Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?

Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz

Abstract

Since the 2010 earthquake, almost $6 billion has been disbursed in official aid to Haiti, a country with a population of just under 10 million. An estimated $3 billion has been donated to NGOs in private contributions in addition to official aid. The United States Government alone has disbursed almost $2 billion of this total amount and has pledged over $3 billion for relief and reconstruction.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private contractors have been the intermediate recipients of most of these funds. The Government of Haiti has received just 1 percent of humanitarian aid and somewhere between 15 and 21 percent of longer-term relief aid. As a result, NGOs and private contractors in Haiti have built an extensive infrastructure for the provision of social services. Yet, these entities appear to have limited accountability; despite the use of public funds, there are few evaluations of services delivered, lives saved, or mistakes made.

Most importantly, Haitians are disillusioned with the overall lack of progress, and with the lack of transparency and accountability.

It is likely that NGOs and private contractors will continue to dominate service provision in Haiti for some time to come. In light of this fact, we recommend three options to improve the current situation. One: NGOs and private contractors carry out systematic and widely accessible evaluations of their work. Two: All actors in Haiti be held accountable by publishing data on expenditures and outcomes in Haiti. The International Aid Transparency Initiative may be the perfect vehicle for this and the United States government should require NGOs (and possibly private contractors) to report to IATI. IATI compliance might eventually be a prerequisite for receiving US funds. And three: The Government of Haiti procure services through competitive bidding whenever possible, in order to maintain service delivery while building local capacity over the longer term.

Contents

Introduction: The Context for Foreign Assistance to Haiti ........................................... 1
Donor Pledges to Haiti in the Aftermath of the January 2010 Earthquake .................. 4
Who Got the Money? ..................................................................................................... 8
The Rise of the Quasi-Private State in Haiti ................................................................ 14
Accountability of NGOs and Private Contractors in Haiti ...................................... 20
  Criticisms of NGOs and Private Contractors .......................................................... 23
The Case for Transparency and Accountability ....................................................... 29
Policy Options ............................................................................................................. 30
  [1] Systematic and Widely-Accessible Evaluations .................................................. 31
  [2] The International Aid Transparency Initiative .................................................... 32
  [3] Competitive Bidding and Building Local Capacity ........................................... 35
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 37
Appendix 1: Disbursed Recovery Funding to the Government of Haiti (in Million USD
  unless otherwise noted) ......................................................................................... 38
Appendix 2: Reports Included in Survey of NGO Evaluations .................................. 39
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 43

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errors.
Introduction: The Context for Foreign Assistance to Haiti

Haiti’s instability is fueled by a long tradition of failed political and economic development, and a volatile relationship with the United States and other foreign countries. French colonialism and the US occupation (1915-1934) left the country with a struggling economy and no local control over industry or trade. The US ended its official occupation without a process to transition the government and few efforts were made to build local institutions or prepare Haitians for leadership. The US kept control of Haiti’s national finances until 1947.1 Even the Haitian army was created by an act of the US Congress, although it never faced a non-Haitian enemy and was disbanded in 1995.2 Reforms were imposed by outsiders, leaving the country with little ownership of the development of economic and political systems. Haitians were left with a “prickly nationalism,” distrust of foreigners, and an economy largely dependent on foreign assistance.3

The economic situation has been exacerbated by intense political instability; Haitian history is characterized by short presidencies and periodic foreign interventions. Since 1806, 54 presidents have been elected. Only nine have completed a full term.4 The US had a hand in forcing five presidents out of office.5 Transitions of power were usually based on military force, leading to the Haitian Creole adage “constitutions are made of paper and bayonets of steel.”6 In one six-month period between 1956 and 1957, five governments took power until the United States aided in installing Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier. Haiti became a pawn in larger Cold War politics as the United States aimed to prevent the spread of Communism in the Caribbean and isolate Cuba. Duvalier capitalized on these fears and garnered significant flows of US foreign assistance.7 Yet his dictatorial rule was based upon massive corruption, cronism, and repression of human rights. During the most brutal years of 1960-1970, thousands were murdered and tens of thousands fled into exile.8 American President Kennedy stopped aid to Haiti to protest the repression under Duvalier, yet President Nixon restored aid after Duvalier’s son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier took power and promised reforms. Instead, Jean-Claude continued the abuses of his father’s regime. Yet the United States continued to provide the country with aid as an ally in the fight against communism.

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1 Buss and Gardner, Haiti in the Balance, 24.
3 Girard, Haiti: the tumultuous history, 5.
4 Buss and Gardner, Haiti in the Balance, 4.
5 Buss and Gardner, Haiti in the Balance, 3-4.
7 Girard Haiti: the tumultuous history, 105.
8 Talantino, Military Intervention After the Cold War, 133.
By 1970, foreign assistance was 70% of the Haitian national treasury revenues; aid levels rose to $35.5 million in 1975. Large-scale corruption meant that this aid never reached the Haitian people and the economic situation remained largely unchanged. As the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, Haiti’s GDP per capita declined at an average rate of two percent annually. One study in 1984 estimated that less than 25 percent of the population lived above the absolute poverty line. Long-term development was further hindered by dramatic levels of inequality. Haiti also suffered from a high rate of population growth, deforestation over 97% of the country, and soil erosion. Ironically, F. Duvalier aptly summarized the Haitian system of government:

Our governments never cared about the national inheritance and never attempted to stop social grievances. They talked a lot about liberty, only to fool the free world instead of using it fairly as a domestic policy. The Country is split into two groups: the exploiters – restless and foolhardy minority – monopolize the administrative power and paralyze the progress of the masses; the exploited – the great majority – [are] victims of a wrongful and cruel system.

This political and economic context led to the rise of populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide, known for his vocal opposition to the government and his platform of economic and social reforms. His election in 1990 was supported by the United States and foreign aid rose as a result – by 1991, Haiti received $380 million from abroad. Aristide was ousted in a coup in September 1991 by Raul Cédras and international policy shifted immediately. The Bush Administration suspended aid once again, enacted a harsh economic embargo, tightened sanctions, denied visas, and froze bank accounts. Although basic food items were exempt from the embargos, inputs such as seeds or fertilizer that were essential for Haitians to achieve food security were blocked. Between 1992 and 1993, gross domestic product fell by 20 percent, and unemployment rose to 75 percent. Textile and assembly plants - which constituted over three-quarters of Haiti’s exports - were closed, the tax collection system collapsed, and infrastructure crumbled. President George H.W. Bush also began a tough migration ban, blocking Haitian “boat people” from settling in the US.

Aristide became a divisive political issue in the United States, and policy disagreements resulted in a schizophrenic approach towards Haiti. President Clinton ran a 1992

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14 “Sanctions in Haiti.”
The volatility of official foreign aid to the Haitian government undercut an already weak public sector. To date, the Haitian government has few resources and little revenue. In 2002, the government budget (for a country of almost 10 million) was roughly equivalent to that of the town of Cambridge, Massachusetts (population 100,000). In 2008, the net foreign assistance to Haiti was $92.30 per capita. Yet only three percent of bilateral aid went to budget

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18 Farmer, Haiti after the Earthquake, 135.
support for the Haitian government.\textsuperscript{19} Funding for budget support is also extremely volatile, even during years where foreign assistance to Haiti remained relatively stable. In FY2010 it increased from $93.6 million to $225 million. As of June 2011, it was only $48.8 million for FY2011.\textsuperscript{20} This unpredictability further complicates the ability of the Haitian government to create long-term plans for recovery and economic progress.

Extreme volatility in foreign assistance levels has undermined human and economic development in Haiti. Any increments in social progress - increased school enrollment, higher vaccination rates, or judicial reform – during the years that Haiti received aid were offset by decreases in the years when the country was subjected to aid embargoes.\textsuperscript{21} Poverty reduction was always a secondary goal in the disbursement of foreign aid; assistance was primarily used as a reward or punitive measure to influence Haitian politics. The most consistent flows of aid were for humanitarian purposes, yet this funding was for short-term immediate relief projects – projects that may have undermined long-term development in some cases.\textsuperscript{22} The volatile Haitian political climate and US policy response also had disastrous impacts on foreign direct investment. In the three years between 1999 and 2002, investment fell from $30 million to $5 million.\textsuperscript{23} A lack of both donor and investor confidence has likely constrained investment flows, even during relatively stable periods in Haiti’s political history.

