Winning the Peace

In service of Afghanistan’s most Vulnerable population

Prepared for the International and Maternal and Child Health Departments of the Boston University School of Public Health by Meghann McNiff Lindholm MA, MPH Candidate
March 2008
Abstract

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With the second highest maternal mortality ratio in the world, “every 28 minutes a woman dies in Afghanistan during childbirth”.¹ In the short term, maternal mortality will not be significantly lowered unless international assistance can meet the immediate needs of women at risk of dying as a result of childbirth. Unfortunately, poor communication and a lack of understanding between civilians and the military are decreasing the efficiency of international assistance programs, the security of civilian aid workers and vulnerable populations.

During a combat operation on February 20th 2007, US Forces acquired the office of an International Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) as a military necessity. The NGO, implementing behavior change education critical to women accessing medical care during childbirth, chose to suspend operations and vacate the compound in an attempt to preserve their status as impartial and independent from military forces.

This incident is just one example of a tactical military decision not supporting the strategic goal to win the peace in Afghanistan, but is a symptom of a more fundamental problem. Civilian players need to find the balance between separation from and integration with the military and share information with the military in protection of their independence; and the military must embrace the protection of civilian space as essential to winning the peace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 4
METHODOLGY .................................................................................................................... 4
BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 5
  Maternal Mortality Challenges ......................................................................................... 5
  Civilian Challenges ......................................................................................................... 6
  Communication Challenges .............................................................................................. 7
  Military Force Structures and Challenges ........................................................................ 7
  International Assistance Successes .................................................................................. 8
NURISTAN CASE STUDY .................................................................................................... 9
  Background .................................................................................................................. 9
  Summary of Events ....................................................................................................... 9
  Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 9
  Lessons Revealed .......................................................................................................... 10
  Nuristan Incident Impact ............................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 11
RECOMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 12

Addendum #1 EXCERPTS FROM THE DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE
INTERACTION AND COORDINATION OF CIVIL HUMANITARIAN ACTORS
AND MILITARY ACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN OCTOBER 2007 ....................... 14
Addendum #2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE PLACEMAT .... 16
Addendum #3 OVERVIEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
COMMANDE AND CONTROL STRUCTURE ......................................................... 18
Addendum #4 UN PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP ............................................. 19
Addendum #5 MILITARY OCCUPATION OF AFGHANAID COMPOUND
KAMDESH DISTRICT, NURISTAN SUMMARY REPORT ........................................ 20
Addendum #6 SCHEMATICS FROM INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM HANDBOOK AND EFFECTS
BASED OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN & THE CJTF-180 METHOD OF
ORCHESTRATING EFFECTS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES OUTLINING
ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL AND MILITARY ACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN .......... 22

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 23
Introduction

According to Zainab Salbi, president and CEO of Women for Women International, and author of The Other Side of WAR: Women’s Stories of Survival & Hope, “A century ago, 90 percent of war casualties were male soldiers. Today, an estimated 90 percent of casualties are civilians, and 75 percent of these are estimated to be women and children”.1 Wars are no longer waged across clear battle lines; likewise, there are no clear demilitarized zones for humanitarian agencies to provide aid or for civilian populations to find safety. And nowhere in the world is this more true than in Afghanistan today.

The center of gravityii or the element necessary to win the war for Operation Enduring Freedom is the Afghan people.2 The military will need to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people in support of the Government of Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom to be a success. Development agencies in Afghanistan are committed to improving the livelihoods of Afghans through improved economic development and access to basic services such as good governance, health and education. Humanitarian agencies seek to alleviate human suffering by meeting the basic needs of humanity in Afghanistan such as food, shelter and water. In Afghanistan the military, development and humanitarian professionals each have different objectives but share a common goal of an independent and stable Afghanistan free of humanitarian crises and each is targeting interventions at the Afghan people.

Afghanistan still faces humanitarian crises of many forms, especially women and children who, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund, face “acute emergency”.3 Unfortunately, poor communication and a lack of understanding between civilians and the military are decreasing the efficiency of international assistance programs, the security of civilian aid workers and vulnerable populations.

Methodology

As a student of international maternal and child public health I was quickly drawn to the body of academic knowledge seeking to improve civil-military operations, or the coordination of civil and military assets in the service of vulnerable populations threatened by and recovering from war. My experience as a Captain in the United States Air Force, a graduate of the Air Force Academy and the Boston University School of Public Health shapes my interest in this topic.

In the spring of 2006, I began by reviewing the literature using the search terms “civil-military relations”, “war and public health”, and by conducting interviews with experts from the field currently working with Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Management Sciences for Health (MSH), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). I also reached out to my colleagues in the military and searched on-line Department of Defense and Department of State databases.

