Executive Summary

Over the past twelve months, the international community comprised of non-governmental organizations, United Nations, and donor governments have supported the Haitian people and its government by providing humanitarian assistance and development aid to rebuild the country. This extraordinary effort on the part of local and international actors has been immense in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, resulting in lives saved and alleviating the suffering of the affected population. As we look towards the next twelve months and beyond, the question now is what can be done to help those who survived . . . thrive.

In an effort to help answer this question, Tulane University’s Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy (DRLA) in partnership with the University of Haiti (UEH) is undertaking a humanitarian aid evaluation in Haiti with funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The goal of this evaluation is to provide programmatic recommendations to the government (and people) of Haiti and the international actors that will increase the resilience of Haitians and their communities.

As part of the inception phase of the DRLA/UEH humanitarian aid evaluation, we carried out an extensive desktop review of current evaluations, assessments, surveys and studies conducted in Haiti since the earthquake to summarize existing knowledge of the results of humanitarian interventions and to develop a database that will provide the local and international actors in Haiti with an ongoing tool to assess and analyze evaluation-related information (the structured analysis database can be accessed at www.drlatulane.org).

A major finding in our structured analysis was the need for more engagement of Haitian local leaders, civil society and more importantly, those directly affected, in future project development to promote resilient recovery. Moreover, the IASC Evaluation Responses to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti reported that “the provision of humanitarian assistance was defined in Haiti by a particular circumstance (the loss of a dwelling due to a disaster), rather than by vulnerability (such as the lack of access to basic necessities), this results in inequity which create nefarious social tensions that make developing exit strategies almost impossible.”¹ It was also indicated that the coordination between the international humanitarian community and their national and local counterparts within the Haitian government and civil society has been particularly weak, resulting in weak national and local ownership.²

We hope this structured analysis report which includes our initial findings on humanitarian aid and Haitian resilience as well as the extensive database of current evaluations and assessments will help guide donors and implementing partners as they continue to support the people of Haiti and their government work towards a brighter and more resilient future.

Sincerely,

Ky Luu
Executive Director
Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy
Tulane University

¹ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Response to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti following the 12 January 2010 earthquake: achievements, challenges and lessons to be learned (Geneva: IASC, 2010).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim (INGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Americas development Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADMD</td>
<td>Asociación Dominicana de Mitigación de Desastres</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>APROSIFA</td>
<td>Association for the Promotion of Integral Family Healthcare</td>
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<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPM</td>
<td>Brigade de la Protection des Mineurs</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUGEP</td>
<td>Bureau de Gestion du Préscolaire (MoE’s Preschool Education Unit)</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Camp Coordination Camp Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Centre d’Éducation Spéciale (National NGO for Special Education)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Child Friendly Spaces</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CMAM</td>
<td>Community Management of Acute Malnutrition</td>
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<td>CNSA</td>
<td>Commission Nationale sur la Sécurité Alimentaire</td>
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<td>CONANI</td>
<td>Dominican republic National Child Protection Authority</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Child Protection</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>Demographic and Health Survey</td>
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<td>Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable (National Unit for WASH)</td>
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<td>Civil Protection Directorate</td>
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<td>Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy</td>
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<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displaced Tracking Matrix</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
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<td>DSNCRP</td>
<td>Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté</td>
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<td>ECD</td>
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<td>European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>Emergency Food Security Assessment</td>
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<td>EMMUS</td>
<td>Enquete de morbiditie, mortalite et utilisation des services</td>
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<td>Emergency Programme Fund</td>
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<td>Expanded Programme of Immunisation</td>
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<td>Fondasyon Konesans Ak Libète (National NGO on Education and Culture)</td>
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<td>FOSREF</td>
<td>Fondation pour la Sante Reproductive et l’Education Familiale</td>
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<td>Fondation Paul Gérin Lajoie (International Development NGO)</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GHESKIO</td>
<td>Groupe Haitien d’Etudes de Sarcome de Kaposi et d’Infections Opportunistes</td>
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<td>GTEF</td>
<td>Groupe de Travail pour l’Éducation et la Formation</td>
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<td>HAVEN</td>
<td>House and community building charity</td>
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<td>HEAS</td>
<td>Epidemic Advisory System in Haiti</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>Haiti Response Coalition</td>
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<td>Haiti Recovery Platform</td>
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<td>Inter-Agency real time Evaluation</td>
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<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IDEJEN</td>
<td>Initiative pour le développement des jeunes</td>
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<td>IHE</td>
<td>Institut Haitien de l’Enfance</td>
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<td>Institut Haitien de Statistiques</td>
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<td>IMCI</td>
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<td>Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan</td>
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<td>International NGO</td>
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<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>Millenium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MHPSS</td>
<td>Mental Health and psycho-social support</td>
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<td>Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique - Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail - Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)</td>
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<td>MUAC</td>
<td>Middle Upper Arm Circumference</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>NNF</td>
<td>National Notario Foundation</td>
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<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>Office of Community Education and Diversity Affairs</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs</td>
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<td>Perspectives pour la Santé et le Développement</td>
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<td>PMTCT</td>
<td>Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission</td>
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<td>PNH</td>
<td>Police Nationale d’Haiti</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RINAH</td>
<td>Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti</td>
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<td>RTE</td>
<td>Real Time Evaluation</td>
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<td>RUIF</td>
<td>Ready-to-use infant formula</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
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<td>SFP</td>
<td>Engineers without Borders – San Francisco Professionals</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (National NGO for Women)</td>
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<td>SOS</td>
<td>Survey of Surveys</td>
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<td>TdH</td>
<td>Terre des Hommes (I-NGO)</td>
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<td>U5</td>
<td>Under 5 years old</td>
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<td>U5MR</td>
<td>Under-five Mortality Rate</td>
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<td>UEH</td>
<td>University of Haiti</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for Project Service</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<td>URD</td>
<td>Groupe Urgence Réhabilitation Développement</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VRQ</td>
<td>Very Rapid Qualitative Approach</td>
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<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO/PAHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation/Pan American Health Organisation</td>
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<td>Zanmi Lasante</td>
<td>Partners in Health</td>
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I. Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation Introduction and project background

**Earthquake effects:** On January 12, 2010 a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti near the capital of Port-au-Prince and, according to the Government of Haiti, resulted in approximately 230,000 deaths, over 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in temporary settlements, 600,000 IDPs living with host families, and over 3 million affected individuals in total. The immediate earthquake affected areas are shown in **Figure 1**. International humanitarian organizations and the United Nations deployed reinforcements to Haiti to provide lifesaving assistance and to support the Haitian Government in long-term recovery efforts.

