Key Issues

1. Closure of two INGO offices without due process, affecting the delivery of timely lifesaving humanitarian assistance

2. Increased risks to humanitarian assets and supply as a result of increased NSAG attacks, thereby contributing to further shrinking of humanitarian access

3. The safety and protection of IDPs in camps is increasingly under threat, with increasing infiltration, looting and attacks by armed individuals believed to be NSAG elements

4. Indefinite suspension of the CMCoord - Hq Theater Command CIMIC weekly meetings following the suspension of ACF and Mercy Corps, which lasted for the whole month, and the subsequent creation of the Board of Inquiries (BOI).

5. Backlog of humanitarian convoys and fuel transport, particularly those eastward bound to Pulka, Dikwa, Ngala, Bama and Pulka; this was believed to be a result of non-availability of security escorts. Fuel requirements in excess of the limit of 1,000 liters per week, continues to be a major impediment to humanitarian operations. Most affected with the fuel restrictions are the hubs and a government hospital in the deep field.

6. Marked increase in security-related incidents mostly affecting civilians.

Key Incidents

September

• There were 22 reported attacks by NSAGs, 19 (83%) of which targeted government forces and forward operating bases, while the rest targeted civilian convoys along major roads. Bama and Gubio had the highest frequency of attacks against government forces for the month of September. Meanwhile, major roads such as the Dikwa-Ngala road, Konduga-Bama, Gajiram-Gajigana road came under attack as well, with the Konduga-Bama road being the most affected. This is further contributing to an increasingly volatile operating environment that is impacting the security of humanitarian activities, with significant consequences on planning for continuity and sustainability.

• Movement restrictions by the military as a direct result of operations against NSAGs significantly affected humanitarian operations. These included restrictions on vehicle movement in Monguno and Nganzai.

• Two incidents of PBIED explosions were reported. Humanitarians were not targeted by both incidents. However, this continues to be a major threat to physical safety within the BAY states.

• Increased frequency of looting of medical supplies from health facilities as well as assistance received by IDPs including other possessions, further exacerbating safety risks for medical facilities and protection concerns for the civilian population in IDP camps.

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1 Source: UNDSS and INSO; incidents with direct or potential impact on humanitarian Programmes, plans and activities in the BAY States
October

- A total of 281 security-related incidents have been reported for the month. Of these incidents, 71% took place in Borno, almost 18% transpired in Adamawa and the remaining 11% happened in Yobe.

- These incidents have affected mostly civilians (57%), government and community forces (GF, 18%), non-state armed groups (NSAG, 16%) and criminals (6%); INGOs represent 1% of the affected groups; the remaining 2% represent the groups that could not be determined distinctly and credibly as belonging to any of the other groups.

- There were 51 attacks by NSAGs against GF, 19 of which were direct attacks on GF positions and check points while the rest were ambushes and/or IEDs. On the other hand, there were 45 GF-initiated attacks on NSAGs in the form of air strikes, ambushes and other armed encounters. Criminals accounted for 16 incidents that involved arrests, capture or neutralization.

- Civilians continue to bear the brunt of attacks. A total of 54 incidences against civilians were committed by criminal groups, representing 32% of all incidents; these criminal activities range from kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, cattle rustling, and killing. Likewise, non-state armed actors (NSAG) have attacked civilians 53 times, representing 31%; these attacks were in the form of armed robbery of passenger cars and commercial vehicles, carjacking, abduction and killing. Cattle rustling and stealing of crops from farmers have also been reported. Vehicle checkpoints were set-up along Bama-Pulka, Ngala-Dikwa, Monguno-Gajiram (4X), Gwoza-Madagali, and Pulka-Gwoza Roads in which valuable items were stolen from civilians. These armed robberies represented 30% of incidents that affected civilians.

- Government forces (GF) operations caused eight incidents, involving restrictions on movements of vehicles and individuals in areas where search and arrest operations were conducted; these represented 5% of incidents affecting civilians. Additionally, there have been four instances of arrest of civilians by GF due to strong suspicion of being NSAG members and/or supporters, representing 2% of the total incidents.