In January of 2007, I stepped out of the classroom to live and work in Afghanistan for a small Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) where I gained a greater appreciation

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1 Theory of identifying necessary elements to winning a war from Carl Von Clausewitz’s book On War; a seminal piece of military history literature still debated today.
of key players, seminal research and written guidelines and, most importantly, the situation on the ground. The ‘Nuristan Incident’, where US Forces entered the office of an NGO and acquired the facility as a military necessity, occurred during my first months in country. I gained permission to include this incident as a case study in my research because of the NGO’s commitment to document lessons learned and improve civil-military operations in the service of Afghanistan.

In researching the Nuristan Incident I conducted interviews with the acting regional director of Afghanaid, the NGO whose compound was acquired, a senior land procurement engineer for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), a senior member of the Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a senior development advisor to the International Security Assistance Forces, and a senior public affairs officer for the Operation Enduring Freedom regional command where the incident occurred. In addition I have searched the International Security Assistance Forces, United Nations (UN) and Afghanaid websites for background information on the organizations and their missions in Afghanistan. When I began researching the Nuristan Incident I was living and working in Afghanistan researching a patient education documentary series targeting women of child bearing age and their attendants.

I use the term operations when referring to the civil-military situation in Afghanistan because this is the direction I want to push the debate, towards procedures that will support a system in the state of being operative.

Background

The military is providing security in Afghanistan. The military also provides resources that no one else has the capacity to provide which make stability efforts possible. Stability and security are necessary for long term development in Afghanistan. International assistance to Afghanistan is provided by organizations of all varieties: faith-based, governmental and non-governmental, for-profit and non-profit. Not all civilian assistance is humanitarian and not every assistance organization is an NGO.

The major categories of assistance to Afghanistan are security, stability, development and humanitarian. Security is a military activity; stability programming is provided by both civilian and military players; and sustainable development programs and humanitarian aid are exclusively civilian activities. The type of organization and the type of assistance the organization provides will determine their role and responsibility in civil-military operations. Unfortunately in Afghanistan today these roles and responsibilities are not commonly understood.

Maternal Mortality Challenges

Afghanistan has been at war for over 25 years; the infrastructure and professional institutional capacities have been completely destroyed. Women die as a result of child birth at a rate higher than any other country except for Sierra Leone. According to The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) the maternal mortality ratio in Afghanistan is

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Addendum #6 provides schematics from the Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook and the US Army which classifies the use of civil and military resources between combat (kinetic), stability and development activities.
1,600 per every 100,000 live births. While a multitude of factors contribute to maternal mortality, emergency obstetric care (EMoC) is the only way to prevent a woman facing life threatening complications from dying during child birth. In Afghanistan there are fundamental barriers to accessing emergency obstetric care. There aren’t enough schools or teachers to train medical personnel or educate women regarding the life saving benefits of emergency obstetric care. And there are few hospitals with doctors, equipment and electricity to perform emergency obstetric care. Probably the most fundamental public health intervention to improve maternal mortality is education, getting girls and boys in school who can over time rebuild the infrastructure and professional institutional capacities of Afghanistan. However, this will take many years, and in the near term provision of emergency obstetric care is the only way to prevent death during child birth.

Civilian Challenges

In a recent UN Civil Military Coordination (Civil Military Coordination) training I learned that the Taliban have a code of conduct, and according to this code of conduct, Afghans are not to accept aid from internationals, including NGOs. A Taliban member was quoted as stating that, “if a doctor himself came to our village we would allow him to treat, but if doctor from an NGO or the Government came to our village we would kill him”.

Civilians must distinguish themselves from the military to preserve their independent mission and maintain their security. Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) or “Doctors without Borders” an organization world renowned for its highly principled humanitarian ethos, withdrew from Afghanistan after the targeted killings of five Medicins Sans Frontiers workers in 2004. And in response, stated that “blurring provision of assistance with military objectives will only worsen the climate of suspicion and violence against ordinary civilians with acute needs and aid workers trying to serve them, which already plagues humanitarian action in southern Afghanistan”.

Medicins Sans Frontiers expressed concern over coalition forces distributing leaflets demanding that people “pass on any information related to Taliban, El Qaeda and Gulbaddin to the coalition forces in order to have a continuation of the provision of humanitarian aid”. According to Medicins Sans Frontiers, “The deliberate linking of humanitarian aid with military objectives destroys the meaning of humanitarianism. It will result, in the end, in the neediest Afghans not getting badly needed aid and those providing it being targeted”. Medicins Sans Frontiers began working in Afghanistan in 1980 and reluctantly withdrew from Afghanistan with “bitterness and outrage,” stating that they “simply cannot sacrifice the security of our volunteers while warring parties seek to rage and kill humanitarian workers”.

Humanitarian professionals commonly express that the ability to protect their image as independent, is shrinking if not already extinct in many parts of Afghanistan because of the military’s use of ‘humanitarian assistance’ to win the heart and minds of Afghans. Anecdotally, a friend and Army officer responds to this criticism that “we are well meaning amateurs. In the Army, humanitarian assistance is measured by the ton”. The military’s use of ‘humanitarian assistance’ has created a perception that all westerners are a part of the military effort in Afghanistan. According to a Medicins Sans Frontiers relief worker with experience in refugee camps in Pakistan, “it is difficult for
people to separate nationality from organization…if they see an American they think we have a gun”.

