has been a significant shift in the political landscape. President Joseph Kabila immediately stated his commitment to peace through the Lusaka Accords, which were signed in July 1999 and pledged all main combatants to a cease-fire. He has accepted Sir Ketumile Masire as facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

In April 2001 Joseph Kabila dissolved his father’s cabinet, largely made up of family members. Many of the old regime’s strongmen were ejected from government, and only five ministers retained their posts. Many of the new cabinet have been recruited from the Congolese Diaspora and are respected technocrats with expertise in their fields. Addressing his cabinet in May, Kabila called for openness and an end to the era of nepotism. He has embraced talk of trade liberalisation and an end to state monopolies, opened dialogue with the IMF and World Bank, and invited humanitarian agencies to assess the situation in the Congo. Kabila faces the unenviable task of presiding over an enormous country riven with regional and ethnic rivalries. Kinshasa is effectively a city state, situated in the far west of a country largely covered in jungle, and so neglected that few roads have been built since the 1960s.

Despite Joseph Kabila’s positive tone, it is alleged that the DRC government in Kinshasa has provided financial and military support to various rebel groups in the east such as the Interahamwe. Moreover, notwithstanding his democratic language, government critics continue to be detained without charge. Staff of Kinshasa’s satirical newspaper, “L’Avenir” are routinely harassed. The editor, Diana Gikupa, was held in jail for several days after publishing an article critical of the president’s Cabinet Director.

The DRC Government issued a statement on 20/7/01 reaffirming that the ban on political activity had been lifted. However, the Government stipulates that parties notify the Interior Ministry of opposition activity in writing. A major opposition rally was broken up shortly before our visit. The President told us this was because the opposition failed to give the authorities due notice of the demonstration. The opposition vigorously denied this and insisted the Government used administrative requirements as a pretext to stifle dissent. We urge President Kabila to show good faith and boost his democratic credentials by lifting restrictions on political opposition activity in DRC.

Despite increased ethnic conflict, Congolese nationalism is evident. In both Eastern and Western DRC people share an overriding sense of being Congolese, although the territory of Congo covers a landmass equal to the size of Western Europe. The distance from Kinshasa to Goma is the same as London to Sarajevo.
President Kabila, meeting on 2nd August 2001

President Kabila met us in his presidential palace in Kinshasa. In an hour-long meeting, he outlined his desire to rebuild the DRC, saying that peace must come before everything else.

The President wants Western support to hold elections within two years. For him the necessary prerequisites are a census (since the government does not know the size of the Congolese population), broad-based political parties (e.g., national not ethnic) and improved infrastructure so that rural inhabitants can vote.

He felt that the inter-Congolese dialogue is moving too slowly “because the suffering of the Congolese people is continuing with no end in sight. I think the problem of DRC is so simple that people cannot see the wood for the trees. All foreign armies must leave.”

3.1.4b MLC/FLC

Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the MLC/FLC, is a charismatic political figure in DRC’s Equateur region. His rebel movement comprises the Ugandan-supported wing of the RCD (MLC) and the MLC, which merged to become the FLC. This movement controls Northeastern DRC. An autocrat, Bemba has faced several challenges from intellectuals within his ranks. The FLC are accused of mineral exploitation, and fewer allegations of human rights abuses, and are said to make greater investment in social services than their counterparts in Rwandan-controlled territory. Bemba has declared his commitment to the Lusaka Accords, but is said to be anxious about his role following the recent elections.

3.1.4c RCD-Goma

The RCD movement has changed leadership several times and suffered various splits. It is unpopular locally (viewed as a Rwandan-controlled organisation), has been unable to establish itself as a credible political force, and has failed to provide support to the local population in key areas of health and education.

Mr Adolphe Onusumba, meeting on August 4th, 2001

Mr Onusumba met us in the former residence of the late President Mobutu. He told us: “We want to be parliamentarians, not warlords. We want to fight with ideas, not weapons. Fighting a war is not a pleasure. We would like to be like you, so we could go and discuss our problems and help our country realise its potential.”

He went on to say that RCD-Goma were looking forward to engaging in the inter-Congolese Dialogue, as it was important for all Congolese to sit down and discuss the future of the country. “I believe we can agree a new political order. We can give the country a new constitution and new political institutions.”

3.1.5. A regional approach

“Solving conflict in the Congo is the key to solving conflict in Africa” Joseph Kabila, March 10 2001

“We want to move the peace process forward, but the international community must respond to security threats in the region” Paul Kagame, September 3rd 2001

It is clear that conflict in the DRC cannot be resolved without national and international agencies taking a regional approach. Good governance must be promoted across the region to encourage politicians to tackle problems of accountability, legitimacy and human rights abuses. Politics in this region is inherently tied to the current problems of war and ethnicity. Politicians in the Great Lakes Region face interconnected problems which will only be solved in the long-term with collective solutions.
3.2 PEACE PROCESS AND OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS

LUSAKA ACCORDS

The Lusaka Accords were brokered in the Zambian Capital in July 1999. The Accords were signed by the governments of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the rebel movements RCD-Goma and MLC. Although not signatories, other militias such as the Interahamwe and the Mayi Mayi agreed to the contents of the agreement.

