Working Paper:

**Coordination in Rwanda: The Humanitarian Response to Genocide and Civil War**

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ADFL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CERF Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CMOC Civil-Military Operation Center
CRS Catholic Relief Services
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team (run by USAID-BHA-OFDA)
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
EDPs Extended Delivery Points
GOR Government of Rwanda
HACU Humanitarian Affairs Coordination Unit
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDPs internally displaced persons
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOC Integrated Operations Center
IOM International Organization for Migration
JTF Joint Task Force
MRND National Revolutionary Movement for Development
MSF Médecins sans Frontières
OAU Organization of African Unity
ODA Overseas Development Administration (British)
PDD- 25 Presidential Decision Directive 25
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front
SRSG Special Representative to the Secretary General
UNAHT United Nations Advanced Humanitarian Team
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
I. Introduction

In April, 1994, the president of Rwanda was killed in an airplane crash. During the next four months, Hutu extremists and their followers executed a gruesome, pre-planned genocide and politicide. The minority Tutsi were killed by their neighbors, friends, and relatives using machetes and garden tools. Those who resisted were killed with rifles and hand grenades by the Presidential Guard and army. Opposition politicians, whether Tutsi or Hutu, were among the first to die. The killing stopped when a rebel army, dominated by Tutsis who had been living in adjacent Uganda for several decades, swept through the country and drove the genocidal regime into exile in Zaire and Tanzania.

The tragedy of Rwanda has a lot to teach us about politically precipitated human disasters, known in the humanitarian relief business as complex emergencies. A cursory glance yields several observations that may be used as starting points for analysis. The collection of events after April were extraordinarily complex and fast-moving. Any attempt to understand and respond to them had to take these facts into account. The international political response to the genocide was despicable. As the Western world prepared to celebrate the end of the Second World War and renew the post-Holocaust pledge of "never again," systematic and violent genocide was being pursued, again. The absence of vital national interests and the lingering political pain from getting finger tips burned in Somalia induced powerful governments, and their collective voice the UN Security Council, to run away from Rwanda rather than try to stop the genocide. The international humanitarian response, in contrast, was praiseworthy. Non-governmental organizations, UN agencies, and bi-lateral aid agencies churned into high gear, delivered thousands of tons of material relief, provided a certain level of coherence to the overall effort, and saved tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people from death due to starvation and disease.

This paper focuses on the more successful aspect of the international response -- the delivery of humanitarian aid. In particular, it delves into the methods of inter-organizational coordination(1) How did the multitude of different relief organizations interact? What coordination mechanisms were most successful? How did they work? What lessons about coordination can be drawn from the Rwandan case? Coordination is defined here as the orchestration of efforts of diverse organizations. This definition is used in a comprehensive study of the international response to the war and genocide in Rwanda in 1994(2). I adopt it for the same reasons the study does: it is acceptable to most organizations (who can be very touchy about preserving their independence) and, more importantly, it incorporates diverse manifestations of coordination.

Within the broad definition, it is useful to think of coordination in terms of four types (or outcomes) and three modes (or processes). The four types are "information coordination; coordination through common representation (e.g. for negotiating access, briefing the media, negotiating funding); framework coordination (requiring a shared sense of priorities); and management/directive
coordination." (3)

The three modes are coordination by default, coordination by consensus, and coordination by command. Coordination by default consists of limited interaction and information sharing between organizations in the absence of a designated coordinating body. Coordination by consensus is diverse in its implementation, but usually involves regular meetings run by a designated organization as a central component. Coordination by command implies some sort of power by the coordinating agency over other organizations, in the form of carrots (e.g. funding) or sticks (e.g. denial of access to certain areas or refugee camps) or both (4). Each of the three modes (or processes) can incorporate one or more type (or outcome) of coordination, as indicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of coordination:</th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible types of coordination with each mode:</td>
<td>information</td>
<td>information</td>
<td>information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representation</td>
<td>representation</td>
<td>framework</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>framework</td>
<td></td>
<td>management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A detailed review of coordination practices in Rwanda indicates that a consensus process aimed at achieving shared information and analysis, common representation, and a common framework for action is the most desirable form of humanitarian coordination in a complex emergency. A key ingredient of successful coordination by consensus is decentralization of decision-making authority. (5) Not all actors agree with this conclusion. Many non-governmental organizations want minimal oversight. They contend the meetings and regulations involved get in the way of rapid and flexible life-saving action. On the other end of the spectrum, the independent study of the international response to events in Rwanda initiated by the Danish government and sponsored by multiple donors, calls for more command power and management for the designated United Nations coordinating body, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. (6)

This question is taken up again in the conclusion, together with several other important implications arising from the study.

II. The Story

Rwanda covers 10,169 square miles (about the size of Maryland) in the heart of Africa. (7) Before the genocide and civil war it was the most densely populated country on the continent. Ninety-five percent of the roughly seven and a half million Rwandan lived in the countryside, scratching out a subsistence living on the steep and lush hills. The population was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. There is an unresolved debate as to whether the Hutu and Tutsi are ethnically distinct. They speak the same language, follow the same religion and share the same history as far back as the 16th century, but the "official" Hutu government position was that the Tutsi were foreign invaders. Most students of ethnic studies agree that "The key to identifying communal groups is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart."(8) By this measure, ethnic distinctions are certainly a fact of life in Rwanda as a matter of personal sentiment and of state policy. (Until the new government ended the practice, all Rwandan were required to carry identification cards that classified them as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.)

The majority Hutu are traditionally subsistence farmers, while the minority Tutsi are traditionally aristocratic land and cattle owners. For the most part, Hutus were bound to Tutsis as vassals and clients. However, it used to be the case that a family could pass from one group to the other, depending on how many head of livestock they owned. It is also true that a great many Tutsis are and
always were subsistence farmers. When Germans in 1890 and then Belgians in 1916 colonized the
area they reinforced group distinctions as a way of controlling the population. The Belgians originally
supported the aristocratic position of the Tutsis, believing them to be superior because their facial
features are more European-looking than the Hutus'. Near the end of their imperial tenure the
Belgians began to sympathize with Hutu claims against Tutsi oppression. In 1959, Hutus forced the
Tutsi king and thousands of Tutsi supporters into exile in Uganda. Three years later, the Republic of
Rwanda gained independence with a Hutu government. The government was monopolized by the
Parmehutu party under the leadership of President Gregoire Kayibanda, from 1962 to 1973. In 1973
General Huvenal Habyarimana seized power, killed most of the former government, and established
an autocratic military dictatorship, which he ruled until his death in 1994[9].

In 1994, when Rwanda descended into genocidal violence, there were several politically important
organizations. The most noticeable international presence in Rwanda was, and remains, international
aid and development organization[10] -- some associated with the UN, such as UNICEF; some
bilateral conduits, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID); and some
independent, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as a huge number
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They are engaged in everything from the provision of
immediate relief from effects of the civil war to building physical infrastructure and teaching
agricultural techniques. They were also the largest single source of employment, outside of farming.

Ordinary citizens played no significant political role, except as receivers and conduits of rhetoric and
propaganda. The government of Rwanda was dominated by the National Revolutionary Movement
for Development (MRND), entirely composed of Hutus and led by President Huvenal Habyarimana
from a prominent northern family.[11] The national army was also entirely Hutu and, like the civilian
side of the power structure, was dominated by northerners who tended to see Hutus from the south as
potentially troublesome. Three other armed Hutu elements played important roles in the ensuing
months. They were (1) the Presidential Guard, (2) the gendarmerie, and (3) loosely associated youth
militia called "interhamwe,[12] who had been recruited and trained by the government and were under
the influence and direction of extremist political leaders. (4) Political extremists found a home in the
Christian Democratic Party, which was closely associated with, but to the right of, the MRND. (5) A
small but centrally important group of extremists, known as the "Akazu,[13] existed within the
Habyarimana regime, centered around Madam Habyarimana and her family. It is these five groups
who are primarily responsible for carrying out the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus after the
death of President Habyarimana. The regular army also participated, especially in the largest
massacres.

In political opposition to these five Hutu groups was a coalition of parties dominated by the
Republican Democratic Movement. Posing a physical, as well as political, threat was the
Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). These two groups shared opposition to the
Habyarimana regime but disagreed on the tactics to use -- the former favored working within the
political system, the latter from without. The RPF, based in neighboring Uganda to the north,
consisted primarily of Tutsi people who had fled Rwanda 35 years earlier when the king was
overthrown. Most members of the Front's armed forces (Rwandan Patriotic Army, RPA) had received
training as insurgents against Uganda's president Obote and then as troops in President Museveni's
army. The RPF began a civil war against the Habyarimana regime in October 1990, managing to gain
control over some territory near the border. Upon the outbreak of civil war France, Belgium, and
Zaire sent 1,000 paratroopers to Rwanda's capital city Kigali to shore up the Hutu government. In
June 1993, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to adopt a resolution to send 105
peacekeeping troops to Uganda to patrol the border with Rwanda and prevent the RPF from
smuggling arms. The operation, known as the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
(UNOMUR), was under-staffed and not very successful.

On August 4th, 1993, after more than a year of negotiations, RPF leaders Paul Kagame and Alexis
Kenyarengwe and Rwandan President Huvenal Habyarimana signed an accord in Arusha, Tanzania ending the civil war. The Arusha accord provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until elections, repatriation of refugees, and integration of the military forces of the two sides. It also called for a UN peacekeeping force to replace OAU troops in Rwanda. That force was approved by the Security Council October 5th, 1993 under the name United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR). Its mandate was to facilitate implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. Habyarimana's government was loathe to implement the talks, but moved slowly forward under constant prodding from the United Nations, regional governments, and international aid donors.

On April 6th, 1994, an airplane carrying President Habyarimana, Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira and several of Habyarimana's top aides was returning from talks held in Tanzania, mediated by regional leaders and intended to bring about realization of the Arusha accord. The plane crashed under suspicious circumstances that have not yet been fully resolved. Observers generally agree it was shot down with two surface-to-air missiles. The question is who fired the missiles. To date all evidence is circumstantial, but the strongest argument implicates the Akazu within Habyarimana's own government who strongly disapproved of his movement (halting though it was) toward implementing the peace accord that would allow RPF members into the government. A consensus has developed that members of the Presidential Guard shot down their own president's plane.

Within half an hour, members of the Presidential Guard and interhamwe in Kigali began killing moderate Hutu politicians and Tutsi leaders. Road blocks were set up throughout Kigali before the president's death was publicly announced. The first violence was politically directed, targeting moderate Hutu opposition members, the intelligentsia, and RPF supporters. The killing spread rapidly into the countryside, taking on a more group-oriented nature with all Tutsis endangered. Within two weeks massacres had taken place throughout the country. Total deaths were estimated at tens of thousands.

The day after the plane crash members of the Presidential Guard killed interim Prime Minister Agathe Unwilingiyimana, leader of the Hutu opposition, and ten Belgian UN peacekeepers defending her. The Belgian government subsequently withdrew its battalion from UNAMIR, leaving the UN force without its best trained and equipped unit. It also lobbied other countries to withdraw their troops. The Belgian reaction seemed to be exactly the intention of the killers. R. M. Connaughton recounts a Hutu extremist plan to drive out the Belgians as early as January, 1994. As it turned out, the opportunity did not arise until April. The plan was built on the assumption that the Belgians would pull out if they lost enough troops, just as the American's had pulled out of Somalia after losing 18 soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993. The assumption was right.

The beginning of the genocide prompted a new offensive by the RPF, who had been encamped along the northern border, in line with the Arusha Accord. The RPF took ground rapidly and within five days, by April 12, the interim government fled Kigali for the town of Gitarama, 35 miles toward the south-west. RPF forces entered Kigali the same day, but did not gain full control of the city or the airport until May 22. During much of that time, aircraft carrying relief supplies were unable to land for safety reasons.

On April 20, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council that UNAMIR troops could not be left indefinitely at risk "when there is no possibility of them performing the tasks for which they were dispatched." He offered three alternatives: (1) reinforce UNAMIR immediately and massively, and change its mandate to allow it to coerce opposing forces into a cease fire; (2) maintain a small group of about 270 military personnel to act as an intermediary between the two sides in an attempt to bring about a cease fire; (3) completely withdraw UNAMIR.

The next day the Security Council adopted resolution 912, calling for a vastly reduced force of 270 military personnel with a mandate to act as an intermediary in an attempt to broker a cease fire, assist
in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations, and monitor developments including the safety of civilians seeking refuge with UNAMIR.

By the time the Security Council acted, the withdrawal process was already underway. On April 14, Belgium announced its troops were leaving; they began to abandon Rwanda April 19. During this time, the Belgian Foreign Ministry worked behind the scenes to minimize the spectacle of a unilateral withdrawal by convincing other countries to withdraw their contingents.(24) Under this pressure, the whole compliment of forces in the Kigali sector quit, forcing UNAMIR to redeploy to the capital troops from other parts of the country.(25) When Boutros-Ghali presented his options, UNAMIR military personnel numbered 1,515, down from 2,165, and military observers numbered 190, down from 321.(26) In the end, about 500 troops stayed, mostly from Ghana.(27)

By the end of April the RPF -- which had begun to move south two days after the genocide began -- had gained control of most of northern Rwanda. Kigali was divided between the RPF and Rwandan government forces. Massacres continued in all parts of the country with the vast majority happening in government held areas to the south. Many refugees in Tanzania reported assaults on civilians by RPF forces, but there is widespread agreement that RPF abuses were minimal compared to those of their adversaries. Uganda said as many as 40,000 bodies had floated down the Kagera river, which flows through mainly interim government and Hutu militia-controlled territory.

On April 29, the Secretary General urged members of the Security Council to contemplate more forceful action. On May 17, the Security Council passed Resolution 918, authorizing an expanded force. It failed, however, to ascertain which member states would contribute troops. The permanent members of the Security Council, who had the capability, maintained they had no national interests in becoming involved. Some African countries expressed an interest, but lacked the capability. Some potential troop contributing states insisted on seeing the rules of engagement before committing troops.(28) As a result, a strengthened UNAMIR force did not come into being for another six months. Meanwhile, efforts to provide humanitarian aid in RPF-controlled regions expanded rapidly as security conditions allowed. Access in interim government-controlled areas continued to be impossible due to severe security problems. On May 31st, a Ghanian peacekeeper was killed in Kigali by an exploding shell, and evacuation and relief shipments halted.

By the end of May, the chief of operations for the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 Rwandans had died since April 6th. From 22 to 27 May, Mr. Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Major General J. Maurice Baril, Military Advisor to the Secretary General, traveled to Rwanda on a special mission to move the warring parties toward a cease fire, ascertain their intentions toward Resolution 918, and review with UNAMIR the modalities of operation outlined in the Secretary-General's May 13 report. The mission was told that those responsible for the killings included members of the Rwandan army, but were primarily from the Presidential Guard and the interhamwe. The RPF's record was by no means entirely clean, but it was not found to have equal culpability. The mission also found the RPF areas were virtually empty of people, due to previous massacres and incitements to flee the advancing RPF that were broadcast on the interim government's clandestine, mobile Radio Mille Collines.(29)

After weeks of dithering by the members of the UN Security Council and realization that a strengthened UNAMIR force would not enter Rwanda any time soon, France took the initiative. It informed the Secretary-General on June 19, and the Security Council on June 20, that it was willing to lead a multilateral military force, subject to Security Council approval, to "contribut[e] to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians in danger in Rwanda . . . ."(30)

The Security Council approved Operation Turquoise, a French-led force of about 2,500 troops, in resolution 929 adopted June 22nd under Chapter VII of the UN charter. The resolution was sponsored by France, favored by ten members of the Security Council, and abstained from by five
The mandate authorized "the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to . . . [use] all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994)." The cited subparagraphs read: "(a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

Although there was widespread skepticism regarding French motives, in light of their close political and military ties to the ousted Hutu government, Operation Turquoise worked to fulfill the humanitarian objectives stated by the Security Council. They based their operations in Goma Zaire with smaller bases in the towns of Bukavu, Zaire, and Gikongoro, Rwanda. Turquoise established a "safe zone" that covered the prefectures of Kibuye, Gikongoro, and Cyangugu in the south-western portion of Rwanda. (see map) Within the area under their control the French stifled much, though not all, of the genocidal activity of the Hutus. They also deterred RPF troops from entering the zone as the rebels worked to solidify their military victory in the civil war. The RPF, which controlled the capital and about two-thirds of the country, announced it considered France an invader. Yet both sides avoided provocation and by July 8th the French, the RPF, and the provisional Hutu government agreed to a no-fighting zone that covered the safe zone and most of the area still in Hutu hands. These French achievements significantly enhanced the security situation in the safe zone, allowing UN and NGO relief organizations to operate more effectively.

On July 18th, the RPF declared victory; on the 19th they installed a broad-based government. Members of the now-former Hutu government fled to the French protected zone, but were turned away and reported to the UN. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled to Zaire out of fear of Tutsi reprisals, many driven across the border by Hutu former army troops and interhamwe who retained their weapons. Clandestine Hutu extremist radio broadcasts continued to polarize the people and incite violence, as they had done since the outbreak of the genocidal killing.

At the end of July, U.S. President Clinton ordered an emergency humanitarian airlift to refugee camps in Zaire, during which 1,600 troops deployed to the region. By the beginning of August, aid workers put the death toll from cholera and dysentery epidemics in refugee camps in Zaire at 20,000 to 30,000. Despite the disease, only about 200,000 of the estimated 1.2 million refugees in Zaire returned to Rwanda by mid-August. Countering that movement of people were about 150,000 Hutus fleeing to Zaire from the south-western region as the French operation drew to a close. On August 22 French troops completed their withdrawal after a two-month deployment. The new Rwandan government did not immediately take control of the region. Instead they allowed an interim presence of UNAMIR to reduce the fear of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region and keep them inside the country. UNAMIR had not maintained a presence in the south-west during Operation Turquoise. This was due primarily to the small size of the UN force, but also to the de facto condition that Turquoise was a French operation. The French did not want the complications of coordinating with a multinational force.

By the end of September Hutu extremists had seized control of most of the refugee camps. The former interim government had re-established itself in Bukavu with complete freedom, a large stock of weapons, and mobile Radio Mille Collines. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported "a virtual state of war" in the Zairian camps and expressed great concern about the worsening situation. The presence and activities of former Rwandan army, militia, and civilian leaders seriously disrupted humanitarian operations. In some camps they virtually took control of all food and relief distribution; the lives of relief workers were repeatedly threatened; and refugees who expressed a desire to return home were terrorized or killed. The Secretary General suggested the most effective way to ensure the safety of the refugees was to separate the coercive leaders from the camp populations. No one in the camps was adequately prepared to cope with this task. In November 1994, some relief workers (most notably MSF personnel) withdrew from camps at Katale and Bukavu, Zaire.
The situation in Rwanda continued to be desperate. The new government lacked basic resources needed to run a country (such as money in the bank and vehicles to travel outside the capital). Most of the donations from the international community went to help the refugees in Zaire and Tanzania. The population was traumatized and the economy was disrupted. The Rwandan government viewed nine IDP camps in the south-west as breeding grounds for hostile groups and undertook to close them down in early May, 1995. As a result the IDPs returned home, but there were high casualties at Kibeho camp where armed opposition groups resisted the Rwandan army. In an attempt to address the wounds of genocide, the government (with help from the international community) is in the process of reconstructing the judicial system so it can put on trial the huge number of people accused of participating in the killing. Nearly two and a half years after the new government took office over 80,000 people languish in horribly over-crowded jails. Not a single trial has been held. (36)

Hutu extremists lodged in camps in Zaire continued to propagandize and in 1995 began frequent, small cross-border raids to kill genocide survivors. In response, the army used more and more violence along the Zaire border, causing increasing numbers of casualties in the civilian population. (37) Violence emanating from the Zairian camps was also directed at indigenous Zairian populations. It was one of the catalytic factors in the late 1996 rebellion in eastern Zaire that resulted in loss of central government control of hundreds of square miles of territory in the provinces of North and South Kivu. The rebel advance also induced (or allowed) over 600,000 of the refugees to repatriate to Rwanda. At the time of this writing, it is too early to tell how difficult it will be for the Rwandan government and society to reintegrate the refugees and people who participated in the genocide. It is obvious that Rwanda's nightmare is not over.

III. Organizational Players

Despite the difficulty of assembling a reinvigorated UNAMIR peacekeeping force and the general reluctance of other states to get involved during the genocide, there was no shortage of international players by July, 1994. It was then that the war ended and a wave of more than a million refugees washed over Goma, Zaire. This section identifies and describes the international actors involved in the crisis. All coordination efforts for the first 10 months were made by international agencies and organizations, rather than the government of Rwanda. The government did not have enough competence or resources to coordinate members of the international community who traversed its territory. This is often the case during internal conflict situations and is one of the things that makes responding to complex political emergencies so much more difficult than responding to natural disasters.

Many analysts categorize actors within the humanitarian community into four groups: the UN, donor governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Below, I use a slightly different categorization: the UN, states, and NGOs. I prefer "states" over "donor governments" because some states did much more than simply donate goods and money. They sent troops or accepted refugees. They also took diplomatic stands that affected events. I count the ICRC among NGOs because the differences between the ICRC and other large, professional relief organizations are more legalistic and traditional than operational. (38) This study is concerned with operational matters.