**Communication Challenges**

There are countless cultural differences between the military and the humanitarian and development communities which hinder a quick solution to the problems resulting in ineffectual civil military operations in Afghanistan. For example, when trying to explain to my friends still on active duty in the Air Force what I do now, I begin by saying that I work for a USAID implementing partner, and that is as far as I get. The first question without fail is, “what is USAID?” USAID is the United States Agency for International Development.

Similarly, when chatting about the Nuristan Incident to a classmate from the Air Force Academy deployed as civil engineer to Afghanistan, it was quickly evident that we had difficulty communicating across the civil military line. My friend would fire out acronyms about the command structure and my eyes would cross trying to understand the complexity of the structure while decoding the acronyms. I would start talking about the important programs Afghanaid was implementing and his eyes would cross trying to understand the complexity of the structure while decoding the acronyms. We, the international community, have each created our own professional languages and this, in addition to organizational cultural differences, is a barrier to coordination. As described in the *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* Phase Two Report “when the same words and ideas mean different things to different agencies, coordination and cooperation are difficult at best”.

**Military Force Structures and Challenges**

There are two major international military forces in Afghanistan today and they both wear the same uniforms 1) NATO International Security Assistance Forces and 2) Operation Enduring Freedom - which includes US Special Forces who operate under a separate command. Both Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO International Security Assistance Forces are combined, joint military operations (combined meaning multination and joint meaning multi-service: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines).

According to the Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook “The Provincial Reconstruction Team is neither a combat nor a development institution”; however, in practical terms Provincial Reconstruction Teams are armed development programs, aiming to create stability, with the ability to fight back if attacked while Operation Enduring Freedom forces are actively fighting a war.

According to a senior Provincial Reconstruction Team official, Operation Enduring Freedom provides security and the Provincial Reconstruction Team provides “technical and logistical” support to the Government and donor agencies. However, both Operation Enduring Freedom and Provincial Reconstruction Teams have Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding to implement relief projects.

The military led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan fall under the command of NATO International Security Assistance Force. Each Provincial Reconstruction Team also falls under the command of their country and practically the

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iv Addendum #3 International Security Assistance Forces Placemat shows the location and host nation of each Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.
country mandate has more influence than the NATO International Security Assistance Forces command.6

Because of the uniquely complicated military operations in Afghanistan the command and control structure between NATO International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom is lateralv rather than hierarchical as one would expect from the military.

**International Assistance Successes**

Despite many challenges and setbacks, progress has been made in Afghanistan. According to NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, “after 25 years of war and just over five years since the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now one of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia; beyond that some 7 million girls and boys are now attending school”.9 Provincial Reconstruction Team operations have resulted in 1,300 development projects totaling $160 million USD.9 According to NATO, the security provided by Provincial Reconstruction Teams enabled 3,200 other infrastructure projects totaling $2.7 million USD investment.9 This funding has resulted in increased access to medical facilities, completed roads, schools, hospitals, and wells.9 Johns Hopkins University, which has been assessing more than 600 health facilities each year since 2004 to measure different aspects of quality of services found “improvements in virtually all aspects of care in almost every province”.10

Probably the most successful program in Afghanistan since 2002 is the National Solidarity Program (NSP); executed by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). The National Solidarity Program was established to:11

...develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development projects. National Solidarity Program promotes a new development paradigm whereby communities are empowered to make decisions and manage resources during all stages of the project cycle. The program will lay the foundation for a sustainable form of inclusive local governance, rural reconstruction, and poverty alleviation.

In addition to the critical role of facilitating partner NGOs, military forces (NATO International Security Assistance Force & Operation Enduring Freedom) played a critical role in the success of the National Solidarity Program. In August of 2007 I witnessed the heartfelt gratitude of a National Solidarity Program representative thanking the military for helping the program gain access to communities they otherwise could not serve. The success of the National Solidarity Program is an example of the military making development possible in areas where it could not otherwise proceed.
Nuristan Case Study

Background

Afghanaid is a National Solidarity Program facilitating partner in Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province. Nuristan is arguably the most remote and underserved province in Afghanistan and Kamdesh is one of the most unstable districts of Nuristan. Consequently Nuristan has extremely high rates of medically preventable mortality and morbidity. As one of twenty-three facilitating partners, the British funded Afghanaid uses Community Development Counsels (CDCs) established through the National Solidarity Program as “fora to introduce ‘basic health messages’ for a wider audience…and will encourage Community Development Counsels to take the lead in educating village men and women”.12

Like most provinces in Afghanistan, Nuristan lacks roads, hospitals and electricity; however a compounding factor for access in Nuristan is that it is located amongst some of the most beautiful and treacherous mountains in the world, the Hindu Kush. Not only is Nuristan breathtakingly beautiful and inaccessible, it is also very insecure. Nuristan borders Pakistan, which alone is considered an inherent risk factor for instability in Afghanistan, but Nuristan also has a unique history which predisposes Nuristanis to tribal conflict and isolation.iii Afghanaid, one of only a few NGOs able to work in Nuristan, has maintained activities in Nuristan since 1999.12