In an effort to respond effectively and to develop a comprehensive recovery strategy following the January 2010 earthquake, the Haitian and international community developed several collaborative and coordination structures. These structures were tasked in defining needs and developing a common approach to meeting the most immediate and long-term challenges facing Haiti’s recovery. The primary mechanisms of the coordination structures are the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) led by the Government of Haiti; the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC); and the Government of Haiti’s Haiti Recovery Platform (HRP). These have given rise to coordinated processes for resource mobilization, including the establishment of the Multi Donor Trust Fund and their Post Disaster Needs Assessment as well as the FLASH/ Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the resulting Action Plan for the National Recovery and Development of Haiti.

**Financial outlook:** On 31st March 2010, the International Donors’ Conference Towards A New Future for Haiti was held at the United Nations (UN) Head Quarters in New York. At the conference, the Government of Haiti presented the Action Plan for the National Recovery and Development of Haiti. As a result, United Nations organizations and international partners pledged $5.3 billion for 18 months of recovery activities in an attempt to jump-start the long-term recovery of Haiti. Donors committed to aligning their support with the priorities and sectors that were targeted in the Government of Haiti’s Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti.

In the months following the launch of the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, donors have pledged approximately $10.2 billion. Of this total, $874 million are funds that are to be re-programmed from existing support funds and $9.3 billion are new funds. The UN Flash Appeal 2010 received 72% of the $1.1 billion funding request for immediate humanitarian activities in 2010. Donors

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have also pledged approximately $44.3 million against the 2011 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) to support on-going humanitarian activities in 2011. Finally, according to InterAction, the largest alliance of U.S. based international NGOs, their members received approximately $1.3 of which 50% to date has been programmed.

II. Rationale of DRLA/UEH Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation

With the needs so vast and the funding and resources being brought to bear so sizable, it is imperative that sufficient systems be in place to monitor the appropriateness and efficacy of the aid delivered. In an effort to support the Haitian people, their government, and the international community in Haiti in working towards long-term sustainable recovery, Tulane University’s Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy (DRLA), in partnership with the University of Haiti (UEH), is undertaking a humanitarian aid evaluation in Haiti with funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

The goal of the DRLA/UEH Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation is to evaluate and assess the scope and impact of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti. This evaluation will provide programmatic recommendations to the government (and people) of Haiti, donors, and implementing organizations that will aid in the increase of resilience of the Haitian people and government. The DRLA promotes the idea of learning from adverse situations and enhancing one’s capacity to withstand and recover from future crises. The DRLA believes that this approach to evaluating humanitarian assistance is both positive and preventive.

Although there are many different definitions of resilience, many typically depart from the notion that resilience reflects the capacity of an affected community or system to withstand and even become stronger from exposure to critical incidents or shock. Broad dimensions of resilience include economic, social, physical and environmental characteristics.

The DRLA/UEH working definition of social resilience used in this analysis is the capacity of social groups and/or communities to cope with disturbances and external tensions and to preserve adaptive behavior. Social resilience identifies and builds upon a community’s resources and ability to overcome these situations of change, and, subsequently, builds upon the inherent capacities of a community instead of relying on external resources to overcome their vulnerabilities.

While economic, environmental and infrastructure resilience can be broadly defined as the capacity of the built environment/ecological, infrastructure or economic system, at the micro, mesa or macro levels, to sustain, adapt to, and recover from a disaster/emergency situation.

Resilience and vulnerability are two underlying characteristics of communities that determine their capability to absorb and adapt to shocks and threats that produce disasters. While vulnerabilities intensify these threats and damaging results to affected communities, resilience characteristics are those that enable individuals, communities and societies to successfully manage these shocks and to reduce inherent vulnerabilities. Resilience, thus, reflects the capacity of the affected community to self-organize, learn from, adapt and recover stronger from adverse situations.

In Haiti, it is particularly critical to understand the effects that the humanitarian response has on the vulnerability and resilience of Haitian society, communities and families because of pre-existing conditions including chronic poverty/underdevelopment but also the potential for community resilience.
Interventions that do not help Haiti to achieve a new bolstered level of development will only recreate the conditions that make it so vulnerable to recurrent environmental threats. Haiti has traditionally suffered from acute and recurring shocks and disasters for decades, making it the most vulnerable country in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti ranks 97th among 135 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and is the lowest ranking country in the Western Hemisphere. However, because of this fragility, vibrant social elements of resilience have emerged, which need to be nurtured and supported by humanitarian and recovery efforts.

Therefore, the objectives of the DRLA/UEH Humanitarian Aid Evaluation are to:

- Evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of humanitarian interventions on human security and community resilience.
- Develop recommendations for improving human security and resilience outcomes in catastrophic disasters.
- Develop the capacity of Haitian academic institutions to execute and disseminate evaluations of humanitarian interventions and their effects on community resilience.
- Disseminate findings among the international humanitarian community.

The DRLA/UEH Humanitarian Aid Evaluation is being carried out in three phases: (1) an inception phase; (2) an evaluation data collection phase; and (3) an analysis and dissemination phase. The evaluation phase began in October 2010.

### III. University of Haiti and Tulane University Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy

The University of Haiti (UEH) is Haiti’s largest institution of higher education and, though affected by the earthquake (9 out of 10 UEH buildings were damaged), was able to re-engage faculty and re-establish the teaching program in temporary settings within months after the earthquake. Like Tulane University, UEH has proved its institutional resilience, making the DRLA/UEH team particularly committed to the study of resilience. UEH’s role in this project is being coordinated at the university level, in order to facilitate interdisciplinary engagement in demographics, evaluation research, community development/culture, environmental science, sociology, engineering, and law. In this way, UEH/DRLA will bring multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary expertise together in order to develop survey methodology, primary data collection, analysis and presentation of findings.

The Tulane University Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy (DRLA) is an interdisciplinary academic center affiliated with Tulane’s School of Law under the Payson Center for International Development. The mission of DRLA is to strengthen leadership of global humanitarian and disaster management through a systems approach that builds the capacity of professionals in the humanitarian and disaster management community to meet the needs of vulnerable populations affected by natural and manmade disasters. The purpose of the Academy is to stimulate, maintain, and lead the emerging field of disaster resilience leadership by identifying and nurturing current and future leaders to become grounded in the science and study of leadership and resilience for the purpose of saving lives, alleviating suffering, and reducing global disaster impact. DRLA and UEH are “twinning” to bring their collective interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral expertise together for this evaluation.
IV. Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation Structured Analysis Methodology

As part of the inception phase of the DRLA/UEH Humanitarian Aid Evaluation an extensive review and analysis of recent evaluations, assessments, surveys and studies conducted in Haiti since the January earthquake was conducted as a step in the formulation of the evaluation framework and guiding hypotheses. As part of this process, a structured analysis of evaluations/assessments was undertaken. This initial inception phase will culminate with a stakeholder workshop to be held in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in February 2011.