A. United Nations

The personnel, agencies, and temporary organizations of the United Nations were instrumental in coordinating and enabling the international emergency response to humanitarian needs arising from the civil war and genocide. As in nearly all complex emergencies, the UN is one of very few bodies willing to attempt to provide a strategic vision of what needs to be done, where and when. It also provides the basic structure and many of the daily mechanisms that are essential for turning the ideas
of many disparate players into coherent action. (The contention that the UN is willing to provide these coordinating functions does not imply that it is always able to do so. Indeed the central premise of this study is that these activities can and should be done better.)

During the period April through December, 1994, the international community allocated approximately $1.29 billion to humanitarian agencies. About half of the total resources expended were channeled through UN agencies, with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP) accounting for over 85% of those resources. A substantial portion of that amount was forwarded to non-governmental organization (NGO) implementing partners. The UN agencies provided strategic and operational coordination, resources, and delivery of goods to the areas of operation. The NGOs were responsible for actually providing assistance to people in need. This division of labor is common to other emergency relief operations.

The rest of this subsection looks at the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the UNAMIR military force, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UNHCR, and the WFP. Each is described briefly and their primary functions are reviewed. Detailed accounts of their activities are presented in the section entitled "Coordination Efforts."

Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG)

The SRSG in Rwanda before, during and immediately after the genocide was Ambassador Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon. He arrived in-country in November 1993, three and a half months after the Arusha Accord was signed. Booh-Booh was a controversial figure in Rwanda and his resignation was eventually sought by RPF secretary-general Theogene Rudasingwa on grounds of incompetence. The demand was not unjustified: the SRSG refrained from criticizing the interim Hutu government or any of its armed forces. He insisted the conflict was simply a civil war between the army and the RPA, and that the priority for the UN was the establishment of a cease-fire. Booh-Booh was transferred out at the end of April and his post was filled temporarily by UNAMIR commander Gen. Dallaire. On July 4 Shaharyar Khan Mohammed arrived to fill the post, which he held until mid-April, 1996. Booh-Booh's central purpose was to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Accord and report to the Secretary-General on progress. That role was crushed in April, 1994 and the humanitarian dimension moved to center stage.

The SRSG did not have the authority to implement a system-wide UN response to the new emergency, nor was he ever given such authority. He never received authorization to act outside the boundaries of Rwanda -- one of several institutional barriers that created an artificial separation between efforts to help those inside Rwanda and those who had fled across international borders. Furthermore, the SRSG did not have authority over any other UN agency.

Matters were complicated by lack of clarity about the roles of the SRSG and the Humanitarian Coordinator (who headed the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). When the new Special Representative, Amb. Khan, arrived in early July, his central task of negotiating a cease-fire was obsolete. The RPA was finishing the process of routing the interim government army so it was not interested in negotiating. In addition, UNREO moved to Kigali from Nairobi at this time and the focus of international efforts turned to emergency relief and rehabilitation. (See below for a detailed account to UNREO.) In short, events put the SRSG on the sidelines while the humanitarian coordinator ran the show, despite the fact that the SRSG officially is the most senior authority in the field during UN operations.

Despite the coordination work of UNREO, the SRSG's office established a Humanitarian Cell. It was staffed by about a half-dozen civilian humanitarian officers drawn from other UN agencies, primarily UNDP. The cell did not work well. It duplicated efforts of UNREO and sometimes sent conflicting...
signals, as when it prepared a Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan with little or no consultation with UNREO or other UN agencies.\(^{(48)}\) The humanitarian cells of the SRSG and UNAMIR used UN funds that could have been better used by UNREO if it had been formally part of an integrated office within the overall organization of the SRSG. This institutional arrangement would also give the Humanitarian Coordinator more weight.\(^{(49)}\) The example is typical of the lack of clarity of rules and relations between the humanitarian-development and political-military arms of the UN. The SRSG is the titular head of UN action in-country, but in reality has no institutional framework to give him the ability to determine the course of events.\(^{(50)}\)

When the UNAMIR commander was acting SRSG this institutional deficiency was temporarily overcome. There was also a clear separation between the roles of the Force Commander and the Humanitarian Coordinator. Nevertheless, the Force Commander/SRSG was far from being in a position to set the course of events. The problem was clarified some in October when a new Humanitarian Coordinator arrived and his post was separated from the UNDP Resident Representative post, thus becoming clearly identified with short-term issues.\(^{(51)}\) The SRSG can potentially play a productive role ensuring harmony between components of the peace consolidation process. An example of positive coordination of political, humanitarian, and military efforts was the reassurance of internally displaced persons in the south-west that they would be safe after Operation Turquoise ended. (See below for more on this.) An example of failure to coordinate was the ”Gersoney Report” sponsored by UNHCR that was critical of the RPF and the security situation in Rwanda for returning refugees. The report was so controversial that it never saw the light of day.\(^{(52)}\)

To be more effective the SRSG's Terms of Reference need to be clearly defined and he needs to be fully familiar with the UN system, its mandates, and capabilities. The primary SRSG function in such situations ought to be to ensure humanitarian considerations get equal weight with political and military considerations. He should not be involved in the day to day functions of any relief coordinating body. Rather he should act as the Secretary-General's spokesperson for policy issues that involve the UN as a whole.\(^{(53)}\)

**United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR)**

UNAMIR had several mandates and widely varying troop levels over the course of its existence. As described above, it was initially established in 1993 to serve a peacekeeping function during the transition to a new governing body, under the Arusha Accord. After April 6 its force strength was significantly reduced and it had severely constrained capabilities to address the ongoing slaughter. In mid-May the Security Council authorized the reinforcement of UNAMIR and changed its mandate somewhat. The mandates, their origins, and their effect on field operations are detailed in the following paragraphs.

The Security Council passed resolution 872 on 5 October 1993 to establish UNAMIR with a mandate:

\(a\) to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali . . . ; \(b\) to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement . . . ; \(c\) to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate . . . ; \(d\) to assist with mine clearance . . . ; \(e\) to investigate . . . instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement related to the integration of the armed forces . . . ; \(f\) to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandan refugees and resettlement of displaced persons . . . ; \(g\) to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations; \(h\) to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.\(^{(54)}\)

UNAMIR had an authorized troop strength of 2,548, which it attained only after great delay. Force Commander Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire (Canada) never received adequate equipment or supplies to operate effectively, lacking even basics like ammunition and petty cash. The force had only
a small civilian policy unit, no human rights cell, and no official intelligence unit. (55) The force was designed only to handle the smooth transition envisioned on paper in the Arusha Accord. As it became evident on the ground that extremists opposed to the peace settlement were escalating the level of violence and had the potential to launch a widespread campaign of killing, Gen. Dallaire made repeated requests to New York for previously authorized equipment. He also requested an interpretation of his mandate that would allow him to conduct cordon and search operations to seize the arms caches of militia members. All his requests were denied. (56)

UN Headquarters was consumed by the desire not to cross "the Mogadishu line" and become involved in another messy internal war that would further erode the credibility of the United Nations. The interests of the field and New York were not in harmony.

When hell descended on Rwanda, UNAMIR was hamstrung by lack of resources and a highly restrictive mandate that allowed no proactive or coercive behavior. Indeed UNAMIR had exhibited its limited capacity during the first part of 1994. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)-France reported at least two cases during that time where UNAMIR personnel were unprepared and unwilling to intervene to protect expatriate relief personnel. Given the constraints placed on Gen. Dallaire, this is not surprising. The episodes likely had little effect on interaction between the UN force and relief organizations for three reasons. First, events after April 6 changed the entire environment and the relationships of those organizations working within it. Second, Gen. Dallaire personally was held in high regard as a dedicated man who understood the dire situation but was saddled with multiple constraints. Third, MSF and UNAMIR, as two of the only international players to remain in Rwanda during April, were forced in the crucible of need to work hand-in-hand. (See the sub-section on the UN Advanced Humanitarian Team, below.)

UNAMIR was also unable to help Tutsis who looked to the UN for future protection prior to April 6. Extremist radio stations Radio Rwanda and Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines stepped up their rhetoric of hatred, but UNAMIR only exhibited impartiality, "as though it were possible to take an impartial position in the prelude to genocide. (57) As a consequence, the population lost confidence in UNAMIR and the extremists gained confidence in their planned genocide.

In the immediate aftermath of the presidents' deaths, Gen. Dallaire and Amb. Booh-Booh were instructed by New York to obtain an immediate cease-fire between the interim government and the RPF and restart the Arusha process. With inadequate transport, Dallaire also had to relocate his Ghanaian battalion to Kigali from the DMZ along the border of Uganda because the RPF had ordered them out. UNAMIR provided escort for the evacuation of expatriates and had to deal with French, Belgian, and Italian forces who arrived to secure the airport while evacuating their own nationals. (58) While in-country, the national militaries preempted UNAMIR control over airport operations and security. France gave UN headquarters and UNAMIR only 45 minutes advance notice of their troops arrival. Within a few days the units were gone. UNAMIR also provided protection to Rwandan who fled to the Amahoro stadium and the city hospital. (59) Protection of Rwandans was outside UNAMIR's mandate, but the Force Commander saved the lives of about 25,000 people by stationing his troops at these two locations and two luxury hotels.

On 21 April, the Security Council passed resolution 912 which reduced the authorized size of the force by 90% to 250. (60) The mandate was adjusted:

(a) to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; (b) to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and (c) to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. (61) UNAMIR rarely had the capacity to conduct overt operations due to lack of troops and even water and fuel. Furthermore, Dallaire's communications capability had disappeared with the departure of the civilian operators.
The Secretary-General's April 20 report to the Security Council that prompted the evisceration of UNAMIR is an astounding example of the disconnect that can exist between UN headquarters and its field operations. The SRSG and the Force Commander had been providing accurate information on what was happening on the ground. They knew and reported that most of the killing was not the result of the renewed civil war, but militia and Presidential Guard attacks on civilians. (62)

Earlier in the year UNAMIR had given headquarters accurate information about plans for extensive civilian massacres. On April 8, the SRSG cabled New York that "a very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror" was underway. (63) Yet Boutros-Ghali's report failed to recognize the nature of the conflict.

There was no mention of an organized conspiracy, and when the killing of moderate cabinet ministers (starting at dawn the morning after the plane was shot down), of the Prime Minister, and of the 10 Belgians were mentioned, those deaths were blamed on "unruly soldiers". There was no mention of the beginning of the organized murder of Tutsi. The provisional government was depicted as disintegrating, as if it fell apart on its own. "Authority collapsed"; (it did not, at least not the authority organizing the conspiracy). Instead of stressing the need to stop the massacre of civilians, Boutros-Ghali declared that "the most urgent task is the securing of an agreement on a cease-fire in the hope that this would lead to the resumption of the peace process and reviving the Arusha Accords." . . . The statement made no mention of UNAMIR's efforts on the ground to protect civilians, a subject that had been discussed in both the Secretariat and the Security Council.

The failure of the Secretary-General to report accurately to the Security Council, despite accurate information from the field, can be plausibly explained by the combination of several factors. First, within the first week, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which is within the Secretariat, established a Situation Center which was in constant telephone contact with the Force Commander and was repeatedly asked by the Security Council to provide it with information and options. On its face this appears to be a good coordinating mechanism. However, many of the requests were not fulfilled. (64) Institutional limitations were the culprit. In early 1994 the DPKO had one policy analyst, one evaluative analyst, and no information accumulated from past efforts at crisis management. (65) Despite the creation of the Situation Center, there was no significant organizational rearrangement in the Secretariat. Personnel involved just worked longer hours. (66)

Second, the leadership in the UN had a distorted view of events based on the concept of a failed state with rogue troops and spontaneous mobs, which had been impressed on them during recent experiences in Somalia. Third, bureaucratic caution indicated that the UN could not afford another peacekeeping failure like that in Somalia, so the inclination was to get UN troops out of harm's way. Fourth, the Secretary-General was physically absent from New York during the first week of the crisis. Decision making responsibility fell to Kofi Annan, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. "Lacking decisive leadership from the Secretary-General, the DPKO seemed caught in a political culture that made it inappropriate to confront the Security Council and futile to present proposals it would not readily approve." (67)

Finally, the major Western powers provided no leadership. They had no strategic interests to protect in Rwanda and were eager not to get involved in another nasty internal war in Africa. (68)

UNAMIR was given the potential to play a larger role on May 17, when the Security Council passed resolution 918, reflecting a significant turn around in the attitude and behavior of the Secretariat and UN headquarters in general. The changes were due to a long-delayed realization in New York of what was really going on, the return of the Secretary-General to New York, and the feeling that the genocide could not be allowed to continue for reasons of morality and the organizational health of the
UN. In other words, once headquarters and the rest of the world knew what was happening, the UN could not afford not to act. The new mandate was expanded to include the following additional responsibilities:

(a) to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; (b) to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations. (69)

The Security Council also authorized up to 5,500 troops. Implementation was slow. By August, after the violence had ended and Operation Turquoise was drawing to a close, UNAMIR II was far from attaining its authorized strength.

The nature of UNAMIR's activities reflected the new emphasis on the provision of emergency relief. The force's Humanitarian Assistance Cell maintained a liaison office with UNREO, the central coordinating body in Rwanda. The Cell connected UNAMIR to the rest of the UN system by exchanging information and acting as a conduit for providing logistical assistance. (70) As UNAMIR grew after August, many of the new contingents sent by member states were oriented toward rehabilitation, as was appropriate. They partook in substantial multi-agency efforts to do key infrastructure repair and rehabilitation. (71)

In March 1996, UNAMIR strength stood at 1,230 soldiers and 146 military observers and staff. The Government of Rwanda had asked the UN to withdraw its military force and on April 19, 1996 the last members of UNAMIR left the country, following a Security Council announcement the previous month. In early June, the Government agreed to a new UN Office for Rwanda as a successor to UNAMIR. The office will serve as an advisory and coordinating agency. As of early August, 1996, the office was expected to open shortly. (72)

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA)

The Secretary-General established the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in April 1992, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of the previous December. In the wake of UN operations in Iraqi Kurdistan and Somalia, the resolution recognized the need to strengthen coordination and make more effective the efforts of the international community to provide emergency assistance to victims of natural disasters and complex (i.e. politically precipitated) emergencies. The new department incorporated the old elements of the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), certain Secretariat structures for dealing with emergency programs, and the Secretariat for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. DHA is headed by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, who is also designated Emergency Relief Coordinator. During the Rwanda crisis, the post was held by Peter Hansen (Denmark). (73)

By virtue of its designated role in the UN system, DHA undertook a number of tasks at UN headquarters in New York and Geneva:

- chaired the IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Committee] meetings and the Under-Secretary-General's Task Force on UN operations;
- administered the CERF [Central Emergency Revolving Fund];
- coordinated the preparation of the April Flash Appeal and the July Consolidated Appeal [for aid donations] and tracked contributions against these appeals;
- sent UNREO [see below] weekly situation reports on e-mail to donor organizations, NGOs and other organizations with access to the UNIENET system;
- provided briefings for the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, the weekly UNHCR coordination meetings in Geneva, the Rwanda Operations Support Group, and occasionally the
Security Council;

- increased the profile of the situation by, for instance, the USG's [Under-Secretary-General's] visits to Kigali in April and July 1994.\(^{(74)}\)

The DHA/Rwanda Team decision-making framework was put in place the weekend of April 9. Desk Officer functions were transferred from New York to Geneva. This was a mistake: the process of transfer caused confusion; the nature of the crisis was highly political (suggesting operations should be run out of the political center in New York); and there were preexisting channels of communication between Kigali and New York, which was not the case with Geneva. DHA has subsequently decided to backstop all complex emergencies out of New York.\(^{(75)}\) The most intensive coordination work occurred at the field level where DHA was the lead agency for the UN relief effort inside Rwanda.\(^{(76)}\)

The Department established two temporary organizations in an attempt to give strategic guidance and day-to-day assistance to the UN agencies, NGOs, and state actors. The United Nations Advanced Humanitarian Team (UNAHT) and the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) are described here briefly and their activities are detailed in the section entitled Coordination Efforts.

*United Nations Advance Humanitarian Team (UNAHT)* -- DHA's first operational move in April was to send the UN Advanced Humanitarian Team (UNAHT) to Kigali April 22, where it remained in operation until July 16. (On that date it was disbanded because UNREO and other UN agencies had moved to Kigali.\(^{(77)}\) The need for a UN humanitarian presence early on was impressed on the Secretariat during the Somalia crisis, when the UN was severely criticized for not maintaining a presence in-country during the initial stages of the food crisis.

The Advanced Humanitarian Team is not an institutionalized response mechanism, as the DART is for USAID, for example. It was an ad hoc arrangement that grew from the conviction of a few people in DHA that presence in Rwanda was essential to prepare for humanitarian relief efforts that were certain to follow. Randolph Kent, a senior DHA officer, recalled Lance Clark's insistence that DHA respond as rapidly as possible, to the point of chasing Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hansen, into the parking lot at UN headquarters and convincing him to act. Clark's efforts led to the establishment of UNAHT and UNREO.\(^{(78)}\) UNAHT personnel were seconded from WFP, UNICEF, DHA, and occasionally the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Individuals rotated in and out of Kigali, bringing first hand knowledge back to the UNREO office in Nairobi, Kenya.\(^{(79)}\) While in Kigali, they worked from the UNAMIR command compound. That was the only "safe" place to be, and it too was occasionally under fire.

The AHT had four objectives:

1) assess existing infrastructure; 2) identify urgent humanitarian needs and actions to be taken (particularly concerning channels of distribution of relief goods); 3) assess other priorities; and 4) establish liaison with all humanitarian aid agencies operating in Kigali.\(^{(80)}\)

The Team found the ability to deliver assistance extremely limited. WFP stocks in Kigali were inaccessible. Even if they could have been reached, large scale distribution might have increased the level of violence. As it was, threatened populations who were provided with limited supplies were then targeted by the militia.\(^{(81)}\)

*United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO)* -- The term "United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office" was introduced April 21 by Lance Clark of DHA, and has been criticized since then because it does not clearly identify UNREO as a UNDHA operation, thus creating some confusion about its proper role and authority in the field.\(^{(82)}\)
UNREO was first set up in Nairobi, Kenya, in offices owned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), since DHA did not have any of its own facilities there. (Nairobi is the center for UN operations in the Eastern and Central African region.) The UN Resident Representative (a UNDP position) was put in charge of UNREO and given the additional title of Humanitarian Coordinator. On policy and planning matters he reported to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator/Under Secretary-General of DHA. An information document put out by UNREO soon after it was established identified four tasks: (1) to prepare policy papers on specific humanitarian issues; (2) to collect, analyze, and disseminate information; (3) to support UN agency operations; and (4) to assume the role of secretariat for Disaster Management Team, NGO, and donor meetings. Perhaps most importantly, UNREO-Nairobi began to produce Situation Reports that provided timely information on the disposition of the civilian population, the most urgent needs to cover, and what was being done to cover them. Though necessarily limited in scope, they were greatly valued by the donor and NGO communities. In addition to establishing the UNAHT in Kigali UNREO opened a sub-office in Kabale, Uganda. The sub-office communicated with the Social Wing of the RPF and held coordination meetings with UN agencies and NGOs beginning preparations for cross-border operations into RPF-controlled areas. Operating Principles for organizations working inside Rwanda were cleared through the interim government and RPF. The principles required "guarantees of security, impartiality and monitoring." 

The first organizations party to the principles were UNREO, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC, and UNAMIR. UNREO greatly facilitated the development of a consensus on priorities among donors and the humanitarian community by serving as a back up to, and line of communication with, UNAHT in Kigali. It was criticized for being slow to move to Kigali where it could do the most good. But by remaining in Nairobi it avoided the dangers and difficulties of operating inside Rwanda in the first few months. Some observers also saw great advantages of neutrality in setting up the central humanitarian coordinating office in an area that was not dominated by either warring party. When DHA had established itself in Kigali with more than just the Advanced Humanitarian Team, it set up the On-Site Operation Coordination Center (OSOCC) in a UNDP building in downtown Kigali on 15 August. It also established field offices in Gikongoro, Butare, and Cyangugu. Field presence facilitated daily operations, helped maintain an up to date review of developments, and safeguarded the image and concept of neutrality.

The OSOCC consisted of UNREO, UNAMIR, a U.S. Civil-Military Operations Center, and an NGO Liaison Unit (see below for descriptions of the latter two). The Center was initially directed by Humanitarian Coordinator Arturo Hein, but in fact run by his deputy Charles Petrie. It had three objectives: (1) provide a framework for coordination of activities by humanitarian organizations, (2) act as a focal point for collection, analysis, and dissemination of information, and (3) facilitate access to, and sharing of, resources. It was divided into an information cell, an operations cell, and a logistics cell, with common services managed by the Swedish support team. In practice, everyone refers to UNREO and all activity was coordinated through UNREO. The term OSOCC is virtually never used.