Summary of Events

On February 20, 2007 Afghanaid head office in Kabul received a call from the Kamdesh district office to report that US Forces had entered their compound “requiring them to give up space” for military operations to be established.13 Afghanaid protested, stating that the occupation would “compromise their ability to work with local communities and implement National Solidarity Programs”.13 Afghanaid contacted the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, and other key players from the NGO Civil-Military working group in Kabul who tried to convince the military to find alternative space. When these attempts failed, Afghanaid vacated the compound on February 23rd in an attempt to preserve their non-governmental status and adhere to their principles of impartiality and independence from military forces.13

Also on February 23rd the International Security Assistance Forces commander informed Afghanaid that the troops had been told to vacate the compound and that Afghanaid could move back in; however, on February 24th the commander informed Afghanaid that the troops would stay and that compound had been acquired “in extremis” as a military necessity.

Analysis

In an interview with a senior land procurement engineer for International Security Assistance Forces I learned about the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) which allows International Security Assistance Forces and Operation Enduring Freedom to officially acquire land or property from the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Usually the process is such that the military provides the necessary paper work to the Government and thirty days later legally acquires the land; however there is a portion of this

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vi Addendum #2 UN Programme Accessibility Map shows Nuristan as red signifying extreme risk
agreement which allows the military to acquire land or property *in extremis* as a *military necessity*. According to a senior representative from the Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team, Operation Enduring Freedom forces “were facing increased instability and heavy fighting in the district of Kamdesh” in February of 2007.

After the incident Afghanaid questioned if the invasion of their compound was premeditated because the military had recently built a road to the compound. According to a senior representative from the Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team, Operation Enduring Freedom forces “were facing increased instability and heavy fighting in the district of Kamdesh” in February of 2007. Afghanaid also expressed frustration at the military’s claim to not know that the compound was run by an NGO because they regularly participated in security meetings with the military. Unfortunately, just as Afghans see an American and ‘think we have a gun’, civilians see individuals in military uniforms and assume they are working together. The distinction between Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Operation Enduring Freedom and Special Forces is not clear to civilians.

Two Task Forces of Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Forces and a Provincial Reconstruction Team operate in Nuristan. Although I have not been able to confirm, it is likely that Operation Enduring Freedom forces were building the road and attending security meetings with Afghanaid and that Special Forces took the compound on February 20th. If greater distinctions existed between the Provincial Reconstruction Team, Operation Enduring Freedom Task Forces and Special Forces, and Afghanaid understood these distinctions, they could have made effort to ensure all of the military players were aware of their location.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team was aware of the location of the Afghanaid compound and theoretically could have prevented the incident, but were not consulted prior to the operation. As a matter of procedure Provincial Reconstruction Teams are not consulted prior to combat operations.” According to a senior official from the Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team, “combat commanders seek to maintain full control and responsibility over actions in the areas of operation”. The Nuristan incident was not a case of a breakdown of communications, but rather a standard operating procedure that does not ensure protection of, or respect for the space necessary to protect civilian operations.

**Lessons Revealed**

According to the NGO Civil-Military working group minutes the NATO International Security Assistance Forces “has links into the Operation Enduring Freedom operations but may not always have full situational awareness of all Operation Enduring Freedom operations”. Afghanaid was advocating to the International Security Assistance Forces commander for the military to vacate their compound, however, this commander could not order the US Forces to do so.

In response to this incident the NATO International Security Assistance Forces commander wrote a letter to Afghanaid stating that “the army will be better informed about locations of NGO operations” and that a special position will be created within the UN to coordinate civil military communications. NATO International Security Assistance Forces have also developed an information tool which utilizes geographic information systems to show who is working where and doing what in Afghanistan. This tool, called the Afghan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) was created to coordinate donor funding and to improve the military’s situational awareness of NGO operations. Ironically, at the first NGO Civil-Military coordination meeting in Kabul after the
incident in Nuristan the Afghan Country Stability Picture was presented and the Afghanaid compound was on the map.

In multiple interviews with officials from Provincial Reconstruction Teams and with the International Security Assistance Forces staff who manage the database I learned that Operation Enduring Freedom forces in the regional command where the incident occurred do not use the Afghan Country Stability Picture tool.

**Nuristan Incident Impact**

In my field experience I learned of the critical role that health education plays in reducing maternal mortality. I learned that often, even if emergency obstetrical care is accessible a pregnant woman is often prevented from seeking professional medical care by her mother-in-law. Anecdotally, an Afghan colleague and friend in Kabul shared with me that even his mother, who is an educated woman, did not allow his wife to seek professional medical care when she was pregnant. His explanation was that his mother did not want his wife to seek professional medical care because his mother had not received professional medical care.