The Accords pledged the signatories to:
- an immediate cease-fire.
- demobilise and disarm all armed groups in DRC such as the Interahamwe.
- accept monitors from a Joint Military Commission.

The Accords also provided for:
- a UN observer mission in Congo (MONUC). Chapter 9 of the Lusaka Agreement states "The Joint Military Commission with the assistance of the UN/OAU shall work out mechanisms for the tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting of all armed groups in the DRC, including the ex-FAR, ADF, LRA, UNRFII, Interahamwe, FUNA, FDD, WNB, UNITA."
- an "internal dialogue" between the DRC government, the rebel groups, the political opposition and civil society, known as the inter-Congolese dialogue.

The UN Security Council approved deployment of up to 5,537 personnel, including 500 military observers, protected by 5,000 soldiers. There are currently approximately 2,500 UN personnel in DRC.
3.2.1 The role of the UN force – MONUC

The key obstacle to peace is the disarmament of armed groups in DRC. The process, known as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR), is subject to continual delay. There is confusion over the UN’s role in securing disarmament. The Lusaka Accord envisages disarmament, and MONUC is mandated under Lusaka to ‘track down and disarm armed groups’ (see box on previous page). Separating warring groups and supervising voluntary disarmament is quite different to tracking them down and disarming them. Voluntary disarmament neither tackles the hard core nor appeases the security concerns that are a major reason for continuation of the war.

MONUC, in co-operation with the joint Military Commission (JMC), has the following mandate:

- To monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire.
- To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the headquarters of all parties military forces.
- To develop an action plan for implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement by all concerned, with particular emphasis on: the collection and verification of military information on the parties forces, the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the parties forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
- To work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, and military captives.
- To monitor compliance with the provision of the ceasefire agreement on the supply of ammunition and weaponry and other war-related material in the field.
- To facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular assistance to vulnerable groups.
- To cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue, providing support and technical assistance to him.
- To assess the scope of the mine and unexploded ordnance problems and carry out emergency mine action activities.

We urge the UK Government to raise at the UN the contradiction between the Lusaka Agreement (which stipulates disarmament) and MONUC’s mission of separating the warring groups and supervising voluntary disarmament; and to identify the increased capacity MONUC will require to carry out its role specified in the Lusaka Agreement.

MONUC deployment has three phases. In phase one MONUC supervised a disengagement of troops from the front lines (March 2001). In phase two, parties to the ceasefire agreement, working with MONUC, prepared and adopted a plan for the orderly withdrawal of foreign troops (April-May 2001). Phase three entails the drawing up and implementation of plans for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and resettlement of armed groups (May 2001 -).

Our visit fell between phases two and three. During phase two the MONUC mission expanded to the cities of Kisangani, Mbandaka, Katembe and Kananga. Disengagement proceeded to 100km from the front lines, although this is not far in a country the size of Western Europe. Given the confusion around MONUC’s role (outlined above) there is concern over the mechanisms for demobilisation, and the delay in implementation of phase three.

The DRC government told us that the Interahamwe and ex-FAR were ready for demobilisation in Katanga and Bas-Congo, but that no DDRR programmes had been implemented. The MONUC Force Commander, General Diallo, confirmed the delay; “We hear they have regrouped four thousand people, but we are still waiting to be invited in.” We urge all parties to accelerate DDRR. However, despite delay, clear opportunities remain to support a disarming and demobilisation programme. We welcome the UK government’s pledge of £15m for a “Quick Start” programme aimed at disarming, demobilising and re-integrating the armed groups that have not signed the Lusaka Accords.

A central problem for MONUC in fulfilling its objective to track down and disarm groups such as the Interahamwe, is that no accurate assessment exists of their location or size. Most people on the ground insist that a lack of reliable information renders estimates of the Interahamwe meaningless. However, estimates range from 5,000 to 40,000.13 Whatever their number, it is clear that the UN does not have the capacity to bring about a sustainable peace in large sections of Eastern DRC without a substantial increase in its force. A comparison with the numbers of UN troops in Kosovo highlights the problem posed by the sheer size of DRC: if the UN deployed the same density of troops to land as it has in Kosovo, it would need 10 million UN peacekeepers!14

If Rwanda and Uganda are to continue withdrawal, they must see evidence that DDRR is taking place. An increased MONUC force is also necessary to fill the power vacuum they leave.
3.3.1 Governance and elections

Political leaders throughout the Great Lakes Region face huge problems of legitimacy. None of the three authorities in DRC have a democratically elected government or parliament. The APPG met with President Kabila and President of the RCD, Mr Onusumba. Both share a sense of shame that conflict and political failure have reduced their people to destitution. Both appear to want peace, and both appealed to the international community for assistance to achieve this. However, the gap between their intentions and their achievements remains great. Human rights organisations document allegations of intimidation, wrongful imprisonment, theft, corruption and extra-judicial killings in all three DRC authorities16. Rumours abound about the true power structures within these governments, and some argue that these men are merely an acceptable face to the international community.