**Donor Pledges to Haiti in the Aftermath of the January 2010 Earthquake**

On Tuesday, January 12, 2010, at 16:53, Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter near the town of Léogâne, approximately 25 km (16 miles) west of Port-au-Prince. Haiti is located in the region where the Caribbean tectonic plate meets the North American plate. The Caribbean plate has been moving northward by 7 to 20 mm per year, grinding against the North American plate as it moves forward. This movement has produced two major fault lines, called *strike-slip faults*, to the north and south of Haiti – the Septentrional fault in the north and the Enriquillo-Plaintain Garden fault in the south. The earthquake of January 2010 was likely caused by movement and release of accumulated pressure around the southern fault, plunging an already poor and unstable country further toward disaster.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} “Has aid changed?”, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{20} “Has aid changed?”, 4-8.
\textsuperscript{21} Erickson, “The Haiti Dilemma,” 293.
\textsuperscript{22} Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 52.
\textsuperscript{23} Erickson, “The Haiti Dilemma,” 293.
\textsuperscript{24} Some scientists believe that the earthquake was caused by separate *blind thrust faults*, which means that pressure in the southern fault (accumulated over a period of 250 years) has not fully released yet.
A third of the country’s population was directly impacted by the quake; over 220,000 people died and several million people were displaced to temporary shelters. Damage and losses were estimated at $7.8 billion, which is an amount greater than Haiti’s GDP in 2009.26

Haiti received an unprecedented amount of support and aid in response. Private donations reached $3.1 billion.27 Individual Americans gave $774 million in the first five weeks—the rapid response was largely aided by text messaging technology. The Red Cross, which pioneered this fundraising strategy, raised an unprecedented $32 million in $10 donations through SMS technology.28 Fifty-eight donors made pledges totaling $5.5 billion to help


27 “Has aid changed?”, 12

28 “Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2011,” pg 5-6
Haiti at the International Donor’s Conference in New York on 31 March, 2010. According to the report, “Has Aid Changed” from the UN Office for the Special Envoy for Haiti, this represents a tripling of aid flows between 2009 and 2010. In 2010, aid from official donors was 400 percent of the Haitian government’s domestic revenue. Figure 3 shows the top ten donors while Figure 4 shows how United States government funds were allocated. Of the relief aid committed or disbursed, 60 percent was in the form of grants while 40 percent was in-kind goods and services.

**Figure 3: Top Donors in Haiti Earthquake Response, 2010-2011**

![Bar chart showing top donors](chart.png)

Note: Total from all Public Sector Donors: $8,401.4M pledged and $5,327.7M disbursed. 2010-2011, Overall contributions as of March 2012. Does not include private sector donors. Contributions include Humanitarian Relief (Earthquake and Cholera) funds as well as Recovery and Development funds (excluding debt relief). Source: UN Office of the Special Envoy.

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30 “Has aid changed?” 14.
The Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti reports that bilateral and multilateral donors have pledged $9.28 billion in humanitarian and recovery funding for 2010 to 2012.\textsuperscript{31} Of these pledges, $5.63 billion (60.7 percent) have been disbursed.\textsuperscript{32} Pledges were also made to support the Government of Haiti’s Action Plan for Recovery and Development. The eighteen-month budget in the Government of Haiti Action Plan identifies priority sectors and requests for levels of funding.

It is clear that the main areas of donor concern do not always align with the Haitian government’s priorities, as is evidenced by the differences in requests and pledges (Figure 5). For instance in the transportation sector, pledges were 510 percent ($737 million) more than

\textsuperscript{31} This total includes humanitarian relief for both earthquake and cholera responses, and recovery money from the New York pledges as well as other recovery funding. Does not include debt relief

\textsuperscript{32} UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, “2010-2012 overall contributions from public sector donors to relief and recovery efforts in Haiti as of March 2012.” http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/International_Assistance/2-overall-financing-data.pdf
the Government of Haiti’s request. Whereas pledges for strengthening democratic institutions fell short—only 20 percent ($31 million) of the Government of Haiti’s request was met by donors.

**Figure 5: Government Priorities vs. Donor Pledges and Disbursements (USD Millions)**


**Who Got the Money?**

From the available figures, it appears that NGOs and private contractors are the primary intermediate recipients of this assistance for relief and reconstruction, with very little money going directly to the Government of Haiti. Funding is broken into two categories: humanitarian aid is immediate relief funding, whereas recovery funding is longer-term financing for reconstruction and development. Humanitarian agencies, NGOs, private contractors, and other non-state service providers received 99 percent of humanitarian aid—less than one percent went to the Government of Haiti.33 Figure 6A shows the breakdown of the $2.29 billion in humanitarian aid from all donors committed or disbursed in 2010 and 2011. However, none of the $1.28 billion disbursed in humanitarian aid from the United States went to the Haitian government (Figure 6B).

33 “Has aid changed?”4.
**Figure 6A: Recipients of Humanitarian Aid to Haiti from all donors**

* Excluding Flash Appeal. ** Under Flash appeal. INGOs are International NGOs. Total funding is $2.29 billion in Humanitarian funding committed or disbursed by bilateral and multilateral donors in 2010 and 2011. And additional $168.2 million went to cholera response. Source: UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti Key Facts as of March 2012. http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/International_Assistance/1-overall-key-facts.pdf

**Figure 6B: Recipients of US Humanitarian Funding**

**Figure 6C: Recipients of US Recovery Funding**

Note: Total disbursed US Humanitarian funding is $1.28 billion and Recovery funding is $655 million as of March 2012. Source: Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, United States Fact Sheet http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/Home/Donor_Status/us.pdf

A slightly higher percentage of disbursed long-term recovery funding has been channeled to the Haitian government. Somewhere between 15 and 21 percent of recovery funding has
been channeled to the Haitian government from donors globally, depending on how the financing is categorized. The United States, however, only disbursed one percent of recovery money to the Government of Haiti (Figure 6C).

Aid to the government remains very low, despite the fact that budget support to the treasury is the Haitian government’s preferred channel for aid. General budget support can also be given indirectly through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (of which the World Bank acts as a trustee). In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the Haitian government had very limited capacity as almost all government buildings were destroyed and agencies were operating in a state of emergency. Yet months, and years, later, donors continue to be reluctant to fund the government. Valid concerns arise about the lack of capacity within the Government of Haiti, as well as entrenched systems of patronage, corruption, and inefficiency. Yet government capacity will never be built or improved if donors continue to bypass local institutions in favor of NGOs.

Even if we believe that non-profit organizations and private contractors may be more efficient in disbursing immediate aid, longer-term recovery requires government leadership. By circumventing the Haitian government, donors are prolonging this process and continuing to undermine the public sector. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was created to provide a platform for collaboration between donors and the Haitian government. The commission was co-chaired by Bill Clinton and Jean-Max Bellerive and was made up of government officials and donor representatives. Yet IHRC only had an eighteen month mandate, which can be argued was too short to deal with the situation on the ground. There was also criticism of its effectiveness. A report by the US Government Accountability office found that over a year after its creation, IHRC was still not fully operational.

The “trickle down” effect of development financing also may be an important element in tracing where the money went. For donor’s civil entities, INGOs, and UN agencies there are often multiple layers of sub-contracts and sub-grants before reaching the groups that are implementing programs on the ground in Haiti. A large donor may provide a grant to a large INGO which may channel money to smaller NGOs, faith-based organization, or Haitian community groups. Each layer in this process may absorb seven to ten percent in administrative costs, which significantly reduces the amount of money used to implement programs on the ground.

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34 Recovery aid (longer-term aid) is distinguished from humanitarian aid (immediate needs) by the UN Special Envoy for Haiti based on the funding pools used. See Appendix 1 for a breakdown in estimations about budget support to the GOH and other direct financing.
36 Farmer, Haiti after the earthquake 156-7.
37 GAO report, “Haiti Reconstruction.”
Not all NGOs have received aid—in fact, the main recipients were large, international non-profits and some UN agencies. (Figure 7). The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) took responsibility for all security in Haiti in the aftermath of the quake. This included restoring and managing the runway at the airport in Port-au-Prince, triaging aircraft landings in Port-au-Prince from a command center in Tampa, Florida, and maintaining security in Haiti’s capital. As such, DOD received the largest amount of relief aid to carry out these activities. The remainder of the funds went to large international NGOs, private contractors, and other agencies of the U.S. government such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Health and Human Services (HHS).