Others believe that because in the previous generation medical care was provided by the Russians, and because medical care is now supported by westerners, there is cultural pressure to rely on traditional methods of prenatal care. Regardless, I have witnessed basic health education such as Afghanaid was implementing in Kamdesh create behavior change that allowed pregnant women to access professional medical care. Although Afghanaid was able to reestablish operations in Kamdesh, this incident will impact Nuristani’s trust of Afghanaid thereby making behavior change even more difficult.

Afghanaid continues to work in Kamdesh because of their relationships with communities; however, this incident did not just impact Nuristani’s trust of Afghanaid but also further degraded civilian’s trust in the military to respect their need for independence from military forces.

**Conclusion**

Colonel John A. Lucynski, in his paper *An Interagency Reform Act: Preparing for Post-Conflict Operations in the 21st Century* concludes that “25 years of post-conflict failures clearly indicate that a change to the current process is required”. As exemplified in the Nuristan Incident, the current processes of the military in Afghanistan do not adequately respect the space necessary to protect civilian operations.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies "because the U.S. military will rarely operate outside the interagency and coalition contexts, its unmatched capabilities to win wars will be squandered if the United States and the international community more broadly do not also develop the capabilities needed to win the peace". The problem from the Nuristan Incident is not that the Coalition Forces did not win the battle, but that their tactical decisions failed to win the peace.

As stated by Major Herdon et al, the Army is fully embracing complex combined joint civil military operations and impressively adjusting their operations; in his words “much talk has been generated and much ink spilled regarding Army transformation”. However for the military to reach their strategic objectives of a stable and secure Afghanistan they must also embrace managing the perceptions of military operations in
protection of the security of civilians. The response of the military after the incident shows their lack of understanding of civilian’s need to distinguish themselves from the military.

In an interview shortly after the incident, the senior public affairs officer for Operation Enduring Freedom forces regional command where the incident occurred stated that, “Afghanaid left the compound of their own free will and US and Coalition forces welcome and in fact invite them back” and further that “Coalition forces continue to recognize and support the important role that NGOs play in the betterment of Afghanistan”.

The Nuristan Incident also highlights the need for greater distinctions between the different military players in Afghanistan to manage the perceptions of civilian beneficiaries and aid workers.

**Recommendations**

The international community at large is working towards improved civil military coordination. According to the WHO Action in Crisis Annual Report, “rarely has health and humanitarian action been so high on the international agenda…G8 Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the importance of the coordinating role played by the United Nations in emergency and humanitarian operations, and pledged to further enhance the UN's effectiveness.” However the rules of civil military coordination in short term humanitarian emergencies do not always apply in stability operations like Afghanistan. Stability operations require a more integrated approach to civil military coordination than humanitarian emergencies.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies states that “Civil-Military Operations Centers, Civilian-Military Centers, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers, and other arrangements have been used in various interventions to coordinate civil-military operations on the ground. These innovations have had varying degrees of success. But fundamentally, they have all been piecemeal approaches, and none has solved the larger integration problem”. The contradiction between the stability approach of civil-military ‘integration’ and the core humanitarian philosophy of civil-military ‘separation’, except in extreme circumstances, continues to be a challenge in Afghanistan.

In the case of the Nuristan Incident, if Afghanaid had a better understanding of the military players in Afghanistan and had ensured communication with these players in a manner that would not have compromised their security, theoretically, they could have prevented the invasion of their compound. This is the balance that civilian players in Afghanistan today must embrace between the integration required to coordinate and the separation necessary to maintain their independence.

In order to prevent future combat occupations of NGO facilities the military must know where NGOs are operating. Information sharing tools, such as the Afghan Country Stability Picture need to be supported widely by all stakeholders. Admittedly this tool is not perfect. The data is often outdated by the time it is released and is missing information, but this tool is only as good as the information supplied to it. The only way to improve this tool is to use it, provide input and suggestions for improvement. Use of
this centralized tool is critical to improving coordination between civilian and military players in the complex contingency of international assistance to Afghanistan.

It is generally accepted that once security improves, Provincial Reconstruction Teams will transfer from largely military to largely civilian and the defense forces will no longer have the lead role in the complex contingency in Afghanistan. Until then, every Provincial Reconstruction Team has civilian advisors and jointly the military commander and senior civilian advisors are known as an integrated command team.

In early February of 2008 a friend and civilian advisor to the military shared with me grave concerns that her unit was distributing food and water while threatening communities that such ‘humanitarian assistance’ is only given as a reward for supporting the US Military. She also shared her frustration that there is nothing she could do to stop it because civilian advisors to the military do not have the authority to say ‘no’ to decisions regarding military Commanders Emergency Response Program funding. When it comes to military ‘humanitarian assistance’ civilian advisors have only persuasion, lobbying, and interpersonal relationships at their disposal to attempt to guide the actions of the military. Many commanders use civilian advisors to their full potential and operate a truly integrated command team; however, in 2008 civilian advisors remain an underutilized resource in Afghanistan. Better utilization of these civilian resources will likely prevent future incidents like a military occupation of a NGO facility.

