MIGRATION IN WEST AND NORTH AFRICA

Possible evolution of migration dynamics within and via West and North Africa to June 2019

Scenario 1  Movement within West and North Africa continues at current levels

Highly unlikely  Somewhat likely  Highly likely

IMPACT

Very low  Moderate  Major

Conflicts or insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the Lake Chad basin, Nigeria’s Middle Belt and Libya continue but do not intensify significantly. Intermittential conflict and, in some areas, weak governance continue to create a vacuum that non-state armed groups exploit. The resulting insecurity causes displacement locally and to neighbouring countries. Return movement to some areas is limited. Security elsewhere in the region does not deteriorate significantly. Meanwhile, migration within West Africa, primarily for socioeconomic reasons, continues as does limited migration to North Africa. Europe continues seeking agreements with countries in West and North Africa to restrict the onward movement of refugees and migrants to Europe.

Scenario 2  Major humanitarian crisis in West Africa; localised displacement

Highly unlikely  Somewhat likely  Highly likely

IMPACT

Very low  Moderate  Major

Although multiple states withdrew before 11 December 2018, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is adopted, generating momentum for a significant scale-up of regular pathways for West Africans to migrate to Europe legally. Concurrently, EU agreements with Algeria and Morocco reduce the number of refugees and migrants leaving their northern borders, while the Libyan Coast Guard becomes more aggressive in preventing irregular migration. Migration continues within West Africa and to North Africa as people seek labour opportunities and potential opportunities to move to Europe.

Scenario 3  Major humanitarian crisis in West Africa; localised displacement

Highly unlikely  Somewhat likely  Highly likely

IMPACT

Very low  Moderate  Major

A major humanitarian crisis, most likely a sudden increase in conflict or a coup, erupts in West Africa. This could be a significant deterioration of a current conflict, fuelled by both inter-communal tensions and increasing violence against civilians, which traps many and causes displacement locally and to neighbouring countries; or it could be a new crisis resulting from violence associated with a coup or elections. The displaced reside with host families and in spontaneous settlements. An L3 emergency is declared and the scale of the emergency necessitates consideration of camps for some of the displaced. Crises in other parts of the region continue at current levels. Intraregional migration outside the affected area is only slightly affected.

Scenario 4  Irregular movement to Europe increases

Highly unlikely  Somewhat likely  Highly likely

IMPACT

Very low  Moderate  Major

A sudden escalation in violence in one or more North African countries results in large-scale displacement within the country and to neighbouring countries. The government loses the ability to police its Mediterranean border and smuggling operations, both from West to North Africa and from North Africa across the Mediterranean, expand rapidly, resulting in increased irregular migration to Europe. Additional routes from West Africa open up and the number of people moving to North Africa increases. Libyan Coast Guard capacity is overwhelmed and humanitarian capacity at sea is insufficient, resulting in more deaths at sea. Italy continues to refuse entry to people arriving by sea and disagreements between Mediterranean states on ports of disembarkation result in people being left adrift for long periods, and the asylum space in Europe contracts further.

Any questions? Please contact our senior analyst, Alex Odlum: ao@acaps.org
Introduction

Problem statement

Intra- and inter-country movement is a central feature of West African life. Some people move as a result of conflict, but most move for social and economic reasons. Migration within and from the region has often had a positive effect on household, local and national economies, including through remittances and access to educational and employment opportunities. It is often a necessary way of coping with limited economic opportunities, poverty, subsistence and harsh environments, but can also be aspirational.

Most West African movement is intra-regional, with a smaller amount towards North Africa and elsewhere in Africa, and only a fraction to Europe. However, Europe’s crisis response to migration in recent years has made it highly sensitive to the inward movement of people from West Africa, North Africa and elsewhere in its neighbourhood. Although policies have sought to reduce irregular migration to Europe, people still need to access safety and asylum, and/or move for socioeconomic reasons. Without regular pathways, they often resort to dangerous routes and face humanitarian and protection needs.

Taking into account a range of variables that affect regular and irregular migration, these scenarios consider how migration dynamics within and via West and North Africa (including across the Mediterranean Sea) might evolve in the first half of 2019 and the potential humanitarian consequences. Scenarios 1 and 2 consider events in West Africa while Scenarios 3 and 4 consider events in North Africa.

ACAPS has developed these scenarios for the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) under the DFID-funded Safety, Support and Solutions – Phase 2 programme.

Scenarios for April – September 2018

These scenarios are not attempts to predict the future. Rather, they describe situations that could occur in the coming six months, and are designed to highlight the possible impacts and humanitarian consequences associated with each scenario. The aim is to support strategic planning, create awareness and promote preparedness activities for policymakers and other actors working on migration. The time frame is until June 2019 although the scenarios may remain valid some months longer. See the Methodology section for more information on how these scenarios were developed.

Limitations

Scenarios can seem to oversimplify an issue, as the analysis balances details against broader assumptions. But scenario-building is not an end in itself. It is a process for generating new ideas that should, in turn, lead to changes in project design or decision-making.