Private contractors have also benefitted a great deal from the Haiti quake. A cable found on WikiLeaks referred to the private contracting process as a “gold rush,” and questions have been raised about the contracts awarded in the aftermath of the quake. Figure 8 shows the top ten private contractors that received funds. However, Haitian-led NGOs have largely been excluded from relief or reconstruction funds. The initial UN appeal included only needs of international NGOs – Haitian NGOs were completely excluded. In later versions, ten Haitian NGOs were included and they requested $5.4 million, which was equivalent to 0.4 percent of the total request. Only two Haitian organizations received funding at a total of $0.8 million – less than 15 percent of the money requested by the ten organizations.

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39 Till Bruckner, a former employee of Transparency International Georgia, argues that “in Georgia, NGOs could not have run the relief operations, they were not strong enough. But it’s worth asking why they were STILL not strong enough after over a decade of “local NGO capacity building” by donors and INGOs. Main problems: (1) donors distrust NGOs and do not give them large grants, (2) INGOs poach the strongest NGO employees with better salaries, (3) NGOs lack core funding.”
40 “Has aid changed?” 15-16.
Figure 7: Top Recipients of USG Haiti Earthquake Funding, FY 2010-2011 (Millions)

Total Humanitarian Assistance from USAID, State, and DOD. USAID and State are not listed since their money was re-allocated to the implementing partners above. Represents obligated amounts as of September 29, 2011. Source: USAID Earthquake and Cholera Fact Sheets, FY 2010 is Fact Sheet #73, Sept 24, 2010. FY 2011 is from Fact Sheet #13, Sept 29,

Figure 8: Top Private Contractors for Haiti, Jan 12, 2010 – March 1, 2012

Source: Federal Procurement Data System; total funding in millions of dollars
Contracts to Haitian firms are also few and far between. Figure 9 shows that about $9 million were used to purchase services from Haitian vendors, according to the Federal Procurement Database System. Only 12 vendors were involved in these transactions. Figure 10 shows that contracts to Haitian firms have all but stopped—in 2011, the amount spent on local procurement fell off sharply compared to 2010. Following a request from Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch Blog (HRRW) run by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, USAID released the names of its local contractors in Haiti in April 2012. These data show that the contracts add up to $9.45 million, which is far less than one percent of more than a billion dollars spent by USAID. Over 75 percent of USAID funds went to private contractors inside the Beltway (located in Washington DC, Maryland, or Virginia).41

**Figure 9: Contracts to Haitian Firms (12 Vendors)**

Notes: Contracts from Jan 12, 2010 to March 1, 2012. Source: Federal Procurement Data System

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The Rise of the Quasi-Private State in Haiti

Due to the limited capacity of the Haitian government and weak national institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private contractors have risen to play a prominent role in Haiti. The immense volatility in Haitian politics and US reluctance to give aid directly to the Haitian government resulted in NGO and contractors becoming the main thoroughfare for foreign assistance. Funding for international charities continued to flow even when aid to the Haitian government was prohibited. NGOs, private firms, and multilateral banks quickly became the preferred recipients of aid as they were more stable and could be held more accountable to international donors than the Haitian government. Prior to the 2010 earthquake, one estimate was that 70 percent of aid money to Haiti flowed through charities and non-profit organizations.42

Some researchers describe how NGOs have become key players in nation building and governance, with some having greater influence over local politics than the local population.43 It is clear that international organizations and NGOs have access to disproportionate levels of funding in comparison with the government. NGOs are a primary channel through which money can be siphoned off. Local politicians often seek support and funding from foreign NGOs to aid in election campaigns and secure successes. Various

Figure 10: USG Contracts to Haitian Firms over Time

Notes: Contracts from Jan 12, 2010 to March 1, 2012. Source: Federal Procurement Data System

42 De Cordoba, “Aid Spawns Backlash in Haiti.”
43 Zanotti, “Cacophonies of Aid,” 759.
organizations, based in the United States and elsewhere, have been accused of funding the opposition to President Aristide. It is difficult to even determine the number of NGOs that are operating in Haiti. Estimates vary greatly, and only a small proportion of organizations are officially registered with the Ministry of Planning (Figure 11). A comparison of some of the most recent and frequently cited sources show great disparities in existing estimates.

**Figure 11: Estimates of the Number of NGOs in Haiti**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIIR (high estimate)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIIR (low estimate)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP (high estimate)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanotti (estimate)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP (low estimate)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Special Envoy (list)</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN OCHA (list)</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directory of Development Orgs (list)</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCAONG (list)</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning (list)</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The inability of the Haitian government to count or register NGOs further highlights the weakness of the public sector in comparison with the parallel non-profit system. Programs and activities run by NGOs are usually not included in government planning and may lack long-term sustainability. There is no method for ensuring accountability or coordination amongst various organizations which are often operating under similar mandates and running identical projects. The Office of the Special Envoy has assisted the Government of Haiti in its effort to regulate and oversee non-state providers, so that work programs and funding might be better aligned with government priorities.

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44 Zanotti, “Cacophonies of Aid,” 759.
InterAction has pioneered the Haiti Aid Map, providing project-level statistics for 65 NGOs currently operating in the country (Figure 12). Yet the task of expanding these projects to include the smallest charities remains daunting.

**Figure 12: InterAction Haiti Aid Map, Active Projects in Haiti (12.7.11)**

Although it remains almost impossible to identify exactly how many NGOs are operating in Haiti, it is worthwhile drawing out characteristics and trends from the data that we do have. The Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti/Inter-American Development Bank CSO portal has the most comprehensive directory of organizations, listing slightly fewer than one thousand Civil Society Organizations and NGOs. Using that directory along with individual websites and annual reports of NGOs, we were able to build a dataset of 980 NGOs. Bias is introduced as we are relying only on organizations that have a website or are registered on a database, thus likely excluding many local Haitian organizations without access to the Internet and/or the means to register. There is a large amount of variation, with listed organizations having anywhere between three and 500,000 employees.

As Figure 13 shows, NGOs are not new players in Haiti, and their growth in recent decades is dramatic. A relatively small and stable number of charities registered between the late

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45 As of December 7, 2011, InterAction, “Haiti Aid Map.”

46 Although for many of these organizations we could find nothing more than a name – we lack data on where it is located, what sectors it works in, etc. Thus our sample sizes for the following analyses varies greatly (sample size is listed on each graph).

47 In our database years are recorded as the year the organization was founded (for very large global NGOs this may not correspond with the date that they actually began operations in Haiti).
1800s and the 1960s. By the late 1960s, the numbers began to grow, along with the birth of the international NGO movement globally. Throughout the 1990s, fluctuations in registration may be correlated with domestic and foreign policies, including the 1995 restoration of Aristide and the resumptions and suspensions of US foreign aid. The most dramatic spike can be seen following the January 2010 earthquake – almost one hundred new NGOs were registered in the aftermath of the quake. According to the registry through the Office of the Special Envoy, an average of 23 new NGOs were founded per year between 2000 and 2009. This quadrupled in 2010 when 93 NGOs were created.

Figure 13: Date of Birth of NGOs Operating in Haiti

We find that 51 percent of NGOs operating in Haiti are headquartered in the United States (Figure 14). This is not surprising given the political history between the two nations, geographic proximity, and the large number of Haitians residing in the U.S. The majority of these organizations have offices and branches based in Haiti, yet are headquartered in the U.S. Only one-fifth of organizations are actually headquartered in Haiti. NGOs operating in Haiti span the globe – from an Armenian Church Association, to a Lebanese Mission providing shelter for the distressed, to the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund providing cash-for-work programs and emergency assistance. Surprisingly, only three organizations from the Dominican Republic are listed.

48 Once again, it is important to note the bias toward small Haitian organizations that do not have a website or footprint on the internet. We may be excluding small Haitian organizations that maintain a low profile and work in isolated areas. Yet by relying on organizations that have a website or information online, we are also likely excluding the large number of fraudulent or non-existent organizations.
Despite where they are located, many NGOs operating in Haiti share the same priorities. Health and education are their main areas of operations—34 percent of all organizations work in at least one of these two sectors. (Figure 15). Humanitarian assistance, general economic development, agriculture, and human rights are also common areas of focus. Both NGOs headquartered in Haiti (Figure 16) and those in the US (Figure 17) seem to share the same priorities.

