Summary

- Between the evenings of 11 and 12 September, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 12 in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded seven ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and one in Luhansk region.
- Between the evenings of 12 and 13 September, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and seven in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two areas.
- The SMM spotted a new trench and a trench extension in Donetsk region, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as a new trench in Luhansk region and new trenches and upgrades to an existing position in Donetsk region, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM visited five border crossing points in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission monitored a peaceful gathering in Lviv.
- The SMM’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at border crossing points outside government control near Izvaryne and Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk) in Luhansk region and at checkpoints of the armed formations near Staromykhailivka and Novoazovsk in Donetsk region.*

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 13 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
Ceasefire violations

Number of recorded ceasefire violations

For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

Number of recorded explosions

Including explosions.

Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
12-13 September 2020

Ceasefire violation concentration
- High
- Orange
- Yellow
- Low
- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA, Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap, Sea - VLUZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only; its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 14/09/2020
In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 11 and 13 September, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, it recorded seven ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 11 and 12 September, the SMM recorded 12 ceasefire violations, including five explosions, in an area south-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). During the previous reporting period, it recorded one ceasefire violation.

Between the evenings of 12 and 13 September, the Mission recorded seven ceasefire violations, all explosions in an area south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,033 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 189 explosions, nine projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 822 bursts and shots).

**Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske**

On 12 and 13 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 11 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – one person on the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), and two people south of the railway track about 550m east of road T-1316 and about 400m south of the area’s northern edge. The same UAV also spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On the same evening, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four undetermined explosions, seven projectiles and six muzzle flashes, all at an assessed range of 3-6km east and assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On 11 September, outside the disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) about 100m north of its northern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 12 September, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a new trench (5m long) with a pile of coal next to it, about 250m south of the area’s southern edge and about 800m east-south-east of its south-western corner, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not present on 10 September 2020).

Throughout the day on 12 and 13 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), some of whom walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.
Also on 12 and 13 September, south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, the Mission saw workers from non-government-controlled areas with heavy construction equipment conducting works on both sides of road T-1316. On the western side of the road, on 12 September, the SMM saw the ground being prepared for paving and installation of electrical poles, while on 13 September it saw concrete blocks being laid on the already paved side.

On the evening of 11 September, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 12 September, while positioned 1km north of the area’s north-eastern corner, the Mission saw a visibly armed person in military-type clothing, outside the disengagement area, 200m of its north-eastern corner, walking from the western part of Petrivske in an easterly direction.

During the day on 12 and 13 September, while positioned at three locations near the disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

**Withdrawal of weapons**

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM saw weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, all in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

**Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

On 11 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 60m-long trench extension to an existing trench in a field about 2km south of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (no earlier imagery available to compare).

On the same day, in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the UAV also spotted for the first time a 40m-long trench running from the backyard of a civilian house in a north-westerly direction, assessed as being used by the armed formations (no earlier imagery available to compare).

Also on the same day, the UAV spotted for the first time upgrades to an existing position near Lozove (non-government-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations (no earlier imagery available to compare).

On 12 September, on the south-eastern edge of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a new 15m-long trench running south-west to north-east in front of a house from a residential area, both assessed as being occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible the previous day).

On 13 September, about 5km east-south-east of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), near a checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw a

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5 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
recent 10m-long trench running north to south and a bunker set up behind the checkpoint, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not visible the previous day).

**Unexploded ordnance near Vesele and mine hazard sign near Chermalyk, Donetsk region**

On 12 September, on the south-eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM observed for the first time a mine hazard sign with “Road closed” written at the top and “Danger mines” beneath, both in Russian, on a road leading to a cemetery, with an improvised barrier set-up next to it.

On 13 September, the Mission saw that the previously reported unexploded ordnance (UXO) (a shell of a 125mm high explosive fin-stabilised round) seen south of Zlitna Street, on the eastern edge of Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), was no longer present.

**SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

On 12 and 13 September, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

On 12 and 13 September, the Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk).

On 12 September, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk), as well as demining activities near government-controlled Hirsko (63km west of Luhansk), Orivhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) (including to support access to agricultural land).

