The Yemen Crisis Impact Overview is a bi-monthly product to provide decision makers with a short, accessible overview of key trends and emerging challenges that may affect humanitarian programming in Yemen.

The product combines trends in key conflict data with daily media monitoring, secondary data review and ongoing joint analysis with a broad spectrum of Yemen analysts to track and identify key trends and risks with potential civilian impact.

As this is the first issue of the Yemen Crisis Impact Overview, its timeframe focuses on the trends and developments reported in the first five months of 2019. The next report will be published in August, covering June and July 2019.

Have we got anything wrong? Do you have ideas for other issues we should look at? Write to us on yahinfo@acaps.org

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**RELIABILITY**

ACAPS has a high degree of confidence in the reliability of this report as it is based on primary data analysis, secondary data review and joint review by Yemen experts.
1. Highest level of casualties in Al Hudaydah

Even though the Stockholm Agreement led to a de-escalation in Al Hudaydah, the governorate continued to suffer the highest levels of civilian casualties in the country in the first five months of 2019. Conflict escalated in other parts of the country, particularly in Hajjah, Taizz, and Al Dhale’e, triggering displacement and a high level of humanitarian needs.

2. Fragility of the Stockholm Agreement

Unilateral withdrawal of Houthis from Al Hudaydah ports in the first half of May resulted in a temporary renewed fighting in Al Hudaydah and deepened political divisions between the UN Special Envoy and the Government of Yemen. This left the Stockholm Agreement more fragile than ever, increasing risk of failure in the political negotiations.

3. Airstrikes more often affect densely populated areas

The number of airstrikes reported countrywide continued to decrease every month until the end of April, while during the same period the number of airstrike-related casualties has been increasing. This shows that airstrikes more often target densely populated areas, causing mass casualties. Such airstrikes, reported in the capital city Sana’a or Mawiyah district of Taizz in May, often have a retaliatory character, following Houthis’ attempts to target critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

4. Increasingly constrained access

Physical access is increasingly constrained in areas of conflict escalation. One of the major land routes connecting Aden and Sana’a has been closed since April due to fighting in Qa’atabah and neighbouring districts. Consequently, the time needed to transport humanitarian supplies from Aden to Sana’a and other northern governorates increased to more than 60 hours, and the total cost of transport increased by up to 60%.

5. Disruption of services and price hikes

Economic wrangling between Aden and Sana’a for the control of fuel supply chains led to fuel shortages and price hikes in north Yemen in March and April. This disrupted transport networks, services, and put further pressure on stretched household budgets.

6. Increased caseloads of cholera

Health and WASH conditions have deteriorated in Yemen due to protracted conflict, leading to increased caseloads of cholera. Between 1 January and 1 June, 366,211 suspected cases of cholera were reported across the country with 640 associated deaths (CFR = 0.17). This is a significant increase compared to the same timeframe in 2018, when 82,794 suspected cases were reported with 65 associated deaths.
IDPs in Abs district, Hajjah governorate

IDPs in Abs district, particularly those who have been displaced multiple times, are among the most affected groups in 2019. Between 1 January and 26 May, around 85,500 people were newly displaced in Abs district of Hajjah governorate (IOM 28/05/2019). Most of these people were displaced between 28 March and 7 April within Abs district due to fighting in Bani Hassan sub-district. This brought the number of IDPs in Hajjah to more than 420,000, of which 250,000 are estimated to be in Abs (OCHA 17/04/2019).

Those IDPs are particularly vulnerable due to the rapid and mass nature of the new displacement, pre-existing poverty and food insecurity in Hajjah, and an immediate risk of exposure to violence if frontlines move further south. Most of the IDP population in Abs has been displaced multiple times; they are highly vulnerable due to loss of livelihoods and income opportunities and depletion of coping mechanisms.

IDPs are mostly scattered in some 167 IDP official and makeshift sites in the district and present acute needs for shelter, housing and, food. More than 8,600 people are in isolated or dispersed settlements that are difficult for humanitarians to reach. In late May, intense rains in Abs caused an estimated 3,000 people in Beni Qais camp to lose their housing (IOM 28/05/2019).