Figure 14: Location of Headquarters

![Location of Headquarters Pie Chart]

**Figure 15: Sector Breakdown of All NGOs in Haiti**

![Sector Breakdown Pie Chart]

*Note: Total of 964 NGOs. Organizations that listed more than one sector are counted for each sector.*
The available evidence suggests that NGOs and private contractors provide almost four-fifths of social services in Haiti.\textsuperscript{49} One study conducted before the January 2010 earthquake found that NGOs provided 70 percent of healthcare while private schools, mostly run by NGOs, accounted for 85 percent of education.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} De Cordoba, “Aid Spawns Backlash in Haiti.”

\textsuperscript{50} Zanotti, “Cacophonies of Aid.”
Whether this involvement is an “infusion” or an “invasion” of NGOs is contested.\textsuperscript{51} International non-profit organizations bring much-needed expertise, human and financial resources, and a stable stream of funding to the country. Yet it is likely that the strength of NGOs further constrains the limited capacity of the Haitian government. NGOs have built an alternative infrastructure for the provision of social services, creating little incentive for the government to spend scarce resources on the social sector. A “brain drain” from the public sector to the private, non-profit sector is also observed, pulling talent away from government offices.\textsuperscript{52} NGOs provide almost one-third of all formal sector jobs, often the most well-respected and well-paying positions.\textsuperscript{53} This has resulted in the Haitian concept of the “klas ONG” (NGO class).\textsuperscript{54} Often, money spent by the NGOs does not stay in the local economy as many non-profits provide contracts to larger international businesses and service providers. There is consequently little contribution to the generation of value added in Haiti.\textsuperscript{55}

**Accountability of NGOs and Private Contractors in Haiti**

How have NGOs performed with regard to service delivery in Haiti? The bottom line is that twenty-eight months after the earthquake, it is still very difficult to tell. There is little publicly-available evidence on the performance of NGOs and what is available is hard to find. Some of the large international NGOs do compile annual reports and publish financial data, but these are few and far between. The non-profit Disaster Accountability Project issued a report on accountability and transparency of NGOs operating in Haiti one year after the earthquake.\textsuperscript{56} Out of 196 organizations identified, only eight had public and regularly updated situation reports on their activities in Haiti. Almost 65 percent of organizations did not have reports available, rather provided emotional appeals or anecdotal case studies on their websites.\textsuperscript{57} Only 38 organizations responded to the Project’s request for a survey and more information. Most easily available assessments from NGOs focus on case studies or other descriptive instances of success. Negative outcomes or failures are almost never documented, at least in publicly available papers.\textsuperscript{58} Reports in the media have described inadequate supplies, inaccurate representations of successes, and questionable financial tracking, but we have very little direct evidence from NGOs or private contractors to confirm or refute these allegations.

\textsuperscript{51} Schuller “Invasion or infusion?” 96-7.  
\textsuperscript{52} Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 90.  
\textsuperscript{53} Schuller “Gluing Globalization,” 91.  
\textsuperscript{54} Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 92.  
\textsuperscript{55} Zanotti, “Cacophonies of Aid,” 760.  
\textsuperscript{56} Disaster Accountability Project, “One Year Follow Up Report.”  
\textsuperscript{57} Revkin, Andrew “Report Faults Haiti Aid Groups on Openness.”  
\textsuperscript{58} Werker and Ahmed, “What do Non-Governmental Organizations Do?” 79.
Evaluations can be difficult to find and are often not accessible on the implementing organization’s website. We found two external organizations which aggregate evaluation and lessons learned reports from organizations operating in Haiti since the earthquake: UN OCHA’s ReliefWeb and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). Merging these sources, we categorized 45 Haiti evaluation reports conducted since January 2010 and assessed how many reports included characteristics we would like to see in rigorous evaluations: an independent evaluator, clear methodology, project data, budget or cost report, a discussion of value for money and other alternatives, and recommendations for future operations. The reports include evaluations carried out at various levels: program, organization, sector or system-wide, and donor agency. Some of the reports focus on coordination between a series of organizations in one location or sector, in which case project data or budget reports are not directly applicable. In the tables below, we present the data for all reports and also for those reports that are evaluations of programs and organizations only (i.e. excluding donor agency and sector wide reports).

Table 1: All Evaluation Reports (Total: 45 reports)

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<th></th>
<th>Independent Evaluator</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Project Data</th>
<th>Budget/Cost Report</th>
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Table 2: Program and Organization Reports (Total: 23 reports)

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59 List of all reports included in Appendix 2. A third effort, which we did not use in this paper but is worth mentioning, has been led by the University of Haiti and Tulane University. Their Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation Database categorized all evaluations, maps, briefs, and papers written on Haiti. Available here <http://www.drlatulane.org/groups/meta/haiti-humanitarian-aid-evaluation-database-explorer>.
60 Includes 7 program reports, 16 organization reports, 16 sector or system reports, and 6 donor reports.
61 Includes 7 program reports and 16 organization reports.
While most reports made recommendations, they fell short in other categories. Less than half of the reports were conducted by an independent party and only slightly over half detailed the methodology used. Of those that explained how the evaluation was done, most involved some combination of data collection, desk research, interviews with field staff, surveys of beneficiaries, and field visits. For program and organization evaluations, we find that more than one-third of the reports do not have specific project data. Especially of concern is the lack of budget or cost data. Only four program and organization reports have any detail about how the money was spent (how much tents cost, how much money was given per cash transfer, or what percentage of funds went to transport vs. logistics). Furthermore, only one of the reports has any discussion about providing the best value for money and what the alternatives might be to the program currently being implemented.

There are some good examples of comprehensive evaluation. One is from Christian Aid, which published a briefing paper in January 2012 that evaluated its program of unconditional cash transfers. It clearly explains the objectives of the program and why aid was given in the form of unconditional cash transfers instead of as cash-for-work, vouchers, or other types of direct assistance. The brief includes a map of where each program was run, how much money was given, and how many times money was given to each recipient. The report then illustrates the impact of the program, based on a survey of over 400 beneficiaries in eight different locations. It concludes with a detailed list of successes and lessons from this program. Although cash transfers are a specific type of program that may lend itself to more direct impact evaluation, this is a very good example of a careful evaluation.

Another good example is a Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) report from January 2011. It includes qualitative analysis about MSF’s programs in the first year, coupled with a very detailed table presenting data about every activity that MSF has carried out (from the number of beds provided to the number of patients treated for sexual violence). Budget data is partially included; there is a table with the major operational spending categories so that we can see what percentage of funding went to staff salaries versus transport and logistics costs. This is a positive step, although more detail on specific expenditures would be good. Overall, both reports exemplify the type of transparency that is very useful in evaluation reports.

The majority of the reports we found do include qualitative analysis gathered from discussions with staff and beneficiaries on program successes or challenges in implementation. Over 90 percent have recommendations for future operations. Interviews and surveys are very important in understanding a program’s impact, the implementation process, collaboration with other agencies, and project sustainability. Yet quantitative data,

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62 Reports that only had broad generalizations (“We reached 5,000 people”) we counted as a “No” if there was no detail about how these people were reached.

63 ChristianAid, “Haiti: Unconditional Cash Transfers – Lessons Learnt.”

64 MSF, “Haiti One Year After.”
especially on project outcomes and budget or cost reporting is crucial to supplement this analysis. It allows donors, recipients, and other stakeholders to understand how money is being spent (especially if it is public money), and helps to identify best practices for future operations.

NGOs are not alone; there is an absence of data even in USG reviews. An external review of USAID’s activities in Haiti lacks data completely, and there is very little in the report on accountability with regard to aid flows. A quote from the “Opening Note” sums it up well:

We had hoped to invest greater efforts in measuring more accurately the quality of aid and its impact on beneficiaries. However, a disquieting lack of data on baselines against which to measure progress or even impact forced this task to the back burner. We realized that devoting more energy to this task could take up all the time and human resources we had available. Thus, some useful lessons in that direction remain unclear.65

It is hard to understand why there is a “disquieting lack of data.” USAID and other U.S. agencies have been operating for several decades in Haiti, as have many of the large international NGOs. Yet, almost nothing is known about how the money has been spent in Haiti, in the years leading up to the quake and in the twenty-eight months following, when several billion dollars were channeled through intermediaries for service delivery to the Haitian people.

The report makes passing references to the lack of beneficiary and local involvement, the large number of NGOs operating in the country, and the fact that many organizations came to Haiti with no previous experience in disaster management. Yet it states that “due to time and resource constraints, we were unable to explore these topics in great detail.” Also, the report says that “no clear baseline or reporting mechanism was established” for organizations receiving USAID funding. NGOs and private contractors operate instead with little oversight, despite the fact that they continue to be the main channels through which the money is disbursed.