Unlike existing seminal guidelines on civil military coordination which focus exclusively on short term emergency and humanitarian crises, the Draft Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Civil Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan reflect the complex spectrum of security, stability, development and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan. The Provincial Reconstruction Team handbook provides an excellent and thorough description of the unique role these combined, joint and civil-military teams play in Afghanistan. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief has produced a condensed handbook intended to promote understanding of the roles and responsibilities of NGOs operating in Afghanistan. Creating condensed versions of the Provincial Reconstruction Team handbook and the Guidelines for the Interaction of Civil and Military Actors in Afghanistan and wide distribution would promote greater understanding of the roles and responsibility of the key players. If these handbooks were distributed in the languages of Afghanistan, Dari and Pashto, and widely distributed the Government of Afghanistan could be empowered to be the ‘watch dog’ to ensure that the guidelines are adhered to.

The Nuristan Incident is just one example of a tactical military decision not supporting the strategic goal to win the peace in Afghanistan, but is a symptom of a more fundamental problem. Civilian players need to find the balance between separation from and integration with the military and share information with the military in protection of their independence; and the military must embrace the protection of civilian space as essential to winning the peace.

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vii Addendum #1 Excerpt from the Draft Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Civil Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan describing the roles and responsibilities of key players in Afghanistan
Addendum #1

Draft
Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Civil Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan
October 2007

International Security Assistance Force (International Security Assistance Forces)

As provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), International Security Assistance Forces is a multi-national force acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under the first resolution International Security Assistance Forces was mandated ‘to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security of Kabul and its surrounding areas’, as provided for under Annex I of the Bonn Agreement, 5 December 2001.

UNSCR 1510 (2003) authorizes the expansion of the International Security Assistance Forces mandate to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts’ and to provide security assistance for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. International Security Assistance Forces’s mandate has since been extended by UNSCRs 1563 (2004), 1623 (2005) and 1707 (2006).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

International Security Assistance Forces has facilitated the establishment of 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), endorsed in UNSCR 1563 (2004) and subsequent UNSRs. As agreed by the Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee in January 2005, the mission of Provincial Reconstruction Teams is to “assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”

Operation Enduring Freedom (Operation Enduring Freedom)

The presence of actors operating under US-led Operation Enduring Freedom is defined in a bi-lateral agreement between participating actors and the GoA of May 2005. The Coalition is referred to in UNSCR 1510 (2003) and subsequent Resolutions, which call for International Security Assistance Forces to work with Operation Enduring Freedom in the implementation of both forces’ mandates.

United Nations (UN)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

UNAMA was established by UNSCR 1401 (2002) with a mandate set out in the UN Secretary-General’s Report of 18 March 2002, which includes, (a) fulfilling responsibilities related to human rights, rule of law and gender issues entrusted to it under the Bonn Agreement; (b) promoting national reconciliation and (c) managing UN relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. Its mandate has been subsequently extended and elaborated by UNSCRs 1471 (2003), 1536 (2004), 1589 (2005), 1662 (2006) and 1746 (2007).
UNSCR 1746 (2007) stresses the role of UNAMA ‘to promote a more coherent international engagement in support of Afghanistan, to extend its good offices through outreach in Afghanistan, to support regional cooperation in the context of the Afghanistan Compact, to promote humanitarian coordination and to continue to contribute to human rights protection and promotion, including monitoring of the situation of civilians in armed conflict’

United Nations Agencies

There are 17 UN agency funds and programmes as a part of the integrated mission in Afghanistan, under the coordination umbrella of UNAMA. The Agencies include WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, UNIFEM, FAO, UNFPA, UNOPS, IRIN and others. UN Agencies have separate mandates, but all adhere to UN values; they are providers of humanitarian assistance and long term development programmes.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs are civil society actors which may be national or international, are non-profit, civilian organizations dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and development support in Afghanistan. NGOs are independent and diverse in their objectives, operations and the degree to which they operate within the principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence. NGOs also vary greatly in terms of the level of interaction or collaboration with military actors. As civil society actors some NGOs may not directly engage in the provision of assistance or service delivery but seek to achieve policy change.
Addendum #2
UN Programme Accessibility Map

UN PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP
(As of 14 September 2007)
The purpose of the Addendum Map is to facilitate UN programme delivery with the government and other agencies to ensure a seamless integration of political, environmental and security issues. This map is not intended as a comprehensive spatial analysis of potential environmental and security risks. The map is updated seasonally and is subject to weather related changes in the absence of updated data. The information on this map is managed at the national level and is the responsibility of the Security Management Team (SMT) and their respective security management teams.