- The security-related incidents reflect the volatility of the operating environment and how it is negatively impacting humanitarian programmes, planning and activities, which makes it even more difficult to reach people-in-need, particularly those outside garrison towns. The increasing audacity of criminal groups in the conduct of their activities in a manner similar to NSAGs is concerning; this reinforces the perception that some criminal groups have linkages with NSAGs for complementarity or co-existence. Some of the criminal groups commit crimes in the name of NSAGs. Relatedly, there are reported NSAGs who camouflage as GFs. As a consequence, the operating environment is getting more complex and challenging to navigate.
### CMCoord Referrals for Troubleshooting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organization / Sector</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>Monguno</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Presence of military personnel in IDP camps</td>
<td>Ongoing with Sector 3 Hq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>Truck with fuel and generator stopped by police at checkpoint and impounded despite clearance from Hq Theatre Command</td>
<td>Referred to Hq Theatre Command; Hq TC sent a letter to police, same letter shared with INTERSOS; completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sep</td>
<td>Damasak</td>
<td>Humanitarian partners</td>
<td>Different curfew timings given by the battalion and newly arrived brigade hq</td>
<td>Referred to Sector 3 Hq; completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sep</td>
<td>Damasak</td>
<td>Humanitarian partners</td>
<td>Checkpoints 100m apart on the way to the helipad delaying movement by 30 minutes</td>
<td>Referred to Sector 3 Hq; completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Preserving $1.2M worth of drugs in ACF’s pharmacies by maintaining suitable room temperatures</td>
<td>Sorted out with WHO and Hq Theatre Command; System in place; completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct</td>
<td>Monguno</td>
<td>ALIMA</td>
<td>Lack of fuel for the generator at the General Hospital being operated by ALIMA</td>
<td>Referred to Hq Theatre Command, coordinated with Health Sector for a unified effort; ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Refueling of generator at ACF office to sustain its operation in preserving the USD1.2M worth of drugs in the pharmacy and service maintenance of the generator</td>
<td>Referred to Hq Theatre Command; completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Oct</td>
<td>Dikwa</td>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Expansion of the perimeter excavation around the town to decongest IDP camps and create more space for productive activities for IDPs and host communities</td>
<td>Discussed and agreed with the local military unit; need to bring NERI, CCCM and the military to the table to determine the exact expansion line; ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Oct</td>
<td>Ngala</td>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Transfer of IDPs to the unoccupied Mercy Corps to decongest existing IDP camps; the former was fenced, and perimeters lights installed as earlier requested by the local military unit</td>
<td>Referred to the local military unit; advised the local CCCM rep to clarify what else is the impediment; local military unit requested for 3 watch towers in the absence of a perimeter excavation around the new site; NEDC was requested to support; ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Dissemination of the FMDHS Press Statement on the lifting of the ban on ACF and Mercy Corps to Hq Theatre Command and all relevant subordinate units for common situational awareness</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Source: CMCoord Actionable Referral Tool (ART)
Impact on Humanitarian Programmes, Planning and Activities

1. **NSAG Infiltration.** On 13 Sep, NSAGs infiltrated Ajari IDP camp in Dikwa, which has greatly compromised the safety of IDPs in camps. As a consequence, several IDPs deserted the camp and relocated to other camps in Dikwa such as Sangaya, Kilagaru, Ahaji Bashir and Motor Park IDP camp, leading to increased congestion in these camps. Relatedly, IDPs in Kuya camp in Monguno are also experiencing incessant infiltration and looting of their personal items and belongings, believed to be committed by NSAG elements. In Banki, NSAG elements infiltrated IDP camps between 6 and 9 Sep and took away various items from some female-headed households like food items, food ration cards and personal belongings. IDPs have protested and are threatening to leave the IDP camp because of the recurring infiltrations by NSAG elements.

