Strangers in Strange Lands:  
An Assessment of Arab Refugees and IDPs in Non-Arab Host Communities in Iraq and Turkey  

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Demographics</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Findings</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABOUT SREO

SREO is an independent, non-partisan research center based in Gaziantep, Turkey. SREO’s team of researchers includes Syrians, Turks, Europeans, and Americans who have all spent significant time in Syria and the Middle East. Its researchers speak local languages and are dedicated to providing objective analysis of what is transpiring inside of Syria as well as in the host communities of neighboring countries.

SREO provides monitoring and evaluation services along with needs assessments and feasibility studies to organizations involved in the Syrian humanitarian response. Together, the SREO team has more than two decades of research experience from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.

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ABOUT IRIS

The Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) is an independent research center based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Through multidisciplinary research, strategic partnerships, and open dialogue events among experts and influential public leaders, IRIS examines the most complex issues facing the KRI, Iraq and the Middle East.

IRIS is housed at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS), Iraq’s only independent, not-for-profit, American-style institution of higher learning. IRIS’s location offers academics, journalists and institutions access to areas of interest and a safe space in an otherwise unstable region, making it an attractive, unique meeting place.
The Institute's main focus areas include but are not limited to: security, energy, water resource management, regional geopolitics, socio-economics, gender and archeology.

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SREO and IRIS take full responsibility for all omissions and errors.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD Turkish Prime Ministry's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AUIS American University of Iraq, Sulaimani
CSO Civil Society Organization
HH Household
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IQD Iraqi Dinar
IRIS Institute of Regional and International Studies
KRG Kurdish Regional Government
KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq
MSNA Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
NGO Non-governmental Organization
SREO SREO Research
TP Temporary Protection
TRY Turkish Lira
UN United Nations
USD US Dollar
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP World Food Programme
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The conflict in Syria, which is now approaching its fifth year with no end in sight, represents one of the worst refugee crises in modern history. At the time of conducting this research, more than four million refugees had fled from Syria to neighboring countries. Most traveled to Turkey, which alone hosts more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 85 percent of whom live outside formally designated camps. A smaller population of Syrian refugees – approximately 250,000 - is also residing in Iraq. Likewise, the number of Iraqi IDPs continued to rise in 2015, to over 2.8 million by the middle of the year, following offensives by the Islamic State.

This report appraises and compares the living conditions and access to services of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs in non-Arab host communities. The research compares the situation of these refugees and IDPs with regard to food security, livelihoods, access to clean water and services like education and health, and migration issues. In Turkey, urban Syrian refugees residing in Antakya, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa were surveyed. In northern Iraq, the cities of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah were included in the geographic coverage. The six locations chosen for this sample form a semi-circular belt across southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.

The research findings indicate that households are normally able to access clean water in all of the six locations in Turkey and Iraq, with the exception of the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraq. At large, Syrian refugees in Turkey are more likely to have access to clean water than refugees and IDPs living in Iraq. With regard to access to food, most respondents reported that their households are able to consume three meals per day. However, the quality and nutrition levels of the meals are unclear, as

these issues were not included in the research scope, and further research is needed into this issue.

Work opportunities are scarce in all locations; however, it appears there are slightly more work opportunities for Syrian refugees in Turkey than for refugees and IDPs in northern Iraq. Similarly, access to free healthcare is higher in Turkey than in Iraq, though it is also common for Syrian refugees to be charged money by health facilities for services that are supposed to be free of cost, indicating a gap between theoretical entitlements for Syrian refugees in theory and the services they can access in practice. As in the case of health services, access to education is greater in Turkey than in Iraq, and findings show that the cities of Antakya and Gaziantep are two locations where access to education is highest. In terms of safety in host communities, the majority of the respondents in southern Turkey stated that they feel safe. In northern Iraq, however, the results between the three locations were mixed, in Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah specifically. In Erbil, most respondents stated that they have no security concerns. Regarding a possible return to their home communities, Syrian refugees in Turkey and IDPs in Iraq are not optimistic about returning in the near future.
INTRODUCTION

The Syrian conflict, ongoing for four and a half years at the time of writing, represents the “worst refugee crisis since World War II, as nearly half of Syria's pre-conflict population has been displaced.”\textsuperscript{4} By May 2015 estimates, 7.6 million Syrians are internally displaced and 3.9 million are refugees in neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{5} According to UNOCHA, by June 2015, at least 220,000 Syrians have been killed and over one million injured since the conflict began.\textsuperscript{6}

While numerous studies have analyzed the condition of Syrian refugees in individual host countries, few have compared refugees’ situations across national lines.

The overall purpose of this study is to review and compare the living conditions for the Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDP in host communities across southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Specifically, this report compares the situation of vulnerable refugees and IDPs with regard to food security, livelihoods, access to clean water and services like education and health, and migration.

\textit{Turkey}

As of July 2015, Turkey was hosting more than 1,800,000 registered Syrian refugees, most of whom live outside of refugee camps in urban settings.\textsuperscript{7} The number of Syrian refugees, registered or otherwise, projected to be living in Turkey by the end of 2015 is approximately 2.5 million, making Turkey the largest host of refugees in


\textsuperscript{5} “UK Aid Syria Response,” Department for International Development, May 19, 2015


\textsuperscript{7} “Syrian refugee numbers pass four million as war rages on – UN”, UN News Centre
the world. Unfortunately, formal and comprehensive needs assessments of the urban-based Syrian refugee population in Turkey are lacking. While the Turkish government had historically taken the lead on humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey, in 2015, government policy began to shift toward embracing a larger international role in the overall response.

Iraq

As of July 2015, 251,499 Syrian refugees were formally registered in Iraq. In addition, the amount of Iraqi IDPs spiked in the middle of 2014 following the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State in June and subsequent conflict along the periphery of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The number of Iraqi IDPs continued to rise in 2015, to more than 2.8 million by the middle of the year, following the Islamic State offensive in Ramadi, Iraqi Armed Forces counter-offensives around Tikrit and elsewhere, and fighting between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Islamic State farther north. Of the IDP population, more than 1.2 million resided in the KRI as of December 2014, across an area already hosting the majority of Syrian refugees. This influx has placed increased pressure on basic infrastructure, employment and services for all nearly all groups in the region, including IDPs, refugees, and even the host community.


9 Ibid., 30


11 Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, UNHCR, July 15, 2015

12 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 3


15 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 4
The Kurdish region in northern Iraq hosts approximately 96 percent of the Syrian refugees currently residing in Iraq. Of the population of the KRI, 20 percent are either refugees or IDPs, while up to 40 percent of the host population has been affected by the influx. The influx of both Syrian refugees and internally displaced Iraqis has increased demand for public services such as education and healthcare, as well as increased competition for jobs and housing. Both the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have struggled financially—due to declining oil prices and the cost of military operations against Islamic State forces—further deteriorating the ability to deliver services to refugees and IDPs alike. For these reasons, the international community shifted its focus toward resiliency in mid-2014 in order to serve impacted communities and buttress the capacity of state institutions.