Related Organizing Bodies -- DHA, through UNREO, worked with a number of other bodies designed to organize the international humanitarian response. They are discussed under appropriate sub-headings below, and are simply mentioned here to acknowledge their interaction with the UN coordination effort. France operated a Humanitarian Cell during its military intervention in the south-west. That body had minimal contact with UNREO and was not a significant actor. The United States sent a small military contingent to the region in July, under the name Operation Restore Hope, to assist with delivery of relief supplies. The U.S. military set up a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) that had a regular liaison office with UNREO in Kigali. The U.S. also supplied technical expertise to the relief effort in the form of a Disaster Assistance Relief Team under the U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID-BHA-OFDA-DART). The NGO community had a Liaison Unit that was collocated with
UNREO in Kigali and worked effectively as an information clearing house. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) unit in Rwanda worked primarily with the ICRC rather than UNREO.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

The UNDP's role in Rwanda, as in most complex emergencies, was largely administrative. General Assembly resolution 46/182, which established DHA in 1991, arranged for DHA to use existing Development Program staff and resources in its initial response. "In humanitarian emergencies, UNDP provides logistic, communications, and other support for the activities of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator/DHA, the international relief community and the UN's Disaster Management Team." (95) UNDP has a network of field offices in 130 countries, so it has assets near emergency situations virtually anywhere they occur. (96)

In January, 1994, an Emergency Unit was created within the UNDP office in Kigali. The unit was established jointly by UNDP and DHA and was staffed by people under UNDP contracts. Its purpose was to coordinate humanitarian activities within Rwanda during the period of political transition envisioned by the Arusha Accord. After April 6, the Emergency Unit moved with its two expatriate staff to the UNDP complex in Nairobi. The Unit effectively became the field coordinating office for activities in Rwanda under the authority of DHA (i.e. the seed of UNREO). This transition was in line with the mechanism envisioned in the General Assembly resolution that created DHA. (97)

The relationship between UNDP and DHA/UNREO was murky. Even some staff working for UNREO were unaware that it was under the authority of DHA. The transition of staff responsibilities from development to emergency response is partially responsible for this confusion. Even an information document produced by UNREO shortly after its inception was confusing: "Created under the authority of the DHA and with the assistance of UNDP, UNREO is a light structure supporting the UN Humanitarian Coordinator . . . . (98) As discussed above, the Humanitarian Coordinator (a DHA position) was, by design, the same person as the UN Resident Representative (a UNDP position). The rest of UNREO's original staff were either UNDP personnel or under contract to UNDP. Those contracts shifted to DHA, but many of the people remained the same, at least for a time.

When UNREO moved to Kigali, it became increasingly separated from UNDP and simultaneously more directly connected to DHA. The post of Humanitarian Coordinator was separated from the post of UN Resident Representative in late October, with the arrival of a new person to take the title of Humanitarian Coordinator. UNREO remained housed in UNDP buildings, and there were tensions over matters such as office space, administrative support services, and access to telecommunications. (99)

United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR)

The mandate of the High Commission for Refugees is to protect and assist people who have fled their country of origin out of well-founded fear of persecution. Due to its traditional refugee repatriation work, it has always been involved within the country of origin to some extent. The agency is independent from the Secretariat, thus not under the Secretary-General's control (in contrast to DHA, the lead agency inside Rwanda). It acts under the authority of the General Assembly and takes its policy direction from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a counterpart to the Security Council within UN headquarters. (100) UNHCR took the role of lead agency outside Rwanda, providing strategic guidance and operational oversight for the humanitarian response to the unprecedented refugee outflows from Rwanda into surrounding countries.

With so many UN agencies, NGOs and other organizations involved in relief operations, there was a critical need for strong capacity at the center to provide leadership and overall coordination. In regard
to refugee operations, UNHCR came close to fulfilling such a role by virtue of its clear mandate, support from host governments (particularly in the case of Tanzania), highly-competent technical coordination personnel, and control over a significant portion of the funds available for agencies and NGOs responding to the refugee problem -- in large part due to a bold decision by ECHO to channel all its funds for refugees through UNHCR. (101)

Among the more important coordination mechanisms used by UNHCR were Emergency Response Teams, an Air Operations Cell that managed the airlift of supplies, and Service Packages. There were three primary areas of operation: Goma and Bukavu, Zaire, adjacent to the north-western and south-western corners to Rwanda respectively, and Ngara, Tanzania, adjacent to the south-eastern corner of Rwanda. The course of events and UNHCR's control over the situation in each of the three locations varied greatly. These differences are investigated in the "Coordination in Relation to Refugees" section below.

UNHCR also became involved within Rwandan borders through efforts to encourage refugees to return to their homes and discourage IDPs from leaving the country. (See the section on Repatriation at the end of the paper.) The agency established field offices at Gisenyi, Gikongoro, Butare, and Cyangugu. (102) Their tasks included coordinating transport and short-term relief assistance to refugees wishing to return, establishing community-based rehabilitation and reintegration projects, supporting ministries and governmental efforts to rebuild the country, and posting staff members to areas of return to monitor the returnees security and welfare. (103)

World Food Program (WFP)

The WFP shares with UNHCR the distinction of being one of the two largest agencies in the UN humanitarian relief system. Its mission is to provide food to needy people in emergency situations, as well as to encourage longer-term development by improving nutrition and building assets to promote self-reliance of poor people and communities. During complex emergencies, in addition to providing a large volume of food relief, WFP collects and disseminates information on global food aid deliveries and requirements, and sets up logistics centers. (104) WFP also works regularly and closely with UNHCR through a Memorandum of Understanding regarding food delivery.

The agency was one of the first to respond to events inside and outside Rwanda. WFP was present in Rwanda before April and had logistical and management capacity that enabled it to respond more rapidly and effectively than it would otherwise have been able to do. It worked closely with a number of NGOs who acted as implementing partners for food delivery to refugee and IDP camps. WFP delivered 75% of the total food aid to Rwanda and surrounding areas. (105) Within Rwanda WFP deliveries accounted for only 32% of the total, with the ICRC acting as the largest distributor. (106)

B. Other International Organizations

Several other international organizations deserve mention. They played a variety of roles, with varying effectiveness. None focused on, nor significantly contributed to, inter-organizational cooperation.

Organization of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is an international organization that consists of all the states of Africa. It played a diplomatic role, but offered no humanitarian or military response. This was in keeping with the role envisioned for the organization from its inception. It is a forum for conciliation and mediation, with minimal provisions for action.

The OAU played an important role in the transition from civil war to power sharing set out in the Arusha Accord. In early 1993 it sent about 60 military observers to monitor the application of a
cease-fire in the civil war. The mission was replaced by a UN observer group to quiet fears that the RPF was being rearmed through Uganda.\(^{(107)}\) The Secretary-General of the OAU at the time was Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania. He was one of the first international officials to condemn the massacres, calling them "heinous acts" (but not genocide) on April 8.\(^{(108)}\) Within the first two weeks Salim met with representatives from the interim government and the RPF and set up a conference designed to establish a cease-fire, end the massacres, and return to the Arusha Accord process.\(^{(109)}\) Two days before the meeting was to take place, the OAU was undercut by the UN Security Council decision to eviscerate UNAMIR. The UN move was publicly criticized by many members of the OAU.

In addition to built in limitations on its ability to act, the OAU suffered from two other factors. It was split along Anglophone-Francophone lines. The countries most closely tied to France, particularly Zaire, backed the interim Hutu government and the French military intervention. Other members did not. In addition, Egypt held the organizations chairmanship until the annual June summit meeting held in Tunis. Egypt was a friend and arms supplier to the Habyarimana regime.

At the June summit meeting, the Hutu interim government still held Rwanda's chair at the table. The RPF attended as special guests of the Secretary-General. The meeting passed a resolution (a) condemning the massacres and calling for their end, (b) calling for the punishment of the perpetrators according to international law, and (c) calling for an immediate cease-fire.

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is frequently viewed as being in a class by itself. One of the largest and most influential humanitarian organizations in the world, it is a private organization based in Geneva with a board of governors of eminent Swiss citizens. The ICRC works together with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and their national chapters. The ICRC is similar to a large NGO in that it receives substantial contributions from governments, but is different in that it has the distinction of being formally recognized in international humanitarian law. One of its central functions is to act as the custodian for that body of law, ensuring that all relevant parties know the law. ICRC's objectives in conflict situations are to monitor compliance with international humanitarian law, provide emergency assistance, visit prisoners, and reunited separated families.\(^{(110)}\)

In Rwanda, the ICRC was working in the country before the genocide erupted and was one of only two international organizations that maintained a presence there throughout the crisis.\(^{(111)}\) It played a central role in the delivery of food aid to the region and the distribution of food and medical care to the civilian population. In these activities it cooperated, sometimes contentiously, with the WFP. ICRC staff members participated in cooperative forums at all levels, from UN headquarters strategy meetings down to field office implementation meetings. The organization did not sponsor any coordination activities of its own.

**European Community Humanitarian Office**

The European Community established a Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in April 1992, in response to events in the former Yugoslavia. The office now gives the European Union a direct hand in humanitarian assistance in conflict areas. It has its own programs and staff posted to field offices, and asserts a significant financial and institutional interest in assistance issues.\(^{(112)}\) It was one of the two largest donor organizations in Rwanda, the other being the American Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). ECHO's role inside Rwanda was to provide money and technical assistance to European NGOs and the ICRC. Funding requests were sent back to Brussels for approval, with a recommendation from the field.\(^{(113)}\) ECHO interacted minimally with UNREO, preferring to work with the ICRC. This was because it perceived the ICRC as more competent and as playing the critical
role in relation to IDPs. (114) Nevertheless, the ECHO office in Kigali, established in early August, did cooperate with UNHCR and UNREO in the transportation of returning refugees and IDPs. (115)

With regard to refugee programs, ECHO strongly supported UNHCR by directing all its refugee-related funding through that agency and attaching personnel to UNHCR offices in Ngara and Goma. ECHO and DART did not have direct contact with each other, despite the importance of their resources. Regular meetings were initiated in November, 1994, but soon ended when ECHO officials felt their information sharing was not being reciprocated. (116)

International Organization For Migration

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was formed in 1951 as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to help resettle displaced people in Europe. The Geneva-based organization has since changed it name and expanded its geographic reach, but it remains concerned with population return and resettlement. Its mandate is to "ensure, throughout the world, the orderly migration of persons who are in need of international migration assistance." The IOM is an intergovernmental organization with 52 member states and 40 observers. (117) In the Great Lakes region, it has played a large role in the transportation of IDPs and refugees. It coordinates its activities with UNHCR.

C. States

States played a variety of roles in response to the crisis. The most important were donations in cash and kind and refugee asylum. Most of the estimated $1.7 billion expended from April to December, 1994, came from state governments. The money was channeled through UN agencies, bilateral organizations, and NGOs. States bordering Rwanda, especially Zaire and Tanzania, allowed refugees to enter (most of the time) and provided in-kind assistance, especially infrastructure, which ranged from basic to minimal.

A number of states sent military contingents, some of which provided security, some of which provided relief assistance, and some of which did both. Most troops within Rwanda were under the UNAMIR command structure. Since UNAMIR's mandate did not extend outside Rwanda, all foreign units operating in Zaire did so under their own command in accordance with bilateral agreements with the government of Zaire. (118) The two largest military operations were undertaken by the United States (Operation Support Hope) and France (Operation Turquoise). They are described below.

States also played a diplomatic role. The diplomatic record is a sorry one indeed. Up to one million people died because efforts to prevent renewed violence after the Arusha Accords fundamentally misunderstood the internal politics of Rwanda. The harder the international community pushed president Habyarimana to implement the power sharing agreement, the more vicious and desperate the extremists within his government became. (119)

Once the genocide broke out and the civil war recommenced, the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General focused exclusively on attempting to establish a cease-fire. They ignored the genocide. When the genocide was recognized for what it was, the response was to substitute humanitarian aid for political action. The conflict between Hutus and Tutsis is as virulent now as it ever has been; the international tribunal on war crimes is making only very slow headway in prosecuting those responsible for leading the genocide; to date far more aid money and effort has been expended on the refugees (many of whom are implicated in the genocide) than on strengthening the new Rwandan government and rebuilding a functioning society and legal system.

The following subsections focus on the military and humanitarian efforts of France and the United States, as well as on the roles played by the border states of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire.
France

France was the European country most heavily involved in Rwanda both before and after April, 1994. As Belgium lost interest and capacity to maintain close relations with its former colony, France undertook to incorporate the country into its sphere of influence as part of Francophone Africa. The French government provided the Habyarimana regime with financial assistance, diplomatic support, and military aid. The military aid consisted of arms transfers, training, and even wartime assistance. When the RPA began the civil war in 1990 and made significant headway toward the capital, France sent a few of its top combat units to back up the Rwandan army. That action turned the tide of the war and pushed the rebels back to just south of the Ugandan border.

France was not a leading donor to the relief effort, in comparison with its traditional leading role in the country: it ranked 16th, just in front of Ireland and Israel. The cost of Operation Turquoise is not available and is not included in this ranking. Diplomatically, France went with the consensus in the UN, voting in favor of all the relevant Security Council resolutions, including the ones to reduce UNAMIR and then re-enlarge it. However, the French government exhibited more leadership than other country. It urged both the Western European Union and NATO to take action. When both declined, France drafted and sponsored Security Council resolution 929 which authorizing France to undertake Operation Turquoise.

Operation Turquoise -- One of the most unusual aspects of the international response to events in Rwanda was Operation Turquoise. On June 22, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 929 authorizing a French-led and dominated military force to intervene in Rwanda under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The following paragraphs discuss the successes and failures of Operation Turquoise in terms of stopping the genocide and allowing relief activities to take place. Coordination efforts with UNREO and other actors are taken up in a later section.

All French troops for Operation Turquoise were mobilized on June 23, 1994, the day after passage of resolution 929. French forces already stationed in Africa -- primarily in the Central African Republic -- were joined by about 350 troops from seven African Francophone countries, primarily Senegal. They established bases of operation in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire, which are on the border of Rwanda at the north and south ends of Lake Kivu. Such a rapid response was made possible by extensive preparations in advance of the UN resolution. The 2,555 French troops easily outgunned both the interim government army and the rebels. Its fairly robust force structure included 12 Jaguar and F-1 aircraft, light armor, helicopters, and a number of other vehicles. French Defense Minister Francois Leotard stated the mission was a limited operation to protect Tutsis by deploying in parts of western Rwanda controlled by the Hutu government. The Security Council's authorizing resolution said explicitly that the mission was to be neutral and impartial and was not to act as an interposition force between the RPA and the Hutu army.

Within a day French troops were making incursions into Rwandan territory. Initially they focused on reconnaissance and temporary protection of small groups of Tutsi whom they happened upon. Within 12 days, Turquoise established a full-time presence in Rwanda with a forward base at Gikongoro and another at Kibuye. The focus of the mission at this point clearly became security oriented. Turquoise established and maintained a so-called safe zone over the three prefectures of south-western Rwanda (see map). The objective was to prevent violence within the zone, thus protecting civilians and enabling aid organizations to operate. The interim government army and the RPA were deterred from entering (the front of the civil war was held at bay), and militia activity was dampened, though not fully extinguished (genocidal attacks were reduced).

Of approximately 2,580,000 people who were within the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle when
the French proclaimed it a safe zone, slightly less than one million were IDPs -- almost exclusively Hutus -- who had fled in front of the advancing RPF forces. People continued to seek refuge in the safe zone, so that at the close of the operation IDPs in the zone numbered approximately 1.7 million. Relief agencies were able to operate behind Turquoise lines and with fewer constraints on their actions than behind RPA lines. Aid agencies verify that greater security afforded them better access to the region occupied by the intervention force. During the third week in July, when the flood of Hutus fleeing the RPF's final push to victory poured into refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire, refugees at Goma were in desperate need of food, but those at Bukavu were relatively well fed. The latter had been in the safe zone, the former had not.

This all becomes rather less impressive when one realizes only about 15,000 Tutsis remained in the "safe" zone. The rest had already been killed. Furthermore, many of the IDPs were active in the pursuit of genocide. The inability of the RPF to move into the southwest meant many key perpetrators of the genocide and the interhamwe infrastructure remained. The conditions in the IDP camps were poor. There were unusually high rates of mortality and morbidity due to congestion, lack of water, inadequate sanitation, and problems with the supply of food and its equitable distribution within the camps. The camps were a constant source of political threat until they were closed by the government in the spring and early summer of 1995. The south-western portion of the country remained the most insecure for some time.

Turquoise should have acted much sooner to jam transmissions from Radio Mille Collines, the clandestine, mobile, extremist radio station that operated within the protected zone. Turquoise commander Gen. Lafourcade admitted this was "a real failure of the French." He claimed he was not aware of the radio station until mid-July, at which point the requisite electronic equipment was brought in and broadcasting stopped on July 17. The existence of the radio station was no secret to UNAMIR, the RPF, and anyone else with a radio receiver. Either Gen. Lafourcade was dissembling, or communication between the French and those already involved in Rwanda was woefully inadequate during the planning and early implementation phases.

The secretary general of the French Foreign Ministry, Mr. Dufourq, said soldiers and militia who entered the safe zone were disarmed immediately. General Lafourcade claims that Turquoise did a rather good job against the militia: roadblocks encountered were immediately broken up and the militia guarding them were disarmed. Furthermore, IDP camps were protected, especially at night. Yet at the end of July, armed Hutu militia still roamed the French zone attacking and plundering.

French troops occasionally clashed with interhamwe but on numerous occasions they proved too few in number to rein in the militia. Several times they discovered Tutsis being systematically killed and simply drove away. They did not even venture into remote rural areas. Turquoise officials were silent on the matter of the large number of interhamwe, including their leaders, who congregated around Gikongoro, where the French established a military base. Worse yet, there are reports of cooperation between French troops and Rwandan army and militia members. Turquoise troops did not stop the destruction by Hutus of government property, the lack of which now significantly hinders the new Rwandan government. Nor did they attempt to apprehend major killers in anticipation of bringing them to court under the Genocide Convention, even when the killers were identified to them. The head of Ethiopia's contingent within UNAMIR saw French troops transporting Hutu government troops to Zaire. The BBC's correspondent in Goma saw "a French military vehicle [draw] up and it had General Augustine Bizimungu, chief of staff of the former Rwandan Armed Forces in it. Turquoise commanders also retained well-known killers in senior positions in local government administration.

United States

The United States played important roles on both the political and humanitarian dimensions of the international response to events in Rwanda. It was instrumental in blocking political and military
action in the UN and it was the largest single donor to the humanitarian effort to assist refugees and IDPs. The American Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, fully supported the Security Council decision to cut the size of UNAMIR. She also opposed several proposals to expand the UN operation. The Clinton administration has been widely criticized for its policy of not using the word genocide to describe what was occurring. Using the word would have increased pressure to take political action under the Genocide Convention of which the US is a member (as are most other states, who also did not say "genocide"). Rwanda blew up just as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was made public. The directive, heavily influenced by America's unpleasant experience in Somalia, laid out criteria necessary for the US to commit military forces abroad. The criteria are extremely demanding and Rwanda did not come close to meeting them.

While it failed miserably to do anything about the genocide, the US donated generously to the emergency relief effort. Assistance amounted to about $370 million during 1994, including $106 million for Operation Restore Hope.(146) As of June, 1996, the US Government had provided approximately $597.5 million. Of that amount, $122.6 million was for humanitarian assistance within Rwanda and $20 million was for development activities within the country.(147) The rest went to support refugee operations.(148) Most of the money was channeled through USAID, WFP, and UNHCR.

In July, President Clinton responded to the widely reported Goma refugee emergency by authorizing a small military operation to assist with the logistics of emergency food and water delivery. Operation Support Hope was "purely humanitarian" with no combat capability. Its headquarters were at the airfield in Entebbe, Uganda, with Joint Task Force A in Goma and Joint Task Force B in Kigali.(149) It operated completely outside the UN authority structure. At its height, there were about 3,000 troops in the region(150) That number quickly dwindled and all US military personnel were gone by the end of September.(151)

The US had two coordinating mechanisms in the region. The Disaster Assistance Response Team, sent by the US Agency for International Development, successfully facilitated the activities of UNREO and individual relief organizations. The Civil-Military Operations Center of Operation Support Hope was severely circumscribed and offered little more than logistical support. They are described in the following sections.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) -- The US Agency for International Development, Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID-BHA-OFDA) has developed a response capability for disaster emergencies called the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). A DART consists of specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills who can be quickly dispatched to emergency locations. Their job is to assist US Embassies and USAID missions with the management of the US government's responses to disasters. DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected government, NGOs, international organizations, other countries, and if appropriate, with US military forces.

During rapid onset disasters, the focus of a DART is to:

- Coordinate the assessment of the situation and report on the needs.
- Manage USG on-site relief activities (e.g. search and rescue and air operations).
- Manage the receipt, distribution, and monitoring of USG-provided relief supplies.
- During long-term, complex disasters, the focus of a DART is to:
  - Gather information on the general disaster situation.
  - Assess the effectiveness of the overall humanitarian response.
  - Identify the needs not being met by current overall response efforts.
  - Monitor the effectiveness of current USG funded relief activities.
- Review proposals of relief activities for possible future funding.
- Advise USAID/Embassy on disaster issues.
- Make recommendations to OFDA Washington on follow-on strategies and actions.
- Implement procuring of contractual and grant services under special circumstances.

