The security situation in Burkina Faso has deteriorated during 2019, and is expected to further worsen over the next 6 months. Violence has spread from the northern regions to the east of the country. While most of the attacks are attributed to Islamist groups such as ISGS, Ansarul Islam, and JNIM, self-defence militias have started to proliferate. Growing insecurity has led to significant forced displacement, both inside Burkina Faso (486,000 IDPs) and to neighbouring countries (16,000 refugees). Access to health services and education has deteriorated, and affected populations are in urgent need of protection, food and livelihoods assistance.

**Anticipated scope and scale**

Attacks from armed groups have increased in intensity and frequency since the beginning of 2019. With no sign of resolution, there are concerns that the conflict might expand to other regions of Burkina Faso and coastal West Africa. Persisting violence is expected to drive further displacement and worsen food insecurity, especially for rural households. National authorities are showing signs of disengagement, meaning service provision is likely to deteriorate.

**Key priorities**

- 486,000 internally displaced
- Rural livelihoods activities reduced 20-70%
- +2,000 schools closed

**Humanitarian constraints**

Insecurity and the presence of armed groups has severely restrained humanitarian access, especially in Sahel, Nord, and Est regions. Due to the ongoing State of Emergency there are restrictions on humanitarian actors’ movements and use of certain vehicles.

**Limitations**

There are significant gaps in the data collection, information sharing, and coordination among agencies regarding IDP registration.
Crisis overview

Seasonal information

Burkina Faso has been politically unstable over the last twenty years. Security challenges such as organised and transborder crime, with banditry groups operating across the borders with Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Mali have been a feature of the context. Up until early 2016, the regional impact of the fall of the Libyan regime had not impacted Burkina Faso. In Niger and Mali the return of between 2,000 and 4,000 Tuareg soldiers who served in Khaddafi’s army, led to some joining the Malian army, and others forming the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), which launched an armed rebellion in January 2012, marking the beginning of the Malian conflict (The Conversation 05/09/2019, ACLED 17/01/2019, Jeune Afrique 26/01/2012).

The ousting of President Blaise Compaoré, after 27 years in power, by a popular uprising in October 2014, created a security vacuum, which has been exploited by a range of armed groups. After the coup a military government briefly took over, before transitioning to a civilian-led transitional government. In September 2015, the former presidential guard attempted a coup, that was quelled by the regular army following large-scale popular protests. Presidential elections took place in November 2015. There was hope that this period of political change would bring stability, but instead, the fall of Compaoré’s regime created a downward spiral in security. While in power, Compaoré was at the head of an important regional and international spying network, and is thought to have negotiated tacit agreements with Islamist armed groups between 2000 and 2012. In order to avoid attacks in Burkina Faso, he allegedly provided them with logistical support. The combination of a new political scene that emerged in the country once he was gone, weak governance, and the noticeably less organised security apparatus paved the way for a range of armed groups to become more active (The New Humanitarian 17/04/2019, Crisis Group 05/03/2018, Washington Post 06/12/2015).

In central and northern parts of Mali, the Dogon (pastoralist farmers) and Fulani (nomadic herders) communities had experienced long-standing disputes over land and access to scarce resources. Relations further deteriorated in 2015 as Islamist groups such as the Macina Liberation Front, Jama’a Nusr al-Islam wal Muslimin, and ISGS started gaining prominence (Crisis Group 28/05/2019, Human Rights Watch 07/12/2018). In January 2016 the conflict Mali spilled over into Burkina Faso, with attacks on hotels and restaurants in the capital Ouagadougou. These attacks signalled that Islamist groups had started opening new fronts in the region, taking advantage of a lack of border security, and being pushed further South by military efforts in Mali. The attacks were claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a group that had been operating in Mali. In late 2016, an armed group named Ansarul Islam established itself as a localised insurgency in Soum region, in Northern Burkina Faso (The New Humanitarian 17/04/2019, Institute for Global Change 19/01/2016).