To date, there is a lack of comprehensive information about the needs of Syrian refugees living in urban settings in Iraq, where approximately 60 percent are estimated to be living. About 90 percent of IDPs live outside of camps. Regulations placed on the provision of aid to urban refugees vary across the KRG, complicating service delivery in Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and elsewhere in the KRI. Many Syrian refugees are unaware of “how to receive assistances and services when needed, which impacts beneficiaries’ access to aid.” Among governorates in the KRI, Dohuk hosts the highest number of displaced persons,

________________________________________________________________________

17 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 4
18 Ibid., 3
19 “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 29
20 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 4
21 “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 30
23 “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 29
24 Ibid., 29
followed by Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. In tandem, there are more people in need in Dohuk (993,199) than in Erbil (557,233) or Sulaymaniyah (307,935) as of June 2015, despite needs being less acute in Dohuk in some sectors.

**Food Security and Livelihoods**

The Turkish government response for Syrian refugees has largely emphasized health and education, leaving the international community to take the lead in addressing food security for Syrian refugees. The World Food Programme (WFP) focuses on providing food assistance in camps, an area outside the scope of this study, where just 14 percent of Syrian refugees in Turkey reside. As of September 2014, less than 10 percent of Syrian refugees in host communities in Turkey were receiving food assistance. NGOs have undertaken cash assistance programs for urban refugees outside of the formal Turkish government and WFP response. Ankara, along with the WFP, are beginning to explore an expansion of e-voucher coverage to urban refugees in 2015.

Syrian refugees face limited access to livelihoods in Turkey, particularly in skilled sectors, with Turks and Syrians competing for low-skilled employment, driving down wages for already vulnerable groups. Syrians’ ambiguous legal status, especially

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25 “Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Hosting Communities Across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.” UNDP and REACH, 2

26 “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 3


28 “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 24

29 Ibid., 24


32 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Turkey.” UNHCR & UNDP, 78
for those without valid passports and/or Turkish residency, leaves them exposed to potential exploitation. Refugees tend to face difficult working conditions, bereft of labor and social rights. The Turkish-Arabic language barrier also makes it difficult for Syrians to find income generating opportunities. Child labor is a common coping mechanism for Syrian households in Turkey striving to support the family income. Most Syrian refugees have exhausted their savings after years of displacement and asylum. According to the most recent livelihoods assessment, which was carried out by AFAD in 2013 and may be “out-of-date” more than half of urban Syrian refugees earn less than 250 USD/month—a figure far below Turkish minimum wage of 1201.50 TL per month set on January 1st, 2015, a value of 515.67 USD at the time. The above obstacles to livelihoods are exacerbated by an increase in the cost of housing due to the influx of refugees, with rent prices as much as tripling in some provinces.

In Iraq, as of June 2015, at least 4.4 million people across the country were food insecure, including Syrian refugees, Iraqi IDPs, and vulnerable host community members. While there is a shortage of comprehensive and up-to-date information about food security among Syrian refugees in Iraq specifically, a 2014 survey found that 12 percent of households across the KRI reported a lack of food. Food security was reported to be a higher concern for urban refugees than for refugees living in camps, where the WFP has a more robust presence. Data on food

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33 Ibid., 78
35 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Turkey.” UNHCR & UNDP, 6
36 Ibid., 78
38 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Turkey.” UNHCR & UNDP, December 2014, 78
40 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 10
41 Ibid., 30
security, particularly in non-camp populations, contains little in the way of prices, food availability, and supply chains.\textsuperscript{42} What is clear is that key agricultural areas in Iraq are under Islamic State control, increasing the probability of food shortages and upward pressure on prices.\textsuperscript{43}

While Syrian refugees’ livelihoods were moderately stable early on in the conflict in Iraq, the IDP crisis has decreased livelihoods and impacted the access of Syrian refugees to public services in Iraq.\textsuperscript{44} In 2014, 30 percent of Syrian households in the KRI reported insufficient income to meet basic needs, and 16 percent of households reported that household members generated no income.\textsuperscript{45} Long-term vulnerabilities have followed from refugees spending savings and incurring debt.\textsuperscript{46} The large scale movement of IDPs in Iraq in mid-2014 heightened competition for limited income generating opportunities, leading to more common negative coping strategies like child labor as in Turkey.\textsuperscript{47}

Positively, Iraq is the only neighboring country hosting Syrian refugees that has allowed refugees residency documentation allowing free access to the labor market, and over 80 percent of households reported that at least one member of the household was generating an income.\textsuperscript{48} Still, many livelihoods are not sustainable and there is great variation in earnings across governorates.\textsuperscript{49}

Among Iraqi host communities, Sulaymaniyah was found, according to the March 2015 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, to have lower incomes and food

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 31
\textsuperscript{43} “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 8
\textsuperscript{44} “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 27
\textsuperscript{45} “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq,” UNHCR & UNDP, 10
\textsuperscript{46} “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 31
\textsuperscript{47} “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq,” UNHCR & UNDP, December 2014, 68
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 68
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 68-69
consumption habits than other governorates in the KRI, indicating that refugees and IDPs may be stretching an already thin resource-base there. However, the costs of basic needs and the availability of income generating opportunities have most affected Dohuk, the province hosting the highest number of displaced persons.

Health

While registration with the Turkish government entitles Syrian refugees to free healthcare, obstacles to access have remained in practice. For example, the Turkish-Arabic language barrier has complicated treatment for refugees in Turkish hospitals; Syrians are only permitted to access healthcare facilities in the province in which they originally registered; and unregistered Syrian refugees only have access to emergency care. Furthermore, the Turkish healthcare system is partially lacking in some of the areas in which Syrian refugees are most in need of care, including mental and psychosocial support. Moreover, the large influx of refugees has strained the Turkish healthcare system and led to overcrowding at medical facilities. Despite the Turkish government’s prioritization of the health sector, clinics have reported a 30-40 percent increase in workload as the number of hospitals and doctors did not increase proportionately with growing demand. Across Iraq, an estimated 6.7 million people require access to essential health services. The influx of IDPs, in addition to the presence of Syrian refugees, has

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50 “Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Hosting Communities Across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.” UNDP and REACH, 1
51 Ibid., 2
53 “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 25
54 Ibid., 25
55 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Regional Strategic Overview.” UNDP and UNHCR, 13
57 “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 9
strained the public health infrastructure in northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{58} Shortages of medicine occur frequently in public medical facilities and urban refugees have increasingly been forced to purchase medication at private pharmacies.\textsuperscript{59} Furthermore, shortages of vaccines and trained medical personnel negatively impact the provision of health services to Syrians and IDPs alike.\textsuperscript{60}

Lack of access and heavy fighting has interrupted immunization programs in Iraq, with large-scale displacements leaving refugees particularly at risk of contracting communicable and infectious diseases like hepatitis A, measles and diarrhea.\textsuperscript{61} Acute Respiratory Infections have become increasingly prevalent for child refugees in Iraq.\textsuperscript{62} Immunization rates were highest in Dohuk and lowest in Erbil for polio and measles.\textsuperscript{63}