These scenarios focus primarily on the potential movement within and from West and North Africa and the impact and humanitarian consequences for those moving.

How to use this report

The four scenarios are summarised on page 2. Pages 7–10 provide more detail on the scenarios, including potential humanitarian consequences. Page 11 lists four factors that could compound the humanitarian consequences of any of the scenarios. Annexed is a summary of the trigger events that could lead towards the situations described in the scenarios.

Terminology

**Armed group**: There is much discussion as to whether some armed groups are actually non-state, even when they are not the legitimate military. In this report, armed groups refer to all groups (whether motivated by crime, ideology or politics) that are not recognised military organisations.

**Asylum seeker**: A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for international protection under relevant international and national instruments.

**Displacement**: Forced movement of people from their homes or places of habitual residence, particularly due to armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.

**Irregular migration**: Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries; for example, crossing an international border without the necessary authorisation or documentation.

**Migrant**: This word is used in this report in an inclusive way. Unless otherwise specified, migrant refers to any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) the particular causes for the movement; or (4) length of the stay.

**Mixed migration**: Mixed migration refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows will have different legal statuses as well as various vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly and wholly or partially assisted by smugglers.

**Refugee**: A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is
outside his/her country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to accept the protection of that country; or a stateless person who, being outside the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.

Smuggling: The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

Trafficking in persons: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of people by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.

Current situation

Migration within West Africa

Most West African migration is within the region (approximately 80%) and is historically and culturally an important avenue to socioeconomic improvement and/or a necessary part of life. Free movement has been a feature of the ECOWAS zone since 1979 and, more recently, the African Union has adopted a common biometric African Passport and a free movement protocol. In comparison, irregular migration from West Africa towards North Africa and Europe, as well as conflict and disaster-induced displacement, are relatively small-scale, though important phenomena. (AU 09/06/2018; UNECA 2018; DIIS 2011; OECD 2008, OECD/SWAC 07/2018, TRALAC 11/2018, World Bank 2013, 2017; UNU 2017)

Seasonal migration: In the northern West Africa, agricultural labourers move for work during the July to September harvest, and through the off-season harvest until March. In the bi-modal south, first season cultivation and harvests start earlier, peaking from May to September, and again between October and April. The agricultural lean season is between April and July (FEWSNET accessed 18/11/2018). Transhumance emerged in the 1970s and north-south migration has become increasingly important for pastoralist livelihoods in the Sahel as recurrent drought and desertification have reduced grazing pastures and water sources. Competition for land and water resources has sparked conflict between farmers and herders, most recently in Nigeria’s Middle Belt and Mali. (FEWSNET accessed 18/11/2018, West Africa Brief accessed 16/11/2018, SDC 02/2016)

Urbanisation: Since the 1950s, West Africa has experienced significant urbanisation and migration to industrial coastal cities and emerging secondary towns. Urban growth is also explained by natural population expansion in cities and the absorption of formerly rural areas into urban agglomerations. Not all migration is towards cities: urban-to-rural migration occurs when migrants return to families and villages after successful temporary urban migration, or as a last resort after failed migration. Other industries not in urban areas also draw migrants, for example groundnut plantations, mining sites along the Sahel Gold Belt or the Abeokuta quarries in Nigeria. (Beauchemin and Bocquereau 03/2004; DIIS 2011)

Remittances help alleviate poverty or finance investments for their family left behind. Migrating to send money home is an important duty to which many young, often male, family members, aspire. Remittances are sent from within the region and further afield; as West African diaspora networks grow across the world, access to capital, information and facilitation services improves for the next in line to migrate. Studies on the potential demand for international migration from West Africa vary: According to a 2013 study, 50%–70% of 2,000 respondents in Senegal would emigrate if given the opportunity, though many lack documents. Another study in 2016-2017 found that fewer people preferred to move elsewhere: Nigeria (50%), Côte d’Ivoire (27%), Mali (19%), Senegal (27%), Niger (11%), Burkina Faso (23%). (Carling et al 01/2013; SWAC/OECD 07/2018)

Drought and desertification are environmental factors that put pressure on individuals and households to migrate, particularly those reliant on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. In 2017-2018, fodder, food and water shortages forced pastoralists in the Sahel to migrate south early (in October instead of January), which created tensions between pastoralists and agricultural populations who were still harvesting their crops. (ICMPD and IOM 03/2015; Geopolitis 23/04/2018)

Floods are recurrent hazards during the rainy season (June to October in northern West Africa; October to January and March to August in southern (coastal) West Africa). Floods often cause temporary displacement, disrupt livelihoods and damage food stocks, crops, infrastructure, basic services and shelter – all of which affect the resilience of vulnerable populations. In 2018, floods affected 826,000 people in Nigeria, 137,000 in Mali and 208,000 in Niger. (FEWSNET accessed 17/11/2018, OCHA 10/10/2018, 01/10/2018, 31/08/2018)