To accomplish these tasks, a DART is divided into five functional areas: management, operations, planning, logistics, and administration. Liaison with other actors is done within the management area.\(^{152}\)

DART staffs are small, reflecting their managerial nature -- that is, they are not large enough to do implementation work. At the height of the crisis OFDA-DART had 17 people spread across Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania. It began operations in mid-May with an office in Nairobi. Field offices were soon opened in Bujumbura, Burundi and Kampala, Entebbe, and Kabale Uganda. With the establishment of a new government in Kigali and the influx of refugees to Goma, offices were opened in those locations in early- and mid-July respectively. (DART personnel were not allowed into Rwanda earlier because of security concerns.\(^{153}\)

DART activities included assessing relief requirements, liaison with UN agencies to establish a coordination strategy, and allocating funds directly to UN agencies and NGOs. The authority to approve cash grants without resort to Washington was unusual. DART field offices helped strengthen UNREO field offices by co-locating with them, thus making available their technical expertise. DART worked closely with UNREO to develop a strategy to keep IDPs in Rwanda after Operation Turquoise left.\(^{154}\)

**Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC) -- Operation Restore Hope, a Joint Task Force (JTF) endeavor by the US military, had as its objective to provide assistance to humanitarian organizations conducting relief operations. The Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) attached to the Joint Task Force were of central importance in the American military's humanitarian effort. CMOCs were set up in Entebbe, Uganda (Restore Hope's rear base), Goma and Kigali. They were the link between the military command and humanitarian organizations. In Entebbe and Goma the link was with the UNHCR coordination office; in Kigali it was with UNREO.**

CMOC-Entebbe was established 28 July, four days after the first US military personnel arrived. The primary task was to facilitate the transportation of relief supplies by air to Zaire and Rwanda.\(^{155}\) It was collocated with JTF headquarters in the airport terminal with an office across the hall from the operations planning office (the J3). The proximity of the CMOC to the J3 helped to overcome conceptual problems about the goals of the American force. It took more than a little work to convince a military trained to fight and support itself that the objective was to support others and not fight. CMOC-Entebbe decreased in importance when WFP's large trucks arrived to provide transport and when Kigali airport reopened in mid-September.\(^{156}\)

CMOC-Goma was established on 30 July. It was a small operation, based at the airfield, that facilitated requests for logistical assistance from NGOs and UN agencies. It did not, however, have any direct contact with these organizations. The CMOC had one liaison officer who attended regular UNHCR-sponsored general and sectoral meetings. He was assisted by experts from DART with collecting and tracking requests validated by UNHCR. On 28 August, CMOC-Goma shut down.\(^{157}\)

CMOC-Kigali came into being on 5 August as a subcomponent of the OSOCC. It worked closely with UNREO in the same manner that the Goma office worked with UNHCR. Requests for assistance went through the UN agency and were passed on to Entebbe by the CMOC. Officers attended the general and sectoral coordination meetings and also made their services known out in the field by visiting NGOs where they worked. Again, CMOC and DART personnel worked together. CMOC-Kigali was closed on 28 September, 1994.\(^{158}\)
Neighboring States

The four states that border Rwanda -- Uganda to the north, Tanzania to the east, Burundi to the south, and Zaire to the west -- played important roles, though they did virtually nothing in terms of inter-organizational coordination.

Uganda -- Uganda was home to several hundred thousand Tutsis who fled Rwanda when the Hutus took power and killed the Tutsi king in 1959. From this population grew the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) members of which fought on the side of Yoweri Museveni in his successful bid to overthrow Milton Obote in the early 1980s. In payment for their support, Museveni did not prevent the RPF from using Ugandan territory as a rear base and supply route during its civil war against the Habyarimana regime. He did, however, agree to the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), designed to stop cross-border arms flow as part of the Arusha Accord. Though very little is said about it, the RPF must have continued to use the supply routes after April 1994, and indeed increased the volume of material flowing through them. There is no way they would have been able to rapidly move the front lines forward without a steady (if primitive) logistics train in the rear.

During April and May, President Museveni kept a low profile, probably not wishing to draw attention to his historical links with the RPF. In June he made a strong call for the RPF to observe a cease-fire. Throughout the period Uganda received only a small number of refugees. At the end of August (when most of the people who wanted to leave Rwanda had already done so) UNHCR counted 15,000 "new case load" refugees in Uganda. Hutus would not go there, knowing it to be Tutsi territory, and Tutsis who avoided the genocide found themselves to be safe behind the RPF lines sweeping down from the north.

The significant refugee movement came after the RPF declared a new government. Hundreds of thousands of what the UNHCR called "old case load" (pre-1994) Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda. Many of them had been born in Uganda. The old case load refugees continue to create grave problems concerning property in Rwanda. They have appropriated land and houses vacated by Hutus who fled. With the sudden return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees from Zaire in late 1996, property rights became a central focus of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. The government of Rwanda did not have any plan for coping with such a large and rapid repatriation.

Tanzania -- Tanzania was closely involved in bringing the Arusha Accord into being and promoting its implementation. The conferences were held in the Tanzanian city of Arusha and chaired by Tanzanian officials. The country is unique among Rwanda's neighbors in having a credible claim to neutral status. Unfortunately that position was not used, as Tanzania failed to act constructively after April. Despite good knowledge of what was happening, the government did not take sides or point fingers. Rather it continually stressed the need to return to the Arusha process. This might have grown from the desire to preserve the diplomatic agreement that Tanzania played a key role in bringing about.

Tanzania accepted the second largest number of refugees, most of whom fled to the Ngara region from south-eastern Rwanda. The government cooperated to a great extent with UNHCR and the other aid organizations working in the camps. This cooperation contributed to the initially good condition of the refugee camps in Tanzania. (See below on why Tanzanian camp conditions deteriorated.) Nevertheless, the country did close its borders on several occasions to stem the flow of refugees. When it became clear that many people who had participated in the killings were taking refuge in Tanzania, the government was stung by criticism of former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere that it should not be harboring killers. No good solution was found, but Tanzanian police forces did subdue violence in the camps following a request by UNHCR.
Burundi -- Events in Burundi have always been closely tied to those in Rwanda. They share demographic profiles, border each other, and involuntarily exchange refugee populations. The internal political balance is different from Rwanda however. The Tutsi never fully relinquished power, despite the election of a Hutu president in 1993. The president was assassinated within months of being elected and was replaced by a Tutsi; the army has always been Tutsi dominated.

Burundi was host to about 200,000 "old case load" Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. In the 1960s they launched an ill-planned invasion into Rwanda that was repulsed and followed by harsh reprisals against Tutsi in Rwanda by the Habyarimana regime. Some of them joined the RPF in Uganda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1994, when the RPF was desperately short of personnel needed to control territory it had captured and it looked as though it would win the war, a large number of Burundi-based Rwandan Tutsi refugees were recruited. These refugees had adopted a mind set of hatred and counter-massacre, following a pattern that had been established over the years in Burundi, intensifying after the death of President Ndadaye in 1993. The result of accepting the new recruits was increased extremism within the RPF and some loss of control over soldiers' behavior, especially in the south-west.

The government of Burundi kept a low profile after April, 1994. President Ntaryamira, who was killed in the same plane with the Rwandan president, was not replaced until September. Burundian leaders were far too busy with their own internal security concerns and political instability to play a coherent role in events next door. One of the few official acts they did take was to deny French troops permission to use or cross Burundian territory during Operation Turquoise. The decision was strongly influenced by demonstrations against the French plan by the Tutsi opposition party UPRONA, which had close ties to the RPF.

Burundi is now enmeshed in its own violent civil war. The adversaries are ethnically based political parties and associated armed groups. As in Rwanda, Hutus are pitted against Tutsis. Unlike Rwanda, genocide is not likely, despite numerous massacres on both sides. This is because the government is much weaker than the former Rwandan government and the balance of power between the two sides is fairly even. International aid agencies have very little access to populations in need due to the violence and to economic sanctions imposed on Burundi by its neighbors which have closed down previously used supply routes. The sanctions are designed to wrench concessions from the government of Pierre Boyoya who took power in a coup during the summer of 1996. As part of its effort to control its territory, new government forced about 80,000 Rwandan refugees in the northern portion of the country to repatriate. There has been very little violence against the returnees to date.

Zaire -- Of the four neighbors, Zaire was and remains the only one allied with the former Hutu regime. In 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko followed France's lead and sent several hundred of his best troops to assist the Habyarimana regime repulse the RPF attack that began the civil war. The Zairian troops clashed directly with the RPF. Nevertheless, Zaire signed the Arusha Accord in August, 1993. Mobutu even personally intervened with President Habyarimana on April 4, 1994 to urge implementation of the agreement. Zaire's behavior is far from exemplary. In the third week of April, Mobutu scuttled a regional summit meeting on Rwanda to be held in Tanzania. Since April 6, Hutu interim government officials, army, and militia members have traveled freely through Zairian territory. The Presence of Hutu extremists, and the reformation of their authority structure within the refugee camps in Zaire has been known for years. This is not necessarily the fault of the government of Zaire. However, the Hutus seem to have Mobutu's blessing. He has traveled abroad with Madam Habyarimana and in June 1994 a leading interim government official was the guest at the Zairian chapter of an international press club. The government did send troops to control the violence in the camps in early 1995, after being pressured by the UN and aid organizations. The troops, undisciplined and poorly paid, engaged in extortion and violence against the camp population, making them more of a problem than a solution. (Their behavior should
have surprised no one. In 1992, Zairian army troops rampaged through Goma, looting everything they could. They threatened to return a few months later but were satisfied with cash payments from the residents. (175)

Most of the first "camp guards" were subsequently removed and replaced by better units. The replacement units were paid by UNHCR in an attempt to reduce the incentive for extortion and looting. However, they too were ineffective at controlling violence in the camps or preventing attacks from the camps into Rwanda.

At one point, in August 1995, Zairian troops expelled 13,000 Hutu from Goma camps and threatened to close all the camps by the end of the year. The threat was not acted upon. Subsequently, members of the former Rwandan army and Interhamwe tried to create an area of Hutu control in the Masisi region north of Goma. In the process they directed considerable violence at the Tutsi population indigenous to the area. (176) The Zairian armed forces did nothing to stop this activity. Extremists within the camps mounted a steadily increasing number of insurgent strikes and "continuing genocide" in western Rwanda from 1994 until late 1996. (177) The violence caused by the Hutu extremists, the Zairian army's unwillingness or inability to prevent it, and attempts by local government officials to revoke citizenship rights and expel members of the Tutsi ethnic group combined to provoke the huge Zairian rebel offensive in late 1996 that brought chaos to the region and caused the repatriation of over 600,000 refugees to Rwanda.

Zaire's role is most widely known for the one and a quarter million refugees it hosted. Most of them arrived in mid-July -- a wave of over a million in less than a week. The majority were in the area of Goma, north of Lake Kivu, with another large concentration to the south in the Bukavu and Uvira regions, and some in camps strung along the western shore of Lake Kivu. Mobutu's government did not seem to mind the large and violent population, probably because his power does not rely on the people of that region, who suffered the stresses of hosting the camps.

A little more than two years after the refugees arrived, an armed rebellion arose in eastern Zaire. At the time of this writing, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), with the covert support of the Rwandan government, had gained control over a swath of territory about 300 miles long and 75 miles wide. The ADFL is composed of several rebel groups but consists primarily of Zairian Tutsis, known as Banyamulenge (from the Mulenge hills of South Kivu) and Banyarwanda (from the Masisi region of north Kivu). The presence of Rwandan refugees, particularly the violent attacks on Zairian Tutsis by extremists within their ranks, increased tensions in eastern Zaire. When local government authorities attempted to implement a ten year old law denying citizenship rights to the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, they took up arms in an apparently well planned rebellion.

The ADFL are being opposed by the Zairian armed forces, the former Rwandan armed forces, and the Interhamwe. The Zairian forces have put up little resistance, preferring to flee the battle front, pillaging villages as they go. The former Rwandan forces put up more of a fight but retreated further into Zairian territory. As a result of the retreat, the vast majority of refugees in the camps managed to escape the hold of the Rwandan extremists and return to Rwanda. Over an million refugees from Zaire and Tanzania have returned to their homes. The Government of Rwanda is now contending with problems of property rights and justice that have accompanied the massive repatriation.

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The final critical role Zaire played was host to Operation Turquoise. Mobutu agreed to turn over control of the airfields at Goma and Bukavu to French forces. As a result of this and behind the scenes diplomatic efforts, his poor international reputation was significantly enhanced in the US and Belgium. His relationship with France, of course, was also strengthened.(178)

Ghana -- Ghana deserves special mention. The government was very active diplomatically, seeking an end to the killing through the context of the OAU. It also spoke out at the UN. More importantly it provided the largest contingent of troops who remained with UNAMIR throughout the darkest days.(179)

D. Non-Governmental Organizations

The UN agencies rely heavily on NGO implementing partners to deliver relief aid at the grass roots level. Feeding centers, medical facilities, sanitation programs and all the other face-to-face, day-to-day undertakings of emergency humanitarian responses are staffed by NGO personnel. The NGOs, in turn, depend on UN agencies for overall coordination and delivery of most of the needed resources. At the same time, they are somewhat resistant to coordination because they do not like restrictions on their independence. Independence is right up there with neutrality and the humanitarian imperative in terms of organizational values. NGOs prefer information sharing and common representation types of coordination, rather than the framework and management types.

The Rwanda crisis attracted an unprecedented number of NGOs -- at the peak about 200 were in the Great Lakes region. Most did not go to the Great Lakes region of central Africa until the high profile exodus of Hutus to Zaire. There were only three international NGOs in the Goma region prior to the July, 1994 influx. The number jumped to about 100 by September.(180) The number entering Rwanda grew rapidly as well, once the fighting stopped and the television cameras arrived. According to DART-Kigali, there were 87 NGOs in Rwanda September 12, 100 on September 19, and 106 on September 21.(181) The large number of organizations made coordination very difficult.

The situation was exacerbated by the unprofessional nature of some of the NGOs. A few were overnight creations with personnel who had no prior experience and no training in emergency response. Their priority appeared to be fund raising back home by getting exposure in the international media. More commonly NGO personnel were dedicated, if often inexperienced, humanitarians who did their best under wretched conditions. As a result they helped save hundreds of thousands of lives from starvation and disease.

There were a fairly large number of indigenous NGOs. Most were small and tied into huge development aid largesse on which Rwanda relied.(182) Of the emergency assistance organizations that did exist, the majority were chapters of the national Red Cross. Many of their personnel attempted to work throughout the genocide period. As a result, a large number were killed. After the
RPF took power, an NGO called Committee Anti-Bwaki established a radio station in Bukavu to counter continuing anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi broadcasts by RTLM.\(^{183}\) All indigenous NGOs received support from international NGOs.

Inside Rwanda there was no single organization mandated to coordinate efforts in the IDP camps.\(^{184}\) UNREO did not have a clear mandate nor the capacity to coordinate in the sense of directing activities. The SRSG's mandate could possibly have been interpreted to sanction coordination efforts, but he did not have anything approaching the organizational capability to do so. UNHCR's mandate does not cover IDPs.\(^{185}\) The result was confusion, inefficiency, and unnecessary IDP deaths, despite isolated efforts made to overcome this deficit.

In late August the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) proposed the establishment of an autonomous NGO coordination unit that would have paralleled UNREO activities, including the dissemination of matrices showing which agencies were working in which functional sector in each prefecture.\(^{186}\) The first incarnation of the coordination unit was lead by ICVA employee John Bennett, who attempted to set up a very bureaucratic and high budget effort that was strongly opposed by the major NGOs because it was not doing any good and was an imposition. The NGO leaders did not want a Geneva-based bureaucracy that was out of touch with the field.\(^{187}\) They wanted information. One close observer believes Bennett's and ICVA's failure badly set back the whole humanitarian response.\(^{188}\) A second attempt established the NGO Liaison Uni as part of UNREO. It operated out of a tent next to the UNDP building and was much more of a facilitating body than a directive one. From August until November the sole staff member was Anita Menghetti. In November, she got the services of two interns. The complexity of NGO coordination is indicated by the circuitous route that brought Menghetti to Kigali. NGOs in the Rwanda region had not requested a liaison unit, but the vice president of ICVA's executive committee, Rudy von Bernuth, felt one was needed. He selected Menghetti, who was an ICVA employee. Bernuth was also the vice president of Save the Children Fund-US. He arranged to have Menghetti's position funded by SCF-US and placed the ICVA unit under UNREO.\(^{190}\)

**IV. Coordination Efforts**

Many coordination mechanisms were applied by a multitude of players at all levels. Some were successful; others were not. The organization of this section roughly follows the division of labor among coordinating bodies. A dividing line existed at the Rwandan border. There were many cross-border operations, but coordinating responsibilities inside and outside the country were somewhat artificially separated between UNREO and UNHCR.

**A. Inside Rwanda**

Prior to April 6, 1994, the civil war and relatively small massacres (if there can be such a thing) created a need for humanitarian relief before the genocide began and the civil war resumed. Several implementing organizations and coordination bodies responded. The ICRC became involved in April, 1991. Worsening violence led to more IDPs, which led to an increased scale of relief operations. By March, 1993, the number of IDPs was about 860,000 spread all across the northern half of the country. The WFP supplied food to the ICRC and NGOs responsible for supervising distribution within the IDP camps. The Belgian Red Cross undertook non-food distributions; UNICEF provided nutritionists and supplies; NGOs substantially involved included Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Caritas, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)-Belgium, MSF-Holland, Oxfam, and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).\(^{191}\) ECHO supported a "cellule de crise" in collaboration with the Government of Rwanda. The cell was chaired by an ECHO official and was the principle coordinating forum for NGOs dealing with IDPs.\(^{192}\)

Overall country coordination was the responsibility of the UN Development Program Regional
Coordinator who was assisted by DHA. In March, 1993, UNDP and DHA decided to establish an Emergency Unit within the UNDP office in Kigali, which did not come into being until January, 1994. DHA was represented in the unit by the UN Resident Representative. (193) DHA organized a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal covering the period April-September 1993 and provided office support in Kigali in early 1994. (194)

When President Habyarimana's plane was shot down there was a humanitarian program and infrastructure, backstopped in New York, already in place. Most of it quickly dissolved as the environment became very violent so quickly. By April 16 the only international presence in Kigali was UNAMIR (soon to be radically reduced in size), the ICRC, and MSF-France who had nine doctors attached to ICRC. They were joined April 23 by the UN Advanced Humanitarian Team, which arrived with Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Peter Hansen. (195) National Red Cross units continued to operate in the countryside for a while. International presence outside Kigali between April 6 and June 22 (when Operation Turquoise commenced) was severely restricted. As the front line of the war advanced, RPF-controlled areas became safe for relief operations by the ICRC, various UN agencies, and some NGOs. (196) All were tightly controlled by the RPF, with most NGOs not allowed to stay in Rwanda over night. In the south-west, the ICRC, WFP, and CRS/Caritas managed to carry out limited operations.

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs Coordination Efforts

The DHA operated on the basis of coordination by consensus. It had no recognized authority or control of resources to permit a more managerial/directive approach. It therefore emphasized information sharing and dissemination, provided an overview of the crisis, and worked toward a common framework for the humanitarian response. An internal review of the process describes DHA as an advocate and facilitator. Advocacy entailed providing a global vision of the problem, strategic and intellectual leadership, and linkages with the political, peacekeeping, and human rights components of the international response. Facilitation entailed providing an organizational structure and a range of services that allowed NGOs to operate in the best possible conditions. (197)

The coordination focal points inside Rwanda were UNAHT, superseded by UNREO (initially operating from Nairobi while AHT was in Kigali), both under the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. They worked in conjunction with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the UNAMIR peacekeeping force, various UN agencies, the American CMOC, and numerous NGOs.

*United Nations Advanced Humanitarian Team --* When AHT arrived in Kigali, it had access only to the airport, the UNAMIR headquarters compound, King Faisal hospital (where 6,000 Rwandan were seeking refuge), and Amahoro stadium (where there were an additional 5,000 people). Initial impressions in this limited view of the capital showed the greatest needs to be water sanitation and emergency medical care. It was based on this information that Under Secretary-General Hansen issued the Flash Appeal of 25 April. (198)

UNAHT worked closely with UNAMIR, (199) the ICRC, and MSF-France in Kigali. It also communicated with the RPF and the interim government. Its greatest value was its ability to keep DHA abreast of developments when all other UN agencies (with the exception of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is under the Secretariat as is DHA) had left the country and did not have a clear picture of what was happening. Needs assessments were relayed to the UN and relief communities through UNREO in Nairobi, which passed the assessments to DHA offices in Geneva and New York. The role of UNAHT also made it clear to UN agencies and NGOs that UNREO was the central point of contact for information.

