NEW DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT AND DISASTERS IN 2018

The country names and figures are shown only when the total new displacements value exceeds 20,000. Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.

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NEW DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT AND DISASTERS IN 2018

The country names and figures are shown only when the total new displacements value exceeds 20,000. Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.

Middle East and North Africa
214,000 | 2,137,000 (8.4%)

Sub-Saharan Africa
2,611,000 | 7,446,000 (36.0%)

South Asia
3,303,000 | 544,000 (13.8%)

East Asia and Pacific
9,332,000 | 236,000 (34.2%)

Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.
WITH THANKS

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Cover photo: Displaced woman from the island of Bholo living in ‘Bhola Slum’ in the city of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Many people have had to leave their homes as a result of coastal erosion and other climate impacts in the country’s southern regions. The majority of the displaced now live in the slums of Dhaka. Credit: Mahmud Hossain Opu for IDMC, February 2019
GLOBAL REPORT ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

MAY 2019
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Internal displacement is increasingly a protracted and urban phenomenon. Existing rapid urbanisation can be further accelerated with the arrival of people fleeing conflict and disasters, which in turn has serious implications for municipal authorities and urban communities coping with the rapid influx. In fragile settings with weak planning systems and capacities, this leads to fast and unplanned urbanisation, further aggravating inequalities, and generating further risk of displacement and instability.

This year’s Global Report on Internal Displacement highlights the many challenges, but also opportunities, that cities face today when dealing with internal displacement. It also demonstrates a changing humanitarian landscape where internal displacement poses risks to both current and future crises. In cities, considering the additional strain placed on already limited local capacities and resources, durable solutions require that local, national and international actors integrate internal displacement into urban development strategies and financing.

Increasing demand for adequate housing, dignified jobs, quality health care and education, social protection and participation in public life presents opportunities for our cities and host communities. Investments in resilient infrastructure, including accessible road networks and public transport, and services, such as water, electricity and waste management, as part of urban growth strategies, can contribute not only to individual well-being but also to urban economic growth, thereby accelerating the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. It is along these same lines that ensuring adequate infrastructure and service provision to returning refugees and internally displaced people can contribute to social cohesion and stability, and the overall resilience of a city.

Cities today are faced with ever-increasing risks associated with disasters, violence and conflict. Cities can also, however, offer sanctuary to those who have lost their homes and livelihoods and facilitate access to durable solutions.

The analysis undertaken by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre shows that we still have a long way to go. Significant data gaps mean that we still do not know how many people are displaced in cities and what the pull and push factors are. Limited understanding of the relationship between urban change and displacement risk are also thought to result in millions of unaccounted forced evictions every year. Despite existing normative frameworks at the international and national levels to manage and reduce urban displacement, progress remains slow.

The New Urban Agenda, Sustainable Development Goal 11 on resilient cities, the Sendai Framework and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, provide a shared roadmap for our collective efforts. We must strive to collectively deliver on our commitments captured in these global agendas, so that we do not fail the millions of internally displaced people across the globe and so that we work towards cities that can flourish, providing a fair and equitable urban future for all. This Global Report on Internal Displacement represents an important step towards attaining this vision.

Maimunah Mohd Sharif
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director, UN-Habitat
KEY FINDINGS

Internal displacement is a global challenge, but it is also heavily concentrated in a few countries and triggered by few events. 28 million new internal displacements associated with conflict and disasters across 148 countries and territories were recorded in 2018, with nine countries each accounting for more than a million.

41.3 million people were estimated to be living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence in 55 countries as of the end of the year, the highest figure ever recorded. Three-quarters, or 30.9 million people, were located in only ten countries.

Protracted crises, communal violence and unresolved governance challenges were the main factors behind 10.8 million new displacements associated with conflict and violence. Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Syria accounted for more than half of the global figure.

Newly emerging crises forced millions to flee, from Cameroon’s anglophone conflict to waves of violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region and unprecedented conflict in Ethiopia. Displacement also continued despite peace efforts in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Colombia.

Many IDPs remain unaccounted for. Figures for DRC, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen are considered underestimates, and data is scarce for Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela. This prevents an accurate assessment of the true scale of internal displacement in these countries.

Estimating returns continues to be a major challenge. Large numbers of people reportedly returned to their areas of origin in Ethiopia, Iraq and Nigeria, to conditions which were not conducive to long-lasting reintegration.

Urban conflict triggered large waves of displacement and has created obstacles to durable solutions. Airstrikes and shelling forced many thousands to flee in Hodeida in Yemen, Tripoli in Libya and Dara’a in Syria. In Mosul in Iraq and Marawi in the Philippines, widespread destruction and unexploded ordnance continued to prevent people from returning home.

Heightened vulnerability and exposure to sudden-onset hazards, particularly storms, resulted in 17.2 million disaster displacements in 144 countries and territories. The number of people displaced by slow-onset disasters worldwide remains unknown as only drought-related displacement is captured in some countries, and only partially.

The devastating power of extreme events highlighted again the impacts of climate change across the globe. Wildfires were a particularly visible expression of this in 2018, from the US and Australia to Greece and elsewhere in southern Europe, displacing hundreds of thousands of people, causing severe damage and preventing swift returns.

Global risk of being displaced by floods is staggeringly high and concentrated in towns and cities: more than 17 million people are at risk of being displaced by floods each year. Of these, more than 80 per cent live in urban and peri-urban areas.

An overlap of conflict and disasters repeatedly displaced people in a number of countries. Drought and conflict triggered similar numbers of displacements in Afghanistan, and extended rainy seasons displaced millions of people in areas of Nigeria and Somalia already affected by conflict. Most of the people displaced by disasters in Iraq and Syria were IDPs living in camps that were flooded.

Promising policy developments in several regions show increased attention to displacement risk. Niger became the first country to domesticate the Kampala Convention by adopting a law on internal displacement, and Kosovo recognised the importance of supporting returning refugees and IDPs, updating its policy to that end. Vanuatu produced a policy on disaster and climate-related displacement, and Fiji showed foresight in adopting new guidelines on resettlement in the context of climate change impacts.
Persistently high levels of new displacement each year coupled with increasingly protracted crises across the globe left 2018 with the highest number of IDPs ever recorded. Despite policy progress in several countries, the root causes of internal displacement are still not being adequately addressed.

Cyclical and protracted displacement continues to be driven by political instability, chronic poverty and inequality, environmental and climate change. Many IDPs are returning to insecure areas with few socio-economic opportunities. Instead of creating the conditions for lasting solutions, this is recreating conditions of risk and increasing the likelihood of crises erupting again in the future.

Ending displacement remains an elusive quest. Precious little information exists on how and when durable solutions are being achieved, and how people and states are progressing toward them. There is growing evidence that the obstacles to IDPs integrating locally are mostly political. This is also reflected in the almost complete lack of reporting on successful stories of local integration.

The primary responsibility for addressing internal displacement lies with national governments. Concrete action to protect IDPs and to reduce displacement risk must take place from the national to the local level. Given the ever-growing number of IDPs living in urban centres across the world, this local action will increasingly need to happen in towns and cities.

Effecting change will require the involvement and leadership of displaced people themselves and their urban host communities. More investment is needed at the city level to strengthen the capacity of communities and local authorities to analyse, plan and act jointly. Inclusive legislation, housing provision and service delivery need to become a part of the DNA of urban governance if urban IDPs are to break out of protracted and cyclical displacement.

With displacement increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon, integrated approaches across sectors and more investment in humanitarian, development and peace-building are required. To support local action effectively, the international community must address institutional barriers to coherence, and pursue joined-up funding and programming with a renewed sense of urgency and purpose.

The way ahead is clear. Filling the significant data, analysis and capacity gaps is imperative to progress. Only around a quarter of global internal displacement data is georeferenced and little to no information exists on the duration and severity of displacement across contexts and demographic groups. These gaps prevent the development of strategies to end or reduce the risk of displacement and mean that too many IDPs are still falling between the cracks of protection and assistance.

A systemic approach to filling the data gaps is possible. Common standards and better cooperation and coordination are within our reach and will go a long way in providing the evidence base required for policy work, development planning and humanitarian operations. Appropriate tools for needs assessments, risk analyses, investment planning and progress monitoring already exist and allow states to develop sustainable approaches to displacement. The priority now is to provide national and local authorities with the financial and technical support they will need to apply them.

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INTRODUCTION

Yemen’s main port and fourth-largest city of Hodeidah became the scene of intense urban conflict and mass internal displacement in 2018. Yemeni forces backed by a Saudi-led coalition launched an offensive on 13 June to wrest control of the city, the entry point for about 70 per cent of the country’s imports including food, medicines and fuel, from the Houthi movement. Aware the battle was imminent, many people had already left and thousands more fled in a matter of a few weeks of the conflict breaking out.1

The fighting disrupted people’s access to goods and basic services, and trenches dug by Houthi fighters cut water and electricity supplies to a number of neighbourhoods.2 Saudi-led airstrikes in October and November severely damaged or destroyed a number of health facilities and other infrastructure including roads, bridges and factories. One airstrike hit a busy market.3

Many of those who fled Hodeidah and the surrounding area made for other cities, including Sana’a, Aden and Taiz, in search of safety, services and humanitarian aid.4 More than 64,000 new displacements were recorded between June and November.5 Many of those who fled have been unable to return, integrate locally or settle elsewhere in the country and remain in displacement. After years of civil war, more than 2.3 million people were living in displacement in Yemen as of the end of 2018. The lack of verifiable data on displacement in the country makes such estimates highly conservative, which has serious implications for the response to what has arguably become the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.6

Despite the dire situation in Yemen, the country accounted for only a fraction of the 10.8 million new displacements associated with conflict worldwide in 2018. Another 17.2 million associated with disasters were also recorded. These global figures mirrored previous years in terms of the countries and regions most affected. The number of recorded new displacements was slightly lower than in 2017, but consistent with the average over the last decade (see Figure 1).


*Updated figures. For further details see methodological annex, available online.
2018 also marked the 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a reminder that despite two decades of development in national policy and local practice, internal displacement figures remain stubbornly high. The good news is that more countries and regions are acknowledging the challenge and stepping up efforts to address and reduce the phenomenon. The world’s only legally binding regional instrument on internal displacement, the African Union’s Kampala Convention, celebrates its 10th anniversary this year, a milestone that will hopefully encourage more countries to domesticate its provisions into national laws and policies. New policy developments in the region, most notably in Niger, hold the promise of renewed action toward reducing internal displacement.

Global efforts are important to galvanise political will and financing to this end, but Hodeidah and many other stories of urban displacement from across the world show that risk and impacts are unequally distributed. The increasing concentration of conflict and disaster displacement risk in towns and cities has implications for both policy and practice, and means action needs to be accelerated as much at the local as at the national level. Local governments have a pivotal role to play because they are the first responders to crises, but they are often overlooked in decision-making processes and higher-level discussions on addressing internal displacement.

Why a global report on urban internal displacement?

Given the vital and ever-growing role of cities in this urban century, this year’s Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) is dedicated to exploring the phenomenon’s urban dimensions. There are significant knowledge, policy and capacity gaps, but also opportunities to prevent displacement from continuing to become a humanitarian and development challenge that, as in the case of Hodeidah, represents a major setback at both the local and national levels.

It is often suggested that 80 per cent of the world’s internally displaced people (IDPs) live in urban areas, but there is not enough data available to paint an accurate global picture. There has been progress in capturing information, but a lack of disaggregated data and clear definitions are among the challenges in assessing what is a complex and dynamic phenomenon. Nor will capturing its scale be enough. Knowing how many IDPs live in cities provides the basis for a conversation about how urban areas may facilitate or impede their achievement of durable solutions, but it does not explain the drivers of displacement risk or the factors that trigger new and secondary displacements. The conditions and vulnerabilities of those forced to flee also need to be accounted for. This means understanding how impacts vary depending on people’s gender, age, socioeconomic situation and ethnic and cultural background, as well as over time. It also means understanding how urban areas and systems aggravate or alleviate these issues, about which only anecdotal evidence is currently available.

Whether their displacement is triggered by conflict, violence, disasters or development projects, hundreds of thousands of people flee from, to, between and within urban areas. Capturing this phenomenon both qualitatively and quantitatively so that its dynamics, risks and impacts can be understood will allow local and national governments to plan and invest to reduce its human and economic impacts effectively over time. It will also be a key element in efforts to meet targets set out in the 2030 Agenda, including the New Urban Agenda and other frameworks that aim to make development sustainable and cities work for all.

About GRID 2019

This report is divided into three main parts:

Part 1 presents the internal displacement data IDMC collected, validated and verified in 2018. It includes the number of new displacements associated with conflict and disasters monitored, and an estimate of the number of people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict as of the end of the year. Data, contextual analysis and urban perspectives are presented in regional overviews. Specific situations are highlighted in the form of country spotlights.

Part 2 discusses why monitoring internal displacement systematically and independently at the local, national and global level matters. It identifies the main gaps in current practice and points to solutions for the future and makes the case for more investment in improving data availability and quality. The section also proposes a way forward for greater collaboration in developing standards and in data collection to ensure that it is interoperable and meets the needs of different stakeholders.
working to understand and reduce the risks and impacts of internal displacement.

Part 3 develops the thematic focus of the report and unpacks the main characteristics, risks, impacts, challenges and opportunities related to urban internal displacement around the world. It reflects on the different contexts in which internal displacement unfolds in towns and cities and highlights selected areas of critical importance to urban development and governance as well as to addressing and reducing internal displacement.

Several tables at the end of the report and an online methodological annex provide detailed explanations of how IDMC calculates its figures and undertakes data analysis. GRID 2019 also benefits from the input of many partners, research institutions and independent experts. IDMC’s call for papers on urban internal displacement in mid-2018 elicited contributions and analysis that are presented as background papers to the main report. The papers’ abstracts appear at the end of this report and full versions are available online.  

How to read GRID figures

The GRID presents the following headline figures:

**New displacements** corresponds to the estimated number of internal displacement movements to have taken place during the year. Figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once. In this sense, the number of new displacements does not equal to the number of people displaced during the year.

**Total number of IDPs** corresponds to the total number of people living in internal displacement as of 31 December 2018.

**Partial or unverified solutions** corresponds to cases of individuals who are reported as having returned, resettled or locally integrated but for whom there is insufficient or no evidence to clearly determine if they have achieved a durable solution. Figure 2 presents IDMC’s data model.
A view of the IDP settlement in Badghis, Afghanistan. There are thousands of makeshift homes spread between mountain hills on the outskirts of Qala-i-naw city. Photo: NRC/Enayatullah Azad, November 2018

PART 1

THE GLOBAL DISPLACEMENT LANDSCAPE
There were 28 million new displacements associated with disasters and conflict recorded in 2018 across 148 countries and territories. Nine out of the ten worst-affected countries accounted for more than a million new displacements each. Several countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Afghanistan, were affected by displacement associated with both conflict and disasters. Many people who fled disasters in countries such as Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Yemen, had already been displaced by conflict.

These are the best estimates of a complex and dynamic global phenomenon that manifests in significantly different ways across countries and situations. The severity and duration of displacement are not captured, and the need for a more nuanced understanding of its drivers and impacts are discussed throughout the report.

Robust information on all of these dimensions is needed to form an evidence base for the decisions and actions of policymakers, planners and responders working to provide durable solutions to IDPs and reduce the risk of future displacement.
NEW DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND DISASTERS

Sixty-one per cent of the new displacements recorded in 2018, or 17.2 million, were triggered by disasters, and 39 per cent, or 10.8 million, by conflict. Displacement associated with communal violence increased considerably compared with 2017. Criminal violence also continued to trigger displacement but numbers should be considered underestimates.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Syria, Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR) and Afghanistan were again among the countries with the highest number of new displacements associated with conflict. New waves of conflict and violence triggered displacement in Nigeria and Cameroon, that were among the ten worst-affected countries globally. Ethiopia had the highest figure, with 2.9 million new displacements, a considerable increase that influenced global trends.

Almost 1,600 disaster events triggered new displacements during the year, most of them associated with weather-related hazards. Storms, particularly tropical...
cyclones, accounted for the majority, a reminder of the importance of reducing the risks associated with vulnerability and exposure to climate change. Geophysical events including earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions triggered 1.1 million new displacements, a considerable increase compared with 2017.

The Philippines, China and India between them accounted for about 60 per cent of all new displacements associated with disasters. Many were preemptive evacuations of people living in high-risk areas, highlighting the unmitigated exposure of people and assets. Vulnerability also played a key role in preventing people from returning and recovering from the impacts of disasters in many countries.

FIGURE 6: Ten countries with most new displacements associated with disasters in 2018
REGIONAL OVERVIEWS

Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East were disproportionately affected by displacement associated with conflict in 2018, and new waves were also recorded in South Asia. Figures for the Americas mirrored those of previous years. Displacement associated with disasters mainly affected East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia, both regions with high levels of population exposure and vulnerability to hazards. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas were relatively lightly affected, but floods and storms still triggered millions of new displacements. This section presents data, contextual analysis and urban perspectives by region. Detailed analysis is presented in the form of country spotlights.

Conflict and violence: New displacement by region

Disasters: New displacement by region
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced ongoing as well as new conflict and violence throughout 2018 and in addition, suffered droughts, floods and storms that forced millions of people to flee their homes. Around 7.4 million new displacements associated with conflict and violence and 2.6 million associated with disasters were recorded, more than any other region and accounting for 36 per cent of all displacements worldwide. Ethiopia, DRC, Nigeria, Somalia and CAR were the countries worst affected. Around 16.5 million people were living in internal displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of conflict as of the end of the year. This figure once again shows that protracted displacement is a significant issue for many countries.

Against a backdrop of important and many positive political changes, 2.9 million new displacements associated with conflict were recorded in Ethiopia, the highest figure in the world and four times as many as in 2017. Old conflicts became more entrenched and new conflicts escalated along various state borders, prompting the government to establish a new Ministry of Peace in response to the increasing violence (see Ethiopia spotlight, p.14). Disasters also triggered 296,000 new displacements, many of them associated with flooding in the Somali region.

More than 1.8 million new displacements associated with conflict were recorded in DRC, primarily in North and South Kivu, Tanganyika and Kasai Central provinces, where conflict and insecurity continued. The province of Ituri had been embroiled in conflict between 1999 and 2007 and had since been relatively peaceful, but intercommunal violence rekindled in December 2017, leading to 60 deaths and more than 576,000 new displacements. What rekindled the conflict is unclear, but a national political crisis, the disintegration of state authority and the increasing activity of politically-motivated militias may all have been contributing factors. The western province of Mai-Ndombe also experienced an outbreak of intercommunal violence between 16 and 18 December 2018, when at least 535 people were killed in a massacre and around 12,000 people displaced from the town of Yumbi.

More than three million people were thought to be living in internal displacement as of the end of 2018 in DRC, a highly conservative figure that does not capture the whole country. There are hopes that presidential elections that took place on 30 December after a two-year delay will help to stabilise the political situation.

More than 578,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in Somalia, the highest figure in a decade and the result of three main factors. Evictions from urban centres, mainly of IDPs, accounted for about 44 per cent of the figure. Driven by a lack of adequate housing and informal tenure agreements in increasingly crowded areas, the number of evictions reached a record high. Tensions between Somaliland and Puntland over the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag also flared, and Al Shabaab fighters clashed with government and African Union troops, particularly in the southern regions of Middle and Lower Shabelle.
In addition, around 547,000 new displacements associated with disasters were recorded in Somalia. Almost half of the figure, or 249,000, were associated with drought, mainly in the southern regions of Bay, Lower Shabelle and Bakool, as people moved from rural areas in search of water and livelihood opportunities. Above average rainfall also caused flooding in southern and central areas of the country during the rainy season in April and May, triggering around 289,000 new displacements. Some families in remote villages were cut off from the rest of the country for months, leaving them in particularly vulnerable conditions.17

Conflict and violence in the north-eastern and Middle Belt regions of Nigeria triggered 541,000 new displacements in 2018, and floods inundated 80 per cent of the country, triggering 600,000. Clashes between northern herders and southern farmers competing for scarce resources have taken place in Middle Belt since 2014, but the violence escalated significantly last year, triggering 200,000 new displacements. Whole villages and herder settlements were burnt down and hundreds of people were killed, making the conflict more deadly than the Boko Haram insurgency.18

Fighting between the government and armed opposition groups in the north-east of the country entered its tenth year, triggering 341,000 new displacements. Despite the ongoing insecurity, the government insists that Boko Haram is near defeat and has been promoting returns to some parts of the north-east. At least 311,000 IDPs were recorded as having returned in 2018, along with more than 30,000 Nigerian refugees returning from Cameroon.19 Based on data on housing conditions of returnees, however, at least 86,000 people returned to partially damaged housing or makeshift shelters. Around two million people were thought to be living in displacement as a result of conflict as of the end of the year (Nigeria spotlight, p.18).

Other countries in the Lake Chad Basin also continued to be affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, with more than 52,000 new displacements recorded in Niger and 22,000 in Cameroon. There was not enough reliable information to compile an estimate for new displacements for Chad for 2018, but displacement is thought to be ongoing in the country.

The impact of Boko Haram in Cameroon was overshadowed by 437,000 new displacements in the Northwest and Southwest regions, where tensions over government moves to impose French on the anglophone population that had been simmering since 2016 erupted into armed conflict between separatists and the military (Cameroon spotlight, p.16).

Continued fighting between armed groups in CAR triggered 510,000 new displacements in 2018, leaving around 641,000 people living in internal displacement as of the end of the year. Clashes in Ouham Pende, Ouaka and Haut-Kotto prefectures triggered the majority of the displacement, including in the urban centres of Bambari and Bria. The government signed a peace deal with 14 armed factions in February 2019, raising hopes that levels of violence and displacement would decrease in the future.

In South Sudan, more than 321,000 new displacements associated with conflict were recorded during the year, leaving almost 1.9 million people living in internal displacement as of December. The two main parties to the conflict signed a peace deal in September 2018, but there was no immediate reduction in violence.20

Clashes in neighbouring Sudan between the government and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) triggered 41,000 new displacements in the Jebel Marra mountains at the intersection between South, North and Central Darfur. Torrential rains and landslides also triggered 420 new displacements in the same area in early September.21 SLM/A declared a unilateral three-month ceasefire the same month to allow humanitarian access to those affected.22

Around 5,600 returns to the five states that make up the Darfur region were recorded in 2018, but a lack of information about people’s circumstances and reports of returnees being attacked raised serious questions about their sustainability.23 The Sudanese government is also working with the international community to convert a number of displacement camps into residential areas, leading to IDPs’ de facto local integration—a positive move though the outcome remains to be seen.24

Around 126,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in Mali, 42,000 in Burkina Faso, 5,000 in Ghana, 3,500 in Benin and 3,000 in Sierra Leone, between them accounting for a significant increase in the overall figure for West Africa compared to 2017. Inter-communal clashes in Mali between Fulani herders and Dogon and Bambara farmers escalated during the year, and intra-community
Internally displaced people return to their homes in Kipese, a small town situated in North Kivu province, which was affected by armed conflict in May 2018. Photo: NRC/Martin Lukongo, July 2018

violence among the Fulani and attacks by extremist groups added to the instability. Many villages were looted and torched, making returns more challenging. Armed Islamist groups have increased their presence in Burkina Faso since 2016, prompting counterterrorism operations in 2017 and 2018 that led to numerous allegations of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and the abuse of suspects in custody.\(^{25}\)

Small to medium-scale disasters affected many countries in the region in 2018, events that tend not to receive enough attention or resources despite their severe impacts on people and local economies. Around 336,000 new displacements were recorded in Kenya as heavy rains led to flooding in all of the country’s 47 counties. Thousands of hectares of farmland were inundated and livestock killed, threatening the livelihoods of pastoralists and farmers alike.\(^{26}\) At least six dams burst, triggering around 12,000 new displacements. Flooding also led to 158,000 new displacements in Uganda, 121,000 in Sudan, 56,000 in Ghana, 15,000 in Liberia and 3,000 in Côte d’Ivoire.

These significant levels of displacement occurred despite policy progress in the region. 2019 marks the tenth anniversary of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.\(^{27}\) Also known as the Kampala Convention, it is the world’s only legally binding regional instrument on internal displacement. Renewed commitment to its provisions on the part of African Union member states is needed, however, given that new and protracted displacement continue to be a major challenge. Niger should be commended for becoming the first country to incorporate the convention into its domestic legislation, when parliament voted unanimously to adopt a national law on internal displacement in December 2018.\(^{28}\)
Internal displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa takes place against the backdrop of unprecedented urbanisation. The region is still substantially rural with 40 per cent of its population living in cities, but this is set to change considerably in the coming years. African cities are among the fastest growing in the world and some, including Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Kampala in Uganda, Abuja in Nigeria, Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and Bamako in Mali, are expected to double in size by 2035.

The rapid and unplanned nature of much of this urbanisation has the potential to aggravate existing challenges and create new ones. Many of the region’s urban dwellers have little or no access to water and sanitation. Millions of people live in inadequate housing in overcrowded, underserved and marginalised neighbourhoods, in conditions of high exposure and vulnerability to hazards and displacement risk. Some cities are also trying to cope with significant influxes of IDPs from rural areas.

Urban floods are a major challenge. Six of the ten largest flooding events that triggered displacement in 2018 were in Sub-Saharan Africa, and urban areas bore the brunt of the impacts. Thousands of people were displaced during the rainy season in cities including Beledweyne in Somalia and Lagos in Nigeria. IDMC’s flood displacement risk model suggests that floods are likely to displace on average 2.7 million people in the region at any given year in the future, two-thirds of them in urban and peri-urban areas.

When crises hit, local authorities often struggle to respond to the needs of those affected, including IDPs. They tend to be understaffed and underfunded, and rely on resources provided by national authorities and in some cases the international humanitarian community. Response capacity also varies between smaller and larger cities, an issue that needs to be considered in future interventions and investments that aim to tackle the challenges associated with urban displacement.

The municipal governments of Maiduguri in Nigeria and Mogadishu in Somalia have taken some positive steps to this end. IDPs in both cities face specific vulnerabilities related to their displacement, including access to employment and livelihoods and the risk of forced evictions. In response, the local government in Maiduguri has collaborated with Nigeria’s central bank to set up entrepreneurship centres for unemployed young people and IDPs. In Mogadishu, the Banadir regional authority has worked with the UN and the private sector to create a durable solutions unit to support employment creation and entrepreneurship programmes for IDPs.

Such initiatives serve as examples to other local governments of their potential to facilitate durable solutions. Urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to play a major role in shaping the region’s development. It has the potential to bring significant social and economic benefits, including alleviating poverty and inequality and reducing the risks and impacts of displacement.

To do so, the role of local authorities must be leveraged.
Somali families that fled conflict and drought live in crowded and unhealthy conditions in a shelter camp in Kismayo in southern Somalia. With shelters made only of plastic, cloth and sticks, families here are vulnerable to flooding and insecurity. Photo: NRC/Jepsen, February 2019
Ethiopia had the highest number of new internal displacements associated with conflict worldwide in 2018. The country’s crisis has been deepening steadily since 2016, but conflict and intercommunal violence escalated significantly and spread to new areas last year, triggering almost 2.9 million new displacements, four times the figure for 2017. Conflict and displacement were recorded along three of the Oromia region’s borders, with the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ (SNNP) region in the south-west, the Benishangul-Gumuz region in the north-west and the Somali region in the east. Urban centres were also affected, including Addis Ababa and Jijiga, the capital of the Somali region.37

This unprecedented rise in new displacement comes against the backdrop of significant political change in the country, with a new prime minister taking power in April 2018. The new government ended the country’s state of emergency, released political prisoners and forged a peace deal with Eritrea.38 It has also been praised for abandoning past practices including the excessive use of force to curb protests and for its cooperation with aid agencies in responding to acute humanitarian needs. By doing so the new government has acknowledged the presence of conflict-induced IDPs within its border. A crucial step towards addressing their plight.39

After two decades of relative calm, the most significant displacement was triggered by inter-communal violence between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups that erupted in April and again in June in the West Guji zone of Oromia and the Gedeo zone of SNNP. Underlying ethnic tensions were aggravated by competition for land and scarce resources.40 The conflict left hundreds of thousands of people sheltering in overcrowded collective centres, where humanitarian agencies struggled to provide food, health, water and sanitation for the rapidly growing displaced population. The government collaborated with the agencies, who had no previous presence in the south of the country, to set up and coordinate a large-scale response.41

Ethnic violence also broke out between Oromos, Amharas and Gumuz in Benishangul Gumuz in October following the killing of three local police officers.42 Around 62,000 new displacements were recorded between October and December. Humanitarian needs were acute, but insecurity hampered agencies’ access and only one aid delivery was reported.43

Fighting and displacement that began along the border between the Oromia and Somali regions in 2017 continued unabated last year. Conflict over the disputed border was aggravated by drought, which increased competition for scarce resources, leading to the displacement of ethnic Oromos living in the Somali region and ethnic Somalis living in Oromia. Hundreds of thousands of new displacements were recorded. Heavy fighting in the Oromo town of Moyale between the Somali Garreh and Oromi Borenas sub-clans triggered around 80,000 new displacements in two weeks in December. The town also suffered significant damage. Its hospital was destroyed and its shops and banks looted.44

Inter-communal violence in Jijiga, a previously calm and vibrant city, led to the displacement of 140,000 people in just a few days in August, of whom 35,000 remained in the city and sheltered in and around churches. Jijiga was inaccessible for several weeks as a result of the insecurity, but economic activity had resumed by the middle of the month and many people returned once the situation had stabilised.45 Clashes on the outskirts of Addis
Ababa in September, when Oromo youth flocked to the capital to welcome Oromo Liberation Front fighters returning from Eritrea, displaced 15,000 people.46

Ethiopia’s new government has put a number of measures in place in response to the country’s displacement crisis, including peace-building activities to promote voluntary returns and programmes to support those who prefer to integrate into their host communities or settle elsewhere.47 A minister for peace has also been appointed. A durable solutions strategy for the Somali region was developed in 2017 in line with the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention, a regional treaty on IDPs’ protection and assistance.48

The government has been criticised, however, for encouraging premature returns to regions not yet safe and for not doing enough to protect civilians.49 Nor has Ethiopia ratified the Kampala Convention yet. In light of the country’s growing internal displacement crisis and in the spirit of improving policies to tackle the phenomenon, the tenth anniversary of the convention’s adoption in 2019 presents an ideal opportunity to do so.
SPOTLIGHT

CAMEROON

A deepening but neglected crisis

Boko Haram’s regional insurgency continued to cause displacement in Cameroon in 2018, but events in the Far North region were all but eclipsed by an internal conflict that erupted in the Northwest and Southwest regions, home to the country’s anglophone minority. A protest movement that began in 2016 escalated into fighting between armed separatists and the country’s military, triggering around 437,000 new displacements during the year. Another 30,000 people fled across the border into Nigeria.

The Northwest and Southwest regions, with a population of four million people, have long been marginalised and have experienced occasional outbreaks of violence as the government suppressed protests. The latest violence has its roots in a strike declared by lawyers’ and teachers’ trade unions over the government’s efforts to impose French on the two sectors. Cameroon’s security forces launched a violent crackdown on protests in support of the strike, and numerous anglophone activists were arrested, including 47 in Nigeria.

