

# Daily Report 217/2020

11 September 2020<sup>1</sup>


## Summary

- The SMM recorded five ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in either Donetsk or Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted people inside the disengagement area near Petrivske.
- The SMM lost spatial control of its mini-UAV, due to signal interference, while flying over areas near Shumy, Donetsk region.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in training areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at the entry-exit checkpoints in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM monitored a peaceful gathering in Kyiv.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>

Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>



## Map of recorded ceasefire violations


<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 10 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 10 September 2020



### Ceasefire violation concentration

- High
- 
- Low
- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 11/09/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations: two explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at south-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) (see below). During the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. During the [previous reporting period](#), it also recorded none. The Mission last recorded ceasefire violations in Luhansk region on 7 September 2020 (see [SMM Daily Report 8 September 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,006 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 176 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 815 bursts and shots).

### **SMM lost spatial control over its mini-unmanned aerial vehicle while flying over areas near Shumy**

On 10 September, an SMM patrol was positioned in Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) to conduct pre-announced mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights. While conducting its third flight, at 14:11, the Mission lost all communication with the UAV, which was flying over areas near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk), about 2km east-north-east of the launching site. At 14:18, the signal was restored for a few seconds and then lost again, resulting in the loss of the aircraft. Its last known location was 3km east-north-east of the launching site. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV and left the area (for similar observations see [SMM Daily Report 21 July 2020](#)).\*

### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske**

On 10 September, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 10 September, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, four of whom walked up to 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On the same day, south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, the Mission saw 24 workers from non-government-controlled areas (all men, mixed ages) with heavy construction equipment clearing vegetation on both sides of road T-1316, as well as excavating, grading and laying gravel along about 100m of the road.

Also on the same day, outside the disengagement area, around 400m north-east of its south-eastern edge, the Mission observed 15 workers from non-government-controlled areas (eight women and seven men, mixed ages) with a tractor and trailer clearing vegetation on both sides of the road leading to Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-

west of Luhansk). The SMM also saw that the road to the Zolote-5/Mykhailivka power substation had been cleared.

On the evening of 9 September, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted three people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: one about 1.5km east-north-east and two about 500m east-north-east of the area's south-western corner. The same UAV also spotted three people inside former positions of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

During the day on 10 September, while positioned at four locations near the disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It also saw weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, all in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

### **Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>5</sup>**

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region, including in a residential area, and in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

### **Presence of mine hazard sign near Ozarianivka**

About 1.5km west of Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, government-controlled, 52km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a rectangular mine hazard sign with "Mines" written in Ukrainian on a barrier blocking entry to a probable military compound.

### **SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), and, reportedly, a

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<sup>5</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas across the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable demining activities near Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk), repairs to power lines between Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and the assessment and maintenance of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate maintenance and operation of the DFS and repairs to its power substation. While positioned north-west of Yasynuvata, it heard five ceasefire violations, including two explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all within a 5km radius of the station.

### **Border areas outside government control**

While at the border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 60 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (including six with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (including one with “DPR” plates), five buses (including four with “DPR” plates, one of them with a sign indicating the route “Rostov-on-Don-Donetsk”, all full, with about 130 passengers in total (mixed genders and ages)) and twenty pedestrians (mixed genders and ages, including two children) entering Ukraine.

During the same time, the Mission observed 30 cars (including 20 with “DPR” plates), four buses (including three with “DPR” plates, one of them with a sign indicating the route “Donetsk-Rostov-on-Don”, all full, with about 70 passengers in total (mixed genders and ages)) and 14 pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) exiting Ukraine.

At the same border crossing point, the SMM observed that a nearby field had been cleared for construction purposes. In front of the border crossing point, the Mission [again](#) observed an improvised 150m-long barrier and a booth, which were assessed as an improvised checkpoint, staffed by two members of the armed formations. The SMM observed that pedestrians and cars were being registered at the checkpoint before proceeding to the border crossing point. In front of the booth, the Mission observed 45 trucks queuing towards the border crossing point (about half with “DPR” plates), displaying a sign with “empty” in Cyrillic.

The Mission also monitored areas near the international border near Manych (76km east of Donetsk) and Katerynivka (79km south-east of Donetsk), where it observed a calm situation.

### **Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoints (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) were closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at 09:45 and 13:15, the SMM saw in total 180 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 100 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission also observed two golf carts operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

### **SMM monitored peaceful gathering in Kyiv**

On the evening of 10 September, in Kyiv, in front of the Office of the President of Ukraine at 11 Bankova Street, the Mission saw between 600 and 700 people (mixed genders and ages), some of whom were holding Ukrainian, black-and-red-coloured and various military battalion flags and expressing messages critical of a recent decision made in the Trilateral Contact Group. The SMM also saw about 200 law enforcement officers (mostly men, mixed ages) present at the gathering, which ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-operation (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government ( for example, see [SMM Daily Report 10 September 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the evening of 9 September, while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

| Date                                   | No. of weapons | Type of weapons   | Location  | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|---|---|-----------------------|
| <b>Government-controlled areas</b>     |                |   |   |                       |
| 09/09/2020                             | 1              | Self-propelled anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 <i>Konkurs</i> , 135mm) | Near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk)                    | Long-range UAV        |
| <b>Non-government-controlled areas</b> |                |   |   |                       |
| 09/09/2020                             | 4              | Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)                         | In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)        | Long-range UAV        |
|  | 16             | Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)                         | In a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) |                       |
|  | 12             | Towed howitzer (D-30A <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)                               |   |                       |

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

| Date                                   | No. of weapons | Type of weapons  | Location  | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|--|---|-----------------------|
| <b>Non-government-controlled areas</b> |                |  |   |                       |
| 10/09/2020                             | 10             | Tank (T-64 variant)                                    | In a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), where imagery also revealed the presence of about 32 armoured combat vehicles <sup>7</sup> | Long-range UAV        |
|  | 13             | Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i> ) |   |                       |
|  | 23             | Tank (12 T-64 and 11 T-72)                             |   |                       |

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>**

| Date                                   | No. | Type                                     | Location   | Source of observation |
|--|-----|--|--|-----------------------|
| <b>Government-controlled areas</b>     |     |  |  |                       |
| 09/09/2020                             | 2   | Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)      | In a residential area of Druzhba (45km north-east of Donetsk)  | Long-range UAV        |
| 10/09/2020                             | 1   | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)        | Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)   |                       |
|  | 1   | Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)       |  |                       |
| <b>Non-government-controlled areas</b> |     |  |  |                       |
| 09/09/2020                             | 10  | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)  | In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 | Long-range UAV        |
|  | 2   | Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)       |  |                       |
|  | 5   | Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) |  |                       |

<sup>7</sup> The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


**Table of ceasefire violations as of 10 September 2020<sup>9</sup>**

| SMM position  | Event location | Means | No. | Observation | Description  | Weapon | Date, time    |
|---|----------------|-------|-----|-------------|--------------|--------|---------------|
| About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk) | 3-4km SSW      | Heard | 1   | Explosion   | Undetermined | N/K    | 10-Sep, 10:03 |
|   | 3-4km SW       | Heard | 1   | Explosion   | Undetermined | N/K    | 10-Sep, 10:05 |
|   | 2-3km SW       | Heard | 3   | Burst       |              | HMG    | 10-Sep, 13:47 |

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<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned. In the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)