Migrants and refugees in Lahj, Aden, Abyan governorates

On 21 April, authorities in these three Yemeni southern governorates began to arbitrarily detain irregular migrants, predominantly men from Ethiopia, in three makeshift camps: two stadiums in Aden and Al Bayda and a military camp in Lahj. At the peak of detentions (27 April – 3 May) an estimated 5,000 people were detained. The detained migrants faced extreme living conditions and protection risks due to overcrowding. Lack of basic services, including lack of sanitation aggrivated risks of disease. Outbreaks of acute watery diarrhoea leading to death have been reported among migrants in Lahj and Aden (IOM 30/06/2019).
OUTLOOK

If the current trends continue and the ceasefire of Al Hudaydah continues to hold despite numerous violations, it is highly likely the conflict will continue to escalate intermittently, driving new and secondary displacement, depleting coping mechanisms of the affected population, aggravating humanitarian conditions, and resulting in high impact on civilians.

The trend of increasing levels of airstrike related casualties is expected to continue, aggravated by Houthi attacks on critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, which increased in intensity since May. Saudi retaliation is highly likely to result in increased air raids across Yemen, which will most likely continue to impact civilians, affecting 3,000 to 8,000 people across Yemen (ACAPS projections based on Yemen Data Project 30/04/2019).

So far, more than a half of the coalition’s air raids struck non-military and unknown targets, causing civilian casualties and damaging/destroying civilian infrastructure.

The displacement numbers are likely to increase following frontline escalations in Hajjah, Taizz, and Al Dhale’e. If the conflict continues to escalate in Hajjah, up to 400,000 people are at risk of secondary displacement and would likely have acute multi-sectoral needs around shelter, food, drinking water, health services and basic NFI, especially as most have been displaced multiple times. The needs are highly likely to exceed the existing response capacity (ACAPS 15/04/2019).

Increased rainfall reported in late May and early June in over 10 governorates led to flash floods, driving displacement and damage to infrastructure. There is a moderate likelihood that the governorates most affected by the flooding (Hajjah, Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Taizz) will report an increase in reported cholera cases. As of 11 June, close to 70,000 people were affected by the flooding and deaths have been reported (OCHA 11/06/2019). The rainy season is going to continue until October in Al Bayda, Al Dhale’e, Ibb and highlands in Taizz; and restart in July in Sana’a, Hajjah, Amran, Dhamar, and Marib (FEWS NET).

Repeated escalations, moving frontlines, displacement, and unstable import regulations are likely to have an increasing impact on access to services and assistance of the affected population. All reported escalations in 2019 resulted in access constraints. Critical infrastructure including hospitals and schools have been impacted. Additionally, administrative constraints and accusations of aid diversion led WFP to begin a phased freeze on aid distribution in Sana’a on 20 June 2019 (WFP 20/06/2019). This is likely to have a high impact on civilians in the northern part of the country, particularly in Houthi strongholds such as Sa’ada or Sana’a. Without humanitarian food assistance 35,000 people in Sa’ada would fall into famine-like food conditions (IPC 5) and 67% of people in Sa’ana would be food insecure (IPC 3 and higher) (IPC 20/12/2018, WFP 20/05/2019).

RISKS

Breakdown in the peace process leads to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah exacerbating food insecurity and increasing the spread of cholera. Increased mistrust in the peace process by the Hadi government and intense fighting between Houthi and pro-Hadi forces in the rest of Yemen risks a breakdown in the Stockholm Agreement and fragile ceasefire in place in Al Hudaydah since 2018. This will lead to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah (The New Humanitarian 20/05/2019, CT 24/05/2019, The Washington Institute 26/02/2019; ACLED 28/05/2019).