2. **Presence of military personnel in some IDP camps.** There is continued presence of military personnel in some IDP camps such as in Monguno despite instructions from the military leadership that IDP camps are off-limits to military personnel. This is affecting the civilian character of the IDP camps and particularly frustrating efforts to address cases of sexual exploitation and abuse and prevention of potential GBV-related incidents.

3. **NSAG robbery.** On 20 Sep, an INGO-supported General Hospital in Monguno was robbed by suspected NSAG elements and took with them medical supplies, drugs, visibility vests and a laptop, including mobile phones and cash from hospital staff. With medical facilities as a major target, this is significantly compromising the safety of medical facilities, supplies and staff.

4. **Road closures and restriction of movements.** The frequent road closures and increased restrictions by the military on movement of humanitarian cargo by road is affecting the timely delivery of much needed lifesaving assistance. The frequent closure of Gajiram-Gajigana road is negatively impacting the movement of needed humanitarian supplies. The security challenges along the axis have forced most humanitarian partners to either stop humanitarian operations or limit their activities to a maximum of three hours per working day in these locations. Access by people-in-need in these areas to humanitarian aid have been significantly limited as a result.

5. **Fluid security situation.** The worsening security situation affecting safety of road movements is significantly hampering humanitarian operations. The regular transport of humanitarian supplies and water-trucking along Pulka-Gwoza road has been continuously hampered by the volatile security situation along the axis. This means that planning for such activities will have to be constantly flexible to take advantage of safe windows that may become available; this may have some cost implications though as a result of having multiple options in place.

6. **Protection of women.** In Pulka, the safety and protection of women, believed to be wives of suspected NSAG members, is increasingly compromised. They reportedly leave IDP camps in the middle of the night to meet with their husbands in the bush. Some of whom have been able to return safely to the IDP camps, while others have been intercepted by NSAG elements.

7. **Turnover of military interlocutors.** The regular turnover of interlocutors on the military side is always a challenge as there is no proper handover to promote a better understanding of operational issues affecting humanitarian actors and their ability to sustain humanitarian operations. As a consequence, there is the tendency to start from scratch as outstanding operational issues are not handed over for follow-up or appropriate action.

8. **LGA level dialogue producing solutions.** In Monguno, Hq Sector 3 Command has agreed to commence the construction of new shelters at Water Board Ext. Camp. It is expected that this expansion will create some space to decongest IDP camps but would need more expansion sites to truly decongest the priority IDP camps in Monguno. This is part of the ongoing dialogue with Hq Sector 3. In Yobe, the humanitarian community is sustaining its dialogue with the military at Sector Hq and subordinate unit level to increase transparency, promote understanding and awareness and reduce suspicion. The team shared a briefing note detailing the activities undertaken by each humanitarian partner across Yobe state. This is aimed at creating a common understanding of the humanitarian activities undertaken, including the movement of humanitarian supplies to remote areas.
9. **Advice against road travel.** On 17 Oct, Hq Sector 3 Command advised against road travel out of Monguno until further notice. This, according to the military, is to help fully secure the Monguno – Maiduguri road. This has become a regular occurrence, thereby seriously impacting on the ability of humanitarian actors to sustain their operation in areas outside Monguno such as Gajiram area.

10. **Humanitarian Notification System.** A humanitarian notification system for cargo movements has been developed and rolled out in Yobe state, as part of efforts to scale up information sharing with the military and promote deconfliction of humanitarian activities. OCHA and the state government, represented by SEMA, consolidate, vet and sign requests from humanitarian partners for humanitarian cargo movement. SEMA signs to indicate that the state government is aware of it and part of the vetting process. This is not the case in Borno State, where the SEMA does not have any role in the vetting and endorsement of requests for cargo movement.

11. **Suspension of INGOs.** The suspension of Mercy Corps and ACF significantly affected humanitarian operations. In Yobe, following the suspension of ACF and Mercy Corps, some INGOs also received instructions to cease operations from individual GF officers who mistakenly thought that the work of all INGOs have been suspended but was later corrected. The services of two nutrition stabilization centres were temporarily suspended on the suspicion that ACF staff are present in the facility but was later re-opened after finding out that they are wrong. These incidents tend to indicate that information and instructions are either not clearly cascaded to subordinate military units and the tendency to jump into conclusions and knee-jerk reactions without validating the information some military personnel are getting. This has been communicated accordingly with Hq Sector 2 Command.