This repression in turn led elements of the opposition to take up arms, and separatist groups calling for an independent Ambazonia Republic have engaged in armed confrontation with the military since January 2018. The government has responded with full-blown counterinsurgency operations. It has been accused of engaging in extrajudicial executions, excessive use of force, the torture and ill-treatment of suspected separatists and other detainees and the burning of homes and property.50

Military operations have been recorded in more than 100 villages in the Southwest and Northwest regions since October 2017.51 Most if not all of the inhabitants of the villages targeted have fled, and around 80 per cent are thought to have sought refuge in the forest, where they have no access to shelter, water or sanitation.52 Meme Division in the Southwest region has borne the brunt of the crisis, producing and hosting the majority of IDPs.

Education has been severely disrupted. Many schools shut down as part of the initial protests, and armed groups have banned them from reopening. They have also burned some schools down, and threatened others who did not comply with the ban. Around 42,500 children are thought to be out of school as a result, and the figure is expected to rise to 311,000 in 2019.53

The insecurity and violence have also undermined people’s livelihoods. The majority of the population depends on agriculture and small-scale trade for a living, and people’s inability to access their land and markets as a result of displacement has led to serious food shortages.54

Humanitarian needs in both the Southwest and Northwest regions are acute, but the response has been limited. Instances of new displacements have even been reported in the Ouest and Littoral regions, as the conflict has spilled over into neighbouring regions. The UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan published in May 2018 called for $15.2 million to reach 160,000 people, but the number of IDPs and others in need has since risen significantly. Very few international agencies are present on the ground, and those who are have had to prioritise the little funding they receive to address the basic needs of the newly displaced people.55
response began to gather pace in the second half of the year, but by the end of the year, only 40 per cent of the requested funding had been secured.56

Education lies at the heart of Cameroon’s new conflict, and the government has continued to enforce French in anglophone schools despite intense and widespread opposition. Doing so drives the tensions that have triggered violence and displacement. The education sector has been particularly hard hit, but the response has been hampered by limited funding and competing priorities.57 More humanitarian assistance will reduce the impact on those affected, particularly children, but a political solution to the conflict is key to preventing further displacement.
SPOTLIGHT

NIGERIA

Floods and conflict converged to deepen an existing crisis

More than 541,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in Nigeria in 2018, bringing the number of people living in displacement as of the end of the year to 2.2 million. Ongoing conflict in north-eastern states and new conflict between herdsmen and farmers over scarce resources in the Middle Belt led to 341,000 and 200,000 new displacements, respectively. Thirty-four of Nigeria’s thirty-six states were also affected by flooding as the banks of the Benue and Niger rivers burst, triggering 600,000 new displacements and submerging thousands of homes.

Despite official insistence that Boko Haram is close to defeat, attacks by armed opposition groups continued last year, particularly in the north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. About 90 per cent of IDPs, or just over two million, were living in the north-east of the country as of the end of 2018. An estimated 832,000 people also continue to live in areas under the control of armed groups in the north-east and remain inaccessible to aid workers. Humanitarian access has been severely restricted throughout the ten years of conflict, despite organisations’ efforts to negotiate entry points.

Over 311,000 movements were reported as returns by data providers in 2018; however, these are not considered sustainable as IDPs are returning to damaged or destroyed housing, or are still living in areas plagued by security risks. The Nigerian government is investing in reconstruction initiatives to promote IDPs’ return. In the Bama area of Borno state, it built or renovated around 10,000 homes, more than 150 classrooms and more than 50 hand water pumps. It approved the return of 120,000 IDPs in March 2018, but armed groups are still active in the area. Concerns about the volatile security situation led the UN and the Borno state governor to sign a returns policy framework, which states that basic services and security must be restored before IDPs go back to their areas of origin. As such, it is an important step toward ensuring safe, sustainable and dignified returns.

In the Middle Belt, tensions that had been brewing for four years between pastoralists from the north of the region and farmers from the south erupted into armed conflict in 2018, leading to significant violence and destruction. Desertification associated with climate change was a factor, degrading already overstretched pasture and forcing herdsmen to move south in search of grazing land. The conflict in the north-east has also driven herdsmen south. These factors combined with others in 2018 to inflame tensions. New anti-grazing laws in Benue state enraged herdsmen, who were pushed into neighbouring states where they clashed with farmers, and a culture of impunity for past crimes, including killings and the destruction of villages, has aggravated the situation further by encouraging people to take the law into their own hands. Only five people have been tried and sentenced for killings in the region since 2017. The under-reporting of the crisis and the lack of humanitarian presence in the area mean that reported displacement figures are likely to be underestimates.

The majority of the new displacements associated with the Middle Belt conflict were recorded in Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau states. Local emergency management agencies have been responding to the crisis. For example, the Plateau State Emergency Management Agency has been providing food and water to IDPs in camps in the state, but shortages are still reported. Camp residents complain of overcrowding and lack of water. More than 60 per cent of those displaced in the
region are children, who are out of school. There has been a significant international response to the displacement situation in the north-east, but no significant international presence is engaged with the unfolding Middle Belt crisis.

Nigeria is also highly prone to flooding, which was particularly widespread in 2018. Eighty per cent of the country was inundated at some point during the year, and the government declared a state of emergency in the worst-affected states of Anambra, Delta, Kogi and Niger. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural land were flooded, harming the livelihoods of farmers who lost crops. In urban areas, poor planning and zoning means many residential areas have been built on exposed river banks and flood plains. This combined with poor drainage systems makes homes highly vulnerable to regular flooding. The Nigerian Red Cross has been at the forefront of the response to those displaced by the flooding.

Nigeria has Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest population and economy, but conflict, disasters and development projects cause significant displacement each year. The government was presented with a draft national policy on internal displacement aligned with the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention in 2011. Eight years later, however, it is still to be adopted. Designing and implementing policies to reduce people’s vulnerability and exposure to displacement and address the needs of those already displaced must be a priority for the government.
Conflict and violence continued to drive internal displacement in the Middle East and North Africa. More than 2.1 million new displacements represented a drop of more than 50 per cent on the previous year, but almost 11 million people were living in internal displacement in the region at the end of the year, accounting for more than a quarter of the global total. The decrease in new displacements was mainly the result of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria winding down as both countries’ armies consolidated their hold on territory recovered from Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and other armed groups. Disasters triggered more than 200,000 new displacements.

Despite the decline in conflict and displacement in Syria during 2018, the country’s civil war, in its eighth year, continued to trigger some of the largest population movements in the world. More than 1.6 million new displacements were recorded, the highest number in the region for the fourth year running. Government offensives to retake areas of Idlib and Dara’a governorates and the Damascus suburbs led to the majority of new displacements. The battle for Dara’a triggered more than 285,000, the largest single displacement event of the war.

Large-scale returns were also recorded shortly after each offensive, and these are likely to continue in the coming months. It will be important to monitor such movements closely to better understand the conditions to which people are returning (see Syria spotlight, p.24). Heavy rains and flooding, which were particularly intense in 2018, displaced as many as 27,000 people in Al Hasakeh, Idlib, Aleppo and Ar Raqqah governorates, all of them IDPs already living in precarious conditions in camps.

The conflict in Yemen escalated significantly in the second half of 2018 as the Saudi-led coalition stepped up its offensive to take control of Hodeidah port, which is controlled by the Houthi movement. Residents began to flee the city pre-emptively in early June, when fighting appeared imminent, eventually leading to mass movements. At least 64,000 new displacements could be verified, but several unvalidated media reports cited hundreds of thousands of displacements and the true figure is likely to be much higher. There was subsequently a temporary lull in the fighting, but it escalated again in October and November, raising serious humanitarian concerns.

The parties to the conflict met in Stockholm in December and agreed to mutually redeploy their forces, swap prisoners and discuss de-escalation along the Taiz frontline. Many details of the agreement were still to be ironed out as of early 2019 and exchanges of fire continued to threaten the fragile ceasefire, but it succeeded in preventing a major humanitarian crisis.

Across the country as a whole, 252,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded and at least 2.3 million people were living in internal displacement as of the end of the year. These figures are considered underestimates, due to chal-
Landmines and unexploded ordnance. These factors have combined to slow the pace of returns as IDPs choose to remain in displacement until conditions in their areas of origin improve.

Flooding and drought triggered the majority of the 69,000 new displacements associated with disasters recorded in Iraq last year. Flooding affected the north of the country particularly hard, triggering more than 35,000 in Nineawa, Salah al Din, Dahuk and Kirkuk governorates in late November and early December. A significant number of IDPs were displaced again from camps when their tents were destroyed. Drought triggered 20,000 new displacements in the south of the country as people fled their homes in search of livelihoods, particularly in Thi Qar, Missan and Qadissiya governorates.

The situation in Libya deteriorated significantly in 2018, with 70,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence recorded, more than double the number for the previous year. New conflict in the urban centres of Tripoli, Derna and Sebha led to the destruction of infrastructure and breakdown of basic services, triggering more than 63,000 new displacements. Migrants
and refugees whose detention centres were caught in the crossfire were also affected (see Libya spotlight, p.26). Fighting and displacement also took place in the districts of Jufra and Murqub and the cities of Sirte and Sabha, and across large swathes of the south, where foreign armed groups continued to establish safe havens and fuel insecurity.

Military offensives in Egypt against an ISIL affiliate led to evictions and the widespread destruction of homes, commercial buildings and farms in North Sinai governorate. More than 15,000 new displacements were recorded, but that is likely to be an underestimate given that the area is inaccessible and the figure was compiled using satellite imagery and eyewitness accounts. More displacements associated with sudden-onset disasters were recorded across the region in 2018 than in previous years. Iran, which is prone to a range of natural hazards, was worst affected. Snow storms in January and February triggered 24,000 new displacements, while floods led to more than 1,400 throughout the year. In November, an earthquake struck the western province of Kermanshah, in particular Sar Pol-e Zahab, triggering almost 47,000 new displacements.

Urban perspectives

More than 65 per cent of the region’s population lives in urban areas, in a region where cities have historically been key hubs of trade and development. Much of the region’s conflict and displacement in recent years has also taken place in towns and cities. Examples include Aleppo, Dara’a, Idlib and Raqqa in Syria, Aden, Hodeidah and Taiz in Yemen, Benghazi and Tripoli in Libya and Mosul in Iraq. Some of the conflicts are ongoing, and among those that have concluded or stabilised, reconstruction and recovery challenges have impeded the achievement of durable solutions.

In cities such as Aleppo, Mosul and Taiz, intra-urban displacement patterns have been observed as residents move to safer neighbourhoods in search of safety and services. In Aleppo, Baghdad and Damascus, power struggles influenced such movements, with conflict and violence used to reorganise and divide populations into ethnic and religious groups, dictating where people are able to go and whether or not they are able to return.

Urban conflict is not a new phenomenon, but it creates specific challenges for IDPs. Unexploded ordnance, landmines and booby traps constitute an important security threat for people wanting to return to previously densely populated areas. The destruction of infrastructure and disruption of essential services have direct, indirect and cumulative impacts that have the potential to render whole neighbourhoods and entire towns or cities uninhabitable. Once the fighting is over, the extent of the destruction and damage may mean recovery takes years. More than a year after its liberation from ISIL, most of Raqqa still lies in ruins and unexploded ordnance litters the town.

De-escalating protracted urban conflict is key to promoting long-term stability and development in the Middle East and North Africa. Reconstruction is essential for peace-building and to ensure those affected are able to re-establish their lives. Delays may destabilise cities and countries, fueling future conflict and displacement. Beyond immediate and much-needed humanitarian assistance, the setbacks caused by urban conflict and displacement will not be overcome unless the development sector engages in implementing longer-term recovery initiatives. Reinvigorating local economies will be key to reducing poverty, and robust urban planning will be equally important in supporting recovery and reducing the underlying drivers of insecurity and conflict across the region as a whole.
Displaced people in Al-Areesha camp in Syria were severely affected by heavy rains and widespread flooding in December 2018. Photo © UNHCR/Hisham Arafat, December 2018
The Syrian government brought large swathes of territory back under its control in 2018, making it a decisive year in the country’s civil war. Non-state armed groups suffered severe losses as the government and affiliated forces retook Eastern Ghouta, Dara’a and Quneitra governorates, the southern Damascus suburbs and the city of Homs and its surrounding countryside. Only Idlib governorate remains in the hands of non-state actors.

As the conflict nears its end, discussions about post-conflict reconstruction and returns have begun. The government passed a new law in April which designates reconstruction zones across Syria. Law No. 10 also gives landowners in those areas a year to prove ownership or risk losing their land with no compensation. This law has been criticised for its potential to create significant obstacles to return. The year began with government forces advancing toward the north of Hama and west of Aleppo governorates, triggering more than 325,000 new displacements over a six-week period. An offensive launched in February to retake the besieged enclave of Eastern Ghouta lasted seven weeks and triggered more than 158,000 new displacements between 9 March and 22 April. Around 66,000 people were displaced to areas of north-west Syria including Idlib and Aleppo, which were still under the control of non-state armed actors. These areas have received large numbers of displaced fighters and their families over the years as a result of local ceasefires.

Heavy fighting also broke out in the southern governorates of Dara’a and Quneitra in June and July, culminating in an agreement that restored government control. The offensive led to the single largest displacement event of the war. The month-long campaign triggered at least 285,000 new displacements, the majority over a period of just two weeks.

A similar fate seemed to await Idlib governorate in late August and early September. The build-up of government and affiliated forces along the conflict line in the north of Hama and west of Aleppo governorates and a subsequent increase in aerial bombardments prompted an international outcry and calls for restraint. The UN, international NGOs and governments around the world warned that further escalation would result in a humanitarian disaster. The area is home to 2.3 million people, almost half of them IDPs, who would have had nowhere to flee because Turkey has shut its border.

Idlib is the largest host of displaced people in the country relative to population size, both in and outside camps, and repeated displacement within the governorate is commonplace. Aid agencies on the ground report that families have been displaced an average of three or four times, and some as many as a dozen times. Many may have chosen to flee abroad had Turkey not closed its border. The proliferation of armed groups has further destabilised the region, with occasional clashes between factions and criminality disrupting daily life and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Turkey and Russia brokered an agreement on 17 September to establish a demilitarised zone between 14 and 19 kilometres wide along the contact line and extending into north-eastern areas of rural Latakia. Turkish military police have been stationed to monitor...
compliance, which includes the withdrawal of all heavy weaponry. The agreement may have averted a humanitarian disaster for now, but reports of violations by all parties are a cause for concern. The initial stability it has introduced should be built on to establish a more lasting solution which genuinely protects Idlib’s civilians.

Many of the IDPs who fled their homes in 2018 have since returned to their areas of origin, particularly in the south. About 695,000 people have been reported to have returned to their homes in 2018. However, given the extent of the damage caused by the fighting, ongoing insecurity and lack of basic services and livelihood opportunities, it is unclear how many of these will have reached durable solutions. An unknown number have been unwilling to return, preferring to wait and see what life will be like in their areas of origin under government control. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the security situation in the south has improved somewhat. Basic services are still lacking, however, particularly in rural Dara’a and Quneitra, and restrictions to humanitarian access means little aid has been delivered. Unemployment is also a problem, particularly for low-skilled workers and those suspected of being anti-government activists, ex-combatants or former officials in non-state armed groups. Many government employees who have not been directly affiliated with armed groups have reportedly returned to their jobs.

As the conflict apparently nears its end, important post-conflict questions remain. It is unclear who will fund the reconstruction of major urban centres such as Aleppo and Raqqa so that those displaced are able to return in safety and dignity. Nor is it clear how north-eastern Syria and Idlib governorate will be administered, a situation that has the potential to reignite conflict.

In a country where nearly half of the population has been displaced, managing the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs will be a huge challenge. Pressure should be put on the Syrian government to address its displacement crisis with comprehensive policies in line with the Guiding Principles to prevent the country from descending into conflict again.
Urban displacement driven by escalating conflict and insecurity

There was hope in 2017 of a decrease in fighting and displacement in Libya, but clashes escalated in several areas of the country in 2018. Fighting took place particularly in the urban centres of Tripoli, Derna and Sebha, triggering 70,000 new displacements. Around 221,000 people were living in displacement nationwide as of the end of year, suffering dire conditions and unable to return because of destroyed housing, ongoing insecurity and a lack of resources.\textsuperscript{104}

In Tripoli, the seat of the internationally recognised government, the deteriorating economic situation fuelled new conflict. Militias from outside the city attacked its southern neighbourhoods in late August, and the intense clashes continued until early October. The fighting was sparked by a push to gain greater control over economic institutions based on the perception that a small number of rival militias and interest groups in the capital have disproportionate access to the country’s wealth.\textsuperscript{105}

Almost 33,000 people were displaced as a result, and many others were trapped in their homes without access to basic goods and services. The Libyan Red Crescent received more than 2,000 calls from families asking to be evacuated, of whom only ten per cent had their request granted. The use of heavy weaponry caused severe damage to homes, roads, telecommunications and utilities infrastructure and health and education facilities. Most of those displaced sheltered with family or friends, though about 200 families sought refuge in five schools across Tripoli.\textsuperscript{106}

Libya continues to be the main point of departure for people attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Europe and a final destination for economic migrants from West Africa. Thus, the fighting also affected the lives of around 8,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers held in detention centres in the city. Humanitarian access to the areas affected by conflict was severely restricted, leaving thousands of detainees without food or water for several days.\textsuperscript{107} Hundreds more were evacuated to safer locations or simply released and left to find their own way to safety through the conflict zone. Others were pulled out of the detention centres by militias, who then forced them to take part in the hostilities.\textsuperscript{108}

The coastal city of Derna has been under siege by the Libyan National Army (LNA), linked to the authorities in the east of the country, since July 2017. It was controlled by a coalition of local fighters and Islamists known as the Derna Shura Council, and was the only city in the east resisting LNA control.\textsuperscript{109} A renewed offensive to take the city began in May 2018 and heavy fighting and shelling continued into June, triggering almost 24,000 new displacements. Electricity and water supplies were cut and the provision of basic services disrupted. Markets ran short of food and non-food items, and only one hospital was left working at severely reduced capacity. Entry points to the city were initially closed, hindering the delivery of life-saving assistance, but the authorities opened a humanitarian corridor and began allowing families to leave the city at the end of May.\textsuperscript{110}

Conflict in southern city of Sebha erupts periodically between the Tebu and Awlad Suleiman tribes over the control of smuggling and trafficking routes, and fighting in 2018 triggered almost 7,000 new displacements. Those who fled the southern and eastern districts of the city were initially housed in schools that were on holiday, but they have since been moved on to allow them to reopen.\textsuperscript{111} Civilians’ freedom of movement was also restricted and severe shortages of basic goods and services were reported.\textsuperscript{112} Very few reports mentioned the plight of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, but given that Sebha was named the world’s human traf-
ficking capital last year, they are very likely to have been affected. Assessments undertaken in Sebha’s districts report the presence of refugees and migrants in every assessed area. The violence in Sebha was further testament to the government’s lack of control over southern Libya. The region’s porous borders aggravate insecurity, allowing foreign armed groups to establish safe havens in the area, and facilitate the trafficking of people heading north. The combination of mounting lawlessness and deteriorating basic services mean conditions are dire for many residents in the south, including the displaced. IDPs in the area are in desperate need of adequate shelter, food and basic household items, but prevailing insecurity across the south means humanitarian access is sporadic at best. The internationally recognized government in Tripoli adopted the first package of economic reforms since the 2011 fall of Muammar Gaddafi in September 2018, but fighting over resources is likely to remain a central feature of the country’s crisis, particularly in coastal and urban areas where economic activity is concentrated. The government also recognizes the importance of improving security in the south, but the vastness of the territory makes doing so a daunting task with relatively little promise of a political dividend.

There is hope that presidential and parliamentary elections due to take place in 2019 may break Libya’s political gridlock. Yet divisions remain between the rival governments in the east and west, and national reconciliation conferences have been delayed, leaving the way open for fighting to continue. It will likely be some time before the country is safe, for Libyans and for those migrants and refugees who continue to pass through the country.
As in previous years, the East Asia and Pacific region accounted for most of the internal displacement associated with disasters recorded worldwide in 2018. Typhoons, monsoon rains and floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions triggered 9.3 million new displacements. From highly exposed countries such as the Philippines, China, Indonesia and Japan, to small island states and territories such as Guam, Northern Mariana Islands and Vanuatu, the impacts varied significantly across the vast region.

The Philippines alone recorded 3.8 million new displacements associated with disasters, more than any other country worldwide. Pre-emptive evacuations organised by the government to mitigate the impacts of typhoons between July and December accounted for a significant portion. The most powerful, typhoon Mangkhut, triggered 1.6 million new displacements or around 40 per cent of the national total. Monsoon flooding, volcanic eruptions and landslides also triggered displacements during the year.119

Armed conflict between the Filipino military and Islamist groups, and other violence including clan feuds and land disputes, triggered 188,000 new displacements in 2018, the majority in Mindanao region. There was also a positive development in efforts to bring peace to the region with the signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in July. The new legislation is intended to address some of the longstanding grievances that have fuelled conflict in Mindanao for decades.120

There were 301,000 people living in displacement as a result of conflict in the Philippines as of the end of the 2018. They include around 65,000 in Marawi who have been unable to return to their homes more than a year after the country’s military retook the city from affiliates of ISIL, because of the extent of the damage and presence of unexploded ordnance (see Philippines spotlight, p.32).

Almost 3.8 million new displacements associated with disasters were recorded in China, particularly in southeastern provinces that were hit by typhoons. Despite the fact that some of the storms were severe, including the category five typhoon Maria, disaster management authorities successfully reduced the risk of loss of life by evacuating people from high-risk areas. China and the Philippines between them accounted for much of the increase in both regional and global figures for disaster displacement in the year.

Most of the 853,000 new displacements associated with disasters recorded in Indonesia were triggered by geophysical events. A number of earthquakes struck the island of Lombok in July and August, triggering 445,000 new displacements, and an earthquake and tsunami in Central Sulawesi province a month later triggered 248,000. The event caused soil liquefaction and extensive damage and destruction of housing, particularly in the coastal city of Palu and the surrounding area. At least 1,754 people were killed. Another tsunami following a volcanic eruption in the Sunda Strait resulted
in 47,000 new displacements in Lampung province in December.

In Myanmar, monsoon rains and flooding triggered most of the 298,000 new disaster displacements recorded during the year. All fourteen of the country's states and regions were affected, and a dam breach caused by a swollen river in Bago region in August triggered almost 79,000 new displacements. Around 42,000 associated with conflict and violence were also recorded. Many of these were triggered by an escalation in fighting between the military and the Kachin Independence Army in Kachin and northern Shan states. Inter-ethnic violence over disputed resource-rich areas of Shan state also triggered displacement, as did other events in Karen, Chin and Rakhine states.

Around 146,000 new displacements were recorded in Japan, the result of typhoons, storms, monsoon rains and floods, earthquakes and landslides. The country was hit by an unusually high number of disasters in 2018 and though it is generally well prepared, some weaknesses in local disaster risk management and early warning systems were exposed, particularly in terms of ensuring citizens' responsiveness (see Japan spotlight, p.30).

In the Pacific, an earthquake triggered more than 58,000 new displacements in Papua New Guinea. Volcanic activity triggered most of the 13,000 recorded in Vanuatu and floods most of the 12,000 in Fiji. A series of deadly bushfires aggravated by record drought conditions in Australia caused significant damage and triggered around 10,000 new displacements.

A number of countries have made significant progress in reducing disaster displacement risk, and regional monitoring, preparedness and response initiatives have also been strengthened. Many countries including Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia have put disaster displacement high on their political agendas by developing and implementing disaster risk management laws and policies. Pre-emptive evacuations carried out by national and local authorities are among the measures which, while they cause displacement, save lives and reduce the impacts of disasters.

Some Pacific small island states have adapted their laws and policies to emerging climate change risks. Fiji, for example, has developed planned relocation guidelines that take into account future risk. Vanuatu also developed a national policy on displacement associated with climate change and disasters last year, an initiative that other countries facing similar challenges would do well to emulate.

URBAN PERSPECTIVES

The East Asia and Pacific region has undergone rapid urbanisation in recent decades. Often hailed as a success for reducing poverty and improving people’s access to markets and basic services, urban growth has also brought challenges, including inequality that fuels social tensions.

The expansion of the region’s cities has also increased disaster displacement risk, particularly in areas ill-planned to withstand hazards’ impacts. Many are located in the tropical cyclone belt and the Pacific Ring of Fire, which is the world’s most active seismic and volcanic zone. Given this degree of exposure, the combination of early warning systems and robust urban planning, building regulations and land management will be key to reducing risk as cities continue to expand.

IDMC’s global disaster displacement risk model suggests that an average of more than 5.4 million people are likely to be displaced by floods in the region in any given year in the future, the highest level of flood displacement risk globally (see Part 3). Many Pacific small island states and territories such as Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Palau rank among the highest in the world in terms of risk relative to population size. Many Pacific cities have expanded in recent years, including informal settlements on river banks and estuaries, peri-urban areas, waste disposal sites and mangrove swamps. This has increased not only exposure to hazards but also the vulnerability of populations and assets, which in turn drives up the risk and potential impacts of displacement.

The policy developments mentioned above point in the right direction, but it is important to strengthen capacity for implementation. Urban development planning that takes disaster and displacement risk into account will also be key, particularly given that East Asia and Pacific’s annual urban growth rate is projected to be three per cent, among the highest in the world.
Disaster evacuations and the importance of resilience

Located at the intersection of three tectonic plates and in the path of seasonal typhoons, Japan is prone to a range of hazards that have the potential to trigger large-scale displacement and cause significant damage to homes and infrastructure. Last year was no exception. Storms, floods, flash floods, landslides, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions triggered more than 146,000 new displacements.

The country has, however, developed significant resilience to the disasters natural hazards can cause. Most new displacements recorded were pre-emptive evictions, which are an effective measure to reduce loss of life when people are exposed to hazards. Japan’s ability to manage disaster risk via early warning systems and evacuation schemes is generally effective at reducing impacts, but last year showed that citizens are not always as responsive as they could be.

Disaster displacement events in 2018 ranged from two people displaced by a landslide in Oita prefecture in April to more than 30,000 by typhoon Prapiroon in early July. Less than three weeks after Prapiroon’s rains triggered widespread flooding and landslides in south-west Japan, the same region was struck by typhoon Jongdari. The government issued pre-emptive evacuation orders for Jongdari, but research conducted in Hiroshima city suggests that less than four per cent of people heeded them. Some of those who stayed put became trapped by landslides and rising floodwaters and more than 170 people died, making Jongdari Japan’s deadliest weather-related disaster in decades.

When typhoon Jebi hit in August, citizens’ responsiveness was similarly low. Japan’s Cabinet Office ordered around 30,000 people to evacuate, but studies conducted in Kobe prefecture after the disaster showed that less than 10 per cent had followed the order. Power cuts prevented some people from receiving the order, while others were unable to hear it over the sound of the wind and rain. In some areas the order to evacuate was issued after flooding had begun. Jebi was the most powerful typhoon to hit Japan in 25 years, and the magnitude of the disaster did help to raise awareness about the importance of pre-emptive evacuations among affected communities. Around half of the respondents in Kobe said they would evacuate next time if they received a similar order.

Evacuations associated with earthquakes appear to paint a very different picture. A pre-emptive order to evacuate issued to 100 people before a 6.6 magnitude earthquake that struck Hokkaido in September was heeded by 12,000. The earthquake triggered landslides that caused casualties and significant damage, including a power cut that affected 5.3 million people. The evacuation order was issued early enough, however, to allow people in the city of Sapporo to flee to safer areas before it struck. This suggests that the Japanese public is more sensitised to the dangers of earthquakes than those of flooding, in part perhaps because of the amount of media attention the former receive.

The government took steps to improve its disaster response in 2018 with the pre-positioning of supplies in evacuation centres, as opposed to sending them after the event at the request of municipal authorities. It also recognised the phenomenon of “at-home evacuees”, people who remain in their damaged homes after a disaster but use facilities at evacuation centres because of the disruption caused to the supply of water, electricity and other basic services. Some may also have...
to rely on humanitarian assistance for food and non-food items.\textsuperscript{144}

Others seek shelter outside officially designated evacuation areas, and these “self-evacuees” tend not to be included in disaster recovery efforts. Some people who evacuated by their own means during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, for example, faced significant challenges in accessing housing and other basic services earmarked for evacuees because they did not figure in official government records.\textsuperscript{145} Addressing the issue of at-home and self-evacuees would be an important step in ensuring that all displaced people are able to achieve durable solutions. Not having provisions for those who evacuate on their own can create inequalities in compensation mechanisms and increase the risk of protracted displacement.

The disasters that struck Japan in 2018 showed that even in a well-prepared country there is still room for improvement. With the very high level of exposure of people and assets to hazards, the country will need to continuously invest in reducing disaster risk further and responding more comprehensively to those displaced. A

A man in an evacuation centre in Okayama Prefecture, organised by the Japanese Red Cross. Photo: Japanese Red Cross Society, July 2018
PHILIPPINES

Solutions still a distant prospect in Marawi, one year on

Marawi, a majority Muslim city of 200,000 people, is the capital of Lanao del Sur province and the economic hub of the southern Philippines. Between May and October 2017, it was also the scene of the country’s longest urban conflict, during which more than 1,000 people were killed and 350,000 displaced. A year later, reconstruction of the city has begun and most people have returned. Around 65,000 remain displaced, however, of whom around 14,000 are still living in evacuation and transitional shelters.

The conflict erupted on 23 May 2017 when the Filipino security forces raided the home of the leader of the Abu Sayyaf group, a local affiliate of ISIL. The Maute Group, another local radical Islamist organisation and an Abu Sayyaf ally, was called in to provide reinforcement. The militants waged urban warfare unseen in the region but similar to that of ISIL in Mosul and other Iraqi and Syrian cities. They created a maze of improvised tunnels in the densely-built city centre to evade airstrikes, engaged the security forces and resisted a siege for five months. The city’s roads were choked with traffic during the first three days of the battle as residents attempted to get out. Between 80 and 90 per cent eventually fled, some of them on foot.