If conflict in Al Hudaydah escalates in the upcoming six months, it will directly affect at least 600,000 people living in Al Hudaydah city and exacerbate food and livelihood needs for around 7.5 million people across Yemen, mostly those living in the north coastal area of Yemen. Al Hudaydah governorate hosts Ras Issa, Saleef and Al Hudaydah ports, through which around 70% of monthly food imports and 40-50% of fuel imports enter Yemen (FEWS NET 12/2018). Fighting around the ports and in Al Hudaydah city will likely lead to the ports’ closure, disruption of the market-supply chain, and limit the delivery of aid to the country. This will exacerbate the food and cholera crisis across Yemen (BBC 14/06/2019).

In the northwestern region of Yemen alone, IPC projections estimated that in the absence of adequate humanitarian food assistance over 7.5 million people are likely to face IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and higher (IPC 20/12/2019). Across Yemen, 238,000 are likely to fall into IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) if humanitarian food assistance is not delivered (IPC 01/2019; HNO 2019).

Increased fighting in Al Hudaydah is likely to exacerbate fuel shortages. This, coupled with the ongoing uncertainty about the stability of the currency and increased bureaucratic and security risks for traders, will likely result in increased food prices. Fuel is also essential to run health facilities and for pumping and trucking water. Although cholera cases have started to fall since May 2019 due to the scale up in the response, if the population is unable to access water and health facilities due to fuel shortages, this will most likely increase the risk of the spread of AWD and cholera, especially in highly populated areas. Limited importation of medicine as well as constrained road travel will hamper the transportation of medicines. The ongoing cholera outbreak will likely spread and suspected cases could reach a new peak (WHO 27/05/2019).

The rainy season is going to continue until October in Al Bayda, Al Dhale’e, Ibb and highlands in Taizz; and restart in July in Sana’a, Hajjah, Amran, Dhamar, and Marib (FEWS NET).
High levels of humanitarian needs continued to be reported in the first five months of 2019 in Yemen, driven by conflict and political dynamics shaped by the Stockholm Agreement and internal conflicts within different political factions and armed groups. Despite a slight decrease in conflict intensity following the Stockholm Agreement signed in December 2018, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, including an increase in cholera caseloads from February to early May 2019.

The Stockholm Agreement remains in effect since 13 December 2018, despite many reported violations. Its biggest success has been the de-escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah, effectively deferring the full-scale military offensive led by the UAE on the Houthis held territories in the governorate. Considering the predicted catastrophic consequences a full-scale offensive could have had on imports, food prices and humanitarian assistance, preventing the offensive from escalating was likely the most important factor deferring the risk of famine in Yemen (IOM 5/10/2018).

However, as of late May, the status of the Stockholm Agreement remains extremely fragile. Political negotiations have been stalled for months and the ceasefire repeatedly violated. The Houthis' unilateral withdrawal from Al Hudaydah ports (Ras Isla, Salef and Al Hudaydah) in the first half of May was criticised by the Government of Yemen (GoY). The GoY claim the Houthis continuing to exercise effective control of the ports through local authorities and the coast guard. The withdrawal, which was supposed to be the first step towards implementing the Stockholm Agreement, was widely denounced by the GoY. The GoY subsequently accused the UN Special Envoy Martin Griffith of pro-Houthi bias and threatened to cease cooperation in the UN negotiations, resulting in a serious risk of a collapse of the political process (Critical Threats 24/05/2019).

While the Stockholm Agreements led to a notable de-escalation in Al Hudaydah, conflict started to escalate in other parts of the country. In January, the conflict escalated in frontline districts of Mustaba, Hayran, and Haradh in Hajjah. GoY forces continued to push south to Abs district in the following months, causing mass displacement and putting up to 480,000 IDPs in the governorate at risk of being displaced again. Fighting between Houthi and GoY forces also escalated in Taizz governorate, particularly around Taizz city, which continues to be surrounded by the Houthis. A 200% increase in total civilian fatalities was reported in Taizz governorate in January and February compared to the previous two months due to several mass casualty incidents involving improvised explosive devices and shelling of residential houses (ACLED 20/03/2019).

In Al Dhale’e, regular fighting was reported since the beginning of 2019 with a notable escalation in April around Qa’atabah and Damt districts. The fighting resulted in severe access constraints and the highest level of civilian casualties in the governorate in over a year. The Aden – Sana’a highway was effectively cut off, as well as connecting roads to Ibb and Taizz. As a result, the movement of goods and people between Aden, Taizz, and Sana’a has been severely limited (ICG 6/05/2019).