Conflict, insecurity and political instability in West Africa

Mali: Insecurity, including due to attacks by non-state armed groups on the Forces armées maliennes (FAMA), UN peacekeepers and civilians, increased in 2017 and 2018. Clashes between Dogon (pastoralist farmers) and Fulani (nomadic herders) communities over land and water resources have also increased in the central and northern regions of Gao and Menaka. Non-state armed groups exploit weak governance and intercommunal tensions, and have recruited fighters from the Fulani community to stoke tensions. Self-defence armed groups have emerged to defend populations affected by intercommunal conflict (Dana Amassagou on the Dogon side and the Fulani Alliance for the Salvation of the Sahel). (RFI 28/10/2018; IRIN 04/09/2018; Malicantu 09/08/2018)

Niger: The conflict in Mali has sparked cross-border violence in Niger (Tillabery and Tahoua regions), with the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA) and the Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) accused of targeting Fulani civilians.
Niger’s Diffa region remains affected by the Boko Haram crisis centred in neighbouring Nigeria. Violent incidents are also reported along migration routes, particularly in Agadez region. Multiple protests in urban centres since January 2017 calling for better governance are putting pressure on the central government in Niamey. (OCHA 10/10/2017; RFI 20/05/2018; 26/08/2018, 11/06/2018, La Tribune 17/08/2018)

Burkina Faso: Violence and insecurity began in 2016. Insecurity grew in 2018 as military operations (Barkhane) in Mali and Niger pushed armed groups into neighbouring countries, with a coalition of Ansaroul Islam and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) now thought to be present Burkina Faso’s Est region. (International Crisis Group 05/03/2018; ACLED 22/06/2018)

Ghana, Togo and Benin: Growing instability in Burkina Faso threatens neighbouring Ghana, Togo and Benin. In May 2018, a joint operation arrested 200 suspected members of violent non-state armed groups, and the affected states met again in late October to devise a regional counter-terrorism approach. (Daily Maverick 30/10/2018)

Nigeria: The Boko Haram crisis has affected more than 14 million people. Attacks on military and civilians, including IDPs remain a concern in the northeast. Additionally, conflict between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers in Nigeria’s ‘Middle Belt’ over land, water and pastures has become increasingly violent since January 2018, forcing the government to deploy the army in affected states. (Council on Foreign Relations 03/01/2018; International Crisis Group 26/07/2018, Geopolis 23/04/2018; US Institute for Peace 17/09/2018, Quartz Africa 22/06/2018)

Côte d’Ivoire: Post-electoral violence in 2010 and 2011 killed 3,000 people and caused rapid and significant displacement. Political and particularly economic recovery has been impressive (8% annually since 2011), but over 45% of the population still lives under the poverty line. Long-standing political divisions, fragmentation within the army and growing civil discontent threaten stability in the runup to presidential elections in 2020. (VOA Afrique 17/07/2018, DW 12/02/2018, New York Times 28/03/2017)

Guinée Conakry: Opposition protests and strikes against poor governance have taken place in Conakry since mid-October 2018. Guinean security forces have responded with violence: according to the opposition, dozens of protesters have been killed in peaceful demonstrations since 2010. Disruptions to commerce and trade are reported. (Garda World 01/11/2018, AFP 08/11/2018, Reuters 13/03/2018)

Guinea Bissau: Discontent with the poorly functioning government has been growing since 2015. Strikes over salaries, working conditions and poor governance have been reported since mid-2018. (Garda World 08/11/2018, 23/10/2018, 12/07/2018)

Movement to North Africa and Europe

Europe: A sharp increase in irregular arrivals of refugees and migrants in 2015 and early 2016 triggered a crisis response, including a deal with Turkey to slow flows across the Aegean and Balkans in 2016, and the creation in 2015 of the Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), currently funded for EUR 4.1 billion to provide aid (humanitarian assistance, skills training, students exchange, evacuation, reintegration and other projects). In addition, the EU and individual member states have spent money on migration management and policing of borders, and pushed African states to cooperate on tackling irregular migration.

Arrivals have since declined from over one million in 2015 to 362,000 in 2016, 172,000 in 2017 and just over 100,000 in 2018 (to November). However, following Italy’s closure of ports to people rescued at sea, arrivals to Spain have increased significantly, with 50,000 arrivals in 2018 to November, compared with 12,000 in 2014, and mortality rates have climbed sharply for attempted crossings of the Mediterranean Sea. Negotiations with third countries in Europe’s neighbourhood are ongoing to strengthen migration management in the region. (UNHCR 09/2018; MPI 06/2018, EC accessed 17/11/2018, European Council 28/06/2018; EC 26/11/2018, UNHCR data portal)

Libya: Conflict in Libya continues, after a peace conference in Italy in November 2018 achieved only minimal progress. The UN-backed GNA controls Tripoli, but is threatened by militia. General Haftar’s LNA, which began pushing south in October 2018, controls the oil-rich east. Central and southern areas are contested by various armed groups and militias (including from Chad) that profit from smuggling and trafficking trades. (VoA 13/11/2018; AFP 13/11/2018)