By the time the fighting was officially declared over, after the leaders of both Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group had been killed, the city had suffered extensive damage. The financial and business district, which accounted for 30 per cent of the urban area, was completely destroyed. The military escorted residents...
In April and May 2018, the Government of the Philippines allowed residents of Marawi City to visit their homes, which had been left in ruins after the five-month long conflict. Photo © UNHCR/Alecs Ongcal, April 2018

In to retrieve what they could from the rubble of their homes before the area was cordoned off. It remains uninhabitable, and reconstruction will not begin until the debris has been cleared and roads rebuilt, which is expected to take at least 18 months.\textsuperscript{149}

As many as 70 per cent of those displaced, or more than 270,000 people, were thought to have returned as of the end of 2018.\textsuperscript{150} In some areas deemed habitable, however, returnees still have no electricity or running water, nor access to education or livelihood opportunities, which prevents them from rebuilding their lives.\textsuperscript{151} Others have had to go back to evacuation centres while they wait for their homes to be repaired. The majority of those still displaced are living with family or friends, but almost 2,000 families live in 21 government-run evacuation centres where they face sanitation and waste management issues.\textsuperscript{152}

The government intends to transfer the people still living in evacuation centres to temporary shelters, but those already transferred say that families of six or more members have had to share a single room, which barely constitutes an improvement on their previous conditions.\textsuperscript{153} Food security is another major concern, because many IDPs have been unable to find work since they fled. Lanao del Sur was the country’s poorest province even before the fighting, and malnutrition levels were among the highest with half of its young population affected.\textsuperscript{154}

Resolving displacement in cities decimated by urban warfare is a long and complex process that governments in many regions are grappling with. The cost of rebuilding Marawi has been put at around $1.2 billion, of which the international community had pledged around $670 million as of November 2018.\textsuperscript{155} Reconstruction is likely to take years, however, leaving thousands of people displaced in the meantime. Their protracted displacement has the potential to fuel further conflict as the young and working-age, in particular, may grow tired of slow and inadequate progress. A transparent reconstruction process that includes community consultation will be key to quelling residents’ fears and frustration.
Large-scale displacement in South Asia was once again triggered by a series of floods, storms and droughts as well as unresolved conflicts and violence. Countries in the region continue to struggle with managing seasonal and recurring weather-related extreme events, resulting in more than 3 3 million new displacements. In addition to tropical storms and floods in India and Pakistan, the monsoon season took a heavy toll in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as did drought in Afghanistan. New waves of conflict and violence in India and Pakistan and ongoing fighting in Afghanistan triggered around 544,000 new displacements.

India accounted for most of the region’s new displacements. Its overall total of 2.8 million was among the highest in the world, of which nearly 2.7 million were triggered by disasters across 15 states. The country was particularly hard-hit by the monsoon season, when flooding devastated the south-western state of Kerala. Almost 1.5 million new displacements were recorded in Kerala in what were described as the worst floods in a century. Cyclone Titli struck Orissa and Andhra Pradesh states in October, triggering 400,000 new displacements, and cyclone Gaja hit Tamil Nadu in November, triggering 249,000.157

More than 160,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Communal violence in Kashmir and West Bengal cast violence in Maharashtra and political violence in Tripura also triggered small-scale displacement (see India spotlight, p.38).

Years of successive dry spells and below average rainfall in Afghanistan led to drought conditions in 2018, particularly in the rural north-west of the country. More than 371,000 new displacements were recorded as people’s livelihoods became unviable and their living conditions untenable. Conflict triggered roughly the same number, leaving around 2.6 million people living in displacement as of the end of the year, one of the highest figures in the world (see Afghanistan spotlight, p.36).

Afghanistan’s four-decade conflict involves not only the country’s military, international forces, the Taliban and ISIL, but also various ethnic, communal and Islamist militias. Exact numbers are hard to come by, but military operations by the government triggered a significant portion of the new conflict displacements recorded, with a total of 372,000.

Intercommunal violence triggered localised, small-scale displacement in neighbouring Pakistan, but this is not systematically reported on, so the figure of 1,800 is likely to be a significant underestimate. Numbers are not available for Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, but frequent ceasefire violations and cross-border shelling in 2018 strongly suggest that displacement must have taken place. For disasters, more than 2,100 new displacements were recorded, mainly triggered by localised floods.

The monsoon season also brought significant flooding to both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Around 75,000 new displacements were recorded in Sri Lanka in the second half of May, and nearly 16,000 in the first
half of October, though the latter figure is likely to be conservative. Riverine floods in Bangladesh triggered 12,000 new displacements in Moulvibazar district and riverbank erosion around 44,000 in Shariatpur, mainly in September. Flooding was also reported in Cox’s Bazar district, which is currently home to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees who have fled violence in Myanmar.

While relatively few new displacements associated with floods were recorded in Bangladesh in 2018, IDMC’s flood displacement risk model shows that the country has the third-highest flood displacement risk in the world. Around 1.8 million people are likely to be displaced at any given year in the future, with more than 96 per cent of the risk concentrated in urban and peri-urban areas (see Part 3).

Urban perspectives

Rural to urban migration and natural population growth in the region’s towns and cities give South Asia one of the highest annual urbanisation rates in the world at 2.5 per cent. This does not, however, equate with economic growth and higher levels of human development. Major cities such as Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata in India, Dhaka in Bangladesh and Karachi in Pakistan are among the most densely populated in the world, but high numbers of people live in informal settlements in peri-urban areas that lack adequate housing, infrastructure and services. Recent data shows 30 per cent of the urban population across the region as living in informal settlements.

Urban infrastructure development is unable to keep up with the pace of population growth in the region. In countries such as India, complex political structures, capacity gaps, corruption and funding shortfalls, hamper infrastructure development as well as basic service provision. Such challenges generate widespread and growing socioeconomic inequality.

Many urban plans are devised without involving locals in decision-making, and new investments in infrastructure and the upgrade of informal settlements have the potential to push the most vulnerable into displacement and isolate them from their livelihoods. That said, in-situ initiatives to upgrade informal and unserved settlements in several Indian cities have been effective in reducing the risk of evictions and displacement.

As in the rest of the world, the true scale of urban internal displacement in South Asia is essentially unknown, which makes it difficult to estimate how the phenomenon is contributing to urbanisation trends. The evidence that is available, however, suggests that disasters, climate change impacts and conflict trigger displacement both to and within urban areas. A study conducted in Bangladesh suggests that a significant proportion of people who live in informal urban settlements may have been displaced from rural areas by riverbank erosion, a major hazard in the country, projected to increase in the coming years.

IDPs are also drawn to urban areas by the prospect of better livelihood and income-generating opportunities. Many, however, struggle to adapt and find themselves living in deepening poverty. They are also vulnerable to secondary displacement triggered by urban disasters and evictions.

The Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, has been identified as the country’s main destination for people fleeing disasters and climate change impacts, and local authorities have been unable to cope with the influx. New approaches to develop the potential of secondary cities to host IDPs, however, hold the promise of alternative durable solutions and a reduction in the risk of repeated displacement.

People who flee to urban areas to escape conflict face similar challenges to those displaced by disasters. IDPs in the Afghan capital of Kabul struggle to secure tenure over adequate housing, which puts them at constant risk of secondary displacement, mainly in the form of evictions. Kabul’s IDPs tend to have significant protection concerns and often live in sub-standard housing in marginalised areas of the city. Policy initiatives such a 2006 white paper on tenure security and community-based upgrading and a 2013 policy on the upgrading of informal settlements point in the right direction, but adoption and implementation remain a challenge.

South Asia’s high urbanisation rate presents both major challenges and opportunities. The meaningful participation and engagement of local communities in urban planning and development will be paramount if the region is to meet sustainable development targets under international frameworks and reduce the risk of future displacement.
SPOTLIGHT

AFGHANISTAN

Drought displaced as many as conflict

Afghanistan has been plagued by four decades of armed conflict, undermining development efforts across the country and triggering displacement every year. In 2018, drought added to the existing crisis and triggered more than 371,000 new displacements, a similar number to those associated with conflict. After four years of below average rainfall in the north-western provinces of Badghis, Ghor and Herat, the situation became critical as a lack of rain and snow melt caused crops to fail and livestock to perish. Large numbers of people began to move from rural to urban areas in April, in search of livelihood opportunities, basic services and humanitarian aid.

In reality, the drivers of displacement in Afghanistan are intertwined. The impact of the drought was the final straw for many families who had been living in rural areas underserviced after years of armed conflict. Their resources and coping mechanisms had been eroded over time, and 2018 marked a tipping point when conditions became unbearable, leading to the country’s largest disaster-related displacement in at least a decade.

North-west Afghanistan is primarily rural, and the drought has decimated the livelihoods of tens of thousands of households dependent on livestock and rain-fed agriculture. Eighty-four per cent of landowners surveyed in IDPs’ areas of origin said production was down by half compared with 2017. Those who owned livestock said they had lost almost all of their poultry, camels and horses and 90 per cent of their large and small ruminants. Respondents also said the lack of water for domestic use was a significant concern. Rain-filled reservoirs are used not only for irrigation but also for drinking water, because groundwater from hand pumps and wells is unpotable.

As of September 2018, more than 250,000 IDPs were living in scattered informal camps on the outskirts of Qala-e-Naw and Herat, the capitals of Badghis and Herat provinces, respectively. Conditions in the camps are deplorable and protection issues rife. Shelters are overcrowded and provide little privacy, and with the onset of winter and sub-zero temperatures members of different families were huddled together in one tent in an effort to keep warm. People are destitute and have resorted to harmful coping mechanisms, including child labour and early marriage. There were 161 reported cases of child marriage in Herat and Badghis provinces between July and October 2018.

There is a misconception that people who flee slow-onset disasters have time to pack their belongings and organise their departure, putting them in a better position than those displaced by sudden-onset disasters or conflict. The situation in Afghanistan disproves this. People fleeing the drought had already sold many of their assets and left their areas of origin with almost nothing.

Humanitarian response teams in the country have extensive experience in dealing with displacement triggered by conflict, which affects the entire country but tends to be localised and relatively small-scale. Their usual response mechanisms have not been able to cope with the mass movements concentrated in the north-west of the country associated with the drought. Some humanitarians may also have been influenced by the reluctance of host communities and authorities to allow IDPs to settle in their areas, due in part to ethnic and tribal differences, but also security concerns; this caused delays in the initial response to the displaced. Given that the drought has predominantly affected areas that are contested or beyond government control, authorities fear the new arrivals may include members of non-state armed groups.

The response has been further complicated by the fact that people living in protracted displacement...
As winter approached in Afghanistan, many families displaced by drought and conflict were still living in makeshift tents. Photo: NRC/Enayatullah Azad, November 2018

and vulnerable host community members have set up makeshift shelters among the new IDPs in an attempt to secure humanitarian assistance, making it challenging for humanitarians to target the most vulnerable recently displaced households. As drought is a slow-onset phenomenon, it is also unclear who has the responsibility to respond: at the outset of the drought-induced displacement crisis, there was much debate about which agencies had the mandate to respond, with many humanitarian agencies suggesting that the emphasis of the response should be on development in the places of origin, and thereby fall to development agencies rather than humanitarians.

Despite the reticence of local authorities and hosts to let IDPs settle, many intend to stay. Only about one per cent of IDPs interviewed in Herat and eight per cent in Badghis said they would consider an assisted voluntary return, and 71 per cent in Herat said they would not consider returning regardless of the assistance on offer. They cite factors such as insecurity, lack of food and livelihoods, and poor access to water and basic services as reasons for not wanting to return to their places of origin.

This raises the question of how to secure suitable, long-term housing, land and livelihoods for people displaced by the drought. Most have pitched their shelters on private land where landlords only grudgingly accept their presence, which leaves them vulnerable to eviction. The Afghan Land Authority has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation to allocate state-owned land to IDPs for five years, but this is on the assumption that they will eventually return to their areas of origin so does not constitute a durable solution.

The Afghan government is already struggling to facilitate durable solutions for the 2.6 million people displaced by conflict in the country. Strong political will and substantial support from the international community will be needed to make real progress towards durable solutions for those displaced by conflict and drought in the country.
Monsoon and conflict displaced millions

India is not unfamiliar with heavy monsoon rains and floods, but the 2018 season was particularly intense. Above average rainfall triggered flooding and landslides nationwide between June and August. Tropical cyclones also struck the country’s east coast between October and December, severely damaging homes and affecting millions of people in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and Tamil Nadu and Puducherry territory. Disasters triggered as many as 2.7 million new displacements during the year, nearly double the figure for 2017. The poverty and vulnerability of many of the households affected was a significant factor in aggravating the losses, damage and displacement caused.

The monsoon season was the world’s second largest disaster displacement event in 2018 after typhoon Mangkhut, triggering almost two million displacements between May and October. The impacts were widespread, but most media attention focussed on the state of Kerala, where severe flooding in 13 out of 14 districts was described as the worst in a century.

The Kerala floods accounted for more than half of India’s new displacements in 2018. As many as 1.5 million people were recorded as displaced in about 5,600 camps set up by the authorities. That figure is a significant underestimate of the overall scale of displacement, given that an unknown number of IDPs stayed with friends and family or in rented accommodation.

By the end of the monsoon season, as many as 2,000 homes had been destroyed and as many as 22,000 damaged, hampering return for many people.

Three cyclones struck India’s eastern seaboard during the year. Cyclone Titli triggered around 300,000 pre-emptive evacuations in Odisha and around 100,000 displacements in Andhra Pradesh in October, the latter figure calculated using housing destruction as a proxy. Communities living in affected coastal areas tended to live in mud and bamboo homes or dwellings with corrugated tin sheets, which were unable to withstand the storm. When cyclone Phethai hit two months later, many were still living in damaged homes. Phethai triggered as many as 32,000 displacements in the two states in December. Cyclone Gaja triggered 249,000 displacements in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry in November. It also destroyed homes and livelihoods, potentially hindering return for many of those displaced.

Though dwarfed in scale, conflict also triggered displacement in India in 2018. Cross-border shelling led to more than 160,000 displacements in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Heavy fire from Pakistani forces triggered about 54,000 in January, when people deserted a number of border villages, and as many as 100,000 from Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts in May.

The intensity of cross-border shelling and subsequent displacement has increased in recent years, but it repeats past patterns of short-term but recurring movements that disrupt daily life, education and the provision of other basic services.

The events of 2018 serve as a reminder that displacement is an everyday reality in India, and one which has the potential to drag down the country’s emerging economy if measures to reduce displacement risk are not taken. The authorities have made commendable efforts in improving early warning and disaster management systems, but they continue to face challenges when it comes to preventing and responding to crises. The last 12 months also showed that poverty and vulnerability, which are key drivers of risk, need to be better addressed. Given ever more frequent and intense weather events and continuing tensions along the country’s disputed border with Pakistan, these challenges may only get more severe in the future.
Weather-related disasters once again impacted several countries in the Americas in 2018. In addition, unresolved conflict, criminal violence and social and economic crises continued to push people to flee. Disasters triggered the majority of new displacements in the region, accounting for around 1.7 million. In addition, about 404,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded.

Hurricanes and wildfires triggered more than 1.2 million new displacements in the United States, the highest figure in the region. Florida was struck by two major hurricanes during the year. Hurricane Florence triggered 464,000 new displacements in August, and hurricane Michael another 375,000 in October. Unprecedented and devastating wildfires triggered 354,000 new displacements in California in the second half of the year, accounting for around 30 per cent of the total new displacements in the US (see United States spotlight, p.42).

Confrontations between different armed groups, intimidation and extorsion triggered 145,000 new displacements in Colombia in 2018, an increase compared with previous years. The government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement in 2016, but to date the country’s military has been unable to secure areas the demobilised guerrilla group used to control. The power vacuum has been filled by other armed groups vying for control of land, illegal mining and drug plantations and trafficking routes. Fighting between two smaller guerrilla groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), triggered most of the new displacements.

Norte de Santander was the worst affected department. Around 30,000 new displacements were recorded, the highest figure since 2002 and 20 per cent of the national total for last year. The department also shares a border with Venezuela, and its capital Cúcuta has been the main crossing point for refugees and migrants fleeing Venezuela’s political and economic crisis (see Colombia spotlight, p.44).

More than 67,000 new displacements associated with disasters were also recorded in Colombia. Floods in the northern department of Antioquia led to more than 26,000 evacuations in April and May, when construction failures at the Ituango hydroelectric complex, Colombia’s largest and one of its most controversial development projects combined with rising waters upstream, raising fears the dam would burst.190 Torrential rains caused several rivers to break their banks in the southern department of Putumayo triggering more than 30,000 in August.

Around three million people have been recorded as fleeing Venezuela in the past 18 months, but the government’s unwillingness to acknowledge its population’s growing humanitarian needs means solid information about any internal displacement is scarce.191 Evidence suggests that it has been significant, however, particularly toward border areas as people seek easier
access to basic services in Colombian and Brazilian border towns. Venezuela’s crisis escalated significantly in 2018 as food shortages increased and the provision of basic services including electricity and healthcare deteriorated.

At least 420 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in Ecuador, as the presence of FARC dissidents and drug trafficking groups such as the Mexican Sinaloa cartel in the province of Esmeraldas forced people to flee. Esmeraldas is a strategic location for these groups because it shares sea and land borders with Tumaco, the largest coca-producing municipality in Colombia. Joint military operations have taken place on both sides of the border and the emerging situation shows that drug production and trafficking remain significant drivers of conflict, instability and displacement in the region.

Violence associated with the drug trade also triggered at least 11,000 new displacements in Mexico, where the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán, Oaxaca and Sinaloa were worst affected. Figures on internal displacement and policies to address it are far from comprehensive, but the modification of the country’s General Victims Law to include IDPs as a vulnerable group and the Senate proposition to establish a specific law on IDP protection in 2018 are positive steps forward.

Mexico also saw 13,000 new displacements triggered by hurricane Willa, which tracked across six states with wind speeds of up to 220 kilometres an hour in November. Many of these displacements can be attributed to evacuations organised by the authorities as a result of the advanced disaster risk management systems in place in the country.

In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which make up the Northern Triangle of Central America, high levels of violence, much of it urban, continued to trigger displacement. Gang activity, structural violence, generalised insecurity, heavy-handed state security responses, corruption and a culture of impunity have all been identified as drivers of internal and cross-border displacement in the region.

Around 246,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in El Salvador and 950 in Honduras. Ongoing violence in Guatemala
suggests that displacement has taken place there too, but not enough data is available to compile an estimate. Of the three countries, not all recognise internal displacement associated with violence let alone collect data on it systematically, effectively rendering the phenomenon all but invisible. It is clear, however, that many IDPs fail to find safety and security in their own country, leading to significant numbers of cross-border movements within and beyond the region. The caravans that gained momentum in 2018 are illustrative of this point.

Urban perspectives

Many countries in the Americas have undergone rapid urbanisation over the last 50 years, and with it came a concentration of economic development in and around large cities. Increasing trade and employment opportunities have drawn economic migrants from rural areas and secondary and less economically active cities toward capitals and other major urban centres. Internal displacement has tended to follow similar patterns. These influxes have combined with natural urban demographic growth to make the Americas the most urbanised region in the world, with around 80 per cent of its population living in towns and cities.

Its urban centres are characterised by the concentration of wealth in specific pockets and among specific groups, creating socioeconomic and spatial inequalities that drive urban poverty, segregation and marginalisation. Many poor people, including IDPs, live in rapidly expanding but unplanned, unregulated and underserved settlements in peri-urban areas.

This issue is among the region’s main urban challenges. Poorly planned urban development in the US has increased disaster risk in many cities, and evidence shows that disasters disproportionately affect poor households living in exposed areas, often leading to their displacement. Estimates also suggest that more than 20 per cent of Latin America’s urban population live in unregulated and underserved settlements, many of them built in hazard-prone and often insecure areas. This puts the urban poor at particularly high risk of displacement triggered by disasters, criminal violence and evictions.

Many of the region’s cities rank among the most dangerous in the world, and cases of individuals and families being forced to flee targeted and generalised gang violence have been documented. Violence perpetrated by criminal groups associated with drug trafficking in Mexico has triggered displacement in many cities, including Ciudad Juárez, Culiacan and Tijuana. Direct and indirect security threats have also been observed to trigger intra-urban displacement, in which people move from one neighbourhood to another, in cities including San Salvador in El Salvador and Medellin in Colombia (see Medellin and San Salvador spotlight, p. 81). The scale and dynamics of urban displacement associated with criminal violence, however, remain poorly captured and understood across the region.

Some countries have implemented successful urban poverty reduction measures, particularly by upgrading informal settlements. Many initiatives in Brazil have combined physical and architectural with social and participatory components to prevent evictions and displacement. Urban regeneration projects in Colombia that combine improved transport, security and social support have benefited hundreds of thousands of poor urban dwellers, including IDPs living in marginalised peri-urban areas. Disaster risk reduction initiatives have also helped to mitigate displacement risk in cities such as Santa Fe in Argentina, Montego Bay in Jamaica and Lima in Peru.

Cities in the Americas will play an ever-greater role in supporting durable solutions and reducing the risk of displacement. Robust urban planning with a focus on risk reduction and conflict prevention will be vital if its triggers and drivers are to be addressed and its impacts reduced.
California wildfires: urban expansion and the risk of displacement

The western US state of California is highly prone to wildfires. In recent years, the combination of climate change and people’s increased vulnerability and exposure to hazards made the wildfire seasons longer and more destructive. The extension of the two long seasons, the first spanning from June to September and the other from October to April, has the potential of turning wildfires into a year-round threat. Prolonged drought, higher temperatures, stronger winds and the overuse of water for agriculture have caused significant harm to local ecosystems, leaving forests tinder-dry and littered with dead wood. The increasing housing stock in the wildland-urban interface, where housing meets and intermingles with wildland vegetation, also means ever more homes are exposed to fire risk, which in turn increases the risk of displacement.

The state experienced the deadliest and most destructive outbreak of wildfires in its history in the second half of 2018, burning about 355,000 hectares of land, four times the annual average for the past five years. More than 100 people are thought to have died. At least 22 wildfires triggered over 354,000 new displacements, accounting for almost 30 per cent of the total new displacements recorded in the United States last year. The Carr, Holy and Mendocino Complex fires, named after the places where they started, forced the evacuation of over 90,000 people in July and August, and during the Woolsey and Camp fires a further 235,000 people in November.

Camp fire alone killed 85 people, displaced at least 53,000 and destroyed almost 14,000 homes. It burnt 62,000 hectares of land and caused between $11 and $13 billion in commercial and residential losses. It was not the largest fire. Mendocino Complex burned almost four times the area. Nor was it unique in how fast it spread. The Tubbs fire in 2017 moved at similar speeds. What set Camp fire apart and made it the deadliest and most destructive fire in California’s history was what happened in Paradise, a town which lay in its path.

Paradise, a picturesque town in Butte county nestled in the Sierra Nevada foothills, had a large percentage of its homes in the wildland-urban interface, increasing the town and its residents’ exposure and vulnerability to wildfires. Within a few hours of taking hold, the fire had spread and destroyed most of the town, displacing about 30,000 people. It was an example of urban conflagration, a phenomenon last seen more than a century ago in which a fire leaps from structure to structure igniting them as it goes.

Since the 1906 San Francisco fire, urban design and development have included better materials and more defensible spaces, space between buildings and grass, trees or shrub, to prevent fire from spreading quickly. Since the 1990s, however, millions of homes have been built in undeveloped areas on the fringes of towns and cities. This has increased the interface between wilderness and urban areas, and the trend is set to continue as ever more people move to such places to live closer to nature and reduce living costs.

If future urban conflagrations are to be prevented, homes in the wildland-urban interface will have to be built with more fire-retardant materials and larger defensible spaces between them to slow the spread of fires. The California Board of Forestry and Fire Protection recommends that homes have between 30 and 100 feet (10 to 30 metres) of defensible space, but without...
state enforcement of regulations on private property, such guidelines are more often than not ignored.\textsuperscript{223}

In an area that was already experiencing a housing shortage, Camp fire left thousands of people homeless. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has dispersed millions of dollars in assistance to those who lost their homes, but many of those displaced still struggle to find somewhere to live locally. FEMA is encouraging people to look for housing in Sacramento, 135 kilometres away, and further afield, but this would disconnect people from their livelihoods and social networks.\textsuperscript{224} The lack of available and affordable housing in the area will inevitably affect those with fewer resources the most.

The 2018 wildfire season in California demonstrates how climate change and urban expansion have combined to intensify fires, alter their patterns and extend the seasons. Average temperatures will continue to rise and populations living in the wildland-urban interface to grow, exposing more people to the risk of displacement. The disaster in Paradise offers an example of what the future may hold if authorities do not enforce urban planning legislation and strengthen disaster prevention and response.\textsuperscript{225}
COLOMBIA

Norte de Santander, where two displacement crises converge

Two displacement crises converged in Colombia in 2018. The one that has attracted by far the most media attention had its origins in neighbouring Venezuela, where more than 3.4 million people are thought to have fled the country to escape economic meltdown and hyperinflation, increasing criminality and human rights abuses, worsening food shortages and deteriorating provision of goods and services. Colombia has received more than half of Venezuela’s refugees and migrants. Some have continued their journey onward to Ecuador and elsewhere in the region, but more than a million have stayed in the country. Between 300,000 and 500,000 Colombians have also returned from Venezuela since the start of the crisis.

These events have diverted the international community’s attention and resources away from ongoing internal displacement in Colombia. Many aid providers now dedicate less than 30 per cent of their resources to the issue. Despite the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the FARC, the number of new displacements associated with conflict and violence increased in 2018 compared with the previous year to more than 145,000. In addition, 5.8 million people remain displaced in Colombia as of the end of the year.

The situation in Norte de Santander department, which borders Venezuela, is of particular concern. Around 30,000 new internal displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in 2018, the highest figure since 2002. Within the department, the Catatumbo region has been particularly hard hit. Once a FARC stronghold, the territory has since been retaken by the ELN and the EPL, two other guerrilla groups which have been present in the area for decades. FARC dissidents and other armed groups have also joined the fray.

Armed clashes intensified after the breakdown of an agreement between these groups on illegal businesses, including drug trafficking. Not only did coca cultivation in Catatumbo increase by 145 per cent between 2015 and 2017, but the expansion of the drug trade combined with the reconfiguration of conflict has led to a growing number of attacks against civilians. At least 31 social leaders were assassinated in Norte de Santander in 2018, out of a national total of 172.

Fighting between ELN and EPL in January and March restricted the movement of almost 18,000 civilians, whose access to basic goods, livelihoods and health services was also impeded. Humanitarian organisations struggled to reach those affected. Children’s education was also disrupted when 80 schools had to suspend classes because of violence and the presence of landmines.

The accompanying influx of Venezuelans risks undermining livelihood opportunities for the department’s IDPs and poor host communities. The situation in the capital, Cúcuta, highlights some of the challenges associated with the combination of internal and cross-border movements. Not only is it a destination for IDPs fleeing conflict and violence in rural areas of the department. It is also the busiest border crossing between Colombia and Venezuela, and hosts more Venezuelans than any
other municipality in the country. Thousands cross the border every day in search of food, medicine and basic services. Hospitals and other social service providers struggle to meet the growing population’s basic needs, and local authorities are close to overwhelmed.

Cúcuta has the highest unemployment rate in the country, reaching 15.8 per cent between September and November 2018. It also has the highest participation rate for informal labour, at more than 68 per cent of the workforce. The influx of Venezuelans has increased competition for this type of work. There are few alternatives and some IDPs report finding it harder to secure employment. The integration of Venezuelans into the workforce is well recognised as an unprecedented challenge for Colombia.

This, in turn, has led to a rise in xenophobia toward Venezuelans. Threatening leaflets have been circulated in Cúcuta, Molotov cocktails have been thrown at places where they live and they have been targeted for robbery and extortion. The lack of opportunities and increasingly hostile environment have led some who cross the border into the city to move on directly elsewhere in Colombia, or further afield to Ecuador, Peru and Chile. International humanitarian organisations, government agencies and the private sector have introduced initiatives to tackle xenophobia and refocus attention on the true priorities of the region’s unprecedented displacement crisis.

The government in Bogota has adopted an open and supportive approach to the influx of Venezuelans, of whom as many as 770,000 entered Colombia in 2018. In a spirit of reciprocity, it has acknowledged that in the past, Colombians have flowed into Venezuela in search of better opportunities or to escape conflict and violence. More than 574,000 Venezuelans were officially registered in Colombia as of February 2019, 240,000 were in process of registering and 218,000 had no legal status. Supporting these refugees and migrants is rightly a priority in the region, but doing so should not be at the expense of those internally displaced, particularly at a time when peacebuilding and reconciliation are key priorities in Colombia.
Every year, Europe and Central Asia have lower numbers of new displacement than other regions and fewer people living in displacement. However, a total of 53,000 new displacements were still recorded in 2018, of which 41,000 were associated with disasters and more than 12,000 with conflict. Almost 2.9 million people were living in internal displacement as of the end of the year, the result of old and unresolved conflicts and territorial disputes in several countries.

The latter figure includes 800,000 in Ukraine, where the country’s conflict entered its fifth year. New displacements were recorded in October when 12,000 people were evacuated following an explosion at an ammunition depot east of Kyiv, thought by the government to have been an act of sabotage.247 The majority were able to return home two weeks later. Around 200 new displacements were also recorded in settlements along the contact line, where ceasefire violations including shelling continue.

Around 344,000 people were living in protracted displacement in Azerbaijan as a result of the country’s unresolved conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. An additional 301,000 IDPs were estimated to have made partial progress towards durable solutions, thanks to the government’s efforts to relocate them into temporary housing. In Georgia, 293,000 people remain displaced because of longstanding territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similar conditions were faced by around 228,000 people in Cyprus, who remain displaced as a consequence of the deadlock between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot authorities over the status of the north of the island. Many of Europe’s IDPs have been living in displacement for 15 years or more.

There is no up-to-date information about displacement in Turkey, but renewed fighting between the government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2015 and subsequent security operations triggered hundreds of thousands of displacements in the south-east of the country. In 2018 the government began building new homes in the region as part of an urban renewal project and to compensate victims of the conflict. Around 25,000 homes are thought to have been built to date, but it is unclear who the beneficiaries will be. Some of the housing offered to IDPs for compensation are far from city centres, pulling them away from their livelihoods and social networks.248 Several people who remained in their homes in areas affected by the conflict, such as in the historic Sur district of Diyarbakir, have also been evicted to make way for regeneration initiatives.249

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia accounted for an important share of the region’s new displacements associated with disasters. Days of heavy rain caused flooding in Tajikistan’s southern province of Khatlon in May, triggering more than 5,400 new displacements
Landslides in the Jalal-Abad region of Kyrgyzstan triggered almost 4,700 new displacements in April, and floods 1,500 in the Russian republics of Altai, Tuva and Khakassia in March.

Storms and floods triggered at least 5,400 new displacements in France, including 1,500 in the Ile-de-France area around Paris when the banks of the river Seine burst in January. A riverine flood in the Piave basin in Italy led to 1,300 new displacements in October, and flash flooding and storm surges pushed a similar number out of their homes in Greece in late September when a storm struck the island of Evia and the southern Peloponnese peninsula.

A short winter, warm spring and record-breaking temperatures and below average rainfall in the summer led to one of Europe’s most destructive wildfire seasons in recent years. Approximately 3,000 homes were destroyed in the Greek region of Attica in July, triggering more than 7,000 new displacements. Wildfires in the Valencia region in Spain triggered 2,600 in August.

The European parliament and Council of Europe approved plans in December 2018 to improve the EU’s management of disaster risk. The scheme, known as rescEU, will create a reserve of civil protection capacity to support national responses to the impacts of natural hazards and epidemics. Member states will also share national prevention and preparedness plans to identify and address possible gaps.

**Urban perspectives**

Europe and Central Asia is one of the most urbanised regions in the world. Seventy-two per cent of its population live in towns and cities. It is a diverse region, and as in other contexts, the drivers, triggers and impacts of urban displacement vary across it, making it difficult to generalise. From Spain to Uzbekistan, the way national and local authorities respond to the phenomenon also vary widely.

