Andrea Iro

The UN Peacebuilding Commission – Lessons from Sierra Leone
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Having studied at the University of Konstanz and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon, Andrea Iro graduated from the University of Potsdam with an MA in Political Science and Public Administration (Dipl. Verwaltungswissenschaft) specialising in international relations and development politics.

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Abstract

The following dissertation is an assessment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) by analysing their performance over the last two years in Sierra Leone, one of the first PBC focus countries. It explores the key question of how the PBC/PBF’s mandate has been translated into operational practice in the field. The paper analyses whether the new PBC/PBF peacebuilding architecture has fulfilled its mandate in Sierra Leone to: 1) increase political attention and strategic commitment; 2) improve the mobilisation and implementation of financial resources; 3) strengthen coordination and cooperation among key stakeholders. These three elements are regarded as key prerequisites in international peacebuilding where the aim is to consolidate peace in war-torn countries and prevent their relapse into conflict. On a theoretical level, the paper acknowledges that the creation of the new UN peacebuilding architecture is one of the most substantive institutional innovations which originated from the UN reform summit in 2005. Nevertheless, conceptual, procedural and political challenges were identified during the research which hamper the implementation of the PBC/PBF’s vision in Sierra Leone. The paper will conclude that though there are signs of progress, translating the general mandate into concrete activities remain a real challenge at the country level. Through exploring the PBC/PBF’s experience in Sierra Leone and identifying key challenges and lessons learnt from this first “institutional experiment” the dissertation aims at contributing to the PBC/PBF’s search for practical solutions in the field.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>DACO</td>
<td>Development Assistance Coordination Office of Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>CSM</td>
<td>Country-Specific Meeting</td>
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<td>CSPEC</td>
<td>Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Outcomes</td>
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<td>ERSG</td>
<td>Executive Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>IPBS</td>
<td>Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy</td>
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<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBFSC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSLAF</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIPSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peace</td>
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Acknowledgments

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Last but not least, my sincere gratitude goes above all to my loving family and friends who I can always rely on.

This dissertation is dedicated in particular to Sierra Leone – a fascinating country – but also to other post-war countries that might learn from Sierra Leone’s experience.
Introduction

Research Question

The overall question this paper will address is how the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) have performed during their initial intervention in Sierra Leone and consequently what impact have they had on that country’s recovery process since 2006.

To make the study more precise this question will be explored in greater detail with three different levels of analysis: conceptual, procedural and political. Therefore, some of the secondary questions the dissertation will answer are as follows:

Has the PBC strengthened international political and strategic commitment to Sierra Leone’s recovery process? And if so, how? (Conceptual level)

Have financial resources for peacebuilding activities been effectively implemented through the PBF? And if so, how? (Procedural level)

Have good coordination and communication between the Sierra Leone government and all relevant international and national stakeholders (donors + government + civil society + UN agencies) in the peacebuilding process been assured? And if so, how? (Political level)

As the following analysis will demonstrate, the different levels will affect each other and are clearly interlinked.

Aim

It is still too early to come to a final assessment of the PBC/PBF’s performance in Sierra Leone after only two years of involvement. Nevertheless, the overall aim of this study is to offer preliminary reflections on the PBC/PBF’s contribution in the field to Sierra Leone’s recovery process and to identify any associated conceptual, procedural and political constraints. A country impact assessment of the PBC/PBF in Sierra Leone is crucial, because as Biersteker (2007: 38) states “as with any new institution, performance on its first cases will prove critical for the PBC’s future development; it will set the precedents for the Commission.” The
PBC/PBF’s credibility is directly linked with its performance in the field and that will affect the UN’s overall standing in the wider peace and security arena. If the PBC/PBF does not want to become “just another forum for talking” (Biersteker, 2007: 38) within the UN system, it has to make a sensible positive impact. Its success will therefore depend on direct peacebuilding results experienced by the country and its people. By analysing the experience of Sierra Leone and reaching conclusions through a case study, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to making the work of the PBC/PBF more effective in future PBC focus countries.