**Purpose:** The purpose of the review and structured analysis is to summarize existing knowledge of the results of humanitarian interventions and also to provide an on-going tool for compiling evaluation-related information. This analysis aims to answer the following questions:

1. How adequate is the currently available information to evaluate the effects of relief interventions on resilience in terms of geography, population groups, indicators and sectors covered?
2. What can be concluded about the effects of intervention efforts on resilience based upon existing information?

**Evaluation Data Sources:** A data base was developed consisting of entries for each evaluation/assessment included to identify type of inquiry undertaken (evaluation or assessment), cluster affiliations, type of organization involved, lead agencies and partners, methodologies used, evaluation start and completion dates, locations, key findings and recommendations. The database can be accessed at [www.drlatulane.org](http://www.drlatulane.org).

The UEH and DRLA team performed weekly reviews of UNOCHA Haiti Survey of Surveys, ReliefWeb, and the websites of, InterAction, One Response; ICVA; International and domestic NGOs; United Nations Agencies; World Bank/ Independent Evaluation Group (IEG); OECD/DAC; Overseas Development Institute (ODI); USAID/OFDA; Inter-Agency Standing Committee; Evaluation Information Share; IFRC and relevant Red Cross membership chapters; MINUSTAH; and SOUTHCOM. Haitian sources include IHRC website; HRP website; PDNA and Haitian civil society organization websites and contacts. Evaluations and assessments also were identified through interviews with key field staff of major United Nations, Non-governmental and Haitian organizations in Haiti. Scholarly peer-reviewed journal articles were captured through academic journal database searches. All sources were routinely surveyed between September and December of 2010. The resulting structured analysis database will continue to be updated throughout the duration of this evaluation project. The database will be maintained by UEH thereafter.

**Data Extraction:** All assessments/evaluations included were coded into a matrix to classify each entry according to the characteristics of the information collected and findings of the studies. The database fields include type of study, objectives and indicators, methodology, key findings, and address of source document(s). Each study has a unique entry identification number. This extraction and classification is described in more detail below.

**Database Inclusions and Exclusions:** Based upon the literature review documents were reviewed for inclusion in the database. The primary inclusion criteria was that the entry was either self-identified as an evaluation/assessment of the humanitarian response or the entry provided information that could be utilized to analyze the effects of humanitarian assistance. These include population based survey
reports, field community assessments, selected presentations and map products produced from aerial assessments. In addition, eight key pre-earthquake documents were included in the database for reference purposes.

Numerous documents were reviewed but not included in this structured database (see bibliography). Others were reviewed and aggregated into a single ‘entry’ to facilitate analysis (for example, bulletins and monitoring data). Currently, the database consists of 94 ‘entries’. Routine situational analysis reports were not included in this evaluation database. Financial reports/documentation such as the UN FLASH Appeal and CAP, MDTF, dated 31 December 2010, are not been included in the database but have been utilized in the broader evaluation context presented in this document.

**Classification of entries:** All entries in the database were then classified and coded by several characteristics, such as report purpose, data type and content, methodology, and geographic coverage. These classifications are described below. They were further classified as to the core purpose of the report (entry). These consist of: Reports focused specifically on review of the performance of humanitarian interventions (34); Post-earthquake primary data collection that included key humanitarian outcomes (40); Post-earthquake secondary data collection only (6); Pre-quake primary data (8), and standalone maps (6). There are a total of 94 entries in the database. However, it is important to note that many reports from assessments made evaluation inferences from these assessments, even though the assessments’ primary goal was to undertake an evaluation.

All reports were classified on the characteristics of the information contained in the entry. These non-mutually exclusive categories are: Representative household or individual primary survey data (16); Qualitative survey (Key Informants, focus groups) or non-representative household or individual primary survey data (39); Other quantitative data (market price data, geographic data, etc.) (16); Secondary data analyses (34); Field visit or other information in narrative form (31); and evaluation-related conclusions/lessons learned (37).

All entries were coded for geographic coverage.

**Geographical Classification:** Entries were coded to reflect their geographic coverage by commune. However, twenty-five entries were not geographically bounded, and therefore not coded, and the pre-earthquake entries were excluded from the maps so as to display only post-earthquake coverage. Figure 2 illustrates that a number of evaluations, assessments, surveys and studies have been conducted in Haiti since the earthquake. The majority of these have taken place in Port-au-Prince and those areas hard hit by the earthquake.

Of the 94 entries in the evaluation database, as illustrated in Figure 2 and as standardized, between 45-75 entries took place in Port-au-Prince, with 23-44 taking place in Leogane and Petit Goave. Only 10-22 have been carried out in the affected communes Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, Grande Goave, and Jacmel.

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4 The list of entries in the most recent Survey of Surveys (SOS) contained 104 entries, of which 6 were duplicates. These duplicates were removed, leaving 98 entries. Of these 98 entries, 55 were not found to date, indicating the study was not completed, the report was not completed/released, or hasn’t been disseminated widely and thus not captured in the extensive search for this report. The remaining 43 have been located and included in the database. An additional 51 entries were included in this evaluative process.

5 Coverage by commune does not imply that data is representative of that commune, or that data collection took place throughout the entire commune, but rather that data was collected in at least some part of the commune.
As illustrated in Figure 2, those communes that are highlighted in light green have had 1-9 entries and those that are gray have had no evaluations, surveys, studies or assessments since the earthquake. It is important to note, that these maps and analysis are based on the 94 entries included in this structured analysis.

Of the 94 entries included in this analysis, 47 pertained to IDP or camp based populations. Of these, 8 covered Port-au-Prince; 4 covered Leogane and Petit Goave, Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Cite Soleil; and 3 covered Jacmel, Carrefour, Gressier, Tabarre, Grande Goave.

Figure 2 also illustrates a geographic overlap between entries and areas directly affected by the earthquake, (in the Communes of Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, Leogane, Grande Goave, Petit Goave, and Jacmel).

Other areas covered by assessments were often located in areas where concentrations of displaced populations are found. These entries are far fewer in number, and are distributed across the Departements of Artibonde, Centre, and in Communes at the western edge of the Departement of Sud which, according to IOM, lists less than less than 20,000 IDPs.  

Quantitative (probability survey) Entries: As illustrated in Figure 3 only 10 entries in the database contain post-earthquake quantitative probability household (or individual) survey data out of these ten, only a few covered significant geographical areas/populations; the rest focused on small specific areas such as a few camps, and certain of these entries had questionable sampling frames/methodologies. An additional six entries contain pre-earthquake data of this sort.

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6 These communes in the Sud departement were assessed post-hurricane, rather than part of the earthquake response.
7 It should be noted that the surveys that do use probability sampling post-earthquake rely on very outdated and/or unreliable sampling frames, such as the 2003 census or the CCCM estimates of camp populations, as improved sampling frames with post-earthquake population data do not yet exist.
Figure 3 illustrates that regarding geographic coverage of these quantitative entries, there were very few; many communes have zero entries. Of those include in the project database, 9 entries were in Port-a-au-prince; and were in 3-5 Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, Leogane, Grande Goave, Petit Goave, and Jacmel).