Distrust between the warring parties was exacerbated by repeated Houthi attacks on critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia since mid-May, which led to heavy retaliatory airstrikes, particularly in the capital and Taizz governorate (ICG 16/05/2019).

Internal fighting between local factions was also a key driver on conflict in January to May 2019. The Houthis engaged in a number of local conflicts with tribes across Yemen. Those conflicts were caused by land or allegiance disputes and led to heavy fighting and high numbers of fatalities, particularly in Kushar district in Hajjah (with the Hajar tribe), Al Husha district in Al Dhale’e, and Qafr district in Ibb (Muftah tribal militia). Tensions were also reported between tribes and GoY forces. Large scale escalation in Qa’atabah district, Al Dhale’e, in April was caused by a political conflict between the prominent Al-Saaidi tribe and the Government of Yemen, which led to large numbers of Al Saaidi tribesmen reportedly defecting to Houthi forces (Operational partners in Yemen).

Internal conflicts were also reported among groups supporting the GoY and within the Saudi-led coalition. Fighting between Islah aligned armed group and the UAE-backed 35th Armored Brigade occurred in March in Taizz, resulting in civilian casualties, damage to civilian infrastructure, and displacement (ICG 5 April 2019).

The Houthi movement is also divided internally with moderate and hardline camps fighting for influence. The influence of hardline groups has reportedly been increasing in recent months. This is impacting on humanitarian agencies as hardline Houthis are more likely to impose administrative and access constraints on humanitarian actors (ICG 28/01/2019).

Continuous conflict, economic collapse, and repeated waves of displacement have had a growing impact on Yemenis, depleting coping mechanisms and deteriorating humanitarian conditions. This was demonstrated by increasing numbers of cholera cases: between 1 January and 1 June, 366,211 suspected cases of cholera were reported across the country with 640 associated deaths (CFR = 0.17). The highest fatality rates were reported in Abyan, Raymah, Marib, and Shabwah. While early onset of the rainy season has contributed, it is important to note that this outbreak was mainly driven by the prolonged conflict leading to a collapse of health, water and sanitation systems in a naturally water scarce country (WHO access 30/06/2019).
The intensity of conflict in Yemen decreased in December 2018 after the signing of the Stockholm Agreement and overall remained at a lower level compared both to the last quarter and the first five months of 2018 (1,976 civilian casualties reported over January – May 2018, compared to 1,652 in 2019) (CIMP).

Although the level of civilian casualties reported in Al Hudaydah over January – May 2018 decreased by 69% compared to the previous five months, it remains the governorate with the highest level of civilian casualties in Yemen. Casualties in Al Hudaydah are currently mainly attributed to shelling and landmines, in contrast to previous months, when most casualties were attributed to airstrikes and shelling.

Conflict escalated in Hajjah, Taizz, Al Dhale’e, and Yemen’s capital Sana’a during the reported period. In Al Dhale’e, the number of civilian casualties reported in May increased by 1,160% compared to January with the highest increase reported in April and May in Qa’atabah and Al Dhale’e districts. Hajjah and Taizz recorded a significant increase in civilian casualties between January and March 2019. Casualties reported in Q1 2019, increased by 191% in Hajjah (Haradh and Kushar districts) and 125% in Taizz (Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts) compared to Q4 2018. In the capital city of Sana’a, airstrikes in April and May led to the highest number of civilian casualties reported since May 2018. The threat of further escalation remains in all these governorates, particularly in Sana’a (city), Al Dhale’e and Taizz.