Objectives

The dissertation’s objectives, by addressing the issues stated above, are:
– to develop a general understanding of the new institutional UN peacebuilding architecture;
– to provide information on Sierra Leone to contextualise the environment in which the PBC/PBF operates;
– to illustrate PBC/PBF activities undertaken and implemented in Sierra Leone on the basis of its mandate;
– to discuss successes, problems and challenges the PBC/PBF has experienced during the implementation process in Sierra Leone; to provide recommendations and identify lessons learnt which may help to improve further interventions in other PBC focus countries.

Structure

The structure of the dissertation is directly linked to the five objectives listed above.

Chapter 1 will give a brief overview of the context in which the PBC was created and answer questions concerning structures and procedures. Most importantly in view of the field analysis, the chapter will provide introductory remarks on conceptual and political dilemmas likely to influence the work in the field.

Chapter 2 will place strong emphasis on identifying the root causes of the conflict that will have to be addressed to achieve a peaceful future in Sierra Leone. To clarify the context in which the PBC/PBF operates, the political, economic and social conditions in Sierra Leone have to be briefly explored. By identifying peacebuilding challenges that still prevail today, the chapter will also give an answer to the question of why the PBC/PBF’s involvement in Sierra Leone is relevant and justified.
Chapters 3 and 4 will synthesise and link the previous two chapters by examining and assessing the PBC/PBF’s performance in Sierra Leone. Chapter 3 will give an overview of activities that it has managed to implement during its first two years of engagement. Chapter 4 will go beyond that by not only asking what has been done, but by analysing the conceptual, procedural and political problems of the PBC/PBF during the implementation process.

Chapter 5 will set out the conclusions reached by encapsulating the main findings of the research and offering, more importantly, recommendations for the way forward.

Research Methodology

As one of the first PBC focus countries, Sierra Leone is an excellent example of a case study for an overall research strategy. The research was conducted as part of a two months work placement with the United Nations PBC focal office and the PBF Support Secretariat in Sierra Leone which led to many research opportunities. Over those two months a good working rapport with colleagues and representatives of the international community in Sierra Leone was developed which led to discussion of PBC/PBF issues in both formal and informal contexts. Working with the PBC focal office and the PBF Support Secretariat on a daily basis gave profound first hand insight into the internal procedures, capacities and the practical realities of the PBC/PBF country team in Sierra Leone and allowed valuable scope for observation exercises. Furthermore, the placement offered excellent access to key stakeholders and documentation. In addition to a regular literature review of internal documents and reports, research was mainly conducted through a wide range of formal elite interviews with PBC/PBF stakeholders in Freetown including donors (DFID, European Commission), international non-governmental organisations (ActionAid, CAFOD), civil society organisations (Mano River Women’s Network for Peace, West Africa Network for Peace, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme), United Nations agencies (UNIOSIL, UNDP, UNICEF, PBSO) and state institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights Commission, Development Assistance Cooperation Office). There was also the opportunity to attend group discussions and meet with parliamentarians, representatives of civil society and beneficiaries during various workshops that were

1 Participation includes the workshop “PBF Project Review on the Human Rights Commission” (Freetown, 27 March 2008), the workshop on “Strengthening Civil Society Engagement with the
organised around PBC/PBF issues. Participation in meetings during the delegation visit of the Dutch UN Ambassador Frank Majoor, Chairman of the PBC Sierra Leone Country-Specific Configuration in New York, meant that a PBC headquarters perspective could be gained. The internal work combined with the described research methods finally led to:

- a better institutional understanding of the PBC/PBF;
- a better knowledge of the dynamics and relationships among the PBC/PBF country team, state officials, the civil society, donor institutions and UN headquarters representatives (stakeholder analysis);
- an internal perspective on future potential and practical challenges the PBC/PBF country team is facing in Sierra Leone;
- an enhanced understanding of the country context and the complex political, economic and social problems Sierra Leone is confronted with as a post-conflict country.