CORRECT AS AT 14 SEPTEMBER 2007

Nursitan Province

UN PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP
Addendum #2
UN Programme Accessibility Map

UN PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP
(As of 14 September 2007)
The purpose of the Addendum Map is to facilitate UN programme delivery with the government and other agencies to ensure a seamless integration of political, environmental and security issues. This map is not intended as a comprehensive spatial analysis of potential environmental and security risks. The map is updated seasonally and is subject to weather related changes in the absence of updated data. The information on this map is managed at the national level and is the responsibility of the Security Management Team (SMT) and their respective security management teams.

CORRECT AS AT 14 SEPTEMBER 2007

Nursitan Province
Addendum #3
International Security Assistance Forces Placemat

Mission: Conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations to assist the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan's reconstruction and contributing to regional stability.

Key Facts:
- Commander: General (USA) Dan K. McNeill
- Current HQ: HQ ISAF XI from 3 FEB 2008
- 49 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 43,250 (Includes National Support Elements)
- OEF USA Contingent: approx 16,000 (Operation Enduring Freedom)
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass): 650,000 km²
- 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

Regional Command Capital: (approx strength 3000)
- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Compassia)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (ITA)
- KIA (BGR)

Regional Command South: (approx strength 16000)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (CAN)
- Forward Support Base KAF
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NL, AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA, ROU)

Regional Command West: (approx strength 2300)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALIA-E-NAW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARANI (LTU)

Regional Command North: (approx strength 4000)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KHANJAR (DEU)
- PRT POLEKHOMIRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMADA (ITA)

Regional Command East: (approx strength 16000)
- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM (USA)
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHORTH (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT JALALabad (USA)
- PRT Gerdz (USA)

National Support Elements (approx strength 6500)

Note on numbers: Regional totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops will never be exact and should be taken as summaries.

Current as of 06 February 2008
International Security Assistance Force

ISAF EXPANSION

NATO Mission in Afghanistan: On 9th August 2003 NATO assumed authority for the ISAF mission. The NATO mission consists of 5 phases:
- Phase 1: Assessment and Preparation, including operations in Kabul (completed)
- Phase 2: Geographic expansion (completed)
- Phase 3: Stabilization
- Phase 4/5: Transition / Redeployment

Expansion: In October 2003 The UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the NATO mission beyond Kabul. In October 2004 Stage 1 of the expansion to the north was completed with Stage 2 in the West following in September 2005. Stage 3 of the expansion to include the South was completed on 31 July 2006 and Stage 4 to include the East occurred on 5th October 2006, at which stage the geographic expansion phase was completed.

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN): The ISAF mission consists of the following 40 Nations. (The troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>370</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>1515</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>230</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1690</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>405</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>535</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above numbers include all troops, both those assigned to NATO and those required for National Support Elements. Numbers vary frequently.

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

Current as of 06 February 2008
Addendum #4
Overview International Security Assistance Forces
Command and control structure (C2)

SACEUR

COM JFC Brunssum

HQ ISAF

COMISAF ****

DCOM ***

COS **

DIR ACE**
Note 3

DCOS STAB **

DCOS SPT **

DCOS OPS **
Note 4

DATES *
Note 5

Single, Combined Joint Staff

RC North

RC South

RC Capital

RC West

RC East

Theatre troops, air elements, reserves, special operations forces and operational mentor and liaison teams

Note 1: Co-ordination with USCENTCOM:
- SACEUR for strategic issues.
- JFC for operational issues.

Note 2: Collocated with COMISAF.

Note 3: Director Air Coordination Element - executes the ATO for ISAF and coordinates real time issues that need to be deconflicted with OEF air forces through Deputy Combined Forces Air Component Commander (DCFACC).

Note 4: DCOS OPS coordinates and deconflicts ISAF and OEF / CT operations.

Note 5: Director ANA Training and Equipment Support
Addendum #5
Military Occupation of Afghanaid Compound
Kamdesh District, Nuristan
Summary Report
[Produced by Afghanaid 4/25/2007]

Overview: British NGO Afghanaid was required to vacate their base of operations in Kamdesh district of Nuristan on February 20th by US troops under International Security Assistance Forces Eastern Region command. Afghanaid immediately registered a protest with International Security Assistance Forces over the military commandeering of space designated for humanitarian and rural development activities. This protest was made because the military occupation of the compound risked damaging Afghanaid’s relationship of trust with local communities in Nuristan, built up over a number of years; compromising its ability to continue implementing development programs.

Several donors assisted Afghanaid to register protests through various diplomatic missions and to meet with the International Security Assistance Forces DC/Stability who tried to convince the Eastern Region command to find alternative space for their military activities. On February 23rd, Afghanaid was informed that the troops had been told to go and they could move back in, however the next day they learned the decision had been reversed, and that troops would continue to require the building because of “military necessity”. Afghanaid (the only international NGO working in Kamdesh) now has no base of operation that district. It regrets that alternative security arrangements could not have been made to avoid this situation, which jeopardizes future development efforts in the district.