The number of airstrikes reported countrywide continued to decrease every month through to the end of April. Airstrikes decreased significantly in Al Hudaydah. However, Hajjah, Sana’a (city), Taizz, and Al Dhale’e all recorded an increase in airstrikes in 2019. Importantly, there is a reverse trend between the number of reported airstrikes and the number of airstrike-related casualties, which have been increasing since the beginning of the year. This suggests that airstrikes more often impact densely populated areas, causing higher numbers of casualties per strike. Such airstrikes, reported in the capital city Sana’a or Mawiyah district of Taizz in May, often followed Houthi attempts to strike critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. As a result, after dropping steeply in December 2018, the number of civilian casualties due to airstrikes increased from February to May 2019, again reaching pre Stockholm agreement levels.

### DISPLACEMENT

Fighting in 2019 displaced 45,200 households (more than est. 271,000 individuals) (IOM 26/06/2019). This constitutes a 60% increase on the 169,000 displaced within the same timeframe in 2018. The largest displacement incident in the January-May period was the displacement from Kushar and neighbouring districts, with over 21,000 people displacing on 25 February alone. This was followed by large scale displacement from Abs at the end of March/beginning of April, with more than 40,000 people displaced within 11 days. Since then, displacement numbers have stayed at consistently lower levels, but exceed the numbers reported in the beginning of the year. Districts most affected by displacement were Abs in Hajjah, Az Zuhrah in Al Hudaydah, and Qa’atabah in Al Dhale’e. The number of IDPs in Al Dhale’e has been consistently increasing between January and May (IOM 31/05/2019). By the end of May, storms and heavy rains caused increased displacement and destruction over 500 temporary shelters in Beni Qais camp in Abs (IOM 26/05/2019).
Access has improved in Al Hudaydah, but deteriorated in all areas affected by conflict escalation. Access deteriorated both for humanitarian actors and for affected populations due to violence and road closures in Hajjah, Taizz, and Al Dhale’e. Fighting has trapped affected people in areas of active conflict and limited their access to health services and humanitarian assistance, particularly in Kushar and Taizz city. Humanitarian actors faced severe access constraints (blocked transport, violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities) and administrative constraints have been increasing particularly in Hajjah and Sana’a.

Road closures hampered humanitarian and trade movements in Hajjah (routes connecting to Amran and Sana’a) and Al Dhale’e. One of the major land routes connecting Aden and Sana’a has been closed since April due to fighting in Qa’atabah and neighbouring districts in Al Dhale’e. Roads to Taizz were also closed due to the conflict. Although humanitarian actors use alternative routes, it takes much longer to transport goods. This is further complicated by bureaucratic delays in customs and at checkpoints, resulting in more time needed to transport humanitarian supplies from Aden to Sana’a and other northern governorates. This increases costs for both humanitarian agencies and traders and results in higher food prices. Travel time increased to more than 60 hours in May and the total cost of transport increased by 60% (OCHA 20/05/2019).

Socio-economic trends (January – May 2019)

Economic wrangling between Aden and Sana’a for the control of fuel supply chains led to fuel shortages and price hikes in north Yemen in March and April. This disrupted transport networks, services, and put further pressure on stretched household budgets.

The crisis was sparked in March 2019 when the Government of Yemen introduced stricter guidelines requiring fuel importers to obtain permits from the Economic Committee in Aden in line with Decree 75 (introduced in September 2018) (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies 10/11/2019). Houthi authorities placed significant pressure on importers to ignore the requirement. The large cash flows from fuel imports are a coveted source of liquidity for both sides. The political disagreement prevented a number of fuel ships from entering Al Hudaydah port in April 2019 causing fuel imports to drop 40% on the previous month. Large scale protests gathered outside the UNDP office in Sana’a calling on the UN to intervene. Political actors agreed on short term measures to allow the ships to enter in mid-April and fuel imports returned to February and March levels. However, the core issue of control over imports has not been resolved and similar issues could occur again in the future. The disruption caused a spike in food prices and placed further pressure on stretched households. (UNVIM monthly snapshots 2019; FEWSNET, 3 June 2019).

Fuel shortages raised the costs of transportation, water pumping and electricity generation. Profitiers took advantage of the crisis, providing fuel and cooking gas at triple and quadruple the official rate (YER 18,000 for 20 litres of fuel, against an official rate of YER 7,300; YER12,000 for cooking gas, official rate YER 3,300) (OCHA 22 March to 17 April 2019).

