A CSIS Special Report

The Road Ahead:
Issues for Consideration at the Berlin Donor Conference for Afghanistan

March 31-April 1, 2004

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors of this report would like to especially thank Elisabeth Kvitashvili, Melissa Fernandez, Jason Aplon, Nick Manning, Tom Nicastro, and David Lockwood for their invaluable contributions. We are also deeply grateful for the insight of several individuals: Nancy Lindborg, Jennifer Noyon, Sima Wali, Suraya Sadeed, Mark Schneider, Ginette Baerten, Peter Manikas, Sara Amiryar, Humayun Hamidzada, Abby Stoddard, Kenneth Payumo, and Julie Myers.

Project Directors Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker provided tremendous guidance at all stages of the report, and during its numerous incarnations. We cannot adequately express our gratitude for their unwavering support and good humor over the past several months. We are also indebted to Jeff Kojac, Ben Rowswell, and Doug Henry for their advice, assistance, and encouragement.

The authors are immensely grateful to the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations, the U.S. Department of State, and the NGO community for their assistance along the way.

This report was made possible by the generous support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, and the Better World Fund.

The report authors are entirely responsible for the content and judgments in this report.
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INTRODUCTION

This special report provides an overview of certain areas that will be addressed at the upcoming donor conference for Afghanistan, to be held in Berlin from March 31 – April 1, 2004. This will be the second donor conference for Afghanistan. The first was held in Tokyo from January 21 to 22, 2002, during which donors pledged $4.5 billion over five years, less than half of the $10 billion the Afghan government requested at that meeting.

At Berlin, the Afghan government will request nearly $28 billion over seven years, for reconstruction and development activities, or around $4 billion per year. That request is outlined in a strategy document entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward,” which in turn is based on the April 2002 National Development Framework (NDF). “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” offers a comprehensive description of the progress made to date in meeting the ND F’s goals and lays out the Afghan government’s priorities for the coming decade.

Early indications are that donors will not meet the $28 billion request. Afghanistan is hoping that donors at the conference will commit to cover at least the first three years, or $12 billion, including by pledging $4.5 billion for the coming year.

The National Development Framework was based upon a needs assessment carried out by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the UN Development Program and approved by the Afghan transitional government. It represents the government’s attempt to assert ownership over the reconstruction process. It identifies three main pillars of activity that the Afghan leaders have prioritized as essential to the development of a stable, secure, and democratic society and a self-sustaining economy: expanding human and social capital (Pillar I); rebuilding infrastructure (Pillar II); and developing an indigenous private sector that can fuel growth and create opportunities (Pillar III).

The body of this report addresses issues in the following sectors: health, education, refugees and internally displaced persons, transport, communications, governance and participation, and security. The report includes the following appendices: Appendix A, a note on elections; Appendix B, an analysis of fulfillment of the Bonn Agreement; Appendix C, funding charts; and Appendix D, a list of Afghanistan’s interim government ministers.

1 The research that fed into development of this report included internet research, discussions with experts on Afghanistan, humanitarian aid workers, and UN and U.S. government personnel; our research was not informed by a field visit.
2 It should be noted that there was a meeting in Dubai, UAE on September 21, 2003, at which some additional amounts were confirmed or newly announced. See Energy, Mining, and Telecommunication Consultative Group, “MINUTES 18 October 2003,” <http://www.afghanistangov.org/resources/aaca/cg+/pdf/energy_mining_cg/EMT%20CG-18Oct-minutes.doc> (accessed March 31, 2004).
PILLAR I OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK: EXPANDING SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL

The Afghan government has identified expanding social and human capital as the first pillar of the NDF with the goal of facilitating not only basic survival, but of enabling the Afghan people to become productive and contributing members of society. The Afghan government is requesting $6.9 billion in donor support for this pillar, which covers five priority programs: health, education, returnee reintegration, livelihoods, and culture, media and sport. This report will examine the first three.

HEALTH

Status Report

Two years after the start of massive international humanitarian relief efforts in December 2001, the majority of the Afghan population still lacks reliable access to health care. Children and women suffer most acutely from this deficiency.

- Childbirth is particularly risky in Afghanistan, with approximately 165 infants and 16 women dying for every 1,000 births.6
- Afghanistan’s infant mortality rate is the highest in Asia and one of the highest in the world, and the maternal mortality rate is the second highest in the world.
- Poor pre-and post-natal care means that children who do survive infancy encounter serious health problems later in life.
  - 90 percent of women do not have access to prenatal care.7
  - 70 percent of primary care clinics are unable to provide basic maternal and infant services.8
- One-quarter of Afghan children die before the age of five.
- Forty percent of Afghanistan’s children die from preventable causes such as diarrhea, often caused by lack of access to sanitation and clean drinking water.
- Chronic malnutrition is estimated to afflict between 45 and 59 percent of children.

The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has created an overall framework for the country’s health sector. Its National Health and Nutrition Program lays out the objective of “reducing the high levels of mortality and morbidity, especially among women and children, through the development of equitable, effective and efficient health services that address priority health and nutrition problems, and by developing the capacity to deliver necessary services.”9

Problems

Lack of Administrative Capacity

The MoPH has budget authority over the health sector, and outsources the majority of the public health functions to international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At present, NGOs deliver 80 percent of all health care services in the country. The lack of administrative capacity in the MoPH has created bottlenecks in Kabul, hampering service delivery. The MoPH has also been unable to coordinate the activities of the numerous groups operating in the health care sector, meaning the multitude of organizations providing health care are not necessarily coordinating with each other or meeting the Afghan government’s priorities.

Lack of Trained Afghan Capacity

The health care sector suffered severely from “brain drain” following several decades of war. Convincing doctors to return is difficult because of security problems and low wages. Doctors earn between $4-6 a month in Afghanistan, much less than in neighboring or Western countries. Although the MoPH aims to replace the large numbers of international health care workers with trained Afghans by 2010, it will continue to be dependent on NGOs to provide most health services throughout the country for years to come.

Lack of Access to Health Care

Most Afghans are dependent on basic health centers (BHCs) to receive health care. Most BHCs are located within 40 minutes’ walking distance of a primary road. Although a significant percentage of the Afghan population lives within 50 kilometers of a primary road, that distance still takes an inordinate amount of time to traverse. As a result, these health centers remain inaccessible to a large majority of the people. Health care centers also tend to be concentrated in urban areas, and there are simply not enough of them. Afghanistan currently has just over 800 BHCs in total, but health experts have estimated that it needs almost 6,000, given its population size (approximately 25 million). Moreover, only 34 percent of BHCs have electricity and clean water, and sanitation remains a major concern.

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10 Ibid.
11 Afghanistan Reconstruction Roundtable, Panel discussion at CSIS, October 17, 2003.
15 Save the Afghan Children report.
Barriers to Health Care for Women

Afghanistan’s culture and history have created particular constraints on already-strained efforts to provide for women’s health. Many women are simply unaware that they now have access to health care, after so many years without. Muslim tradition also dictates in favor of women being seen by female doctors and nurses, but the majority of the country’s female health care practitioners left during the Taliban regime. Only 40 percent of all BHCs presently have female staff. Only 28 percent of facilities that provide maternal and newborn care employ a female health worker.17

Challenges Ahead

The Afghan government has offered some means of addressing the present obstacles.