Libya has long been an important destination for sub-Saharan African migrants. Many continue to seek work in Libyan towns or industries, including services and resource extraction, to improve their socioeconomic position, send remittances or fund onward movement, including towards Europe. In August 2018, IOM estimated that 669,000 migrants were in Libya. Detention centres are officially run by government, but often controlled by militias, and are overcrowded and lack food and healthcare. Around 4,000 of the 5,413 people in government-run detention facilities in Libya are persons of concern to UNHCR. Outside detention centres, refugees and migrants face inhospitable desert terrain, armed groups, criminal and smuggling networks, extortion, ill-treatment, unlawful arrest, trafficking, forced labour, sexual violence and exploitation. Deaths and injuries are frequently reported, while many refugees and migrants become missing. (IOM 08/2018; IOM 18/07/2018, UNHCR 11/2018, UNHCR 09/11/2018, MMC 05/2018)

Given the dangers in Libya, IOM has taken 14,622 migrants home or to third countries for safety, and recently resumed flights out of Sebha in southern Libya. UNHCR has evacuated 2,344 asylum-seekers from detention centres in Libya to Niger since November 2017. However, only 12 European states have committed 3,886 resettlement places from Libya and Niger, leaving many people stuck in dangerous detention centres. (IOM 09/11/2018, 08/10/2018, UNHCR 14/11/2018, 09/11/2018, UNHCR 15/11/2018)

Niger and Mali: Refugees and migrants heading north to Libya transit towns in northern Mali and Niger, including Agadez, Arlit and Tessalit. Increased criminalisation of smuggling in Niger has reduced observable northbound migration through Agadez by 75% from 2016 levels, but also removed the livelihoods of some 6,000 people and had an
impact on the local economy. Moreover, smugglers are still able to provide routes through Mali or via the desert to escape detection. Further routes via Chad to Libya and via Mauritania to the Canary Islands have been reported in 2018, highlighting the adaptability of the smuggling business. (MMC 09/11/2018, The Atlantic 11/02/2018, IOM 09/2017; VoA 28/10/2018)

Morocco: In 2018, the Western Mediterranean route from/via Morocco has grown. European governments want Morocco to tighten its borders, but Morocco’s position is unclear: it is said to have relaxed migration controls to improve its bargaining position with Europe, but also carried out violent raids on camps and moved people to remote settlements near its southern borders. It has removed visa exemptions for nationals of Guinée Conakry and Guinea Bissau who previously could travel visa-free to Casablanca. (UNHCR data portal accessed 17/11/2018; Frontex 15/10/2018; Der Spiegel 03/08/2018; Amnesty International 07/09/2018)

Algeria: An estimated 25,000–100,000 undocumented migrants live in Algeria, which, although relatively stable, faces potential political instability with elections in 2019 and an ageing president. Migrants in Algeria mainly come from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso for socioeconomic reasons. Although documented Malian nationals can enter Algeria under a bilateral agreement, many migrants use dangerous desert crossings to enter irregularly, and can be expelled under Algeria’s 2008 law on foreigners. The Algerian army has increased interceptions and arrests in 2018. Between January and August 2018, some 16,400 people were deported from Algeria to Niger, 8,700 of whom were Nigerien nationals. Many other refugees and migrants are thought to be abandoned in the desert rather than deported. (Global Risk Insights 07/10/2017; ISS 04/07/2018; Amnesty International 23/10/2018, Le Monde 20/03/2018; RFI 16/10/2015; MMC 09/11/2018)

Tunisia: are among the largest groups migrating irregularly to Europe, but Tunisia is also a destination or transit point for refugees and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa: Some 58,000 non-Tunisian nationals are believed to be in the country, with limited rights and services. Tunisia’s young democracy remains fragile and political tensions are on the rise as elections scheduled for late 2019 approach. (IOM 31/10/2018; REACH 10/2018, Mixed Migration Hub 03/2018; TRT World 10/01/2018)
Scenarios

1 Movement within West and North Africa continues at current level

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<th>PROBABILITY</th>
<th>Highly unlikely</th>
<th>Somewhat likely</th>
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<th>IMPACT</th>
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Current conflicts or insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, Lake Chad basin, Nigeria’s Middle Belt and Libya continue but do not intensify significantly. Intercommunal conflict and, in some areas, weak governance continue to create a vacuum that non-state armed groups exploit. The resulting insecurity causes displacement locally and to neighbouring countries. There is limited return movement to some areas. There is no significant deterioration in security elsewhere in the region. Meanwhile, migration within West Africa, primarily for socioeconomic reasons, continues, as does limited migration to North Africa. Europe continues seeking agreements with West and North African countries to restrict the onward movement of refugees and migrants to Europe.

Possible triggers/assumptions

Some or all of the following occur:

- Military forces are unable to defeat the armed groups in the region
- Armed groups continue to receive financial support / raise income by smuggling and trafficking
- Competition for natural resources continues fuelling intercommunal conflict
- Attacks on civilian population by non-state armed groups continue
- No significant further deterioration in food security

Geographic areas of most concern

Burkina Faso, Mali, southeastern and western Niger, and the Middle Belt of Nigeria

Estimated additional caseload

Up to 50,000 newly displaced over seven months and up to 50,000 additional refugees and migrants in North Africa.