Afghanaid background: Afghanaid (AAD) is a British NGO formed 25 years ago to assist the people of Afghanistan and was one of the earliest NGOs in Afghanistan to convert from an emergency relief mode of operation to one of integrated rural development. Afghanaid currently works in 927 communities in 13 districts in four provinces implementing a combination of the National Solidarity Program (National Solidarity Program) and rural livelihoods activities (agriculture, animal health care, women’s vocational training). Afghanaid has been working in Kamdesh and Bargi Matal districts of Nuristan for the past seven years although their operations in Kamdesh district has frequently been interrupted because of the volatile security situation, and at times AAD has maintained a very low profile with reduced numbers of local staff.

Background on Afghanaid’s compound in Kamdesh District: Until February 20th, 2007, Afghanaid operated from a compound that had been a former palace/hunting lodge of the King of Afghanistan in Kamoo village, Kamdesh District. The building fell into extreme disrepair in the 1980s and 1990s and had only 3 rooms standing at the time Afghanaid began using it. In 1999, Afghanaid was given written permission by the local Shura and District Governor to use the building as long as Afghanaid had operations in Nuristan in return for the extensive renovation work Afghanaid agreed to carry out.
Summary Chronology of the Military Occupation:

On February 20th, 2007, AAD’s national staff working in Kamdesh district phoned the AAD Kabul Head office to report that US troops had entered their compound with no prior warning and were requiring them to give up space in their compound so that the military could set up operations. They also reported the presence of blindfolded detainees in the compound. AAD national staff protested to the troops and after reporting the situation to AAD’s Head Office in Kabul, the AAD Managing Director (MD) asked to speak by phone to the office in charge (Captain Mathew Gooding) who said they needed the building as it was the only one in the area and there had been heavy fighting going on. The AAD MD protested and said the occupation would compromise their ability to work with local communities and implement National Solidarity Program and directed AAD national staff working in Kamdesh to vacate the compound occupied by the military.

Between February 21-23, AAD reported the incident to a CF spokesperson (David Accetta) working in their Public Affairs office as well as to DFID, the British Embassy, the US Embassy, NATO, the EC, ACBAR, the Governor of Nuristan and MRRD. The ACBAR director passed the report to UNAMA. All were concerned to hear of the incident and DFID/British Embassy were extremely supportive as was ACBAR and the EC/ECHO (Laurent Saillard). International Security Assistance Forces General Ramirez called the AAD Director the evening of Feb. 20th to express concern and confirmed his intention to try to resolve the situation.

On February 23rd, Afghanaid was informed that the troops had been told to go and they could move back in, however the next day they learned the decision had been reversed, and that troops would continue to require the building because of “military necessity” and that they had permission from the local government.

Feb. 24 -March 1: Afghanaid staff spoke with the Kamdesh District Governor to obtain details and he confirmed that on Feb. 24th the CF asked him whether or not he could control security in Kamdesh district. When he confirmed he could not he was requested to sign a paper saying he gave them permission to occupy the AAD compound in order to control security in the district and he agreed to sign. The Afghanaid Director met with Major General Gary Robison, Deputy Commander/Stability at International Security Assistance Forces who was concerned at the situation and the potential impact in stability and continued good working relations with NGOs. He promised to urge Eastern Command to find other alternatives for locating the troops out. On March 1st, Gen. Robison’s office confirmed they had failed in that attempt.

viii Several days earlier the US troops had widened the road to the compound. When AAD national staff expressed concern, the CF assured them they had no intention of interfering in AAD operations. The fact that Afghanaid is an NGO undertaking National Solidarity Program in Kamdesh was well known to the troops since they participate in periodic security meetings also attended by AAD.
Addendum #6
Schematics from *International Security Assistance Forces Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook and Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan*

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**Figure 3:** Assets Available for Effects-Based Operations in ITGA

**Figure 4:** Spectrum of Intervention (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2005)


Bibliography


2 Interview with senior official from Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team


5 Emergency Obstetrical Care or EmOC refers to the functions necessary to save lives. They are called Signal Functions and these include: • Administer parenteral antibiotics • Administer parenteral oxytocic drugs • Administer parenteral anticonvulsants for pre-eclampsia and eclampsia • Perform manual removal of placenta • Perform removal of retained products • Perform assisted vaginal delivery • Perform surgery • Perform blood transfusions [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/health/sympo0306/qa.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/health/sympo0306/qa.pdf) Accessed February 28, 2008

6 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Course on Civil and Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord); respecting the Chatham House rules of the training the identify of the participant who shard this information will not be specified.


12 Afghanaid 2005-2006 Annual Report

13 Addendum #5 Military Occupation of Afghanaid Compound Kamdesh District, Nuristan Summary Report; Produced by Afghanaid April 25, 2007


17 Achieve Objectives; Major Robert B. Herndon, Chief Warrant Officer Three John A. Robinson, Colonel James L. Creighton, Lieutenant Colonel Raphael Torres and Major Louis J. Bello; January-February 2004

18 WHO - Health Action in Crises annual report 2006.

19 A Handbook for understanding NGOs. ACBAR