Scope and Limitations of the Research

As Chambers (1983) explains, field research is always confronted with limitations and constraints. This case study was challenged and biased in many ways which have led to compromise in the findings that must be taken account of.

Country Level Bias

One important limitation of the study is that political dynamics and processes inside the UN headquarters were widely neglected. Though knowledge of the headquarters’ perspective was gained through visits of UN representatives from New York in Freetown, the study mainly looks at the end of the chain at country level. Possibly, it overlooks the course of action of UN member states or the influence of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and other important actors in New York that might have a strong impact on the work in Sierra Leone. At this point it must be emphasised that the dissertation’s scope is limited to analysing the PBC/PBF’s practical contribution in the field in operational terms. The dissertation does not aim at formulating a policy paper on the PBC/PBF on a more abstract and strategic level.
Diplomatic and Professional Bias

The research findings could have been affected crucially by the UN country team in Sierra Leone. Expectations and a working rapport with the PBC/PBF country team on a daily basis could have influenced the neutrality and objectivity of the research. This risk was mitigated by interviewing various stakeholders outside the UN to get to know their perspectives and opinions on PBC/PBF matters. However, the interviewees’ reflections could have been influenced by the fact that they regarded the interviewer as a “representative” of the UN. The research was not confronted with many translation problems, nationality or gender issues, because mainly elite interviews within international organisations were conducted. However, these questions cannot be completely ignored when analysing research results.

Urban Bias

A major constraint limiting research findings results from an urban bias and the fact that the majority of stakeholder interviews were conducted with the “elite” in the capital Freetown. Nevertheless, in cooperation with the local Sierra Leone Red Cross Society an excursion to the Pujehun District was undertaken to visit Red Cross CAPS (Community Animation and Peacebuilding Support) communities and a Red Cross WARE (War Amputees Rehabilitation and Empowerment) project offering the possibility for further research and interviews with people in the countryside. The trip was particularly valuable in gaining a better understanding of the PBC/PBF awareness level outside Freetown in local communities.

Timing

As already emphasised, Sierra Leone has taken part in this “institutional experiment” as one of the first PBC focus countries. Still undergoing a process of self-discovery and institutional learning, it is too early to judge the PBC/PBF’s final impact after only two years of involvement. As Jenkins (2008: 1) correctly states: “Defining (and redefining) its role will remain an ongoing endeavour for the PBC.” However, it is particularly important to look carefully at these first steps, distil important lessons from the last two years of involvement in Sierra Leone and provide this new institution with appropriate directions for the future.
Finally, at this stage it has to be made clear that due to limits in scope, an in-depth theoretical analysis of the peacebuilding concept as such will not be an integral part of this paper.
1 Filling the Institutional Gap: The Creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission

Introduction

In order to understand the PBC’s pilot intervention in Sierra Leone, it is necessary to concentrate exclusively on the PBC’s institutional design first. In doing so, this chapter aims to lay the foundations for the following sections by developing a better general understanding of the context in which the PBC was set up and operates. Chapter 1 therefore examines the PBC’s origins, its rationale and mandate, and gives a brief overview of the PBC’s organisational structure and its modus operandi.

With the establishment of the PBC, further supportive structures, the PBF and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), were created. Together, they form the new UN peacebuilding architecture. Although built on different pillars that are institutionally independent, the three bodies jointly aim at addressing the shortfalls of the international community in post-conflict environments and interact continuously. As Jenkins (2008: 3) correctly mentions, the PBC is, strictly speaking, an autonomous intergovernmental body itself. Nevertheless, the name is widely applied to refer to all three elements, the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO. At this point it must be noted that for reasons of comprehension this paper will keep to the PBC at most times in the course of the paper.

Peacebuilding: Preventing a Relapse into Conflict?