Impact

Internal displacement, including secondary displacement, continues in many regions, especially within Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, gradually affecting more people over wider geographic areas. Aggressive military tactics combined with a lack of employment opportunities cause growing numbers of youth to become more susceptible to recruitment by non-state armed groups. Trafficking, smuggling and attacks on civilian populations increase, further destabilising Mali and Burkina Faso. The G5 Sahel stabilisation efforts, as well as recovery and development work, cannot be put in place. The smuggling industry reacts to efforts to stop northward irregular migration by opening new, more expensive and risky routes. Free movement remains the norm across West Africa. Efforts to stop irregular migration through Niger and Mali, supported by the EU and member states, lead to more controlled borders, but also some negative consequences for access to cross-border livelihoods and protection of people pushed underground.

Humanitarian consequences

Border control, displacement, land disputes, insecurity, military operations and other government measures to combat armed groups continue to disrupt livelihoods. IDPs face ongoing protection issues and gender violence, and vulnerability increases due to negative coping strategies. A limited number of people leave affected countries for socioeconomic reasons and use irregular pathways, increasing vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking. People from unaffected countries continue to move northwards by irregular means and are exposed to risks of exploitation and trafficking. New arrivals affect host communities with limited resources.

Operational constraints

Continued access problems for both IDPs and people moving across borders, for security and logistical reasons. Poor coverage of specialised services; inadequate individual case management in some locations. Insufficient humanitarian funding. Limited humanitarian presence in newly affected areas of Burkina Faso and Niger. Underfunded and overstretched response in Mali and Nigeria, and complicated political environment in Nigeria due to elections.
2 Major humanitarian crisis in West Africa; localised displacement

A major humanitarian crisis, most likely a sudden increase in conflict or a coup, erupts in West Africa. This could be a significant deterioration in a current conflict, fuelled by both intercommunal tensions and increasing violence against civilians, which traps many and causes displacement locally and to neighbouring countries. Otherwise, it could be a new crisis resulting from violence associated with a coup or elections. The displaced mostly reside with host families and in spontaneous settlements. An L3 emergency is declared and the scale of the emergency necessitates consideration of some camps for some of the displaced. Crises in other parts of the region continue at current levels. Intra-regional migration outside the affected area is only slightly affected.

Possible triggers/assumptions

Some or all of the following occur:

- Non-state armed groups receive increased support (external material support and/or sympathy within the affected area)
- The G5 Sahel restarts operations
- The G5 Sahel Task Force adopts aggressive tactics affecting the local populations
- UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) scales down
- Counter-insurgency and social disruption fuel sympathy for armed opposition groups
- Attacks by non-state armed groups or individuals increase significantly
- Instability increases in Burkina Faso areas bordering Benin as non-state armed groups fight for territory
- Disruption of smuggling routes through Niger, causing smugglers to engage in conflict or be recruited to armed groups
- Returned migrants unable to reintegrate
- Increased recruitment or kidnapping of young people by non-state armed groups
- Rapid deterioration in food security in part of the region
- Election violence in Guinea-Bissau or Mauritania

- Escalation of pre-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire

Geographic areas of most concern

Burkina Faso, Mali and the Middle Belt of Nigeria – although this scenario could also occur in one or more West African coastal states.

Estimated additional caseload

Up to 500,000 newly displaced and up to 50,000 additional refugees and migrants in North Africa.

Impact

Large-scale localised displacement requires emergency humanitarian response, which is complicated by insecurity. Many of those displaced reside with host families and others settle spontaneously. Tensions arise between those displaced and host communities in rural areas over the use of land, water and other limited resources. Neighbouring states impose tighter border controls, affecting movement for socioeconomic reasons, including trade and remittances patterns. Meanwhile, other intra-regional migration beyond the affected area and irregular migration to Europe continue at present levels while the smuggling industry continues to react to efforts to stop northward movement by opening new, more expensive and riskier routes.

Humanitarian consequences

Same as for Scenario 1 but at greater scale; and:

Infrastructure and services in places of displacement, including water points, sanitation facilities and health centres, are overstretched due to the sudden influx. The humanitarian needs of the displaced, both those with host families and those in spontaneous settlements, increase significantly while their livelihood options decrease. Lacking identity cards, many displaced resort to informal employment.

Operational constraints

Humanitarian access declines and movement of people and goods is restricted in some areas. Existing humanitarian capacity is overwhelmed.
3 Regular movement to Europe increases; irregular movement reduces

Despite multiple states withdrawing prior to 11 December 2018, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is adopted, generating momentum for a significant scale-up of regular pathways for West Africans to migrate to Europe. Concurrently, EU agreements with Algeria and Morocco reduce the number of refugees and migrants leaving their northern borders, while the Libyan Coast Guard becomes more aggressive in preventing irregular migration. Programmes to reduce irregular migration are implemented but needs and aspirations to move remain. Migration continues within West Africa and to North Africa as people seek labour and opportunities to reach Europe.