Since 2017, activities of armed groups in Burkina have increased in intensity and frequency, driving displacement and creating humanitarian needs. With new fronts appearing, the Burkina government has shown its limitations in responding to the expansion of armed actors and stopping the violence. At first active in the Nord and Boucle du Mouhoun regions (2017), armed actors began expanding in the East, where ISGS, Ansarul Islam, and JNIM combatants started launching frequent attacks, developing ties with existing criminal networks, and taking control of gold mining sites (The Conversation 05/09/2019, ACLED 17/01/2019, RFI 05/03/2018). 2018 ended with a State of Emergency being declared in seven out of the 13 regions of Burkina Faso (Hauts-Bassins, Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Centre-Est, Nord, and Sahel), following an attack which killed 10 gendarmes on 27 December 2018 in Boucle du Mouhoun region (RFI 28/12/2018, Jeune Afrique 31/12/2018).

2019 has seen a continued deterioration of the security situation in Burkina Faso, with violence spreading to the Centre-Nord and Sahel regions. While most of the attacks are attributed to Islamist groups, self-defence militias (referred to as Koglweogo) have also begun to gain prominence.

Growing insecurity has led to an increase in forced displacement (both inside affected provinces and to other safer provinces, or outside the country), humanitarian needs, and intercommunal tensions. A report from Human Rights Watch documented that members of the Bella, Mossi, and Foulés communities were largely targeted by Islamist groups. In response to the presence of armed extremists, there were reports of Burkina government security forces summarily executing civilians, mostly from the Fulani community, accused of having supported or housed armed Islamists. Abuses committed on both sides led to an increase in intercommunal tensions between Fulanis, targeted by the State, and Mossi and Foulés communities, disproportionately targeted by armed groups and perceived as supporters of the State (Jeune Afrique 13/10/2019, FEWSNET 24/09/2019, ISPI 09/09/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, HRW 03/2019, Jeune Afrique 04/01/2019, Courier International 26/07/2018).
Key Stakeholders

**Burkinabe authorities:** The government of Burkina Faso has struggled to address the security situation in the country, despite having launched large-scale operations to regain control over conflict areas. Authorities lack the resources to control the border and territories beyond checkpoints on major roads (DW 13/05/2019, OCHA 11/03/2019). A report by Human Rights Watch documented serious human rights violations and extrajudicial killings perpetrated by security forces during counter-terrorism operations. In particular, they are suspected of targeting the Fulani Muslim minority (6% of the population), whom they sometimes accuse of supporting or housing members of Islamist groups. Such attacks risk fuelling further intercommunal tensions (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 15/09/2019, The Conversation 05/09/2019, Human Rights Watch 03/2019, globalsecurity.org).

**Armed groups:** The organization of armed groups in Burkina is complex. Attacks are rarely claimed by a particular actor, and the organisation and affiliations of the myriad of armed groups are ambiguous, and ever-shifting. There is a nexus between banditry and jihadism, where more formalised and organised groups are providing logistical and technical support to smaller local criminal networks. Because these groups’ methods and modes of operation are becoming increasingly organised, Burkinabe forces struggle to neutralise them. In areas where the State’s influence is decreasing as a result of insecurity (especially Est, Centre, Centre Plateau, et Centre Nord) self-defence militias have proliferated. They sometimes assume sovereign duties, and facilitate the establishment of Islamist groups (The Conversation 05/09/2019, DW 13/05/2019, ACLED 17/01/2019).

**Jama’at Nusr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM):** A coalition of al-Qaeda affiliated groups headed by Iyad Ag Ghali, Tuareg leader of Ansar al Dine (based in Northern Mali) operating throughout Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. They conduct complex attacks, assassinations, and IED attacks. In Burkina Faso, it is the main Islamist group, and has managed to attract a network of smaller criminal groups. In exchange for technical and logistical support, these groups act alongside JNIM to destabilise the region (ISPI 09/09/2019, The Conversation 05/09/2019).

**Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS):** ISGS first operated in the West of Niger and Ménaka regions of Mali before expanding its activities in the north and east of Burkina Faso, where it carries out attacks and capitalises on local grievances against the state. The group has exploited smuggling routes between the Sahel, North Africa, and Europe, facilitating illicit trafficking (ISPI 09/09/2019, The Conversation 05/09/2019).