- The MoPH’s Interim Health Strategy calls for focusing all efforts in the sector on national strategic priorities such as basic health services for Afghans living in rural communities. The two-year program (2002-2004) is meant to ensure that donors are not tempted to fund high profile tertiary care hospitals, which have less of an impact on vulnerable populations.19
- The MoPH’s Health and Nutrition Sector Development Program lays out longer-term goals in service provision.20 The Afghan government aims to provide (through subcontractors) maternal and infant health care, child health and immunization, nutrition, and vaccinations for communicable diseases for the entire population in the next three to seven years. Services will be delivered through health posts, basic health centers, comprehensive health centers, and district hospitals.

The government’s program falls short in several areas.

First, the government and donors must prioritize paying reasonably competitive salaries for health care workers and addressing the issue of “brain drain” in the health care profession. Government documents supporting the NDF do not specifically address the “brain drain” issue as pertains to the health sector. The government envisions that community health workers, many of whom will be working in rural areas, will either work for free or be remunerated through community financing,21 a system that is not likely to be sustainable. Efforts since December 2001 to entice health care workers to return, such as offering rent-free accommodations, have shown only modest success.22 A more concerted effort will be needed to help fill the dearth of qualified Afghan health care providers.

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19 Ibid. As an example, Kuwaiti charities built a state-of-the-art, well-stocked hospital in 1999 in the rural Paktika province, but it has never been used, for lack of trained professionals. See Pamela Constable, “Anti-Terror Efforts Put Vise on Afghan Region,” The Washington Post, March 15, 2004, A16.
21 Ibid.
Second, the international community’s commitment to basic health care should be matched with adequate funding. At present, external funding for the government’s budget request for basic health services covers only 40 percent of the population.  

Third, the government and donors should build upon innovative programs that have shown some success thus far.

- UNICEF ran a highly successful immunization campaign in 2002. During that campaign, UNICEF was able to immunize 96 percent of Afghan children against polio and measles. The program’s success was driven in large part by the role played by local mosques in every province, which acted as conduits of information between aid organizations and the people.
- The Afghan Government and the international community should also expand the Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) run by the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent. There are currently eight Afghan Red Crescent EMTs, each of which comprises a doctor, a driver, a pharmacist, and a nurse. Teams work in pairs, each forming an emergency medical unit, and see about 100 patients a day. This appears to be a far more effective system than reliance on BHCs, particularly in the short term. Records of BHCs before 1978 show that the government employed 25,000 people to run the system, but BHCs typically saw no more than 10 to 20 people per day.

Fourth, the government must begin to address the cultural and traditional barriers to improving women’s access to health care. These issues will take significantly longer to address. The government has taken some preliminary steps to increase the number of female health professionals and rural health centers. Measures must also be taken to increase awareness among women that health services are available to them, as those who are able to receive health care do not know to access it.

**EDUCATION**

**Status Report**

The Afghan government’s policy is to extend education to all children, regardless of their ethnicity, gender, geographic location, or educational ideology. The target is to bring two million more children into the education system within the next two years. In the longer-term, the Ministry of Education...
Education aims “to provide opportunities for secondary and higher education of international standard to build human resources which are able to meet private-sector driven national development, social and reconstruction objectives.”

To achieve such lofty goals, huge strides must be made in education levels and school enrollment.

- Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate in Asia, an estimated 36 percent (51 percent male, 21 percent female).\(^{29}\) UNICEF estimates that the current female literacy rate is actually closer to 10 percent.\(^{30}\)
- The current girls’ enrollment as a percentage of total children enrolled in primary school is roughly 40 percent, as compared to 3 percent in 1999 under Taliban rule, and 35 percent in 1995, before the Taliban takeover.\(^{31}\) Yet the overall percentage of girls attending primary school is misleading; in the more religiously conservative southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, girls’ enrollment is far lower than elsewhere in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Girls’ Enrollment (2003)</th>
<th>Primary School</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- According to UNICEF, the education sector is functioning in all of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces and 329 districts.\(^{32}\)
  - In 2002, the Afghan government and its partners in the education sector expected 1.7 million students to enroll. Instead, more than three million students were enrolled in grades 1-12 that year.
  - In March 2003, enrollment rose to four million. Of those, 90 percent are in primary school, and about 60 percent are in grades one and two alone.\(^{33}\)
- Enrollment and interest in higher education has increased since the fall of the Taliban, during which time curriculum was concentrated on Islamic Studies.\(^{34}\)
  - In 2003, 31,000 students enrolled in Afghanistan’s 17 higher education institutions, up from 4,000 in 2001. Nearly 70 percent of the students are in the first two years of study.\(^{35}\)
  - The Ministry of Higher Education aims to increase the number of higher education students to 100,000 by 2015. With a 20-year-old curriculum and just over half of

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\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{33}\) Education Technical Annex. This demographic bubble is due to the interruption in schooling during the Taliban, and will migrate through the school system as children matriculate.
\(^{35}\) Education Technical Annex.
the faculty having only a Bachelor’s degree, the quality of the country’s university system is questionable.36

Problems

Lack of infrastructure

Afghanistan’s educational infrastructure is insufficient to handle the huge influx of new students. An estimated 1.5 million Afghan children are effectively denied access to education due to the lack of schools or teachers.37 Over 50 percent of Afghanistan’s schools do not have access to water,38 and only one-fourth have sanitation facilities, a crucial requirement in convincing adolescent girls to attend school. Students in rural areas suffer most from the lack of infrastructure, as most education services are concentrated in urban centers. Enrollment in rural areas stands at 47 percent of the eligible population, while 80 percent of eligible students in urban areas are enrolled.39

Lack of qualified teachers

The lack of teachers is another pressing problem, especially as the demographic bubble of students currently in grades one and two matriculates through the system. During the Taliban era, women—who comprised 70 percent of the teacher corps—were forbidden from teaching. As a result, thousands fled the country, and have been slow to return.40 The current teacher-pupil ratio varies widely by region; in rural and urban areas, the ratio varies from one teacher to 20 and 100 students, respectively. The Afghan government aims to achieve a target ratio of 1:40 at the primary level and 1:30 at the secondary level.41

Barriers to girls’ and women’s education

Education for girls and women presents a host of cultural problems that must be addressed in order to bring women back into productive society. Parents typically do not allow their daughters to travel long distances to attend school, and there are fewer education facilities for girls than for boys. Historically, the Afghan education system has been gender-segregated, and it is unlikely that coeducation will be considered acceptable in the foreseeable future. In some provinces of the religiously conservative south and southeast, girls’ net enrollment rate has been estimated to be an alarming one percent.42 Security concerns, cultural and traditional opposition to girls’ schooling, and economic realities all impact parents’ willingness to send girls to school.

Ibid.
38 It should be noted that one of the most pressing needs in the education sector is a frequent and comprehensive assessment of resources. As numbers fluctuate, it is hard to determine with any certainty the number of schools at any time; this estimate was derived from the total of number of schools constructed in 2003, number of schools to be newly built (“already exist but no structure”), number of schools which require major repairs, and number of schools which require minor repairs, as defined by the Technical Annex on Education prepared for the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, January 2004. See Education Technical Annex.
39 Ibid.
40 Training teachers has also been difficult, as only two of 14 teacher-training colleges that existed before the Taliban are currently operational. See Asian Development Bank report.
41 Education Technical Annex.
42 Ibid. These provinces are Badghes and Zabul.
Economic realities

The abysmal Afghan economy affects the education sector in at least two ways. First, a large sector of the population requires vocational training in order to rejoin the workforce. Before the rise of the Taliban, Afghanistan had a technical and vocational educational system, but presently there are no government ministries or NGOs responsible for training vocational education teachers.43

Second, economic considerations have deterred parents from sending children to school, preferring instead to put them to work to supplement household income. This will be an important factor to consider as the government undertakes to enroll millions more children in the coming years.