**Criticisms of NGOs and Private Contractors**

A lack of budget and program transparency has sometimes led to investigations. The Red Cross has been the subject of negative attention about its operations in Haiti since the earthquake.66 Two reporters—Jacqui Charles and Frances Robles—at the *Miami Herald* have asked some pointed questions about NGO expenditures and outcomes in Haiti. Robles points out that NGO costs are high—it costs $3,500 per month to rent an SUV, $30,000 per

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65 Ghua-Sapir, Debarati, et al.
66 For instance: HRRW “Scrutiny of Red Cross Effort Grows” and “Why doesn’t the American Red Cross Want People to See “Haiti: Where Did the Money Go?”
month to cover warehouse fees (Oxfam), $150,000/month on trucking water (Oxfam), and $30,000/month for electricity (Project MediShare, University of Miami).67 These types of expenditures may well be justified given the tough working conditions in Haiti, but it is hard to make that case without data on inputs, outcomes, or lessons learned.

It makes sense that appeals on NGO websites tend to filled with heart-warming case studies and pictures. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) webpage for Haiti exemplifies this. The page headline titled “You’re the Hero in a Real Life Drama,” says: “In all cases, you pray, you advocate and you give, often never knowing how much or how many people you are helping. In some cases, the benefits of your care will last for generations after the actual work is done.”68

It is likely the case that NGO websites are aimed at maximizing private donations, a goal that makes sense for organizations that rely on both public and private funds, as well as volunteers. But the lack of publicly-accessible evaluations that include budget reports is troubling. CRS does provide a breakdown of spending in Haiti which documents how much funding went to general operational categories, yet detail on more specific expenditures is needed.69 One CEO of a large international NGO says, “I don’t look back and see mistakes. I think we saved lives and made lives better. I know we got more kids in school.”70 With no data and few evaluations, it is difficult to confirm this claim. Organizations receiving large amounts of public funding and operating with influential budgets should be held to higher standards of accountability.

There is also little evaluation of the private contractors operating in Haiti. The authors of the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s (CEPR) Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch (HRRW) blog have done groundbreaking work monitoring the use of funds in Haiti, especially by USAID-funded private contractors. They argue that many of the top recipients of relief aid are operating with little to no oversight, despite a history of inadequate performance. HRRW details how Chemonics has received hundreds of millions of dollars for operations in Afghanistan. Subsequent General Accounting Office (GAO) and USAID Inspector General Investigations found significant problems with their programs, stating that Chemonics failed to “address a key program objective,” and there was inadequate support and documentation for the reported results. Despite this history, Chemonics became the largest recipient of USAID contracts in Haiti. A 2011 audit by USAID’s Inspector General found inadequate results with their cash-for-work projects in Haiti, a lack of oversight, and no financial reviews of their implementing partners.71 This story is not

67 Robles, Frances, “many question whether Haiti quake donations put to best use.”
68 Accessible here: http://crs.org/united-states/you-are-the-hero-in-a-real-life-drama/
69 Accessible here: http://crs.org/emergency/haiti/financials.cfm
70 Robles, Frances, “Many question whether Haiti quake donations put to best use.”
71 HRRW, “With Poor Track Records For-Profit Development Companies Team UP to Fight Reform,” 1 December 2011.
unique to Chemonics. Many other contractors have been involved in controversies in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Hurricane Katrina relief, yet continue to receive large contracts in Haiti. These include Development Alternatives Inc (DAI), CH2M Hill Constructors, Flour Enterprises, Inc, The Shaw Group, MHW Americas, and the Kuwait-based Agility Logistics (formerly PWC Logistics), among others.\(^72\)

The lack of oversight of large contractors means that it is nearly impossible to track the amount of money flowing to both contractors and subcontractors. There are no publicly-accessible reports on what private contractors are doing, and whether or not their efforts have worked. It is a weakness that USAID has recognized on its website:

> Unfortunately, the Agency does not have the systems in place to track sub-grants and sub-contracts so it is not possible to state precisely the number of partners or the percentage of USAID funds that flow to local nonprofit organizations (or, for that matter, to local private businesses) through these indirect arrangements.\(^73\)

Yet, (according to HRRW), a leaked contract between USAID and Chemonics says that Chemonics is required to “track and report on the overall monthly commitments and disbursements for all activities and non-activity expenditures.” Chemonics is also “required to provide a detailed budget and vouchers for all subcontractors.” A USAID Inspector General report from 2010 found that while other branches of USAID had conducted financial reviews of their partners, USAID/OTI had not carried out this task. Given that private contractors are receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer funds, the lack of evaluation is very troubling. A key priority of the USAID Forward reforms is to increase local procurement and improve capacity to track spending through contractors and subcontractors. In response, private contractors have formed a lobby called the *Coalition of International Development Companies*, to “increase visibility” with the USG and other entities.\(^74\)

By and large, efforts to obtain information from USAID on NGO and private contractor activity in Haiti and other countries have not been very successful. Jake Johnston at CEPR describes his experience with a Freedom of Information act (FOIA) request to get information on two USAID contracts with Chemonics in Haiti. He received task orders and documents with no specific targets or projects:

> Of all the various documents and financial reports that the contractor was required to submit to USAID, none of them were released, nor were they even withheld. It


\(^{74}\) Rogin blog post “Corporations Unite to Fight for Development.”
was as if they didn't exist. Further, all of the cost information, including overhead and labor costs, was redacted on the grounds that this is considered the proprietary information of the contractor and could cause competitive harm.\footnote{Johnston, Jake. “Op-Ed: Haiti’s Fight for Transparency.”}

This experience is not unique; FOIA attempts for USAID and NGO data in other parts of the world have followed the same pattern. Figure 18 shows the results of a FOIA request made by Till Bruckner (a former employee of Transparency International Georgia), to USAID, and posted on the popular blog, Aid Watch. After 14 months, Bruckner received a heavily redacted document which contained no information. Despite various statements by NGOs regarding their openness, one is left with the impression that transparency is still very much lacking when it comes to NGO operations and expenditures. In his final post on Aid Watch (excerpted here, dated October 1, 2010), Bruckner had this to say:

Sixteen months after I first filed a Freedom of Information Act request with USAID for the budgets of American-financed NGO projects in Georgia, I have reached the end of the road. Rejecting my appeal, USAID has confirmed that it continues to regard NGO project budgets as “privileged or confidential” information, and will not release budgets without contractors’ permission.

The opacity of USAID’s subcontracting makes it impossible for researchers to get access to comprehensive and comparable data that could inform debates about the effectiveness of delivering aid through NGOs. For example, the issue of aid fragmentation within NGOs could only be raised because Oxfam GB voluntarily provided a researcher with a list of all its projects abroad.

USAID is on very thin ice when it tries to push developing country institutions to become more accountable. The next time USAID lectures an African official on the importance of transparency in public procurement, I hope she will pull out a list of blacked-out budgets and argue that her ministry is following American best practice when it treats all financial details of its subcontracting arrangements as “privileged or confidential.”

Bruckner goes on to say:

This FOIA journey has shown one thing above all: NGOs (save Oxfam GB) simply do not want outsiders to see their project budgets, full stop. Not a single NGO has used this forum to announce its willingness to give beneficiaries or other stakeholders access to its project proposals and budgets in the future, even though every country director has these documents on his hard drive and could attach them to an email within two minutes.
Project budgets are shown only to those stakeholders who have the power to force NGOs to open their books: donors, headquarters, and audit institutions. The poor and powerless have to be content with whatever information NGOs choose to provide.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{76} Bruckner, Till, “TransparencyGate: the end of the road” 1 October, 2010.
It is certainly the case that NGOs and private contractors in Haiti work under very difficult conditions, and are often staffed by dedicated professionals who sacrifice much to deliver services. Yet, there is considerable dissatisfaction all around. Haitians are, in general, not very happy with the international community. NGOs are variously described in Haitian Creole as “vôlè” (thieves or crooks), “malonèt” (liars) and “kowonpi” (corrupt). Much of the Haitian population is angry about the volatility in the delivery of basic services. Says UN Deputy Special Envoy Paul Farmer, "There's graffiti all over the walls in Port-au-Prince right now saying, 'Down with NGOs'...I think people in the NGO sector need to read the writing on
the wall.”77 Figure 19 shows the level of frustration—all major NGOs are crossed out with a red X with the caption below indicating that all are complicit in the misery of Haitians.