**Ansarul Islam:** Has its roots as a local insurgency in Soum region in the north of Burkina Faso, led by the Fulani radical imam Ibrahim Malam Dicko. The group has mainly recruited marginalised Fulanis, with grievances against Burkinabe authorities. As a result of counter-terrorism efforts, Ansarul Islam’s influence decreased in 2019. However, it is suspected to have splintered into smaller groups and joined other armed groups (ISPI 09/09/2019, The New Humanitarian 18/04/2019).

**Local communities:** Disputes in rural areas over the lack of opportunities and poor infrastructure have been exploited by armed groups, and the risk of widespread intercommunal clashes is rising in Burkina Faso. Fulani communities in particular are often being discriminated against, due to the perception that they are affiliated with Islamist groups (ISPI 09/09/2019, The New Humanitarian 18/04/2019). Violent intercommunal incidents reminiscent of the Dogon/Fulani conflict in central Mali have been observed in Soum and Centre Nord regions since January 2019 (BBC 30/05/2019, The New Humanitarian 17/04/2019). Since April 2019, violence also took on a religious dimension, with a series of attacks against churches. The Christian community (30% of the population in Burkina Faso) had until then been spared from targeted violence. There are strong suspicions that these attacks were perpetrated by Islamist groups (BBC 30/05/2019, New York Times 18/05/2019). On 11 October, an attack on a mosque in Salmossi (Nord) causing the death of 16 civilians seems to confirm the extremists’ new strategy of targeting along religious lines (Al Jazeera 13/10/2019, Le Monde 12/10/2019).

**International Involvement:** The G5 Sahel Cross-Border Joint Force (comprising of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) is a regional military alliance launched in late 2014 aiming to support counter-terrorism and anti-trafficking efforts in the region. The group aims to combat the increasing number of attacks by Islamist armed groups, as well as transnational trafficking (human and drugs). However, the force has been hampered by a lack of funding (only a small portion of the 415 million euros promised by the international community has been received), lack of training, and coordination problems between the five members. Since its creation, it was only able to carry out a limited number of operations. In September 2019, heads of the G5 Sahel States requested the force’s budget to be put under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, dedicated to actions with respect to threats to the peace, in order to ensure its sustainability. The request was denied by the United States, favouring a system of bilateral cooperation (DW 25/09/2019, Le Monde 02/09/2019, Reuters 16/02/2019, Jeune Afrique 20/01/2019). The French counterterrorism force Operation Barkhane, comprising of 4,500 French military, has been deployed in Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad since 2013. While Barkhane experienced a few victories, notably in Ménaka region (Mali) where it contributed to weakening ISGS, it is showing its limitations (Ministère des Armées 05/06/2019, The New Humanitarian 15/01/2019, RFI 01/08/2019).
Drivers of the current conflict

Conflict in Mali and spill over into Niger and Burkina Faso: In Mali, long-standing grievances between Dogon (pastoralist farmers) and Fulani (nomadic herders) communities over land and access to scarce resources have further increased since 2015. The violence has led to the proliferation of self-defence Dogon and Fulani militias, and allowed Islamist armed groups to exploit the conflict and strengthen their presence. Despite the deployment of MINUSMA, operation Barkhane, and the signing of the 2015 Bamako Agreement, violence has persisted in Northern and Central Mali, and increased significantly since early 2018 (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 15/09/2019, IDMC 12/09/2019, The Conversation 05/09/2019, Human Rights Watch 07/12/2018). Porous borders have facilitated the expansion of the Islamist insurgency to neighbouring countries, first in late 2016 to northern Burkina Faso and western Niger, and February 2019 in eastern Burkina Faso and neighbouring areas in Niger (ACLED 17/01/2019).