This means that most probability survey household/individual information, even one year since the earthquake, comes from only 5 surveys. Moreover, these surveys are not national in coverage, but are focused primarily on the areas directly affected by the earthquake. Most of the Department of Artibonite, for example, was covered only by one quantitative survey (the post-earthquake SMART survey). This leaves little to no information on key indicators for much of the country on the post-earthquake context.

**Participatory Entries:** Reports were classified by whether they included primary data collected through participatory methods. Two levels of classification indicated first whether the entry demonstrated any possible application of participatory assessment, either because the report stated that participatory methods were employed (explicitly or implicitly). Then the entry was further scrutinized to determine whether or not the analysis, results or recommendations reflected Haitian participation recommendations.

**Figure 4** illustrates the distribution of entries that reflect any evidence of the use of participatory methods of assessment. When looking at the scale of entries per commune, the communes of Leogane and Port-au-Prince had 8-16 entries; affected of communes Leogane and Petit Goave; and the remaining communes of Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, , Grande Goave, and Jacmel each had 2-4 entries.

Of the 94 entries reviewed, 31 were found to have provided some evidence of the use of participatory methods when collecting post-earthquake information (as reported by the authors of the report in question or because the report mentioned the use of common participatory methods). These reports were further classified according to whether or not they provided clear evidence of incorporating Haitian perspectives into the findings and recommendations. Only 12 entries were judged to have clearly demonstrated use of participatory methods to inform results. As with quantitative data,

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8. Participatory was defined as data collection that involved open-ended or opinion questions to potential beneficiary (or actual beneficiary) populations, through household surveys, key informant interviews, or focus groups. Examples include questions on key priorities for the household, opinions on programmatic priorities or program function were considered participatory.
information collected through participatory methods is concentrated in the directly affected areas, with little information coming from other parts of the country.

**Domain Classification:** Entries also were classified by information content according to the four resilience domains and each of the 19 cluster categories. Some address a single domain or cluster area while, others inform multiple domains. Frequency counts of the numbers of entries that address each domain and cluster are reflected in Table 1.

Of the 94 entries included in this analysis, 75 were categorized in the social domain, of which, 28 had evaluative content; economic had 46 entries of which 19 were evaluative; infrastructure had 60 of which 24 were evaluative; and the environment domain had 31 entries of which 9 had evaluative content.

These domains reflect both the categorization and language of the Action Plan for the National Recovery and Development of Haiti and the UN CAP 2011.

**Database Limitations:** Though this structured analysis database provides extensive information relevant to evaluating the effects of humanitarian assistance, it has several limitations: 1. Data acquisition became increasingly difficult. This can be possibly attributed to diminished security due to political unrest related to elections and the cholera epidemic; 2. Many entries in the UNOCHA Survey of Surveys database could not be utilized either because the entry was incomplete or could not be accessed; 3. Classification of entries was difficult due to variations in methodological descriptions between organizations/agencies; 4. Academic peer-reviewed literature was very sparse given the recentness of the event and the lengthy process involved in conducting and publishing academic literature; and 5. Continuity of information exchange was a challenge when requesting evaluations, studies, assessments and surveys from humanitarian focal points in Haiti.

Therefore, the database analyzed and reported here is not exhaustive, though it appears to be the most extensive database currently available.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resilience Domain</th>
<th>Resilience Subcategory</th>
<th>Number of entries</th>
<th>Number of entries with evaluation-related conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Nutrition</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Protection</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Migration and Displacement</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Early Recovery</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Remittances and Livelihood</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Markets</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td><strong>Camps and Resilience</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Early Recovery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Physical Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Emergency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Telecom</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Shelter</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Non-Food Items</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following domain specific information is presented graphically in each section. Each section below also presents the number of evaluation reports reviewed. Map production applied a uniform classification scheme across domains. When comparing domain specific entries that have taken place throughout the country, within each domain, the following trends can be seen:
Social entries are more broadly distributed across the country, but concentrations are found in communes around the epicenter.

Economic entries are highly concentrated in Port-au-Prince, with widely dispersed studies elsewhere around the country.

Infrastructure entries are concentrated in a tight cluster around the earthquake impact zone.

Environmental entries are distinctly concentrated along the axis of the earthquake.

The following sections outline the domain specific definitions of resilience as well as the impact of the earthquake and activities to date. The information below also outlines key findings, recommendations and financial support per sector as well as examples of the effect that humanitarian response has had on Haitian resilience.

a. Social Resilience Domain

The Social Resilience Domain contains the following sectors:
- Education
- Food
- Health
- Nutrition
- Protection
- WASH (Water, Sanitation, Hygiene)
- Migration and displacement

As illustrated in Figure 5, most affected communes in Haiti have between 1-20 entries, with Port-au-Prince having between 21-40 entries. When examining the social domain further, within impacted communities close to the epicenter of the earthquake (in the Communes of Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, Leogane, Grande Goave, Petit Goave, and Jacmel and St Marc). With all of these, except port-au-Prince, have 4-8 entries per commune. However it is important to note, that although 75 entries were reviewed and included in the project’s database, that only 37%, or 28 entries, have evaluative content.

**Impact:** The earthquake left millions of Haitians with limited access to food, water and sanitation, and devastated an already vulnerable infrastructure that wiped out basic service delivery (healthcare, education, etc.) and forced 1.3 million internally displaced persons to find temporary shelter in insecure environments. Food access was negatively affected by the destruction of the ports, increasing food prices, and disruption of transport and normal market flows within the country. Beyond the immediate health impacts of the earthquake, the loss of already insufficient water and sanitation facilities as well as the concentration of people in IDP camps continues to put the population at risk of disease, asset
depletion and impoverishment on top of mental trauma. The mass displacement and resulting IDP population in spontaneous settlements has exposed many to physical security concerns and has been further complicated from a protection perspective as households and individuals compete for sparse resources (humanitarian assistance and otherwise), with vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and the disabled at particular risk for protection concerns.

Moreover, according to the Haiti PDNA, the greatest impact to the educational sector is from physical damage to buildings, in addition to population movements and loss of life. 90% of university students and nearly 50% of the country’s students are found in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. In addition, 30 out of 49 hospitals were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake and left 50% of health care workers living in tents. Food insecurity rose to 52% of the population in the directly affected areas following the earthquake, and many households utilized unsustainable coping strategies such as selling assets or going into debt to buy food.

Response: The humanitarian community has to date put forward $686.6 million in emergency funding and has pledged an additional $637.5 million in response to the International Donors' Conference Towards A New Future for Haiti. It is important to note that these figures include combined sums from sector response per project domain. Duplication in counts is present when comparing sums between project domains.