Critics of the DRC Government argue that the international community should resist engaging in bilateral and multilateral aid programmes until the Kabila Government turns some of its positive words into action; they fear a ‘new Mobuto’ scenario. Others argue that unless help is given to the Kabila Government now, at this critical time, a significant opportunity may be lost.

3.3.2 Inter-Congolese dialogue (ICD) & Civil Society

The inter-Congolese dialogue is a crucial part of the Lusaka Peace Process, committing all the main parties and unarmed opposition groups within DRC to a political dialogue on the country’s future. It is facilitated by the former Botswanan President, Sir Ketumile Masire, who has encouraged negotiations between the DRC government, RCD, the MLC and members of civil society. After the preliminary meeting in Gaberone, the ICD takes place in Addis Ababa as this report goes to print on October 15th 2001. The dialogue involves four commissions comprising:

1) military and security issues;
2) the constitution;
3) humanitarian and development issues;
4) an electoral commission.

The dialogue presents Congolese civil society representatives with an important opportunity to make their voices heard. The weakness of state institutions in the Congo has created strong and vocal civil society groups.

The civil society representatives we met were enraged at what they see as a foreign war being fought on their territory. They believe that some western powers maintain the war, and they fear that the UN wants to partition their country. None of the representatives we met seemed able or willing to appreciate Rwanda’s security concerns. At a meeting with civil society in Kinshasa we caused uproar by suggesting that the DRC Government is unable to police its borders with Rwanda and Uganda. We view this as a self-evident fact. However, civil society representatives view it as another attempt to undermine the integrity of the DRC as a nation state.

3.3.3 Citizenship

Participants in the dialogue must carefully consider issues of citizenship and ethnicity, including issues such as whether the DRC Government should extend citizenship to all Congolese citizens (e.g. the Banyamulenge). In conjunction with the UNHCR, the DRC and Rwandan Governments must also address the status of non-Congolese citizens currently resident in DRC. The story of 16 year old Baraka is a sobering example of the scale of the problem facing refugees without a state.
3.4 EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

The war in DRC is currently motivated by both security and economic concerns. Throughout the visit people expressed strongly held views that security issues were a pretext for mineral exploitation. The Congo is renowned for its natural resources, and has 8% of the world’s diamond reserves. There are plentiful supplies of copper, cobalt, coltan (columbo-tantalite) gold and zinc. Mining previously accounted for 3/4 of export revenue and 1/4 of GDP. Rwanda and Uganda both cite security concerns as their reason for military involvement in DRC.

Senior International Observer: "It is important to make the distinction between trade happening between Kigali and the Kivus a decade ago and the situation now. The previous governor of Kivu built roads and schools. The RCD is raping the country. They are unaccountable and have done nothing for the people."

Congolese citizen, Kinshasa: "I don't care what the government says. Zimbabwe's reasons for being here are in the first place economic."

We believe – as does the British Government – that attacks on Rwanda between 1995-1998 by Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias based in Eastern DRC, and the failure of the DRC Government to prevent their activity, justified Rwanda's initial intervention in DRC. However, Rwanda's security justification is now in doubt: Rwanda's military bases – in common with those of other foreign governments in DRC - are more closely linked to the positioning of mineral mines than rebel forces.

Project visit to CAJED transit centre in Goma:
Baraka (16 years old.)
"I left Rwanda in 1994. My family were moderate Hutus, but they were sympathising with the Tutsis. My aunt was a Tutsi, so we hid my aunt’s family. I fled to DRC with my parents, but they died after we arrived. The Red Cross registered me and I went back to Rwanda. From an orphanage in Rwanda I was taken to Gisenyi. A member of my family was there but they chased me away, because they didn’t want to look after me. So after that I went back to Masisi in DRC. One time I was in the market selling potatoes and the military (RCD) came and kidnapped me, they conscripted me. They took me to their military position, but I escaped. After that I was taken back to Rwanda, but the border-guards wouldn’t let me enter because I have no family there anymore who will take me. Now I am back in DRC, but they don’t want me here either. I ask you to find me country of exile where I can live. That’s all."

A successful Inter Congolese Dialogue, addressing issues of citizenship, would be a crucial milestone in the peace-process. It is vital that the parties involved develop a clearly defined working relationship to tackle the difficult questions ahead. Greater support should be given to the office of the ICD facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire. The UK government currently provides financial support (£43,000 in 2001) and a technical expert to the facilitator. We urge the Government to double this.

The table overleaf shows how Ugandan and Rwandan troops are stationed next to mineral or timber resources. We received reports that Uganda is responsible for exploiting timber in 800 sq. km of rainforest. It is also alleged that the Mayi Mayi are involved in exploiting natural resources, especially coltan, for their own self-gain. A correlation is also visible for Zimbabwe between deployment and mineral resources.