Figure 19: Haitian Frustration with NGOs, Private Contractors, and the UN

Bottom of the wall reads: “Tout Komplis Nan Mize Nou” – “All are complicit in our misery.” Source: Daniel Morel, in Valbrun, “Amid a slow recovery, Haitians question the work of aid groups,” 10 January 2012.

The Case for Transparency and Accountability

It is a contradiction that donors push the Haitian government to improve transparency in their budget projects and efficient allocation of funds when the international aid community itself fails to provide this information to the public. Transparency and organizational accountability can play a crucial role in improving development cooperation in Haiti. It is an issue at the heart of many discussions among donors globally, as it not only strengthens relationships between governments and citizens, but also builds trust and confidence in the programs that are being implemented. Even a country such as Haiti that is seemingly run by donor agencies and INGOs could experience dramatic improvements in development cooperation through the availability of easily accessible data.

Initiatives such as InterAction’s Haiti Aid map are important steps to mapping where projects are actually being implemented, but a comprehensive and mandatory system for project reporting and geocoding is needed. In an ideal world, this type of transparency would lead to coordinated and complimentary projects. For instance, the government could construct a road through an area where a donor agency or NGO is already working to increase agricultural productivity so that the investments work together and result in greater impact. The predictability of aid is also crucial as governments lack the ability to create long-

77 Elfrink, Tim, “Paul Farmer at Barry.”
term project plans or budget estimates with no sense of how much aid they will receive. One study estimates that the cost of unpredictability is 15-20 percent of the value of aid.78

The difficulty that we have had piecing together even allocation data on Haiti illustrates the fragmented and disjointed nature of current data systems. There is no comprehensive source for anything other than donor pledges and disbursement data. We know that the information we have compiled in this paper on contracts or implementing partners is not complete, and there is a dramatic absence of information on sub-contracting or actual project implementation. We can tell a patchy story about where the money is going, but gaping holes on specific data from donor aid agencies, NGOs, and private contractors remain. In theory, the Government of Haiti should take the lead in coordination and assistance tracking, but their capacity to do so remains a serious concern.79

It would be of help to no one if every NGO and private contractor in Haiti packed up and left the country next week. But it is equally problematic that they continue to operate on multi-million dollar contracts with no accountability and no requirement for publishing public budget and project data. What we need to create is a system that fosters transparency, holds these organizations accountable, and forces them to operate in a competitive market.

**Policy Options**

This exercise raises some big questions—would Haiti have been better off without any aid following the 2010 earthquake? Almost $600 has been spent on each Haitian since the 2010 quake but what do we have to show for it? Would a $600 cash transfer made directly to each Haitian have been better than service delivery contracts with private firms and NGOs that are often shrouded in secrecy?

It is very likely that NGOs and private contractors will dominate service delivery in Haiti for some time to come. With this in mind, we recommend three things to address the current situation. One, that NGOs and private contractors be transparent about what they are doing in Haiti, by publishing easily-accessible, systematic evaluations of their work. Two, that they provide data on expenditures and outcomes, first on an interim basis, and then via a common platform known as the *International Aid Transparency Initiative*. And three, that the Government of Haiti procure services through competitive bidding whenever possible.


79 Till Bruckner argued in comments on this draft that coordination must happen at a level above NGOs, ideally the host government. The Government of Haiti could limit the number of donors (as India has done) or number of INGOs authorized to receive institutional donor funding. Yet engagement on this level requires both an interest in doing so and the capacity to do so. (8 May 2012).
[1] Systematic and Widely-Accessible Evaluations

There is a great need for systematic evaluation of the $6 billion spent in Haiti since the earthquake. Evaluations are not, by any means, confined to randomized control trials. Evaluation is defined as a systematic and objective performance assessment of the design, implementation, and results of a project or program. Guidelines for development evaluation from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) emphasize relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. How were the program’s objectives achieved? Were activities cost-efficient and timely? How many people have been impacted? How did the benefits of the project continue after funding ended? There are six key criteria that we would like to see in evaluations:

- Independence (should be carried out by a third party not the organization itself)
- Clear methodology, which explains how the evaluation was conducted
- Clear project data about the number of services provided and number of people benefiting
- Cost break-down or budget report
- Discussion of alternative programs, cost comparisons, or other uses for the money
- Recommendations for improvement

In addition to harmonization and improved planning, transparency in aid flows lowers the risk of corruption or diversion of aid. A series of case studies undertaken by AidInfo found that the priority for citizens in developing countries was not data on aid allocation, but execution. Where does the money actually go? How much is lost to consultants or donor regulations before reaching the country? Who are the contractors and subcontractors actually building the houses or buying the textbooks?

Evaluation of NGO projects in Haiti is complicated by the number of agencies and programs operating in Haiti. The system is fragmented and it is difficult (but not impossible) to measure the effects of any given intervention. Many Haitians do not make the distinction between which projects are coming from which organizations, and often view the donor community as one collective agency. Thus, when evaluations are based solely on surveys or interviews of the recipient population, interviewees may not be talking about individual

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80 “DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance.”
81 These findings are described by Owen Barder in his blog post “Eight Lessons from Three Years Working on Transparency” [http://www.owen.org/blog/4433](http://www.owen.org/blog/4433). The case studies mentioned are available at AidInfo here [http://www.aidinfo.org/resources/case-studies](http://www.aidinfo.org/resources/case-studies).
82 ALNAP report, “Haiti Earthquake Response: Mapping and analysis of gaps and duplications in evaluations.” P.12
project or operations but rather of some unspecified combination of projects. Outcomes and beneficiary feedback is crucial, but it should be only one aspect of evaluation. Evaluations should focus equally on the input side of the equation – how much was provided and for what cost. And ideally, all evaluations should be run by independent, external entities at arm’s length. The donor funding the project should not be the entity that also funds the evaluation.

USAID and other USG contracting agencies need to clarify reporting mechanisms for recipients of public money and require third-party evaluations based on OECD standards. These organizations are currently operating with little oversight and no clear guidelines for baseline measurement or reporting standards. Evaluations that meet the above criteria should be requirements for all organizations that receive contracts from USG agencies.

Imagine what Haiti might look like if donors and NGOs operated with greater transparency. Organizations would not be running dozens of independent (yet overlapping) programs. If citizens and recipient governments could see comparable, reliable, and current project and budget information from various organizations, they would be equipped to make better choices. Cost comparisons would pressure the worst-performing organizations to reform or they would lose business. Public data also fosters public learning, and provides venues for discussion on feedback, best practices, and a better understanding of what works and what does not.

[2] The International Aid Transparency Initiative

NGOs and private contractors can greatly improve the reporting of data on expenditures and outcomes. There is an existing platform that encourages such accountability and transparency for all aid players – donor agencies, large foundations, UN agencies, and NGOs. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is a multi-stakeholder initiative that has developed a standard for publishing information about aid spending. Donors, partner countries, and civil society organizations can publically disclose information on volume, aid allocation, and results of development expenditure. The IATI declaration says: “We will urge all public and private aid donors, including bilateral and multilateral organizations, and philanthropic foundations, and those who deliver aid on our behalf, to work with us to agree and then implement these common standards and format.” Large donors such as the US and the UK are IATI signatories, along with international institutions and agencies from the World Bank to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Organizations such as Oxfam Great Britain and the International HIV/AIDS Alliance have published data to IATI as well.84

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83 International Aid Transparency Initiative Accra Statement.
84 For more information, see www.aidtransparency.net
Donors currently report allocation and aid information to a variety of systems and users—the Development Assistance Committee’s Creditor Reporting System (DAC CRS database), the Financial Tracking Service, country treasuries and parliaments, journalists and researchers, embassy or donor websites—the list continues. It is not only burdensome for the aid agencies to provide separate reports with varying levels of data, but it is not user-friendly. With information scattered across multiples sites, data is often difficult to find and inconsistent. IATI might solve these problems. It is a reporting standard—think of it like an accounting standard. It does not aim to ‘merge’ these different systems, but rather to provide a single, coherent, underlying, machine-readable data set from which all these different systems can draw. The IATI standard format also plans to geocode aid spending, which means that both donors and NGOs would be able to easily access geographic information about all projects and programs. This initiative would foster aid traceability—enabling us to follow money from taxpayer to activity on the ground.