Challenges Ahead

In recognition of the need to capitalize on the enthusiasm for education in this post-Taliban phase, the Afghan government has developed creative short-term solutions to accommodate all the new students in the primary and secondary levels.

- Tents and rented buildings are being used in lieu of proper schoolhouses.
- Classes are being held in shifts, and contract teachers who do not satisfy the usual qualifications are being used as an interim measure.44
- The international community has been funding an effort for more sustainable infrastructure, by constructing new schools.45
- The government has requested $41 million for the upcoming year, to fund 17 projects to rehabilitate Ministry buildings and other education centers for 2004-2005. (It is worth noting that in the 2003 budget year, the government requested $104 million from international donors for this need, but received only $2.1 million.)

Still, the government’s programs fall short in several areas.

First, the Afghan government must prioritize increasing the number of teachers. Thus far, the government has called for a strategy of a fiscally disciplined education budget including increased, competitive, but affordable salaries for teachers.46 The national development budget includes requests for the rehabilitation of teacher training colleges and the creation of new colleges. It requests $3.3 million for teacher development.47 Building and rehabilitating teacher training schools is an important element of improving education. As “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” notes, however, investment in infrastructure “cannot outrun capacity,” and the number of teachers already lags behind the number of schools. Without economic incentives, teachers will not be convinced to return to Afghanistan, become teachers, and remain in the education sector.

Second, the government and international donors should build on successful community-based education models. One of the most successful examples of non-traditional education coping mechanisms is informal classes held in villagers’ homes. Studies have shown that students in these informal classes perform as well

43 Asian Development Bank report.
44 Education Technical Annex.
45 National Development Budget.
47 National Development Budget.
as students in formal classes.\textsuperscript{49} In the strategy document to be presented at the Berlin donor conference, the Government emphasizes strengthening the role of schools and communities in education. It notes that the Government plans to offer financial support for local coping mechanisms, which have sustained the education system in communities through decades of war and repression.\textsuperscript{50} However, the national development budget includes a request for only $1.06 million for community organized primary education. A comparable request in the last budget year went unfunded.\textsuperscript{51}

Third, the government and international donors must prioritize education for women and girls. The Government of Afghanistan identifies women’s education as a priority, and its budget includes funding requests for girls’ literacy programs, accelerated learning for girls, and media campaigns to promote education and literacy of Afghan women and girls. For the 2003 budget year, the Government requested $6.15 million for these activities, but only $1.1 million was committed.\textsuperscript{52} Several NGOs and international organizations are working independently on the promotion of women’s education. Creating inviting and culturally accessible learning environments for women must be addressed separately from other education considerations, and will require separate funding streams, but up until now, the Afghan government has not adequately pursued the funding that will be necessary to reestablish women’s role in Afghan society.

Fourth, the government must increase vocational training opportunities. The Afghan Government should prioritize absorbing those parts of the population that will require vocational training, including demobilized youth, ex-combatants and returnees, in order to reintegrate them into civil society. It is important that these groups do not become spoilers in the reconstruction process, frustrated at the lack of opportunity. The Government is requesting $6.47 million for 2004 in support of four vocational training projects. It is also hoping to create a market-driven vocational training system. With the rate of growth needed and desired in the Afghan market, however, the current training programs may be too slow.

The government should accelerate its plans for short-term apprenticeships with the private sector. It is planning to develop programs aimed at short-term training for reconstruction projects in order to build capacity, foster a sense of local ownership, and potentially empower disenfranchised populations.\textsuperscript{53} There have been several successful small-scale training programs involving international companies, universities and specialized organizations. Such programs facilitate economic growth by creating a skilled workforce and fostering community development; they can also improve the status of women.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{49} Asian Development Bank report.
\textsuperscript{50} Education Technical Annex.
\textsuperscript{51} National Development Budget.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Education Technical Annex.
\textsuperscript{54} To encourage the training of women, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is constructing Women’s Development Centers in 14 provinces selected by the Minister of Women’s Affairs with funding from USAID. These centers will provide classroom space, libraries, and day care centers, and will also serve as provincial offices of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Informational meetings as well as vocational training and educational courses will be provided, allowing women with little to no formal education or training the ability to acquire new skills. Correspondence with Ginette Baerten, Gender Program Officer, IOM Kabul, January 10, 2004.


**REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)**

**Status Report**

Afghans comprise the second largest number of refugees and IDPs in the world; it is estimated that one of every three Afghans was a refugee or an IDP at one time. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has facilitated the return of 2.4 million Afghans, mostly from Pakistan and Iran. 600,000 IDPs have also returned to their areas of origin. Despite this progress, approximately 3.4 million Afghan refugees and 200,000 IDPs have yet to return. The dramatic surge in population has the potential to catalyze health, food and security crises.

**Problems**

Security

Many returnees are refusing to return to their native areas, citing insecurity, the lack of land to which to return, and potential ethnic conflict or tension. Forty-five percent of returning refugees went to central Afghanistan; 22 percent went to northern Afghanistan; and 21 percent went to the eastern part of the country. Returns to the southern and southeastern regions of Afghanistan have been lower than all other areas of Afghanistan, reflecting the poor security situation in those areas.

Urban Saturation

Overall, 42 percent of returning refugees have settled in urban areas, where there are more health centers, schools, and job opportunities. 750,000 Afghans have flooded into Kabul in the past 18 months, and Kabul’s population has doubled to 3 million people over the past two years. Urban areas throughout the country have almost reached saturation.

Inadequate Financial Support

Returnees requesting repatriation assistance through UNHCR are registered at Voluntary Repatriation Centers (VRCs) established throughout Pakistan and Iran. Upon registration, the returnee receives a Voluntary Repatriation Form, which is used to secure a transport grant upon arrival in Afghanistan. In addition, children are inoculated, and an aid kit is provided to families. According to Amnesty International, the cash grant is not sufficient to cover returnees’ travel, and as a result, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for refugees to return to their home areas. UNHCR reports that the VRCs are functioning smoothly and efficiently, but that funding is lacking for long-term economic aid to help returnees enhance their livelihood.

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55 The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation’s priorities are: 1) Refugee and IDP repatriation and return; 2) Assistance to the residual IDP population; 3) Initial returnee reintegration; 4) Refugee and IDP protection and social services, and 5) Refugee and IDP capacity.


57 Amnesty International report.
Challenges Ahead

The international community’s efforts to repatriate returnees have been impressive, although funding lags. Of the $164 million requested in 2003 by the Afghan government for refugee and IDP return, donors committed only $77.9 million, and only $55.7 million was disbursed. Most of these funds contributed to protection, transport, and returnee packages for refugees and IDPs, as well as shelter provision and relief and recovery operations. For 2004-2011, the Afghan government is requesting $155 million for refugee return and reintegration. Over the course of the next seven years, the government aims to establish a framework for controlled migration, provide incentives to encourage returnees to settle, continue to provide assistance to returnees, and create a legal framework to resolve property rights issues.

Significant challenges remain.

First, the government and donors should focus on the long-term solution of providing incentives for returnees to settle in rural areas. There has been increased focus on improving urban conditions, but Afghanistan’s cities will not be able to sustain the huge influx of expected refugee returns and IDP movements. Those returning to rural areas have had difficulties finding jobs and farming on land damaged by war, disuse, and drought.  