Many IDPs in Ukraine come from urban backgrounds, particularly cities such as Donetsk, Horlivka, Kramatorsk, Luhansk and Sloviansk. The country’s urban centres, including the capital Kyiv, have also been important destinations for those fleeing the conflict. Ukraine’s towns and cities offer better access to services and income-generating opportunities than rural areas, and many IDPs have managed to establish themselves in their new urban environments.

Housing, land and property rights are challenges, however, because Ukraine does not have a specific mechanism to process claims on properties affected by the conflict. Nor does Ukrainian legislation list IDPs as a group entitled to social housing. The local authorities in Bakhmut, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk have made efforts to address some of these issues with support from the international humanitarian community.

Local governments and international agencies have also worked together to address displacement in Kosovo, where policies have been put in place to help municipalities support sustainable returns for people displaced by conflict between 1998 and 2004. The Regulation on the Return of Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions in Kosovo, for example, calls for municipal action plans on the issue and emphasises the importance of IDPs’ socioeconomic integration based on their skills, gender, age and disabilities. It also aims to improve cooperation between national and local authorities to ensure return conditions are comparable across the territory.

In many parts of the region, however, urban IDPs face marginalisation and unequal access to basic services. Those in many post-Soviet countries receive lower quality service provision than host communities, particularly in terms of healthcare. The dynamics of urban displacement in Central Asian countries remain poorly understood, but evidence suggests that urban renewal and beautification projects have caused displacement in cities including Ashgabat in Turkmenistan, Dushanbe in Tajikistan and Tashkent in Uzbekistan.

The Council of Europe called in 2018 for renewed action by states and regional bodies to address internal displacement in the region. Among many recommendations, it highlighted the importance of addressing IDPs’ housing, land and property rights and providing humanitarian assistance to those living in protracted displacement. The role of local authorities and cities in unlocking solutions will be central to implement these national and regional commitments.
There were an estimated 41.3 million people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence in 55 countries as of the end of 2018, an increase of about 1.4 million on the previous year. Around 70 per cent were living in just ten countries (see Figure 7).

Ethiopia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria and Cameroon saw increasing numbers of people living in internal displacement. The end of year figures for countries such as Syria, Iraq, India and Myanmar fell, but they remain among the highest in the world.

As figures 7 and 8 show, displacement associated with conflict and violence is highly concentrated, mainly in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa that are in the throes of protracted crises.

These are conservative estimates that should be treated with caution. Each country and organisation that reports on the number of people living in displacement as of the end of the year faces numerous challenges and limitations when it comes to compiling their figures. They include inconsistent methodologies for collecting, analysing and sharing data, reporting biases, political considerations and out-of-date datasets.

The data for 2018 shows, however, that as in previous years, millions of IDPs around the world have been unable to achieve durable solutions, and the figures serve an important purpose in reminding us not just of their existence, but also of our collective failure to address their predicament.
FIGURE 8: People internally displaced by conflict and violence as of 31 December 2018
ASSESSING PROGRESS TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS

We have not included people reported to have made some progress toward achieving durable solutions in our global end-of-year estimate of the number of IDPs. To do so would have significantly risked inflating the figure and double counting anyone who was displaced more than once. This is because most of the data on internal displacement does not track the trajectory or conditions of individual IDPs or households over time, nor does it distinguish between new and repeated displacements. For example, once an IDP has returned or left a camp with the intention of returning, this is the last we hear of them. If they were to become displaced and counted again as an IDP we would end up accounting for them twice.

Rather than continue to account for these people in our global headcount, we have developed additional metrics that allow us to shine a light on their situations and underscore the need for governments and data providers to capture the number and conditions of people reported as having returned or achieved durable solutions (see Table 3, p.123). This is vital to prevent people who may still be extremely vulnerable from falling off the radar.

Total number of IDPs: The map on the previous page presents IDMC’s best estimate of the number of people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence as of 31 December 2018. It encompasses a wide range of situations across 55 countries, each of which is unique. The global total includes people who have been displaced for vastly different lengths of time and who face a wide array of challenges in their efforts to achieve durable solutions to their displacement. If IDMC is able to verify that returned IDPs or refugees are still effectively living in displacement, they are included in the global figure.

This was the case for 9,000 “returnees” in Iraq who, although they had returned to their areas of origin, were living in collective shelters, in displacement camps or with host families. As such they were, by IDMC’s definition, still displaced. They and a number of other groups whom IDMC still considers IDPs but its data providers no longer count as such are included in the global figure.

Number of IDPs who have reportedly returned, been resettled or locally integrated but who may still have vulnerabilities linked to their displacement: In some cases, IDMC’s sources provide evidence that those who have returned, resettled or begun to integrate into their host communities still face risks related to their displacement. We have therefore accounted for these movements as partial solutions.

In north-east Nigeria, for example, 86,000 people were reported as having returned home, but information on their shelter conditions suggested they had gone back to damaged or destroyed housing or were living in temporary structures in their original place of origin. In DRC, almost 1.5 million people were reported as having returned, but there was significant evidence to suggest that their situation was not sustainable given high levels of insecurity. In both cases, IDMC accounted for the returns as partial solutions.

Number of IDPs whose reported return, resettlement or local integration cannot be verified: In other cases, IDMC’s sources report only that people have left a shelter, camp, evacuation centre or host community, sometimes with the stated intention of returning home. No further information is available about what happens to them or the conditions they face after leaving. Characterising these movements as durable solutions would be both misleading and inconsistent with the Guiding Principles, which clearly state that IDPs who continue to face risks and vulnerabilities related to their displacement should still be considered internally displaced.

In Burundi, for example, the total number of IDPs reported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) declined by around 25,000 between 2017 and 2018 because security had improved. IDMC characterised this change as an unverified solution, because no further information about these people was available. In South Sudan, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and local media reported that 12,000 IDPs returned. IDMC accounted for these returns as an unverified solution since it could not obtain any information about the conditions to which people had returned.
Children run through “Bhola Slum” in the city of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Many people have been forced to relocate to the capital as a result of coastal erosion and other climate impacts in the country’s southern regions.

Credit: Mahmud Hossain Opu for IDMC, February 2019
PART 2
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DATA:
FROM CHALLENGE TO OPPORTUNITY
As the number of IDPs worldwide continues to rise and crises become increasingly protracted, it is ever more important that all actors working to address internal displacement have comprehensive and accurate data and evidence. We currently have a good sense of the numbers of IDPs from country to country, but much remains unknown about the scale, patterns, impacts and drivers of the phenomenon, particularly in urban areas. There are a number of unanswered questions about the extent to which displaced people are able to achieve durable solutions.

There are many good reasons to invest in quality data and evidence. It helps to prioritise the investment of resources and inform programming, policymaking and advocacy. It establishes a better understanding of internal displacement, which helps to forecast and contextualise trends. This in turn informs better responses and contingency and long-term planning. It also sheds light on the costs and impacts of the phenomenon on individuals, communities and states, which helps to make the case for risk reduction and promote the accountability of governments and other actors to vulnerable people.

Improved data and evidence may also challenge assumptions and orthodoxies about the nature of displacement crises, including those in urban areas, which remain poorly understood. Solid baseline data and evidence at the national and global level is a precondition for measuring the success of efforts to protect and assist IDPs and help them achieve durable solutions. Using data to better understand the phenomenon over time, including displacement risk, is also paramount to informing the achievement of sustainable development targets and the monitoring of progress to that end.

To be considered comprehensive and robust, internal displacement data should cover the causes, triggers, patterns and impacts of displacement in all its forms and regardless of scale, including its duration and severity. It is also vital that such data is recorded using methodologies that track population flows based on events and without the use of minimum thresholds for collection and analysis, in order to fully capture and differentiate between small-scale disasters or localised conflicts and major events that trigger mass displacement.

Data should be disaggregated by geographic, demographic, temporal and socioeconomic characteristics which also cover host communities to ensure that vulnerable groups are identified and no one is left behind.

Significant advances have been made, including the development and use of innovative technologies and methodologies that will be discussed below. Partnerships at the national and international level need to be strengthened and government agencies’ capacity to record displacement data improved. Greater collaboration would also help to explore the untapped potential of data to generate evidence and insights about the whole spectrum of human mobility and its links with development challenges and opportunities.

Along with political will, adequate resources and appropriate capacities, a clear and comprehensive picture of the severity and scale of internal displacement will enable those working to address the phenomenon to take appropriate measures to mitigate the risk of future displacement. It would also help donors and the humanitarian and development community to prioritise their spending and national and local governments to take evidence-based decisions.
COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION: THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DATA ECOSYSTEM

WHO USES INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DATA AND WHAT FOR?

A broad range of stakeholders with diverse roles produce and publish internal displacement data for different reasons. They include governments, UN agencies, local and international NGOs and research organisations. Some focus on data collection, others support its sharing or analysis and some perform a combination of functions.

Internal displacement data is often collected or analysed as part of wider exercises, or can be extrapolated from reports that focus primarily on other issues such as housing or protection. It often does not cover the full scope of displacement crises, whether because of access restrictions, funding shortfalls, security issues or other factors. Nor is the data that is collected always made public to increase transparency and accountability.

Data users at the local, national, regional and global level can be divided into the following broad categories:

| Governments, donors and institutional policymakers use data to design laws and policies, decide where to invest resources for prevention, planning and response, and to track progress over time |
| Research bodies use data to analyse displacement trends, patterns and impacts, collate and aggregate figures, and to establish understanding of emerging or under-explored aspects of internal displacement |
| Operational (including coordination) actors use data to inform responses to internal displacement crises, collate and aggregate figures, and help monitor trends and identify risks to inform future programming |
| Civil society organisations use data to raise awareness, and advocate for policy changes, resource allocation and more effective programming |
| Displaced persons can use evidence to inform their own decision making, and to advocate for better service delivery, inclusive solutions and respect for their civil, human and political rights |
| Technology initiatives use data to identify better ways to quantify displacement and understand its impacts |
| Data users at the local, national, regional and global level can be divided into the following broad categories: |
| Data analysis: once data has been collected and/or aggregated, it is evaluated and scrutinised to inform and support policymaking, operational decisions, reporting and research |
| Media use data and evidence for reporting and to inform the public |
| Data repositories: these are storage platforms that host and preserve data according to specific categories, and which are used to facilitate analysis, reporting and research |

The main functions performed by various actors at the national and global level in the data ecosystem are outlined below. Some specialise in specific functions, but many engage across a number of them (see Figure 9).

| Primary data collection: this is the process by which actors gather specific information on IDPs and other populations affected by crises, using methods including key informant interviews, surveys and various forms of registration |
| Data aggregation: once primary data has been collected, it is consolidated with other data to facilitate analysis, whether for geographic, sectoral, temporal or thematic purposes |

The main functions performed by various actors at the national and global level in the data ecosystem are outlined below. Some specialise in specific functions, but many engage across a number of them (see Figure 9).
A number of processes, initiatives, networks and frameworks focus on humanitarian or development data, and include internal displacement as a component of their work. But only a handful focus solely on internal displacement data.

ARRIVING AT BETTER INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DATA

The displacement data ecosystem is complex, particularly given that actors often perform more than one function. Different stakeholders also experience and prioritise challenges in different ways, depending on their focus (e.g. humanitarian or development) and the levels at which they operate (e.g. local, national, regional or global). Some challenges involve institutional overlap or the potential proliferation of initiatives, but the main ones in obtaining comprehensive and quality data and evidence – which emerge repeatedly during formal and informal discussions – relate largely to a lack of common standards, ineffective coordination and limited sharing and interoperability.

Common standards

There is conceptual and legal guidance on internal displacement, starting with the Guiding Principles and encompassing various resources such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on durable solutions for internally displaced persons, its Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters, and the Brookings Institution’s publication Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

Translating this guidance into practical common standards for data collection and analysis has, however, proved challenging. There is not yet agreement on major questions such as how to systematically measure the end of displacement, and what the best methodologies are for accurately capturing its different stages and characteristics. This significantly hampers the availability and compilation of quality, comparable data and evidence at the national and global level.

Processes such as the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS), established by the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) at its 47th session in 2016, are starting to address some of these questions as they relate to official statistics. The group includes various governments, international experts and organisations including the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the

FIGURE 9: Functions in the internal displacement data ecosystem

This graphic is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of organisations contributing to each category.
World Bank, IOM, the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), and IDMC among others. It has been developing two sets of guidelines for national statistics offices, the International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS) and International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS). Building government capacity and developing this type of guidance is important, and EGRIS’s recommendations will be an extremely valuable resource once finalised in 2020.

In many displacement situations, however, governments still lack the capacity and support, or have little incentive, to collect data. Major data gaps are currently largely filled by humanitarian and development agencies, which collect the bulk of internal displacement data. But their operational planning and responses require information that differ substantively from official statistics.

IASC’s guidelines to improve common data collection to inform disaster preparedness and response, mentioned above, outline the common datasets needed for responses to humanitarian emergencies. This governance model lays out accountabilities and responsibilities in data management, technical standards and recommendations to improve data quality and interoperability. To support the guidance, IASC has developed and endorsed operational datasets, which OCHA has disseminated. These articulate and share baseline data across sectors for mapping and other information and planning purposes.

IASC’s durable solutions framework is also supported by a library that builds on the IASC framework to develop a set of indicators and guidance to durable solutions analysis in internal displacement contexts. Such analyses can support national authorities and other stakeholders to develop joint evidence-based responses to displacement crises.

However to further improve the quality of the evidence base on internal displacement, national and international actors will still need to agree on clear definitions of basic concepts and develop common metrics and indicators. They could also build on existing indicators from other fields as proxies, in order to monitor and analyse different forms of displacement.

**Coordination**

There are examples of good coordination on data collection. But many displacement crises happen in countries where governments have limited capacity, or in some cases the political will to collect data. In the international community, while it is the role of the humanitarian coordinator’s role to lead and coordinate responses during crises, no single agency has the sole mandate to monitor and lead the response to internal displacement. Even where the Cluster System or other consortia operate, coordination within and across them can be challenging, creating data collection and aggregation issues that ultimately affect the quality of evidence. When national authorities lead the collection or aggregation of data, typically in response to disasters, gaps in coverage and the fragmentation of datasets across ministries or levels of government are also challenges.

Lack of coordination also is an issue internationally, which can create confusion about the scope of institutional mandates. This can lead to overlapping initiatives and ultimately the publication of less comprehensive and reliable data than would have been the case if coordination were more effective.

In order to avoid duplication and identify potential complementarities, new and existing data initiatives and processes should be linked and aligned as much as possible. Opportunities to collaborate on broader thematic research that goes beyond data would also help to establish a stronger evidence base on internal displacement.

**Data sharing and interoperability**

Interoperable data is drawn from different sources but can be jointly analysed or compared to help consolidate numbers and create more holistic contextual information to support analysis, decision-making and accountability. In practice, however, different organisations define and monitor population movements and collect data in different ways. There may even be differences within organisations in how populations, their movements and their needs are defined. This means the data produced tends not to be interoperable. At the national level, this can undermine the effectiveness of programming and impedes critical insights into trends, patterns and linkages between different population movements. The lack of interoperability also affects efforts to aggregate and analyse data at the global level, including
for forecasting. To address the issue, organisations will need to share information more regularly, consistently and systematically, with due regard for data protection and privacy concerns. They will also need to identify the different methodologies they use to collect data more clearly to strengthen analyses and identify potential duplication, overlap and gaps in coverage.

Box 1. HXL: making datasets interoperable and useful

One of the main challenges data users face is the sheer amount available across different platforms. One way to address this is by labelling, storing and sharing displacement data in a way that allows for easier, faster and more efficient access and use.

Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL, pronounced HEXel) aims to do just that. It is a new kind of standard, designed to complement rather than replace existing humanitarian data processes. Supported by a range of partners and convened by OCHA, it is intended to reduce duplication, improve interoperability, semi-automate data preparation and make use of existing data visualisation applications using common tags and practices.

IOM, for example, uploads, updates and shares its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data on the Humanitarian Data Platform (HDX) as part of its standard operating procedure. It also adds HXL hashtags to improve processing and sharing. Common tags include administrative division, geographical information, population, sector, needs and incident/event. This helps to harmonise and enhance data quality and usefulness.

Adding a row of HXL hashtags to a spreadsheet greatly improves interoperability. For example, #country+name identifies a column containing country names, #adm1+name always identifies a column containing top-level geopolitical subdivision names and #affected+idps+ind identifies a column containing the number of individual IDPs. Because the hashtags are standardised, differences in column ordering or even the number of columns no longer pose a problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Top-Level Geopolitical Subdivision</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#country+name</td>
<td>#adm1+name</td>
<td>#affected+idps+ind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Admin1</td>
<td>Nombre de PDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>ADM1_NAME</td>
<td>IDP_ind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>ADM 1 Geodivision (EN)</td>
<td>IDPs in Baladiya (IND)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Admin 1</td>
<td>Total No# of IDPs Ind#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>State of Displacement</td>
<td>Number of IDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC releases all its publicly available datasets with HXL tags to make it easier to promote, disseminate and share. Tagging also facilitates data visualisation using platforms such as HDX and its tools.
IDMC collects data from a wide range of sources, including UN organisations, national governments, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, international and local NGOs and media sources (see Figure 10). These organisations are engaged in a broad spectrum of humanitarian, development, human rights and other work. They also differ widely in terms of regional and national scope, and the types of movement and metrics they report.

Seventy-five per cent of the data that IDMC uses to compile its global estimates for displacement associated with disasters comes from national governments. It relies largely on UN and humanitarian agencies for data on displacement associated with conflict and violence.

IDMC uses the data provided by different sources to produce the best estimates possible of internal displacement at the national and global level (see Figure 11). In doing so we have identified some critical gaps in data collection that prevent a comprehensive assessment of the scale, nature, trends and impacts of the phenomenon. Still, progress has been made in some areas, and new technologies and approaches hold the promise of significant advances in the future.

**FIGURE 10: IDMC workflow**

Inconsistent Methodologies

The lack of consistent methodologies for data collection and analysis creates many challenges. When different stakeholders use different methodologies to collect displacement data in the same country, it may lead to conflicting estimates of the number of IDPs, new displacements or returns. This in turn has the potential to cause confusion for policymakers, donors and organisations on the ground, and to undermine effective interventions and the prioritisation of resources to respond to internal displacement crises. In some crises, constraints on humanitarian access to areas where IDPs are present impede or severely limit data collection efforts. In others, more effort is required to ensure the added value of simultaneous data collection in similar locations.

This issue also makes aggregating and comparing data at the regional and global level more difficult, particularly if no adequate explanation for differing methodologies is given that might allow for comprehensive analysis. This in turn hampers efforts to understand the regional dynamics of crises. Collecting displacement data will by necessity continue to involve a number of stakeholders. Addressing this issue requires the development of clear, harmonised and consistent approaches to data collection for these actors.

* The list of terms used in this graphic is not exhaustive.
FIGURE 11: Sources of IDMC’s estimates for displacement associated with conflict and violence, and disasters, by region

| Conflict and violence |

- Sub-Saharan Africa
- East Asia & Pacific
- South Asia
- Middle East & North Africa
- Europe & Central Asia
- Americas

- United Nations
- Clusters and Consortias
- Media
- Civil Society
- Local Authority
- International NGOs
- Government
- National/Regional Disaster Authority
- International Organisations
- Community Leaders
- Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
- Non-State Armed Group

| Disasters |

- East Asia & Pacific
- Americas
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Europe & Central Asia
- Middle East & North Africa

- National/Regional Disaster Authority
- Local Authority
- Government
- Media
- Clusters and Consortias
- United Nations
- Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
- Civil Society
- International Organisations
- International NGOs
- Community Leaders
- Private Sector

Note: IDMC distinguishes between the source, where the information comes from, and where it is published. Sources provide their own figures for IDPs.
DATA TRIANGULATION

What is it, and why is it useful?

The main purpose of triangulating data is to increase its credibility and validity. IDMC uses triangulation to validate datasets from various sources that describe the same phenomenon. Doing so becomes even more relevant given today’s fast-moving news cycle, including the proliferation of “fake news”, and the fact that anyone can present unverified information, potentially leading to significant discrepancies in what is reported and confusion about true displacement numbers. Around 70 per cent of the information on disasters recorded in IDMC’s database in 2018 was collected for triangulation purposes.

The value of triangulation is demonstrated by IDMC’s method of estimating displacement associated with disasters in Afghanistan. IOM and OCHA each work closely with local humanitarian organisations to produce two comprehensive datasets on disaster damage. OCHA recorded 235 disaster incidents in the first six months of 2018, and IOM 304 incidents. The datasets overlapped geographically. OCHA’s covered 24 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and IOM’s covered 26. Twenty-three provinces were covered by both. The two datasets differ in the terminology they use to classify disaster events or damaged and destroyed housing, which highlights the need to synchronise and develop common definitions and metrics.

IDMC used the two datasets to analyse displacement triggered by floods in May 2018. Using OCHA’s data on housing destruction as a proxy for the number of people displaced yielded a figure of 24,589. IOM’s data on housing destruction produced an estimate of 12,090 people. Additional IOM data on affected people living with host families, in open spaces and informal settlements suggested that 44,884 people had been displaced. IDMC compared the data taking into account differences in definition and coverage, and the potential for double counting. It also triangulated the data with information from media sources to arrive at a final figure of 46,380 people displaced.

Triangulation is also useful in compiling the best estimates for new displacements associated with conflict. Ethiopia had the highest figure worldwide in 2018, and IDMC used data from 16 sources that reported internal displacement during the year. IOM’s DTM reports were used as the basis for triangulation, and calculations were made using the sum of positive variations between reports at site level for the whole year. The DTM reports, which covered only nine out of eleven regions in the country, were published bi-monthly and people’s movements were highly dynamic. This meant that relying only on DTM data risked missing a significant number of short-term or repeated displacements. Using only IOM DTM reports, IDMC calculated about 1.5 million new displacements.

To overcome this issue, IDMC used other sources including OCHA, national and regional government reports, The Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), other types of IOM DTM reports and assessments, and local and international media to produce a more comprehensive estimate. This method allowed to reach 2.9 million new displacements, which is almost twice the number based only on IOM DTM bi-monthly reports. In order to avoid double counting and errors, the dates, type of movement, triggers, contextual information, geographical and temporal coverage and access to IDPs were considered to determine which caseloads should be included or excluded from the calculation. This method ensured that a significant number of under-reported displacements were not left out, and at the same time minimised the risk of double counting.

Given the increasing amount of information, news and data available, such triangulation exercises will remain important and necessary tools in IDMC’s monitoring.
DATA DISAGGREGATION: WHO IS DISPLACED, WHERE AND WHY?

A number of challenges remain when it comes to identifying IDPs’ place of origin, destination and current location at a specific point in time. The general lack of data disaggregated by sex, age, disability and other characteristics is also a significant issue that countries need to address if they are to support IDPs in achieving durable solutions and report progress against global frameworks.275 Data disaggregation gaps currently tend to be filled with qualitative and anecdotal evidence. Data disaggregated demographically, geographically and temporally would also make a significant difference in shaping responses, informing policy and assessing progress in reducing displacement.

Displacement is a highly dynamic phenomenon, making it difficult to monitor over time, and a number of factors make doing so more complicated still. A significant proportion of IDPs live in dispersed settings with or among host families and communities, where they are harder to locate let alone monitor. Some IDPs may be displaced a number of times, while others undertake pendular movements between their places of origin and refuge. Families may also split up, with some members remaining in displacement while others return home. In addition, capturing pendular displacement is further complicated by the fact that it is often missed by assessments which are more prone to capture data on individuals in camps or camp-like settings.

IDMC aims to gather and report information disaggregated by geographical area, including by urban and rural locations, but even when such data is available it can be inaccurate and is not always broken down by location.

Knowing what triggers people’s displacement is also vital to fully understand the phenomenon and the type of response needed. To address this issue, IDMC revised its hazard classification and developed a new conflict typology in 2018 with the aim of improving its reporting, and clarifying and expanding its data model to better capture how and why people move.

Data disaggregated by sex, age and other characteristics

Data disaggregation is essential to ensure all vulnerable groups and their needs are properly captured and addressed. Different groups will require tailored interventions that respond to the circumstances of their displacement depending on their income, age, gender and location. It is challenging, however, to obtain comprehensive data on key metrics disaggregated by sex, age and other characteristics such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and disability.

In 2018, IDMC obtained data on displacement associated with conflict disaggregated by sex or age for 12 out of 57 countries and territories, or 21 per cent, and by age for 8, or 23 per cent. Some of the data received for other countries was also disaggregated in this way, but the datasets either did not cover the whole country or the whole year. Further, despite greater efforts and improvements over the past decade in collecting data on displaced children, there is very little information available about their age and sex, where they come from, where they are going, why they moved, whether they moved with their families or alone, how they fared along the way or what their specific vulnerabilities and needs are.276

Understanding these characteristics, the push and pull factors that lead to their displacement and its impacts is key to designing responses that address diverse protection and assistance needs and to better understanding the implications of displacement for communities and states.

Geolocation and geographical reference issues

Obtaining data disaggregated by specific location continues to be a challenge. One of the most notable gaps in displacement monitoring is the lack of georeferenced information. Local data collectors often have a more accurate idea of where people move to, but gaining access to such information at the global level is difficult. This means that most of the data made available to IDMC is not geolocated at the site level. At best, only the names of towns and provinces are mentioned.
In some conflicts, governments or non-state actors obstruct the systematic collection of data, or security risks may be too high to undertake such exercises. Data may also not be made available because of protection protocols, and investments in data collection tend to decrease after the emergency phase of a crisis. This may mean that IDPs in hard-to-reach areas or protracted situations fall off the radar. Having accurate estimates of the scale of population movements, including rural to urban, urban to urban, intra-urban and urban to rural movements, would also help to fill the stubborn data gap on the number of displaced people living in cities (see Urban displacement spotlight, p.63).

To establish a more accurate picture of where displacement happens, IDMC applies different methods to georeference the phenomenon. In doing so, it gives due consideration to the ethical implications of using such data. The aim is not to track individuals, but rather to understand broader displacement trajectories during and after crises to inform improved responses and help estimate future movements.

In 2018, IDMC was able to geolocate the origin or destination of some displacement flows. Figure 12 shows the approximate geolocation of displacement reports related to both conflict and disasters during the year.

**FIGURE 12:** Geolocated displacement events monitored by IDMC in 2018

Note: 11,511 data entries in the IDMC database by cause of displacement recorded in 2018
By some estimates, between 60 and 80 per cent of IDPs live in cities and “out-of-camp settings”. There is, however, no strong evidence to support such assertions, and a number of factors make understanding the true scale and characteristics of urban displacement particularly challenging.

There is a lack of common definitions and methodologies to classify urban and rural areas. Different definitions emphasise different factors including demographics, social dynamics, infrastructure, the availability and provision of services and the way land use and the built environment are structured. Nor does displacement data that includes information about the type of settlement, whether it be a camp, out-of-camp setting or spontaneous site, necessarily specify an urban or rural location.

Camps and camp-like settlements facilitate data collection because IDPs are gathered together in one place, unlike urban areas where they tend to live in dispersed settings among the local population, which makes them more difficult to identify. Some may also choose to stay under the radar to preserve their anonymity because of potential threats to their security.

IDMC was able to address some of these challenges for the first time in 2018, and disaggregate displacement associated with conflict by urban and rural location. The EU’s Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) was used as a basis for conducting the analysis. GHSL is a global dataset that assesses degrees of urbanisation using census data from national statistical institutes and satellite observations. It provides multi-temporal geospatial data, presented in grids of one square kilometre, enabling a globally consistent and comparable classification of rural and urban areas. By overlaying information on displacement sites with GHSL, it was possible to disaggregate the data.

More than 41.3 million people were living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence as of the end of 2018. Information on displacement sites was obtained for 19.8 million, or 48 per cent of the total. Of 55 countries where conflict displacement was identified, information on IDPs’ specific location was available for 12. Within these 12, specific caseloads were selected where good quality geolocalised data was available, for example from site-level assessments. IDMC’s analysis concluded that 52 per cent of IDPs were living in urban settings in these twelve countries (see Figure 13).

**FIGURE 13**: Disaggregation of stock figures for 12 countries by rural and urban settings using GHSL as reference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of Caseload in Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages refer to the portion of the national IDP caseload that has geospatial information. In the case of Yemen, Chad, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Sudan and Dem. Rep. Congo, more than the 90% of the caseload is published with coordinates. In other countries this proportion is lower: Libya 85%, Nigeria 55%, Cameroon 37% and Palestine 0.2%.*
Iraq provides an interesting example. The use of data provided by IOM’s DTM, all of which was geolocated, helped to paint a more accurate picture of urban displacement. The analysis shows that 70 per cent of IDPs were living in urban settings as of the end of 2018. Sixty-two per cent were living with host families or in rented accommodation. Ninety-six per cent of displacement sites were also within ten kilometres of an urban area. At an even more granular level, Figure 14 illustrates urban displacement in Mosul as revealed by overlaying data with the GHSL layer.

This exercise was a first step toward filling the significant data gaps on urban displacement. Clearly, when primary collectors geolocate and share their data, a consistent methodology can be applied to illustrate the scale of the phenomenon. As long as this kind of information is not consistently collected or shared, however, it will be difficult to paint a global picture. In its absence, policies and programmes to support IDPs and host communities and to help cities cope with displacement will not be as effective as they might.

**FIGURE 14:** Iraq: IDPs’ location by distance from an urban settlement
OTHER METHODS OF TRACING DISPLACEMENT FLOWS

IDMC collects and analyses data on two main metrics – stocks and new displacements, as well as on solutions. Stocks are the number of people displaced at a certain moment in time, new displacements also include repeated movements, and solutions include returns, local integration, resettlement and “partial or unverified solutions” (see Part 1). IDMC uses a number of proxy data sources to paint a more complete picture of internal displacement events. A significant part of IDMC’s analysis relies on data and reporting that does not focus specifically on displacement, which can pose challenges in terms of accuracy.

Mobile phone data

The number of mobile phone users in the world is expected to pass five billion in 2019, and anonymous mobile phone data offers a way to bridge data gaps and better monitor IDPs’ movements with due regard for privacy and data protection concerns. The use of mobile technology in the humanitarian sector is not new, but it has been used primarily to support emergency operations and disaster relief. Its use beyond the emergency phase helps to understand population movements before, during and after a disaster or conflict event, including their duration (see Box 2).

Box 2. Using mobile phone data to track displacement in Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea experienced a 7.5 magnitude earthquake on 26 February 2018, which was followed by significant aftershocks in the subsequent days and weeks. As many as 465,000 people are thought to have been affected by the disaster, which left around 247,000 in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. Around 58,000 people were internally displaced.

A study conducted in the aftermath of the earthquake showed the benefits of using anonymous mobile phone data to track the displacement it triggered. The data proved particularly useful in assessing how far and in which direction people had fled, and how their movements evolved over time. Because mobile phone data is uniquely detailed and traceable, it can provide information that is not easily gleaned from other sources at such scale. On the downside, only the movements of mobile phone users can be analysed, and it is not possible to assess people’s specific vulnerabilities.

