Summary

- The SMM recorded 12 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded five ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 23 in Luhansk region.
- A woman was injured by the explosion of an object in Sloviansk, Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted people inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- An SMM long-range UAV spotted a cargo train travelling north-west during late evening hours in an area adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation.
- The Mission visited a border crossing point in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs to, and the operation of, critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The SMM’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, Donetsk region.

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Report 05.09.2020</td>
<td>2019 daily average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
<td>Daily Report 05.09.2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous 30 days average</td>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 daily average</td>
<td>2019 daily average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>previous 30 days average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 4 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
4 September 2020
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 12 ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below). During the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded five ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded 23 ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 948 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 171 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 762 bursts and shots).

**Woman injured by explosion in Sloviansk, Donetsk region**

The SMM followed up on reports of a woman injured by an explosive object while at work in a private compound on the north-eastern edge of Sloviansk (government-controlled, 95km north of Donetsk).

On 4 September, at 55 Ordenonostiv Street, in the north-eastern outskirts of Sloviansk, a man (in his sixties) told the Mission that early on the morning of 2 September his wife (in her fifties) had suffered injuries to both of her hands at a compound on 72 Suchasna Street, and that after the incident he had transported her to a hospital in Sloviansk where she underwent surgery. He added that four fingers on her left hand had been amputated. On the same day, staff at the hospital told the Mission that a woman who had suffered injuries caused by an explosive object on 2 September had been undergoing treatment in the hospital. Also on the same day, a police officer in Sloviansk told the SMM that on the morning of 2 September 2020, a woman had been injured due to an explosion at a compound at 72 Suchasna Street, where she works as a guard. He said that the woman had tried to break a brick of salt using an iron object she had found nearby and that the object had exploded, causing multiple injuries to both her hands.

**Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske**

During the day on 4 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 3 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted one person near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area’s north-eastern corner and two people near a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 4 September, about 500m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, the Mission saw 18 workers and heavy construction equipment conducting work on both sides of road T-1316.
On the same day, north of the disengagement area’s northern edge, between 500m and 1km north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, the SMM saw ten workers with one truck clearing vegetation on the eastern side of road T-1316. Throughout the day, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area. The SMM saw three of them (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) enter the disengagement area and walk up to about 350m north of its southern edge, before returning.

On 4 September, while positioned at two locations near the disengagement area near Petrivske, the Mission heard 12 undetermined explosions assessed as outside the area but within 5km of its periphery.

**Withdrawal of weapons**

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

**Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

Analysis of aerial imagery from between 21 December 2019 and 2 September 2020 in the area of Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk) revealed a 25m trench extension of existing positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (seen in imagery from before 5 July 2020). No change has been observed since 5 July 2020.

**SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable preparations for construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable railway maintenance in Vilkove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and assessment and maintenance works on the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the examination and inventory of gas drilling assets and supplies in government-controlled Verkhnia Vilkova (27km north-east of Luhansk), Pishchane (22km north of Luhansk) and Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk), and to enable demining activities near government-controlled Bolotene (22km north-east of Luhansk) and Stanystia Luhanska.

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5 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

**Border areas outside government control**

On 3 September, at 22:39, in an area adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation about 8km east-south-east of Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a cargo train consisting of a diesel locomotive and nine wagons traveling north-westward from the direction of the border towards the railway station in Voznesenivka, where it stopped at 23:15. At the railway yard, the UAV spotted three stationary electric locomotives and about 50 open topped wagons. At 23:30, one of the electric locomotives was hitched up to the front of the abovementioned train, which was then seen traveling westwards towards Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk, 60km south-east of Luhansk). At 00:09, it arrived at the station in Dovzhansk, where it stopped and ten more wagons were hitched up to it. The train then remained stationary until 00:44 when the UAV left the area (for a previous, similar observation, see SMM Daily Report 3 August 2020).

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 60 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (including seven with “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (including six with “DPR” plates), two trucks carrying timber with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians (mostly women, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission observed four cars (including three with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates and route “Donetsk-Nizhniy Novgorod”, with about 30 passengers (mixed gender and ages), and ten pedestrians (mostly women, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

At the same border crossing point the SMM observed one excavator and three men with spades conducting construction work (widening the road, fresh asphalt) approximately 200m west and ending at the border crossing point. At the western end of the work, the Mission saw a booth, which was assessed as an additional checkpoint, staffed by a member of the armed formations (visibly armed).

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

While at a checkpoint near Olenivka between 9:40 and 13:30 and between 15:00 and 15:40, the SMM saw in total 70 people (mixed genders and ages, including ten children), and ten cars travelling towards government-controlled areas and a car with three passengers entering non-government-controlled areas. It also saw a bus with about 50 passengers (mixed gender and ages) being escorted by members of the armed formations (in one vehicle) towards non-government-controlled Donetsk city.

At the same checkpoint, the SMM observed that all those crossing toward government-controlled areas had to fill out forms to confirm that they had been informed about the...
impossibility of returning to non-government-controlled areas outside designated “humanitarian corridors” or without approval of those in control in these areas.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational. While present at the EECP, at about 8:50 and 11:10, the SMM observed in total 400 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas (mixed genders and ages) and in total 450 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also observed two golf carts operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

The SMM monitored a peaceful gathering in Odessa

On 3 September, in Odessa, in front of the building of the General Directorate of the National Police in Odessa Region, located at 12 Yevreiska Street, the SMM monitored a peaceful gathering of about 40 supporters of the National Corps (almost all men, in their twenties and thirties) expressing critical messages in relation to the people attacked on 27 August on road M-03 near Liubotyn (22km west of Kharkiv) (see SMM Daily Report 28 August 2020).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka a visibly armed member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.
### Table of weapons

**Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/09/2020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td>In a compound near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table of ceasefire violations as of 4 September 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-4km S</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>4-Sep, 09:10-09:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)</td>
<td>2-4km SE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>4-Sep, 09:12-09:14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

7 The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)