\textit{Education}

Formal registration with the Turkish government also entitles Syrian refugees with access to free public education. Despite this, at least 70 percent of school aged Syrian refugees in Turkey - representing 450,000 children - are not attending classes.\textsuperscript{64} Many Syrian households have decided not to send their children to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[59] “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 32
\item[60] Ibid., 32
\item[61] Ibid., 28
\item[62] “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Regional Strategic Overview.” UNDP and UNHCR, December 2014. \url{http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/strategic-overview/}, 31
\item[63] “Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Hosting Communities Across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.” UNDP and REACH, 1-2
\item[64] “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 25
\end{footnotes}
Turkish public schools because of the language barrier, the high and uncovered cost of transportation, a lack of seats, and the need to have children work to support the household income.\textsuperscript{65} Refugee households have prioritized expenditures on basic needs over education, and school attendance is particularly low for students in grades 10-12, who are more likely to find income generating opportunities to support the family's income.\textsuperscript{66} While Arabic-language schools represent an alternative, parents face high costs and a lack of both available seats and quality teachers.\textsuperscript{67} Turkish language instruction is in high demand among Syrian refugees, and further provision of language courses would positively impact social cohesion and the livelihoods of refugees.\textsuperscript{68}

The availability of education in Iraq for IDPs and refugees has been hampered by numerous factors. The start of the 2014 school year, for instance, was delayed because many schools have been used to shelter IDPs.\textsuperscript{69} This was particularly notable in Dohuk, where 100,000 IDPs were relocated from about 500 schools that had been used as shelter.\textsuperscript{70} A lack of textbooks and Syrian teachers has also negatively impacted refugees’ access to education.\textsuperscript{71} An agreement over the division of oil revenue between the Iraqi government and the KRG allowed the latter to begin paying teachers, who had previously not been receiving a salary, as of December 2014, increasing classroom capacity.\textsuperscript{72} Households have also sent

\begin{itemize}
\item Kanat, Kilic Bugra, and Kadir Ustan. “Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Toward Integration,” 22
\item “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Turkey.” UNHCR & UNDP, 41
\item “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Turkey.” UNHCR & UNDP, 6
\item “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 33
\item Ibid., 33
\item Ibid., 33
\item Ibid., 33
\end{itemize}
school-age children to work as a coping mechanism to support the family income.\textsuperscript{73} In 2014, only 39 percent of school-aged children among Syrian refugees in the KRI were attending school regularly.\textsuperscript{74} In 2015, only 30 percent of school-aged IDP children were attending school.\textsuperscript{75}

The education infrastructure has been strained by the influx of refugees and IDPs. Since the start of the conflict, the number of school-age children in Dohuk has risen 50 percent from 400,000 to 600,000.\textsuperscript{76} Among host communities, Dohuk had the highest rate of school attendance while Sulaymaniyah had the lowest, as of March 2015.\textsuperscript{77} Host communities are struggling to cope with teacher shortages as well as the damage, destruction and occupation of schools.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{WASH}

In Turkey, while Syrian refugees living in camps have often encountered inadequate water and sanitation, this has been less true of Syrians living in host communities. The Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan for 2015-2016 found that water, sanitation and hygiene was adequate and available for refugees in Turkey.\textsuperscript{79}

Access to water and adequate sanitation infrastructure remain a concern for refugees and IDPs in Iraq, however. Among Syrian refugee households in Iraq in 2014, 36 percent reported that their drinking water was unsafe and of these, 59

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 33

\textsuperscript{74} “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 10

\textsuperscript{75} “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 6

\textsuperscript{76} “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 33

\textsuperscript{77} “Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Hosting Communities Across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.” UNDP and REACH, 1

\textsuperscript{78} “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 8

\textsuperscript{79} “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Regional Strategic Overview.” UNDP and UNHCR, 37
percent stated that they did not treat it.\textsuperscript{80} Particularly in areas in the KRI, which have shouldered a disproportionate burden, water and sanitation systems are in disrepair, increasing the risk of major epidemics.\textsuperscript{81}

\textit{Migration and Displacement}

The international community largely praised Turkey's migration policies in 2014, which saw the adoption of Turkey's first asylum law, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, passed in April and the adoption of the Temporary Protection (TP) regulation in October, both of which complied with international standards and principles.\textsuperscript{82}

However, Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey, largely but not entirely from Aleppo and Idleb governorates, have faced increasing scrutiny at border crossings as the conflict has gone on. Driven by a larger burden from hosting refugees and heightened concerns about the Islamic State, Ankara has toughened border restrictions in the last year. This has placed a burden on refugees seeking to generate income on the Syrian side of the border, as well led to a higher prevalence of fines and entry bans for Syrians lacking valid passports and/or Turkish residency.\textsuperscript{83} In extreme cases, Syrians have been arrested, beaten, detained and killed trying to cross into Turkey.\textsuperscript{84}

In the last three months of 2014, nearly 24,000 Syrian refugees fled to northern Iraq from Kobani—a particularly vulnerable group given that many had already been

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{80} “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Iraq.” UNHCR & UNDP, 10
\textsuperscript{81} “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 7
\textsuperscript{82} “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: Turkey.” UNHCR & UNDP, 5
\textsuperscript{83} “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 23
displaced previously.\textsuperscript{85} Apart from that exception, the Iraq-Syria border largely remains closed. Asylum seekers crossing borders are often arrested, interrogated and deported.\textsuperscript{86}

Despite the presence of nearly 250,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq as of the end of 2014, there were more than eight times as many internally displaced Iraqis at that time.\textsuperscript{87} In 2015, Iraq accepted few new Syria refugees, yet an additional 800,000 Iraqis were displaced in the first half of the year.\textsuperscript{88} While it is impossible to disentangle the two, the “overall Syrian refugee crisis in Iraq is of small scale compared to the ongoing conflict and resulting displacement flows within Iraq itself.”\textsuperscript{89} The IDP crisis in Iraq will only get worse, as Peshmerga and Iraqi Armed Forces counter-offensives in Ramadi and Mosul appear forthcoming. Because of tight border restrictions implemented by the Iraqi government, United Nations funding appeals have planned for an increase of only 15,000 Syrian refugees in 2015.\textsuperscript{90}

Residency cards issued in the KRG allow access to legal work and freedom of movement. However, while 89 percent of Dohuk households had at least one residency card, only 34 percent in Erbil and 5 percent in Sulaymaniyah obtained residency.\textsuperscript{91} While, in theory, those without residency are entitled to public services, in practice, many choose not to interact with the authorities for fear of deportation.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{85} “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 27
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 31
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 28
\textsuperscript{88} “Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.” UNOCHA, 7
\textsuperscript{89} “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 28
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 29
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 31
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 31
Relations between Syrian refugees and their Turkish host communities have been mixed. On the one hand, the majority of both Turks and Syrians are co-religionists, and have enjoyed historical and economic ties for centuries. However, the populations are clearly divided linguistically and ethnically. While many Turks express feelings of solidarity with Syrians, others resent the refugees due to increased competition over jobs—especially in low-skilled sectors—higher housing costs and the persistent perception that the presence of large numbers of Syrians has increased crime.\(^93\) For example, in Gaziantep, housing prices increased dramatically with the arrival of Syrian refugees, with many host community members blaming the newcomers for rent hikes.\(^94\)

The March 2015 MSNA found that perceived hospitality levels in Iraq were highest in Dohuk and lowest in Sulaymaniyah.\(^95\) While an increase in social tension has not been overt as a result of the displacement crises, increased costs and competition over income generating opportunities could cause inter-communal strife in the future.\(^96\) Further IDP influxes and the protracted nature of the crisis may cause further competition over economic resources and livelihood opportunities, deepening tension between host communities, IDPs, and refugees.