In terms of meeting many basic immediate survival needs, in the areas directly affected by the earthquake (camp and non-camp populations) the analysis suggests that mortality and nutritional levels were at similar levels as they had been using national and regional comparisons from before the earthquake such as pre-earthquake SMART and EFSA I.

To date, humanitarian organizations have reported major achievements in addressing the sectoral needs of Haitians in the social resilience domain. For example, six months out, 80% of the approximately 5,000 schools damaged by the earthquake have re-opened, and support provided to the Ministry of Education for teacher training and to design and develop standards for school reconstruction. Emergency food assistance reached 4.3 million people by June, and has now transitioned to conditional programs such as cash/food for work programs, school feeding, and other vulnerable group assistance programs. As part of the food and nutrition response, nutritional support has been provided to children and pregnant mothers, and severely malnourished children have been treated.

Health programs, such as those focusing on HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria, vaccinations, health service delivery, have been implemented. Finally, safe water, latrines, bathing facilities, hygiene kits, and removal of solid waste and improved drainage was provided to 1.72 million people. The devastating outbreak of cholera in Haiti which to date, has claims approximately 1,900 lives and affected an additional 84,000 persons can be viewed as an example of how resilience can directly affect the outcome of a disaster.

However, despite these reported programmatic successes, there remain unaddressed or insufficiently addressed needs that support the social resilience of Haitian the population. For example, the Haiti Real Time Evaluation (RTE) noted the overall protection response as weak – particularly to sexual and

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gender-based violence. Below are illustrative programmatic challenges and recommendations that surfaced as common themes across evaluations reviewed and analyzed.

**Table 2** shows the number of evaluations that informed each of the Social Resilience sub-domains. Within the Social Domain, 75 entries were reviewed, of which 28 contained evaluative content.

i. **Migration and Displacement:** Evaluations rarely address the challenges and recommendations concerning migration and displacement. As shown in **Table 3**, it is a finding in itself that so few of the reports focus on exploring the determinants of settlement patterns and factors driving displacement. Most address the difficulties in managing the IDP population, through facilitation of their return home or resettlement to other areas outside Port-au-Prince. Protection concerns are also cited, including the possibility of the reestablishment of gangs and the need for advocating children’s concerns.

ii. **Education:** **Table 4** reflects that key programmatic challenges and recommendations concerning education revolve around physical and financial access to schools of both the IDP populations (in and out of the directly affected areas) as well as the resident population. The Rapid Joint Needs Assessment for the Education Cluster reported, “Youth were proud to take part in focus group discussion and asserted that they believe that ‘education is the most important thing in society, it is how we will change the country’.”

The burden of school fees on households who have already had their resilience eroded is the most commonly cited barrier, followed by the challenges related to repair and construction of schools.

iii. **Food and Nutrition:** There are few evaluation reports that cite specific recommendations related to food and nutrition. These are outlined in **Table 5**. The challenges and recommendations for food focus primarily on contingency planning and preparation for future crises, as well as transitioning current programming to programs that address longer-term food security issues. Nutrition focuses on the challenges related to capacity and availability of staff, as well as the programmatic improvements in general.

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10 IASC Education Cluster, Rapid joint needs assessment (Geneva: IASC, 2010).
Looking at other data sources to complement this information on food and nutrition, it can be concluded that food assistance (including nutritional support) may have had a positive impact in preventing increases in mortality (after the initial emergency) and the degradation of the nutritional status of children.\(^\text{11}\)

Additionally, FEWS-NET\(^\text{12}\) reports that as of April, 2010, food assistance had not had a negative effect on rice prices in Haiti, nor was it predicted to have a significant negative impact on rice production.

It is also possible that the initial large-scale food distributions mitigated further increase in food prices immediately following the earthquake, decreasing the impacts on household food security and vulnerability as well as drawing affected families and individuals to Port-au-Prince and IDP camps.

iv. Health: The challenges and recommendations addressing health found in the evaluations primarily address themes of access and availability of health care. Haitian women identified a need for improved health care, especially prenatal care, as only 19\% and 8\% had access to any medical care and prenatal care, respectively.\(^\text{13}\) These are outlined in Table 6.

v. Protection: Shown in Table 7, the sub-domain of protection has striking challenges and recommendations that focus primarily on IDPs, in particular camp residents.

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\(^{12}\) FEWS-NET, Impacts of food aid rice distribution in Haiti on the rice market and production (Washington DC: FEWS-NET, USAID, 2010).

\(^{13}\) Circle of Health International, Picking up the pieces: women’s health needs assessment (Boston, MA: COHI, 2010).
vi. Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH): Several evaluations\(^\text{14}\) addressed the challenges and concerns related to water, sanitation, and hygiene. As illustrated in Figure 8, the challenges mostly center on barriers to addressing immediate needs, such as difficulties to find suitable locations to construct pit latrines, and ensuring consistent water quality. The recommendations however center around longer term solutions, such as assessing financial access to safe drinking water, particularly in the urban environment where water is commonly purchased, as well as moving to medium term solutions (much of this is related to economic and infrastructure resilience as well).

vii. Domain Cross Cutting Issues: In addition to these themes cited above, 50% of the evaluations reviewed for the social domain make a strong recommendation to improve the inclusion of Haitian staff, NGOs, and other organizations in the design and implementation of the programmatic response, and yet a consistent finding that this is not always happening. There is also a regular mention of the lack of information in general, and the lack of sharing existing information. This is further compounded by poor cross-sectoral coordination. In addition, the IASC report Responses to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti explains that the utilization of English as the response’s working language in most clusters has been a serious impediment to a more active engagement of local actors.

Resilience: The Real Time Evaluation (RTE) stated that despite the overall commitment to “build back better,” the earthquake response by the humanitarian community has had some “negative side effects” thus increasing vulnerability rather than improving social resilience. An example cited was the provision of free services in Health, Water and Education by the humanitarian community which has negatively affected Haitian private. Several private hospitals and schools went bankrupt since the earthquake. Furthermore, according to the Red Cross Recovery Assessment, March 2010, the focus of humanitarian aid on the directly-affected areas have left poor host communities in other parts of the country that were further burdened by the displaced and other effects without humanitarian assistance. In addition, as noted by several evaluations and studies, but most notably by the Red Cross Recovery Assessment, March 2010, the Reflections on the Initial Multinational Response to the Earthquake in Haiti, and the Evaluation des programmes d’urgence finances par la foundation de France en Haiti, Solidarite Haiti, September 2010, it was noted that by bringing in volunteers, the international community supplanted Haitian health care professionals and should have engaged local health care professionals instead.\(^\text{15}\)

There is a concern about the substitution effect of the humanitarian response, in effect taking on the role of the government in many domains.