Power vacuum in Burkina Faso: Armed groups from Burkina Faso have benefited from a governance vacuum and limited state presence in a region where development deficits, poor infrastructure, and lack of opportunities have created resentment from local populations towards their government. In many areas, the state is perceived as limiting opportunities of rural populations to the benefit of urban populations through the selling of land, stocks, and the industrialisation of the mining sector. The weakness of Burkinabe security forces paved the way for self-defence militias such as the Koglweogo to develop and act as an alternative justice and security system. Some of these militias have since become more organised, or have been co-opted by Islamist groups (The Conversation 05/09/2019, DW 13/05/2019, The New Humanitarian 18/04/2019, Crisis Group 05/03/2018, Crisis Group 12/10/2017).

Climate vulnerability: 80% of the population in the region (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) lives in rural settings, where agriculture and cattle represent the main source of food and livelihood for most households, making them particularly vulnerable to natural disasters (UNICEF/OCDE/OCHA 27/02/2019). Pre-existing vulnerabilities are exacerbated by recurrent natural disasters such as drought and floods. Between 2002 and 2013, 19% of the territory (the equivalent of 5.16 million hectares) suffered from environmental degradation due to deforestation, overgrazing, and bush fires. Competition over scarce resources and limited access to agricultural inputs and technologies are fuelling migration to urban centres and tensions between communities (The New Humanitarian 15/01/2019, WFP 08/11/2018). In 2019, almost 33,800 people were estimated to be in need of assistance as a result of floods and winds (the rainy season usually spans from July to October) (OCHA 07/08/2019).

Humanitarian impact

Displacement: In January 2019, the number of IDPs was 87,000. By June 2019, this number had increased to 220,000. An additional 267,000 people were displaced in the span of 3 months between July and September 2019, bringing the total number of IDPs to 486,000 as of October 2019. Centre and Sahel regions are hosting the highest number of IDPs. The number of IDPs is likely to not be accurately reflecting the situation on the ground, and should be treated with caution, as the system in place to monitor IDPs is recent, and there are significant gaps in the data collection, information sharing, and coordination among agencies dealing with IDPs registration (OCHA 15/10/2019, UNHCR 11/10/2019, IDMC 12/09/2019, OCHA 10/07/2019). Improvements in the registration processes, which allowed people previously displaced to formally register (OCHA 23/09/2019), Not only are opportunities in the places people displace to scarce for IDPs, their presence in these places exacerbates food insecurity and overstretches services for the host populations. Many people have been displaced multiple times, particularly from Sahel towards Nord Centre region. Returns to their places of origins remain unlikely and are not currently being planned for. May 2019 assessments conducted by the Danish Refugee Council show that 89% of IDPs surveyed do not foresee a return to their place of origin within the next six months given the current security situation (DRC 10/10/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019).

As of 31 May, there were over 30,600 refugees and asylum seekers in Burkina Faso. Over 30,000 originate from Mali and are located in the Sahel region. They live in Mentao, Goudoubo camps (60%) and with host communities in Soum and Oudalan (40%). According to a 2016 survey conducted by UNHCR, over 93% of Malian refugees were entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. Malian refugees have also been impacted by the insecurity in Burkina Faso, and are facing the same protection risks as Burkinabe populations (OCHA 07/08/2019, UNHCR 12/03/2019).

Food security and nutrition: Poverty, high levels of economic inequality, climate shocks, and agricultural deficits are some of the underlying vulnerabilities driving food insecurity in Burkina Faso (WFP 08/11/2019). The conflict has exacerbated a poor indicators for food security and nutrition. Resources are being stretched in communities hosting displaced people, and access to markets and fields is constrained due to insecurity. According to the March 2019 Cadre Harmonisé, 662,000 people were in IPC 3, and 25,500 in IPC 4 for the projected period June - August 2019, around 3.5% of the total population (FAO 04/10/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, CILSS 03/2019). With the deterioration of the security situation, and significant increase in displacement, it is possible that food insecurity levels worsened since the last IPC monitoring exercise. The situation is particularly dire for displaced populations: according to assessments conducted in February 2019 in Soum...
province, 98% of displaced households (about 365 households) had identified access to food as one of their priority needs. Access to food is further constrained by difficulties for aid actors to deliver assistance due to insecurity. Some households have had to adopt negative coping strategies, with 86% surveyed reporting having reduced their food consumption (FEWSNET 24/09/2019, UNHCR 27/02/2019).