Papua New Guinea has a mobile penetration rate of 54 per cent, and Digicel is the main service provider with a market share of more than 90 per cent. The study, which was carried out with the collaboration of the government, the UN country team and Digicel, ensured users’ privacy was protected by following guidelines for the use of mobile phone data published in 2014 in response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

The data was analysed from several angles, first by modelling the relationship between the activity of transmission towers and their distance from the earthquake’s epicentre. The logs of calls and messages sent and received via the towers also reveal population movements that can be tracked over time. Analysis over longer periods can provide insight into return movements.

The study also combined mobile phone data with information from humanitarian sources including OCHA and IOM DTM. It found that the humanitarian community had targeted its assistance effectively, showing the data’s added value in monitoring crisis responses and disaster management.

The Papua New Guinea study illustrates the significant value of anonymous mobile phone data in tracking displacement flows, including when it is used in conjunction with other forms of data collection and assessments determining displaced people’s specific needs.
Aerial and satellite imagery analysis

Satellite and aerial imagery is useful in assessing displacement via proxy indicators such as housing damage and destruction or the extent of flooding. The method is particularly suited to urban settings, where the ready availability of images can also help to track reconstruction processes and estimate the duration of displacement.

For example, IDMC conducted a satellite imagery analysis exercise for its previous global report in close collaboration with the UN’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). It aimed to assess displacement associated with development projects by tracking the number of dwellings inundated as a result of the construction of a dam in Indonesia. Similar methodologies were applied to estimate housing damage and destruction in southern Turkey, because no other form of data on the conflict in the region was available.286

This method does not come without challenges, however, such as the expense of scaling up given the cost of the images, and the complexity of the analysis. The human validation currently required is also resource intensive, and may lead to misinterpretation and errors.

That said, new technologies such as aerial and drone imagery produce high-resolution images, and recent advances in artificial intelligence permit the extraction of information with very high accuracy, even if image quality is compromised. This can help to overcome some limitations from satellite imagery noted above. IDMC continues to work with its partners to explore innovative ways of filling data gaps. This includes a study of disaster displacement in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), where drone imagery is complemented by local data collection on the ground (see Box 3).
Box 3. The Ramani Huria project: community mapping to assess displacement

Ninety-five per cent of global urban growth over the next 20 years will take place in developing countries.\textsuperscript{287} As cities grow, disaster displacement risk is also expected to increase, but a number of factors make assessing it at the local level difficult.\textsuperscript{288} They include:

- A lack of up-to-date population data
- A lack of up-to-date urban plans
- A lack of data on populations’ exposure, vulnerability and resilience
- A lack of disaggregated information on possible vulnerability to specific hazards
- A lack of national spatial data infrastructures that provide access to information, such as exposure, vulnerability or risk models

To overcome these challenges, participatory tools such as community mapping have been developed to report on events that take place at the local level. This type of crowdsourcing, which is combined with geographical data, has been constantly improving as communication technologies and tools evolve.

One example of this approach is Ramani Huria, Swahili for “open map”, a project in flood-prone areas of Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam is one of the fastest growing cities in Africa. Its population is expected to exceed 10 million by 2040, making it a megacity. However urbanisation is largely unplanned and flooding occurs regularly during two annual rainy seasons, the “long rains” between March and May and the “short rains” between October and December.\textsuperscript{289}

Around 70 per cent of the city’s residents live in informal settlements which are particularly vulnerable to flooding given their poor infrastructure and drainage and a lack of solid waste management.\textsuperscript{290} Data and information about the impact of large-scale floods are fairly easy to come by, but not for smaller, more localised events in vulnerable areas, despite the fact that local residents are affected. The Ramani Huria project is supported by the World Bank and DFID, and implemented by the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team. It has addressed the need for up-to-date and detailed data on flood hazards, vulnerability and exposure since 2015. Through the engagement and participation with local communities, authorities, leaders, civil society and academia, it produces community maps using open geospatial technologies and tools supported by the collection of high-resolution drone imagery.\textsuperscript{291}
DETERMINING THE DURATION OF DISPLACEMENT

With a few exceptions, it remains difficult to estimate for how long people are displaced. This is a major gap that is far from being filled, but it requires attention, especially as internal displacement becomes protracted. As explained above, IDMC collects and analyses data on two main metrics – stocks and new displacements, as well as on solutions.

Measuring the duration of displacement associated with disasters

The main obstacle to determining the end of displacement following disasters is that systematic data collection stops long before IDPs have achieved a durable solution. Data tends to be collected only during the immediate recovery phase to guide responses. The emergency phase is also usually covered by media reporting. IDMC has previously found that for more than half of the largest disasters recorded since 2008, displacement data was collected for less than a month. This makes attempting to assess whether IDPs have achieved a durable solution following many disasters extremely complex and resource intensive.

As a result, it has been difficult to compile an end-of-year estimate of the total number of people living in situations of internal displacement as a result of disasters at a given moment in time (disaster stock figure). Without this the aggregate global estimates of the number of people living in displacement, including those quoted in previous GRIDs, are incomplete. For example, UNHCR adds its global number of refugees to IDMC’s conflict stock figure to arrive at a global displacement figure that is often published or cited by the media and policymakers, but without a disaster stock figure it constitutes a considerable underestimate. This gap also encourages the framing of displacement as associated exclusively with conflict, when in fact it is a much broader and more complex phenomenon.

The absence of a global disaster stock figure also feeds the mistaken assumption that people who flee disasters are only displaced for short periods, when in fact there are many examples of such displacement lasting years and even decades. This in turns means policy and operational responses tend not to address major questions such as how to achieve durable solutions to disaster displacement. Without time-series data it is also difficult to measure and track the social and economic impacts on individuals, communities and economies.

IDMC was able to estimate a global stock figure for disaster displacement for the first time in 2018. More and better data from partners was obtained, and models to fill gaps and infer the number of people displaced by disasters over time were applied. The estimate for 2018 was of just over 1.6 million people still living in displacement as a result of disasters which took place in 2018. This is a highly conservative estimate, as it does not include people displaced by disasters prior to 2018. More work will need to be done to refine the model in 2019 and beyond (see Box 4).

Estimating a stock figure for disaster displacement will not only clarify how many people are still living in displacement at the end of a given year. It will help to reveal those who until now have been off the radar and so are unlikely to have been reached as part of disaster recovery processes or with initiatives to support the achievement of durable solutions. It will also help to assess the mid to long-term impacts of displacement on societies and economies.

More broadly, comprehensive monitoring and reporting on the duration and end of disaster displacement will fill a critical gap, which in turn will help the humanitarian and development sectors to plan and implement more effective and evidence-based responses.

Returning home, but under which conditions?

A core element of the Guiding Principles is that IDPs achieve durable solutions by returning to their habitual place of residence, integrating locally or resettling elsewhere in the country or further afield. To be considered a durable solution, this must happen voluntarily, in safety and in dignity and involve overcoming all vulnerabilities associated with displacement. Such outcomes are particularly complex to achieve, and also to measure.
Box 4. Estimating a disaster stock figure for 2018

Figure 15 shows a conceptual illustration of how the number of people living in displacement as a result of disasters at the end of 2018 was estimated. The time-series curves for the stocks are represented by the blue dotted lines. The stock for disasters on a given date equals the sum of the values of each curve on that date.

IDMC applied a two-step approach based on data gathering and modelling to estimate the number of people living in displacement as a result of disasters as of the end of 2018. A data pool from a variety of sources was compiled, based primarily on around 100 disaster events recorded in its database during the year. Each time series describes the evolution over time of the number of people displaced in a specific location.

These time series were used to model the remaining displacement for each event. Due to the lack of data, the model does not distinguish between different types or location of disasters, and is applied to all of the events. A simple model was used because it provided a good fit with the observational data and was easy to interpret. IDMC may construct specific models for hazard types or countries in the future as more time series data becomes available.

IDMC derived a closed mathematical expression for the model. By using the most recent stock figure it had for each of the events that took place in 2018, it applied the model and estimated a global stock figure of 1,601,150 individuals. Taking into account the uncertainty of the model, the number could be twice as high.

IDMC believes this to be an underestimate because the learned curve is heavily skewed toward capturing evacuations, which dominated the time-series pool used for training. This type of displacement tends to last for a relatively short period of time.

The same curve is also applied to all events, regardless of whether the reported figures correspond to evacuations or displacements. This implicit assumption is an important source of modelling error because the same decay rate is applied even to time series in which the reported displacement was inferred from reported destruction of housing. Again, given these issues, the true figure could be twice as high.

This methodology is a first step toward estimating a global stock figure for disaster displacement. IDMC will refine the model by using additional and more representative data, testing and validating it against observational data and employing more complex modelling methods. Taken together, these improvements will help to estimate how the number of people displaced by disasters evolves over time more accurately.
The IASC’s framework establishes a set of criteria for what would constitute a durable solution. They are:

| Safety and security |
| Adequate standard of living |
| Access to livelihoods |
| Restoration of housing, land and property |
| Access to documentation |
| Family reunification |
| Participation in public affairs |
| Access to effective remedies and justice |

Putting the framework into practice, however, has proved a challenge. It is supported by the Durable Solutions Indicators Library that provides useful guidance for durable solutions analyses, but translating such analyses into numerical, universal and comparable data is difficult, particularly when trying to aggregate at the global level. It is hard, for example, to measure vulnerabilities numerically and so to assess progress toward achieving durable solutions. EGRIS is, however, in the process of developing guidance and recommendations for measuring the end of displacement statistically, and it is hoped that this will provide more concrete guidance.

Nor are many reported returns followed up on over time, making any assessment of their sustainability extremely difficult. When return movements are reported prematurely or go unverified, people may be “taken off the books” before they have been able to achieve a durable solution, which means their needs are unlikely to be met. This happens, for example, when IDPs are reported as returnees simply because they have left a camp, or because they have gone back to their places of origin despite their homes having been damaged or destroyed. In order to capture such movements, IDMC has started recording them as “partial and unverified solutions” (see Part 1).

ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND THE SEVERITY OF DISPLACEMENT

The number of people living in displacement offers only partial insight into IDPs’ reality. Their needs and the impacts of their displacement at the individual, local and national level differ from one situation to another. They may vary widely based on the duration of displacement, pre-existing capacities and resources and current levels of vulnerability. There are, for example, roughly equal numbers of IDPs in Colombia and Syria, but their needs are vastly different. Effective and targeted responses require a fuller understanding of the impacts and experiences of displacement beyond the numbers.

Economic impacts of displacement

Displacement affects economies in many overlapping and interconnected ways. Its impacts may be felt directly or indirectly, in the short or long term and at the local or national level. Some are tangible, for instance when crops and livestock are lost. Others, such as months of lost education, are intangible. Impacts may occur at the time of displacement, when IDPs have to pay for transport and temporary lodgings, or later when they have to accept a lower-paid job in the saturated labour market of their host area. As part of IDMC’s research into the economic impacts of internal displacement, we have developed a new methodology to assess the direct costs, showing that internal displacement could be costing countries across the world a total of nearly $13 billion each year.

We were able to estimate the direct economic impact of displacement associated with flooding in Somalia in 2018 at around $19 million for 287,000 people displaced from April to August. We also estimated the impact of displacement associated with drought between January 2017 and August 2018 at $500 million for 1.2 million IDPs, and of displacement associated with conflict over the same period at $110 million for 423,000 IDPs. The latter figures represent 4.7 and 1 per cent of Somalia’s annual average GDP respectively.

A better understanding of the longer-term economic impacts of displacement is also needed to inform the development sector about where and how to engage in displacement crises (see Box 5).
Box 5. Assessing the economic impacts of displacement

IDMC’s estimates account for the costs associated with IDPs’ housing, health, education and security needs, and for their loss of livelihoods. They focus on direct and immediate costs and losses for which quantitative data is publicly available at the global level. Information such as the funding required to provide food to a given number of IDPs serves as proxy for the cost associated with nutritional needs that result from displacement.

The estimates do not account for the longer-term consequences of internal displacement, nor its impacts on hosts, communities of origin and other affected groups. As such, they should be considered underestimates of its overall financial burden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>What is included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Cost of shelters or</td>
<td>providing emergency and transitional shelter solutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>temporary accommodations</td>
<td>including subsidies for rents or repairs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>delivering needs-based lifesaving non-food items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>providing water, sanitation and hygiene services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>coordinating and managing shelters and camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>Loss of income</td>
<td>loss of income from work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Cost of providing temporary</td>
<td>restoring educational activities for children of primary and secondary school age</td>
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<td>education</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>including in some cases psychological support to children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Cost of providing food</td>
<td>providing life-saving food assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assistance</td>
<td>improving food production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>preventing and treating malnutrition of children aged under five, and pregnant and lactating women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of providing healthcare</td>
<td>providing emergency and essential primary/secondary health services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>in emergency situations</td>
<td>preventing and responding to outbreaks and communicable diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>providing immunisation coverage for children aged under five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Cost of ensuring security in</td>
<td>reinforcing and providing protection to IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>host areas</td>
<td>preventing and responding to human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>protecting children and women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Toward a better understanding of displacement severity and vulnerability

Understanding how IDPs’ vulnerabilities differ from one situation to another, irrespective of scale, is important in painting a comprehensive picture of the severity of the phenomenon and informing effective and targeted responses and planning. IDPs in the Afghan city of Ghazni, for example, were caught in the crossfire of fighting between the Taliban and government forces in 2018. Those sheltering in civilian protection sites in South Sudan are generally shielded from such conflict, but women and girls are at high risk of sexual and gender-based violence. IDPs in Mexico’s Guerrero state are exposed to criminality and extortion.

These contrasting experiences of security are just one component of displacement severity. Access to housing, services, livelihoods, documentation, family reunification, public affairs and justice are also factors.

IDPs in makeshift shelters in Tanganyika and South Kivu in DRC, for example, are exposed to severe weather and fire hazards, while those in collective centres in Ukraine’s government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions close to the Line of Contact receive free accommodation but are reportedly at risk of eviction. Similar contrasts exist in terms of access to services. The cost of medicines is the main barrier to healthcare for IDPs in Donetsk and Luhansk, while for those in Tanganyika and South Kivu it is scarce and poorly equipped facilities.

Assessing the severity of displacement and differing vulnerabilities associated with disasters is also challenging, mainly because of the absence of reliable data on its duration and the different coping capacities of individuals, communities and states. Some people are able to return shortly after a disaster strikes, but many remain displaced for months or even years and find it difficult to access effective mechanisms to restore or rebuild their homes, land and property.

For each disaster event recorded, IDMC tries to collect as much information as possible on housing destruction, whether as a proxy for displacement or for triangulation purposes. Housing destruction is a good proxy to estimate the magnitude of displacement. Also, as highlighted in the section above on measuring the disaster stock, the duration of displacement could be used as an indicator of people’s vulnerability.

An illustrative example can be found in India, where tropical cyclone Titli struck the states of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh in October 2018 and caused significant destruction, particularly in coastal districts. In the aftermath of the disaster, the authorities in Andhra Pradesh recorded the extent of damage by housing type.

By using the authorities’ classification of damage according to the two housing types, IDMC was able to establish a better and more nuanced understanding of Titli’s impacts on the local population. People living in kutcha houses were four times more affected by housing destruction than those living in pukka houses. Those whose pukka houses were destroyed, however, are likely to have remained displaced for longer time.

IDMC will continue to develop this qualitative assessment of the severity of displacement to enable meaningful comparisons between countries, and to help monitor their progress toward resolving the phenomenon.

HARD-TO-DETECT DISPLACEMENT

Some types of displacement are particularly difficult to assess because of missing data or the complexity of their drivers and triggers. These include displacement associated with development projects, criminal violence, slow-onset hazards such as drought and sea level rise, and overlapping factors. Data limitations also impede efforts to determine how many IDPs become refugees, and migrants return to a life of internal displacement. The result is an incomplete understanding of the displacement continuum and its dynamics.

Many reports of displacement associated with disasters provide data on evacuation orders, but not necessarily
Box 6. Why do some people refuse to leave?

The most visible and tangible aspect of displacement associated with disasters is having to evacuate from one’s home. This may take the form of self-evacuations or as ordered by local authorities. The challenge with accounting for displacement associated with mandatory evacuation orders is that the orders cover more people than are accounted for in temporary shelters.

At the height of tropical cyclone Prapiroon in Japan, for example, as many as two million people were ordered to evacuate, but fewer than 31,000 were recorded in shelters (see Japan spotlight, p.30).299 Two factors account for at least some of such discrepancies. First, not all of those ordered to evacuate may comply, meaning that the number of people covered by evacuation orders is likely to overestimate the scale of displacement. Second, many evacuees may choose to stay with family and friends, in hotels or elsewhere, meaning the number of people in shelters is likely to underestimate the scale of displacement.

People’s reasons for not following evacuation orders are complex and multifaceted. They range from practical challenges for the elderly and those with disabilities, to a lack of timely and accessible information and the perception and communication of disaster risk. These factors may also combine with people’s desire to protect their home, pets, livestock and other assets.300 Socioeconomic factors may also be an influence. Some households may not be able to afford to self-evacuate, and the same people may also be vulnerable in other ways such as being located on flood plains, living in mobile homes or lacking reliable transport.301

Displacement associated with slow-onset disasters and environmental degradation is also complex to monitor. It is difficult to distinguish from internal migration and painting a comprehensive picture is challenging because it encapsulates a wide range of phenomena, drivers, triggers, impacts and movement types. More concrete examples and evidence of how displacement occurs in different slow-onset situations are needed to inform more solid risk assessments and the evaluation of appropriate policy responses.

To overcome these challenges, IDMC has begun to explore modelling and the interconnectivity of systems to understand the complexity of slow-onset displacement. A similar approach is being used to better understand the interconnected factors driving displacement associated with criminal violence in the Northern Triangle of Central America (see Figure 17, p.74).302
Based on system dynamics and agent-based modelling approaches, IDMC is also mapping the ways in which policy responses and long-term investments determine displacement risk. This helps to understand the circumstances in which displacement is likely to occur and why. This approach will enable IDMC to model scenarios for displacement risk in different slow-onset situations and with different policy interventions.

ACCOUNTING FOR FUTURE RISK

Many governments and operational actors recognise the need to understand future displacement risk. There is increasing demand for displacement risk models and forecasting tools that are able to estimate the scale and severity of future displacement and reveal its underlying drivers. However, the development and improvement of these tools is still catching up with the demand.

Using probabilistic approaches to estimate displacement, however, requires highly localised and detailed information, and many governments lack the data needed to validate risk models and conduct full risk assessments. More capacity building is needed before models can be adapted to specific needs and the results applied to inform policy development and investment planning.

IDMC released its unique global disaster displacement risk model in 2017. The first iteration, based on a global model developed by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) calculates the average number of people likely to be displaced every year by sudden-onset hazards (earthquake, tsunami, floods, cyclonic winds and storm surge). It calculates the probability...
and intensity of hazards, and exposure and vulnerability components to estimate disaster displacement risk (see Figure 18). The results are based on the likelihood of housing destruction as a proxy for displacement, and suggest that an average of around 14 million people are likely to be displaced globally in any given year in the future.

Because the model excludes those displacements associated with pre-emptive evacuations – which is particularly relevant for countries with strong disaster preparedness capacity such as Bangladesh, China, Cuba, the Philippines and Viet-Nam – the estimation of risk is inherently conservative. The model is likely to be a closer fit for countries with less disaster preparedness capacity.

IDMC’s model also provides a benchmark for measuring progress toward DRR, including against international frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. It can also be adapted to support operations in real time by indicating the number and location of damaged and destroyed homes caused by modelled or observed hazards.

THE WAY FORWARD

The ongoing challenges associated with internal displacement data are clearly interlinked. A systemic response which develops common standards and improves cooperation, coordination and data interoperability is critical, if governments and other actors are to fully understand, prevent and address the phenomenon through better policymaking, planning and risk reduction.

New technologies and approaches have the potential to overcome some of the specific challenges in obtaining comprehensive, timely, accurate and disaggregated data on a range of displacement situations. Used with due regard for ethical questions of privacy and data protection, they could help to fill significant knowledge gaps.

Armed with stronger data and evidence, governments and other stakeholders will be better equipped to understand and plan for future risk and to monitor progress toward targets under frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris Agreement. More importantly, they would also be in a better position to address the needs of IDPs.
PART 3

URBAN INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: RISK, IMPACTS AND SOLUTIONS
Displaced people make their way to urban areas because they are seen to offer opportunities. IDPs are often highly vulnerable and lack protection, but the social networks, jobs and services in towns and cities have the potential to help them achieve durable solutions. Ever better connectivity and new technologies, greater social mobility and planning aligned with this century’s urban agenda hold the promise of positively shaping entire communities and driving national-level growth and development. In principle, urbanisation and human mobility present great opportunities for individual and social wellbeing.

Not that urban areas are spared challenges. Many cities have high levels of poverty and inequality, and large numbers of residents who live in inadequate housing with few if any basic services. This is the reality for many, if not the majority of IDPs, and the differentiated living conditions in cities influence the ways in which displacement is experienced and the way urban centres are able to support displaced people.311

How cities cope with these challenges affects the extent to which they are able to welcome and support those displaced.312 If IDPs are offered the means to integrate, urban centres benefit from their productive social and economic contributions. Rapid and badly managed urban growth and the forced movement of people to and within cities stretches urban systems and the capacity of authorities and host communities to deal with displacement. Urban crises may also trigger new and secondary displacement, creating a downward spiral of vulnerability and risk. How displacement and urban change are managed therefore makes the difference between systemic resilience or risk of collapse.

This calls for a better understanding of how urban displacement comes about, so that it can be effectively addressed and reduced. Knowing how displacement drivers, risks and impacts play out in urban settings will be vital in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly given the central role cities will continue to play in shaping 21st century societies and economies.313 Left unaddressed, urban displacement will impede achievement of SDG 11 on making cities safe, resilient and sustainable, with knock-on effects for the achievement of other goals.
DEFINING “URBAN” AND “DISPLACEMENT”

Given the lack of a common definition of what constitutes an urban area, for the purposes of this report it is defined as “a spatial concentration of people and wealth that is usually reliant on a cash-based economy, with relationships between the two shaped and regulated by a set of political, social, legal and economic institutions”. In this sense, both towns and cities are considered urban areas (see Glossary p.105).

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border”. Urban displacement encompasses forced movements from rural to urban areas; between urban areas, referred to as inter-urban; and within urban areas, referred to as intra-urban (see Figure 19).

Towns and cities are common destinations for people fleeing conflict, violence, disasters and development projects, but also dispossession and loss of income in rural areas. In this urban century, a growing proportion of displacement can also be expected to start and end within the same city. Urban centres’ capacity to deal with the phenomenon varies significantly according to their size and wealth and whether they are main or secondary cities.

Urban displacement is a complex topic that touches on a wide range of issues. The following does not try to capture it in its entirety but will focus on the specific ways in which displacement risk accumulates in urban areas and its impacts, and the main aspects of urban life that influence the extent to which IDPs are able to adapt. These include employment and livelihoods, housing and tenure security, basic services and infrastructure. It will also propose ways forward in addressing the challenges of internal displacement in towns and cities across the world.
URBAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT, DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT

Conflict and insecurity, climate shocks and changes in the rural economy erode livelihoods and drive displacement toward cities in many countries. As such, urban systems and growth are strongly connected to what happens in peri-urban and rural areas. That said, displacement increasingly takes place within cities, whether the result of urban conflict, disasters or infrastructure and urban renewal projects.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RURAL CONDITIONS

Disasters, conflict, a lack of livelihoods, land grabs, the eviction of indigenous and poor communities, and loss of land, productivity and opportunity in rural areas all push people toward cities.\(^\text{316}\) Extended drought in the Horn of Africa, for example, has severely disrupted the ability of pastoralists and farmers to make a living in recent years. Options to diversify their income have become increasingly limited over time, forcing them to move to urban areas in search of alternative livelihoods.\(^\text{317}\)

People from rural areas are also drawn to cities by the prospect, real or perceived, of better income and livelihood opportunities, access to education, healthcare and markets, and greater individual liberty and social mobility.

Acknowledging that many IDPs who make for cities do not want to go back to rural areas is also important. Young people and the more educated are particularly averse to returning. The majority of young IDPs in Butembo, DRC, for example, decided to stay in the city because it offered them better socioeconomic conditions and opportunities than their rural places of origin.\(^\text{318}\) A study conducted in Khartoum, Sudan, showed that IDPs with better education, higher levels of economic integration and job security were more intent on staying to establish urban lives.\(^\text{319}\)

Unpacking the push and pull factors and the relationships and overlaps between them is key to understanding when and why displaced people may choose to move to cities, stay there or return to their places of origin. Investments in connecting rural and urban areas and improving socioeconomic and security conditions in areas of origin have been shown to go some way in increasing people’s choices and reducing urban displacement.\(^\text{320}\)

URBAN CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND DISPLACEMENT

Conflict and violence in cities may trigger mass displacement both within and from them, and the damage and destruction wrought may create long-term barriers to return and other durable solutions.\(^\text{321}\) Many of the world’s most recent conflicts have taken place in densely populated urban areas, as evidenced in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Other types of violence that do not reach the threshold of armed conflict may also trigger significant displacement, as seen in Latin American cities affected by criminal and gang violence.

Urban conflict triggers displacement in a number of ways. Warring parties use cities as military bases and as places to hide, and booby traps and sniper fire can turn residents’ everyday routines into potentially life-threatening activities. The use of explosive weapons in densely populated areas causes significant civilian casualties and displacement.\(^\text{322}\) The death toll from conflict in urban areas of Iraq and Syria has been eight times higher than in other areas, and airstrikes and mortar fire have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in the last two years in cities such as Hodeida in Yemen and Raqqa in Syria. The disruption of basic services and the destruction of housing and infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, electricity plants and water mains also have direct, indirect and cumulative impacts.\(^\text{323}\)
Displacement patterns specific to urban conflict and violence have been identified. Some people move to safer neighbourhoods within the same city, as was seen during the battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul. Others may flee further afield and across borders. Parties to a conflict may also seek to exert territorial control in cities by expelling certain political, ethnic or religious groups. This took place in cities such as Baghdad and Aleppo, where residents were segregated and their previously peaceful coexistence shattered.

Such politics of exclusion may persist long after a conflict ends. Sieges have also been used in recent Middle East conflicts, denying people access to food and healthcare and preventing them from fleeing high-risk areas, a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

Destruction, segregation and the presence of booby traps, unexploded ordnance and other explosive hazards are among the main obstacles to return and other durable solutions. Returning refugees and IDPs may unwittingly go back to damaged or destroyed homes or neighbourhoods that are still highly insecure, which may effectively mean they continue to live a life of internal displacement. If the destruction is such that service delivery and urban systems collapse, conflict may also lead to “de-urbanisation”, as seen in towns such as Bentiu and Rubkona in South Sudan’s Unity state in 2013, when an almost complete lack of facilities and services makes it difficult to consider these as urban centres.

Reconstruction costs tend to be extremely high, as the case of Marawi city in the Philippines shows (see Philippines spotlight, p.32). The challenges associated with reconstruction can be overcome, however. A UN planning framework for the reconstruction of Mosul published in January 2019 envisages rebuilding not only homes but also public and social spaces, with particular emphasis on markets. It aims to encourage investment and stimulate the urban economy to create livelihood opportunities for returnees. The restoration of basic services and transport infrastructure is also a priority.

Criminal violence can also have effects comparable with those of a war zone, displacing thousands of people within and from urban centres. Central American cities such as San Pedro Sula in Honduras and San Salvador in El Salvador have some of the highest homicide rates in the world as a result of widespread criminal and gang activity. In other cities, such as Medellin in Colombia, gang violence continues to trigger displacement despite development gains (see Medellin and San Salvador spotlight, p.81).
Medellin is Colombia’s second city with a population of around 2.5 million people. Once considered the most violent in the world, it has successfully reduced poverty and violence over the last decade. Criminal gangs still operate in many peripheral neighbourhoods, however, where they continue to force individuals and families to flee. Estimates put the number of people displaced at between 5,000 and 15,000 a year.

Displacement patterns associated with criminal violence in Medellin are mainly intra-urban, as people move from one neighbourhood to another in search of safety. Where they move to is influenced by a number of factors, including family ties, economic opportunities and the nature of the threats they face. A fifth of respondents in a recent study said they had fled violence more than once. Returns only tend to take place once a new gang has taken control of the area, the reason for flight, such as an unpaid debt, has been resolved or generalised violence has abated. The activities of street gangs appear to trigger most of the displacement.

The same study identified two different types of trigger for displacement: targeted gang violence, including gender-based violence, forced recruitment, extortion and threats against community leaders based on their rights activism; and generalised violence fuelled by shootouts between gangs or clashes between gangs and police that may lead whole neighbourhood blocks to flee.

Medellin’s IDPs tend to share socioeconomic conditions and characteristics. They are usually younger, have more children and are more likely to have been active in their community than their non-displaced peers. They are also likely to incur significant financial and social losses as result of their displacement. Many lack tenure documents for their homes, and for property owners, violence tends to drive down prices. Many IDPs also struggle to find work and afford three meals a day, and children’s education is disrupted even if only temporarily.

Similar patterns emerge in El Salvador’s capital of San Salvador, where insecurity and criminal violence also push people to leave their homes. For those who have been victims of crime or targeted persecution, it is often the only reason they flee. For others, it may be one of several considerations, including economic conditions and family reunification. Other factors are also emerging, such as violence perpetrated by the security forces, drought and food shortages.333

Much of the urban displacement that takes place in El Salvador is effectively invisible, because many of those affected prefer to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. Most, however, is known to take place from informal settlements in peri-urban areas of large towns and cities. IDPs tend to move to safer neighbourhoods in the same city in an effort to minimise disruption to their work, education and family and social networks. If they are unable to find a viable local option, however, or if the threats or violence they face are severe, people will flee further afield, whether it be to another city, department or country. In fact, what was previously a largely intra-urban phenomenon appears to be becoming less so. Some urban-to-rural displacement has been observed and it is thought to be increasing, but many more people choose to leave the country instead.

Several similar patterns emerge in the displacement occurring in Medellin and San Salvador. Much of it takes place in marginal neighbourhoods and many people flee within the same city, to minimise the disruption to their lives, but others flee beyond the city and even country borders. As increasing numbers of case studies shed light on the drivers, triggers and impacts of displacement associated with criminal violence in Latin American cities, the issue can no longer be ignored.334
URBAN DISASTERS AND DISPLACEMENT

The close relationship between rapid and badly managed urbanisation and heightened disaster risk is well recognised. When hazards hit urban areas, the concentration of people and assets and the vulnerability of residents and the built environment can lead to catastrophic outcomes. Displacement associated with disasters has only recently been acknowledged in national policies and international frameworks. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is important in this sense, because it mentions disaster displacement and its risks among the main global challenges to address in ensuring communities and countries are resilient. The New Urban Agenda reinforces this need as it applies to towns and cities.

Given the rapid urbanisation the world is undergoing, people’s exposure and vulnerability to disasters and the displacement they trigger is likely to continue to rise. Many major and expanding urban areas are located in hazard-prone areas such as seismic zones, coasts, deltas and estuaries, and climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of weather-related hazards. Depending on their location, cities may also be exposed to climate change impacts such as sea level rise, coastal erosion, salinisation, extreme temperatures and water scarcity.