Reflections on the Initial Multinational Response to the Earthquake in Haiti noted that by not using local health experts, but instead bringing in volunteers with limited emergency experienced volunteers who did not speak French or Creole frustrated Haitians and decreased confidence in existing health systems within communities. A result of free health care as part of humanitarian assistance, many institutions

\(^{14}\) Most evaluations available and reviewed were produced before the cholera outbreak, and therefore do not reflect current challenges and recommendations that may exist as a response to this ongoing emergency.

\(^{15}\) See Annex 1.
that played a fundamental role at the top of the health care referral pyramid as well as managed cases requiring hospitalization, have been driven to failure. Furthermore, a significant number of health practitioners left the country, being unable to practice. Haiti Watch Dog’s Rapport Sur les Conditions de vie des personnes handicapées vivant sur les camps – 10 Mai 2010 reported that the structure of camps has diminished the traditional structure to support handicapped persons, and that response and recovery groups are not engaging traditional experts in response for handicapped persons.

Related to water and sanitation activities, it was noted by IFRC’s From Sustaining Lives to Sustainable Solutions, the Challenge of Sanitation in Haiti, Six Months On, July, that the current situation with the agencies providing water and sanitation services on behalf of the Haitian authorities is not sustainable. Haitian authorities must receive funding and support to build their capacity and to provide the improved sanitation services the Haitian population needs and deserves. The Evaluation des programmes d’urgence finances par la foundation de France en Haïti, Solidarite Haïti, September 2010 noted that the installation of water bladders, providing free safe water, sets a precedent of water being free, when it would be better to have a more durable solution that is not necessarily located in the same site as water selling locations.¹⁶

The Economic Resilience Domain contains the sub-domains of:

- Early recovery (as it relates to livelihoods and remittances)
- Agriculture
- Markets

As illustrated in Figure 6, most affected communes in Haiti have between 1-20 entries, including Port-au-Prince, illustrating poor evaluative coverage. Impacted communities close to the epicenter of the earthquake, such as in the Communes of Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, Leogane, Grande Goave, Petit Goave, and Jacmel had between 2-6 entries; and Port-au-Prince had 7-12 entries within the economic domain only. It is important to note that although 46 entries were reviewed and included in the project’s database, only 41%, or 19 entries, have evaluation-related content.

**Impact:** The earthquake had a large impact on economic resilience both in the directly affected areas and across the country with the reported material loss to be equivalent to more than 100% of Haiti’s national income. The destruction of the major port in Port au Prince effectively halted all major food

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imports into the country (Haiti imports around 50% of its food). Additionally, internal transport of food and other goods was hampered by damage to an already poor road infrastructure and the initial chaos and insecurity in the aftermath.

According to the Haiti PDNA, more than half of all households are severely indebted following the earthquake; most of this debt was incurred to buy food. Agricultural areas were hit by the earthquake, and debris and landslides damaged irrigation systems for over 3,500 hectare of farming land. The earthquake affected employment through the loss of workplaces, stock, and access routes to markets, energy sources, and supplies. Jobs were temporarily or permanently lost.

The largest source of income in Haiti is self-employment and the transfer of money from abroad. Salaried employees account for only one fifth of total income, and are found mainly in metropolitan areas. According to data from the Banque de la Republique d’Haïti (BRH), the private transfers from abroad amount to between $80 million and $110 million per month. The IDB estimates that in 2006, the total remittances topped $1.65 billion. The World Bank Group stated in March that they expected remittances to be 20% above normal in 2010, amounting to approximately $360 million more than normal in 2010.

The lack of food and other goods coming into the country led to a spike in food prices, most notably rice, a key staple in Haiti. While the food price increases did not reach the same levels seen during the 2008 global food crisis, pre-quake food prices had already eroded many households’ resilience, and the ensuing spike coupled with extreme asset loss severely eroded coping capacity of households. This price spike was observed not only in the directly affected areas, but across the country. There was little physical impact on agriculture beyond some loss of irrigation canals, but some rural areas did have increased difficulty accessing agricultural inputs due to the disruption of the markets.

Additionally, farming households often resorted to depleting their resources post-quake and so were further burdened by the cost of seeds and other agricultural inputs. In rural areas, 60% of livelihoods depend on agriculture, and households relying on agriculture are among the poorest and least resilient.

The FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment found that, although the spring planting harvest was predicted to be slightly less than in 2009, there were not major impacts of the earthquake on agricultural production overall. Other livelihoods were strongly affected, however. Many households lost their sources of income as a consequence of the earthquake, either through loss of a job or the death of a working household member. Additionally, an increased percentage of households were relying primarily on cash remittances (from within and outside of the country) post-quake, increasing from 5% to 13% of households in the directly affected areas. Households that were able to retain their livelihood sources still often suffered from decreased income, which coupled with increased prices and general asset loss, took a great toll on economic resilience of households.

20 OCHA, Haiti: 6 months after.
21 Ibid.
22 National Food Security Coordination Unit, Rapid post-earthquake emergency food security assessment (Port-au-Price: CNSA, 2010).
**Response:** In response, the humanitarian community has to date put forward $85.2 million or 43% of requested funding in emergency funding and has pledged an additional $595.7 million in response to the *International Donors’ Conference Towards A New Future for Haiti*. It is important to note that these figures include combined sums from sector response per project domain. Duplication in counts is present when comparing sums between project domains.

To date, the humanitarian agencies have reported several major achievements in addressing the impacts on economic resilience. Cash and food for work programs were quickly put into place in the directly affected areas, and later scaled up to cover other parts of the country as well, eventually providing employment to 116,000 people by mid-year. Agriculture support was provided in the form of plants, seeds, tools, and fertilizer in the directly and indirectly affected areas. Monitoring of national and international prices on the markets continues to ensure that market function can be predicted and mitigated where possible.23

Within the Economic Domain, 46 entries were reviewed, of which 19 contained evaluations related content. Below are illustrative of programmatic challenges and recommendations that surfaced as common themes across evaluations reviewed and analyzed. Table 9 shows the number of evaluations that informed each of the Economic Resilience sub-domains.

![Table 9: Economic Domain: Number of evaluations reviewed](image)

**i. Early Recovery (Livelihoods and Remittances):** Evaluation reports generally cite the inadequacy in scope and coverage of livelihood oriented interventions. A large number of focus groups respondents expressed a preference for activities where their skills and competencies could be used, as the food-for-work program, which gives people in these affected areas an opportunity to maintain their dignity and self-esteem.24 The main challenges and recommendations for early recovery focus on the narrow scope of cash-for-work and other livelihood programs, how these programs should be expanded to include vulnerable groups such as disabled people and pregnant women, and how they should better cover rural areas. In general, cash-based programming is supported, as well as livelihood-based programming on multiple levels. These are illustrated in Table 10.