We believe – as does the British Government – that attacks on Rwanda between 1995-1998 by Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias based in Eastern DRC, and the failure of the DRC Government to prevent their activity, justified Rwanda’s initial intervention in DRC. However, Rwanda’s security justification is now in doubt: Rwanda’s military bases – in common with those of other foreign governments in DRC - are more closely linked to the positioning of mineral mines than rebel forces.
## 3.4.1 Location of troop deployment and existence of natural resources

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<th>POSITION OF UPDF and FLC</th>
<th>RESOURCE</th>
<th>POSITION OF RPA and RCD</th>
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<td>Province Orientale/Ituri</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>Coltan, gold</td>
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<td>Mongwalu</td>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>Punia</td>
<td>Cassiterite, gold, coltan</td>
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<td>Nokia</td>
<td>Gold, coffee</td>
<td>Kalima</td>
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<td>Bumia</td>
<td>Gold</td>
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<td>Gold</td>
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<td>Butembo</td>
<td>Gold, coffee, timber</td>
<td>Ninja</td>
<td>Coltan, gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Some coffee, timber</td>
<td>Kalehe (Numbi)</td>
<td>Tourmaline, emerald, coltan, niobium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabadoitile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Walungu</td>
<td>Gold, coltan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kamituga</td>
<td>Gold, cassiterite, tourmaline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kitutu</td>
<td>Gold, palm oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Walikale</td>
<td>Gold, timber, coltan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bunyakore</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Rutshuru</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Pinga</td>
<td>Coltan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Orientale</td>
<td>Road to Banalia</td>
<td>Road to Banalia</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisangani town</td>
<td></td>
<td>Road to Banalia</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
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## ZIMBABWE ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCE</th>
<th>ANGOLAN ARMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katanga (Shaba)</td>
<td>Cobalt, copper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubumbashi</td>
<td>Copper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolwezi</td>
<td>Uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinkolobwe</td>
<td>Uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitwaba</td>
<td>Gold</td>
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<td>Kisenge</td>
<td>Manganese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasai Occidentale</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasai Orientale</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbuzi Mai</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusambo</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamina</td>
<td>Diamonds, copper</td>
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<td>Kinshasa</td>
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## ANGOLAN ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCE</th>
<th>POSITION OF RPA and RCD</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kasai Orientale</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodja</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusambo</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga Province</td>
<td>Cassiterite, coltan, copper, pewter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manono</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyura</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabongo</td>
<td>Gold</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
More attention must be directed at all countries involved in resource exploitation in the DRC. A controversial UN report on the illegal exploitation of precious minerals in DRC, published in April 2001, was heavily critical of Rwanda, Uganda and the rebel movements.

The report accused the Rwandan-backed RCD and the Ugandan-backed FLC23 of systematically looting gold, diamonds, coffee, wood, coltan and other resources in areas under their control. However, the report was widely attacked for being insufficiently rigorous. As a result, the UN Security Council has called for more research. Whilst we agree that the report was unbalanced and flawed in some areas, during the course of our visit we heard numerous eyewitness reports which confirmed that the broad findings were credible.

In Goma, several reliable sources alleged that the RPA and the RCD monopolise mineral trade by controlling the mining areas and the Rwandan border crossing. We were told that the RCD Department of Mining and Energy is linked to individual brokers buying and selling minerals. People are afraid to take high value goods to Kigali as they are easy targets for the military who pick them off as members of the Interahamwe.

We heard reports that the RCD fix local coltan prices by commissioning civilians to purchase coltan from miners. The process starts in the middle of the mines, where the military influence miners to sell coltan to intermediaries in the local markets such as Rubaya or Kibabi. The military own some mines, and bring over prisoners from Rwanda’s jails to mine them25. The RPA and RCD steal minerals from local miners and force local Congolese to mine at gun-point. Military helicopters fly to Walikali airstrip from Kigali about five times a week to deposit arms and other ammunition at various locations and carry back coltan.

Large sums of money from the DRC mineral trade flow through Rwanda and Uganda. Approximate estimates for the value of trade in minerals leaving the Kivus are around US $100m annually26. Last year, Uganda made nearly as much money from gold exports as from coffee, despite having hardly any reserves at home27. Similarly, Rwanda produced 83 tons of coltan, but exported 603 tons28. The discrepancy between the domestic production and the export volume of coltan from Rwanda is 520 tons. Almost certainly, the balance comes from mining in the DRC. Whilst foreign exchange data merely shows where produce was sold, and not by whom (eg the Rwandan / Ugandan Governments, or private companies and individuals), the implication is clear.

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3.5 HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES

3.5.1 Current humanitarian crisis
The humanitarian crisis in the DRC has been described as one of the worst in the world. The fighting has lead to appalling levels of hunger, disease and death, and countless abuses of human rights. It is estimated that 18 million people currently have no access to services of any kind. There are currently two million displaced people in DRC and 340,000 refugees in neighbouring countries.

UN agencies and NGOs require more financial support to extend basic assistance to remote areas. The current OCHA appeal has not yet reached half of the total requested, falling far short of the need. Responses are mostly in-kind contributions and are not addressing crucial areas like health and education.