There are a growing number of country-level efforts to track aid, as over 40 countries have established Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS). Efforts have been underway to establish an AIMS in Haiti since 2009, with support from the United Nations Development Programme. Developing national capacity to analyze, communicate and make decisions based on high-quality information about aid is extremely important. Yet relying solely on AIMS is difficult as individual efforts are often plagued by poor data or extreme time lags, and data may not be comparable or widely accessible.85 For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, country data were collected manually from donors and were incorrect in comparison to standardized IATI data. Several recipient country government officials have voiced their preference for IATI data from donors, not manually collected information.86 IATI offers the benefit of a universal reporting standard, it is more comprehensive than the DAC-CRS database and often more accurate and timely than specific country efforts. Yet IATI needs to be very closely linked to country-level efforts, reinforcing government planning processes, and building local capacity to better manage aid. Efforts to analyze how IATI can best link with AIMS and other national systems should be continued.

There are potentially large benefits for all the players in Haiti if every organization reports project-level data to IATI. Although it may sound like a pipe dream, perhaps it is not all that unreasonable to expect. The UK government has spearheaded the process of IATI compliance; their Department for International Development (DFID) is currently requiring the NGOs which get the biggest grants to implement IATI, as outlined in the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee.87 It has not yet required all NGOs and contractors to implement

86 Email from Owen Barder to authors, May 1, 2012.
IATI, nor has it yet required that the obligation be passed on to sub-contractors. But the UK government is actively considering how it can extend the requirement to implement IATI to these players as well. As of March 2012, nine NGOs had already published IATI-compliant data and by June 2012 more than 60 other DFID grantees will do the same.\(^8\) There are clear instructions on how NGOs can become IATI compliant and extensive guidance on how to develop an open information policy.\(^9\) The assumption (backed by evidence from the early publishers) is that if an NGO must be IATI-compliant for money received from DFID, they will publish along the same standards for the rest of their grants and operating budgets. This is an unprecedented step with tremendous potential for improving aid transparency and accountability globally. The US government might learn from these efforts and actively collaborate with the UK on a single, uniform platform of IATI compliance.

We strongly recommend that the United States, as the largest donor and home to the most active NGOs and private contractors in Haiti, adopt the IATI process in a timely manner. The US signed on to IATI in November 2011 and has committed to work for more transparency and accountability in its aid processes. We welcome the fact that the USG is a signatory and look forward to publication by USG of its first IATI data. In her keynote address at the Busan High-Level Forum, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the US commitment to IATI and stressed the value of transparency. “All of us must live up to the international standards that the global community has committed to…. Transparency helps reveal our weaknesses so we can improve our work.”\(^9^0\) It is important that the US should now make it clear what this means for NGOs and firms receiving USG money. In addition, the US should put its weight behind the work now underway in IATI to increase geocoding, publish project and transaction level details, and build traceability into the standard.

If implemented effectively, IATI will provide a platform through which both the American and the Haitian public can hold organizations accountable for the money they are receiving and the work they are doing. In turn, a single process may well reduce the reporting burden of NGOs. Admittedly, full compliance to IATI will be difficult to achieve in a timely manner. As the USG and partner organizations work toward full compliance, steps can be taken to release all available data in the short-term. USAID should render public, the financial reports from primary contractors and grantees in Haiti. Since implementation of standardized reporting requirements is likely to take time, it would be very useful for USAID to simply release these documents and build the capacity needed to track grants and sub-grants, so as to provide some form of transparency in the interim.

\(^8\) See here for examples of the reporting from these agencies on operations in Haiti: http://www.aidview.net/activities?Country=HT
\(^9\) For more info, see http://www.bond.org.uk/pages/iati-resources.html
\(^9^0\) Clinton, “Keynote at the Opening Session.”
[3] Competitive Bidding and Building Local Capacity

The state may be able to re-establish its credibility by jump-starting service delivery in weak institutional environments through contracting out, while donors simultaneously invest in building state capacity for service delivery over the long-term. However, it is particularly important that donors recognize the time frame required for this transition to occur. Experience in other fragile states suggests that it will be over decades, not years.

Perhaps the strength of the NGO sector in providing services could be leveraged to the advantage of the Government of Haiti. New Public Management (NPM)-style contracts to provide services like transportation, health and school construction could help order the NGO landscape in Haiti through a competitive bidding process, while increasing service supply and efficiency. With careful design, they might also increase accountability between donors, NGOs and the Haitian government.

Contracting out—purchasing services from external sources instead of providing them through public entities—began in rich countries like the UK and New Zealand as a means to “promote cost-savings, efficiency, flexibility, and responsiveness in the delivery of services” through market-like competition.91 It has since spread to poorer countries. Notably, the World Bank found financial and efficiency gains for road maintenance, port management, and water supply services when these were contracted out to private firms in Brazil, Malaysia, and Guinea, respectively.92 Of course, there have been less successful attempts at contracting. Weak governments may lack the capacity to regulate, monitor, or evaluate contracts and run the risk of becoming over-dependent on non-state actors. Traditional channels of government-citizen contact are interrupted, and entrenched patronage system may lead to further corruption or rent-seeking behavior.93

Although Haiti lacks a robust private sector, market competition is possible since there are several thousand NGOs to compete for contracts. Donor funding for specific projects could be channeled through this model, and competition would help to eliminate the inefficient organizations. Contracts can be contingent on IATI compliance. This process can bring order to the proliferation of NGOs and create an enforcement mechanism for the policy recommendations discussed above.

Contracting private entities to provide basic services is not new in Haiti. Beginning in 1999, USAID hired a US-based consulting firm to contract directly with Haitian-based NGOs to provide basic health services, including immunizations, prenatal and maternal care.94 NGOs were reimbursed for services provided based on measured outcomes. The project was

94 OECD, “Contracting Out Government Functions.”
successful in increasing the rate of coverage, immunization and assisted birth.\textsuperscript{95} However, the project sidestepped the government, doing little to improve its future capacity to administer public health projects. Indeed, USAID’s stated goal was to improve the capacity of NGOs to deliver services.

A better example is the 1998 contract between the Haitian government and PSI (a US-based NGO active in Haiti) for the procurement and marketing of condoms, funded by the World Bank and supported by UNFPA. Although negotiations were lengthy—the Haitian government was wary of private provision and there were questions regarding procurement and costs—PSI reported that donor support and involvement was pivotal in ensuring the legitimacy and execution of the contract.\textsuperscript{96}

The perceived weaknesses, corruption, and lack of capacity within the Government of Haiti poses a key challenge, yet building the state is one of the most important role in reconstruction and long-term development in Haiti. A recent report entitled “Voice of the Voiceless” highlights that the main priorities of many Haitians is that they want their state to be a state.\textsuperscript{97} This approach may maintain the status-quo of service provision through NGOs. However, the Government of Haiti would take an active role, shifting the balance of power and creating a new source of accountability for the NGOs. There is the opportunity for capacity building within the government as well, if officials work closely with the private firm or NGO. Of course, such an approach may not be viable for certain sectors—market competition might translate better to construction firms than it does to providing a high quality education in schools. Contracting also requires clear, measurable deliverables, some of which (road construction) may be more feasible than others (school test scores), given Haiti’s lack of data and administrative problems.\textsuperscript{98}

There is no doubt that there are many questions to be resolved with contracting. For example, would the Haitian government or donors be responsible for soliciting and evaluating tenders? How could the Government of Haiti gain donor confidence to receive a greater share of funding? What concrete steps can be taken to develop and demonstrate successful action by the Government of Haiti, particularly where the donors are concerned? How should non-state actors work with and support government-led action? Nevertheless, piloting contracts for select services may be a worthwhile experiment.

\textsuperscript{95} Eichler & Levine, “Performance Incentives for Global Health.”  
\textsuperscript{96} Rosen, “Contracting for Reproductive Health Care.”  
\textsuperscript{97} “A Voice for the Voiceless.”  
\textsuperscript{98} In written comments, Meredy Throop of Partners in Health argues for a rights-based approach to service delivery in Haiti. She is skeptical of the scope for competitive bidding and says that rather than creating parallel service delivery systems that drain away resources from the private sector, Partners in Health and its local sister organization, Zanmi Lasante, have worked with the Ministry of Health to strengthen the public health infrastructure. She argues that a “collaborative approach is critical in the Haitian context where institutions remain weak and universal access to basic services is desperately needed.” (May 2012).
While beyond the scope of this paper, a larger question is how to shape broader policy given that the NGOs and private contractors are already providing many services. The answer might be for government and donors to have a stronger emphasis on core functions, in particular “core governance”: security, civil service, public financial management and corruption, core infrastructure, and legal and regulatory reforms. These are areas where NGOs cannot provide services, and are vital for any sustained recovery. Building (or rebuilding) in these areas will take time and various metrics can be used to chart progress. For example, the initial World Bank re-engagement program in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001, had a strong emphasis on core governance and infrastructure, and might serve as a model for donors and the Haitian government.