**Further Developments and Potential Humanitarian Implications**

- **Various criminal groups have been reported to be committing illegal activities,** ranging from extortion to cattle-rustling and trade, kidnapping, looting/robbery, smuggling and other income-generating activities in the name of “Boko Haram”. Reports indicate that some of these groups have entered into agreements with NSAGs for a “profit-sharing” scheme to be allowed to continue their nefarious activities. This is going to further complicate the already difficult operating environment for humanitarian actors, aid workers and the people-in-need. An example is the incident on 23 September where three individuals in a car were apprehended by the military between Chibok and Damboa, in possession of 29 million, in which they implicated Mercy Corps which, in part, led to the suspension of their services.

- **The turnover of personnel** within humanitarian organizations, particularly those with knowledge of the context and useful contacts with key stakeholders such as the military is also affecting operations. This is in part attributed to a difficult and challenging operating environment which is taking a toll on personnel and staff. Knowledge management and proper handover are measures that could ensure continuity and minimize disruptions in the programmes, planning and activities.

- **The temporary lifting** on 30 Oct of the ban on ACF and Mercy Corps operations has given renewed hopes to the IDPs and host communities being served by both INGOs. The report and findings of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) have not been released or shared. They could have been a solid basis in improving appropriate interaction with the military at different levels.

- **Military clearance operations** were launched in the last week of Oct in several adjoining LGAs such as Dikwa and Marte. This could have been a contributory factor to the lack of availability of security escorts for humanitarian convoys from Maiduguri moving eastward. Areas being cleared of NSAGs have been abandoned by civilians according to Hq 7 Div/Hq Sector 1 Command. According to the military the clearance operations are meant to facilitate the return of IDPs originating from these locations.
Recommendations and/or Next Steps

1. **Reinforce existing CMCoord mechanisms and other complementary platforms** to better address issues involving humanitarian actors, including promoting respect for due process. Continuous efforts should be made to create a better understanding and mutual respect of organizational roles and mandates. This mutual respect is key to promoting an environment of understanding and perhaps, at a later stage, trust in a challenging operating environment. Optimize existing CMCoord mechanisms at Abuja, State and LGA levels to sustain advocacy for solutions to operational challenges and troubleshooting efforts at all levels.

2. A **proposed workshop** on 24 Oct aimed at discussing operational issues and generating options and solutions which was later absorbed by the Civil Security Cooperation [CiSEC] Workshop that took place on 6 to 8 Nov in Maiduguri.

3. **Sustain sensitization** of Protection, CCCM and Health Sector partners on the CMCoord actionable referral tool will continue.

4. Given the highly militarized humanitarian operating environment in Nigeria, the CMCoord approach needs to be a shared responsibility among the humanitarian community. This is the only logical way to go to ensure consistency and coherence within the humanitarian community given the regular turnover of staff and the absence of the civil government at the LGA level. Humanitarian organizations should identify a CMCoord focal point in the respective organization who will be responsible for ensuring consistency and coherence in appropriately interacting with the military at various levels. OCHA will convene the CMCoord Focal Points Group with the objective to identify key issues and ways to coherently address those after the International Civil-Security Cooperation (CISEC) Workshop in Maiduguri.

5. Advocate with the military for alternatives to the use of armed escorts where feasible, particularly areas where military clearance operations have made gains.

6. **Sustain joint learning activities** in a neutral setting to promote appropriate interaction at appropriate levels and locations.

7. Consistently **drive the narrative based on facts** during instances of allegations of wrongdoing through the appropriate media and channels.

8. **Collectively and consistently advocate for LGA officials’ predictable presence at the LGAs** to improve humanitarian – civil authorities – military coordination at the LGA level. This will resolve a number of critical issues, including having a common understanding of the problems and agreeing on who will do what to address the problem.