Interestingly, IDPs may be more likely to face social tension in host communities in Iraq than refugees, because, historically Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed better ties with


\(^{95}\) “Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Hosting Communities Across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” UNDP and REACH, 2

\(^{96}\) Ibid., 2
Syrian Kurds than with non-Kurdish Iraqis. Continued violence along explicitly sectarian lines will likely only strengthen sub-national identity further.

97 “Regional Analysis Syria: Host Countries.” Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 33
METHODOLOGY

Geographic Scope

This assessment represents a study of the condition of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs in non-Arab host communities and in camps across six locations in two countries. In Turkey, SREO surveyed Syrian refugees residing in Antakya, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa, from west to east. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, IRIS conducted research based on identical data collection tools in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, from northwest to southeast. In Iraq, enumerators took particular care to interview the most vulnerable populations depending on the location, among refugees, IDPs, camp residents and urban residents. The six locations chosen for this sample form a semi-circular belt across southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq roughly 1000 kilometers long stretching from the most northwestern border between Turkey and Syria nearly to the Iran-Iraq border (See Map 1).

Data Collection

In northern Iraq, eleven field researchers were responsible for the data collection in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, working under the direct supervision of IRIS. In southern Turkey, SREO supervised a total of six field researchers, two in every city (Please see Map 1 for details on the exact number of interviews per location). For the data collection, a mobile survey platform, with offline data collection features, was used to increase data collection efficiency and data accuracy. Before the inception of the fieldwork, the field researchers were introduced to the software and instructed on how to approach respondents when asking them to participate in the study. The field researchers were also provided with a written short introduction in Arabic, to explain the objectives of the study to the respondents and to obtain informed consent. The survey questionnaire was jointly developed and translated by SREO and IRIS.
SREO and IRIS conducted more than 200 surveys in each of the locations in Turkey and Iraq respectively. In Iraq, IRIS also sampled respondents living in camps. Of the 630 surveys IRIS completed in Iraq, 194 were completed in camps (30.1 percent).

**Map 1 - Sample locations**

Among the respondents surveyed in Iraqi camps, just over half (51 percent) were residing in Dohuk. Just over one-third of the Iraqi camp sample were living in Erbil governorate, while less than 12 percent of camp residents surveyed were living in Sulaymaniyah (Figure 2). In all of the locations, even Dohuk, non-camp respondents represented a plurality of the sample.

Camp residents comprised 47.6 percent of the sample in Dohuk, 33.6 percent of the sample in Erbil and 11 percent of the sample in Sulaymaniyah (Figure 1).
There was large variation across the three Iraqi locations in the living situation of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs. For example, all Syrian refugees sampled in Erbil...
resided in host communities, whereas IDPs in Erbil were roughly split between camps and host communities. All of the Syrians surveyed in Sulaymaniyah lived in camps while nearly all of the IDPs were in host communities. In Dohuk, a slight majority of Syrians were in camps while a slight majority of IDPs were in host communities (Table 1).

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<th></th>
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<th>Total Number</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dohuk</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>157</td>
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<td><strong>Erbil</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sulaymaniyah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Gender representation in the sample by location – in percentage**
Despite the goal of obtaining gender parity in the sample, men made up a majority of respondents in all six locations. In four of the six locations in our sample—Dohuk, Antakya, Gaziantep, and Sanliurfa—women represented more than 30 percent of respondents. In Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, women represented 15.9 percent and 15.4 percent of the sample respectively (Figure 3).

CHALLENGES

In addition to the difficulty in obtaining gender parity in the sample, the major challenge in this assessment was analytical. While the Turkish half of the sample was comprised solely of Syrian refugees living in urban host communities, the Iraqi sample included both Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs, and respondents both living in urban host communities and in formal camps. The inclusion of these additional variables on the Iraqi side complicated country-level analysis and comparisons between displaced persons in Turkey and Iraq. The asymmetry in variables also naturally led to an increased analytical focus on Iraq, so that differences between refugees and IDPs, and between camp and urban refugees, could be properly parsed out.

The breadth of this assessment—examining the situation for displaced persons across countries, within countries, and across different sectors and types of refugee statuses—required the evaluation team to dispense with generalizations and easily digestible analysis. Clear, declarative statements are not forthcoming in this report as substantial variation existed not just between countries, but within them and across several other fault lines. What follows is the evaluation team’s best effort to elucidate the shades of gray we have discovered, which characterize this complicated subject matter.
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

Respondents’ ages followed a relatively normal distribution. A plurality of respondents (30.1 percent) were between 36 and 45 years old, while 22 percent and 23.6 percent of respondents fell in the age brackets just above or beneath this level. Just 11.2 percent and 10.1 percent of respondents were aged 18-25 and 56-65 years respectively, while a very small percentage of respondents were either under 18 or over 65 (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Age distribution of respondents

In Turkey, all of the respondents SREO surveyed were Syrian refugees. In Iraq, nearly four-fifths of respondents were Iraqi IDPs, while Syrian refugees comprised 20.6 percent of the sample (Figure 5). Even though 96 percent of the roughly 260,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq are residing in the KRI, their numbers are still greatly exceeded by Iraqi IDPs, of whom there were nearly three million during the time of the evaluation period.98

Given that all of the surveys in Turkey were conducted with refugees, IDPs still make up a minority of the full sample when combining the respondents in both Turkey

and Iraq (Figure 6). The female-headed households represent 19.6 percent of the total sample (Figure 7).

**Figure 5: Household status by country – in percentage**

![Bar chart showing the household status by country: Iraq with 79.4% IDP and 20.6% Refugee, Turkey with 100% IDP.]

**Figure 6: Household status of total sample**

![Pie chart showing the household status: 59.6% Refugees, 40.4% IDPs.]

30
The majority of the sampled Syrian refugees originate from Aleppo. The second and third largest groups that have migrated from Syria are from Ar-Raqqa and Idleb. Respondents from the remaining Syrian governorates composed smaller groups in the sample (Table 2).
The governorates of origin of the Syrian refugees differed significantly across the sampled locations. In Erbil, the vast majority of Syrian respondents were originally from Aleppo. In Dohuk, 47.1 percent of Syrians sampled came from Aleppo while 41.2 percent came from Ar-Raqqa. Although only 13 Syrians were comprised in the sample from Sulaymaniyah, the majority originated from Qamishli (Figure 8).
On the Turkish side, a plurality of respondents (34.2 percent) in Antakya came from Idleb, while 25.6 percent came from Aleppo. Sizeable minorities originated from Lattakia, Hama, Homs and Damascus. Urfa represented perhaps the most diverse location in term of Syrian refugees’ governorate of origin. While a plurality came from Ar-Raqqa, large groups also came from Deir-ez-Zor, Aleppo, Idleb and Al-Hasakeh. For Gaziantep, a majority of respondents originated from Aleppo. Much smaller numbers hailed from Damascus, Hama, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa and Homs (Figure 9).