Beyond hazard intensity, urban disaster displacement risk is largely determined by the way cities are planned, developed and built. Kathmandu, which has undergone rapid and largely unplanned and informal urban growth in recent decades, is a case in point. Most of the 2.6 million people estimated to have been displaced by the devastating earthquake that struck Nepal in 2015 were living in the country’s capital.

The city’s authorities were already aware about the link between disaster risk and urban development. They had devised a risk-sensitive land use plan for 2010 to 2020, intended to guide urban development that reduced seismic risk and improved disaster resilience. The earthquake severely disrupted Kathmandu’s urban system, but it also became an opportunity to accelerate implementation of the plan, acting as a reminder that

Marginalized communities in the neighbourhood of Iztapalapa, in Mexico City, were still living in displacement a year after the 2017 earthquake, at risk of flooding and diseases. Photo: IDMC/Vicente Anzellini, August 2018
robust urban planning, land use regulation, zoning and building standards are vital in reducing urban disaster and displacement risk. The same applies in other cities and for other hazards, particularly floods that displace large numbers of people every year (see Flood displacement risk spotlight, p.84).341

Stark differences exist within cities in how risk is distributed. Disaster impacts are often highly localised and affect only a small proportion of the urban population. There is, in effect, an urban segregation of disaster and displacement risk.342 Not all areas of Rio de Janeiro, for example, are exposed to flooding and landslides and not all homes are vulnerable to destruction. Those that are often lack water and sanitation infrastructure, a common feature of low-income neighbourhoods and informal settlements.343

Urban poverty and inequality play a significant role in the dynamics of urban disasters and the distribution of displacement risk. In cities such as in Mumbai and Kolkata in India, high levels of exposure to hazards such as floods combine with high levels of vulnerability, poor education and limited access to critical infrastructure and livelihood opportunities.344 This not only increases displacement risk and impacts. Recovery also takes longer if people do not have the financial resources to rebuild or move elsewhere and impoverishment contributes to making displacement protracted.

Unplanned and poorly managed urban growth combine with poverty to aggravate the impacts of disaster displacement. Urban expansion has grown in parallel to Nigeria’s economic boom, but the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty continues to rise.345 Lagos, Nigeria’s economic hub, is growing rapidly and is soon expected to become one of the world’s 20 most populated cities.346 The city has attracted investment in recent years and more roads and other infrastructure have been built, reducing its water run-off capacity, and poor drainage systems are unable to cope with the rainy season. The result is urban flooding.347 The poor, who make up most of the city’s residents, are disproportionately affected and many are displaced, as happened most notably in 2012 and again last year.

Corruption is also a pervasive underlying driver of urban disaster displacement risk. Mexico City, for example, has stringent construction standards, but corruption continues to compromise compliance. This can have serious consequences as witnessed in the 2017 earth-quake when many buildings that were not compliant with the building code collapsed.348 The recovery process was also blighted by a lack of transparency.349 Civil society organisations have developed promising approaches to challenging and tackling corruption before, during and after disasters, but a better understanding is needed of how it continues to impact risk levels and people affected, including IDPs.350

Most future displacement associated with disasters is expected to take place in urban settings. Disasters also have the potential to cause the collapse of urban systems, markets and supply chains, with short and long-term implications for cities’ residents and economies. As such, displacement should become part of a broader conversation about the reduction and management of urban disaster risk that also covers planning, governance and poverty reduction.
FLOOD DISPLACEMENT RISK

An urban perspective

Flooding is a common hazard that affects towns and cities around the world, meaning that mitigating the risk of urban flooding would considerably reduce future disaster displacement. IDMC improved its global disaster displacement risk model for floods, and results show that around 80 per cent of the people at risk of displacement associated with riverine flooding live in urban and peri-urban areas.

By using more granular exposure data for its modelling and disaggregating the results by urban and rural locations, IDMC was able to calculate that on average 17.8 million people worldwide are at risk of being displaced by floods every year, far more than previously thought.

Eighty per cent, or 14.2 million, live in urban and peri-urban areas (see Figure 20). Flood displacement risk is highest in South Asia and East Asia and Pacific, and also high in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 21).

The model also allows the assessment of displacement risk at the subnational level to reveal hotspots, which unsurprisingly are urban areas. Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh and home to more than nine million people, is traversed by six rivers that have been vital to trade, transport and livelihoods for centuries. In recent years, however, rapid urbanisation and badly managed embankment and drainage schemes have increased the risk of flooding and waterlogging.351

FIGURE 20: Global flood displacement risk
As the city continues to expand, this risk will grow with the city’s population unless adequate measures to reduce it are put in place. By revealing where in Dhaka flood displacement risk is concentrated, the results identify areas where interventions are most needed (see Figure 22). Such metrics are useful to decision-makers at the local, national and global level to inform planning and investments in disaster risk reduction. This in turn will help to prevent displacement and reduce its impacts.

Given that no climate change scenarios were applied to the model and that it uses current levels of exposure, future climate variations and urban growth have the potential to increase the displacement risk revealed significantly.
From large-scale infrastructure projects to local gentrification initiatives, urban development can trigger displacement. The construction of infrastructure, the upgrading of neighbourhoods and gradual changes in housing markets can force people to move with little or no respect for their rights, including to relocation and compensation. The scale, severity and visibility of this type of displacement vary depending on the project or change taking place, and there are also significant differences in the phenomenon between countries and regions.

Data is sparse and difficult to obtain, and greater efforts are needed to fill this significant information gap. There is currently no global estimate of the scale of displacement associated with development projects, but the first attempts to compile one reveal significant risk in urban areas (see Box 7).

Development-based displacement may be a slow process that evolves over months or even years, but it sometimes takes the form of sudden movements when people are evicted. Evictions are not by definition unlawful, but there are concerns that in reality many are because they violate people’s rights (see Nairobi spotlight, p.88). Displacement to make way for development projects is often justified as being in the public interest, but it often lacks the prospect of durable solutions for those affected.\(^{352}\)

The UN’s Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement recognise that forced evictions “share many consequences similar to those resulting from arbitrary displacement” as defined in the Guiding Principles. They also highlight the fact that forced evictions violate the right to housing. The guidelines, together with the right to adequate housing, constitute a strong normative framework to guide policy and practice on urban housing and neighbourhood regeneration that prevent displacement and reduce its impacts.\(^{353}\)

Adopting a human rights approach to make visible the challenges of displacement, evictions and resettlement

Box 7. Development and displacement: an urban glimpse of a global issue

IDMC began to explore approaches to estimating the number of people at risk of being displaced by development projects in 2017. One such approach was to review data on projects funded by the World Bank, which represent only a fraction of those that involve displacing or relocating people, but on which documentation was available.\(^{354}\)

The World Bank has some of the most rigorous environmental and social standards and reporting requirements for infrastructure investments. It is one of the few institutions to publish resettlement plans.\(^{355}\) An analysis of nearly 600 of its resettlement plans, published between 2014 and 2017, identified more than 130,000 people at risk of displacement in 77 countries. Most of the projects assessed were in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia and Pacific.

Taking the projects in the dataset that could be geolocated, 70 per cent of the people at risk of displacement were identified as living in urban and peri-urban areas. The project’s scale and nature varied from small and highly localised to medium and large-scale initiatives, some of which cut across municipalities, provinces or, in the case of roads and pipelines, even countries. Some also cut across sectors.

Efforts to fully understand and report on this phenomenon are still in their infancy, but new methodologies and technologies such as satellite imagery analysis, economic and built environment growth projections and demographic change analysis offer the prospect of gradually painting a comprehensive picture.
Many questions about displacement associated with developments projects arise, among them the role of the private sector. States are the ultimate duty bearers when it comes to addressing the impacts of displacement, but this does not absolve other parties of all responsibility. A better understanding is needed of how real-estate and other private sector investments trigger urban displacement, and how they can play a role in reducing displacement risk.

Gentrification has played an increasingly significant role in urban demographic change and displacement. In cities of emerging and high-income economies and neighbourhoods, it often involves large capital investments in urban renewal processes that lead to changes in the built environment and land-use of an unattractive neighbourhood to raise its socioeconomic status. It can also result in evictions and other forms of displacement.

High gentrification rates in San Francisco have made many neighbourhoods increasingly unaffordable to local residents, leading to the displacement of some lower-income families. Large numbers of evictions are recorded in the US every year, but little information is available on how long those affected are displaced for. The relationship between gentrification and displacement generally is complex, and its drivers, patterns and impacts poorly understood.

Homelessness can be also linked to gentrification in some situations. The relationship between displacement and homelessness is hard to define, however, and differentiating between homeless people and IDPs can be difficult, particularly in urban settings. Yet, it is unlikely that most homeless people would be considered IDPs, and many displaced people have shelter and do not consider themselves homeless. The two groups do, however, tend to suffer similar discrimination, marginalisation, impoverishment and human rights violations.

The data and knowledge gaps on urban displacement associated with development projects should not detract from the significance of the phenomenon. In an ever-more urbanised world, people forced to move by development, renewal and expansion in towns and cities should not be left behind.
NAIROBI
Development and displacement

Nairobi is one of the fastest growing cities in the world. Natural population increase, international migrants and refugees, IDPs and internal economic migrants have all contributed to shaping the urban landscape and demography.

Ethnic, political and economic disputes over land and property have also played a part in the Kenyan capital’s development for decades. Powerful groups have carved the city up to their benefit through land acquisition and evictions.

These dynamics have created a city divided by income and ethnicity, in which half of the population is concentrated in just two per cent of the metropolitan area. Electoral violence and disasters have triggered urban displacement, and the city’s social and spatial divergence aggravate the risk of new and secondary movements.

More than 30,000 people were evicted from an informal settlement in July 2018 to make way for a road. The project and its consequences were justified as being in the public interest. The Kenya Urban Roads Authority, the National Land Commission and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights reached an agreement before the evictions took place meaning that, on paper at least, the process was legal.

Kenya’s 2012 law on internal displacement states that when no feasible alternatives exist, the government is obliged to seek the free and informed consent of the people to be displaced by a development project, and is responsible for providing those affected with a durable solution.

In reality, however, people were evicted without adequate notice, and homes and schools were bulldozed. The situation was condemned by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, who said “the destruction of houses, schools and a place of worship in one of the poorest communities of Kenya flies in the face of commitments made by the government to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.”

Nairobi illustrates the problems that many cities in low and middle-income countries will face in the coming decades if the risk and drivers of urban displacement are not addressed. The quality of infrastructure and the way it is built will play an important role in determining the risks and impacts of displacement, as will the types of governance and accountability mechanisms in place to oversee and manage urban development.
URBAN DISPLACEMENT IMPACTS AND CONDITIONS

When IDPs arrive in an urban area, they face challenges and opportunities determined by its character, demographic composition, spatial layout, infrastructure, socioeconomic dynamics and governance.379 Their experience and ability to adapt will also depend on their gender, ethnic and cultural background, economic resources and social networks before and after their displacement. Any thorough analysis of urban displacement also needs to consider how its impacts differ from those observed in rural areas and camps, and how responses may also have to vary in terms of timeframes, stakeholders, approaches and financing.

In the Nigerian city of Maiduguri, for example, pre-existing unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities affect both IDPs and host communities, and the former face challenges in accessing credit and engaging in economic activities. Displaced women in particular struggle to find work and integrate into urban life. That said, insecurity, freedom of movement restrictions and even more limited livelihood opportunities in rural areas still make Maiduguri a destination for many.380

By contrast, many IDPs who were forced to flee to Iraqi cities during waves of violence in 2014 and 2015 were able to establish lives in their new urban environments. People who moved from one urban area to another found it easier than IDPs from rural areas to get informal and temporary work and make a living. Public sector workers also found it easier than their counterparts in the private sector to re-engage in work and earn an income.381

How IDPs navigate and adapt to urban spaces varies from city to city and between different groups and individuals. There is little evidence about the different impacts of urban displacement on IDPs, host communities and marginalised groups, but urban profiling exercises are particularly useful in establishing a better understanding and should be a priority so as to inform tailored responses (see Spotlight, p.90).382

That said, urban IDPs also face many similar impacts and challenges across cities, countries and regions (see Figure 23).

FIGURE 23: Urban displacement: main impacts on IDPs383

- **LIVELIHOODS**
  Jobs are more readily available in urban than in rural areas or camps, and cities may support self-reliance in the long run. Urban IDPs’ economic conditions, however, tend to be similar to if not worse than those of the urban poor. They often have lower incomes and only limited social networks, making it even harder for them to adapt to their new environment. Farmers and agricultural workers who flee from rural areas tend to find their skills are irrelevant in the city.

- **HEALTH**
  Cities tend to offer better access to health services than rural areas, but the overcrowded conditions in which many IDPs live, with little or no access to safe water and sanitation, increase the risk of diseases for them and their hosts alike. The mental health implications of displacement are also widely acknowledged but tend to be overlooked.

- **EDUCATION**
  Cities offer better education opportunities than rural areas. Urban IDPs tend to prioritise education over other services because it is transferrable human capital that may be key to rebuilding their lives. During urban crises, however, schools may be used as emergency shelters. They may also be damaged or destroyed during conflict or disasters. Ensuring education for displaced children as well as those from host communities should be a priority.

- **ENVIRONMENT**
  Large influxes of IDPs into already overpopulated urban areas may rapidly increase water and soil pollution, and create challenges in terms of solid waste. Cities should be prepared and able to adapt their waste management, sanitation and water infrastructure to cope with mass displacement.

- **HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE**
  Many urban IDPs live in overcrowded, sub-standard conditions. They often settle in the poorest peripheral neighbourhoods where their informal arrangements make them particularly vulnerable to eviction and abuse from landlords. IDPs regularly cite rent as one of their main expenses. Ensuring they have access to adequate housing with secure tenure should be a priority for urban authorities. Lack of access to adequate infrastructure may drive new and secondary displacement.

- **SECURITY**
  On one level cities provide IDPs anonymity and security, but informal settlements and poorly managed collective centres may also carry risks. Displaced women, children and other vulnerable groups may be subject to abuse, harassment and violence. Young IDPs in some cities may be exposed to criminal violence and forced to join gangs.

- **SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE**
  Cities offer more potential than camps for social mobility and local integration, but many urban IDPs find themselves isolated and marginalised because of their backgrounds. Creating ties with host communities is essential to support their integration. Authorities should also take a participatory approach to decision-making by including IDPs and local residents in the process.
Effective interventions to address internal displacement depend on robust and trusted evidence of its impacts. The complexity of displacement dynamics in cities, however, makes collecting such data particularly challenging. For a start, urban IDPs tend to be less visible than those in camps because they do not all live in one area, which makes them difficult to reach with assistance and protection measures.

Profiling exercises strengthen the evidence on urban internal displacement by bringing stakeholders together to collaborate in collecting and analysing data. This provides the basis for information to be more relevant and useful in informing the pursuit of durable solutions. The process involves analysing not only IDPs’ needs, but also those of the general population living in the same area to better understand how both groups are affected by displacement.

To best capture the diverse experiences of urban displacement, a combination of complementary data collection methods is used. This normally includes enumeration, sample-based household surveys, interviews with key informants, focus group discussions and a review of secondary data. This mixed methods approach has proven the most effective in establishing a shared and in-depth understanding of the challenges that urban IDPs and their hosts face.

A series of profiling exercises in cities in Somalia, Iraq and Syria have yielded a number of important lessons that have helped to refine the methodology and scope of the process and adapt it to other urban displacement situations.

An exercise conducted in Mogadishu in 2014 and 2015 mapped and enumerated informal settlements, which helped to identify IDPs and differentiate them from their hosts. The analysis highlighted the specific challenges IDPs faced in different areas of the city where little or no information on their conditions previously existed. The exercise only covered displaced populations in specific settlements and not in the entire city, but its results have been useful to the local authorities in Mogadishu in supporting durable solutions.

With the Mogadishu experience in mind, a second exercise conducted in the Iraqi city of Erbil in 2015 and 2016 adopted an area-based approach. It provided a holistic and comparative analysis not only of IDPs and non-displaced populations, but different areas of the city as well. The results also informed broader local authority plans for issues such as service delivery, which benefit IDPs and their hosts alike. The exercise was not, however, able to analyse the pressure displacement puts on service provision. A main takeaway was the need for more specific urban planning expertise and additional time and resources to generate more detailed results.

These considerations in turn were built into a series of profiling exercises under way in various Syrian cities. They include the identification of gaps between the population’s needs and the city’s capacity to meet them. Understanding urban systems and their capacity to respond to IDPs’ needs is the next important step to incorporate into urban displacement profiling.

The lessons learned from these and other displacement profiling exercises have made a significant contribution to good data collection and analysis practices for urban crises. Forging stronger partnerships and encouraging joint planning among humanitarian and development responders, technical experts, local authorities and others is key to helping urban IDPs overcome the challenges brought on by displacement.

Source: JIPS
These impacts are not only barriers to durable solutions and sustainable urban development. They may also function as triggers and drivers of new and secondary displacement. Many IDPs fleeing conflict, disasters and lack of livelihoods in rural areas of Somalia have made for the capital, Mogadishu, in search of safety and opportunity. Once there, however, they face overcrowded housing conditions, insecure tenure and only limited access to basic services and infrastructure. They also have difficulty finding livelihood and income-generating opportunities and are at high risk violence, including gender-based violence. Poverty, marginalisation and extortion, forced evictions and disasters push many into secondary displacement.386

Similar challenges in managing displacement in major urban centres occur in other countries and regions. Not only are cities difficult to govern. Large influxes of people put further strain on already fragile systems. The speed and scale of displacement into urban areas tends to significantly outpace regular urbanisation processes. This in turn means that urban systems, including planning processes, services, markets and financing instruments, need to adjust much more quickly to displacement than they otherwise would usually do.387

EMPLOYMENT, HOUSING AND BASIC SERVICES: URBAN GOVERNANCE OF DISPLACEMENT

Internal displacement creates a wide range of challenges for urban systems. If local authorities are unable to cope and respond effectively, its impacts are borne almost entirely by IDPs and their hosts, fuelling further vulnerability and displacement risk. Cities’ capacity to support IDPs and create opportunities for them is central to reducing such risk, and local and national authorities have a key role to play in ensuring they are able to achieve durable solutions.388

This section covers three areas which will be critical to preventing, avoiding and reducing the impacts of urban displacement: first, the employment opportunities affecting IDPs’ self-reliance and local integration; second, the role of adequate housing in reducing the risk of new, secondary and protracted displacement; and finally, the ways in which basic infrastructure and services can help both IDPs and those at risk of displacement to improve their living conditions and wellbeing.

Political participation and urban governance cut across all three of these areas. An inclusive city is all the more likely to be able to address and reduce displacement. The consultation and participation of IDPs and their hosts in governance and decision-making would also directly shape their lives and increase the likelihood of their being able to achieve durable solutions.

Employment and livelihoods

One of the main concerns for displaced people is to ensure a livelihood and regular income. Doing so is vital to improving their self-reliance and preventing their displacement from becoming protracted.389 It also helps them to integrate socially, reduce their dependence on government and humanitarian aid and contribute to the local economy.390

The potential for IDPs to integrate economically and improve their overall situation over time is greatest in urban areas.391 A distinct advantage of cities can be that the range of opportunities expands, particularly for those who previously lived in rural areas and had less diversified sources of income, provided the right conditions are in place.392 Higher employment figures do not necessarily mean a higher employment rate, but evidence shows that cities tend to provide more opportunities, and that job prospects tend to be better in larger, more economically diverse cities.393

There is relatively little information about the extent to which displaced people are able to take advantage of these opportunities, but research suggests that more than half of the IDPs displaced by conflict for whom location data is available live in urban areas. Given that almost half among them are of the working age, they should in theory at least be in a position to benefit from the better access to employment cities offer.394 More detailed data would help to enrich these types of analyses.

IDPs’ economic activity may also have positive impacts on urban areas, and their skills and enterprise may benefit host communities. Somali refugees and Ethiopian IDPs in Addis Ababa trade with their areas of origin and bring in goods, contributing to a vibrant local economy in the Ethiopian capital.395 IDPs and refu-
Gees have also helped to diversify the local economy Kitchanga in DRC’s North Kivu province, where many young displaced people have found alternative livelihoods. Some have even managed to buy land and settle permanently.396

That said, large influxes of displaced people over a short period of time can have adverse local effects on local economies, at least initially, in many cases driving down wages while increasing rents.397 This in turn makes it more difficult for IDPs to settle temporarily or permanently, particularly if the city concerned already had high unemployment or underemployment before their arrival.

Years of conflict and insecurity in and around the Nigerian city of Maiduguri have decimated the local economy. The regional employment rate was less than 30 per cent in 2017, and many local markets and businesses have had to close.398 Instead of finding new livelihood opportunities in the city, IDPs only receive humanitarian assistance. This not only has the potential to make them more vulnerable and marginalised, it also puts further strain on a local government already struggling to provide the city’s displaced people with food, water and shelter.399

When formal employment opportunities are scarce, informal labour and businesses emerge. UN data shows that more than half of the labour force and more than 90 per cent of small and medium enterprises worldwide are involved in the informal economy.400 This reality presents both challenges and opportunities.

Informal local economies help urban IDPs to foster livelihood opportunities and self-reliance.401 For many of those in Soacha, on the outskirts of Bogota, informal labour remains their only source of income even after several years of displacement.402 Many IDPs and refugees in the Ugandan capital of Kampala have also adopted informal livelihood strategies to cope with displacement in an urban environment where jobs are scarce.403

The informal sector, however, often involves discrimination and the exploitation of IDPs, and may encourage dangerous or high-risk activities. The average day rate for casual construction work in Goma, the capital of DRC’s North Kivu province, is normally $1.80, but IDPs earn as little as $1.20.404 A profiling exercise in Mogadishu showed that almost half of IDPs were working as day labourers, compared with 36 per cent of economic migrants and 30 per cent of host community members in the same informal settlements.405
The hardship of internal displacement may also push children into work. Many displaced Afghan children earn money as street vendors or car washers, which exposes them to the risk of road accidents, abuse and violence. Displaced women too face specific challenges in terms of employment and livelihood opportunities in cities. In 2016, around 68 per cent of unemployed IDPs in Ukraine were women. Many displaced women in Abuja, Nigeria, resorted to self-employment and remained either unemployed or outside of formal labour markets.

Addressing these challenges will require investment in both the formal and informal institutions of labour markets rather than offering one-off income generating initiatives. This may include providing IDPs and host communities with the documentation they need to engage in formal work, offering incentives such as tax breaks or wage subsidies to businesses that employ displaced and other disadvantaged people, and developing and investing in long-term economic growth strategies at the municipal level that consider the implications of population influxes on labour supply and demand.

Accepting that informal labour markets are a reality in many cities may be the first step in ensuring they contribute to solutions for both displaced people and the urban poor. There is increasing evidence from across the globe that the risks associated with informal employment, as with housing and services, are reduced when formal systems accommodate and find provisions for less regulated markets.

Involving IDPs and unemployed urban residents in city development may help to release them from the poverty trap many find themselves in. Instead of evicting vendors who trade in goods from their areas of origin, negotiating their regulated use of market space supports small businesses and self-employment with relatively little investment from local authorities. Many informal settlements are places of small-scale economic activity where people set up home or street-based enterprises that often coalesce to form complex economies.

Understanding and improving the livelihoods and skills that IDPs bring with them and providing vocational training helps to support their local integration. The skills IDPs bring from rural areas can become irrelevant in urban settings, and helping them to develop new capacities benefits both them and their host cities. Humanitarian approaches such as cash-based assistance have also shown promise in urban displacement situations. Cash is a cost-effective means of support and it gives beneficiaries more choice and flexibility in their spending. It also helps to reinvigorate local markets and trade rather than dampening them as in-kind assistance does can. Importantly, people are not passive recipients of relief but rather play an active role in revitalizing local urban economies. It requires a detailed understanding of market systems, products and services and local-level demand, but it is increasingly seen as a potential way of moving from humanitarian to longer-term development interventions.

More important than targeted programmes, perhaps, are broader changes to institutional arrangements. These include local trade and business incentives, labour market regulations, access to banking and insurance policies that facilitate the generation of employment opportunities.

IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Mosul, for example, were employed by local small businesses involved in city’s reconstruction and recovery process. This combined with self-build support for housing facilitated the return of IDPs and refugees and helped to reinvigorate whole neighbourhoods and local urban economies. Other positive examples exist, mainly involving refugees, but they offer valuable lessons applicable to urban IDPs.

Housing, land and property

Finding shelter is among IDPs’ main priorities, and its provision is a core priority for those involved in humanitarian responses to crises. Beyond crises, the provision of housing becomes a matter for urban planners, municipal authorities and community organisations, and lies at the centre of unlocking the challenges associated with urban displacement. Many countries, however, do not do enough to guarantee their IDPs’ housing, land and property (HLP) rights, an old and unresolved issue that requires renewed attention.

Urban centres tend to offer more housing stock than rural areas, but that does not necessarily mean that urban IDPs and poor residents find it easy to access adequate and affordable housing. Even if they do, they may struggle to secure tenure over their homes. This issue tends to be overlooked or poorly addressed by national and local authorities, but tenure insecurity is a significant driver of urban displacement risk.
There are many forms of tenure, from freehold and public or private rental agreements to cooperative, customary and even religious systems. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. Which of these arrangements are available to IDPs newly arrived in urban areas and how they provide them and hosts with secure tenure influences the extent to which they are able adapt to their new situations (see Box 8).

Tenure insecurity is often driven by IDPs’ and poor urban dwellers’ search for affordable places to live. Housing costs in some cases account for up to three-quarters of their monthly income. This leaves many, particularly newly, displaced people with little or no option but to live in informal and unregulated settlements that tend to be overcrowded, insecure and lacking in services. As such, the housing challenges urban IDPs face involve not only unaffordability but also inadequacy and precariousness.

In the DRC city of Goma, for example, both displaced and host communities lack adequate housing and access to sanitation and hygiene, but IDPs have less tenure security and are at greater risk of forced eviction.

Box 8. Tenure ambiguity in Afghanistan and Vanuatu

Many Afghan IDPs live in informal settlements in and around Kabul, where ambiguity over land ownership makes it difficult for many to obtain formal deeds or rental agreements. It also facilitates land grabs and the occupation of empty homes and other buildings by returning IDPs and refugees.

The latter phenomenon is aggravated by the fact that many refugees returning to Afghanistan find their own homes have been occupied by other displaced people or local power brokers, effectively meaning they return to a life of internal displacement. Even those who have deeds may struggle to reclaim their property because mechanisms to resolve legal disputes are ineffective.

The lack of clear tenure has led to conflict over land disputes, harassment, unjustified rent increases and evictions without due process, all of which have triggered secondary displacements. The government developed policies on tenure security and the upgrading of informal settlements in 2006 and 2013, but implementation of their provisions has been slow.

In Port Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, customary and newly introduced tenure arrangements exist side-by-side, creating a hybrid legal system that makes it difficult to settle land disputes and is often applied arbitrarily. Powerful public and private elites use the grey areas to justify forced evictions, in some cases of whole communities.

These have altered the cityscape and pushed its boundaries out into peripheral areas of a city that has not planned adequately for such expansion. The new displacement policy that Vanuatu adopted in 2018 is still to address these regulatory and legal issues, to the detriment of Port Vila’s IDPs.

Some resort to taking out loans to cover their rent payments in an effort to avoid being evicted, leading to unsustainable debt burdens. Long-term housing policies and urban planning and the implementation of regulations and municipal housing programmes are needed to mitigate and address such issues.
Reconstruction, resettlement and the right to housing

Transparent HLP rights and processes for settling disputes are vital to the resolution of urban displacement.\(^{427}\) Therefore, the establishment of tenure security and guarantees of housing rights for displaced and host communities should be included in conflict prevention, disaster risk reduction and durable solutions initiatives. They also need to be part of transitional justice, peace-building and reconciliation processes in the aftermath of conflicts.

The same issues are fundamental in ensuring sustainable returns for IDPs and refugees, and reducing the risk of new and secondary displacement.\(^{428}\) In this sense land and property disputes in places of origin can be both a cause and consequence of displacement.

There are numerous accounts in Sudan, for example, of the government forcibly evicting the new occupants of abandoned homes to allow IDPs to return, fuelling new tensions and triggering further displacement.\(^{429}\) Recent reconstruction efforts in Syria also show that in the absence of transparent HLP rights, resettlement schemes contribute to the wilful appropriation of IDPs’ property (see Spotlight, p.96).

Many cities have undertaken major gentrification and neighbourhood upgrade projects that involve large-scale resettlement programmes for slum dwellers as well as displaced populations. Such initiatives carry impoverishment risks that need to be addressed particularly when, as if often the case, approaches seem to deal with the symptoms rather than the causes of lack of adequate housing.\(^{430}\)
Eight years of civil war have left around a third of the Syria’s urban housing stock in ruins. As the government retakes control of towns and cities across the country, reconstruction is beginning, but evidence suggests that segregation and displacement are being used as part of the process to consolidate the state’s authority and reward its supporters. New HLP laws have also been passed that raise questions about how IDPs and other groups will be included in the reconstruction process.

The government adopted a law in April 2018 that speeds up expropriation procedures to support the reconstruction effort and “redesign unauthorised or illegal housing areas”. Known as Law No. 10, it is an extension of Decree 66, a measure first implemented in the Damascus area. The new law initially established a deadline of just 30 days for people to prove ownership over property subject to expropriation, but this was extended to a year in November under international pressure.

Once the deadline has passed, people will not be compensated and property rights will revert to the state or local authorities. This has the potential to disproportionately affect Syria’s 6.1 million IDPs and more than 5.7 million refugees, many of whom are likely to find it hard to prove ownership, whether because they have lost documentation, are unaware of the new legislation or are unable to travel to deal with the formalities required. Many land registries have also been destroyed during the war.

Nor does Law No. 10 provide for enough compensation and assistance, making it difficult for former residents to re-establish themselves in their areas of origin. This has the potential both to prevent IDPs returning and cause new displacement.

The law applies to informal and unplanned settlements where residents lack building permits or property titles. Even before the conflict, between 30 and 50 per cent of the population lived in such areas, meaning that it has the potential to significantly change the demographic and spatial composition of Syrian cities.

There are concerns that Law No. 10 and other HLP regulations will be used to consolidate the government’s authority to the detriment of its opponents, as highlighted by the case of Basateen al-Razi neighbourhood in Damascus. An informal settlement associated with the opposition, its working and lower middle-class residents were evicted to make way for Marota City, an upmarket real estate project. Other legislation imposes strict security clearances for property transactions, ostensibly an anti-terrorism measure, and provides for the confiscation of property owned by people who failed to do military service.