Possible triggers/assumptions

Some or all of the following occur:

- The GCM is adopted in December 2018
- EU member states significantly increase regular migration via legal pathways
- EU member states sign bilateral agreements with countries of transit and origin
- Algerian elections pass peacefully
- Algeria and EU sign agreement on migration
- Morocco and EU sign agreement on migration
- Morocco tightens border controls with Ceuta and Melilla, Spain
- Morocco revokes visa exemptions for additional West African countries
- Libyan elections pass peacefully
- Libyan security forces continue to increase efforts to curb smuggling operations
- Increased and stricter border controls between coastal West African countries and Sahelian countries

Estimated additional caseload

Up to 100,000 additional refugees and migrants in vulnerable situations over seven months.

Impact

The number of irregular arrivals in Italy and Spain decreases, although the number of migrants arriving in Algeria, Libya and Morocco remains at similar levels; as a result, more people are stuck. Algerian and Moroccan security forces continue to relocate migrants to camps in the south while increasing the number forcibly returned and refouled to Mali and Niger. Additional smuggling routes open up across North Africa, and costs increase for what become longer and more covert journeys. The number of people departing ports in The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal increases, including from new areas less well patrolled by Frontex and Spain. The rate of deaths at sea continues to rise as smugglers and migrants make increasingly unsafe attempts to reach Europe while rescues at sea remain impeded. As irregular arrivals are reduced, the political climate in Europe around migration calms. EU countries increase the number of returns to North Africa. Returnees to countries of origin face difficulties reintegrating, including some who avoid returning to their place of origin due to the stigma of failure, and others who look elsewhere or migrate again for socioeconomic opportunity. Regular migration to Europe increases significantly but does not affect the rate of irregular migration between West and North Africa. Movement within West Africa continues as normal.

Humanitarian consequences

Refugees and migrants in, and journeying towards, North Africa are exposed to greater violence, trafficking and extortion as smuggling operations are driven further underground. A growing number are at risk at sea, en route from West African ports. Instances of refugees and migrants being forced to disembark occur, including the use of tear gas and rubber bullets. Detention centres become increasingly overcrowded and abuse of detainees increases. Additionally, many people relocated to southern Algeria and Morocco or returned to Mali and Niger lack adequate protection and essential services. Increased numbers of returnees require reintegration assistance.

Operational constraints

Humanitarian access to those stuck in Algeria, Libya and Morocco and northern Niger.

Geographic areas of most concern

4 Irregular movement to Europe increases

PROBABILITY

Highly unlikely

Somewhat likely

Highly likely

IMPACT

Very low

Moderate

Major

A sudden escalation in violence in one or more North African countries results in large-scale displacement within the country and to neighbouring countries. The government loses the ability to police its Mediterranean border and smuggling operations, both from West to North Africa and from North Africa across the Mediterranean, expand rapidly, resulting in increased irregular migration to Europe. Additional routes from West Africa open up and the number of people moving to North Africa increases. Libyan Coast Guard capacity is overwhelmed and humanitarian capacity at sea is insufficient, resulting in increased deaths at sea. Italy continues to refuse entry for people arriving by sea and disagreement between Mediterranean states on ports of disembarkation results in people being left adrift for long periods.

Possible triggers/assumptions

Some or all of the following occur:

- Political instability in Libya increases
- Libyan internal conflict intensifies
- Libyan elections spark violence
- Libyan security forces reduce efforts to curb smuggling operations
- Political instability emerges in Algeria
- Political violence in Algeria compounded by economic crisis
- Civil unrest in Morocco
- Morocco relaxes its border controls with Ceuta and Melilla, Spain
- Additional smuggling routes open up
- Smuggling costs from sub-Saharan Africa to Algeria, Libya or Morocco fall

Geographic areas of most concern

North African countries, northern Mali and northern Niger

Estimated additional caseload

Up to 500,000 IDPs and/or refugees and 500,000 refugees and migrants in vulnerable situations.

Impact

Security forces lose control over parts of the affected North African country including some coastal areas used by smugglers and migrants. Significant internal displacement and possibly also to Tunisia and/or Egypt results as people flee the violence. Further destabilisation of Libya would result in armed groups resuming their smuggling operations while government detention centres in Libya are abandoned or left out of control. An African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission is planned while the EU and its member states consider military action to secure Mediterranean shores to prevent people from reaching Europe. Migrants working in Algeria/Libya seek to return home while others attempt to cross to Europe. Italy and Malta continue to refuse humanitarian boats while the EU puts pressure on neighbouring countries (Tunisia and Egypt) to accept the displaced. The asylum space in Europe contracts further for people in need of protection and perceptions of refugees and migrants worsen. Significant numbers of people would become stuck inside the affected country and at sea. Smuggling routes through the conflict zones become increasingly dangerous. Movement within West Africa increases slightly, with some people moving to generate funding as the opportunity for more northward movement opens.