The increase in transport costs and market uncertainty also pushed up the price of food in March and April, 3% above January and February levels. The impact of higher food and basic commodity prices was reflected in rising levels of food insecurity in April 2019 (up 5% on the previous month). Food imports rose in April and May in preparation for Ramadan. This is in line with usual trends for the season (MVAM April 2019).
40% of Yemenis surveyed in April 2019 reported inadequate food consumption. Governorates with high levels of pre-existing poverty - Raymah and Al Bayda - recorded the highest levels of food insecurity, with more than 60% of people surveyed reporting inadequate food consumption. Over half of people in conflict-affected districts like Al Hudaydah, Al Dhale'e, Lahj and Al Jawf also recorded poor food consumption (MVAM April 2019). IDPs reported slightly poorer food consumption scores (13% had poor food consumption, 30% borderline). However, non-displaced populations still reported high levels of inadequate food consumption (12% poor, 26% borderline) (MVAM April 2019).

Yemenis are continuing to rely on negative coping strategies. Over 55% of families surveyed by WFP in April 2019 were relying on support from family or had no income source (MVAM April 2019). The Yemeni Rial, buoyed by a $2 billion Saudi cash injection in early 2018, stabilised somewhat from a record low of YER 800 to the USD in September-October 2018, and continued to hover between YER 530 to YER 600 in 2019. However, there is an ongoing risk that future currency depreciation could put further pressure on food prices (ICG 8 February 2019).

The outlook for future incidences of economic disruption is high, as economic talks in Amman over 14-17 May made no progress (Sana’a Centre, 20 May 2019).

**HUMANITARIAN IMPACT (January – May 2019)**

Humanitarian conditions in Yemen are deteriorating due to protracted conflict, collapse of the economy and services, and repeated waves of displacement. The most significant needs reported in Yemen in the five first months of 2019 were food and shelter for newly displaced IDPs and migrants; drinking water and health services for people exposed to the outbreak of cholera, and; fuel and cooking gas countrywide due to acute shortages since the beginning of the year. The most vulnerable groups are IDPs and migrants, particularly those who were displaced multiple times, are outside of their social support networks, in proximity to conflict frontlines, or who are detained (ACAPS Expert judgement).

Generally, the vulnerability and severity of needs of IDPs across Yemen have been increasing throughout the conflict. Compared to previous years, in 2019 more IDPs are living in settlements, including isolated and dispersed settlements rather than rented accommodation or host families, which were the main IDP shelter types in November 2018. This shows that IDPs are depleting their financial reserves and cannot afford rent. Those who still live in rented accommodation face growing risks of eviction and often use most of their limited income to pay rent, naming increasing levels of basic survival needs (food, drinking water) as their main humanitarian needs (IOM 26/05/2019).

Migrants from the Horn of Africa continue to arrive in Yemen despite the ongoing conflict. In first four months of 2019, approximately 55,500 migrants arrived in Yemen, predominantly from Ethiopia, with increasing arrivals registered. Migrants arrive at coastal and urban areas and are at significant risk of arbitrary detention, with serious protection risks such as murder, torture, and sexual violence reported (UN Security Council 29/03/2019). On 21 April 2019, authorities in three Yemeni southern governorates began to arbitrarily detain irregular migrants, predominantly men from Ethiopia, in three makeshift camps: two stadiums in Aden and Al Bayda and a military camp in Lahj. At the peak (27 April – 3 May 2019) an estimated 5,000 people were detained. At the end of May this number decreased, but approximately 2,500 migrants continued to be detained in stadiums in Aden and Al Bayda (IOM 27/05/2019).
Bad living conditions including overcrowding, glass, brick, and metal refuse strewn throughout the sites, and a lack of basic services including lack of sanitation were reported across all the detention sites, driving risks of disease. Outbreaks of acute watery diarrhoea have been reported among migrants in Lahj and Aden, leading to fatalities. Serious protection risks have been reported due to overcrowding and presence of armed security personnel at sites. Humanitarian actors report limited access to detained migrants (IOM 02/05/2019).