It is estimated that around 587,400 children are in need of nutrition assistance, including 133,000 suffering from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), and 332,700 from Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM). Around 121,700 lactating women are also at risk of suffering from malnutrition (FAO 04/10/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019).

**Protection:** As attacks and human rights abuses perpetrated by armed actors are becoming more frequent, the civilian population is facing increasing protection concerns. Both security forces and armed groups have committed human rights violations and killings of civilians. Over a 12 months period in 2018 there were 116 attacks against civilians were registered in the country, including 77 in the Nord, Centre Nord, and Sahel regions. In just nine months in 2019 the number rose to 276. The most affected regions are Sahel (120 violent events against civilians), Centre-Nord (69) and Est (38). Since 2015, it is estimated that the conflict has caused over 600 deaths. Conflict figures remain approximate and should be treated with caution, as many violent attacks go unreported due to access constraints (Jeune Afrique 13/10/2019, ACLED accessed 11/10/2019, Human Rights Violations 03/2019). IDPs in hosting areas and settlements are particularly at risk due to the lack of security in these areas. Risks of GBV are heightened for women and girls (UNHCR 03/06/2019). The lack of official documentation was also identified as a problem for affected populations. In the Sahel region, between 25% to 50% of the surveyed population possessed legal documentation, limiting access to services and employment (DRC 10/10/2019).

**Livelihoods:** The majority of the population of Burkina Faso is reliant on agriculture and livestock production for their livelihoods. Because of insecurity, access to markets and fields is challenging. Not only do people risk getting attacked, but movements are constrained by the ongoing State of Emergency, limiting the use of certain types of vehicles, including those used to transport medicine (ISS 21/02/2019). In areas affected by violence, agricultural activities have reduced by 20% - 70% compared with 2017/2018. Livestock farming and transhumance pastoralism has also been impacted, as cattle theft and attacks are common (FAO 04/10/2019, Protection Cluster 22/01/2019). In areas hosting displaced populations, resources have been strained, and competition over resources exacerbated. Displaced populations lack livelihood opportunities. Assessments from February 2019 in Soum province report that 50% of the displaced population is unemployed, and only about 25% have been able to access precarious livelihoods options, including daily labour and farm work (FAO 04/10/2019, UNHCR 27/02/2019).

**Education:** Armed groups have targeted schools and education has been severely disrupted since the beginning of the crisis, which is likely to impact children and adolescents immediately and in the long term. In 2018, 790 schools across the country were forced to closed due to insecurity, the majority in the Sahel (432), Est (197), and Nord (150) regions (Insecurity Insight 12/2018). This number increased in 2019: 1,284 schools were closed in March 2019, and over 2,000 as of October 2019, affecting some 330,000 children (of whom 48% are girls) (Save the Children 03/10/2019, UNICEF 30/08/2019). The attacks are likely to be ideologically motivated, and aiming at controlling the kind of education delivered (language, curriculum, etc.) and its recipients (OCHA 11/09/2019, RFI 03/03/2019). Some 9,000 teachers are affected by the crisis. Some have been killed, abducted, and threatened by armed groups, and in places where the delivery of education is possible, teachers lack the support, training, and resources to teach (UNHCR 03/10/2019, UNICEF 30/08/2019). Specific information about the education needs of displaced children is limited. 21% of the IDP households in Soun province cited lack of schools as a priority concern (UNHCR 27/02/2019).

**Shelter:** Displaced populations are living in a variety of shelter conditions including camps, rented or borrowed housing with host communities, collective sites, etc., which complicates comprehensive needs analysis. Many displaced in host communities live in extreme poverty, sometimes out in the open on bare land, and under extremely harsh weather (hot and semi-arid climate). Displacement camps only account for 3% of all displaced people, and some 43,000 IDPs are living in 92 schools (74% of them in the Centre-Nord region), which further disrupts education. According to several surveys conducted between 2018 and 2019 show that around 80% of IDPs have inadequate shelter conditions, with an estimated 384,700 people in urgent need of shelter assistance. (UNHCR 11/10/2019, OCHA 11/09/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, UNHCR 16/01/2019).