Second, the government must prioritize land redistribution. The single most pressing issue in refugee repatriation is property ownership. In 2002, 74 percent of returnees said that they did not have farmland to which to return. To benefit from shelter projects, a returnee must own a title to a parcel of land or his community must vouch for his ownership. Returnees seeking land have worked through the traditional dispute-settlement village councils, or shuras. A new Land Disputes Court system has been established to take on this responsibility, but it has had limited success and lacks credibility among the Afghan people. Further, there is a weak land law and no land policy.

Third, the government and donors should strengthen job creation programs for returnees. Forty percent of returnees are of working age (18-60), and another 40 percent will soon reach working age (5-17). The Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) is encouraging job creation through the employment of returnees on infrastructure reconstruction projects. UNHCR is also supervising a “cash for work” program in which returnees are employed in agricultural activities, irrigation projects, and road and bridge rehabilitation, with an eye toward encouraging the training and employment of women. Creating jobs for returnees will be essential to protect against their becoming spoilers.

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59 Amnesty International report.
PILLAR TWO OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK: REBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE

The second pillar of the NDF addresses physical infrastructure and natural resources. The aim of this pillar is to leverage external assistance to build or rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure, and to develop its natural resources in order to lay the foundation for sustainable growth led by the private sector. Fifty-two percent of the total $27.6 billion requested by the government in its 2004-2011 national development budget is for development in this sector. As envisioned by the Afghan government, the activities and programs that fall under this pillar are: transport and communications, water and sanitation, energy, urban management, and natural resource management. The government has prioritized funding for the transport and communications sectors—$7.5 billion out of the total pillar II request of $14.4 billion—and those are the two issues covered here. Seventy-nine percent of the funds requested for the transport sector are for road rehabilitation.

Ethnic conflicts, geographic terrain, factionalism, and different languages all contribute to fragmentation within Afghan society. Connectivity, both internally and externally, is a central theme in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. Indeed, the natural strategic potential of Afghanistan lies in its position as a trans-Asian link. As Afghanistan’s vice-president, Hedayat Amin Arsala, has said, “My dream is for Afghanistan to rediscover its role as a bridge.”

TRANSPORTATION

The NDF focuses on restoring and creating basic transport infrastructure to allow better operation of necessary public and private transport services in all areas of the country. The government hopes that international linkages will facilitate economic development by improving access to markets, potentially impacting Afghan poverty levels. The program focuses on specific interventions in primary and secondary roads, civil aviation infrastructure, and essential public transport.

Exploiting its geographic location as a trans-Asian trade and transportation route would establish Afghanistan as a viable international player, contributing to its prosperity and to regional political and economic development. Afghanistan will not realize its economic potential until goods can be more easily and reliably transported through the country. Transportation systems will also enhance the ability of customs officials to monitor and tax goods moving through the country.

Physically connecting the disparate ethnic groups in Afghanistan, separated by language, geography and varying local governance structures will decrease levels of fear and tension between the groups and will be essential to the central government’s efforts to assert its role. Ministers in Kabul rarely leave the city limits, as travel within the country is unsafe and time-consuming. The recent assassination in Herat of the minister of civil aviation and tourism is the second assassination of a minister of civil aviation and tourism, and the third assassination of a minister in two years. (It followed a failed assassination attempt on Ismail Khan, Herat province’s governor and Sadiq’s father.)

The Afghan government identified roads as its highest priority for large donor infrastructure investment, and despite initial setbacks, much progress has been reported. The remnants of Soviet and American-built roads from previous eras have deteriorated after decades of neglect; most are barely passable at best. The United States, Japan, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and the European Union are all engaged in road-building activities. (See following page for a map of road projects in Afghanistan. Donors are implementing the strategy laid out by the Afghan government to create a countrywide network of highways, consisting of:

- A ring highway linking major urban centers;
- Highways from the ring roads to major border points;
- A cross-country highway, linking Kabul to Herat; and
- Secondary and tertiary roads providing farm-to-market access.

Despite the emphasis on roads running to Kabul, the highway system benefits Afghans throughout the country.

- Sixty-six percent of the population lives within 50 kilometers of the ring highway.
- One-third of Afghans live within 50 kilometers of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, the first completed section of the ring highway.
- Twenty-five years ago, it took 4 hours to travel from Kabul to Kandahar; in 2002, after years of war damage and neglect, it took 14. Since the completion of the first phase of the road project, the journey can once again be completed in just a few hours.
- The Salang Tunnel, a 2.6 kilometer tunnel linking the northern part of the country (often inaccessible during winter) to Kabul was reopened on December 28, 2003. The tunnel’s opening has reduced travel time between the north and south by two days.

The Kabul-Kandahar highway has been the poster project of the U.S. and Afghan governments. It officially opened on December 16, 2003, in a highly publicized ribbon-cutting ceremony with President Karzai. The second phase of the road project—additional layers of asphalt, highway shoulders, and signage and road markings— is due to begin in the spring of 2004.

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65 Source: Afghanistan Information Management Service, Map of Afghanistan Road Reconstruction, June 2003,

66 “Afghans Celebrate Phase I Completion of Kabul to Kandahar Highway,” USAID press release, December 16, 2003,

67 “Afghanistan’s National Programme for Reconstruction,” Government of Afghanistan, December 2002,

68 “Completion of the Salang Tunnel,” U.S. Department of State press statement, December 28, 2003,
The second section of the road, from Kandahar to Herat, is also due to start this spring. Initially built by the Soviets, this section of the road will take longer to rehabilitate because of logistical barriers to reconstruction.

**Problems**

**Security**

Security concerns have caused serious delays and absorbed large percentages of funding for infrastructure projects. The Kabul-Kandahar road project has been fraught with security problems, including kidnappings and murders of Afghan workers and foreign engineers. In fact, the newly built Kabul-Kandahar highway remains one of the least safe places in the country.\(^{69}\)

**High costs**

There has been a consistent underestimation of construction costs for infrastructure projects, largely because such projects have been redesigned after the initial estimates were made. For example, initial pledges for construction of the Kabul-Kandahar road totaled $180 million, but just the preliminary paving of the road ended up costing $270 million. In many places, there is only one layer of asphalt, not enough to withstand heavy use or more than one harsh winter. Initial estimates were made by people outside of the country, and did not accurately reflect local prices.\(^{70}\) Security problems, emergency humanitarian relief, refusal to procure supplies from neighboring countries due to political issues, and premature deadlines for political reasons all contributed to escalated costs.

**Environmental Concerns**

Environmental factors are another challenging component; frequent dust storms make importation of supplies, particularly asphalt, ahead of time all but impossible. The “just in time” model that must be employed inevitably results in delays.

**Challenges Ahead**

Road construction has been the Karzai government’s most effective showing thus far in terms of capitalizing on its close links with the international community. Considering the difficulties discussed above, progress on the construction of roads has been impressive. The important question going forward, though, is whether the Afghans and their international partners will focus on the longer-term sustainability of the roads.

The Afghan government and international donors must prioritize long-term road maintenance. In addition to continuing work on the Kandahar-Herat highway, the United States has recently re-affirmed its commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan’s road system, pledging to construct over 1,300 kilometers of provincial roads in Afghanistan. These roads should benefit over one-third of the Afghan…

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population.\textsuperscript{71} While this is a worthy start, it will be important that donor funds are used not only to construct new roads but also to ensure that those already constructed are adequately paved to withstand weather and time, and undergo routine maintenance.