The AHT is seen by participants and close observers as a potentially very useful model. It got in fast,
provided desperately needed information, and enjoyed a rare level of inter-agency collaboration. The collaborative relationship was due in part to the extreme pressure of the situation and in part to the very small number of actors who had to work together. A leading participant described a sense of the Alamo about their situation. They constantly expected extremist militia members to climb over the walls of the UNAMIR compound. Lance Clark, the head of UNAHT, had a close personal relationship with Gen. Dallaire of UNAMIR. UNAMIR personnel in general had respect for the humanitarian workers in Kigali because they saw them taking personal risks and not hiding behind the military. The humanitarian personnel, in turn, respected the UNAMIR troops for their commitment to save as many people as they could in an impossible situation. (200)

United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) -- A central activity of UNREO-Nairobi was to convene daily meetings of the UN humanitarian agencies. The meetings kept everyone abreast of developments and served as a strategy forum on the fly. This arrangement allowed both flexibility and coherence in the individual activities of the agencies. (201)

UNREO's structure was finalized by the end of May. The four main components of the Nairobi office were: "an Operation Center to provide a snapshot of the status of needs and operations, an Information/Liaison Cell to process and analyze information; a traditional UNDP Project Support Unit, and an Administrative Unit." The Kabale and Kigali offices were to carry out field office and liaison tasks. In June UNREO devised a matrix to elicit a comprehensive picture of needs and operations from active organizations. The information was integrated into DHA's Rwanda Civil Disturbance Situation Reports, which were issued from Geneva. (202)

UNREO's strength came in large part from its ability to understand what was happening in the country and relay the information to others. The Nairobi office began issuing Situation Reports as soon as it was up and running in mid-April. The four to six page documents came out every few days with specific information on critical needs, security, and who was doing what. The Reports were distributed to UN agencies, donors, NGOs, and on the Internet via E-mail. The information provided by UNREO was an extremely beneficial mechanism for the NGO community in terms of facilitating NGO action and enabling them to coordinate their activities with UN and other organizations. UNREO also undertook a number of other activities. All UN staff traveling into Rwanda had to get security clearance from the Humanitarian Coordinator in Nairobi, who then passed the information on to UNAMIR. Non-UN staff were encouraged to inform UNREO offices in Nairobi, Kabale, or Kigali when they traveled in Rwanda. (203)

In June, UNREO organized the first needs assessment mission to areas of Rwanda outside the capital. By that time several UN agencies and humanitarian organizations had divided responsibilities for critical sectors. WFP covered food and logistics; UNICEF covered non-food items, supplies to NGOs, water and sanitation, and administration and finance; and MSF covered medical care and assisted with water and sanitation. Also in June, UNREO-Nairobi held discussions on guidelines for the use of military resources for the security of humanitarian operations, particularly escorts. With the help of the IOM, it began contingency planning for a possible mass movement of people to the south and west. The planning let UN agencies, donors, and NGOs know what resources existed in the region and how they could best be used. (204)

Once UNREO and others moved to Rwanda, field-level coordination intensified. One of the key UNREO activities in Kigali was to hold general meetings every Tuesday and Friday evening, attended by over 100 people, where everyone had a chance to speak. The meetings were chaired by Charles Petrie who sat at a table in front of a number a chairs, with standing room at the back. Petrie would open each meeting with praise for the specific achievements of various organizations, then ask for concurrence on the meeting's agenda. After that representatives would speak their piece, proceeding in order of emergency priority, sector, or region. As they spoke a picture emerged of what was being done and what needed doing. (205)

On other evenings of the week, agencies and organizations...
working in specific functional sectors would get together in a room provided by UNREO and discuss the details of their responsibilities. Monday meetings addressed water and sanitation; Wednesday it was food distribution; and Thursdays covered health, nutrition, and logistics. (211) Items of broad interest coming out of the sectoral meetings cycled back into the bigger picture in the subsequent general meetings. The Tuesday-Friday meetings were more than simply information sharing. Priorities were discussed and informal decisions were made on load sharing and possible future areas of concentration. The relationship between UNREO sub-offices and area NGOs seemed to be equally productive. (212)

Judgments of UNREO's value differed by actor. The smaller NGOs saw the information briefings and Liaison Unit as very helpful throughout the international response. Large NGOs saw the value but were critical of UNREO's lack of technical expertise (which they themselves possessed in at least one sector) to provide an informed basis for operational coordination. Other UN agencies maintained only light contact, with the exception of UNICEF which worked closely with UNREO in the successful effort to prevent a mass exodus of IDPs from the south-west in late August. OFDA-DART also worked closely with UNREO and valued an "agency-neutral" forum. ECHO criticized UNREO for poor management, the poor caliber of some personnel, and failure to move much beyond information sharing. (213) The last criticism stems from ECHO's interpretation of what constitutes effective coordination. NGOs, for example, preferred UNREO's consensus approach and the autonomy it allowed them. ECHO appears to have preferred something closer to the directive end of the scale.

Assessments of UNREO also varied over time. It was seen as most helpful in the early months when its on-the-ground presence and knowledge were greater than any other actor. As other UN agencies and the large NGOs became established in Rwanda and as attention turned from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the value of UNREO diminished. (214) This is as it should be: an emergency coordination office should fade in importance as the emergency comes under control. Unfortunately a problem arises as the process continues. In the absence of an office like UNREO, there is little joint planning on the humanitarian front in the UN system. Each agency has a tendency to assume the coordinator role in its sector of specialization. At best there is inter-agency coordination by consensus in that agencies inform each other of their plans. But there are plenty of instances of agencies taking actions that affect others without prior notification. The most striking example occurred when UNAMIR dropped leaflets over refugee camps in Zaire that encouraged the refugees to return to Rwanda. UNHCR was never informed this would happen and at the time was did not think it wise to encourage repatriation, given uncertainty about the safety of people who returned. (215) It is rather extraordinary that UNREO worked at all given its basic management, personnel, and resource deficiencies. The deficiencies reflect the sudden start of the operation, the idea that in complex emergencies scarce resources must not fall under heavy bureaucratic constraints, and bad management. (216) In the management category of problems, there was no administrator to look after office functions. Until November 1994, there was no managerial direction at all. There were no defined responsibilities, chain of command, regular staff meetings, procedures for trips and security clearance, no filing system, and no paper trail. There was no budget and proper tracking of funds.

Many UNREO personnel, while willing to work hard, were largely inexperienced in emergencies or in the UN system. Most of them were recruited locally in Nairobi or seconded by NGOs. (217) The personnel recruitment mechanism netted both the good and the indifferent. UNREO had little control over this since DHA did not have a large personnel pool from which to draw (unlike HCR and UNICEF, for example, who can redeploy staff). There was a high turnover rate, which interfered with continuity and efficiency. Inexperience remained a problem through 1995 when six of about thirty personnel had prior emergency experience and expertise was lacking in basic things like data management, secretarial skills, and office administration. (218) Personnel where not adequately briefed on their responsibilities or trained on equipment before their arrival. Briefing and training did not happen once there either because there was a (short-sighted) attitude that time was of the essence and all key staff were already stretched to the limit. Poor recruitment and deployment procedures again
indicated bad management procedures. Resources were scarce, particularly during the first month. As noted above, UNREO relied heavily on UNDP for basic facilities such as office space and equipment; it had only one truck and was dependent on the sporadic availability of UNDP vehicles; there was no organized maintenance system for vehicles; there was no assurance of radios in vehicles, despite security dangers; and there was no independent means to purchase local services and resources, and no cash.

In New York and Geneva UNREO was not always well supported by DHA, which had to fight all the time to be heard and accepted as the coordinating agency. DHA's struggle for recognition can be chalked up to organizational politics. It was the new kid on the block, having come into being only a few years earlier; its budget and staff were small; it was not backed by the Secretariat as strongly as it could have been; and despite that fact, it was trying to influence the actions of the large, independent UN operating agencies. DHA's lack of resources, lack of clear authority, and need to maintain good relations with other UN agencies meant UNREO could do little more than gather, process, and disseminate information. It lacked the mandate and capability to offer technical advice and help. Technical coordination -- that is, identifying and implementing operational details -- was the responsibility of UN agencies that specialized in particular sectors, but they proved slow to coordinate.

Despite all this, participants and close observers generally agree that UNREO did a good job coordinating the international response inside Rwanda, particularly in the area of information sharing. The most important factor in UNREO's success was the personalities and experience of the top people on the staff. Charles Petrie ran UNREO and was praised by many participants as perfect for the type of leadership that was needed. He worked by consensus, which won the hearts of the NGOs, and he had significant military experience, which gained the confidence of the various military forces who played a role. Anita Menghetti, the NGO coordinator was extremely efficient, came from an NGO background so was seen as "one of them," and also got along well with the American officers in the Kigali CMOC. The Humanitarian Coordinator from November 1994 until November 1995, Randolph Kent, had a good working relationship with the SRSG Khan. Kent also brought managerial and administrative structure to UNREO.

Some of UNREO's most pressing resource deficiencies were addressed by donations in kind. In August, a Swedish Support Team technical spec arrived to provide communications and transportation equipment and expertise. About a dozen technical specialists with a large number of vehicles and state of the art communications equipment provided sorely needed logistical support. They were trained, fully self-sustaining, and arrived ready to go.

Between August, 1994 and November, 1995 the team personnel turned over three times. The Team enabled UNREO to maintain close contact with its sub-offices in Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Butare, and Kibuye. Without the Team's support, the field offices would not have existed. They not only provided the equipment necessary for twice-daily radio contact between field offices and UNREO-Kigali, they also visited each outpost once a week, bringing food, water and other basic supplies. The vehicles used by UNREO offices to keep track of events in their areas of responsibility were provided by the Swedes. When the Swedish personnel left, DHA in New York provided money to buy the equipment so highly reliable communications could be maintained. However, the transition was very messy and UNREO was not at all certain that New York would come through with the money in time to keep the assets on which it relied. The Humanitarian Coordinator sent numerous urgent messages to the effect that UNREO would be forced to shut down in the absence of communications and transportation equipment. Funds to purchase the equipment came through at the last moment, the Kigali office also retained four Team personnel on contract to operate and maintain what it had just bought. USAID-DART helped overcome the need for cash on hand by providing UNREO with funds to pass on to NGOs in the critical early stage of the effort to prevent IDPs in the south-west from leaving the country when Operation Turquoise ended. (See below for events in the southwest.)
UNREO's work benefited from good relations with NGOs as a result of its "ambiance" and facilities. The UNREO offices had a welcoming atmosphere. The coordinating structure was supportive and participatory, rather than directive. The offices themselves were easily accessible and not collocated with UNAMIR, which would have spooked many military-shy organizations. At the offices NGOs had access to a meeting room, a rendezvous place, a bulletin board, pigeon hole mailboxes, and satellite communications equipment.(228) The DHA interim review by Donini and Niland suggested many of the headquarter-level problems can be overcome by a straightforward definition of DHA's mandate and its interactions with other actors. They maintain there should be a clear identification of the key services DHA and its field offices can provide, such as advocacy, strategic planning, consolidated appeals, headquarters inter-agency coordination, monitoring, and operational coordination. There should be a clear definition of the coordination services available in the field, including information gathering and dissemination, ensuring that the humanitarian dimension remains part of a comprehensive UN approach, serving as a focal point for security information and clearances, state-of-the-art communications capability, etc. There must be a clear understanding of whether these services will be provided by DHA in-house or by outside units. Finally there must be a clear definition of the type of staff needed, including model job descriptions.(229) Based on these recommendations and end of mission reports from key DHA-UNREO staff, DHA is working to improve its management practices.(230)

United States Civil-Military Operations Center -- CMOC-Kigali was formed August 5, by Army Col. Karl Farris as a liaison unit to UNREO.(231) It was separate from UNREO in that it reported to Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder at Entebbe. It was also separately in the US embassy building, one block away from the UNDP compound where the OSOCC was established.(232) There was no doubt, however, that it was working in support of the UN effort.(233) There was no official direct military-NGO contact: all NGO requests were routed through UNREO. The CMOC's function was to receive requests already prioritized by UNREO and provide logistical assistance accordingly. The US military was very clear in its statements and actions that it was there to facilitate the activities of humanitarian organizations, not replace them. Examples of CMOC activities include providing aerial photography of population movements to inform aid agency planning; posting of a Rwandan government map of known land mines around Kigali; and calling in a Movement/Control team from European Command to coordinate the fleet of trucks that grew to more than 400.(234) Some observers lauded the constrained American attitude, pointing out that it did not tempt NGOs to make an end-run around UNREO to the military. NGOs had to respect the OSOCC structure: submit requests to, and await decisions and assignments by UNREO.(235) Others criticize the CMOC and US military for not doing as much as they could have. They focus not on the facilitate-don't-do rule, but on the extreme casualty sensitivity of the Americans and their desire to be minimally involved. US officers often were very slow to respond to requests, despite the urgency of many situations. This prohibited other actors from forward planning and relying on the provision of American equipment. For example, clear water was a priority need in Kigali and tanker trucks were an important part of making it available. At a time when distribution was an important problem, the U.S. military had water trucks parked at Kigali airport, but did not release them, despite entreaties by UN force Commander Gen. Dallaire.(236)

The American preoccupation with safety included strict interpretation of security guidelines that led to strange sights such as troops constantly in full battle dress, traveling only in guarded convoys, and not leaving their compounds after dark. Meanwhile civilian NGO workers were unarmed, unprotected, often traveled in single vehicles, and frequently did not return from a day's work until after dark.(237) The US could have taken on a larger role, it could have stayed longer, and it could have become more integrated into the overall effort, thereby creating greater cohesion. Many in the humanitarian community felt the US pulled out earlier than was appropriate. They also point to inefficient use of
resources such as duplication of effort at Kigali airport where American personnel set up cargo operations that substantially overlapped with work already being done by Canadian troops under UNAMIR command. (238)

Despite the lack of official contact between humanitarians and troops and criticisms of overweening caution, the CMOC officers (as distinct from the rest of the US military force) were dedicated to the humanitarian effort and took actions that increased their positive impact. Col. Farris and his successor broke with the traditional military mind set and recognized that it was good not to be in charge. This strengthened UNREO and avoided militarization of the international response. CMOC personnel also traveled in the field to make contact with NGOs and let them know not only that CMOC existed but what it could do for them. One officer suggested the experience indicates that the more structured an operation becomes, the less effective it is in coordinating with humanitarian actors. (239)

The CMOC worked well as a liaison (though it did not do much that humanitarian organizations wanted or expected) partly because of the particular personnel involved. Col. Farris was Director of the Army Peacekeeping Institute and as such had some experience working and talking with UN agencies, NGOs, and donors. (240) His commanding officer, Gen. Schroeder, recognized the importance of the CMOC as the appropriate focal point in a humanitarian operation and gave it the necessary stature and attention. (241) The military tail was not allowed to wag the humanitarian dog.

Perhaps more important was the decision taken by policy makers in Washington and New York, and humanitarian organizations alike to ignore the political context of the relief effort. Humanitarian organizations like to say they are neutral actors. The only way they can do so is to refuse to recognize the political context in which they act and the impact their presence has on that context. The US government, for its part, said Operation Restore Hope was "purely humanitarian," meaning not intended to have any role in the political/military situation that brought US troops to central Africa in the first place. It soon became clear to everyone that the Americans were not there to defend anyone, to chase down perpetrators, or to interposition themselves between opposing sides. Similarly, the UN politico-military presence was all but absent during critical times. When a new SRSG and a strengthened UNAMIR did arrive, they focused on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNAMIR personnel were spread thinly throughout the county in a way that made them militarily ineffective. Humanitarian decisions could be made and carried out without concern for the political and military considerations. One observer states flat out that the CMOC would have failed if either the military or humanitarian community had not ignored the political context. (242)

NGO Liaison Unit -- The Liaison Unit served a number of functions during the first few months following July, 1994. It registered NGOs, eventually building a computer database of who was doing what where. It gave arriving NGO personnel basic information such as costs for renting space and how to get interpreters and drivers. It also served as a reference point for NGOs with questions about UNREO, going so far as to build a library organized by functional sector. (243) NGOs used the Liaison Unit, but did not invest in it. They did not take it over or expand it into a working group to express a collective voice at UNREO meetings. While they could free-ride they did. (244)

The Liaison Unit ceased to function when Menghetti (the only paid staff member) took a four week leave. The Unit was supposed to be maintained in Menghetti's absence by a Steering Committee composed of representatives from the NGOs, but it virtually never met. Upon return, Menghetti devoted her time to transferring the Unit from UNREO to the new government's Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, as part of the process of transferring responsibility for recovery activities to the Government of Rwanda (GOR).

The Steering Committee did not meet for several reasons. NGOs were oriented on the ground by that time, so did not need the basic information that had been so valuable to them when they first arrived.
More importantly, they did not see the need for common representation to the Government of Rwanda or the donor community. They did not want to go to yet another meeting, viewing such activities as obstructions to what they were there to do. Furthermore, they saw themselves as all different -- small, large, different specializations, different nationalities, etc. NGO attitudes changed dramatically at the July, 1995 Roundtable Conference in Geneva (a big twice-yearly donor show) when they were severely criticized, by donors and the Rwandan government. The GOR accused NGOs of taking money from donors that should have gone to the government and doing very little with it. NGO leaders realized the value of speaking with a single voice. The Steering Committee reorganized itself and changed its name to the NGO Executive Committee. (245) Jette Isaksen, who had replaced Menghetti, acted as the secretariat of the Committee. She attended regular meetings within the Ministry of Rehabilitation. She was initially allowed only very restricted liaison duties. Feeling ineffective, she called the chairman of the Steering Committee asking for more authority, after which she could speak with a stronger voice, though she still was not allowed to officially represent the NGOs. After these changes, NGOs had a much more effective voice. (246)

The Government of Rwanda's Humanitarian Affairs Coordination Unit and the Integrated Operations Center

The Integrated Operations Center (IOC) working group was established early February 1995 by the Government of Rwanda, UNREO, UNAMIR, UN operating agencies, and representatives from NGOs. The IOC itself was set up in the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration in March, 1995. The Ministry created an office called the Humanitarian Affairs Coordination Unit (HACU) to be its institutional connection to the IOC; NGOs used the secretariat of their Executive Committee to keep contact; UN agencies and bilateral organizations sent their own representatives. The IOC was an avenue for transferring responsibility for recovery and rehabilitation activities to the Government of Rwanda (GOR) -- a goal everyone shared, though the GOR had a much shorter time line in mind than did most NGOs and UN agencies. (247) Its immediate purpose was to bring the government and international community together in their attempts to deal with IDP camps in the south-west.

The IDP program had ground to a halt as camp residents no longer volunteered to go home out of fear of reprisals both at home and in the camps. Meanwhile, the government and UN agencies agreed the camps had become criminal sanctuaries. The IOC succeeded in bringing UNAMIR more tightly into the overall IDP operation, but failed to do the same with the government. The massacre at the Kibeho IDP camp in May, 1995, was a direct consequence of the failure of the IOC to bring about a meeting of minds between the government and the international community. (248)

UNAMIR became more fully integrated because Gen. Tousignant, who had replaced Gen. Dallaire, supported the IOC concept and made personnel and resources available to push the process forward. The IOC failed to bring in the new government for several reasons. Divisions within the government were so intense that different ministries could not work together. The RPA was the most stand-offish because it did not feel the proposed process for dealing with the IDP camps in the south-west could work, and because it had bad relations with UNAMIR. (249) Bringing in the Ministry of Defense required fruitful military-to-military (UNAMIR-to-RPA) interaction. It never worked. Former RPA commander, now Minister of Defense and Vice-President, Col. Paul Kagame, did not trust UNAMIR. There may have been a clash of personalities between Kagame and Tousignant. More importantly, Kagame questioned who the UN troops were protecting: UNAMIR had been ineffective against the genocide and now appeared to be mandated to defend the Hutu IDPs from the new government. Furthermore, the well-equipped UNAMIR force was an embarrassment to the RPA, which was no more than a bush army. (250)

In addition to the particular failure to agree on how to close the IDP camps, the GOR and NGOs had very poor relations. Two reasons stand out: the first concerns process, the second substance. The NGO Liaison/Executive Committee secretariat (Ms. Isaksen) and the Humanitarian Affairs
Coordination Unit jointly ran NGO coordinating meetings. In the beginning, Rwandan officials sat at head table and spoke in turn and at length; NGOs were set up as the audience. This arrangement was not conducive to a good working relationship and confirmed NGO feelings that coordination meetings were a waste of time. The NGO Liaison prodded NGO representatives to keep attending and told the leader of the HACU that it had to change its methods. The HACU leader began to sit with the NGOs, the meetings loosened up, and a real exchange of information began (three months after the meetings started). (251)

During the time the GOR-NGO coordinating meetings struggled to operate and even after, the government simply did not have the resources to know what was going on outside the capital. It had no way of verifying NGO claims to be doing good work in the countryside. It did not have vehicles to get to field, nor did it have the ability to communicate with its own local authorities around the country. All the government saw were dozens of NGO vehicles cruising Kigali's streets and expatriates sitting in restaurants. Relations reached their nadir in December, 1995 when the government expelled 42 NGOs. (252)

The GOR was surprised by the strong negative reaction several donors had to the expulsion of some NGOs and harsh criticisms of others. They had failed to understand that almost all funding is attached to a particular NGO and/or project and that donors have their favorite NGO recipients. When the NGOs were kicked out and their projects terminated, donors withdrew funding, rather than simply shifting their largesse directly to the new government. The episode taught both NGOs and the GOR that they had to get much better at coordination, and to do that they had to learn to trust one another. (253)

The NGO Executive Committee proposed a joint GOR-NGO evaluation of NGO work in the field, which the government accepted and UNDP funded. The intent was to establish criteria for evaluating NGO performance, then apply them to field projects as the basis for deciding whether or not particular NGOs deserved to remain in the country. The evaluation proved to be a very positive exercise. The report itself was too vague and unsystematic to act as the basis for expulsion/retention (254) but at frequent meetings both sides could express their concerns and explain their actions, leading to a positive and open dialog. The GOR visited NGO projects and found that they were doing a surprisingly good job. The whole process worked because the Minister of Rehabilitation trusted Ms Isaksen and the NGO Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, trusted the Minister. They had differences of opinion, but were willing to talk and could understand each other. (255)

South-Western Rwanda and Operation Turquoise

Three characteristics distinguish the south-western portion of Rwanda from the rest of the country. First, it took a little time for the genocidal violence to reach the prefectures of Butare, Gikongoro, and Cyangugu. (256) The intense horror visited upon the rest of the country arrived only with the importation of members of the Presidential Guard and interhamwe in the third week of April. (257) This delay meant that a small relief effort continued to be carried out by the WFP and ICRC together with Caritas/CRS and the Red Cross of Rwanda. Second, the region was occupied by the French-run Operation Turquoise, from June 24 until August 22. The occupation significantly dampened the genocidal activity and prevented the front line of the civil war from sweeping through as the RPF routed the Rwandan Army. The so-called "protected zone" became a temporary home to more than a million displaced persons, mostly Hutus fleeing the advancing Tutsi rebels. Third, most of the IDPs were persuaded not to flee across the borders of Zaire and Burundi when the French left. This was achieved by an unusual level of cooperation and planning by UNREO, UNAMIR, Operation Turquoise, the new Rwandan government, and a variety of UN agencies and NGOs.