**Conflict has caused health and WASH conditions to deteriorate in Yemen, leading to increased caseloads of cholera.** Between 1 January and 1 June, 366,211 suspected cases of cholera were reported across the country with 640 associated deaths (CFR = 0.17). This is a large increase compared to the same period in 2018, when 82,794 suspected cases were reported with 65 associated deaths. The outbreak has affected 22 of 23 governorates and 295 of 333 districts in Yemen. The governorates reporting the highest number of suspected cases of cholera in 2019 are Amanat Al Asimah, Sana’a, Al Hudaydah, Ibb, Dhamar, Hajjah, and Amran. The highest case fatality rate was reported in Abyan, Raymah, and Marib (WHO access 30/06/2019).

The rapid increase in suspected cases is attributed to poor sanitation and sewage management, use of the contaminated water for irrigation, power cuts affecting food storage, and conflict-induced population movement (UNICEF 26/03/2019). While the early onset of the rainy season, increased awareness, and disease surveillance have contributed, the outbreak is mainly driven by prolonged conflict leading to the collapse of health systems in a naturally water scarce country. A spike in measles cases was also reported from late December 2018 to February 2019 (MSF 17/04/2019).

**Ongoing conflict has increased health and protection needs.** Access to health services was particularly constrained in areas of fighting. Hospitals were closed, inaccessible, or damaged in March in Taizz city and Kitaf district (Sa’ada governorate) against a higher level of health needs reported by the local population. Fear of attacks on hospitals resulted in some patients avoiding medical services and doctors not showing up for work (MSF 24/03/2019).
METHODOLOGY

ACAPS develops the Yemen Crisis Impact Overview product on a bi-monthly basis through:

• Maintaining a core dataset of around 90 cross-sectoral indicators on a district level, both quantitative and qualitative, covering the reporting period
• Conducting analysis of key conflict, displacement, economic, social and humanitarian impact indicators in the dataset to identify trends
• Daily monitoring of Yemeni media, social media in English and Arabic
• Secondary data review of key analysis products published on Yemen (see ACAPS metadatabase)
• Regular joint analysis with operational and analysis experts working on Yemen to test and refine assumptions
• Quality review by ACAPS’ expert readers group to try to identify and address errors and bias

LIMITATIONS

• This is the first issue of the Yemen Crisis Impact Overview. The first publication has a wider timeframe focusing on the trends and developments reported in the first five months of 2019.
• ACAPS’ Yemen Analysis Hub is currently developing a core dataset with indicators tracking trends in conflict, socio-economy, and humanitarian impact. This report was based on the beta version of the dataset, which is currently being finalised in consultation with operational actors. The depth and quality of quantitative analysis is expected to further improve in future editions once the dataset is fully operational.
• ACAPS analysis is based predominantly on publicly available reports and datasets. This makes us susceptible to availability bias. To mitigate this, ACAPS cross-checks information with operational actors and actively seeks out alternative sources to provide the broadest possible basis for analysis.
• The majority of agencies ACAPS consults with engage in humanitarian response in predominantly the north and west of the country. Less comprehensive analysis exists on the east of the country and hard to reach areas.

INFORMATION GAPS

• There is a lack of information on current levels of humanitarian needs and conflict impact in Sa’ada governorate. More information on the conflict dynamics of the current offensive, territorial gains, and impact of airstrikes would help strengthen analysis on this governorate.
• Governorates that registered the highest cholera-related case fatality rate between January and May 2019 were Abyan (1.29%), Raymah (0.89%), Marib (0.65%), and Shabwah (0.54%). There is not enough information about vulnerabilities and drivers contributing to cholera associated deaths in these areas. More in-depth analysis on the humanitarian conditions in these governorates is required.
• More information and analysis is needed to improve the understanding of humanitarian conditions in hard to reach areas.
• No IPC update on levels of food insecurity has been published since December 2018. The numbers of people at risk of food insecurity quoted in this report are based on IPC data that was valid until January 2019. It is the most up to date numbers available but should be used with caution as changes since 2019 are not reflected.