It is anticipated that once the road construction is complete, the Afghan government should have some increased capacity for road maintenance, which is expected to cost $80 million per year. Assessments suggest that without such maintenance, the roads will suffer major destruction in five to ten years.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{Air Transport

\textbf{Status Report

There are twenty-two airports in Afghanistan, many of which are being serviced once again by Ariana, the national airline.\textsuperscript{73}

- The main international airport is in Kabul. It is poorly located and difficult to navigate into.
- The Kandahar airport also provides international services. It is used mainly by the coalition military forces.
- The airport at Mazar-e-Sharif has asphalt-paved runways that are in poor condition due to bombings.
- The Kunduz airport is relatively inaccessible because an unpaved 10-kilometer road connects the airport to the city center.

\textbf{Problems

Airports are in need of massive repair and are poorly located.

Afghanistan’s air transport sector is barely functional: there are no functioning navigation aids or meteorological facilities, and none of the airports are up to international standards.\textsuperscript{75} At present, the international community provides its own flight safety operations in the areas in which it operates. The main international airport in Kabul is poorly located. Nestled between treacherous mountains, it is very difficult to navigate. There are plans underway to relocate the Kabul airport. Repairing sub-par infrastructure and building a new, international airport will be extremely costly.


\textsuperscript{74} Transport Technical Annex.
The national airline is heavily subsidized.

The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism oversees Ariana Airlines. The Ministry of Finance supports the airline by paying its personnel costs directly. It is not officially a state-owned business, however, and the company itself maintains all of its revenues. The government has also provided benefits to Ariana in the form of not having demanded landing and civil aviation fees for 15 years.

**Challenges Ahead**

The government’s emphasis in this sector is on revitalizing the international airports at Kabul and Kandahar and the regional airports. Thus far, it has committed $37 million for air transport needs, more than 50 percent of which is targeted for the Kabul international airport. The Berlin document requests a further $375 million for airport rehabilitation and development.

The government’s priorities in this sector are worth revisiting, however.

First, the government should shift focus away from rehabilitation of the current Kabul airport. Because of its difficult location, the government is planning to eventually build an entirely new international airport in nearby Logar, and is setting aside some monies for the construction of this airport in ten years’ time. Rather than pouring money into the Kabul airport, whose location presents a difficulty that even renovations cannot overcome, it would be more productive to focus what little funds are available on building the new airport at Logar.

Second, the government should shift funds in this sector toward transport projects that would provide benefit to a greater proportion of the population, or more economic benefit to the country. Few Afghans—other than a small elite and some of those making the Hajj—can afford air travel. Repairing the damaged airports will not have a big impact on the well-being of the majority of Afghans, although it will permit international aid workers to access otherwise inaccessible parts of the country. Greater focus on building secondary roads and rail transport would provide more benefit to the country’s people and economy.

Third, the government should clarify the relationship between itself and Ariana Airlines to avoid an unnecessary drain on its stretched budgets. Eventually, the airline itself has to create a strategic business plan, much like other industries in the transportation sector in Afghanistan.

**Rails**

**Status Report**

Afghanistan has only a few miles of rails. In the mid-1970s, a feasibility study was conducted assessing the advantages of countrywide railways, but nothing further was done.

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76 Berkeley Group report.
77 Although weather is a major hindrance to travel in Afghanistan, security remains the main reason that much of the country is inaccessible. Improved security would do much more to open up the country than repairing airports.
The Government has offered no firm commitment to developing rail infrastructure, despite acknowledging its potential benefits. Even just the few functioning miles of rails in Afghanistan have far greater capacity to transport food and humanitarian supplies than roads. In 2002, for instance, 86,000 tons of cargo were imported by rail despite the mere five kilometers of track to Turkmenistan and the single rail access over a bridge to Uzbekistan. Even with this very limited system, a large proportion of freight between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia is shipped by rail. Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran have existing rail systems that could be connected to a trans-Afghanistan railway. Several countries have expressed interest in investing in a rail initiative in Afghanistan, including Russia. Additionally, there are hopes that Afghanistan will eventually be linked by rail to Iran, which connects to both Central Asia and Europe. India has agreed to participate in building trans-Afghanistan road and rail links between Uzbekistan’s Termez to Iran’s Chahbahar Port in the Persian Gulf.

In addition to bolstering international trade, an improved rail network would also benefit domestic markets. The World Food Program has concluded that rails in Afghanistan move ten times faster and transport 50 times more cargo than roads.

Challenges Ahead

The Afghan government should place a higher priority, including by shifting funding requests, on expanding the country’s rail network. The government has placed rails low on its list of priorities in the transport sector. It is requesting just $124 million for the development of rails, compared to the nearly $400 million for the aviation sector over a seven-year period. Yet air transport will service a significantly smaller proportion of the Afghan population.

Communications

Status Report

The communications sector has seen some improvement since the fall of the Taliban. Afghanistan still has one of the lowest telephone densities in the world, and its telecommunications system is inadequate to connect a country of an estimated 25 million people. But Afghanistan’s population has widespread access to radio. Its availability and regional focus is one of the primary means for Afghanistan’s largely illiterate population to stay informed.

- There are 1.6 telephones per 1,000 people.
- Afghanistan’s telecommunications network operates about 57,000 telephone lines in five major cities, two-thirds of which are in Kabul. The rest of the country is largely without phone service.

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81 Ibid.
82 Transport Technical Annex.
83 Afghanistan Reconstruction Roundtable, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel discussion, October 17, 2003.
84 “Securing Afghanistan's Future.”
As of December 2003, 135,000 Afghans had subscribed to mobile telephone service.\textsuperscript{96} International organizations, the United Nations, USAID, and various NGOs\textsuperscript{97} have taken advantage of the widespread radio coverage and introduced programming aimed at various sectors of the population, including a UNHCR/BBC Radio Program for Afghan refugees, IDPs and returnees that discusses security and development activities.\textsuperscript{88} Radio instruction, particularly through BBC programs, but also through NGO digital broadcasting, has been widely used by child and adult learners.\textsuperscript{89} Women are running a variety of radio programs, permitting an otherwise marginalized group to address its particular concerns and further integrate into productive society.\textsuperscript{90}

The inadequate telecommunications infrastructure is hampering the central government's ability to function. As it stands, the central government is largely unable to communicate its policies outside of Kabul; it has limited, if any, access to its regional offices, which are intended to implement government policy throughout the country.

**Challenges Ahead**

The government hopes to spur private investment in its communications networks, including through plans to set up a telecommunications regulatory authority and the establishment of a Telecommunications Development Fund to support growth in areas less desirable to private investors.

First, the government should place greater emphasis on non-traditional means of communications, including the enhancement of the country's cellular network. Improved communications infrastructure in Afghanistan would help spur private investment and allow the government to operate more effectively.\textsuperscript{91} But given the country's size and lack of basic telecommunications infrastructure, innovative models should be the priority.

Second, the government and donors should prioritize expanding radio programming as a creative means of accessing and connecting to the Afghan population. Innovative programs already begun in this area have proven and successful at reaching rural and illiterate populations.

\textsuperscript{86} “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”
\textsuperscript{87} The NGOs include Internex, the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS), and the Afghan Women in Media Network.
\textsuperscript{89} Asian Development Bank report.
THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT: SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

The NDF lays out a clear role for the state: to provide security, invest in human capital, provide for the vulnerable, and create an enabling environment for a private sector to flourish. This will require an “effective central government that reestablishes the national unity... on the basis of strong institutions, while building community level participation and effective management at the local level.” Two fundamental issues will enable the government to fulfill this role: governance and participation and security.

GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

There has been progress in establishing a central government. The Bonn agreement, signed on December 5, 2001, laid out a path toward democratic self-government for Afghanistan, including a plan to hold two loya jirgas, which have both been held according to Bonn’s timetable. (A description of some of Bonn’s provisions and their implementation is included in appendix B.) Participants in the first loya jirga, held from June 10-16, 2002, elected Hamid Karzai as interim President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan (ITSA), set out the formation of the transitional government, and agreed upon a schedule for drafting a constitution and holding permanent elections.

At the second loya jirga, held on January 3, 2004, participants approved the new Afghan constitution. The constitution mandates a strong central government with a democratically elected president and two vice-presidents. There will be a two-chamber national assembly and an independent judiciary. Women are recognized as equal citizens and are guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in the lower house of the national assembly. Islam is the state religion, but the constitution guarantees broad religious freedom. It has been called “one of the most enlightened [constitutions] ... in the Islamic world.”

Transforming the constitution into a “living reality” is the next great challenge. National presidential and parliamentary elections, originally scheduled to occur by June of this year, will be delayed until September. Physical insecurity has slowed the pace of voter registration.

Establishing the legal grounding of the central government is an achievement. Afghanistan’s civil administration now includes 29 ministries, 12 independent bodies, and other central government agencies. Yet, these institutions have little reach beyond Kabul. The central government in Kabul makes policy decisions— large and small— for the 32 provincial and 329 district-level

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98 See Appendix A.
administrations, but the practical challenges to communicating and implementing these decisions are
great. (See appendix D for a list of Afghanistan’s interim government officials.)

Despite examples of the central government developing elaborate budget planning, collecting tax
revenue from reluctant local officials, enforcing remittance requirements, or replacing uncooperative
governors, warlords retain control of vast regions of the country.\textsuperscript{99} The split between Kabul and
regional fiefdoms hampers revenue raising schemes, payroll processing, and distribution of funds.

**Challenges Ahead**

Some basic reforms are underway. Legislation has been established that will allow individual
government ministries to restructure. The Public Administration Reform Program provides a
framework to build a sound legal, administrative, and physical environment for efficient and
effective public service provision. Launched in July 2003, the Priority Reform and Restructuring
Program rationalizes the responsibilities of employees and labor market pay scales.

The Berlin document describes a decade-long plan to build a civil service that is better equipped,
skilled, and managed, while more representative of Afghan society. Ambitious targets include a
merit-based and transparent system of civil service appointments that will cover 90 percent of the
entire system by March 2015. Another goal is to increase the percentage of civil service staff based
outside Kabul (currently 63 percent) in order to decentralize and provide services to the provinces
and districts.\textsuperscript{100} For its strategic vision of economic management, public administration, and
technical assistance, the Afghan government is requesting $201 million this year, and $1.1 billion
over a seven-year period.\textsuperscript{101}

Although a good start, there is more to be done.

First, the government must move more quickly to decentralize decision-making and service provision throughout the
country. The highly centralized nature of decision-making is problematic considering the security,
communications, and transportation problems in Afghanistan.

Second, timely and reliable payment of civil servants must become one of the first measures of government competence.
While acknowledged in the government’s strategy document, Kabul must prioritize the payment of
civil servants in Afghanistan’s provinces and districts. Currently, such payment occurs only after a
complex chain of events, including a series of requests from district finance ministries to provincial
finance ministries to provincial governors to the Ministry of Finance in Kabul. Payments are often
delayed due to security, transportation, and communications problems.

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\textsuperscript{100} “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
The NDF emphasizes the need to create a secure environment, to encourage private investment and allow the rule of law to develop. But security has actually deteriorated since the beginning of the reconstruction effort in December 2001, in particular over the summer and fall of 2003.\(^\text{102}\)

The security problems stem from at least three sources: a resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda activity in southeastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan; a huge increase in poppy production and trade; and the dearth of reconstruction progress throughout the country. The continued existence and legitimacy of warlords throughout Afghanistan compounds all three of these security problems.

The UN Security Coordinator has declared more than one-third of the country off-limits to UN workers.\(^\text{103}\) Refugee welcome centers in the most troubled regions of Afghanistan, in the south and east, were closed in late 2003 after the murder of a young UNHCR staff member.\(^\text{104}\) Daily incidents continue: 20 wounded in a bomb explosion in Kandahar; two Indian workers kidnapped while working on the Kabul-Kandahar highway; Afghan census-takers ambushed in Farah, resulting in one death, and the list goes on.\(^\text{105}\) In October 2003, it was estimated that there were fifteen attacks per day on American soldiers.\(^\text{106}\) In August 2003 alone, 90 Afghans were killed in violence attributed to the increase in attacks by Taliban forces.\(^\text{107}\)

Increased narcotics production is also contributing to the worsening security situation. It has been estimated that Afghanistan provides 76 percent of the world’s heroin.\(^\text{108}\) Afghanistan produced 18 times more poppy in 2002 than in the last year of the Taliban rule.\(^\text{109}\) Worriedly, Afghanistan has begun refining the poppy in country, making a large portion of the production apparatus domestic.\(^\text{110}\) In 2002, revenues from the drug trade were estimated to be worth $1.2 billion, equivalent to the total amount of international assistance in that year.\(^\text{111}\)

There is evidence that the Taliban continues to be funded through the drug trade.\(^\text{112}\) As explained by the U.S. government, “The drug trade funds terrorist activities, undermines central government authority, and contributes to the instability that allows extremist elements inimical to the U.S. to

\(^\text{106}\) Sedra, “Afghanistan in Search of Security.”
operate." Yet failed attempts by the British to offer viable alternatives crops to poppy producers only prove how difficult it is to combat this problem.

The international response on the security front includes: 13,800 U.S.-led coalition troops to root out remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces; an estimated 5,000 international troops as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is currently led by Canada; and the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s army and police force. On October 14, 2003, the United Nations Security Council decided to expand ISAF beyond Kabul. On March 11, 2004 a formal NATO plan called for NATO to take responsibility for security in northern and western Afghanistan, soon to expand to the entire country.

Seven Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with 200 military and humanitarian personnel each are currently operational in Afghanistan, and an additional ten will be deployed in 2004, to focus on troubled areas in the southern and southeastern regions of the country. These will represent the main vehicle to bring NATO forces outside Kabul. The PRTs have been criticized as being too slow to assert their security mission, and NGOs have expressed concern that they blur the distinction between enforcing security and delivering community assistance. The former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, welcomed the work of the PRTs but noted that expanding ISAF would be more effective from a security perspective.

Development of the local capacity in the security sector is progressing slowly. Approximately 6,000 of the target 70,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers have been trained by a mix of international partners, including the United States, France, and others. In 2003, the Afghan Police Training facilities trained more than 2,000 policemen; increased funding should result in 20,000 more police officers being trained in 2004; and donors have set a goal of 50,000 police trained by December 2005. With donor assistance, Afghanistan has also developed a nationwide communications system for the police for the first time in its history.

Challenges Ahead

Ultimate success in terms of the goals laid out in the NDF and across all reconstruction activities will depend upon a vastly improved security situation. The Afghan government estimates that it will take three years for indigenous security forces to reach capacity. International forces will have to fill the vacuum, and until now, their numbers have been far too thin. Without substantial international assistance, the Afghan National Security forces may not be able to meet the security needs of the country.