After Habyarimana's Death and Before Operation Turquoise -- Humanitarian work in the south-west
was severely constrained but symbolically important.\(^{(258)}\) The WFP worked with CRS/Caritas for two weeks and the Rwandese Red Cross until the end of May, but was virtually paralyzed when the NGOs closed their operations. They managed to distribute only 400 metric tons of food. In May, WFP and the ICRC held discussions to rationalize their operations in the south-west. WFP stocks in the town of Butare were distributed by both organizations. WFP was responsible for supplying Burundese refugees and Rwandese IDPs from the southern border of Rwanda up to and including Butare. ICRC took responsibility for those people from Butare north to Gitarama.\(^{(259)}\)

The WFP-ICRC decision to separate their operations geographically rather than collaborate more closely is partly due to organizational desires to maintain independence of action and partly to their prior experience with each other in Rwanda. The two organizations had a history of friction stemming from their efforts in the north before April, 1994. It had become obvious then that much of the food supplied by WFP and distributed by ICRC to northern IDPs was being diverted -- the episode lead to tensions. WFP wrote a letter of complaint to the Rwandan Prime Minister and worked more closely with ICRC to assess the number of beneficiaries and improve monitoring. WFP was critical of ICRC for not having alerted it to the extent of diversions. ICRC, for its part, resisted closer monitoring by WFP.\(^{(260)}\)

In an interesting episode that came to be known as the "Father Vjeko effort," a local priest initiated a relief effort that was eventually joined by a number of international actors. At the end of April, CRS-Rwanda personnel made contact with Father Vjeko, from the mission in Kabgayi, who had entered Burundi to gather supplies for IDPs at his mission. CRS supported his efforts to deliver food, blankets, and medicines to groups of Hutu and Tutsi throughout the south-west. The first two truck convoys entered Rwanda at the beginning of May and soon two to three trips per week delivered between 100 and 400 tons of supplies each week.\(^{(261)}\) The effort worked because of the courage and initiative of the Father Vjeko and CRS-Rwanda director Christian Hennemeyer. It was an ad hoc operation driven by the belief that helping the local population survive required action, not discussion, and was worth risking ones' own life. It also worked because the experienced relief organization CRS/Caritas had a network ready to be tapped. They had been working in the Great Lakes region for some time and were not knocked out of commission for very long by the violence in Rwanda.\(^{(262)}\) Agencies assisting CRS/Caritas-Rwanda were Caritas-Neerlandica, Caritas-Germany, Caritas-Spain, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, OFDA, WFP, UNICEF, and World Vision International.\(^{(263)}\)

By the end of June, an UNREO sub-office in Bujumbura, Burundi, was holding regular coordination meetings. The purpose of the meetings was to share information on needs, security, what various organizations were doing, and the resources available.\(^{(264)}\) Enough NGOs had become involved to rationalize the use of trucks and provide complimentary assistance. Solidarite Francaise provided trucks and drivers, allowing smaller trucks to be redeployed to diocese in Butare and Gikongoro. Trocaire and Medical Missionaries of Mary put a four-person medical team at the growing IDP camp at Cyanika. Action International Contra la Faim, Merlin, and CARE also joined the operation.\(^{(265)}\) As the region became more secure under Operation Turquoise, some NGOs moved their operations base into the Gikongoro area, rather than continue only with cross-border forays. A food coordination meeting was held in Gikongoro 18 July. Sectoral meetings were held in the days following.\(^{(266)}\) CRS was the first organization to set up in Gikongoro in July and was not followed until WFP opened an office at the beginning of August. The ICRC opened an office in Cayangugu at the same time\(^{(267)}\)

The WFP and ICRC reviewed their division of labor agreement in early July and agreed to jointly supply food to IDPs around Gikongoro (the area of highest concentration), with WFP taking responsibility for camps to the north of the Butare-Cyangugu road and ICRC for those to the south.\(^{(268)}\) WFP, UNICEF, and other UN agencies initially had great difficulty implementing food distribution because of the lack of NGOs and trucks. Both Turquoise and UNAMIR maintained they could not spare any vehicles for WFP to use in the south until its own arrived from Ethiopia. ECHO
eventually almost required NGOs it was funding in Burundi to establish operations in the Rwandan safe zone. (269)

Operation Turquoise -- Turquoise had a deleterious effect on overall planning and preparation for IDP and refugee assistance. The French intervention began just as UNHCR completed its North Kivu Contingency Plan to handle an influx of 50,000 refugees. An UNREO-led IDP assessment project also reached completion in the third week of June. French actions quickly altered the dynamic of the conflict, thus rendering moot these planning efforts. (270) The effect on the civil war of closing off the south-west was to corner the interim government and its failing army into the north-west where the RPA could concentrate on their rapid defeat without having to worry about maintaining control over a significant chunk of territory. Consequently, the civil war ended even faster, resulting in a more intense flow of refugees into Goma. (271) Furthermore, French leaders decided against providing security in the north-west, necessary for humanitarian agencies to assess and respond adequately to needs in the region. Finally, the dampening of conflict in the south-west diverted attention of donor governments, UN agencies, and NGOs to the IDPs in the south-west at a critical time for those in the north-west. (272) It is not reasonable to expect to be able to avoid all harmful outcomes that are the result of coincidental timing. Nevertheless, many of the above problems could have been mitigated if the people in charge of Operation Turquoise had consulted humanitarian actors during their planning phase.

The French urged relief organizations to work in the Operation Turquoise safe zone and attempted to ally the suspicions of NGOs who almost universally doubted French humanitarian objectives. They made their Humanitarian Cell a civilian-run operation separate from the military operations cell. (In contrast to American military-run CMOCs.) The Cell divided its interests between UN agencies and NGOs. (273) Despite this effort, NGOs remained wary of interacting with the French. Not only did they distrust French motives, they did not want to appear to compromise their neutrality by associating with a political actor. To avoid the French Humanitarian Cell at Cyangugu, 20 NGOs interested in building upon the Father Vjeko/Caritas efforts in the area asked UNREO to fulfill the coordinator function. In response, the lines of communication were altered in mid-July (when UNREO moved to Kigali) so that the humanitarian-military linkage passed through UNREO. UNHCR took over the liaison role after July 20. (274)

Despite the initial reluctance of NGOs to work in the south-west, there was a rapid increase in the number of agencies in August. Some worked camps supplied by both ICRC and WFP, whilst others established programs for the host population. The earlier CRS-Caritas operations were expanded and in July, MSF, CARE, AICF and Equilibre opened offices in or near Gikongoro. Trocaire, Merlin, Feed the Children, UNICEF, SCF-UK and several other agencies set up programmes involving non-food distributions, health care and supplementary feeding during August. On 20 August, the British Army field medical team that had initially been based in Ruhengeri in the north-west was redeployed to the south-west and ran treatment facilities in Kitabi and Kibeho camps and provided mobile services to several other IDP camps. Oxfam and UNICEF began water supply and distribution operations for IDPs during September. (275) Until it left on August 22, the French military continued to coordinate and control activities others were unable to do, such as air delivery, the provision of vehicles, helicopters, and aircraft, and assistance with water supplies. (276)

Operation Turquoise did not coordinate well with UNREO or other organizations working on the humanitarian effort. Situation reports distributed by UNREO and by UNAMIR show a striking lack of the most basic regular interaction between the French operation and the UN humanitarian agencies. Even internal communications from UNREO field offices in the south-west to UNREO-Kigali make very little mention of Operation Turquoise. (277) The Turquoise Humanitarian Cell was not set up in support of UNREO, as the CMOCs were, but rather as an alternative to it. NGOs' request for UNREO's assistance in the southwest suggests the French Cell could have played a constructive role if it had subordinated itself to the UN coordinating body. Such an arrangement might have mitigated
the discomfort and reluctance many relief NGOs felt about working with the French military. Relief organizations did occasionally work directly with Operation Turquoise force but only on an ad hoc basis. For example, French troops initially helped Caritas-Goma to collect and bury dead bodies, but stopped doing so without warning. Prior to the Goma influx, no support and very little information was provided to the relief effort. After the influx, the French provided heavy equipment such as fork lifts and earth-moving equipment. There was virtually no direct support in the south-west. (278)

Institutional shortcomings were only one of three reasons there was little coordination between Operation Turquoise and other actors. Another was the way in which France envisioned its role. It did not intend to be a humanitarian actor in the sense of providing food and medical assistance. It viewed Turquoise's purpose as protecting pockets of displaced people, thereby preventing the continued killing of civilians and enabling relief organizations to do their job. (279) As a military operation Turquoise was very successful. Unfortunately the traditional barrier between military operations and humanitarian ones as not lowered by French politicians at the strategic level nor by military planners and practitioners at the operational level.

The final reason Operations Turquoise and UNREO did not interact much was that their presence in the south-west did not substantially overlap, even though UNREO moved to Kigali in mid-July and Turquoise did not end until August 22. As explained above, UNREO relied on the Swedish Support Team to establish and maintain its field offices. The Team did not get an RPF security clearance to enter the country until July 30. (280) It took some time after that to extend UNREO's permanent presence outside Kigali. The French force commander was in the process of reducing Turquoise's presence in the south-west as part of a phased withdrawal, during which UNAMIR units moved in to take over. While in hindsight it would have been desirable for a closer connection between the two actors, it likely did not make sense at the time to move beyond ad hoc interactions to establish a more structured coordination mechanism. (281)

Connaughton identifies several organizational improvements for future French operations suggested by the Turquoise experience. Decision-making powers had been delegated down from Paris to a significant degree. The Command Post thus became the point of contact between the military and aid representatives. In the future the Command Post would work better if it had a large Secretariat to deal with mail, liaison with Paris, and aid agency access to logistics and vehicle-borne intervention teams. Military and civilian roles were not clearly defined, even though their responsibilities were meant to be distinct. Some civil servants should occupy seats outside the military environment to be able to engage in non-confrontational dialogue with NGOs. There was also an apparent need for civil affairs teams to accompany the Task Forces (cf UNITAF). (282)

Outside purely French improvements, relief operations in the south-west were not well coordinated early on, which is a large part of the reason IDP camp conditions were so wretched. As mentioned, it took UNREO and Turquoise some time to convince NGOs to work under the French umbrella. Many of the ICRC medical personnel in the area were inexperienced. In addition there was a lack of technical coordination among agencies, at least until late September. (283) (UNREO suffered in all locations and at all times from lack of technical expertise.) Difficulties also arose from the number and variety of organizations involved and competition among NGOs once they decided to work in the zone. (284) These problems existed throughout the Great Lakes region, particularly in Goma.

*Getting the IDPs to Stay After Turquoise -- Despite the difficulties just identified, one of the great coordination success stories took place in the south-west. Everyone feared a massive exodus of Hutus at the close of Operation Turquoise. It never happened. This was due almost entirely to advance planning and coordinated effort on the part of UNREO, UNAMIR, Turquoise, the Government of Rwanda, the SRSG, and various UN agencies and NGOs. The importance of early warning, coordinated planning, and preemptive action were clearly demonstrated. UNREO, the SRSG, and UNAMIR generated a consensus in the relief community, mobilized an international*
presence to calm the population, and established an emergency support system while the French were still on the ground.\(^{(285)}\)

UNREO had a presence in the field with a good communications network that gave it an overview of the situation. This overview was instrumental in developing a framework for coordinated action. The general strategy consisted of two phases. During the first phase, relief assistance was established in the more vulnerable prefectures and strenuous efforts were made to reassure the population of its safety.\(^{(286)}\) NGOs who had been building on the Father Vjeko effort concentrated their services around Gikongoro where there was a large IDP population. The location was advantageous in that there was a large and difficult forest to transverse between the IDP camps and the Zairian border.\(^{(287)}\) Simultaneously UNAMIR increased its presence as the French withdrawal approached and the RPA delayed its deployment to the region.\(^{(288)}\) In preparation for the handoff from Turquoise to UNAMIR, French Gen. Lafourcade met with UN Force Commander Gen. Dallaire in Kigali. Turquoise maintained good contact with UNAMIR and was also in touch with SRSG Khan. These connections enabled France to explain the situation to the RPF as it planned its withdrawal. The handoff took place during a ten day period in which Ghanian UN troops replaced the French. The transition from French to UN to Rwandan government control went surprisingly well.

During the second phase, camps were established on the Rwandan side of the border at Cyangugu to accommodate people moving toward Zaire, and at the same time provide them with incentive not to cross into Zaire, where the relief structure was minimal. Added capacity was not made available on the Zairian side of the border. The communications infrastructure was also strengthened. By the end of September, nearly every NGO in the south-west was able to communicate with others in the south-west on handsets, using UNHCR Channel 7 for security.\(^{(289)}\) UNREO's role was facilitated by DART, which made available $10 million to be channeled through the coordinating body and used locally by NGOs.\(^{(290)}\)

**B. Coordination Beyond the Borders of Rwanda**

The Rwandan violence spilled over state borders, giving it a transnational character, but coordination efforts did not follow suit. The jurisdictions of the SRSG and the UN Force Commander ended at the Rwandan border. UNHCR created the post of Special Envoy of the High Commissioner prior to the emergency, which could have allowed a certain amount of integration of HCR regional activities. As it turned out, he was concerned almost exclusively with general refugee protection principles, rather than operational matters of camp management and aid delivery.\(^{(291)}\) The Humanitarian Coordinator/Head of UNREO theoretically could have exerted authority over refugee matters, but UNHCR's traditional role and strong mandate, together with DHA's resource constraints and weak mandate, severely curtailed his reach. UNDHA did have a presence in Goma prior to, and for a short time after, the refugee influx. In response to the need for a connection to Operation Turquoise, the Relief Coordination Branch in Geneva had set up an office independent from UNREO. The office helped the skeletal UNHCR office to define an overall strategy and orchestrate a response during the early days of the refugee crisis. It also helped to keep DHA and the wider world abreast of events as they unfolded.

An internal review concluded the DHA office could have and should have played a more active role in strategic planning, information dissemination, and reporting if it had more resources, including a stable presence in Goma.\(^{(292)}\) As it was, the office closed in August, a move regretted by other agencies' staffs, including HCR's. The DHA office provided services others could not under the circumstances, such as reporting on the evolving situation, articulating a broad unity of purpose, and performing political liaison functions. All of these might have mitigated the camp security problems encountered later.\(^{(293)}\) There were at least three effects of this separation of coordination jurisdictions. First, it increased the number of senior coordination officials in the region, further confusing an already cloudy picture. World Food Program officials commented that there were so
many coordinators in the regional theater that there as no coordination. Second, it hampered the effort to adopt an effective regional approach to the crisis. Third, it was probably a contributing factor to the lack of coherence between the humanitarian and political domains. (This problem will be illustrated below in a discussion of repatriation efforts.) This is not to suggest that there should be overlapping and competing coordination jurisdictions. That sort of arrangement would exacerbate problems by encouraging turf battles and sending divergent messages to humanitarian organizations and local actors. A single agency should be given overall responsibility for regional coordination. The Secretariat's intent (following the General Assembly's lead) seems to be for DHA to be that agency. To date, it has had too many growing pains and too little support from within the Secretariat to fulfill the aspiration.

To the extent that there was coordination covering the entire Great Lakes region, it can be found in the activities of the two largest UN humanitarian agencies -- WFP and UNHCR -- and the short-lived American military operation. The WFP, with overall responsibility for food distribution, took three crucial actions to facilitate overland transport -- one logistical; two coordinative. Nearly all NGOs and UN agencies relied on WFP services. In response to the need for a huge volume of general ration food, WFP established a railroad and truck route from Dar-es-Salam, on the coast of Tanzania, across Tanzania and Burundi to Zaire and Rwanda. This was done in consultation with the governments and local authorities who were affected. The second thing the agency did was established the Food Aid Coordination Information Center in Nairobi, Kenya at the end August. Its purpose was to facilitate the provision of a consistent supply of vital resources by regularizing resource flows from donors. To do so it collected and disseminated information on the food aid pipeline in the greater Horn of Africa region. WFP and individual donors used the information to better manage the food pipeline. Given the vast amount of material suddenly being sent to the region, such a management tool was clearly needed.

Thirdly, when WFP moved its center of operations from Nairobi to Kigali in mid-August, it tried immediately to set up a movement coordination cell called the Transportation Coordination Unit. It was given responsibility for tracking about 600 long- and short-haul trucks operating in the region. The Unit's objectives were to (a) collect data on food and non-food stocks to be moved to and through Rwanda via different road and barge operations; (b) process and analyze the data and distribute the analysis to governments, foreign military advisors, donor representatives, and NGOs; (c) monitor road conditions and convoy movements and recommend convoy route changes when necessary; and (d) monitor transport, storage, handling, and fuel costs in an effort to contain them. The Unit had a small staff consisting of representatives from WFP, the US military, IOM, and NGOs operating in the region. It took WFP about a month to get the Transport Coordination Unit up and running. The new head of WFP/Rwanda admitted at the end of September that the agency had not focused on movement of food supplies and coordination with NGOs for some time. To rectify the situation, WFP undertook to chair a weekly food coordination meeting, that would be in addition to UNREO's weekly food transport and logistics meeting.

Most of UNHCR's work took place at the camp level, but it did institute and manage the Air Operations Cell from July 20 until the end of the airlift on September 30, 1994. The Cell was an outgrowth of the two year old Sarajevo Air Operation Cell, operating out of Geneva and was established by the same person, who had established the Sarajevo operation. The purpose of the Cell was to manage overall airport operations and cargo handling in Goma. It was supported by French troops with Operation Turquoise, and complimented with personnel from Britain's Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and several other donor countries. By October, Geneva was also supporting management of the reopened Kigali airport. Its tasks were to schedule humanitarian flights, assign UN call signs, and coordinate landing slots with Kigali airport traffic control personnel.

At the beginning of September, UN agencies, ODA, DART, and CMOC-Kigali reviewed the airlift
operation and found it lacking. They decided UNHCR had not managed the air cell to its capacity and many of the US military aircraft in the theater were underutilized, despite the existence of a large backlog of relief supplies in Entebbe. They recommended aircraft, personnel, and expertise be better used while still in theater; that the main air hub for relief efforts be shifted from Entebbe to Kigali; that contingency stockpiles were needed in Kigali; and that more attention needed to be paid to overland transportation, given its cost effectiveness. A retrospective evaluation found still more problems. The Air Cell had difficulty adjusting to a multi-destination operation (Bukavu and Kigali were served as well as Goma); several agencies complained it was used as a UNHCR airlift, rather than a service for all agencies; cargos did not always conform to field priorities; and it seems the air operation lasted several weeks longer than necessary, using valuable resources.

UNHCR and WFP worked together on food distribution programs in the refugee camps. The two had signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1992 in an attempt to overcome problems HCR had experienced with mobilization, procurement, and transport of general ration food commodities. Under the agreement, WFP is responsible for all operations up to the Extended Delivery Points (EDPs, warehouses or storage tents located at or near the camps being served) and also manages the EDPs. UNHCR is responsible for arranging transport from the EDPs to the camps, and for coordinating the NGO implementing partners undertaking general ration distribution. Monitoring of distributions is shared by UNHCR and the NGOs.

The process was generally successful but exhibited several problems. There were periods of inadequate supplies due to WFP logistical and resource problems. WFP made things worse in Ngara and Bukavu by not adequately sharing pipeline information with HCR at the field level. UNHCR-Ngara workers were frustrated enough to try to convince visiting USAID officials to by-pass WFP with their donations, providing them directly to UNHCR. US officials were not pleased and WFP officials formally protested: the HCR-Ngara request was dismissed. These problems led UNHCR and concerned NGOs to establish supplemental feeding programs as a back up system. Throughout the crisis period a recurring source of friction between the two agencies was different estimates of the number of refugees needing assistance. UNHCR estimates were always higher than WFP ones. Further, UNHCR delayed the refugee registration process, a procedure which inevitably resulted in substantially reduced numbers. The crux of the problem was that the costs of registration were borne by UNHCR, while majority of the costs of a delay in reducing the planning figures were borne by WFP. All of this led to a tendency of staff for each agency to blame the other when things went wrong.

There is a final note on UN inter-agency relations at the Great Lakes regional level. UNHCR did not have good relations with UNREO. UNREO led an inter-agency contingency planning process that would have given UNHCR better information on the size of population movements in the north-west in June. The refugee agency initially took the process seriously and went to great lengths to ensure key staff from Goma and Geneva attended a meeting in Nairobi. The meeting ended before the implications of various scenarios were considered, and UNHCR requests to resume the meeting were not supported by other UN agency representatives. The experience led UNHCR to pay no heed to the UNREO-led process. The final inter-agency document that contained a worst-case scenario of large numbers of people moving toward Goma was not forwarded to the UNHCR office in Goma. The worse-case scenario came true. If UNHCR had paid attention to it, the immediate response in Goma might have been better.