Unsurprisingly, most Iraqi IDPs came from Nineveh, Anbar and Mosul—three of the Iraqi governorates that have seen the heaviest fighting (Table 3). The Islamic State maintains a presence in all three of these governorates. Large waves of displacement followed Islamic State offensives in these governorates, exemplified by the group’s attacks on Mount Sinjar, Ramadi/Fallujah, and Mosul city respectively. Smaller groups of IDPs originated from Saladin and Babil, while less than two percent of those sampled came from Baghdad.
According to the survey findings, 41 percent of the total sample did not have any children under five in their households. However, the majority (52.2 percent) of the households had between one and two children under five. A very small group had more than three children younger than five years of age (Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Number of children under five years – total households**
Similarly, close to 40 percent of the female-headed households had no children under five, while 53.5 percent had either one or two children in this age group (Figure 11).

Figure 12: Number of children between 5-15 years old – in percentage of total households
A majority of households surveyed had at least one child between five and 15 years old. Just under half of all households had at least two children in that age range (Figure 12). Approximately 36 percent of households had at least one adult over the age of 65 (Figure 13).

**Figure 13: Number of adults above 65 years old – in percentage of total households**

**Figure 14: Number of household members – in percentage of households**
The median household contained five members. Just 28.1 percent of households comprised three members or less while 23.7 percent of households included seven or more members. Nearly half of the households, 47.1 percent, contained four to six members (Figure 14).

**Figure 15: Current employment of respondents in Iraq – in percentage**

A plurality of respondents in Iraq was unemployed. The unemployment rate among respondents was highest in Sulaymaniyah and lowest in Dohuk. Interestingly, Dohuk is hosting the highest number of displaced persons of the three locations surveyed, and Sulaymaniyah is hosting the least. This may be understandable if the labor market in Dohuk was stronger than that in Sulaymaniyah before the
displacement crisis. It is possible that the relatively stronger local economy in Dohuk is what attracted a larger proportion of displaced persons in the first place.

The most common areas of employment in Iraq were as day laborers, professionals and business owners respectively. Respondents in Dohuk were more likely to be professionals and business owners as opposed to Sulaymaniyah, where respondents were more likely to be day laborers (Figure 15).

**Figure 16: Current employment of respondents in Turkey – in percentage**

![Graph showing current employment of respondents in Turkey](image)

Syrian refugees in Turkey had a significantly lower unemployment rate than their refugee and IDP counterparts in Iraq. Among the locations, Sanliurfa experienced an unemployment rate nearly twice as high as that in Gaziantep and Antakya.
The three most common areas of employment for Syrian refugees in Turkey were as day laborers, business owners and employees for NGOs/CSOs. The latter is explained by the much larger presence of the international and Syrian humanitarian community in Turkey than in Iraq. Respondents from Gaziantep were less likely to be business owners or day laborers and more likely to be employed by NGOs/CSOs—an unsurprising finding as Gaziantep is the hub of the Turkey-based Syrian humanitarian response. With a very low unemployment rate, large numbers of respondents from Antakya worked in all three sectors mentioned above. Respondents in Urfa were less likely to work for NGOs/CSOs than those in Gaziantep and Antakya, and more likely to work as day laborers and business owners. Roughly ten percent of refugees in all three locations worked as professionals (Figure 16).

None of the Turkish-based respondents worked as fighters or in agriculture, whereas in Iraq those areas employed small numbers of respondents.
KEY FINDINGS

Access to Clean Water

Figure 17: Household access to clean water – total sample

Figure 18: Household access to clean water by location
Across all six locations and both countries, more than 70 percent of respondents had access to clean water (Figure 17).

There was much more variation in access to clean water across the Iraqi locations than the Turkish locations. At least 80 percent of Syrian refugee respondents in the three Turkish locations had access to clean water. Gaziantep residents were most likely to have access while Sanliurfa residents were least likely to have access. In Iraq, 93.9 percent respondents in Erbil had access to clean water—the highest percentage across the six locations. However, 41.3 percent of Dohuk respondents and a shocking 77.4 percent of Sulaymaniyah respondents indicated a lack of access to clean water (Figure 18).

| Table 4: Access to clean water in Iraq by camps versus host communities |
|------------------|--------|--------|------------------|
|                  | No     | Yes    | Total Responses |
| Camp             | 30.3%  | 69.7%  | 99               |
| Host community   | 51.4%  | 48.6%  | 109              |
| **Erbil**        |        |        |                  |
| Camp             | 9.7%   | 90.3%  | 72               |
| Host community   | 4.2%   | 95.8%  | 142              |
| **Sulaymaniyah** |        |        |                  |
| Camp             | 91.3%  | 8.7%   | 23               |
| Host community   | 75.7%  | 24.7%  | 185              |

Across all six locations and both countries, more than 70 percent of respondents had access to clean water (Figure 17).

There was much more variation in access to clean water across the Iraqi locations than the Turkish locations. At least 80 percent of Syrian refugee respondents in the three Turkish locations had access to clean water. Gaziantep residents were most likely to have access while Sanliurfa residents were least likely to have access. In Iraq, 93.9 percent respondents in Erbil had access to clean water—the highest percentage across the six locations. However, 41.3 percent of Dohuk respondents and a shocking 77.4 percent of Sulaymaniyah respondents indicated a lack of access to clean water (Figure 18).

In Erbil, both camp and non-camp respondents had exceptional access to clean water. However, in Sulaymaniyah, a majority of both camp and non-camp respondents were without clean water. Those living in host communities were better off: 24.3 percent of Sulaymaniyah respondents in host communities had
access to clean water as opposed to just 8.7 percent of camp respondents. Dohuk respondents, on the other hand, were more likely to have access to clean water in camps than host communities. Just under half of Dohuk respondents in host communities had access to clean water, while about 70 percent of camp respondents did (Table 4).

With the exception of Sulaymaniyah, Syrian refugees had more access to water than Iraqi IDPs. None of the 16 Syrians surveyed in Sulaymaniyah—all of whom lived in camps—had access to clean water. Syrians in Erbil and Dohuk were much more likely to have access to clean water. Over 96 percent of Syrian respondents in Dohuk had access to clean water, as opposed to less than half (46.5 percent) of Iraqi IDP respondents. Among Iraqi IDPs in Dohuk, 58 percent of those in camps had access to water while only 37.5 percent of those in host communities had access (Table 5).

**Meal Frequency and Household Income**

Across the six locations, access to food appears to be less of a concern than access to clean water. Close to 78 percent of the respondents ate at least three meals per day. Only 1.7 percent of respondents ate one meal per day (Figure 19).