**Health:** Prior to the conflict, access to health care was a challenge, especially for rural populations who had to travel long distances to access health centres. The health sector also suffered from poor infrastructure and lack of medical equipment (Medium 11/06/2018). Insecurity has led to the closure of health facilities, armed groups burning down health centres, and stealing medical supplies and medicine. Shortage of medical staff is also a problem, many having fled to safer areas. As of September 2019, 60 health facilities were closed, and 65 only partially functioning, disrupting healthcare delivery for almost 626,000 people. Access to health facilities is constrained, travelling long distances has become dangerous, and the bad road conditions, lack of ambulances and restrictions imposed by curfews aggravate the situation (IDMC 12/09/2019, OCHA 11/09/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019).
UNHCR 27/02/2019). The conflict is expected to have serious psychosocial effects on the affected populations, especially people having been repeatedly displaced (MSF 17/01/2019, Le Monde 18/03/2019).

WASH: Evaluations conducted in villages hosting IDP populations in Nord and Sahel regions showed that about 20% of the population did not have access to latrines and practices open air defecation, increasing the risks of contamination of water points and transmission of waterborne diseases. Access to water is also complicated in Soum province, where 24% of surveyed IDPs had to walk over 30 minutes to access clean drinking water, and 68% of IDPs were primarily drinking from an unprotected well. Access to safe drinking water in Burkina Faso is generally poor. In 2015, 48% of the urban population and 12% of the rural population was using at least basic sanitation services (WHO 2015). Long distances to water points increase protection risks, especially for women who are more vulnerable to GBV and sexual assaults (DRC 10/10/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, UNHCR 27/02/2019, UNHCR 16/01/2019).

**Vulnerable groups affected**

In Burkina Faso, 70.6% of the population is rural, and approximately 80% of the population is employed in the agricultural sector. Cotton is the main cash crop. There are significant disparities between rural and urban populations, with 92% of the poor living in rural areas (World Bank accessed 16/10/2019, IFAD 11/2018). Rural populations are heavily impacted by the crisis as the majority of the violence is occurring in rural areas, where the absence of the state makes it easier for armed groups to establish themselves and operate. This leads to significant losses of livelihoods for rural communities, in part due to reduced access to the fields. Rural communities are also more susceptible to being recruited by armed groups, in areas where no authorities are present to oppose extremist discourse, and education opportunities are more scarce (The Conversation 05/09/2019).

Women’s agency within Burkinabe society is limited by the discrimination they face regarding inheritance, access to resources, financial services, employment, and political and leadership positions (WFP 08/11/2019). Conflict means women and girls are particularly exposed to incidents of rape, sexual assault, and GBV. These protection incidents largely go unreported. The presence of Islamist armed groups, including ISGS and Ansarul Islam which follow a Salafist-jihadist interpretation of Islam and seek to impose a sharia-based social order in the areas where they are present poses a threat to women and girls. The rights of women and girls and projects and initiatives which aim to enhance gender equality and women’s empowerment are under threat. (Lobe Log 03/09/2019, UNICEF/OECD/OCHA 17/02/2019).

Education services have been severely disrupted, with armed groups targeting schools. The closure of schools threatens social cohesion, and puts out-of-school children at risk of being recruited by extremist groups. Displaced children are also at risk of exploitation and abuses, especially those separated from their families (Reuters Foundation 28/02/2018). In addition, early marriage is a common phenomenon in Burkina Faso, with 8.9% of women aged 20-24 reporting to have been married before the age of 15, and 51.3% before the age of 18. Sahel and Est regions have higher incidence of early marriage than the national average, with 87.1% and 67.3% incidence of early marriage respectively (UNICEF accessed 16/10/2019, RFI 07/07/2019).