Operation Restore Hope's Joint Task Force at Entebbe used several simple mechanisms to facilitate the flow of information and materials. One of the simplest, yet greatly valued, was a bulletin board outside the CMOC office in the Entebbe air terminal. NGO personnel passing through put their business cards and notes on the board, enabling people who arrived later to quickly see who was already in the region. Another simple mechanism was providing free air transport for NGO and UN personnel from Entebbe to Kigali when there was room on already scheduled relief flights. This
was particularly important early on when Kigali airport had not yet been certified as safe, so it could not get insurance and commercial airlines would not fly in.\(^{(312)}\)

The most important coordination mechanism was daily morning meetings with representatives from the US military, UN organizations, and NGOs. NGO representation was in constant flux. They were always present, but personnel changed as people moved in and out of the region. The morning meetings were initially run by CMOC officers until UNHCR acquired office space and furniture, at which point they were chaired by UNHCR. As discussion progressed a common sense of needs emerged, which led to prioritization and specific coordination events for the following 48 hours. The humanitarian needs of the Goma area dominated the process. Information on shipments coming in, events planned and underway, and needs in Zaire and Rwanda was critical. If there were disputes, the senior UNHCR representative had the final say.\(^{(313)}\)

**Field Level Coordination in Zaire and Tanzania**

There were a number of coordination mechanisms used for refugee and IDP assistance at the field level. To better understand them, it is useful to have in mind a generic division of labor between humanitarian actors involved in the delivery of relief assistance. Briefly, a few UN agencies set up the overall structure of the relief response -- where camps will go (UNHCR and host governments), how food will get to the camps (WFP), what types of aid and technical expertise are needed (several agencies), and so on. Together with some of the largest NGOs, they take responsibility for overseeing the provision of specific sectoral needs (water, sanitation, health, logistics, etc.) The hands-on delivery of services is provided by large and small NGOs working in the camps.

Field level mechanisms used during the response to the Rwanda crisis number at least seven. First, UN agencies have mandated roles.\(^{(314)}\) The mandates confer authority and make clear to all concerned what a particular organization is supposed to do. UNHCR's responsibility for protecting and providing assistance to refugees is the most obvious example. NGOs accept UNHCR's lead in refugee matters not only because of its experience and resources, but because the world body says they should. The refugee agency's authority is further enhanced when the government of a country hosting refugees formally recognizes UNHCR's position. For example, the government of Tanzania requested UNHCR to coordinate relief operations on its territory.

Second, UN agencies and a few of the largest NGOs took on "lead agency" roles, based on their mandate, recognized expertise, and experience. Lead agencies were responsible for fulfilling needs in particular functional sectors, such as food delivery and body collection. Ideally the lead agency would assess needs within the sector, notify resource providers of those needs, coordinate delivery and dispersal of the resource or service in question, and monitor delivery and results. Around Bukavu, Zaire, for example, five lead organizations set up and managed 25 camps and four unaccompanied children centers. They were CARE, IFRC, Order of Malta, Caritas, and the Pentecostal Church Community of Zaire/Free Church Community of Zaire. On some occasions the lead agency failed to adequately fulfill its role and the camp populations suffered as a consequence.\(^{(315)}\)

Third, some funding was channeled through lead organizations. For example, ECHO gave all its money for refugee relief to UNHCR and directed NGOs seeking money to that agency. Although the amount of money HCR had to disperse was small compared to the total resources entering the region, it did give it some capacity for direction.\(^{(316)}\) This was particularly true in the early stages of the international response in Ngara, Tanzania. Similarly, large NGOs would occasionally use money or in-kind resources to sub-contract smaller NGOs.

Fourth, lead agencies used technical coordinators to great effect. UNHCR's technical personnel were particularly skilled, as were DART personnel (though DART never takes a lead agency role). All three UNHCR sub-offices (Goma, Bukavu, Ngara) had technical coordinators in all eight sectors of
health, water, food, site planning, logistics, security, communications, and community services. The key ones arrived with the Emergency Response Teams. The work of the technical coordinators consisted of identifying needs and agreeing with particular implementing NGOs about what needs they would fulfill. They then monitored NGO performance and gave advice and occasional support to overcome problems. Skilled practitioners with technical knowledge, provided structure, monitored indicators of refugee status to assess the needs and health of the population, applied internationally recognized per capita targets (e.g. liters of water per person), and generally followed good practice in managing large camp populations. (317) (Recall that lack of technical capacity was identified by large NGOs and UN agencies as a problem for UNREO coordinating efforts.)

Fifth, lead agencies and organizations held regular meetings attended by all organizations concerned. At the meetings representatives exchanged information and notified each other of their activities and problems they encountered. Meetings were of the same type detailed above in the description of UNREO activities in Kigali. For instance, coordination meetings were held in Bukavu every morning. In attendance were representatives from WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF, and relevant NGOs. The meetings were chaired by the WFP Rapid Response Team's leader because of his seniority and emergency experience. (318)

Sixth, ad hoc collaborative efforts were undertaken for specific purposes. For example, a joint food assessment mission in southeastern Rwanda was undertaken by UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and MOB. (319). After the fall of Ruhengeri, Rwanda (that led to the sudden rush across the Zairian border), a joint assessment team initiated the first steps of the subsequent major relief effort. Team members were drawn from DHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, and Britain's ODA. (320) UNICEF and UNHCR worked together to provide assistance to unaccompanied minors in all five countries of the affected region. (321)

The seventh method was the concept of "service packages," developed by UNHCR in response to the overwhelming and urgent situation brought about by the Goma refugee influx. The agency requested governments to provide self-contained facilities in sectors such as airport services, water management, and camp site preparation. More than a dozen countries responded. (322) As it happened, few if any of the services were provided in self-contained packages, unlike the Swedish communications team that dramatically helped UNREO. (323) Despite this drawback, the concept is likely to be employed in the future as a way of rapidly responding to emergency situations without UNHCR or other agencies having to make substantial investments in standby capacity.

V. Findings

What promotes effective coordination? What are some of the implications with regard to coordination that can be drawn from Rwanda? Other assessments of UNDHA and UNREO have identified a number of specific institutional strengths and weaknesses, and ways to improve future operations. (324) The interaction of humanitarian and military actors has been assessed with an eye toward improving relations during the next complex emergency in which foreign militaries become involved. (325) The multiproject study takes a broader view that incorporates political, funding, and military considerations. (326)

This section of the paper does not attempt to duplicate what has been done well elsewhere. Rather, it offers an analysis of coordination in a generalized context and points to several implications for future coordination efforts.

A. Coordination Through Consensus and Decentralization

It will be recalled that coordination can be categorized by process (or mode) and outcome (or type). Possible processes of coordination are default, consensus, and command. Possible outcomes of
coordination are exchange of information and analysis, common representation, a shared framework or agenda for action, and directive management. The default mode can only yield information and analysis sharing -- other types of coordination demand more concerted effort than default entails by definition. Consensus mode can accommodate information sharing, common representation, and agenda setting. It does not allow for management. The command mode can yield all four types of coordination. (327)

The Rwanda experience suggests that consensus is the most effective mode of coordination for humanitarian organizations at the operational level. The central humanitarian coordinating body concerned with events and people inside Rwanda (UNREO) worked by consensus and by all accounts vastly enhanced the effectiveness of the international response. It did so by acting as an information clearinghouse and by creating fora for consensus-building and facilitation of humanitarian operations. To a lesser extent, the same can be said of UNREO's sister organization, the UN Advanced Humanitarian Team. Instances of default, or ad hoc, coordination played a useful role in particular circumstances (such as field reconnaissance missions and geographically defined food delivery agreements at the height of the crisis), but they would have been utterly inadequate to deal with the hundreds of organizations that flooded into the small central African state when the fighting stopped. Several players attempted coordination by command, including UNHCR in the refugee camps, ICVA in Rwanda, and the new Government of Rwanda. UNHCR was successful in Tanzania, but all other attempts failed.

Effective coordination by consensus implies delegation of authority. (328) Coordinating and implementing organizations must give their regional- and field-level staff permission and the means to make decisions in conjunction with personnel from other organizations. The authors of DHA's internal review voiced the opinion of most field representatives when they wrote that the coordination of an emergency can only occur on the ground, requiring decentralized decision-making and appropriate backup from headquarters. (329)

The respected International Response to Conflict and Genocide disagrees. Volume three, which concentrates on humanitarian aid and its effects, argues that the international response was characterized by a "hollow core" unable to fill the critical need for leadership and overall coordination. It recommends that the UN, "[c]onsolidate, in a new, expertly-led and -staff and fully operational mechanism of the United Nations, the emergency response functions of DHA and the principle UN humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF). . . . The proposal would ensure coordination by centralizing all policy and operational responsibility in one agency/department."

The new mechanism would include control over all funds for UN agencies and their implementing partners. The justification for major reform is to rationalize the response system, reduce duplication of effort, and "create a strong body fully capable of providing leadership." (330) In other words, overcome the weaknesses exhibited in Rwanda by creating a UN body to manage the international humanitarian response through a command process, at least to some extent. (331)

It is true that DHA in New York was (and still is) organizationally weak, leading to a hollow core when seeking a comprehensive humanitarian response to complex emergencies. However, that does not necessitate creation of a highly centralized body, the existence of which would likely throw up bureaucratic barriers to the flexibility needed to respond to rapidly changing complex emergencies. The United Nations is infamous for its bureaucratic stultification. Rather than wade into that morass, the humanitarian community as a whole and UN agencies in particular should move in the opposite direction -- toward decentralization.

For a decentralized, consensus-based approach to work, each NGO, UN agency, and bilateral agency must be willing to delegate authority within its own structure so the field personnel can act quickly and be free to innovate. (332) The designated coordinating body must also follow a decentralized
model that provides central focus and readily accepts input from implementing organizations. To be effective, decentralization requires high-quality personnel at all levels; solid support for the field from headquarters, including taking field-level suggestions seriously; field-level control over enough resources to implement projects without waiting for funding approval; a clear delineation of each organization's mandate and role in the emergency at hand, so that all needs are met and conflict between organizations does not arise out of false expectations; on-going planning and training to develop responses to generic scenarios and to familiarize every organization with what others are capable of doing; good reporting mechanisms so the central offices can keep track of what is happening and offer guidance; and accountability so that organizations and individual staff members can be recognized for particularly good or bad practices.

Decentralization does not imply that there is not need for a lead agency. Indeed for decentralization to work in a complicated and fluid environment in which many separate organizations are supposedly working toward the same end, a shared vision and common purpose are essential. A comprehensive response to a complex emergency must take into account political and humanitarian considerations. As the case of Rwanda shows, political action might not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the need for a clear humanitarian strategy in such circumstances still exists. That strategy, or common purpose, is best formulated by a single actor that is able to comprehend the problem, envision an achievable objective, and articulate in general terms a method for reaching the objective. It might be that in many cases a strengthened DHA is the appropriate organization for the task, but in other cases the lead role might be better assumed by a state (such as the US in Haiti) or an operational agency (such as UNHCR in refugee situations).

B. Lead Agency

Lead actors are an important part of successful responses to complex emergencies. The concept is compatible with both consensus and command modes of coordination, depending on the leader's approach and available resources. Potentially a lead actor can (a) provoke others to action where it is needed but would not occur without advocacy, (b) take action themselves, (c) guide the development of a consensus around specific topics and plans of action, (d) direct other actors as to what they may and may not do, and (e) increase efficiency by promoting a common framework of understanding, reducing duplication of effort, and providing technical expertise where needed. On the other hand, lead actors can make a situation worse if they are too heavy handed, or over emphasize one aspect of an emergency to the detriment of other aspects (e.g. further militarizing a conflict by sending in troops).

The Rwanda case provides some insight into variations on the lead actor model in complex emergencies. In the political sphere the UN tried to lead, after initially shirking responsibility like all the states. It was ineffective in the absence of strong support from member states. It simply did not have the resources or authority to move beyond pronouncements and diplomatic entreaties. In the military sphere France took the lead when a feeling finally prevailed in the international community that something must be done beside sending food and medicine. From a military standpoint Operation Turquoise was a success. This was due to a number of factors, not least of which was the unilateral nature of the intervention. France was able to call all the shots and had control over all troops on the ground -- two command and control variables that are not usually present in coalitional warfare (though more so when there is a strong lead state, vis. the Gulf War). However, France did not play a lead actor role outside the military sphere. In the humanitarian arena lack of a single leader for the entire Great Lakes region made a fully coordinated response impossible. This was particularly problematic since events inside Rwanda led directly to huge refugee-related challenges in neighboring states. UNDHA and UNHCR did take lead agency roles within and beyond Rwandan boundaries respectively. DHA managed to play an important, though weak role; its field office, UNREO, played an essential and somewhat stronger role. UNHCR had a dominant leadership role in Tanzania but was overwhelmed in Goma.
These examples tell us that several factors contribute to a successful lead agency. If there is a will, there must also be a way. Would be leaders who do not have control over a significant amount of material resources will not get very far. Also a high level of technical expertise is important if the lead agency is to play a strong role in developing a shared vision of the problem and how to address it. Other actors must recognize the validity of a lead agency's claim to the position, or they will be disinclined to follow. Legitimacy rests on mandate and experience. Lead agencies usually do not intend to take on all aspects of a complex emergency. This is wise in that few if any actors have the capabilities necessary to do so. But task-specific leadership is also problematic: it can distort the international response either by over emphasizing one aspect (e.g. focusing on humanitarian aid and ignoring political issues), or by allowing the development of incompatible strategies (the common military-humanitarian tension).

C. Shared Frameworks for Action

One of the greatest weaknesses at all levels of the international response to the war and genocide in Rwanda was lack of coherent strategy to guide activities. The Rwanda experience stands out for the failure of world leaders to make any connection between the political and humanitarian spheres. Not a finger was raised in response to the explicit policy of genocide. The small amount of diplomatic footwork that did take place was aimed at creating a do-nothing united front in the UN Security Council(335) and attempting to secure a cease-fire that would have ended the RPF advance against the extremist regime. (Recall that it was the rapid rebel victory on the battlefield that stopped the genocide.) If UNAMIR had been strengthened and given a new mandate or if a unilateral military force had intervened early, it is very likely the genocide could have been severely curtailed.(336) UNAMIR was weakened instead and no unilateral force with the intent of stopping the genocide was ever deployed(337). In contrast, the humanitarian response was unprecedented in its speed and delivery of copious resources over long distances. Tens of thousands of refugees and IDPs died of disease due to squalid conditions, but many more were saved. Death due to starvation was largely averted. Donations from the international community flooded in, particularly after more than a million people fled over the border to Zaire. The dark side is that many of the people who received international largesse in Zaire and Tanzania participated in, or supported, the genocide. Their existence on the doorstep of the new Rwandan government has been a destabilizing factor for the entire Great Lakes region ever since and helped spark a civil war in Zaire with potentially calamitous consequences.

To avoid perpetuation of the causes of complex emergencies in the future, political leaders can not pretend that humanitarian action will make political problems go away.(338) Conversely, humanitarian organizations can not continue to insist that their actions do not have political consequences.(339) By definition complex emergencies are politically caused humanitarian crises. To resolve them requires a strategy that brings together political and humanitarian considerations.

A clear framework for action is required at the operational and field levels as well. While UNREO did a good job providing information and enabling common representation, it was criticized for its weak ability to set an agenda and adhere to it.(340) This type of coordination requires greater directive capacity than UNREO possessed and is an argument in favor of moving beyond a purely consensus mode. To develop and follow a framework, an operational level coordinating body needs more resources than UNREO had, from cash to set up field offices and hire local employees to influence over which organizations work in particular functional sectors and geographic regions. It also needs a more authoritative voice, such as can be provided by placing the coordination office under the overall direction of the SRSG (the highest ranking UN officer in the country). Steps of this sort could strengthen a body like UNREO without undermining its essentially consensual nature that allows for flexibility, significant input from the field, and mutual respect between coordinators and implementers.
D. Institutionalization

Just as censuses-based coordination and decentralization do not imply lack of need for a lead organization, they also do not imply organizational laxity. Observers and participants have pointed to UNREO's practice of flying by the seat of the pants as an important weakness. UNDHA did not have in place any standard procedures for its field offices. There were no guidelines for managing personnel or files; there were no administrative personnel during the first crucial months to follow the guidelines if they had existed. Some UNREO personnel who were seconded from other agencies (mostly UNDP) did not even know they were working for DHA. They certainly did not have a clear conception of how "their" agency operated or of its organizational philosophy and mandate. At the headquarters level, the DHA-New York desk officer for Rwanda was asked to spend time on things other than liaison with the field. When he was available, he did not have the authority to make many decisions and higher ups were too busy to respond in a timely manner. The field office thus was subject to an agenda that had little to do with what was happening in the field. (341)

Lack of institutionalization was partially responsible for the near disintegration of two important components of the Rwanda relief effort: the NGO Liaison Unit and the Swedish Support Team that provided communications and logistical support to UNREO. The Liaison Unit was an ad hoc, shoe string operation that ceased to function when the key staff member went on leave. Had procedures been in place for timely replacement and had there been some provision for the maintenance of institutional memory the Unit could have played a useful role for longer than it did. Despite the fact that the Swedish Support Team was recognized as essential to UNREO's effectiveness, there were no provisions for its maintenance when the Swedish government wanted cut off its funding. The transition of responsibility and ownership from Sweden to DHA took place at the last minute in an inefficient manner that required a good deal of personal attention from the Humanitarian Coordinator in Kigali, the Under Secretary-General in New York, and senior personnel in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (342) Such transactions need not consume the sustained attention of top-level officials whose time would be better spent in other ways.

An effective coordinating organization must have a certain level of institutionalized procedures so that mundane problems do not inhibit effective action and so that all personnel know the organization's designated role and capacities. It must also develop lines of communication and authority to enable timely responses to changing conditions. DHA has rectified some shortcomings with its Orientation Handbook that provides an overview of DHA, its relations with other humanitarian actors, and the purposes and tools of coordination. In cases were an actor other than DHA is the lead coordinator, such as UNHCR or a state government, a written statement of roles, procedures, and capabilities is also a good idea. (343)

E. Overcoming Organizational Distrust

No matter how good a coordinating agent is during a complex emergency, it will meet with limited success if the other organizations involved do not trust each other. The problem of organizational distrust usually occurs across the boundaries of political, humanitarian, and military communities -- politicians, humanitarians, and soldiers view the world in different ways. A related problem of organizational rivalry usually occurs within these boundaries -- NGOs often compete for resources from the same donor pool, for example.

Liaison officers do not provide a broad enough point of contact to overcome distrust. American military officers in a CMOC might do an admirable job of facilitating military-humanitarian operational interaction, but they can not change the basic attitudes of the majority "war fighters" in their own ranks or the gun shy humanitarians on the other side of the divide. Task-oriented meetings (such as regular coordination sessions) are better at overcoming distrust and rivalry because they allow participants to get to know one another and provide opportunities for organizations to work
together toward specific. However, these meetings are another manifestation of ad hoc behavior, and if they are not well run they can even increase distrust between organizations.

In addition to regular interaction in the field, several preparatory measures can increase inter-organizational understanding and thus decrease distrust and rivalry. Most important among these are (a) joint training prior to the outbreak of an emergency; (b) joint planning for the initial response to a new emergency; and (c) clear statements by every organization of its purpose, capabilities, and philosophy (including its view of the use of force and the role of politics in complex emergencies). These measures will help to bring expectations into line with reality. They will also increase operational efficiency by showing various organizations where weaknesses in the response network are and how to fill them.

VI. Conclusion

This study has presented a detailed appraisal of the coordination of humanitarian relief efforts in Rwanda. In doing so it has identified particular methods of coordination and the factors that determined the extent to which each coordination effort was effective. The study has also drawn broader coordination lessons. It supports the argument that a consensus approach to coordination with decentralized decision-making authority is the most effective means for coping with fast-moving complex emergencies. It recognizes the importance and limitations of lead actors for promoting effective action. Finally, it points to the need for a widely accepted framework for action in accordance with a clear overall strategy; the desirability of institutionalizing certain aspects of the coordination response structure; and the need to overcome distrust between organizations.

Other cases should be examined to determine the strength of the findings presented here. Particularly interesting questions for further exploration are the relative advantages of the consensus and command modes of coordination, the efficacy of lead agents, and (stepping beyond the bounds of this study) the interaction of humanitarian and political actors and their objectives.

Reference List


Okabe, Marie. Senior Liaison Officer, UNHCR Liaison Office to UN Headquarters. Interview by author, 12 April 1996. New York, New York.


1993.


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Notes

1. This study is part of a research project on inter-organizational coordination during complex emergencies, directed by Professors Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes. The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation's Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict. I am indebted to the Chayes for highlighting the importance of coordination, to the entire group of researchers for ideas discussed during several meetings, to Toni Chayes, Abe Chayes, and George Raach for comments on earlier drafts, and to the Carnegie Corporation for a research stipend.