**Figure 19: Number of meals per day – in percentage of households – total sample**
In Dohuk, 97.1 percent of respondents claimed that their households were able to eat at least three meals per day. In Erbil, 87 percent of the respondents stated the same. Refugee and IDP populations of Sulaymaniyah appear to be facing more challenges regarding access to food with slightly higher number of households eating two meals per day (Figure 20). Although the meal frequency indicates that the vulnerable households have access to food, the quality of the food as well as the nutrition intake among the sampled households is not revealed by the data, as this was not included in the scope of this study.

Relatively in line with the findings about access to clean water, Syrian refugees were better off in terms of food consumption than Iraqi IDPs in Dohuk, worse off in Sulaymaniyah, and roughly equal in Erbil. Although food security provided less variance, 98 percent of Syrian refugees in Dohuk ate three or more meals a day compared to 96.8 percent of IDPs. In Sulaymaniyah, 62.5 percent of refugees had three or more meals a day as opposed to 88.5 percent of IDPs. In Erbil, 90.5 percent of the refugees and 94.7 percent of IDPs had three or more meals per day (Table 7).

**Figure 20: Number of meals per day in Iraq – in percentage of households**
Table 6: Number of daily meals by average monthly household income – in Iraqi Dinar (IQD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of HH Daily Meals</th>
<th>Average Income - Dohuk</th>
<th>Average Income - Erbil</th>
<th>Average Income - Sulaymaniyah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One meal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two meals</td>
<td>166.700</td>
<td>283.300</td>
<td>128.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three meals</td>
<td>428.200</td>
<td>377.800</td>
<td>235.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four meals</td>
<td>453.700</td>
<td>250.000</td>
<td>357.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The average monthly household incomes are rounded to the nearest hundred. The average monthly incomes of households that have one meal per day were not included because only three respondents selected the answer ‘one meal’ per day.

Table 7: Number of daily meals in Iraq by Syrian refugees versus Iraqi IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dohuk</th>
<th>Erbil</th>
<th>Sulaymaniyah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21: Number of meals per day in Turkey – in percentage of households
Eating three meals per day was more common in Iraq than in Turkey, and it was more common in Turkey for households to subsist on one meal per day. This finding suggests that Syrian refugees in southern Turkey are finding it more challenging to access food when compared to refugees and IDPs residing in northern Iraq. Of the locations surveyed in Turkey, Sanliurfa was the city where it was more common for refugees to eat three meals per day with 68.4 percent of the confirming this, as opposed to just 55.5 percent of households in Gaziantep (Figure 21). In Turkey, numbers of meals per day correlates strongly with average monthly household income: a higher income means more meals per day. Across the three locations, for all possible number of household meals per day, household income was highest in Gaziantep, followed by Antakya and Sanliurfa in that order (Table 8). The level of food security across the locations may indicate that while income was highest in Gaziantep and lowest in Sanliurfa, the cost of living, and particularly the cost of food, may be much higher in the former than in the latter. In other words, the cost of living may impact meal frequency more than household income.

| Table 8: Number of daily meals by average monthly household income – in Turkish Lira (TRY) |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Number of HH Daily Meals       | Average income   | Average income   | Average income   |
| One meal                        | 567              | 863              | 186              |
| Two meals                       | 1253             | 2116             | 896              |
| Three meals                     | 2279             | 2848             | 1434             |
| Four meals                      | --               | --               | --               |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Percentage of households with access to relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: Do you have access to relief distributions from the UN and other agencies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antakya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanliurfa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In all three locations in Turkey, slight majorities reported not having access to relief distributions from the UN and other agencies. At least 40 percent of respondents in all three locations reported having access to relief. Relief was found to be most common in Antakya and least common in Gaziantep but variance was minimal.

Access to relief distributions had a higher deviation in Iraq, between locations as well as between Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs. In Sulaymaniyah, 93.8 percent of the refugees reported access to relief as opposed to just 38.5 percent of Iraqi IDPs.

In Dohuk, refugees were also more likely to have access to relief (58.8 percent) than IDPs (45.2 percent). Only in Erbil were IDPs better off than refugees in this respect, although the difference between the two groups was found to be minimal. Access to relief distributions was worse in Erbil—for both Syrians refugees and Iraqi IDPs—than in any other location surveyed (Table 9).

**Employment Opportunities**

More than 70 percent of respondents in all six locations indicated that there were not sufficient employment opportunities in their host community. Negative opinions about livelihoods were starker in Iraq than in Turkey. Over 21 percent of respondents in all three locations in Turkey expressed that there were sufficient employment opportunities, while in Iraq, this figure did not exceed three percent in any of the locations surveyed. Perception about employment opportunities was most negative in Sulaymaniyah, where 84.1 percent of respondents expressed that there were not sufficient income generating opportunities (Figure 22).
Access to Health Services

In all six locations, large majorities of respondents reported that health services were available. However, often health services were not free and/or medical centers only provided a limited number of services. Substantial variation existed in health services access both between the two countries and within them.

In general, access to healthcare was stronger in Turkey than in Iraq. In all three locations in Turkey, at least 96.5 percent of respondents reported that health services of some sort were available. On the aggregate, respondents in Turkey were more likely to be able to access free health services than their Iraqi counterparts were. One exception was that respondents in Erbil, the strongest Iraqi location in this sector, were more likely to have access to free healthcare than respondents in Gaziantep, the weakest Turkish location in this sector. Still, in no Turkish location...
did a majority of respondents report having access to free healthcare, despite the Turkish government's efforts to provide free health services for all registered Syrian refugees.

Within Turkey, respondents in Sanliurfa and Antakya reported better access to healthcare than did respondents in Gaziantep. Over 70 percent of respondents in Gaziantep reported that health services cost money, as opposed to 57.7 percent of respondents in Antakya and 48.1 percent of respondents in Sanliurfa. Sanliurfa boasted the highest percentage of respondents with access to free healthcare at 44.2 percent.

Within Iraq, Erbil respondents reported better access to healthcare than did respondents in Dohuk or Sulaymaniyah. Still, even in Erbil, 40.7 percent of the respondents indicated that services were limited and 28 percent indicated it is not free of charge. Respondents in Dohuk were the least likely to have access to comprehensive and free health services and the most likely to have no access to any health services at all. Still, Dohuk respondents were more likely than those in Sulaymaniyah were to have access to some sort of free health services, even though services in Dohuk were more likely to be limited and in Sulaymaniyah it was more likely to cost money (Figure 23).
Within Iraq, health services were generally as readily available in camps as in host communities, although Sulaymaniyah was an exception, where access was poorer in camps. In Dohuk, health services were more likely to cost money in host communities, but more likely to be limited in camps. The same relationship held in Erbil, where more than 70 percent of camp respondents had access to some free health care services, though the majority of those respondents reported that the services were limited. A larger proportion of Erbil respondents living in host communities reported having to pay for care. Overall, healthcare was more accessible in Erbil, in both camps and host communities, than in any of the other
locations surveyed in Iraq. In Sulaymaniyah, over half of camp respondents reported having no access to health services. In Sulaymaniyah host communities, access was stronger, but two-thirds of respondents reported that care cost money (Figure 24).