A multisectoral needs assessment conducted by the Danish Refugee Council in May 2019 found that 14% of households interviewed in Oudalan, Sanmatenga, and Soum provinces reported having at least one physically disabled person in their family, and 3% reported a mentally disabled person (DRC 10/10/2019).

**Humanitarian and operational constraints**

**Response capacity**

33 humanitarian organisations are responding to the crisis in 26 provinces. Soum and Sanmatenga, two of the most affected provinces, register the most operational presence, with 23 organisations present in each, implementing mostly health, nutrition, WASH, and protection programmes (OCHA 22/08/2019).

Underfunding in hampering the response. In August 2019, the Government/UN coordinated response plan was revised from $100.3 million to $187 million in order to respond to growing needs. As of October 2019, the response was only funded at 35% (Financial Tracking Service accessed 11/10/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, OCHA 09/04/2019). During a conference held in Brussels in 2018, aid was promised by Western countries to help Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in responding to the crisis, but the funds have not been received yet. More recently, during the August 2019 G7 summit in Biarritz, Germany and France committed to send more aid to region, and support the G5 Sahel (DW 10/09/2019).
Impediment to humanitarian access

Ongoing insecurity and violence against personnel, facilities, and assets: Humanitarian access has been constrained by insecurity, the presence of armed groups, and the deployment of security forces. Access is particularly challenging in Sahel, Nord, and Est regions, and humanitarian actors express concerns about their ability to reach affected populations, especially in the Sahel and Centre-Nord regions. On some roads in Sahel region (Djibo - Dori, and Dori - Oudalan for example), security escorts are required. The presence of IEDs also poses a threat to the delivery of assistance. Attacks against humanitarian have been on the rise since the beginning of 2019, with at least six attacks, and the kidnapping of ten aid workers in the first five months of the year. As a result, some organisations were forced to limit their movements in several localities. In hard-to-reach areas, some international organisations have contracted local NGOs to carry out their activities. In Soum province, the presence of landmines and IEDs have been reported by local communities (WFP 03/10/2019, Jeune Afrique 09/09/2019, Counter-IED Report 09/09/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, UNHCR 16/01/2019).

Restriction of movement (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions): In the seven regions where the State of Emergency is ongoing, the use of motorcycles and pick-up trucks has been restricted or prohibited, requiring special authorisations or mission orders to circulate. Authorities argue that motorcycles are used by violent extremists to carry out attacks. However, they are also used for medical evacuations and to supply medicines, especially in hard-to-reach areas. The State of Emergency was declared on 31 December 2018, and extended for six more months in July 2019 (BBC 14/10/2019, Le Faso 13/10/2019, Le Monde 12/07/2019, Institute for Security Studies 21/02/2019).

Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance: Frequent attacks on roads, including humanitarian trucks, are hindering aid delivery. Affected populations in Burkina Faso fear to leave their houses, travel on roads to reach hospitals and other services due to insecurity (ICRC 09/09/2019).

Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities: Humanitarian actors are facing reluctance from local communities. IDPs in Soum were unwilling to register for aid, fearing repercussion from armed groups for engaging with “outsiders” (The New Humanitarian 15/01/2019).

Physical environment: Four main national tarred roads are connecting Burkina Faso to neighbouring ports (Abidjan, Lomé, Accra, and Cotonou) as well as Bamako and Niamey. The 4,500 km long trans-Saharan road connects Dakar to N'Djamena and crosses Burkina Faso through Ouagadougou. Those main axis facilitate regional trade in landlocked Burkina Faso, however, out of the 61,367km of road network in the country, 75% are not paved (Logistics Cluster 28/05/2018, Économies Africaines 24/04/2017). Humanitarian access is hampered by the poor quality of roads (the rural road network is mostly composed of dirt roads that become impracticable during the rainy season) and poor infrastructure (OCHA 07/08/2019).