114 CIC report, 15.
119 FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification.
120 Ibid.
support, the Afghan government has predicted that violence will resume, terrorist groups will once again find a safe haven, and the country will descend into a narco-mafia state.\textsuperscript{121}

First, donors must make the necessary long-term commitment to rebuilding an effective Afghan security sector. The Berlin document lays out a short, medium and long-term strategy to create a security sector under the control of the civilian democratic leadership. The Afghan government estimates that over the medium term, from the 2004-2005 budget year until the 2010-2011 budget year, a total of $645 million will be required for police and law enforcement, $1.77 billion for the Afghan National Army (ANA), and $164 million for counter-narcotics operations.\textsuperscript{122}

Second, the international community should urgently move forward with the long overdue commitment to expand forces outside Kabul. Expanding the number of PRTs will not in and of itself address Afghanistan’s security problems.

Third, donors must better coordinate their security-related activities. Different donors are leading the various security-related activities discussed above: the United States has taken the lead on the ANA, Germany on the Afghan National Police, the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics, and Italy on judicial reform. While this design was meant to ensure long-term engagement by a multitude of countries, it has served in practice to create a disjointed and less effective security sector. Donors must synchronize these efforts to ensure consistency of purpose and improve the overall results. The Afghan government is calling for the creation of a Unified National Security Framework, which would provide much-needed national ownership, guidance, and coordination.

Fourth, the international community should use diplomatic and other measures to discourage Afghanistan’s neighbors from harboring spoilers and terrorists. The U.S. government should seek to reaffirm the non-interference commitment made by all of Afghanistan’s neighbors in December 2002, something the Berlin document notes. The signatories to that pledge agreed to not supply arms and military equipment, and to respect the borders of Afghanistan (including the disputed Durand Line frontier with Pakistan).\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{121} “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Council on Foreign Relations report.
CONCLUSION

The sustainability of the National Development Framework is contingent upon long-term donor commitment, in terms of increased resources, greater numbers and coverage of international security forces, sustained diplomatic attention, and civilian reconstruction efforts. The Afghan government and the international community have constructed an admirable plan that captures the near and mid-term needs of the Afghan people.

With NGOs, bilateral donors, international financial institutions, multilateral organizations, and others all offering their input into the reconstruction and development process, it is vital that the Afghan government be at the center of the coordination and delivery process, one important goal of the NDF. The viability and self-sustainability of Afghanistan’s plans for its future will depend upon the government playing that role. But this will only happen if donors sustain and enhance their support for the government’s goals, as laid out in the NDF and the government’s submission for the Berlin donor conference, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”

Reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan thus far do not provide much room for hope. Those efforts have been plagued by woefully inadequate security measures and funding commitments from the international community. Donors must reverse this trend, starting at the upcoming Berlin conference. Without a dramatic increase in international focus and resources, Afghanistan could deteriorate into that which the international community has been working to prevent—a failed state serving as a breeding ground for terrorists and narco-traffic릭ers.
On March 28, 2004, Interim President Hamid Karzai made a statement officially postponing presidential elections until September 2004, such that they may be held around the same time as parliamentary elections. This is several months later than the deadline established by the Bonn Agreement, which dictated that elections were to be held no later than June 2004. As the newly passed Afghan constitution supercedes all other laws and decrees (including the Bonn Agreement), the postponement of elections was legal. As outlined in the constitution, the president of the transitional administration will continue to run Afghanistan until a new president is elected.

The postponement of elections provides a much-needed extended timeframe for election preparations. The difficulties in registering voters (Afghans 18 years of age or older) abound. The security situation remains dire; only 1.6 million out of the potential voting pool of 10.5 million people have been registered, and the budget for registration falls short by $8 million. Diverse ethnic backgrounds, cultures, and inhospitable geography make accessing voters a challenge; for example, in the winter, 1.7 million eligible voters were accessible only by donkey, helicopter, or plane. Further, the security situation is such that one-third of the country is off-limits for UN and other international workers. The government is unable to provide even minimal security for elections, and international security forces in Afghanistan have not yet been mandated to monitor elections. These hurdles, exacerbated by the lack of coordination and cooperation between the various agencies involved in voter registration and the absence of a registration strategy, have led to extreme difficulty in election preparations.

New estimates of costs associated with the September elections have not yet been released, but as parliamentary elections will require a census and the demarcation of electoral districts, figures will likely exceed the June estimates. For a presidential election in June, the registration process was estimated to cost approximately $76 million, and the election itself was expected to cost $130 million.
**APPENDIX B**

**BONN AGREEMENT: CHECKLIST OF SELECTED PROVISIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bonn Agreement Provision</th>
<th>Accomplished</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1.) Establish Interim Authority.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>On December 22, 2001 the internationally recognized government of President Rabbani handed over power to the Interim Afghan Administration, headed by Hamid Karzai, as established in the Bonn Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4.) Emergency Loya Jirga to be convened by end June 2002 and to decide on the Transitional Authority.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Met on time in June 2002. About 1,700 people representing a cross-section of Afghan society met in Kabul to discuss the future of Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4.) The Transitional Authority will govern until a government can be elected by free and fair elections no later than June 2004.</td>
<td>Pending.</td>
<td>Concern as to whether all necessary preparations can be made for free and fair elections by June 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-6.) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened by December 2003.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>The Constitutional Loya Jirga met December 14, 2003. Originally it was scheduled to take place in October, but was changed to December in order to allow for redrafting and an extensive community consultation process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-6.) By August 2002 the Transitional Authority should establish a Constitutional Commission to prepare the Constitution to be proposed at the</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>The Constitutional Drafting Commission was inaugurated on November 3, 2003. Vice-President Ustad Nimatollah Shahroni is its chairman. Other Commission members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Constitutional Loya Jirga. include legal scholars and jurists. Two are women.\textsuperscript{131}

II-2.) The Interim Administration shall establish a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system. Yes. On November 28, 2003 a new Judicial Commission was inaugurated. The Commission includes two women.\textsuperscript{132}

Much time was lost with the previous Judicial Commission, which was dismantled due to the fact that it was considered insufficiently independent.\textsuperscript{133}

III-C-5.) The Interim Administration shall establish an independent Civil Service Commission. Yes. Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission was reconstituted by decree in June 2002. Its first meeting did not take place until April 29, 2003. The head of the Commission is Heyadat Amin Arsala.\textsuperscript{134}

III-C-6.) The Interim Administration shall establish an independent Human Rights Commission. Yes. The Afghanistan Human Rights Commission (AHRC) was established on June 6, 2002. Dr. Sima Samar was appointed director.\textsuperscript{135}

IV-1.) A Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga shall be established by the end of January 2002. Yes.

IV-3.) The Special Independent Commission shall publish and disseminate the rules and procedures for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before the Emergency Loya Jirga convenes. No. The rules of procedure were released only one day before the Emergency Loya Jirga. This delay meant that organizers and activists did not have an opportunity to learn and use the rules. The first few days of the Loya Jirga lacked an agenda and were considered chaotic.\textsuperscript{136}


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>IV-4.</strong></th>
<th>The Special Independent Commission shall adopt and implement procedures for monitoring the process of nomination of individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that the process of indirect election or selection is transparent and fair.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V-1.</strong></td>
<td>Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in Afghanistan shall come under the command of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td>Independent and private security forces continue to operate outside the command of President Karzai’s government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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# Appendix C

## Funding Charts

### Requested External Funding Assistance and Funds Committed for 2002-03 (US$ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-sector</th>
<th>2002-03 Requested</th>
<th>2002-03 Committed</th>
<th>2002-03 Percentage Committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>250.000</td>
<td>70.173</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>172.495</td>
<td>130.779</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>253.600</td>
<td>531.471</td>
<td>210%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy, Mining and Telecommunications</td>
<td>162.360</td>
<td>68.029</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration and Economic Management</td>
<td>96.977</td>
<td>71.681</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>98.410</td>
<td>13.820</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Army</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>240.246</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Actual and Projected Expenditures and Financing for Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>03/ 03-03/ 04</th>
<th>03/ 04-03/ 05</th>
<th>03/ 05-03/ 06</th>
<th>03/ 06-03/ 07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent Expenditures</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital and Development Budget</td>
<td>1,817</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>3,379</td>
<td>3,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>4,666</td>
<td>4,131</td>
<td>4,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Financing in US $ Millions

| Domestic Revenues | 200 | 242 | 341 | 467 |
| External Financing | 2,167 | 4,424 | 3,790 | 3,919 |
| Total Financing | 2,367 | 4,666 | 4,131 | 4,387 |

- The Afghan government itself will only fund approximately eight percent of the total expenditures over the next three years.