**Figure 24: Availability of health services by camp versus host community – in percentage**

Access to Education

In general, respondents in Turkey reported a higher access to primary and secondary education than the respondents in Iraq did. Access was highest in Gaziantep at 94.5 percent, followed by Antakya at 87.6 percent. Only 60.7 percent of respondents in Sanliurfa reported having access to primary or secondary education.

Among the three Iraqi locations, Sulaymaniyah respondents reported the best access to education. This finding was interesting because, relative to Erbil and Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah was found to have lower access to clean water, healthcare,
income generating opportunities, and food. Erbil had the lowest reported access to education—slightly more respondents indicated that they had access to education than did not (Figure 25).

**Figure 25: Access to (primary and secondary) education in host communities by location – in percentage**

![Bar chart showing access to education by location](image)

While respondents in Turkey in general reported that their children were more likely to be attending school than children in Iraq, reported school attendance was highest in Sulaymaniyah (56.5 percent) than in any other location. School attendance was roughly 50-50 in Antakya and Gaziantep while two-thirds of respondents in Sanliurfa reported that their children were not attending school. In Dohuk and Erbil, this figure was about the same: children were twice as likely to be out of school than in school (Figure 26).
The majority of the households in all of the six locations had one to two children attending school. Close to 20 percent of the households in Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah, Antakya and Gaziantep stated that they have three children attending school. Erbil and Sanliurfa had, in general, fewer households with more than two children attending school. Households with more than three children attending school represented a small portion of the sample (Table 10).

In Iraq, access to education was higher in host communities than in camps, but only slightly. The biggest variance was in Erbil, where 54.3 percent of respondents in host communities indicated access as opposed to only 40.3 percent of camp
respondents. In Dohuk and Sulaymaniyeh, access was roughly the same in both camps and host communities. Overall, access was strongest in Sulaymaniyah and weakest in Erbil (Table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Average number of children attending school — in percentage of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average number of children attending school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antakya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanlurfa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table only includes only households that said ‘yes’ when asked if their children attend school (See Figure 26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Access to (primary and secondary) education in host communities by camps versus host communities in Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Iraq, the cost of schooling had a large impact on whether or not children attended school. In all three locations, when respondents reported that education was free of charge, the chances of their children attending school were 70 percent.
When school did cost money, respondents’ likelihood of sending their children to school varied. In Sulaymaniyah, 31.8 percent of the respondents still sent their children to school when education was not free, as opposed to only 4 percent of respondents in Erbil (Table 12).

### Table 12: Cross-tabulation of school attendance in Iraq among Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs in relation to school fees — in percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Children attend school</th>
<th>Children don’t attend school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free of charge</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs money</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free of charge</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs money</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free of charge</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs money</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Turkey, the cost of education most affected respondents in Sanliurfa: 96.9 percent of respondents sent their children to school when it was free, as opposed to only 31.3 percent when school cost money. Given the lower average household income in Sanliurfa relative to the other locations in Turkey, either the lower household income or higher education costs could explain this disparity.

### Table 13: Cross-tabulation of school attendance among Syrian refugees in Turkey in relation to school fees — in percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Children attend school</th>
<th>Children don’t attend school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antakya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free of charge</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs money</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free of charge</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs money</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanliurfa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free of charge</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs money</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>68.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents in Antakya were only slightly more likely to send children to school if it was free than if it cost money, perhaps indicating that education in Antakya, when it
cost money, was not exorbitantly expensive. Despite relatively high household incomes in Gaziantep, only 83.3 percent of respondents sent their children to school even when it was free. This may indicate that standard of living was higher in Gaziantep relative to the other locations in Turkey, forcing some parents to have their children support the household income rather than go to school (Table 13).

Migration and Displacement

Neither Syrian refugees nor Iraqi IDPs are optimistic about being able to return to their homes in the short-term. Syrian refugees in Iraq were the most pessimistic—less than 5 percent said that they anticipated being able to return to their native cities in the next one or two years. Syrian refugees in Turkey were slightly more optimistic, though large majorities of respondents in all three Turkish locations reported that they did not anticipate returning to Syria soon. Sanliurfa was the most optimistic location surveyed, with just over one-fourth of respondents anticipating a return home. Iraqi IDPs were the most optimistic, but still considered it more likely than not that they would not be able to return to their home city in the next couple of years (Table 14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Refugee</th>
<th>IDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antakya</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanliurfa</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Syrian refugees living in Turkey indicated that their host community was more welcoming and supportive than did either Syrian refugees in Iraq or Iraqi IDPs. Within Turkey, Antakya and Gaziantep were the most welcoming host communities. Sanliurfa was reported to be less welcoming than the two other Turkish locations, yet more respondents there felt welcomed than unwelcome.
Within Iraq, IDPs in all three locations felt more welcomed than unwelcome. Relations between host communities and displaced populations were most positive from Iraqi IDPs in Erbil. Interestingly, they were worst for Syrian refugees in Erbil, where no respondents felt welcomed and 95.2 percent felt unwelcome. In Sulaymaniyah, nearly three times as many Iraqi IDPs felt welcomed as unwelcome, while in Dohuk the relationship was closer to 50-50. While Syrian refugees in Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah were more likely to feel unwelcome than welcomed, large majorities indicated that they did not know, perhaps because their relationship with the host community was ambiguous (Table 15).

In all three locations in Turkey, Syrian refugee respondents were more likely to feel safe than unsafe in their host communities. Respondents felt relatively safest in Antakya and most unsafe in Sanliurfa, where 41.7 percent of respondents were concerned about safety.
Syrian refugees in Iraq reported feeling overwhelmingly safe in Erbil and overwhelmingly unsure in Dohuk. Exactly 50 percent of Syrian refugees in Sulaymaniyah felt safe and 50 percent felt unsafe.

The group most concerned about its safety was Iraqi IDPs in Dohuk: 86 percent felt unsafe, even though more members of this group felt supported than unsupported in their host community. Iraqi IDPs felt most safe in Erbil, where 72.2 percent of respondents were unconcerned about their safety. A slight majority of Iraqi IDP respondents in Sulaymaniyah felt safe (Table 16).

Within Turkey, majorities of respondents in Antakya and Gaziantep had been displaced more than once. About two-thirds of respondents in Sanliurfa were only displaced once—the highest percentage among all locations surveyed.

For Syrian refugees in Iraq, those settled in Erbil had been displaced the fewest times: 55.6 percent of respondents were only displaced once. However, over 80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Refugee 1</th>
<th>Refugee 2</th>
<th>Refugee 3</th>
<th>4 or more</th>
<th>IDP 1</th>
<th>IDP 2</th>
<th>IDP 3</th>
<th>4 or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
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<td>23.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antakya</td>
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<td>12.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
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<td>8.2%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanliurfa</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
percent of Syrian refugees in Sulaymaniyah had been displaced two or more times, and 98 percent of respondents in Dohuk had been displaced three or more times.

For Iraqi IDPs, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, in order, were more likely to be the first destination following displacement for those living there. Just under half of Erbil IDP respondents had been displaced before, as opposed to over 90 percent of Dohuk respondents (Table 17).