Humanitarian consequences

In the affected country, access to food, healthcare and other basic services is limited for IDPs and non-displaced affected communities. Most IDPs, refugees and migrants lose access to employment. The poor are pushed further into poverty and resort to negative coping mechanisms. Growing numbers of people are vulnerable to violence, trafficking, extortion and being caught in the conflict. Existing humanitarian services are overwhelmed. Increasing numbers of people die attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea.

Operational constraints

Humanitarian access to refugees and migrants stuck in Libya decreases while the need for additional emergency funding limits scale-up of humanitarian response in other North African countries, hindering the provision of timely humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees and transiting migrants.
Compounding factors

The following developments can occur in parallel to any of the above scenarios and have the potential to significantly change the humanitarian situation.

Economic Boom

An economic boom in one or more ECOWAS countries would fuel inward migration. This could happen in conjunction with any of the above scenarios, while having little impact on the scenario itself. In addition to attracting migrants who seek economic improvement, increased economic opportunities will improve the ability and finances of those who wish to migrate outwards, resulting in a slight increase in outward migration.

Communicable disease outbreak

The West Africa region is particularly vulnerable to different kinds of outbreaks. A severe cholera outbreak currently affects Niger and Nigeria. There is a risk the situation might deteriorate and spread further in the region due to poor sanitary conditions and frequent population movement. Nigeria is also facing an ongoing Lassa fever outbreak (an acute viral haemorrhagic illness transmitted via rodent urine or faeces). In addition, over 2,200 suspected cases of dengue fever have been reported in Senegal and Mauritania since September, and the presence of three different types of virus strain increases the risk of a more severe infection, straining health facilities. The West Africa region faced a major Ebola outbreak in 2014, and though actions have been taken to reduce the risk of future outbreaks, the need for vigilance remains strong.

A large-scale disease outbreak is particularly of concern in Scenario 2, as significant displacement would result in high concentrations of IDPs and conflict would constrain health service provision. In all scenarios, however, those undertaking irregular migration would be especially vulnerable should a communicable disease outbreak occur along migration pathways.

Natural disaster

Natural disasters such as floods or drought may drive limited, short-term displacement, but apart from drought contributing to intercommunal conflict such as in Mali and Nigeria (Scenarios 1 and 2), will not directly trigger any of the above scenarios. However, they will cause significant economic losses that will result in increased poverty: this can prevent movement for the most vulnerable (through lack of financial resources), yet also increase the need and desire to migrate, as well as the risk threshold for people whose only option is to move along dangerous routes with the assistance of smugglers.

Increased movement via the eastern routes to Europe

Movement has decreased significantly along the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans Route since 2015-2016. However, refugees and migrants remain along the route.

Conflicts and/or natural disasters continue to cause displacement and economic need in places connected with routes to Europe, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. Many mobile populations in the region remain without durable solutions of local integration, voluntary repatriation or adequate access to resettlement and other regular pathways. As European attention has shifted from the Eastern to Central and now Western Mediterranean Route, it is possible that another major movement along the Eastern Route could occur. It would be particularly relevant to Scenario 3 by creating further competition for regular pathways to Europe, and Scenario 4, by complicating negotiations over disembarkation.

How scenarios can be used

Scenarios are a set of different ways that a situation may develop. The aim of scenario building is not to try and accurately predict the future, but rather to understand the range of possible futures and then select a few that result in distinct situations with, usually, differing humanitarian outcomes that can:

- Support strategic planning for agencies and NGOs
- Identify assumptions underlying anticipated needs and related interventions
- Enhance the adaptability and design of detailed assessments
- Influence monitoring and surveillance systems
- Create awareness, provide early warning and promote preparedness activities among stakeholders

For more information on how to build scenarios, please see the ACAPS Technical Brief on Scenario Development.

Methodology

These scenarios were developed in November 2018, during a one-day workshop in Dakar, Senegal. Staff from 20 humanitarian, diplomatic, academic or policy organisations contributed to these scenarios through participation in the workshop or bilateral meetings.

Many variables that could cause change were mapped during the workshop. By making assumptions as to how these variables might plausibly change, four scenarios were identified. These scenarios were then expanded and the major impact of each scenario and its humanitarian consequences identified.

Scenarios 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. Scenarios 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive. A list of individual triggers is given on pages 14–16. It should be noted that a combination, but not necessarily all, of the triggers are required to reach a scenario. However, elements of
each scenario could unfold at the same time, and elements of each scenario could also trigger other scenarios.

The estimated caseload for each scenario is an estimate of the additional caseload that could result should each scenario unfold. Scenarios 1, 2 and 4 envision a caseload of people newly displaced directly by the foreseen events as well as new refugees and migrants transiting North Africa. They are designed to give an order of magnitude only, and are based on the current displacement and migration figures.

Thank you

ACAPS would like to thank all organisations that provided input to these scenarios: both those that attended the workshop in Dakar and those that contributed via bilateral meetings.