For successful implementation of the Lusaka Accord substantial aid commitments will be required for rehabilitation and development work. Aid should be channelled through the UN system and NGOs, and tied to milestones in the peace process. Key areas for assistance are food security, shelter, education and health. It is also important that NGOs, UN and donors adopt a more co-ordinated approach.

For assistance to be extended to remote areas, the DRC government and the warring parties must ensure access. This continues to be a sticking point: all areas have been least addressed by the partial response to the OCHA appeal to date.

3.5.2 Development opportunities and access to services
Poor access to services leads to great suffering in the Great Lakes region. Long-term development aid is essential if further bloodshed is to be avoided. In the DRC it is possible to undertake carefully considered development projects. Wherever they live, people have the right to development. In secure areas such as Goma and Kinshasa, opportunities to support development work should be explored.

Humanitarian Assistance to IDPs, Kababi in Masisi, Eastern DRC

NGO Worker: “Armed militias will attack any areas where people start cultivating crops. The local population has been forced to run away from their crops. They often lack the seeds and tools to start cultivating in the displaced areas. ECHO is funding packs for displaced families. Each family receives a pack containing kitchen tools, two blankets, two plates, four cups and a gerrycan. There is never enough to go around.”

Head of Displaced Peoples Committee: “We come from a town called Katoyi, about 100kms from here. The Interahamwe and Mayi Mayi drove us out in 1998. Its impossible to identify how many of us there are. Most of us fled with nothing. Now we work doing tasks for families in the area in exchange for food.”

The European Union:
The European Commission has spent over €200m (£125m) in the last decade on NGO-run rehabilitation programmes. This year €35m (£22m) was committed to providing minimal healthcare and malnutrition relief. In March the Commission adopted an €28m (£17m) programme of support to administer justice, and other measures designed to restore the rule of law. The Commission has also financing (around €2m or £1.2m) for the work of Sir Ketumile ‘Maison and his facilitation of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

The European Council adopted a common position in January concerning European Union support for implementation of the Lusaka agreement and the peace process in DRC. During July the European Parliament adopted a resolution expressing concern at the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC.

PEOPLE UNABLE TO MEET BASIC NEEDS
1) Street Children, Orphans and Widows Project, Kinshasa town
16-year-old boy: “There is peace in Kinshasa now. Why can’t you help me now? We can’t even wash. We want to go to school. We want to understand things in the world. We want to be clean like other children we see. When we are sick we pour water over our heads and then we sleep. We’ve never seen a doctor, ever. No money, no doctor”.

2) AIDS project, Foundation Femme Plus at Njere Njere, Kinshasa
20-year-old woman: “Women who haven’t eaten for days sometimes offer themselves to soldiers for a few biscuits. The soldiers get sex and the women get AIDS. In time the women will infect more soldiers, who go home and infect their wives and their girlfriends.”
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only for development, but also for prospects of peace building and promotion of civil society. Without universal education women will not benefit, whatever education is available.

Education helps to raise awareness of issues such as justice and human rights. The work of local NGOs and international NGOs providing formal and informal education should be given greater support.

Primary School - Kabibi in Masisi, Eastern DRC
The school is concrete with a tin roof. Inside it is very dark, but there is a blackboard and some benches. The school is designed for 200-400 but serves around 600 pupils. There are 140 girls and 337 boys in this school. It costs $10 per year to attend this school and many children drop out during the year because their parents cannot pay the fees. Most children learn to write by watching the lucky few who can afford writing materials. Primary school teachers are paid $2.50 per month.

3.5.2b Health

FOOD AND WATER
There is scope for increasing aid to vulnerable populations in secure areas.
- Only 45 per cent of people have access to clean drinking water. In Kinshasa, 30 per cent of diseases registered by the health authorities in 1998 were water related32.
- A survey conducted by Save the Children UK in the poorest parts of Commune Kimbanseke (Kinshasa) in April 2001 found that 42 per cent of children were chronically malnourished. In rebel held areas, malnutrition among children under five has reached 41 per cent33.

Health Centre, Bihambwe in Masisi, Eastern DRC
There is no hospital in the vicinity, so the community started building a clinic with the help of missionaries and later from Save the Children. It covers 6,547 people. There is one nurse. The health centre is small and dark, consisting of three small dark rooms. In the treatment room there is very limited equipment: scissors, a bowl and some disinfectant. The fridge for vaccinations is broken, so the nurse travels to another town to get them. The journey wastes a lot of his time and exposure to the heat ruins the vaccine’s effectiveness. There is one bed in the clinic. On the day of the visit a woman occupies the bed. She has a breach birth. “They can’t operate on her here. Someone has been sent to find her family. Unless she goes to hospital today she will probably die. We can’t send her to hospital on her own because she needs someone to look after her and feed her. The hospital has no food to feed patients, so they must bring their own.”