Given that around half of Syria’s pre-war population has been displaced during the conflict, resolving HLP issues will have to be a first and central step toward nationwide peace-building and stability. In its current form, however, Law No. 10 appears to benefit only a small fraction of the population, raising serious questions about its role in the post-conflict recovery process.
The Brazilian government, for example, launched a flagship programme known as *Minha Casa Minha Vida*, or My House My Life, in 2008 to build a million homes across the country in four years. The focus, however, was on quantity over quality, and led to millions of people being resettled into poor-quality houses in peripheral urban areas, far from their jobs and amenities.441 Lessons from a similar approach four decades earlier clearly had not been learned. Nearly 30 per cent of Rio’s informal settlers were moved to marginal areas of the city in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ultimately creating new *favelas* with high levels of insecurity and poverty, and with it driving new displacement risk.

| New approaches to addressing housing challenges |

Despite attempts to raise global awareness of the importance of housing, not least with the New Urban Agenda and SDG 11, more than a billion urban dwellers across the world are thought not to have decent accommodation or tenure security. Many if not most cities across the world, even those unaffected by displacement, have shortages of affordable and adequate housing.442

**Box 9. Matching housing policies to IDPs’ specific needs in Colombia**

Colombia has one of the highest numbers of people displaced by conflict globally, and new displacements associated with both conflict and disasters take place every year. The government has created robust legislation to address the challenges of internal displacement, but as the national ombudsman’s office highlighted in a 2014 report, there was an important law and policy gap on making housing accessible and affordable to IDPs. It said housing legislation failed to reflect IDPs specific vulnerabilities, and called for taking a differentiated approach toward IDPs as a vulnerable group.445

The Constitutional Court made a similar point in 2016 when it ruled that the government had made only “medium to low” progress in providing them with housing. It also noted that some urban municipalities had been allocated funds to build homes without having been consulted to ascertain if they had enough land available for their construction. It called on the government to expedite targeted action to fill this and other gaps.446

The housing ministry responded by issuing a decree in late 2017 that revised the housing legislation and included a differentiated approach toward IDPs.447 The decree considers people displaced by both conflict and disasters, and establishes key actions and the lead institutions accountable for them. Social and other housing policies now need to consider IDPs recognising their specific situations.

Such efforts to match national housing policy with IDPs’ needs are commendable, but questions remain open, such as how many IDPs will benefit, how resilient the homes provided will be to disasters, how safe and secure their location will be, and which livelihood opportunities will be available. In short, the extent to which the legal reforms will support IDPs in achieving durable solutions beyond the provision of four walls and a roof remains to be seen.
A number of promising approaches to tackle IDPs’ housing challenges have been developed over the past decades, many of them originally designed to address the general scarcity of urban housing and then adapted to the pursuit of durable solutions. They can broadly be divided into housing approaches and area-based approaches, the former including incremental housing schemes and purchase certificates targeting individuals’ needs and the latter broader schemes such as neighbourhood upgrades, incremental tenure, support grants and cooperative development initiatives.

As with informal labour markets, recognising that housing and urban development in many cities are driven by informal processes is an important step toward finding ways to build on existing potential. In Latin America, for example, more housing per square kilometre of city is built and maintained by informal settlers than by governments and developers. Accepting this reality implies adopting new approaches that find ways of turning temporary answers to housing crises into sustainable solutions for all.

Mariupol municipality in Ukraine, for example, recognised a need to provide IDPs with the option of affordable rented accommodation as well as the opportunity of buying property. It developed a “rent to own” initiative, in which a range of stakeholders including an international development bank, the local government, civil society organisations and contractors have come together to create affordable housing options for IDPs. Those eligible received homes with a contract that gives them title deeds to their rented property after 10 years.

Venezuela tested cooperative approaches in Petare, the largest informal settlement of the capital Caracas. The idea was to facilitate the securing of loans for a group of families and close communities against the value of larger properties. To do so, informal settlers were given land rights under collective rather than individual lease agreements. This approach could be applied to urban displacement situations when it becomes clear that IDPs are unable or do not want to return to their areas of origin. It would allow them to invest into their homes and neighbourhoods while reducing the risk of gentrification and secondary displacement in the long-term.

These examples are promising steps in the right direction, but three major challenges remain: the availability of data on numbers of IDPs, their capacities and requirements; legal obstacles; and the financial sustainability of subsidised housing schemes. In Mariupol, the last two combine resulting in limitations to the support made available. National budget allocations to the local authorities do not account for IDPs and at the same time, IDPs are not locally registered, leaving them unable to exercise their right to vote and with little leverage over local officials.

Basic services and resilient infrastructure

The provision of services, like housing, lies at the heart of urban planning and development. Access to water, sanitation, healthcare, education, security and transport determine the living conditions of all urban dwellers. They are also central to IDPs’ ability to integrate locally, and to addressing and reducing urban displacement more broadly.

The SDGs reflect the global significance of these services and the infrastructure required to deliver them. SDG 3 covers health, SDG 4 education, SDG 6 water and sanitation, and SDG 9 infrastructure, including transport. SDG 11, the urban goal, also calls for better service provision as part of its call for safe and affordable housing. Targets 11.1 and 11.5 emphasise the importance of access to healthcare, drinking water, sanitation and social protection programmes. One of the Sendai framework’s seven targets focuses on reducing the disruption of basic services associated with disasters.

Many cities, however, have a serious shortfalls in terms of coverage, quality and affordability. Only 43 per cent of the urban population in low-income countries have access to basic sanitation. Fewer than one in ten settlements for IDPs in Haiti meet minimum standards for water, sanitation and hygiene. Provision is inadequate for most displaced households in Kathmandu. Twenty per cent of IDPs in Libya live in former schools or warehouses without adequate sanitation. Evidence from countries in eastern Europe and Central Asia shows that urban IDPs are more likely to be dissatisfied with the public health services they receive than their non-displaced counterparts, even 10 or 15 years after their displacement.

Shortfalls in urban service provision are often combined with or are the result of infrastructure gaps, which may also contribute to segregation, tensions, conflict and disaster risk. Many urban areas in low and middle-income countries have poor infrastructure, which means...
local authorities may also struggle to cope with mass displacement, whether to or within their cities.\textsuperscript{462}

\section*{Disruption of basic services}

The extent of basic services disruption and infrastructure damage caused by urban conflict may be make some cities all but uninhabitable. It has the potential to cause the collapse of entire city systems and can have cumulative or indirect effects that ripple out into peri-urban and even rural areas.\textsuperscript{463} The restoration of services is a vital element in establishing conditions conducive to IDPs’ sustainable return.

In western Mosul, were most of the fighting against ISIL in the Iraqi city took place, critical infrastructure including nine out of 13 hospitals was severely damaged. Medical staff also fled, bringing health services to a virtual standstill and obliging people in need of treatment to move to eastern areas of the city. Many IDPs who have returned to Mosul still live in damaged or destroyed homes without access to services.\textsuperscript{464}

Disasters also regularly destroy critical infrastructure and disrupt service delivery, and the effects may continue to be felt long after the event. Typhoon Haiyan caused widespread damage in the Philippine city of Tacloban in 2013. Seventeen health facilities, including two public and five private hospitals, were affected, more than 90 per cent of education facilities were severely damaged and most power lines were brought down. Tacloban’s recovery has been effective given the extent of the damage, but Haiyan was a powerful reminder of the importance of building disaster-resilient infrastructure.\textsuperscript{465}

\section*{Dealing with the infrastructure and service gap}

Not only is critical infrastructure indispensable for service provision, it also plays a role in determining future displacement risk, and current practices in many cities may be increasing rather than reducing it.\textsuperscript{466} In the US, for example, aging and decaying infrastructure and the way in which urban development has been conceived and implemented in recent decades have been major drivers of flood risk. Not only is the risk of flooding increasing, but its impacts also tend to be concentrated in poorer areas.\textsuperscript{467}

Approaches that aim to address infrastructure gaps at the same time as integrating informal neighbourhoods and systems into the broader city have been developed in recent decades, and many of these, once again, in Latin America. Along with housing, these initiatives have placed significant emphasis on transport infrastructure, to the extent that “the most effective urban policies were transport policies”.\textsuperscript{468}

Projects such as cable cars and express bus networks that connected low-income neighbourhoods with city centres became known as “urban acupuncture”, applying pressure and change to a small part of a city with positive effects for the whole system. Urban acupuncture became a key strategy in cities including Medellin in Colombia and Curitiba in Brazil, and on other continents, with important lessons for efforts to address urban displacement about the significance of infrastructure in fostering inclusion (see Box 10, p.100).\textsuperscript{469}

Service provision and infrastructure development before, during and after crises plays a significant role in shaping IDPs’ vulnerabilities and the patterns and impacts of urban displacement.\textsuperscript{470} If current challenges are to be overcome and global sustainable development goals achieved, planning tools and financing instruments, particularly those of local authorities, will have to consider future demographic changes including displacement risk.

The cost of meeting SDG targets in terms of universal access to drinking water, sanitation and electricity in both urban and rural areas by 2030 has been estimated at $3.5 trillion per year, the equivalent to 0.3 percent of global GDP and significantly more than current investment scenarios envisage.\textsuperscript{471} Many countries currently trying to deal with internal displacement are still catching up and trying to plug their existing infrastructure and service gaps, but significantly more inclusive urban investment will be needed to fulfil their commitments under the SDGs.\textsuperscript{472}
Box 10. Connecting the formal and the informal with urban acupuncture

Curitiba’s innovative bus rapid transit (BRT) system has been replicated in 170 cities around the world.473 It was originally conceived in the 1970s to respond to rapid urban growth that was congesting the city, and to connect peripheral areas with its economic centre. The scheme was complemented by a range of other investments in schools, parks and cultural buildings that served to upgrade a number of low-income neighbourhoods while preserving their character and identity.474

Medellin has made a series of urban acupuncture investments over recent decades, from the renovation of the city’s road network and the improvement of water and sanitation facilities in poor neighbourhoods, to installing street lighting in less secure areas and running art workshops to prevent young people being recruited into gangs.475 These focused and relatively low-cost investments have been particularly successful in Comuna 13, a neighbourhood affected by displacement, and have also helped to city as a whole to transform its image.476 A similar initiative was successfully applied in Bogota.

There are also lessons to be learned from community-based approaches adopted by people living in informal settlements in sub-Saharan Africa and south and south-east Asia, who used joint negotiating power to secure access as a community to electricity, water and waste management, healthcare and education.477 The efforts of so-called Slum Dwellers Federations helped to ensure that informal settlements were upgraded rather than demolished, preventing potentially significant urban displacement.

A community-based initiative in Nairobi also successfully relocated residents of Kibera, the city’s largest informal settlement. It facilitated new housing near people’s previous homes, minimising disruption to their lives and local communities by preserving their networks and employment, livelihood and education opportunities.478

Urban planners, architects and engineers in cities across the world have developed innovative solutions to seemingly intractable problems that can be brought to bear to support urban IDPs in integrating locally and achieving durable solutions. In the Peruvian capital of Lima, for example, drones, community mapping and 3D-printing were used to establish neighbourhood-level evidence to influence local and national policy to the benefit of the urban poor.479

Through the co-production and visualisation of quantitative and qualitative spatialised data, the communities themselves and the municipal authorities were able for the first time to picture and combine the spatial aspects required for planning with results from community-led household surveys and vulnerability mappings. The exercise made the authorities aware of the “considerable income, time and labour that the urban poor spend on improving collective accessibility and services and ameliorating housing conditions”.480 This shifted perceptions of the city’s poor as a problem and brought their resilience and potential productivity to light.

A similar approach could be taken to highlighting and harnessing the huge investment that displaced people make over time to navigate and survive in their host cities. Negotiated upgrade or resettlement schemes led by IDPs and other inhabitants of informal settlements could go a long way toward countering the negative effects of evictions and reducing the risk of secondary displacement.
This year’s GRID reconfirms that internal displacement is clearly a development and a humanitarian concern. The global data highlights the fact that the persistently high numbers of new displacements associated with conflict and disasters are the result of a convergence of risk drivers, most of which are development-related and often concentrated in cities.

There is a need for comprehensive development approaches to urban displacement, along with humanitarian responses. But the institutions, policies and financing instruments needed for an integrated approach are not yet in place. A number of vital steps are required to support displaced people in cities, prevent displacement and reduce the risk of it happening in the future. Despite the highly localised and specific nature of each urban displacement situation, a few general conclusions on the most important of these steps are drawn below.

Filling data gaps and establishing an evidence base

There are significant data and knowledge gaps on urban displacement, and the lack of clear understanding about its scale, duration, severity and the way it relates to broader urban development challenges impedes the design and implementation of appropriate prevention, risk reduction and response measures. A vital first step to addressing the phenomenon and reducing its risk and impacts effectively would be to establish a solid and shared evidence base to guide policy and practice.

Promising collaborative methods of doing so have been developed and are in use, but more investment and greater efforts to ensure that data is interoperable are needed. The empirical evidence available makes it clear that local planners, sector departments, neighbourhood organisations, local businesses and displaced people themselves will all need to be involved.

A new narrative and approach to urban displacement

The notion and narrative of urban displacement have to change. When attention is drawn to displaced people’s agency, resilience and potential contributions, local responses are more likely to emphasise participation and inclusion rather than assistance and exclusion from the longer-term vision of a city. Focusing on victimhood and vulnerability will only convey a negative picture of urban displacement.

Vulnerabilities undoubtedly exist and may be aggravated over time, but the language and framing of the issue must promote and support IDPs as active agents of their own solutions. Local authorities and urban communities, for their part, should be seen not only as facilitators but also beneficiaries of their resilience.

Accepting local integration as a displacement solution

A new understanding and acceptance of the nature and duration of urban displacement is also required. There is growing evidence that a significant number of urban IDPs plan to stay. Responses to both acute and protracted urban displacement need to recognise this, and authorities and host communities need to accept that local integration will often be the only feasible option for many.

Common concerns about the impact of displacement on a city’s housing, infrastructure, services, labour markets, stability and demographic and cultural composition will need to be addressed with a long-term perspective in mind.
Building leadership of local communities and municipalities

Inadequate urban infrastructure, housing and services, and limited job prospects and opportunities to access justice and participate in public life are all issues that go beyond the humanitarian sector’s remit. When urban displacement crises occur, however, humanitarians often find themselves having to deal with such challenges.

The leadership and continuous engagement of local authorities before, during and after crises is paramount, as is the active participation of displaced people and their hosts in processes that affect their lives. Their involvement in and even management of urban planning and service provision is central to their success. Community-led data collection, needs assessments and risk analyses in informal settlements, at-risk neighbourhoods and other urban areas have proven effective in facilitating sustainable approaches to urban integration and resettlement.

Supporting local authorities in hosting and integrating IDPs

Instead of focusing on providing humanitarian assistance, national governments and the international community need to devise new ways of supporting local authorities, service providers and businesses in addressing displacement and reducing the risk of it happening.

This includes identifying new ways of providing assistance at the local level through national governments and organisations as well as directly, using existing development funding instruments and developing new ones to support local governments and community-based organisations, and creating incentives for local and national authorities to accept responsibility for their IDPs and facilitate their local integration.

Integrating formal and informal markets and institutions

In the absence of functioning formal housing and labour markets, and strong governance and institutions to address grievances and deliver justice, informal systems take their place. For many IDPs, and particularly new arrivals, the latter are all that is available. Humanitarian and development stakeholders need to understand and accept the role that informal local powerbrokers play in facilitating life in the city for IDPs, and allow a combination of formal and informal institutions to support them in their process of local integration. This requires dealing carefully with the benefits and risks of informal arrangements, including transparency and accountability.

Developing new approaches to housing and tenure

The pivotal role of tenure security for IDPs and the urban poor more broadly is recognised. New approaches have been developed over the past decade that address the ambiguity of tenure that many displaced people experience, and facilitate their entry into more formal housing arrangements and markets over time.

Innovation and adaptation will be vital in regulating IDPs’ tenure agreements and supporting them in making the transition from abusive rental markets to more secure tenure and housing. Progressive approaches to housing policies and informal markets also mean investing in new approaches to informal settlements that allow for them to develop in ways that benefit the city as a whole.

Setting goals and tracking progress at the local level

To understand the progress made in addressing urban displacement and reducing displacement risk globally, steps toward local durable solutions need to be monitored at the city level. SDG 11 contains targets and indicators on planning and urban development financing that will also need to be monitored effectively from the bottom-up. The latter should in principle provide a solid basis not just for reporting but also for planning.

As progress is aggregated, however, and ultimately measured at national level, the metrics will not necessarily reflect urban realities. The disaggregation of data by location, sex, age and mobility status has also been encouraged, but there are few tools and little capacity to systematically collect and analyse data in this way. In this sense, most of the SDGs’ metrics will be more effective in tracking the performance of national governments than in informing and shaping action at the local level.
CONCLUSION

From global to local solutions

In 2018, IDMC took stock of the progress made in the 20 years since the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This year is the 10th anniversary of the Kampala Convention, and to mark the occasion the African Union has declared 2019 the Year of Refugees, Returnees and IDPs. Activities across the continent will draw attention to internal displacement and the need for durable solutions, but the situation of those displaced has not significantly improved at the regional or global level.

The figures presented in this report show that in many countries affected by conflict, not only is displacement becoming protracted, but new displacements continue to take place, deepening national and regional crises. Certain countries and regions are also consistently affected by disasters year after year. Many IDPs face serious vulnerabilities and protection gaps and are at high risk of being displaced again within urban centres, particularly if they lack secure tenure, employment and social support that ensure their local integration.

Humanitarian responses alone will not resolve the internal displacement crises affecting many countries around the world, nor reduce the risk of future displacement. As our cities grow and the landscape of urban displacement changes, local authorities will be at the forefront of both responding to crises and reducing risk in the long-term. National responsibility and leadership and international accountability now must combine with tangible and significant support to local action. And given that growing numbers of IDPs live in urban centres across the world, this local action will increasingly need to happen in towns and cities.

The provision of basic services for IDPs remains an important humanitarian challenge in active crises and camp settings. It also lies at the heart of development efforts in complex urban and protracted displacement settings. Long-term displacement in already deteriorating socioeconomic conditions makes it difficult for local authorities to provide services to the whole urban population. Decades of conflict and displacement result in municipal structures and services unable to meet the needs of the urban poor. Many IDPs are trapped in poverty, which in turn contributes to making their displacement protracted. In such circumstances, concerted and coherent poverty reduction efforts, including targeted assistance and broader social protection, need to be developed in place of siloed, short-term humanitarian interventions.

Cities are also tasked with applying and localising global and national development frameworks as part of the sustainable development agenda, but often struggle to do so. The way and extent to which authority and resources are decentralised will determine their capacity for effective governance and implementation. Financial capacities to achieve development objectives and address humanitarian crises vary considerably from country to country, and from city to city. Size, economic productivity, social equality and institutional arrangements all determine the ability of a city’s government and its communities to prevent and cope with crises, including internal displacement crises.

Affecting city-level change will require progress across at least three main areas. Knowledge and evidence of the drivers, impacts and risks of urban displacement and of appropriate and successful approaches to addressing it are a prerequisite for effective action. The capacity to act on the evidence also needs to be strengthened, particularly in low-income countries and those that face large displacement crises.

Most importantly, however, incentives to increase political will are needed at both the municipal and national level to adapt urban planning, investment, regulation and service delivery to the realities of informality and protracted displacement. Urban opportunities cannot be unlocked without political solutions, and those solutions need to move beyond short-term responses to embrace long-term risk reduction and inclusive development.
In moving ahead in these three areas, a checklist of sorts may be useful to guide prioritisation of local-level actions and encourage more national and international support for relevant sectors and institutions, adapted to each city. Data and insight, and the capacity to present evidence that generates incentives to create the required political will are critical in this regard and suggest a first set of priority areas for action at local level (see Figure 24).

As we look into the coming years, the conclusions from our last global reports remain alarmingly valid. More than 20 years of mass displacement and increasingly protracted situations across the globe leave us today with the highest number of people living in displacement ever. Despite policy progress in several countries, the root causes of internal displacement persist.

FIGURE 24: Toward a checklist for action on urban displacement: start by building an evidence base

Data and analysis

- Systematically account for urban IDPs. Record their number and the duration and severity of their displacement, disaggregated by sex, age, disability and other relevant criteria
- Monitor movements and conditions of those displaced over time, not just during and immediately after crises
- Undertake profiling exercises that include both displaced and host populations
- Collaborate with humanitarian, development and other stakeholders working to reduce vulnerability and risk to ensure that any data collected is interoperable

Capacity and participation

- Build on communities’ existing capacities, including for the collection of data on their vulnerabilities and needs, but also their existing resources, skills and community services
- Strengthen the capacity of local organisations and government departments for data and statistical analysis
- Work with IDPs and those at risk of displacement to identify priority areas in service delivery and infrastructure development
- Identify urban development approaches that accommodate informality, including through flexible and secure tenure arrangements and adaptive labour market strategies in line with national and international sustainable development initiatives

Incentives and political will

- Estimate the impacts of displacement on city development and the risks inherent in inaction, including effects on the city’s economy, security, stability and social wellbeing
- Use risk assessments to advocate for new and appropriate financing mechanisms to support city action and make displacement risk one of the core considerations in urban planning and development
- Document successful approaches to managing and reducing internal displacement in cities and provide a platform for exchange and learning for municipalities and their partners
- Recognise IDPs as local citizens, even when return is their preferred long-term solution, by allowing voting rights and providing space for public participation, and supporting their access to documentation
Armed conflict: An armed confrontation between the armed forces of states (international armed conflict) or between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a state (non-international armed conflict).488

Communal violence: Violence perpetrated across ethnic, religious or communal lines that has not met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict. Communal, in particular inter-communal violence can overlap to a significant extent with political violence with one type of violence triggering the other.489

Criminal violence: Homicides, threats, extortion and a general atmosphere of violence due to, inter alia, drug cartels, organised crime, or gang activity, in a situation that has not met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict.490

Cross-border displacement: Forced movement of persons across borders, whether as a result of conflict, disasters, or other drivers of movement including development projects, irrespective of legal status in receiving countries.491

Disaster: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts.492

Driver of displacement: Underlying structural factors that combine, overlap and accumulate to enable a crisis to erupt. Synonyms include root cause, push factor, or stressor. Examples of displacement drivers include environmental (e.g. desertification), social (e.g. ethnic tensions), political (e.g. corruption), and economic (e.g. poverty or inequality).493

Durable solutions: In the context of internal displacement, a situation where IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.494

Flows: The number of individuals or instances of displacement that cause the total number of IDPs (stock) to increase or decrease. Flows include new displacements, returns, cross-border displacement, settlement elsewhere, and local integration.

Forced evictions: The permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.495

Informal settlements: The term is used in this report to denote the wide spectrum of inadequate housing found in urban areas. While context-specific, the mostly widely applicable is probably that used by UN-Habitat which includes: i) residential areas where inhabitants have no security of tenure and may squat or rent informally; ii) neighbourhoods that lack basic services and infrastructure, and iii) housing that may not comply with planning and building regulations and may be built in environmentally sensitive areas.496

Locally integrated: A situation where former IDPs who, based on a voluntary and informed decision, have achieved safe, dignified and sustainable integration in the location they were displaced to. Those who do not meet the criteria set out in this definition should still be considered to be IDPs.

Political violence: The use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation, such as surrounding an electoral process or during civil unrest, riots, state repression or demonstrations, in a situation that has not met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict.

Protracted displacement: A situation in which the process for securing a durable solution to displacement is stalled, and/or IDPs are marginalised as a consequence of a lack of protection of their human rights.497
Relocation: The act of moving evacuated people to a place where they stay until return or settlement elsewhere in the country becomes possible (temporary), or the act of moving people to another location in the country and settling them there when they no longer can return to their homes or place of habitual residence (permanent).498

Resettlement: A situation where former IDPs who, based on a voluntary and informed decision, have settled in a location other than their place of former habitual residence or place of displacement, and have achieved safe, dignified and sustainable integration in this location.

Return: For internal displacement, return implies movement from the place of displacement back to the place of former habitual residence, ideally the former home. In the case of cross-border displacement, return signifies movement from the host country back to the country of origin.

Returnees: A distinction should be made between ‘returning refugees’ and ‘returning IDPs’. In the case of internal displacement, a returnee is a former IDP who, based on a voluntary and informed decision, has returned in safety and dignity to their place of former habitual residence. Former refugees or migrants who cannot go back to their former habitual residence for one of the reasons set out in the Guiding Principles and are unable to sustainably integrate elsewhere are IDPs. Similarly, former refugees or migrants who, after their return, are forced to flee or leave their home or place of habitual residence for one of the reasons set out in the Guiding Principles, are also IDPs.

Risk: The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity.499

Stock: Number of individuals living in situations of internal displacement as a result of conflict, disasters, or other drivers of displacement at any given point in time. In the absence of durable solutions, the stock figure may include IDPs who have attempted to return to their areas of origin, resettle elsewhere, or integrate locally in their place of displacement.

Trigger: Event in the wider environment that threaten people’s security. Triggers may or may not lead to displacement as people evaluate the level of threat posed by an event to their immediate physical and economic security and their capacity to flee their homes. While these events directly trigger displacement, they come about as a result of the complex interaction of multiple underlying drivers.500

Urban area: Given the lack of a common definition of what an urban area is, for the purposes of this report, an urban area is defined as “a spatial concentration of people and wealth that is usually reliant on a cash-based economy, with relationships between the two shaped and regulated by a set of political, social, legal and economic institutions”. In this sense, both towns and cities are considered here as urban areas.501

Urban displacement: Encompasses forced movements of people from rural to urban areas (rural-urban), between (inter-urban) and within urban areas (intra-urban).

Vulnerability: The characteristics determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.502


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# Table 1: New and total displacement in 2018

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*Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures*
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2018 (conflict)</th>
<th>New displacements in 2018 (conflict)</th>
<th>New displacements in 2018 (disasters)</th>
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<td>New displacements in 2018 (disasters)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2018 (conflict)</th>
<th>New displacements in 2018 (conflict)</th>
<th>New displacements in 2018 (disasters)</th>
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<td>4,600</td>
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### TABLE 2
Largest disaster events triggering displacement per region in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Event name</th>
<th>Month disaster began</th>
<th>Countries and territories</th>
<th>New Displacements*</th>
<th>Figure source(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Typhoon Mangkhut</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>China, Philippines, China (Macao), Guam, China (Hong-Kong), Northern Mariana Islands, Thailand</td>
<td>3,191,000</td>
<td>Government, Government, Government, Local authorities, Local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Southwest monsoon (Habagat)</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, China, Viet Nam, Thailand</td>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>Government, Humanitarian Response Forum, United Nations, Government, Government, Local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Typhoon Maria</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>China, China (Taiwan)</td>
<td>521,000</td>
<td>Government, Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Monsoon season</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,967,000</td>
<td>Government, local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americas</td>
<td>Cyclone Titli</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Government and NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>371,000</td>
<td>IOM and OCHA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event name</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Countries and territories</th>
<th>New Displacements*</th>
<th>Figure source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurricane Florence</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>United States of America (Florida)</td>
<td>454,000</td>
<td>Government and local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurricane Michael</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>United States of America (Florida)</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>Government and local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildfire Woolsey</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>United States of America (California)</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria floods</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya floods</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>327,000</td>
<td>OCHA and Kenya Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia floods</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>289,000</td>
<td>OCHA and Protection and Return Monitoring Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarpole Zahab earthquake</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>IRCS, OCHA, and Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS)</td>
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<td>Iraq floods</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>IOM, OCHA and Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran snow storms</td>
<td>January</td>
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<td>23,000</td>
<td>IRCS</td>
</tr>
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<td>Attica wildfires</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan floods</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>5,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jalal-Abad landslides</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Definitions

**New displacements**: This corresponds to new instances of internal displacement during 2018.

**Total number of IDPs**: This corresponds to the total number of people living in internal displacement as of 31 December 2018.

**Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution**: This corresponds to the number of IDPs whom our data providers have identified as having returned, resettled or locally integrated in 2018 and for whom the evidence obtained by IDMC suggests that progress toward durable solutions is only partial given their living conditions. In a few instances this number may refer to movements rather than people.

**Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified**: This corresponds to the number of IDPs whom our data providers have identified as having returned, resettled or locally integrated in 2018 but for whom there is no available evidence to corroborate progress toward durable solutions. In a few instances this number may refer to movements rather than people.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abyei Area</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>31,000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Abyei Area is based on two intention surveys carried out by IOM in Abathok and Agok in April and November 2017. Based on an analysis of the IOM DTM data, IDMC subtracted the estimated number of households that consider themselves to be locally integrated in their area of displacement according to the survey, but included those IDPs newly displaced in 2018.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on an analysis of data from the IOM DTM event tracker, which primarily identified incidents of displacement triggered by armed attacks in Abyei Town in mid-July 2018.

*Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
<td>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</td>
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<td>2,598,000</td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td>IDM'C's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Afghanistan is based on an analysis of data obtained from IOM which was collected from key informants between December 2017 and December 2018. IDMC's estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is mainly based on the number of newly displaced IDPs registered by OCHA's displacement tracking system and whose displacement has been verified. It also accounts for people displaced as a result of arbitrary evictions reported by OCHA, and temporary unregistered displacements reported by IOM's humanitarian assistance programme. Given that many short-term displacements are not verified by humanitarian agencies, IDMC's reported number of new displacements is likely to be an underestimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8,400 (As of 2004)</td>
<td>IDM'C's estimate of internal displacement in Armenia is based on data from a mapping survey conducted by NRC and Armenia's State Department for Migration and Refugees and published in 2004. This report indicated that most of Armenia's approximately 8,400 IDPs, who were displaced as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan in 1994, had resettled in unknown conditions by 2004. Given the lack of updated information on their conditions, IDMC has characterised these resettlements as unverified solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>344,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>301,000 (As of 31 December 2018)</td>
<td>IDM'C's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Azerbaijan is based on an analysis of data provided by the government's State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. According to its data, there were around 644,000 IDPs in Azerbaijan as of December 2018 as a result of the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The figure is divided into two groups: 344,000 people living in protracted displacement who still have outstanding needs in terms of access to housing, employment, education and health; and 300,000 the government reports as having been relocated to temporary housing. IDMC has accounted for this second group as having achieved a partial solution to displacement because they have been relocated and receive assistance from the government. The government also reports that 750 IDPs returned to Jojuq Marjanli in 2018. IDMC also characterises these returns as a partial solution pending further information about conditions in the village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Number 2018</td>
<td>Number 2018</td>
<td>Year figure was last updated</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Bangladesh includes two protracted displacement caseloads associated with conflict: The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) IDPs, displaced by internal armed conflict between 1973 and 1997, and Urdu-speaking Bihari IDPs, also known as “stranded Pakistanis”, displaced by Bangladesh’s 1971 war of independence. Recently updated estimates of the size of these populations are not available. IDMC’s estimate for the CHT caseload is based on a 2009 survey by the Human Development Research Centre, a Bangladeshi NGO, which suggested about 31 per cent of rural CHT households had been displaced at least once between 1977 and 2007. Given this figure, along with census data, IDMC estimates there are 275,000 IDPs in Chittagong. IDMC’s estimate of the Bihari IDPs comes from a profiling study commission by UNHCR in 2006 and carried out by Al-Falah, a local NGO. This study indicated that more than 151,000 people were displaced in camps or informal settlements at the time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Benin and the number of new displacements in 2018 are both based on data from IFRC and refer to people displaced by clashes between pastoralists and agriculturalists in Atakora department in July 2018. IDMC triangulated this information using reports from local civil society organisations. IDMC did not receive any evidence that those displaced have returned home or achieved any other form of durable solution, and so has included them in the end-of-year figure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on official government statistics, which rely largely on lists from the electoral commission. The Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN in Geneva shared the statistics with IDMC. The displacement was triggered by wars that followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and the displacement data was last updated in 2015. More than half of the country’s IDPs live in Republika Srpska, more than a third in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a minority in the Brcko district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Burkina Faso and the number of new displacements in 2018 are based on an analysis of OCHA reports which in turn refer to data collected by the Belgian Red Cross, Burkina Faso Red Cross, Conseil National de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation, ICRC, the Danish Refugee Council, UNICEF and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country or territory</td>
<td>New displacements</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs</td>
<td>Partial or unverified solutions</td>
<td>Comments on the figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
<td>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>25,000 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td>IDM...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>459,000</td>
<td>668,000</td>
<td>382,000 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td>IDM...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Burundi is based primarily on its analysis of data obtained from IOM. Most of the IDPs are people who fled political violence in 2015, although the threat of political violence has continued to generate displacement in subsequent years, including in 2018. IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs also includes refugees who returned from Tanzania in 2018 and became displaced upon their return.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on an analysis of net increases in IOM’s monthly figures, as well as an analysis of specific events that caused displacement in 2018.