Surprisingly, in all three locations in Turkey, respondents were more likely to not have formal refugee status. Without formal registration, Syrian refugees in Turkey do not have access to non-emergency medical care or Turkish public schools. Syrian refugees in Iraq were far more likely to have formal refugee status. Iraqi IDPs were also more likely to have formal refugee status than not, with the exception of Sulaymaniyah (Table 18).
CONCLUSION

The findings of this assessment indicated substantial variation not only across countries, but within countries across the three locations surveyed in both Turkey and Iraq. On the Iraqi side of the border, this variation was even more pronounced, as differences existed along camp-urban lines and between Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs. Depending on the sector under consideration, camp respondents were sometimes better off than urban respondents or vice versa, and Syrians were better off than Iraqis or vice versa. Variation across country, city, sector, and refugee status made accurate generalizations about displaced persons’ situations difficult. We could argue that the clearest finding of this assessment was that there were very few clear, generalizable findings.

That being said, for most sectors in this assessment, displaced persons were better off in Turkey than in Iraq. Food security and having formal registered status represented notable exceptions to this rule. Within Iraq, displaced persons were most vulnerable in Sulaymaniyah, where access to water, food security, income-generating opportunities, healthcare and security were worse than in Dohuk or Erbil, despite Sulaymaniyah providing the best access to education. While Sulaymaniyah is hosting a smaller number of displaced persons than Dohuk or Erbil, it appears that their needs are more acute. The well-being of Syrian refugees versus Iraqi IDPs, and camp residents versus urban residents, depended on the city and on the sector. For example, in Dohuk, Syrian refugees were better off than Iraqi IDPs in several sectors while in Sulaymaniyah, the former were often worse off than the latter. However, this could be explained by the fact that all of the Syrian refugees in the sample from Sulaymaniyah resided in camps. In Iraq generally, camp residents and Syrian refugees had more access to aid distributions than urban residents and Iraqi IDPs.

Within Turkey, substantial variation in concerns existed across sectors between Gaziantep, Antakya and Sanliurfa. Gaziantep was found to have the worst access,
among the three locations in Turkey to food security, aid distributions and healthcare. We found that Antakya respondents were relatively worse off in terms of income-generating opportunities and security. Finally, Sanliurfa respondents had relatively worse access to clean water and education, and were less likely than their counterparts elsewhere in Turkey to be formally registered.

Clean water was widely available in all of the surveyed locations except Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, where the majority of the respondents claimed that they faced difficulties accessing it. Similarly, a considerable portion of the surveyed population in Dohuk reported not being able to access clean water. In the Turkish cities, however, access to clean water is common. In general, refugees in Turkey are more likely to have clean water in their households than both refugees and IDPs in northern Iraq.

Roughly 80 percent of all respondents stated that their households are able to consume a minimum of three meals per day. The number of households that can only eat one meal a day is minimal in the sample. The three Iraqi locations had highest access to food, with the majority of the households being able to eat at least three meals per day. Access to food and nutrition for Syrian refugee households in Turkey is more limited than for displaced households in northern Iraq, as it is more common for the former to subsist on one meal per day than for the latter.

More than 70 percent of all respondents in the six locations indicated that employment opportunities are insufficient in the communities where they currently reside. Although work opportunities for Syrian refugees and IDPs are scarce in Iraq as well as in Turkey, the three Turkish cities appear to have more work opportunities available in relation to the northern Iraqi cities.

In Antakya, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa, slight majorities reported not having access to relief distributions from the UN and other agencies, whereas in northern Iraq,
Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah are the two cities where humanitarian assistance is most accessible. Findings show that, among the surveyed northern Iraqi cities, Erbil has least access to relief. However, this may be due to the fact that across many sectors, Erbil residents were found to be less vulnerable, with the exception of access to education.

Although health services are available for Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs, often health services cost money and do not meet all needs. In general, access to free healthcare is stronger in Turkey than in Iraq. Nevertheless, the majority of the respondents in Turkey stated that health services cost money, despite the Turkish government's efforts to provide free health services for all registered Syrian refugees. There could be a number of reasons for Syrian refugees not having access to free healthcare. First, Syrian refugees may not have enough information about their rights and entitlements in Turkey as registered refugees. Second, they could be forced to pay for private healthcare, if their medical needs are not met or covered by the public health system. Moreover, a large portion of the sample consists of unregistered refugees, who do not have access to free healthcare services regardless.

In general, Syrian refugees in Turkey have more access to primary and secondary education than Syrian refugees and IDPs in Iraq. Access was highest in Gaziantep and Antakya with a slightly lower percentage confirming access in Sanliurfa. Among the three Iraqi locations, Sulaymaniyah has the best access to education while Erbil had the worst, an exception to the trends presented above.

Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs are currently not very hopeful about returning to their homes in the near future. With regard to host community hospitality, Syrian refugees living in Turkey indicated that their host community was more welcoming and supportive than did either Syrian refugees in Iraq or Iraqi IDPs. Within Iraq, the majority of the IDPs in all three locations felt well treated by their host communities. Relations between host communities and displaced populations were
most positive from Iraqi IDPs in Erbil. While Syrian refugees in northern Iraq were more likely to feel unwelcome than welcomed, large majorities indicated that they did not know, suggesting an uncertain relationship with their host communities.

In general, Syrian refugees in Turkey feel safe in their current location, however, this was most evident in Antakya were the majority of respondents reported that they had no safety concerns. Syrian refugees in Iraq reported feeling overwhelmingly safe in Erbil and overwhelmingly unsure in Dohuk, whereas in Sulaymaniya the safety perception was very mixed.

In the Turkish cities of Antakya and Gaziantep, the majority of Syrian refugees have been displaced multiple times, whereas most refugees currently living in Sanliurfa had only been displaced once. In Iraq, the majority of the respondents, both refugees and IDPs, in Dohuk had been displaced more than three times, making Dohuk home to households that have been displaced most frequently. In Sulaymaniya and Erbil it was more common for households to be displaced only once. Dohuk’s geographical location—it is the most northern and western city in our sample— and its relatively stronger levels of resources, could explain the higher displacement frequency among surveyed households.

Having a formal refugee status, which applies to both refugees and IDPs, is more common in Iraq than in Turkey, as a clear majority of the respondents in Iraq confirmed having this status, whereas in the Turkish cities, less than half the respondents in each location revealed that they are not formally registered, hence lack access to healthcare and education.

Our findings indicated that future interventions should be targeted and specific, along the lines of country, city, sector and refugee status. Interventions in Turkey should focus on food security, providing Turkish-language education, and expanding both formal registration and the capacity of the public healthcare system. Interventions in Iraq should focus on access to clean water, education and
healthcare, although protection, identified as the foremost objective of the 3RP for Iraq in 2015, is perhaps the area of most serious and immediate concern. This is due to the closure of the Iraqi border to refugees; the level of internal displacement; expected future displacement from heavy violence involving the Islamic State, Shia militias and the international coalition; and serious concerns about SGBV and violence against children. Livelihoods and access to income-generating opportunities were a major problem in both Turkey and Iraq, although it was found to be starker in the latter than the former.
REFERENCES


“UK Aid Syria Response,” Department for International Development, May 19, 2015