For additional information or to comment please email: info@acaps.org.
### Scenarios triggers

**Scenario 1** = Movement within West and North Africa continues at current level  
**Scenario 2** = Major humanitarian crisis in West Africa; localised displacement  
**Scenario 3** = Regular movement to Europe increases; irregular movement reduces  
**Scenario 4** = Irregular movement to Europe increases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The scale of humanitarian need in West and North Africa is likely to remain similar if:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military forces are unable to defeat the armed groups in the region;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed groups continue to receive financial support / raise income by smuggling and trafficking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition for natural resources continues to fuel intercommunal conflict</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on civilian population by non-state armed groups continue</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No significant further deterioration in food security</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Background information

- **Scenario 1**  
  In Mali, tensions over scarce natural resources between Dogon and Fulani communities have escalated into armed clashes. In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, farmer-herder conflict has been growing increasingly violent, due to the environmental degradation of pastures and violence in northeast Nigeria forcing herders to move south.

- **Scenario 2**  
  Between January and July 2018, at least 289 civilians were killed in Mali (most in Mopti region). In Nigeria, farmer-herder conflict has left more than 1,300 people dead and displaced some 300,000 ([Al Jazeera 17/07/2018](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/179-civilians-killed-nigerias-middle-belt-violence-180717140242750.html), [International Crisis Group 26/07/2018](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-africa/central-african-republic/conflict/725069/nigeria-farmer-herder-conflict-resurgence)).

- **Scenario 3**  
  In February 2018, G5 Sahel received EUR 413 million in pledges from donors, yet less than half of these funds have been received and the force is far from being operational ([RFI 16/11/2018](http://www.rfi.fr/en/afrique/20181116-g5-sahel-task-force-receives-413m-in-funds-to-battle-terrorists)).

- **Scenario 4**  
  On 28 July 2018, MINUSMA’s mandate was renewed for one additional year ([UN Security Council 28/06/2018](https://www.un.org/en/sections/humanitarian-agencies/united-nations-multidimensional-integrated-stabilization-mission-in-mali/)), so would unlikely withdraw in the timeframe but may scale down towards the end of the mandate or become ineffective.
### Background information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counter-insurgency operations and social disruption fuel sympathy for armed opposition groups</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks by non-state armed groups increase significantly</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instability increases in Burkina Faso areas bordering Benin as non-state armed groups fight for territory</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption of smuggling routes through Niger, causing smugglers to engage in conflict or be recruited to armed groups</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned migrants are unable to reintegrate</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased recruitment or kidnapping of young people by non-state armed groups (most likely in Mali and Burkina Faso)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid deterioration in food security in part of the region</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election violence in Guinea-Bissau or Mauritania</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escalation of pre-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Only a few hundred of the 7,000 people who applied for the EU-funded reconversion mechanism programme have benefitted from it ([IRIN 28/06/2018](https://www.irinnews.org/feature-news/2018/06/28/only-a-few-hundred-of-the-7000-people-who-applied-for-the-eu-funded-reconversion-mechanism-programme-have-benefited-from-it)).

### The scale of humanitarian need in North Africa is likely to remain similar if:

- The GCM is not derailed in December 2018
- EU member states significantly increase regular migration via legal pathways
- EU member states sign bilateral agreements with countries of transit and origin
- Algerian elections pass peacefully
- Algeria and EU sign agreement on migration

- The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is to be held on 10 and 11 December 2018 in Marrakech. It is expected to be the first, intergovernmentally negotiated agreement to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner ([IOM](https://www.iom.int/)).

- Postponed legislative elections in Guinea-Bissau, and 2019 presidential elections in Mauritania have the potential of sparking political and institutional instability.

- As socioeconomic issues remain unaddressed, civil discontent is growing inside the country, and protests and strikes are multiplying.
### Background information

For the past 15 years, the EU has been pushing for a deal with Morocco to manage migratory flows to Spain (DW 31/07/2018).

On 26 July, over 600 people entered into Ceuta by breaking through the wired fences (VOA 26/10/2018).

Nationals from the following countries are currently exempt from acquiring a visa to enter Morocco: Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal.

Elections were postponed due to an increase in violence and paralysis of the political process. The United Nations Special Envoy to Libya announced that a national conference in early 2019 would set the stage for the vote, expected to take place during the spring.

### The scale of humanitarian need in North Africa is likely to increase significantly if:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political instability in Libya increases</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan internal conflict intensifies</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan elections spark violence</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan security forces reduce efforts to curb smuggling operations</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability emerges in Algeria</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence in Algeria compounded by economic crisis</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil unrest in Morocco</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco relaxes its border controls with Ceuta and Melilla, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite being poor health, President Bouteflika is seeking re-election in 2019. Uncertainties remain around the issue of presidential succession and whether a peaceful transition of power is possible.

As the 2014 fall in the price of oil turns into a severe economic crisis, protests denouncing economic deterioration and corruption have multiplied.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional smuggling routes open up</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling costs from sub-Saharan Africa to Algeria, Libya, or Morocco</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>