As security improved, the total number of people living in displacement as a result of conflict as reported by IOM decreased by about 25,000 between 2017 and 2018. IDMC characterises this change as an unverified solution in the absence of further information about the situation.

IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Cameroon and the number of new displacements in 2018 are based on data obtained from IOM. The figures include people displaced by the regional crisis caused by Boko Haram in the Far North region, and violence in the anglophone Northwest, Southwest and Littoral regions of the country. The anglophone crisis has worsened significantly, leading to assessments in new regions and accounting for the notable increase in new displacements and the number of IDPs in 2018.

Based on its analysis of IOM’s data on the number of IDPs reported as having returned, IDMC accounts for the 288,000 people who returned to undamaged houses and the 94,000 living in damaged or destroyed housing or shelters as having achieved partial solutions, due to their living conditions and general lack of security in those areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IDPs 2018</th>
<th>New Displacements 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>641,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>175,000 (Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>5,761,000 (Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in CAR is based on reports from the Commission of Population Movement (CMP).

IDMC's estimate of new displacements in 2018 is based on OCHA reports, which IDMC complemented with analysis of additional information from UN Security Council reports and the local media. IDMC considers the figure to be an underestimate because of a lack of access to all displacement reports.

Based on its analysis of data from IOM DTM and Action Against Hunger concerning 175,000 IDPs who reportedly returned, IDMC categorised these movements as unverified because no information about their conditions upon return was obtained.

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Chad is based on data from IOM DTM reports. The figure refers primarily to people displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency, mainly concentrated around the Lac region in the west. Despite evidence of new displacements in 2018, IDMC was not able to estimate their number because of the limited monitoring and a lack of published quantitative data collected in 2018.

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Colombia is based on an analysis of data provided by the Victim’s Registry (RUV), which keeps records of all victims of the civil war. The RUV data accounts for all people displaced since 1985 and includes people who have died or made progress toward durable solutions. IDMC has worked with the RUV to estimate the number of people who are still displaced by discounting these two caseloads.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of partial solutions is based on an analysis of RUV data on social and economic indicators for people in the registry. It accounts for the 1,089,000 people who have overcome vulnerabilities related to housing, family reunification, documentation, nutrition, health, education and income; and the 813,000 who reportedly have only overcome vulnerabilities related to housing.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is a projection performed by the UN’s Colombia Information Management and Analysis Unit (UMAIC), based on RUV data from previous years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Congo is based on an analysis of data collected by the government’s Ministry for Social and Humanitarian Affairs and refers to people displaced in the Pool and Bouenza departments. The ministry is the main source of data on IDPs in the Republic of Congo and collects and publishes its information in collaboration with OCHA. Given that many IDPs reportedly returned from Bouenza to Pool in 2018, the total figure is likely to be an overestimate. IDMC has included these people in our estimate of 107,000 IDPs and not categorised these returns as unverified solutions. This is due to the fact that neither the number of returnees nor their conditions were known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>302,000</td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire is primarily based on a JIPS assessment from 2014 and refers to IDPs displaced during the 2002-2003 war and the political crisis in 2010-2011. The figure also accounts for IDPs displaced in 2017 as a result of land disputes between the Baoulé and Wê communities, and who have not yet returned. It also includes people whose houses were destroyed in May 2018 during a land dispute between indigenous Toura and the Burkinabé Giandê community in Biankouma department. IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on local media reports and refers to the people displaced in May 2018 mentioned above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>228,000</td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the number of IDPs in Cyprus is based on the “Humanitarian needs and rights of internally displaced persons in Europe” recommendation report (document N° 2126) which was presented in 2018 on the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The report includes the latest figure provided by the Cypriot delegation to the assembly. This refers to people displaced since the armed conflict with Turkey and the latter’s occupation of the northern part of the island in 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Total IDPs 2018</td>
<td>Total IDPs 2019</td>
<td>New Displacements 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>1,840,000</td>
<td>3,081,000</td>
<td>1,480,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure</td>
<td>(1 January - 31</td>
<td>(1 January - 31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was last</td>
<td>December 2018)</td>
<td>December 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1 January - 31</td>
<td>(1 January - 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 2018)</td>
<td>December 2018)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure</td>
<td>(1 January - 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was last</td>
<td>December 2018)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in DRC** was derived from data from village-level assessments conducted by IOM DTM throughout 2018 in Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Lomami, Sankuru, Tanganyika and South Kivu provinces. It is also based on IDMC’s analysis of data on camp populations in North Kivu, published by the camp coordination and camp management cluster, and data from ACAPS on displacement associated with violence in Mai-Ndombe. IDMC considers the figure to be a significant underestimate, because it does not include data about provinces highly affected by displacement but not yet covered by IOM DTM such as Ituri, Maniema and most of North Kivu.

**IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018** is based on information on new arrivals in villages covered by IOM DTM, data published by ACAPS for Mai-Ndombe and population movement alerts for provinces covered by OCHA. This includes Haut Katanga, Haut Lomami, Ituri, Maniema, North Kivu and Tshopo. Both IOM DTM and OCHA also reported significant numbers of returns in 2018.

**IDMC categorises as partial solutions** people who returned to their former homes and no longer have shelter as their primary humanitarian need but who still have other needs related to their displacement.

**IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Egypt** is primarily based on Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports from 2015 and 2018 which relied on a combination of satellite imagery analysis of housing destruction and interviews with affected families to estimate displacement in North Sinai. IDMC complemented and verified this analysis with additional information obtained from local media sources.

**IDMC’s estimate for the number of new displacements in 2018** is based on the most recent HRW report. Given the lack of systematic data collection, the figure is likely to be an underestimate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2,985,000</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>412,000 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,895,000</td>
<td>2,137,000</td>
<td>412,000 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000 (Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000 (Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments on the figures**

IDMC’s estimate of new displacements in El Salvador in 2018 is based on an analysis of a representative survey conducted in November 2018 by the Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) at the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA). IDMC extrapolated the results from the survey based on population projections from the latest census, published in 2007.

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Ethiopia is based on an analysis of several sources: IOM DTM data from 31 December 2018 covering most of the country; IOM DTM data from 30 November covering West Guji and Gedo; and government data from December 2018 for Benishangul Gumuz. IDMC also added about 110,000 Ethiopians deported from Saudi Arabia and reportedly living in precarious conditions to the total number of IDPs.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 was calculated by analysing increases in figures published by IOM DTM and new caseloads identified by other sources including OCHA, the government, local and international media and the European Commission.

IDMC’s estimate of partial solutions is based on government reports and refers to IDPs who returned to their homes in Addis Ababa but are still in need, and IDPs who returned to their former homes along the border of the Oromia and Somali regions whose conditions following their return are unknown.

IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Georgia refers to three caseloads. The first two concern IDPs in South Ossetia assessed by OHCHR and OCHA in 2008 and 2009. The third refers to the number of IDPs from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees in February 2018. The displacements took place in two major waves, both associated with conflict with the Russian Federation in 1991-1992 and 2008.

IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Ghana are both based on an OCHA report which cites local authorities. IDMC subsequently triangulated these figures using local media. The displacements were triggered by land disputes between two ethnic communities in the Northern region on 31 December 2018.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs</th>
<th>IDMC's estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>242,000 (Year figure was last updated: 1996)</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Guatemala is based on a 1997 UNFPA figure for people left internally displaced after the civil war. Although this figure is now outdated IDMC has not obtained any evidence suggesting these people are no longer displaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>950 (Year figure was last updated: 2016) 190,000</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Honduras is based on data obtained from UNHCR. UNHCR's projection of the number of IDPs was calculated from the average annual number of people displaced from 2004 to 2014, reported in a profiling exercise conducted by the Honduran Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence in 2015. The exercise was updated in 2018 but the report and methodology have not been published as of IDMC's reporting. IDMC's estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on the latest report by the National Commissioner for Human Rights (CONADEH), published in March 2019, which includes information on at least 950 people who reported themselves to authorities in 2018 as displaced, mostly by criminal violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>169,000 (Year figure was last updated: 2018) 479,000</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in India is based on a review of reports on displacement published by the media and academic research. The figures include people displaced by armed conflict and intercommunal and political violence across the country. IDMC considers its estimate to be a rough approximation given that much of the data upon which it is based is now out of date. IDMC's estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on event monitoring and draws primarily on data published by the media and other publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country or territory</td>
<td>New displacements</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Total Number of IDPs</td>
<td>New Displacements (1 Jan - 31 Dec 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kenya**

IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Kenya concerns several caseloads and is based on data from various sources including the government's National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), IOM, local media, NGOs and civil society organisations. The figure includes people displaced by election-related violence in 2007, 2008 and 2017 and people displaced by inter-communal violence, resource conflicts and al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018.

IDMC considers the 780 people displaced by a land dispute and then ordered to return to the Eastern Mau forest to have achieved an unverified solution because no information was available to confirm that they had returned or the conditions they faced.

**Kosovo**

IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Kosovo is based on a national database maintained by the Ministry for Community and Return and refers to people displaced during the conflict in 1998-1999. The database is updated with the support of UNHCR and other partners and is used to provide assistance to displaced families.

The slight decrease in the figure since 2017 represents the number of people the government reported as returnees. Because no information was available about these returns, IDMC categorised these returns as a partial solution.

**Lebanon**

IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Lebanon is based on data from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). It primarily corresponds to Palestinians displaced in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, considered to be their place of habitual residence, who have not been able to return.

Based on information published by local media, IDMC estimates that about 280 people displaced in 2007 reached a partial solution by returning to the camp in 2018.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
<td>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>221,000</td>
<td>107,000 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Libya is based primarily on IOM DTM reports and refers to people displaced by the country’s armed conflict. IDMC includes in its total figure the number of people who tried but failed to return, which was estimated based on an analysis of IOM DTM data on returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on an analysis of events reported on by IOM DTM through its event tracker, the protection cluster and ACLED. Most of these movements were triggered by conflict between the Libyan military forces and militias as well as clashes between different militias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates of partial solutions are based on an analysis of IOM DTM reports on returnees and corresponds to the number of returnees who are living in their former or new homes, temporary accommodation and other types of shelter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 (As of 31 December 2018)</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Macedonia is based on data obtained from the government’s Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and refers to Albanian minorities displaced by violence in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The lower number IDMC reports compared with 2017 reflects 10 people who deregistered as IDPs. Given the lack of information on their specific location and situation, IDMC reports on this as an unverified solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs and the number of new displacements in 2018 in Madagascar are based on an analysis of data from IOM and media articles, both of which refer to displacement caused by banditry. This is the first time IDMC has reported on displacement associated with conflict and violence in Madagascar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Total IDPs</td>
<td>New Displacements</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>338,000</td>
<td>72 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td>1,800 (1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mali**
IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Mali is based on data made available by the Commission on Population Movement (CMP), which in turn is based on IOM DTM data compiled through the registration of IDPs. The figure accounts for people displaced by intercommunal and ethnic conflicts and violence linked to al-Qaeda.
IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on data obtained from Mali’s rapid response mechanism, led by NRC, which reports on verified incidents of displacement associated with the same causes.

**Mexico**
IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Mexico and the number of new displacements in 2018 are based on an analysis of data provided by the Mexican Commission for the Defence and Protection of Human Rights (CMDPDH). The total number of IDPs refers to people displaced by political violence and land disputes, and violence associated with organised criminal groups.
IDMC’s estimates of the number of new displacements and partial or unverified solutions in 2018 are based on data collected by CMDPDH through its event-based media monitoring. IDMC’s estimate of the number of people who achieved partial solutions concerns 72 who reportedly returned to their houses under improved security conditions, which could not be certified. IDMC categorised the 1,800 people who reportedly returned but for whom no information was available as unverified solutions.

**Mozambique**
IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Mozambique is primarily based on a report published by UNICEF in 2016 on the number of people living in resettlement sites in Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces. These IDPs were displaced by violence between the government and an opposition group. IDMC’s figure also includes people who were newly displaced in 2018 as a result of violence associated with extremist groups in Cabo Delgado province, but who had not returned as of the end of the year.
IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is derived from local media reports about housing destruction linked to attacks in the province.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Myanmar was produced using various data sources covering different regions of the country: 131,000 in Rakhine, 97,000 in Kachin, 50,000 in Karen, 40,000 in Tanintharyi, 27,000 in Karenni, 22,000 in Bago, 18,000 in Mon, 15,000 in Shan and 1,300 in Chin. The majority of the estimate is based on data collected by the camp coordination and camp management and shelter clusters and by the Border Consortium. IDMC’s figure also accounts for smaller groups of displaced people based on information and data obtained from the Chin state government, township authorities in Rakhine and UN agencies. The figures include people living in protracted displacement as a result of various internal armed conflicts and intercommunal violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>401,000</td>
<td>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on reports by OCHA, the Border Consortium and civil society organisations including the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and Free Burma Rangers, and media sources. Given the limited access to displaced populations, IDMC considers all of its estimates to be rough approximations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Niger and the number of new displacements in 2018 are primarily based on data reported by the government, obtained through surveys conducted by local authorities. The data covers the south-eastern region of Diffa, which borders Lake Chad and has been severely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. IDMC’s estimates also reflect information obtained from the protection cluster about displacement caused by attacks in Tillabéri and Tahoua as a result of spill-over violence from Mali. IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs also accounts for Nigerien refugees whom the government reported as having returned to displacement camps in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Total Number of IDPs</td>
<td>New Displacements</td>
<td>New IDPs in 2018</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>541,000</td>
<td>2,216,000</td>
<td>311,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td>(1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Nigeria and the number of new displacements in 2018 are based on IOM DTM and emergency tracking tool (ETT) reports covering the north-east of the country. From these sources, IDMC identified people displaced by conflicts or violence. The number of new displacements in 2018 also combines data from both IOM ETT and media reports for the period not covered by the last DTM report of 2018. IDMC also included information provided by the International Crisis Group and media reports about displacement in the Middle Belt, where the spread of violence into previously more peaceful areas of the country accounted for much of the increase in both the number of IDPs and new displacements compared with 2017, along with greater geographical coverage in the north-east where data collectors were able to access more areas.

From its analysis of IOM DTM reports, IDMC categorised 225,000 reported returns to non-damaged houses in areas of high insecurity and 86,000 returns to damaged or destroyed housing or shelters as partial solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
<th>New Displacements</th>
<th>New IDPs in 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>119,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td>(1 January-31 December 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Pakistan is based mainly on verified data produced by the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) disaster management authority (FDMA). It covers the former FATA, now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where people live in protracted displacement as a result of military operations. The National Disaster Management Authority’s (NDMA) data on other regions is less comprehensive and is likely to underestimate the total number of IDPs, so IDMC supplemented its coverage of those areas with media monitoring.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 includes estimates of movements associated with small-scale events, based on media and civil society reports.

IDMC’s estimate of partial solutions is based on data on reported returns obtained from the FATA DMA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
<td>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>238,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>(1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Total IDPs</td>
<td>New Displacements</td>
<td>Year figure was last updated:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>(1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in the Philippines and the number of new displacements in 2018 are based on reports issued by the government’s Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Centre (DROMIC) and the Protection Cluster, which provide current and cumulative figures on specific incidents of displacement. As in previous years, most in 2018 was triggered by conflict in Mindanao, including armed attacks, political violence and communal tensions.

Based on its analysis of data published by DROMIC and the protection cluster, IDMC characterises the return of 65,000 IDPs as a partial solution because they may still face vulnerabilities related to their displacement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total IDPs</th>
<th>Year figure was last updated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Russia is based on data by the government. IDMC’s estimate includes only Russian citizens recorded as “forcibly displaced” within the country as a result of violence, harassment or persecution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total IDPs</th>
<th>Year figure was last updated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Senegal is primarily based on an OCHA report from 2015, updated with more recent data from ICRC. The displacements were triggered by a separatist conflict between the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) and the Senegalese army in the 1990s and early 2000s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total IDPs</th>
<th>Year figure was last updated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Sierra Leone and the number of new displacements in 2018 are both based on media articles that cite Caritas as their source. Both figures concern displacements triggered by post-electoral violence in April 2018. IDMC was not able to obtain evidence that displaced people had managed to return or achieve any other type of durable solutions, so they were accounted for as still being displaced as of the end of the year.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
<th>Partial or unverified solutions</th>
<th>Comments on the figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
<td>Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>578,000</td>
<td>2,648,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,148,000</td>
<td>2,648,000</td>
<td>(1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>1,869,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,148,000</td>
<td>1,869,000</td>
<td>(1 January - 31 December 2018)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Somalia is based on the Information Management Working Group’s estimate as of February 2018, which was compiled from several sources, including key informant interviews, site assessments, IOM DTM assessments, local NGO assessments and registration data collected by the camp coordination and camp management cluster. Because the data was not clearly disaggregated by cause of displacement, the figure represents a mix of triggers, including people displaced by disasters and conflict.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on data obtained from the UNHCR/NRC-led Protection & Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), to which IDMC also added figures from NRC/UN Habitat reports on forced evictions. The PRMN data does not distinguish between forced and voluntary movements, however, which means not all movements were necessarily internal displacement.

The estimated number of unverified solutions is based on PRMN data which indicates only that 200 people had returned but with no corroborating evidence.

IDMC’s estimates of the number of new displacements and unverified solutions in 2018 are derived from event-based monitoring which relied on information and data obtained from OCHA, IOM DTM, REACH, UNHCR, the protection cluster, Relief and Rehabilitation Commissions, UNMISS and the local media. Both figures are likely to be significant underestimates given the limited geographical coverage and lack of systematic data collection in the field on this issue.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total IDPs</th>
<th>New Displacements</th>
<th>IDMC Estimate Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Sri Lanka includes IDPs still awaiting resettlement after the end of the country's civil war in 2009, as reported by the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern Development and Hindu Religious Affairs. It also includes a very small number of people identified as being displaced through event-based media monitoring. This latter caseload provides the basis for <strong>IDMC's estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>2,072,000</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Sudan is based on an analysis of data from IOM DTM's August 2018 report, which covers the five Darfuri states and South and West Kordofan, data published by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and OCHA's figures for Blue Nile state. Sennar state, where IDPs are reportedly also living, is not covered, meaning that IDMC's figure is an underestimate. IDMC's estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on data from OCHA and local media reports and covers Jebel Marrah at the intersection of South, North and Central Darfur. IDMC categorised all IDPs reported as having returned as unverified solutions because of the lack of tangible information on their conditions. The estimate is based on data collected by IOM and published in June 2018. Given that it only accounts for registered returnees for part of the year in the above-mentioned states, the actual number of returnees is likely to have been much higher than reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,649,000</td>
<td>6,119,000</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate of the total number of IDPs in Syria is based on an analysis of data published by the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP). IDMC combined the number of IDPs with the number of people affected by shelter damage, who are displaced within their community. The estimated number of new displacements in 2018 is based on IDMC's analysis of data obtained from HNAP, the camp coordination and camp management cluster and Syria's IDP Task Force. The number of new displacements is an underestimate given that the data has limited coverage between January and April 2018 and excludes IDPs displaced for fewer than 30 days. Given high levels of insecurity and lack of services and infrastructure, IDMC considers all reported returns to peoples' original homes or temporary accommodation reported by HNAP as partial solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country or territory</td>
<td>New displacements</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs</td>
<td>Partial or unverified solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,097,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Year figure was last updated: 2018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Total IDPs 2018</td>
<td>New Displacements 2018</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Ukraine and the number of new displacements in 2018 are based on data and information provided by the UN, the media and the Protection Cluster. IDMC’s estimate of 800,000 IDPs is based on a population projection produced by the UN and its partners. It consists of people living more permanently in government-controlled areas and those newly displaced during the year. The 1.5 million people registered as displaced in the database maintained by Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy is widely acknowledged by humanitarian actors to be an overestimate because it includes at least 477,000 people who are no longer displaced but remain on the registry to access their pensions. IDMC accounted for the number of people who reportedly returned to their residences after being evacuated in October 2018 when a series of explosions occurred at an ammunition depot, as having reached partial solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>2,324,000</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Yemen corresponds to people reported as displaced by conflict by the Task Force on Population Movement (TFPM) in its 17th report, published in August 2018. TFPM includes data from IOM DTM and ETT, UNHCR population movement tracking and the National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Recovery (NAMCHA). IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 was calculated from data reported by the Protection Cluster and IOM DTM and ETT. IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs and the number of new displacements are approximate and conservative given limited access to displaced people and the fact that data collection did not continue until December 2018. For example, the TFPM’s data covering Al Jawf governorate was not updated after January 2018. IDMC accounts for more a million returnees reported by TFPM but whose conditions were unknown as having achieved partial solutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Year figure was last updated: 2018)
BACKGROUND PAPERS

GRID 2019 benefitted from the input of many partners, research institutions and independent experts who submitted background papers to the main report. Full versions of the papers are available online at http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/

Are IDPs satisfied with the quality of public health and education services they receive?
A long-term perspective from urban areas in the post-socialist countries

Artjoms Ivlevs, University of the West of England

The livelihoods and wellbeing of IDPs depend on the provision of public services, the access and quality of which tend to be better in urban areas. This study analyses IDPs’ direct experiences of using key public services – health and education – in urban areas of post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe that experienced conflict in 1990s and 2000s. The findings suggest IDPs are more dissatisfied with the quality of health services than people not affected by conflict, pointing to the long lasting vulnerability and disadvantage of IDPs in the health domain. At the same time, no disadvantage is observed for education, reflecting the willingness of the forcibly displaced to invest in education to compensate for the loss of material possessions.

Cities as a refuge, cities as a home
The relationship between place and perceptions of integration among urban displaced populations in Iraq

Roger Guiu, Nadia Siddiqui, Social Inquiry

How does the socio-ecological context and urban morphology of the cities where IDPs reside influence their feelings of integration? Incorporating a two-fold definition of integration - belonging and influence in displacement - we use existing large-scale datasets covering locations across four governorates in Iraq to test whether place factors - development, governance and security, social capital and demography - in addition to household characteristics, determine the likelihood of IDPs feeling integrated. We find that place factors matter, and that it is harder for IDPs to fit into more stable and better functioning host environments. We argue for the importance not only of improving conditions for all in fragile urban areas where IDPs reside, but of making more stable environments more inclusive as well.

Comparing population displacement estimates from mobile network data and other sources
Working paper: Evidence from the Highlands earthquake in Papua New Guinea

Pamungkas Prahara, Annissa Zahara, Muhammad Rheza, Muhammad Rizal Khaefi, Dikara Alkarisya, Yulistina Riyadi, Rajius Idzalika, George Hodge, Pulse Lab Jakarta

Accurate and timely measurement of population displacement due to natural hazards and other drivers of displacement has proven to be complicated. This research paper explores anonymous mobile network data as a source of insights on displacement and compares the findings to the current good practice for displacement tracking, namely IOM’s displacement tracking matrix. We also compare the insights against information on the targeting of humanitarian resources, finding that the targeting of surveys and the allocation of humanitarian assistance are respectably efficient. The findings offer new perspectives on the quantification of displacement and underline the potential of mobile network data to offer highly valuable information during what are often chaotic days and weeks following a disaster.

Comparing the experiences of IDPs in urban vs rural areas: Findings from a longitudinal study in Iraq, 2015-2017

Rochelle Davis, Salma Al-Shami, Grace Benton, Jake Moran, Caila McHugh, Nicole Ruggiero, Moez Hayat, IOM Iraq and Georgetown University

Millions of Iraqis were displaced by ISIS between 2014 and 2017. This longitudinal study tracks the needs, challenges, and self-engineered solutions of IDPs not living in camps. The vast majority of IDPs report feelings of safety where they now live. But in terms of livelihoods and standard of living, they have only found temporary, rather than permanent solutions. Urban IDPs who worked in the agriculture sector cannot rebuild their farming and animal husbandry businesses without considerable assistance to make the land safe again. Supporting public and private agricultural initiatives, housing projects and micro loans programmes will allow refugees to return and rebuild their homes or successfully integrate in their new communities.
Demolition, forced evictions and wellbeing in the city

Jaideep Gupte, Dolf te Lintelo, Sheela Patel, Vinod Kumar Rao, Allister McGregor, Rajith Lakshman, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres, University of Sheffield

Forced evictions and home demolitions have been described as creating another sort of refugee crisis in the developing world. In India, we find that people who have experienced demolition have a lower sense of achievement on the life-goals they value; that this pattern is evident for both women and men; that a person’s outlook on life is lower than other members of the same household who have not experienced demolition, even when they are of a similar age, have similar levels of education, have similar occupation profiles and live under the same roof. However, we also find that this impact dissipates over time, and importantly, is mitigated when the process of relocation is facilitated through local participatory action.

Displacement profiling in urban areas

Methodological approaches for collecting and analysing data on internal displacement in cities

Melissa Weihmayer, Margharita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi, Laura Kivelä, Joint IDP Profiling Service

While there is general agreement of displacement’s impact on urban environments, evidence on the experience of internally displaced populations in cities remains sparse. However, certain evidence-gathering techniques and processes are gradually filling this gap. This article presents three case studies of displacement profiling in urban areas that tailored data collection and analysis to these contexts in different ways. The approaches taken enabled a robust evidence base to inform responses to internal displacement in those cities. The case studies from Mogadishu, Somalia (2015 - 2016); Erbil, Iraq (2015 - 2016); and various cities in Syria (2018 - 2019), and implemented by humanitarian, development and government partners with support and technical advice from the interagency Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), demonstrate continued learning for improved evidence.

How urban are IDPs and what does that mean for their economic integration?

Cindy Huang, Jimmy Graham, Center for Global Development

IDPs face severe economic challenges. Because economic opportunities cluster around urban areas, understanding where IDPs are located is crucial to understanding their potential for achieving self-reliance. By analysing the existing known locations of IDPs in developing countries and visualising them in an interactive map, we show that millions of IDPs are located in urban areas. Thus, stakeholders can and should pursue solutions to help IDPs achieve self-reliance, as greater self-reliance should create benefits for IDPs and hosts alike. Our analysis also underscores the lack of data on IDPs’ locations, implying that the urban rates we present are a minimum rather than an estimate. Better data would allow policymakers to better target self-reliance programming and policies.

Learning from survivors of development-induced displacement

Operationalising Vanuatu’s new displacement policy toward an inclusive capital city

Jennifer Day, Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, The University of Melbourne and the University of the South Pacific

This paper documents some impacts of development-induced displacement in the capital city of Vanuatu, South Pacific against the backdrop of a brand-new policy: Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement. Vanuatu’s is the first such policy in the Pacific and could be a model for peer countries. However, further work is necessary to make Vanuatu’s policy inclusive for survivors of urban displacement, particularly for people living on the fringes of urban areas. Using recent fieldwork, we illustrate the challenges for operationalizing the policy in Port Vila. We also analyse the policy language, pointing out human rights that are left unaddressed by the policy. We provide recommendations that Vanuatu’s government may consider as it operationalises the policy.
Stuck in the mud
Urban displacement and tenure security in Kabul’s informal settlements
Mohammad Abdoh, Anna Hirsch-Holland, Norwegian Refugee Council

This paper examines three of Kabul’s 55 informal settlements in order to explore the effects of local power dynamics and individual interests on displacement and its disadvantaging effects. In one out of the three settlements featured in the study, residents managed to purchase land with a written document proving ownership. In the other two sites, purported landowners and bureaucrats seem to exploit weaknesses in policy and legal frameworks to perpetuate tenure insecurity for their own gain – such as earning substantial income from rent, speculatively protecting land for potential real estate development or grabbing land from others who may hold a claim to it. The research finds a stark difference between these sites: in the former, residents have been able to build permanent structures, set up a school and plan for the future; in the latter, they are prevented from upgrading their shelters, not enrolling children in school and live day-by-day in fear of eviction and homelessness.

The urban displaced
Fleeing criminal violence in Latin American cities
Jerome Marston, Brown University

Criminal organisations and the violence they produce force individuals and families to flee within and from cities across Latin America. To increase understanding of this little-studied topic, this paper asks: Who flees within and from Latin American cities? What triggers their flight? And, upon fleeing, where do they go and what are their experiences? This paper describes broad trends in criminal violence-induced urban displacement around Latin America while also presenting fine-grained insights from Medellin, Colombia. Finally, concrete policy recommendations are offered for mitigating urban displacement due to criminal violence. Half of the recommendations are from the author’s analyses of survey data; half are qualitative accounts from displaced people detailing what might have helped them to stay in their homes.

Urbanisation as a result of displacement
A case study of Bentiu, South Sudan
Dr Tarnjeet K Kang, Displacement Tracking Matrix Unit, IOM, South Sudan

This report explores urbanisation in Bentiu and Rubkona towns in Unity state, South Sudan. Using a host community perception survey and qualitative interviews conducted in August of 2018, this case study examines the impact that the introduction of a Protection of Civilians site has had on urbanisation, establishes the perception of the host community, and clarifies what constitutes urbanisation in a South Sudanese context. The findings revealed that insecurity in the area had interrupted development in both towns, which had consequently hindered urbanisation in the area. The state’s access to oil revenues was seen as a viable funding source for future development and economic stability, however respondents noted that this was contingent on security in both the locality and the country at large.

Forced Migration and the City: the urban experience of IDPs in Abuja, Nigeria
Living at the brink of the city: the urban experience of IDPs in Abuja
Chiahemba J. Nor, Sherif Y. Abdulrazak, Bashir Abdullahi, Zainab T. Gajiga
(Federal Capital Development Authourity, Abuja, Nigeria, Konad Group, Taraba State University)

People displaced by violence or conflict are increasingly fleeing to cities, where they hope to find security and opportunity. This study draws on 17 months of qualitative research into the experience of internally displaced people who have fled violence and conflict their home regions for Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja. It focuses particularly on the challenges they face as they try to find places to live and ways to generate income. The IDPs spoke about planning laws and regulations which, more than any other single factor, they feel are working to prevent them accessing the secure and stable lives they hope for. That is, their experience is that Abuja’s organizational and planning structure, far from helping them, is in fact making their lives harder. The study also examines the importance of adapting urban planning concepts to city contexts and the reality of displacement.
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