On 12 and 13 September, the Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

**Border areas outside government control**

On 12 September, while at the border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 60 minutes, the SMM saw 15 cars (including seven with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (including three with “DPR” plates), three buses (including two with “DPR” plates and about ten passengers each (mixed genders and ages)) and three people (one woman in her thirties and two men in their forties) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission observed 15 cars (including 11 with “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (including three with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates and about 30 passengers (mixed genders and ages)) and two people (a woman in her thirties with an infant) exiting Ukraine.

On 13 September, while at the border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for two hours, the SMM saw 11 cars (including seven with “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (including six with “DPR” plates) and two trucks carrying timber (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission observed four cars (including three with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.
On 12 September, while at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two covered cargo trucks (with “LPR” plates) and 20 people (11 women and nine men, mixed ages) entering Ukraine, and 56 people (31 women and 24 men, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine. After 25 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 12 September, while at the border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the Mission observed two people (a woman in her twenties accompanied by a child) exiting Ukraine.

On 13 September, while at the border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car entering Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told Mission to leave the area.*

Also on the same day, while at the railway station in Voznesenivka for about eight minutes, the SMM observed ten cisterns and 50 freight wagons, all stationary. After two minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

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**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic**

In Luhansk region, on 12 and 13 September, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

On 12 September, while at the EECP at about 09:50, the SMM observed in total 50 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 30 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. On 13 September, while at the EECP at about 09:30 and 11:15, the Mission observed in total 1,000 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 90 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

On 13 September, while at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations, at about 11:00, 11:40 and 14:15, the SMM observed in total 53 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 33 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

On 12 and 13 September, the Mission saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP. On 13 September, it also saw a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint and a bus stop south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

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**SMM monitored a peaceful gathering in Lviv**

On 9 September, at the Taras Shevchenko Monument on Svobody Avenue in Lviv, the SMM observed a peaceful gathering of about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) expressing messages critical of the Government in relation to a recent decision made in the Trilateral Contact Group. The Mission saw about five law enforcement officers at the gathering, which ended peacefully.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-operation (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials:

- On 12 September, at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of armed formations told the Mission to leave the area, referring to a lack of permission from his superiors.
- On 13 September, at a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), two members of armed formations denied the SMM passage.
- On 13 September, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage, referring to a lack of permission from his superiors, which prevented the SMM from monitoring border areas.
- On 13 September, at the border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzans, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
- On 13 September, at the railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Delay:

- On 13 September, at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk), the SMM was allowed passage only after 24 minutes.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.
Other impediments:

- On 12 September, while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two separate flights.
- On 13 September, an SMM mini-UAV, on two occasions, experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between non-government-controlled Spartak (9km north of Donetsk) and Mineralne (10km north-east of Donetsk).

6 The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.
### Table of weapons

**Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa)</td>
<td>Near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Towed mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), loaded on a train</td>
<td>At a train station near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near a residential area of Trokhizbenka, (32km north-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (probable BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armored reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)</td>
<td>Near Novomukhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60m-long trench extension to an existing trench (no earlier imagery available to compare)</td>
<td>In a field about 2km south of Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/09/2020</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15m-long trench (not present on 12 September)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Non-government-controlled areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2020</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40m-long trench, running from the backyard of a civilian house in a north-westerly direction (no imagery available to compare)</td>
<td>In a residential area in the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/09/2020</td>
<td>5m</td>
<td>5m-long trench (not present on 12 September)</td>
<td>About 2km north-east of Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 250m south of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/09/2020</td>
<td>10m</td>
<td>10m-long trench (not present on 12 September)</td>
<td>Near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of ceasefire violations as of 13 September 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>3-5km ENE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>In vertical flight. Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 23:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muzzle flash</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>NW to SE (assessed as outside of disengagement area, subsequent to previous event)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Muzzle flash</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>NW to SE (assessed as outside of disengagement area, subsequent to previous event)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Muzzle flash</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>NW to SE (assessed as outside of disengagement area, subsequent to previous event)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 22:06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 23:20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 23:26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muzzle flash</td>
<td>Assessed as outside of disengagement area.</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 23:26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>NW to SE (assessed as outside of disengagement area, subsequent to previous event)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Sep, 23:26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Magnitude</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5km S of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km NW of Luhansk)</td>
<td>5-7km S</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>4 Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>13-Sep, 09:18-09:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-7km S</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>3 Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>13-Sep, 09:28-09:29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned. In the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)