At least 37 per cent of the population, over 18 million people, have no access to any form of healthcare34. Many hospitals lack medical equipment, sanitation and water. In rebel-held areas medical facilities have been looted or damaged and have little or no essential equipment. Malnutrition rates in Eastern Congo have reached a staggering 41%36. The biggest killer in DRC is Malaria and basic protection from this disease is desperately needed. The lack of healthcare and poor living conditions have resulted in the return of previously eradicated diseases (bubonic plague, whooping cough), and epidemics (cholera, measles, meningitis).

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3.5.2c HIV/AIDS
The greatest long-term health problem is HIV/AIDS. Statistics in DRC are notoriously unreliable, but the Congolese Ministry of Health estimates a rate of around 10 per cent in Western Congo. Rates in the East are thought to be higher. The presence of troops from countries known to have a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection such as Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Angola will have a detrimental effect on women and their families throughout DRC.

The increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS amongst the Congolese population is a time bomb. As observed in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, it is likely to have a profound effect on the country’s future. Given that the 15-49 year old age group is the most vulnerable to infection, the productivity of the workforce will be severely affected and expenditure on healthcare will place an even greater strain on family incomes. Children will be born with the virus as others are left as orphans.

3.5.2d Grassroots peacebuilding
Community-based peace initiatives are vital in solving conflict, and must work in tandem with external peace processes. People want peace, but the challenge for politicians and civil society representatives is to build a feeling of ownership amongst the population. People must feel part of the process, and believe that leaders are negotiating on their behalf.

Efforts should be made to support projects promoting reconciliation and justice in DRC. As in Rwanda and Burundi, projects to build peace at the community level deserve more funding. There have been massive human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict, which have reinforced the corruption and sense of impunity inherited from the Mobutu era. At a street-children project in Kinshasa we were told “every child here has their money stolen by a soldier at some point.”

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REGIONAL APPROACH
1. We recommend that, in line with the proactive approach Britain has already taken in the Great Lakes, the UK government produces a Regional Strategy paper, similar to current national strategy papers; this should be a collaborative initiative between the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in consultation with interested parties.

PEACE PROCESS
The international community must demonstrate greater commitment to resolving key problems in the peace process; specifically:

2. We urge the UK Government to raise at the UN the contradiction between the Lusaka Agreement (which stipulates disarmament) and MONUC’s mission of separating the warring groups and supervising voluntary disarmament; and to identify the increased capacity MONUC will require to carry out its role specified in the Lusaka Agreement.

3. We recommend that MONUC is expanded. Disarmament of armed groups must be accelerated. The provisions for disarmament laid out in the Lusaka Agreement will only be feasible if an expansion in personnel and resources is made available to MONUC.

4. We commend the UK Government on its ‘Quick Start’ demobilisation programme, and urge for its expansion.

5. We urge the UN to facilitate a study of how many Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces currently operate on the ground. A credible study must determine the scale of the threat posed by the Interahamwe.

6. We urge the UK government to ensure, with its European partners, that the EU embargo on arms imports into the region by all parties in the DRC conflict is made legally binding; and that a similar embargo is imposed by the UN.

INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE
7. Greater support should be given to the office of the ICD facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire. The UK government currently provides financial support (£43,000 in 2001) and a technical expert to the facilitator. We urge for the government to double this.

EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
8. An even-handed approach must be taken with all parties involved in the illegal exploitation of resources. Appropriate pressure must be brought to bear to end the suffering that has escalated around mineral-rich areas.

9. We urge the UK government to respond publicly to the findings of the UN’s report of the External Panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/2001/357), and the addendum report, when it is published.

10. The All Party Group welcomes the UN initiative to introduce certification schemes detailing the country of origin for diamonds. We recommend similar certification schemes, where appropriate, to address the exploitation of other precious resources.

AID
11. The UK government and the EU should substantially increase humanitarian assistance to the DRC through the UN and NGOs. Assistance must be extended in the areas of health, nutrition and education, that have been least addressed by the partial response to the OCHA appeal to date.

12. The APG welcomes the recent initiative of DFID to support peace promotion efforts in eastern DRC. We urge DFID to expand the Africa Conflict Fund to assist peace-building projects across the country.

13. We recommend that British and European bilateral aid policy demonstrates balance and transparency. Aid should be linked to the cessation of illegal exploitation of natural resources and implementation of the Lusaka Accords.
The Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention

APPENDIX 1
ITINERARY 1ST AUGUST - 7TH AUGUST 2001

2nd August
Arrive Kinshasa @10:00
13:30 Briefing on DRC and security issues
15:00 Meeting with Foreign Minister, She Okitundu
16:30 Meeting with President Joseph Kabila
19:00 Dinner with Michel Kassa, Head of OCHA

3rd August
AM Project visits
* Public health and education project (Oxfam)
* Market Gardening Project (Save the Children)
* Street children, orphans and widows (Christian Aid)
14:00 Meeting with Civil Society representatives.
15:45 Meeting with opposition politicians
20:00 Dinner at the British Embassy