4. The typology of modes of coordination is from Antonio Donini and Nora Niland, Rwanda: Lessons Learned, A Report on the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1994), p. 5. They describe the carrots and sticks of the command mode as "authority" rather than "power." I prefer power to describe the things the
coordinating agency can wield over others and authority to describe the stature given the coordinating agency by others. By this light, coordination by consensus also confers authority on the coordinating agency.


6. Study 3, especially pp. 159-160.


11. The MRND was the Parmehutu party with a new name. The new name was part of a larger governmental discourse intended to show the international community how dedicated the Habyarimana regime was to economic development programs, which brought the government huge amounts for foreign money. Uvin, *Development, Aid and Conflict*, p. 9.


13. Literally "the little house." A name given to the inner circle of the Royal Court. It was applied to the inner core of the Habyarimana regime after 1985, with a strongly critical connotation of power abuse. Prunier, p. 367.

14. A case can be made that members of the international community who pushed the Habyarimana regime to live up to the Arusha Accord did so without adequate understanding of the possible repercussions. In this way they are responsible for the pursuit of genocide in Rwanda. See Alan J. Kuperman, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage Than Good," *SAIS Review* (Winter-Spring 1996): 221-240.


19. Study 2, p. 44.


21. The government of Habyarimana became known as the "interim government" after the President was killed.

22. UNAMIR Report.

23. General Dallaire had earlier suggested a similar list to the Secretary-General. Dallaire's list did not include the option of complete withdrawal, but did offer the status quo as a choice. The general favored strong reinforcement, but the Security Council voted for his least favored option. Connaughton, p. 12.


25. Connaughton, p11.


27. *African Rights says the number was 450, p1117. Study 2 says the number was 540, p45.*


29. UNAMIR report, pp. 15-16.


33. Despite increased security, most NGOs were very reluctant to work in the safe zone because they did not trust the French and/or did not want to be seen as condoning French activities in Rwanda. For more on this point, see the subsection below titled "Operation Turquoise."

34. It is not clear why the French troops did not arrest the extremist Hutu leaders to be tried on charges of crimes against humanity. This is only one of a number of questions about French actions and motives in Rwanda after April 6.

35. Bluebook, p. 75.

36. The entire judicial system had to be built from scratch. All the people with legal training had either
been killed or had fled the country -- new people have been trained. A new set of laws with a three-part division of culpability for genocide participants has passed through the legislature. Although new and untested, the legal system seems ready to begin its work. It is not clear what the delay is at this point. Joe B. Felli, Special Representative of the OAU Secretary-General in Rwanda. Interview by author, 23 September 1996. Kigali, Rwanda.


38. The ICRC has official observer status in the General Assembly of the UN, which no other nongovernmental, non-UN organization has. It has also been operating for longer than nearly every other relief agency. The ICRC likes to distinguish itself from other relief organizations by the strictness with which it adheres to the principle of neutrality and the non-partisan, non-ideological nature of its work. To my mind, these are differences of degree, not kind. NGOs, including the ICRC, exist on a partisan - non-partisan continuum. This is not to deny that the ICRC deserves recognition for the instrumental role it has consistently played in bringing humanitarian principles to the attention of all parties in conflict situations.

39. This case study gives great attention to a third UN agency, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and its Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). This agency did not have nearly the volume of resource flow as UNHCR and WFP, but was essential in the coordination effort inside Rwanda. (As discussed below, greater control over resources might have facilitated UNREO's work.)

40. Study 2, p. 36.

41. Prunier p. 276.

42. African Rights, pp. 1116-1117. It appears, however, that the SRSG was simply reflecting the attitude of the Secretary-General and New York headquarters more generally. Booh-Booh did provide largely accurate assessments of events to New York, according to documents cited in Study 2.

43. Study 3 p. 123.

44. Donini and Niland, p. 8.

45. Donini and Niland, p. 3.

46. The SRSG never has formal authority over UN agencies, but is often able to facilitate cooperation through informal leadership.

47. Study 3, p. 126.


49. Confidential source.

50. Donini and Niland, p. 7.

51. Study 3, p. 126.

52. Donini and Niland, p. 8.


55. Study 2, pp. 36-37.

56. Study 2, p. 38.

57. Connaughton, p. 9.

58. The U.S. elected to evacuate its nationals in an over-land convoy via a southward route to Burundi. Putzel diary.

59. Study 2, p. 41.

60. In the event, about 500 troops remained in Rwanda, primarily from Ghana and Bangladesh.


62. Initially Dallaire thought the killing was politicide. He did not recognize it as genocide until later, but well before the work "genocide" was ever used by top diplomats at the UN.

63. Quoted in Study 2, p. 42.

64. Study 2, p. 41 and fn. 70.

65. Study 2, p. 43.

66. Study 2, fn. 75.

67. Study 2, p. 43 and fn. 76.

68. France did have interests in Rwanda, as demonstrated by its later actions, but it refrained from taking a leadership role. The French government says it did not step forward because it was inappropriate to suggest forceful action at the time (before the extent of the killing was known), given its history in the country. Another interpretation is that France believed the massacres were to be limited in scope and that the Hutu government, with whom France was aligned, would win the civil war and needed no help.


70. Donini and Niland, p. 3.

71. Study 3, p. 45.


74. Study 3, p. 131.
75. Donini and Niland, p. 12.

76. DHA did not have any authority outside Rwanda. The lead agency beyond the international border was UNHCR. This artificial distinction was counter-productive, as discussed below.

77. UNDHA Situation Report No. 20.

78. Kent interview.


80. UNDHA Situation Report No. 6.

81. Study 3, p. 51.

82. Clark interview. Donini and Niland. One suspects concern over the name also arises from DHA's organizational sensitivity. As a new and small unit within the Secretariat, the value of DHA is questioned by some who see it as another bureaucratic layer.

83. The UN Resident Representative/Coordinator, in most circumstances, is the head of the UN Development Program (i.e. the UNDP Resident Representative), who is responsible for overall coordination of UN assistance efforts. When an emergency arises the head of DHA may designate a special Humanitarian Coordinator, who may be a separate person, or the current Resident Coordinator, if that person has adequate emergency experience. DHA Handbook draft, p. 7.

84. Study 3, p. 123.

85. Study 3, p. 123.

86. DHA Situation Report No. 10.

87. DHA Situation Report No. 11.

88. Study 3, p. 34.

89. Study 3, p. 124.


92. Study 3, p. 124.


95. DHA Handbook draft, p. 22.

96. DHA Handbook draft pp. 14 and 22.
97. Study 3, p. 123.

98. Quoted in Study 3, p. 123.


101. Study 3, p. 16.


103.


104. DHA Handbook draft, p. 23.

105. Between April and the end of 1994, total food aid delivered was approximately 270,000 tons. Study 3, p. 88.

106. Study 3, p. 88.


111. The other organization was Médecins sans Frontières-France, which had a group of doctors attached to the ICRC mission in Kigali.

112. Minear and Weiss, pp. 47 and 151.

113. Study 3, p. 127, fn. 46.

114. Study 3, p. 127.

115. DHA Situation Report No. 23.


117. Minear and Weiss, p. 152.

118. National units operating in Rwanda under separate command from UNAMIR were from France, the United States, and Canada. Canada also contributed troops to UNAMIR. National units operating in Zaire came from France, the United States, Japan, Israel, and Holland. Study 3, p. 53.

120. The fifteen top donors, in order of amount donated, were: the US (including the cost of Operation Support Hope), the EU, Japan, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, the World Bank, Italy, Denmark, and Norway. Study 3, p. 25.

121. Study 3 p. 25.


127. All the logistical units but one were related to combat support. The exception was a military hospital put at civilian disposal to be used primarily for inoculations. Connaughton, p. 18. Inoculation is not what people driven from their homes need most -- they need rehydration and care for wounds. Skeptics of French motives argue these facts support the contention that Operation Turquoise was not a humanitarian undertaking, despite its rhetoric and the fact that it helped save lives. Nora Niland, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UNDHA. Interview by author, 11 April 1996, New York.

If delivery of humanitarian aid were the primary concern, then a good deal of attention would have been given to providing appropriate logistical expertise and resources. On the other hand, it can be argued that the French never intended to get involved in the provision of relief; they intended to create an environment secure enough for others to provide relief.


129. Niland interview.


131. The official French estimate of lives saved is 80-100,000 Tutsi and a large number of Hutu. Connaughton, p. 20. Another source that was very critical of the entire international response, especially the roles played by the French and Americans, says only about 10-15,000 Tutsi were saved. African Rights, p. 1147. The exhaustive *International Response to Conflict and Genocide* estimates the number at 14,000. Study 3 p. 11. Ten to fifteen thousand lives is nothing to sneeze at, but it is a small number on the Rwanda scale. Lt. Col. Eric de Stabenrath of the French military spent several weeks investigating the massacres in Kibuye prefecture. He said, "Between 80 and 95 percent of the
Tutsi population has been destroyed in this area." Consolidated Rwanda Report No. 4, quoting an August 8, 1994 story in The Washington Post.

132. Clark interview.

133. Study 3, p. 45. As many as 20,000 IDPs died of dysentery in the IDP camps around Gikongoro. Study 3 , p. 11. For comparison, the widely broadcast cholera and dysentery epidemics around Goma resulted in about 40,000 deaths. No one has heard of Gikongoro.

134. Study 3, p. 56. That distinction moved to the areas bordering Zaire (Cyangugu, Kibuye, and Gisenyi) as interhamwe and former army members residing in the Zairian refugee camps progressively increased cross-border guerilla attacks, killing genocide survivors.

135. Connaughton, p. 20.

136. Le Monde quoted a "reputable" American source saying, "Technically, it was possible to locate and destroy or silence Radio Mille Collines' mobile transmitters, and we were surprised that France did not consider such a mission a priority."


141. The Economist (July 9, 1994): 42.


146. Study 3, p. 25.

147. USAID Situation Report No. 2, Fiscal Year 1996. USAID Situation Report No. 1, 1996 says the US donated a total of $647.3 million, of which $244.2 million was earmarked for use inside Rwanda. I have used the more recent figures.

148. The distribution of funds followed the same pattern as virtually all other donations. The government of Rwanda complained bitterly that those responsible for the genocide were getting more attention and help than the survivors of the genocide who remained in Rwanda.

149. Connaughton, p. 25.

150. Study 3, p. 57.

152. All of the above from OFDA Field Operations Guide available on the USAID homepage. URL http://www.info.usaid.gov/

153. Study 3, p. 127 and footnotes 44 and 45.

154. Study 3, p. 127.


156. Seiple, p. 232. Trucks are much more efficient than airplanes for transporting large quantities of bulky material.


158. Seiple, p. 236.

159. One can not help but notice the similarity of the situation with the current Hutu refugee population in Zaire.


165. UNHCR estimated quoted in Prunier, p. 62.

166. Prunier, p. 322.


168. Assiana interview.


171. Prunier, p. 279.


180. Study 3, p. 38.


182. Peter Uvin, *Development, Aid and Conflict*.

183. USAID "Consolidated Rwanda Report No. 7" 1994


185. In the last several years UNHCR has expanded its population of concern to include IDPs. The broadened mandate is the result of events in places like Rwanda and Bosnia where no other organizations was in a position to take the lead on IDPs. Key members of the UN have encouraged UNHCR's expanded role in the belief that it is one of the most effective UN agencies.

186. Study 3, p. 125.

187. NGOs tend to see ICVA as an organization that exists for itself without serving a useful purpose. When Jette Isaksen replaced Anita Menghetti at the NGO Liaison Unit, she put an ICVA placard on her door because they paid her salary. NGO personnel were quite hostile but changed their attitudes considerably after Isaksen removed the placard. Isaksen interview.


189. The multi-donor Study 3 calls it the NGO Coordination Cell. I have adopted the name used by Seiple, who provides greater detail.

190. Seiple, pp. 244-245.

191. Study 3, p. 28.

192. Study 3, p. 123.

193. Study 3, p. 123. The Resident Representative answers to UNDP and is primarily concerned with development. In an emergency situation, he or she does double duty.

194. Study 3, p. 28.


197. Donini and Niland, p. 6.


199. Gen. Dallaire had established a Humanitarian Assistance Cell by the time DHA made contact with UNAMIR on 16 April. DHA Sit. Rep. No. 6.


202. DHA Sit. Rep., No. 11.


204. DHA Sit Rep., No. 13.


206. A follow-on to UNREO has been established in Nairobi to act as an information clearing house for the Great Lakes region. The UNDHA Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), conceived of and directed by Pat Banks, gathers reports and data from a number of sources, then sends regular information updates to over 40,000 people and organizations via e-mail. The director has decision-making power over who is hired. IRIN is independently funded by direct contributions from about a half dozen states. Banks and Randolph Kent had to push DHA-New York for four to five months for permission to get the project off the ground. It is now widely recognized as a vital resource for facilitating a common understanding of needs and priorities among international organizations, NGOs, and governments. Jette Isaksen, former UNREO-Gikongoro field coordinator and current IRIN employee. Interview by author, 11 September 1996. Nairobi, Kenya.

207. DHA Sit. Rep., No. 11.


211. DHA Sit. Rep., No. 20.

212. Donini and Niland, p. 16.

213. Study 3, p. 125.

214. Donini and Niland, p. 17.
217. Donini and Niland, p. 20.
218. Confidential source.
220. Connaughton, Annex A.
221. Study 3, p. 126.
223. Clark interview. Seiple p. 244.
224. Kent interview.
225. Donini and Niland, p. 5. Connaughton, Annex A.
226. Isaksen interview.
227. Internal DHA communications from Kigali to New York. Isaksen interview.
228. Donini and Niland, p. 16.
229. Donini and Niland, pp. 6-7.
231. Seiple, p. 236.
233. Connaughton, p. 25. Seiple, p. 239.
236. Connaughton, p. 25.
237. Study 3, p. 59.
240. Point of interest: the new Director of the Army Peacekeeping Institute is Col. Larry Forster, who was in charge of force security for Operation Restore Hope.


243. Seiple, p. 245.

244. Seiple, p. 245.

245. The Executive Committee was (and still is) chaired by CARE, with other members being SCF-UK, SCF-US, Concern Worldwide, World Vision, Lutheran World Federation, and African Humanitarian Action (a small Ethiopian organization that is on Committee because it is African and because the director is a good communicator).

246. Isaksen interview.

247. Isaksen interview. Kent interview.

248. Kent interview. Study 2, pp. 63-65 and footnote 133.

249. Kent interview.

250. Kent interview.

251. Isaksen interview.

252. Isaksen interview. About three quarters of those expelled had already left the country, but had failed to inform the government or even the NGO Executive Committee secretariat (the Liaison Unit follow-on) that maintained mailboxes and other basic services for all the NGOs.

253. Roome interview.


255. Isaksen interview. Roome interview.

256. The north-south rivalry in Rwanda meant the Habyarimana regime never had as strong a grip on the local politicians in these prefectures. The bourgemeisters and village officials were in some cases so reluctant to order genocidal activity that they themselves were killed by members of the Presidential Guard and interhamwe brought in from other regions.

257. Study 3, p. 41.

258. Donini and Niland, p. 11.

259. Study 3, p. 42.

260. Study 3, p. 28 and footnote 4.
261. Study 3, p. 42.


263. Study 3, p. 42.


265. Study 3, p. 42.


268. UNDHA Situation Report No. 22, 1994. It is not clear why they elected to switch areas of responsibility from their earlier agreement, when WFP took responsibility for locations south of Butare and ICRC for locations to the north. Particularly since WFP trucked its food from Burundi northward through the southern areas and ICRC trucked its food from Uganda southward through the northern areas. Study 3, p. 44 and footnote 44.

269. Study 3, p. 43.


271. Morris interview.

272. Study 3, p. 11.


274. Connaughton, p. 18 and fn. 75.

275. Study 3, p. 44.

276. Connaughton, p. 20.


278. Study 3, pp. 55-56, 129.

279. "The objective of [the French government's] mission would be to protect pockets of displaced people in Cyangugu and Kigali." UNREO Situation Report No. 27. See also the 20 June, 1994 letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Secretary-General, and the UN Security Council resolution authorizing French intervention. S/1994/734, 21 June 1994; S/RES/929, 22 June 1994. Skeptics will view all three sources as possible covers for less noble intentions, particularly the latter two which are public documents. It is likely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more motivated by the human tragedy (and possibly electoral politics) and the Ministry of Defense by plight of their allies in the interim government army and militia.

281. Examples of the types of interaction between Turquoise and UNREO are: inter-agency teams to assess the growing number of IDPs in the south-east during June and July, in which personnel from the French Humanitarian Cell, UNREO, and DART played central roles; UNREO representatives traveling to major towns in the south-west to discuss methods for preventing a mass IDP exodus with representatives from Turquoise, UNAMIR, UN agencies, and NGOs. Study 3, p. 43. DHA Situation Report No. 25.

282. Connaughton, Annex B.

283. Study 3, p. 45.

284. Connaughton, Annex B.


286. Donini and Niland, p. 15.

287. DHA Sit. Rep., No. 22.

288. Some IDPs did not have confidence in African UNAMIR forces which were not as materially strong as the French. Connaughton, p. 21.


290. Donini and Niland, p. 15.

291. Study 3, p. 130.

292. Resources were limited to one manager, a logistics team, and their equipment.


294. Study 3, p. 130, footnote 66.

295. Study 3, p. 130.

296. The ICRC had its own supply system, which it set up independently from WFP. This gave ICRC independence and provided a backup/alternate food delivery system.

297. Bluebook, p. 73.


300. Study 3, p. 38.


302. Study 3, p. 38. While American troops were in Goma, they largely took over airport operations.


307. Study 3, p. 129.

308. Study 3, p. 129 footnote 59.

309. Study 3, pp. 129-130.


312. Seiple, p. 228.

313. Seiple, p. 227.

314. NGOs have their own mandates which they take very seriously but which are not provided or sanctioned by any multinational body.

315. Study 3, p. 41.

316. Study 3, p. 38.

317. Study 3, p. 127.

318. Study 3, p. 40.


323. A sample of services and their providers follows. The US, through Operation Restore Hope, added substantial airlift capacity, secured the Goma airport perimeter, managed aircraft and cargo, provided and operated site and road preparation equipment, operated water purification equipment and delivered water in tankers. The German government sent a sizable team of engineering and logistics specialists, participated in water purification and pumping, and contributed three military cargo aircraft. The Israeli military provided and operated a military field hospital in Goma from late July until the end of August. The Dutch military fielded a mixed logistics/water transport and medical
contingent from the end of July until early September. The Japanese Self Defense Force attached a medical team to Goma city hospital and sent a water team which took over from the Swedish Relief Team from mid-October until late December. Study 3, p. 37.

324. See Donini and Niland, Donini, and a variety of DHA internal memoranda and after mission reports.


326. The Synthesis Report and Studies 2, 3, and 4 of the five volume The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience conclude with findings and recommendations.

327. The matrix presented in the introduction summarizes these sentences:

Mode of coordination: Default Consensus Command

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Possible types of coordination | representation representation
with each mode: management

328. The concept of decentralization was first clearly articulated for this author by Chayes, Chayes, and Raach Beyond Reform.


331. As partial support for its proposal, the study cites other sources who have made similar proposals. They are Erskine Childers with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations System," Development Dialogue 1994:1 (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1994); "Readying the UN for the 21st Century: Some UN-21 Proposals for Consideration" (Washington: US State Department, 1995).

332. NGOs already give their field personnel considerable latitude within their designated functional sectors.

333. Chayes, Chayes and Raach, pp. 21-25.

334. The Study 3 team described and rejected an option that would allow DHA to take on the role of clearly articulating a shared vision: "Strengthen and extend existing inter-agency coordinating arrangements and mechanisms through: (a) the use of inter-agency Memoranda or Understanding (such as that between UNHCR and WFP); (b) strengthening DHA by assuring its funding base and giving it responsibility for providing common services to the UN and other agencies (air cell management responsibility, integrated humanitarian early warning system, etc.); (c) structure UN coordination meetings as inclusive task forces, chaired by DHA, at which representatives of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, major bilateral donors and key NGOs would be routinely invited to participate; (d) reducing the number of senior officials with coordination and leadership roles and clarifying lines of authority of those with such roles." Study 3, p. 160.

335. The actions of Belgium and the United States stand out in this regard.

336. UN Force Commander Gen. Dallaire has made this argument in several public fora. The argument is not universally accepted. It is my belief, given how the violence spread and the way in which large numbers of victims sought protection in relatively easy to defend churches, that an early and forceful military intervention could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. See Taylor Seybolt, "Whither Humanitarian Intervention? Indications from Rwanda," Breakthroughs (Spring 1996), pp. 19-26.

337. Operation Turquoise was a late and partial attempt, but it sought to control a portion of the country and protect the people there rather than stop the pursuit of genocide throughout the country.

338. From a cynical point of view humanitarian action does alleviate political problems -- domestic political problems. If there is a public demand to "do something" and something (anything) is done, the emergency fades from the domestic political agenda and politicians can return to their priorities of choice.

339. See, for example, the declaration made by NGOs and the ICRC at a Humanitarian Summit in Madrid, Spain, 14 December 1995, sponsored by ECHO. Among other things, it restates their commitment to impartiality and neutrality.

340. Even NGOs, which often resist impositions on their independence of action, wanted the coordinating body to have a more take-charge approach. USAID "Consolidated Rwanda Report No. 16," 1994.

341. Confidential source.

342. Internal DHA correspondence.

343. 

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