![Table 10: Early Recovery and Agriculture Sub-Domains: Challenges and Recommendations](image)

**ii. Agriculture:** The agricultural challenges and recommendations naturally focus on rural populations. Many of the negative coping strategies, such as the incurrence of debt, early harvest, and loss of assets (such as livestock) are cited as blows to the resilience of households that practice agriculture.

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23 OCHA, Haiti: 6 months after.
interventions recommended revolve around agricultural inputs such as seed-based programs, as well as improving distribution channels.

iii. Markets: The evaluations reviewed for markets provided limited information on challenges and recommendations. As mentioned in the Social Domain, it was cited that food assistance had not had a negative impact on rice prices in Haiti, indicating that the markets were not negatively impacted by food-based interventions. However there was concern of the three major importers interviewed by FEWS-NET in March, 2010, two expressed concerns about the impact of massive food aid distributions on prices, even though some humanitarian organizers had been procuring food aid from them or from wholesalers.

Resilience: The formal economy in Haiti makes up only 30% of the country’s total economic activity. Concerns have been raised regarding current aid efforts may inadvertently block Haiti’s economic recovery, absorptive capacity, and the diversification in the numbers of contractor and suppliers to be centralized in Port-au-Prince. In addition, the Office of Inspector General’s Audit of USAID’s Cash-for-work activities stated that the high cost of rubble removal from private residential areas has caused corrupt individuals to use cash-for-work efforts for personal gain.

Both the Groupe Urgence Rehabilitation Developpement (URD) Real time evaluation of the response to the earthquake, mission 9-23 February and the Inter-agency Real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake reported that the provision of free services can have a harmful impact on the highly privatized Haitian economy. Finally, ongoing and far-reaching cash-for-work programs can potentially undermine the Government of Haiti’s legitimacy, as the programs are branded with the humanitarian or donor names and logos instead of the logo of the respective ministry, and branded t-shirts can stigmatize Haitians participating in cash-for-work activities. Evaluations typically call for more use of cash transfer approaches generally though a small portion of the assistance is provided through this assistance instrument.

b. Environmental Resilience Domain

The Environmental Resilience Domain contains the cluster areas of:
- Environmental
- Agriculture
- WASH (Water, Sanitation, Hygiene)

As illustrated in Figure 7, most affected communes in Haiti have between 1-20 entries, including with Port-au-Prince. When reviewing the number of entries undertaken per commune,

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26 IFRC, Haiti recovery assessment.
on a standardized scale, there were 8-12 entries in the communes of Petit Goave, Leogane and Port-au-
Prince, and 3-7 in the communes of Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil,
Carrefour, Gressier, , Grande Goave, Belle Anse, Marigot, Cabaret, and Jacmel. It is important to note
that although 31 entries were reviewed and included in the project’s database, only 29%, or 9 entries,
have evaluation related content.

**Impact:** The earthquake had an immediate as well as a long term impact on environmental resilience.
Landslides destroyed homes and croplands in certain locations in the most directly affected areas. The
rubble remaining after the earthquake poses a large waste-disposal issue.

According to the Haiti PDNA, only 52% of waste in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area was collected
before the earthquake, and although the earthquake had little impact on waste management
equipment and facilities, more waste is being produced and there is a high volume of construction
debris. The impact on the drinking water system was comparatively minimal; the pre-earthquake
structural problems remain, and were further aggravated by the quake.

The chronic environmental issues in Haiti, not only in the directly affected areas, but also throughout the
country, still remain. Historically, agricultural practices have negatively affected Haiti’s environmental
resilience. According to Partners in Progress, in 1940, Haiti’s forested land was estimated at 30% of
Haiti’s total area. By 1970, the percentage had dropped to 10% and current estimates are between 1.4-
2%. This has led to a continued decrease of wooded land, causing an increase in soil erosion, landslide
risk, and flood risk.

**Response:** In response, the humanitarian community has to date put forward $169.6 million in
emergency funding. It is important to note that these figures include combined sums from sector
response per project domain.

The humanitarian response to environmental resilience issues is both specific and cross-cutting.
Programs like cash-for-work may have environmental aspects to them, such as improved farming
techniques or hillside stabilization to prevent landslides. Small scale but potentially powerful programs,
such as fuel efficient stoves, have been implemented since the earthquake to reduce deforestation for
cooking fuel. However, there is little reporting on specific activities that have
been implemented since the earthquake
to specifically address environmental resilience. Also, none of the entries
reviewed included local Haitian perceptions on environmental resilience.

Within the Environmental Domain, 31 entries were reviewed, of which 9
contained evaluations related content Table 11 illustrates programmatic challenges and recommendations that surfaced as common themes
across evaluations reviewed and analyzed.

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i. **Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene**: The evaluations addressing WASH cited basic standard challenges related to Environmental Resilience. Longer term sustainable solutions, involving the community were commonly highlighted as key recommendations, including risk-reduction components as part of these solutions.

ii. **Environment**: Illustrated in Table 12, the main challenges in the urban environment revolve around debris and rubble removal, which is affecting other areas of progress. Lack of community involvement in addressing environmental issues was also cited as a problematic aspect of current programming and a frequent recommendation for improvement.

iii. **Agriculture**: Evaluations frequently cited the need for more environmental monitoring as it relates to agriculture, as well as recovery activities in the rural areas.

**Resilience**: The IASC report *Responses to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti* reports that a positive consequence of cash-for-work programs was those programs that involved activities that bolstered resilience for the upcoming hurricane season by creating flood barriers and canal rehabilitation. It is also important to note that there is very little reporting on the impact humanitarian aid has on environmental resilience to date. It is critical that an understanding of the environmental impact of IDP camps and other displaced families in rural areas be further explored in the coming months.

c. **Infrastructure Resilience Domain**

The Infrastructure Resilience Domain contains the sub-domains of:

- Camps and Resilience
- Early Recovery (physical infrastructure)
- Emergency telecom
- Logistics
- Shelter
- Non-food Items

As illustrated in Figure 8, most affected communes in Haiti have between 1-20 entries, with Port-au-Prince having between 21-40 entries. It is important to note, however, that although 60 entries were reviewed and included in the project’s database, only 40% or 24
entries have evaluative content. When examining the infrastructure domain further, between 14-25 entries included Port-au-Prince; 8-13 entries in the communes of Leogane, Petit Goave, and Jacmel; and 3-7 in the communes of Grande Goave, Delmas, Petionville, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Carrefour, Gressier, which shows a primary emphasis on communes in and immediately surrounding the Port-au-Prince area.