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138 National Development Budget. This chart does not include “ordinary” (or recurrent) expenditures.

139 This includes technical assistance.

140 Support for the Afghan National Army is recorded outside the National Development Budget report.

141 Numbers for this chart taken from “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”

142 Recurrent expenditures are wage expenditures and non-salary operations and maintenance.

143 The Capital and Development Budget covers the three pillars of the NDF.
External financing will comprise 94 percent of the total financing in 2004-2005, and will drop to 89% percent in 2006-2007.

The recurrent costs of the government, largely representing wages, will nearly double over the next three years as pay reform is implemented. The reform aims to create a more skilled, motivated, and delivery-focused bureaucracy. It is expected that after 2007 the wage growth will decline.\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{itemize}
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\item The recurrent costs of the government, largely representing wages, will nearly double over the next three years as pay reform is implemented. The reform aims to create a more skilled, motivated, and delivery-focused bureaucracy. It is expected that after 2007 the wage growth will decline.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{itemize}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Sectoral Component of the Development Budget}
\textbf{(USD Millions) (2004-2011)}
\textbf{Total Request: $27.6 Billion}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item Physical Infrastructure and Natural Resources: 14,408
\item Transport and Telecommunications: 7,485
\item Human and Social Protection: 6,922
\item Refugee Return: 155
\item Education: 2,746
\item Health and Nutrition: 1,350
\item Security and Private Investment: 4,117
\item Public Administration: 960
\item Police and Law Enforcement: 645
\item National Army: 1,043
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{144} “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”
### Appendix D

**Afghanistan’s Interim Government**[^45]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Hamid Karzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-president and Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Mohammad Fahim Khan[^46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Mohammad Karim Khalili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Hedayat Amin Arsala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Nimatollah Shahroni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Security Advisor</td>
<td>Rasool Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor on Tribal Issues</td>
<td>Taj Mohammad Wardak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ministries**

- Minister of Agriculture: Sayed Hussain Anwary
- Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs (Ministry of Frontiers): Mohammad Aref Noorzai
- Minister of Air Transport and Tourism: [unfilled][^47]
- Minister of Commerce: Sayed Mustafa Kazemi
- Minister of Communications: Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai
- Minister of Education and Presidential Adviser on National Security: Mohammad Yunus Qanuni
- Minister of Finance: Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
- Minister of Foreign Affairs: Abdullah Abdullah
- Minister of Hajj and Religious Affairs: Mohammad Amin Naseryar
- Minister of Higher Education: Mohammad Sharif Fayez
- Minister of Information and Culture: Sayad Raheen Makhdoom
- Minister of Interior: Ahmad Ali Jalali
- Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources: S. Yosef Nooristani
- Minister of Justice: Abdul Rahim Karimi
- Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: Noor M. Qirqeen
- Minister of Mines and Industries: To be determined
- Minister of Martyrs and Disabled: Abdullah Wardak
- Minister for the Return of Refugees: Innayatullah Nazari
- Minister of Planning: Ramazan Bashardoost
- Minister of Public Health: Dr. Suhaila Seddiqi
- Minister of Public Works: Abdullah Ali
- Minister of Reconstruction: Mohammad Amin Farhang
- Minister of Rural Development: M. Haneef Atmar

[^45]: This list was current as of the date of publication.

[^46]: Formerly the deputy to the late Ahmed Shad Masood, Khan was the military leader of Northern Alliance after Masood was assassinated on Sept. 9, 2003. He operates in a semi-autonomous manner and has factional supporters from Panjsher Valley. The Deputy Minister of Defense is Abdur Rasheed Dostum, who refuses to abandon his power base in the north to come to Kabul to take up his post. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Karzai’s Government Reshuffle: Better Late than Never,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, August 27, 2003, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1682](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1682) (accessed December 2, 2003).

[^47]: The previous minister, Mirwais Sadiq, was killed in factional clashes on March 21, 2004 while traveling in Herat Province.
Minister of Transport                                                  Sayeed M Ali Jawid
Minister of Urban Development                                 M. Yousuf Pashtoon
Minister of Water and Electricity   Mohammad Shaker Kargar
Minister of Women's Affairs                                Habiba Sarabi

**Independent Bodies**
Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA)
Central Statistics Office (including the Afghan Computer Center)
Geodesy and Cartography Office
National Security Agency
Narcotics Eradication Agency
Office of the Attorney General
Science Academy
National Olympics Committee
Repatriates Agency
Supreme Court                                          Fazel Hadi Shinwari, (Chief Justice)

**Oversight Commissions**
Civil Service Commission
Human Rights Commission                                         Sima Samar, (Head of Human Rights Commission)
ABOUT THE PROJECT DIRECTORS

FREDERICK D. BARTON

Frederick Barton currently serves as a Senior Adviser in the International Security Program and Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS. Mr. Barton is also a visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he was previously the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy. Prior to that, as UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva (1999-2001), Mr. Barton worked to protect and find durable solutions for 22 million uprooted people in 130 countries. He was the first director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at the U.S. Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. (1994-1999), where he helped to start political development programs in over 20 war-torn regions, from the Philippines to Rwanda, from Bosnia to Haiti. He was also president of Barton & Gingold in Portland, Maine (1983-1994), providing services in strategic planning, marketing, crisis management, and organizational development to commercial, governmental, and nonprofit clients. Mr. Barton served Secretaries Joseph Califano and Patricia Roberts Harris (HEW and HHS, respectively) as New England Director of Public Affairs in Boston (1978-1981). He has served as chairman of the Maine Democratic Party and on the Democratic National Committee. A graduate of Harvard College (1971), Mr. Barton earned his M.B.A. from Boston University (1982), with an emphasis on public management, and received an honorary doctor of humane letters from Wheaton College of Massachusetts (2001).

BATHSHEBA N. CROCKER

Bathsheba Crocker is a Fellow and Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. From 2002-2003, she was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, working on post-conflict reconstruction issues at CSIS. She has co-authored three CSIS reports on post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and was a member of a CSIS-led reconstruction assessment team that went to Iraq in July 2003 at the request of the U.S. Department of Defense. She also co-authored Winning the Peace in Iraq, which appeared in the Spring 2003 edition of The Washington Quarterly. She has written chapters on post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, Iraq, and Sierra Leone, which will appear in a forthcoming book to be published in the spring of 2004. Ms. Crocker is also a visiting professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Before joining CSIS, Ms. Crocker worked as an attorney-adviser in the Legal Adviser’s Office at the U.S. Department of State, where she focused on foreign assistance, appropriations law, and economic sanctions issues. Prior to that, she served as the Deputy U.S. Special Representative for the Southeast Europe Initiative in Rome, Italy, working on economic reconstruction in the Balkans. She has previously served as the executive assistant to the Deputy National Security Advisor at the White House. She received a B.A. from Stanford University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a Masters in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
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