4th August
AM Fly to Goma, Eastern DRC, with WFP
14:00 Briefing on Eastern DRC and security issues
16:00 Meet with RCG President Onusumba
17:00 Meet with Civil Society and local peace NGOs
19:00 Reception with international humanitarian actors

5th August
Day visit to see reality in a war touched area
School – Kibabi, Masisi
Health centre – Bihambwe, Masisi
Community network – Matanda, Masisi
CAJED transit centre – Goma

6th August
AM
Meeting with local researchers
Discussion of issues on Ugandan held territory of Ituri
11:30 Fly to Nairobi, Kenya, with Save the Children
19:30 Press briefing
23:40 Depart Nairobi

APPENDIX 2
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS: 1870 - 2001

1870s
Belgian King Leopold II sets up a private venture to colonise Congo.
1874-77
British explorer Henry Stanley navigates Congo river to the Atlantic Ocean.
1879-87
Leopold commissions Stanley to establish the King's authority in the Congo basin.
1885
Leopold announces the establishment of the Congo Free State, headed by himself.
1885-1910
Up to ten million Congolese are estimated to have died as a result of King Leopold's genocidal regime.
1891-92
Belgians conquer Katanga.
1892-94
Control of Eastern Congo wrested from East African Arab and Swahili speaking traders.
1908
Belgian State annexes Congo in the wake of Leopold's debts to the state and growing condemnation of widespread human rights abuses.
1955
Belgian Professor Antoin van Bilsen publishes a "30 year plan" granting the Congo increased self-government.
1959
Belgium begins to lose control following serious nationalist riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa.)
1960 June
Congo gains independence. Patrice Lumumba is elected Prime Minister. Joseph Kasavubu is President.
1960 July
Following a mutiny by the Congolese army and the declaration of independence by Katanga province (lead by Moise Tshombe), the UN Security Council votes to send in troops. This is the first time in the UN’s history that peacekeepers are dispatched.
1960 Sept
Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba as Prime Minister.
1961 Feb
Lumumba murdered, reportedly with US and Belgian complicity.
1961 Aug
Congo troops begin disarming Katangese soldiers.
1963
Tshombe agrees to end Katanga’s secession.
1964
President Kasavubu appoints Tshombe as Prime Minister.
1965
Kasavubu and Tshombe ousted in a coup led by Joseph Mobutu.
1971
Joseph Mobutu renames the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko.
1973-74
Mobutu nationalises foreign firms and expels Europeans.
1977
Mobutu invites foreign investors back. French, Belgian and Moroccan troops help repulse attack on Katanga by Angolan based rebels.
1989
Zaire defaults on loans from Belgium; aid programmes are cancelled and the economy deteriorates.
1990
Mobutu agrees to end the ban on multiparty politics and appoints transitional government, but retains substantial powers.
1991
Following riots in Kinshasa by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu agrees to coalition government with opposition leaders, but retains control of the security apparatus and key ministries.
1993
Rival pro and anti-Mobutu political parties created.
1994
Mobutu agrees to appointment of Kengo Wa Dondo, an advocate for austerity and free market reforms, as prime minister.
1994
After genocide in Rwanda, Rwandan refugees and Interahamwe arrive in Eastern DRC. The UN sets up refugee camps to cope with the influx.
1996-7
Tutsi rebels capture much of eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad for medical treatment.
1997 May
Tutsi and other anti-Mobutu rebels, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, capture Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo; Laurent Kabila becomes president.
1998 Aug
Rebel forces, backed by Ugandan and Rwandan troops, advance towards the capital, Kinshasa; intervention of troops from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola turns the tide and the rebels are pushed back.

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1998 Sept
Kinshasa comes close to running out of food, while rebels face defeat in the west and thousands of rebels who narrowly failed to reach Kinshasa are captured. Despite this the rebels in the east continue fighting.

1998 Oct
Rebels capture the government stronghold of Kindu in the east as more peacetalks break down, this time in the Zambian capital, Lusaka.

1999 Feb
 Civilians flee fighting following major rebel offensives in North and Southeast.

1999 July
 Fighting breaks out in Kisangani between former allies, Rwanda and Uganda.

1999 Aug
 All rebel groups sign a peace agreement in the Zambian capital, Lusaka.

1999 Oct
 Amid allegations of cease-fire violations, rebels reject President Laurent Kabila’s invitation to take part in a national dialogue on reconciliation.

2000 Feb
 Ethnic fighting erupts between communities in the rebel held east. The UN Security Council authorises a 5,500 strong UN force to monitor the cease-fire.

2000 Aug
 Leaders of the countries involved in the Congolese civil war - Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe - as well as President Kabila - assess implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.

2001-16 Jan
President Laurent Kabila is shot dead by one of his bodyguards.

2001-31 Jan
Joseph Kabila sworn in as president.

2001-1 Feb
Kabila meets Rwandan President Paul Kagame - a key backer of the rebels in DRC - in Washington.