**Impact:** The earthquake had massive impacts on the infrastructure, particularly in the directly affected areas. Homes, businesses, and other buildings were partially or completely destroyed; in some areas nearly 100% of structures. Asset loss of basic items, such as cooking utensils and basic materials for temporary shelter were lost or destroyed in the earthquake. Basic infrastructure was destroyed or damaged, such as the airport, roads, electrical lines, cell phone networks, and public water supply. Many of the government buildings were destroyed in the earthquake, further inhibiting the capacity of the government to function.

As a result of the earthquake, the Haiti PDNA estimated that approximately 289 km of primary roads were destroyed by the earthquake, primarily in the Ouest Department. This adds to the already poor road system. Additionally, rubble continues to block or hamper traffic. The maritime transport was seriously affected with the main docks being damaged or destroyed, as well as warehouses and security buildings and fences around the port.

The response cites many achievements in response to infrastructure support. Emergency shelters have been distributed, as well as tool kits, and transitional shelters.\(^{28}\) A building damage assessment was undertaken to classify structures as safe, in need of repairs, or targeted for demolition. Rubble clearing is ongoing, but progress is being made. Within the Infrastructure Domain, 60 entries were reviewed, of which 24 contained evaluative content.

**Response:** In response, the humanitarian community has to date put forward $257.6 million in emergency funding and has pledged an additional $729.3 million in response to the *International Donors’ Conference Towards A New Future for Haiti*. It is important to note that these figures include combined sums from sector response per project domain.

The Table 13 above shows illustrative programmatic challenges and recommendations that surfaced as common themes across evaluations reviewed and analyzed as well as the magnitude of entries addressing this domain.

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\(^{28}\) OCHA, Haiti: 6 months after.
i. **Camps and Resilience**: Two major challenges are identified: debris removal was hindering other areas of progress, and language-barrier issues.

Recommendations for this sub-domain are focused on community and beneficiary engagement in the relocation of camp residents, as well as the importance of risk-reduction activities. These are illustrated in Table 14.

ii. **Shelter and Non-Food Items**: As illustrated in Table 15, the main challenge identified was the need for a long-term shelter plan. There is a worry that the protracted camp issue and concentration of poverty will recreate slums or even create new slums. Recommendations include addressing debris removal, land tenure issues, risk reduction activities, and improved real-time information to populations.

iii. **Early Recovery of Physical Infrastructure**: A major challenge to the improvement of the physical infrastructure is the lack of construction experts and other trained professionals, the size and scope of the task at hand is overwhelming for the current construction personnel base. 42% of entries identify lack of Haitian involvement as major constraint. The recommendations revolve around the involvement of the community and beneficiaries both in program design and as present local capacity.

Quality control is a concern, as is tailoring construction to take into consideration local construction types and traditional structures. Damage assessments need to be simplified and reconstruction be tailored to local construction types and traditional structures. These are illustrated in Table 16.

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iv. Emergency Telecom: As illustrated in Table 17, the few challenges identified were that there was a lack of GPS mapping tools for assessments due to collapsed cell systems.

Recommendations to better this situation for the future include maximizing local systems, structures, communications/IT professionals. Additionally, community engagement was frequently mentioned, as in the other sub-domains.

v. Logistics: the challenges that were identified for this sector focus on the lack of machinery, materials, and coordination of supply chains and customs hold-ups.

As highlighted in Table 18, recommendations mostly address infrastructure improvements such as improvement of roads, the airport, and the port, as well as removal of debris. Additionally, the evaluations often recommend the involvement of the local Haitian private sector for the procurement of goods rather than using international sources.

Resilience: As U.R.D. comments in their Rapport de Mission, as the majority of humanitarian aid was primarily administered in IDP camps, those residing out of these IDP camps were neglected. This created a situation where, due to the centralization of aid, families or individuals would maintain ‘tents’ in camps although they were residing on their own or adjacent, neighbor property. Finally, U.R.D., in the report, Real time evaluation of the response to the earthquake, mission 9-23 February, stated that temporary shelters have often now become long-term shelters, thus delaying the return of families and individuals to their original homestead.

VI. Next Steps and Considerations:

To date, the national and international community has contributed enormously to the delivery of emergency services and the provision of services for IDPs and earthquake affected communities. These immediate lifesaving activities have increased access to potable water and sanitation, health care, food aid and nutritional services, protection, education for affected populations. However, areas outside of the earthquake impacted areas have not received substantive support and their long-term development should be considered for the decongestion of Port au Prince and sustainable recovery of Haiti as a whole. Though short-term economic activities have been introduced and are on-going, there has been little reflection as to how this on-going protracted emergency response supports resilience in Haitian communities as well as how it may be contributing to undermining that same resilience.

Twelve months after the devastating January 2010 earthquake, more than 1 million Haitians remain in IDP camps and substantive recovery has not yet begun. Many of the evaluations reviewed in this structured analysis identified the lack of Haitian participation in decision making processes as a major
concern and obstacle to building individual, household, community and national resilience. Moreover, current resources and activities still focus on humanitarian maintenance type work, and building back better is still a notion that has not yet penetrated relief and recovery efforts.

Therefore, the findings and recommendations of this structured analysis will be presented and used in our DRLA/UEH Haiti Humanitarian Evaluation working groups, which will consist of stakeholders from the Haitian community, UN, NGO, and donor community. Stakeholders will be asked to answer the following key questions to guide and re-align their decisions and interventions:

**What is the Impact of current operations?** What has been the effect of disaster response on the resilience of Haitian communities: geographically defined and in terms of sectoral groups?

**How effective has the response been to date?** Outcomes? Was human security achieved in terms of SPHERE standards? In terms of beneficiary assessment? Did local organizations participate actively and feel augmented by external assistance? Or was external assistance viewed as competitive?

**What have the outputs contributed to Haiti’s resilience?** Were goods and services delivered to beneficiaries in a timely fashion? Were they delivered by local or international organizations? What key factors affected the effectiveness of organizations in terms of achieving human security goals and organizational capacity development goals? International, national and local leadership? Coordination structures and their efficacy? Planning and management skills of response personnel, both local and international? Availability of goods and human resources? Logistical constraints?

**Were responses efficient?** To what extent did massive infusions of human resources from outside add value to the response in terms of human security and resilience outcomes? Did these resources result in significant opportunity costs? How could coordination and management of resources better serve human security and resilience goals?

**Have responses taken into consideration sustainability?** What evidence suggests that humanitarian response is eroding or supporting durable change in human security and community resilience? What might be done to strengthen current and future approaches?

Moving forward, national and international, governmental and non-governmental, civil society and affected Haitians will need to reflect on how the humanitarian response to date has affected Haitian resilience and how they can contribute to the recovery of Haiti and the resilience of its people. As this project progresses, the stakeholder community, will have an opportunity to participate in the development of resilience definitions, specific to Haiti, the development of evaluation measurement tools that more effectively capture vulnerability and resilience factors, and the influences on resilient recovery.
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