Coping mechanisms and resilience of affected populations

Although humanitarian emergencies are frequent in Burkina Faso (food and nutrition crises caused by drought and), this is the first time the country is experiencing large scale displacement and conflict. The crisis has been negatively impacting the socioeconomic fabric of the country, and resilience mechanisms of the local populations are being stretched (Libération 29/08/2019, OCHA 07/08/2019, The New Humanitarian 17/04/2019).

Outlook for key drivers

Regional instability

The State of Emergency was renewed in July 2019, and Operation Otapuanu led by Burkina Faso armed forces seems to have weakened ISGS’s presence at the border with Niger in Est region. However, the risk that the conflict might spread to other regions in
Burkina Faso is real. While the northern and eastern parts of the country appear to remain the focus of Islamist groups, crime and small-scale attacks have been observed in western and southern areas bordering Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast since December 2018 (ISPI 09/09/2019, ACLED 17/01/2019). An expansion of the conflict to the rest of Burkina Faso would lead to an increase of displacement not only inside the country, but also into neighbouring countries.

Countries in coastal West Africa such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast are also threatened by an expansion of the conflict. Burkina Faso’s intelligence services have warned neighbouring countries that several militants had been hiding in Benin, Togo, Ghana. These countries have not experienced Islamist violence in the way Sahel countries have, however, there is a possibility armed groups could try to gain access to ports in West Africa and trafficking routes, and look into expanding their influence to West Africa. The border between Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin is of particular strategic interest, as it is a vast natural reserve with limited state presence and population density.

In May 2019, the kidnapping of two French tourists and murder of their Beninese guide in Benin raised concerns about a spill over of the conflict. The hostages were later recovered during a military operation in the North of Burkina Faso, where they were about to be sent to militants based in Mali (UNHCR 11/10/2019, ISPI 09/09/2019, Africa Center for Strategic Studies 10/06/2019, Jeune Afrique 16/04/2019, Institute for Security Studies 08/03/2019, ACLED 17/01/2019).

Persisting insecurity, displacement, and erosion of service provision

In recent months, the death toll among government forces has increased, leading to a decline in their engagement, compounded by limited training, lack of resources and capacity. In mid-September, Bukinabe security forces quietly left the town of Djibo (Soum province), arguing they were poorly equipped, undermanned, and incapable to address the security situation (Mediapart 13/10/2019, Crisis Group 28/01/2019). Health and education provision is already significantly reduced in the Sahel, Nord, Centre Nord, Est, Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre Est, and as Burkinabe authorities are progressively losing control of their territories, they are at risk of being further stretched. Given the magnitude of humanitarian needs created by the crisis, the government and humanitarian actors already had to revise the response plan in the past year. Humanitarian actors fear that the situation might deteriorate further, leading to a significant increase in displacement, humanitarian needs, and deterioration of humanitarian access, hampering aid delivery (OCHA 07/08/2019).

Food security and livelihoods outlook

The March 2019 Cadre Harmonisé projected about 346,000 people inIPC 3 and 4 levels of food insecurity between June and August 2019. The current actual number of food insecure people is likely to be higher, given the magnitude of recent displacements that caused livelihoods damages and lowered food availability. Several localities in Boucle du Mouhoun and Hauts-Bassins experienced dry spells in July and August 2019, as well as flooding in late August. This is likely to negatively impact agricultural production. Countrywide, delays in crop growth combined with access constraints caused by insecurity will likely render lower than usual agricultural production. As the violence shows no signs of slowing down, economic activities and livelihoods opportunities are likely to keep rarefying. Further disruptions of trade and markets, increases in prices, and decrease of purchasing power for the most vulnerable populations are to be expected (FEWSNET 24/09/2019, FAO 05/08/2019, FAO 17/07/2019). Insecurity also negatively impacts livestock migration (usually running between January and June), and herders’ livelihoods. Transhumance patterns are likely to be disrupted, which could trigger land disputes and tensions over natural resources. Some 4.7 million people living in the areas affected by the conflict rely on livestock and cereals as their main sources of livelihood, and according to ICRC, 1.2 million people are currently at risk of being in need of food and nutrition assistance (DW 10/09/2019, FEWSNET 2009).