**Conclusion**

The dominance of international NGOs and private contractors in Haiti has created a parallel state more powerful than the government itself. These entities have built an alternative infrastructure for the provision of social services, but do not have much accountability to the Haitian government or people. In forthcoming papers, we will look at USG procurement policies in more detail and explore the scope for local procurement in Haiti. We will also carry out comparative research, looking at the cases of Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Aceh, to put the Haitian story in perspective.

There is not any particular evidence to support the view that simply abolishing NGOs and private contractors, or cutting off aid, will cause the population to seek a more accountable government. But it is clear that NGOs and private contractors need to be more effective and more accountable. They do need to improve cooperation with each other and with the Government of Haiti, and be held to common principles, in order to achieve better outcomes. Systematic and widely-accessible evaluations by NGOs and contractors, compliance with the International Aid Transparency Initiative, and increased use by the government of competitive bidding—may help to hold international organizations accountable and rebuild government capacity while maintaining the delivery of services to the people of Haiti.

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### Appendix 1: Disbursed Recovery Funding to the Government of Haiti (in Million USD unless otherwise noted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NY Pledges</th>
<th>Other Funding</th>
<th>Total Funding</th>
<th>% Budget support</th>
<th>Budget support (NY)</th>
<th>Budget support (Total)</th>
<th>% GOH (NY)</th>
<th>GOH (Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>114.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>114.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>14.87</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>14.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>240.50</td>
<td>112.40</td>
<td>352.80</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>14.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>9.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>187.80</td>
<td>117.20</td>
<td>305.10</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>69.49</td>
<td>112.89</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>73.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>175.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>175.60</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>50.92</td>
<td>50.92</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>49.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>360.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>360.50</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>86.52</td>
<td>86.52</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>93.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>138.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>138.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>106.80</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>106.80</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>77.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>76.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>76.50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>15.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>295.20</td>
<td>34.40</td>
<td>329.60</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>23.62</td>
<td>26.37</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>17.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>179.00</td>
<td>476.00</td>
<td>655.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>222.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>222.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>210.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>210.00</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>46.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,307.30</td>
<td>740.20</td>
<td>3,047.50</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>314.10</td>
<td>369.53</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>456.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        |             |                |               | 13.61%           | 12.13%              | 17.32%                 | 14.98%     |             |

The twelve countries listed are the top donors with individual profiles that detail recipients of disbursed funding. Authors’ calculations are based on recipient percentages from donor profiles available from the Office of the Special Envoy here: [http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/relief-and-recovery/international-assistance/](http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/relief-and-recovery/international-assistance/). This chart is missing flows from other smaller donors – approximately $193 Million. ($2.48 billion from NY pledges and $760.5 Million in other recovery funding have been disbursed for a total of $3.24 billion). All data is as of March 2012.

The Office of the Special Envoy’s Key Facts as of March 2012 presents these data: “Of the $2.48 Billion funding disbursed from the New York pledges, an estimated 21 percent has been disbursed to the government using its systems.” This total includes $337.2 million in budget support and an estimated $193.8 million in other funding that has used country systems. The report also lists that “$246.6 million (9.9 percent) in budget support directly to the Government of Haiti” and “196.9 million (7.9 percent) in loans and other financing to the Government of Haiti.” All of these totals, however, only reflect recovery funding from the New York Conference pledges and do not include other recovery funding.
## Appendix 2: Reports Included in Survey of NGO Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Title of Report</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context Merlin</td>
<td>Evaluation to assess Merlin’s Emergency Response in Haiti</td>
<td>Mar-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Case Study: Two-Way SMS Communication with Disaster Affected People in Haiti</td>
<td>Mar-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint (IFRC, UNHCR, UN Habitat)</td>
<td>Shelter Projects 2010</td>
<td>Feb-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAHO, WHO</td>
<td>Health Response to the Earthquake in Haiti - January 2010</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development and Peace</td>
<td>Development and Peace Haiti program: 2-Year progress report</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash Learning Partnership - Christian Aid</td>
<td>Unconditional Cash Transfers – Lessons Learnt, Humanitarian briefing paper January 2012</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
<td>Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti - 20 months after</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>OCG response to cholera in Haiti, October 2010 – March 2011</td>
<td>Dec-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ushahidi Haiti Project</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation of the Ushahidi Haiti Project</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InfoAid</td>
<td>Ann Kite Yo Pale: Let Them Speak - Best Practice and Lessons Learned in Communication with Disaster Affected Communities: Haiti 2010</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration’s Ongoing Activities on Support to the Flash Appeal for the Haiti Earthquake and Cholera Outbreak</td>
<td>Oct-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Title of Report</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>HelpAge (through UK Disaster Emergency Committee)</td>
<td>Evaluation of the AgeUK/DEC funded HelpAge project in Haiti Phase 1 and Phase 2.1</td>
<td>Oct-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office)</td>
<td>Real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti 2009 - 2011</td>
<td>Aug-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Haiti earthquake response: evaluation of Oxfam GB's DEC-funded programme</td>
<td>Jun-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>OCHA Evaluations Synthesis Report, 2010</td>
<td>May-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Environmental Programme</td>
<td>UNEP in Haiti: 2010 Year in Review</td>
<td>Apr-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster - Haiti 2010</td>
<td>Apr-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>CRS Haiti Real Time Evaluation of the 2010 Earthquake Response: Findings, Recommendations, and Suggested Follow Up</td>
<td>Mar-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disasters Emergency Committee</td>
<td>Urban disasters-lessons from Haiti: Study of member agencies' responses to the earthquake in Port au Prince, Haiti, January 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE, Int'l Planned Parenthood Federation, Save the Children</td>
<td>Priority Reproductive Health Activities in Haiti</td>
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<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
<td>Strenght in Numbers: A Review of NGO Coordination in the Field - Case Study: Haiti 2010</td>
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<td>DG ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office)</td>
<td>Beyond Emergency Relief In Haiti</td>
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<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Haiti: Despite massive aid response, significant needs remain one year after earthquake</td>
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<td>Plan</td>
<td>Plan Haiti: One Year After The Earthquake - Response and priorities for the future</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Title of Report</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Real–Time Evaluation Of The Humanitarian Response To The Earthquake In Haiti</td>
<td>Jan-11</td>
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<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Misguided Kindness: Making the right decisions for children in emergencies</td>
<td>Dec-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership</td>
<td>After Action Review of the HAP Roving Team Deployment to Haiti</td>
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<td>DARA International</td>
<td>DARA Humanitarian Response Index - Crisis Reports: Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE, Save the Children</td>
<td>An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>Nine months of action by Handicap International</td>
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<tr>
<td>Govt of Australia</td>
<td>Australian Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake of 12 January 2010</td>
<td>Sep-10</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>Audit Of Usaid's Cash-For-Work Activities In Haiti</td>
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<td>British Red Cross</td>
<td>British Red Cross - Mass Sanitation Module - 2010 Haiti Earthquake Response: Post Deployment Learning Evaluation</td>
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<td>Various</td>
<td>Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake</td>
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<td>World Economic Forum</td>
<td>Innovations in Corporate Global Citizenship: Responding to the Haiti Earthquake</td>
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<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
<td>Response To The Humanitarian Crisis In Haiti Following The 12 January 2010 Earthquake: Achievements, Challenges And Lessons To Be Learned</td>
<td>Jul-10</td>
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<td>United Nations in Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti: 6 months after...</td>
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<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>A Real- Time Evaluation of Christian Aid's Response to the Haiti Earthquake</td>
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<td>Tearfund</td>
<td>Real Time Evaluation of Tearfund's Haiti Earthquake Response</td>
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<td>Govt of France</td>
<td>Real-time evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010</td>
<td>Apr-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Title of Report</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>UN Children's Fund</td>
<td>Children of Haiti: Three Months After the Earthquake</td>
<td>Apr-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Govt of Norway</td>
<td>Norwegian humanitarian response to natural disasters: Case of Haiti Earthquake January 2010</td>
<td>Mar-10</td>
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Source: Reports pulled from ReliefWeb and the ALNAP Evaluative Reports Database
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Barder, Owen, Personal communication, May 1, 2012.