2001-3 Feb
Kabila urges all warring sides in DRC to hold roundtable peace talks with him. Addressing a meeting of the UN Security Council, he called for a precise timetable for the deployment of troops in DRC and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

2001-28 Feb
Ugandan and Rwandan troops begin pulling troops back from the DRC frontline.

2001 3 Apr
Zimbabwean troops begin withdrawing from DRC.

2001 20 Apr
UN troops deployed in the rebel held town of Kisangani.

2001 May
President Kabila lifts ban on all parties that were in operation under former president Mobutu Sese Seko.

(1999)
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## APPENDIX 5
### ACRONYMS AND NAMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALIR</td>
<td>Armee de Liberation du Rwanda, a Hutu rebel group composed of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and new recruits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPG</td>
<td>All Party Parliamentary Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>Ethnic Tutsis who have lived in South Kivu since the 1900's. Their rights to Congolese citizenship are questioned by many, and their communities are under assault from rival ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba, Jean Pierre</td>
<td>Leader of the Equateur-based MLC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Re-integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-FAR</td>
<td>Former Government of Rwanda Army (up to 1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armees Congolaises or Congolese armed forces. The military force of the Kinshasa government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>A Burundian Hutu rebel group lead by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLC</td>
<td>Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie - Mouvement de liberation du Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hema</td>
<td>Eastern DRC-based ethnic group with powerful land and business interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interahamwe</td>
<td>Extremist Hutu militia group that committed the bulk of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. Now known as the ALIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network (UN).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Military Commission. A body composed of two officers picked from each of Lusaka’s signatory armies, appointed to plan and implement the cease-fire and force’s disengagement with the help of the UN and OAU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabila, Joseph</td>
<td>DRC President and former top commander in the FAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabila, Laurent</td>
<td>Former President of the DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lendu</td>
<td>Eastern Congo ethnic group that has been embroiled in bloodletting against the Hema.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka Agreement</td>
<td>Cease-fire agreement signed by the DRC war combatants – five foreign states, Congo’s government and rebels – in July and August 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayi Mayi</td>
<td>Traditional militias found in Eastern DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisire, Ketumile</td>
<td>Former president of Botswana and OAU appointed Inter-Congolese Dialogue Neutral Facilitator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo, Jean Pierre Bemba’s Equateur-based guerrilla group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UN).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okitundu, Leonard</td>
<td>DRC Foreign Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Goma</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la democratie or Congoolese Rally for Democracy, Goma wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-ML</td>
<td>Faction of RCD that followed Wamba dia Wamba when he split from the Goma-based RCD in March 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army. Current Rwandan Government, lead by President Paul Kagame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme.</td>
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</table>
ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND GENOCIDE PREVENTION

Chair: Oona King MP
Vice-Chair: Dr Jenny Tonge MP

PURPOSE OF THE GROUP
- To raise awareness about the ongoing crisis in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region.
- To use parliamentary channels to press for greater British Government assistance to Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region.
- To work with international agencies and NGOs to ensure early warning signals of conflict in the region are brought to the attention of the British Government.
- To consider issues raised by Rwanda and the Great Lakes region: e.g. conflict resolution, reconciliation, displaced persons, children in conflict and child-headed households: capacity building across all sectors; the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) and debt restructuring.
- To consider reform of intervention in conflict and pre-genocide situations and the role of the UN and International Agencies.
- To provide a campaigning forum for NGOs and other interested groups to network more effectively.
- To support the dialogue between NGOs, interested groups and governments.

If you are able to support the work of the APPG, please make a cheque payable to “All Party Parliamentary Group, Great Lakes” and send to Oona King MP, House of Commons, London, SW1A 0AA.

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Email bensberga@parliament.uk or apggreatlakes@yahoo.com
The Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention

REFERENCES

2. For the purposes of this report defined as DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.
3. In Ituri, Eastern DRC, the pro-Hema Governor, installed by the Ugandan army has alienated the Lendu ethnic group and pushed them to arms. In the Kivus attacks on Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan descent (the Banyamulenge) by Hutu rebels fighting the Rwandan and Burundian governments are frequent. This has sent refugees the other way from DRC to Rwanda, although since 1999 over 10,000 Congolese Tutsi refugees have returned to Rwanda.
4. Reassemblement congolais pour la democratie.
5. The RCD split in May 1999. From the outset Rwanda and Uganda disagreed with each other over the best strategy for the war. Rwanda sought to topple Kabila through military means alone. Uganda advocated a more political approach of using political-military education to “empower the Congolese.” The pressure of these differences fractured the rebel RCD movement into the RCD-Goma (Rwanda) and the RCD-MLC (Uganda).
6. Reassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) - Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC).
7. Front pour la liberation du Congo (FLC).
8. The ADF - Allied Democratic Forces.
9. Forces pour defense de la democratie. The FDD is a Hutu rebel group that attacks the Burundian government from bases in Eastern DRC.
12. DfID estimates Interahamwe numbers at 10,000-15,000. International Crisis Group (December 2000), and Amnesty International (June 2001) estimate up to 40,000.
13. Conversation with Kamel Morjane, political advisor to MONUC, 3/8/01.