The increasing number of international interventions in civil conflicts in the 1990s demonstrated that “ending war” and “building peace” are two different challenges (Call and Cousens, 2007). Failure to build a lasting peace, for instance in the cases of Liberia or Haiti, confirmed Collier’s (2004: 8) influential finding that “[a]round half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses. […] The risks of conflict relapse are very high during the first postconflict decade – typically around 50%.” In terms of statistics, Harland (2005) identified two time spans that are particularly critical in this respect. The first precarious period relates to the first six to twelve months after a peace treaty has been signed. Often parts of the population are still disposing of arms and
weapons in a country that exists in a legal and political vacuum. The second critical phase starts three years after a peace agreement, when the international community slowly shifts its political attention to another “hot spot”, and the local citizens become more and more disillusioned because their expectations regarding the peace dividend have not been met.

Peacebuilding, along with peacemaking and peacekeeping, became another important term in the UN vocabulary, and the international community shifted its focus to the question of how to sustain peace beyond the cessation of violent conflict (Call and Cousens, 2007: 1). First introduced by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) in his document *An Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding was defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Today, defining and conceptualising the term peacebuilding is one of the most difficult challenges academics and practitioners face. Having surveyed twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental institutions and their conceptualisation and operationalisation of the word peacebuilding, Barnet et al. (2007) clearly confirm the inflation and confusion of the term in their article *Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name*? Furthermore, according to Barnet et al. (2007: 44) the different interpretations of the peacebuilding concept result in great differences in approach and those priorities relating to it: “when the Bush administration thinks of peacebuilding it imagines building market-oriented democracies, while UNDP imagines creating economic development and strong civil societies committed to a culture of nonviolent dispute resolution.” As a result, while the international community agrees on the idea and importance of building peace, the different actors involved operate very differently according to their organisational mandates and worldviews. In this respect, Biersteker (2007: 37) describes peacebuilding as a “fundamentally value-laden project that entails core decisions about how to construct the ‘good society’ ”.

However, though a common understanding is missing, Call’s review of peacebuilding at the UN since the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* puts forward two points of clarification (Call, cited in Barnet et al., 2007: 37ff.). First, it is widely recognised that peacebuilding “involves the creation of a positive peace, the elimination of the root causes of conflict so that actors no longer have the motive to use violence to settle their differences.” Second, as a logical consequence peacebuilding can be regarded as conflict prevention because “the same technologies that are used to help build peace after war also can be used to help
societies avoid war in the first instance.” Furthermore, the crucial role of the state in the peacebuilding process is widely accepted, because “pursuing peacebuilding without an institutional foundation is a recipe for failure.” (Barnet et al., 2007: 37). The importance of statebuilding during the peacebuilding process was highly emphasized post-9/11. In this respect, the case of Afghanistan raised the awareness of the international community that so-called collapsed or fragile states do not only pose a development challenge but also a security risk, if state-free environments are used by terrorists as an operating base (Rotberg, 2002; Krasner and Pascual, 2005; Ottaway and Mair, 2004).

Deficiencies in International Peacebuilding

If peacebuilding wants to address the prevention of conflict relapse, there are certain questions that must be addressed. What are the reasons behind it? Why are countries caught in the so-called “conflict trap” (Collier, 2004: 2). And what can the international community do about it?

Growing recognition of the cost of failure of peacebuilding has provoked increasing reflection on the shortcomings the international community faces with these processes. The recurrence of war can be highly influenced by multiple, internal factors (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 43ff.). Down and Stedman (2002: 44) indicate, for instance, the absence of an inclusive peace agreement, the presence of spoilers, failed state institutions, a lack of trust, and natural resources that are at risk of looting. However, the following external factors can be considered as key problems for the international community when involved in post-conflict environments (Call and Cousens, 2007; Weinlich, 2006; Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004: 71ff.).

First, one of the major problems of international peacebuilding is the lack of sustained international political commitment. There is no “quick fix” to peacebuilding but as Call and Cousens (2007: 10) summarise what is widely accepted, the attention of the international community “is generally short-lived, crisis-driven, and prone to weaken when it is needed the most.” Second, peacebuilding, often regarded as a difficult grey area between peacekeeping and development activities, suffers from the slow and unpredictable mobilization of resources. Finally, another cluster of problems in post-conflict settings involves deficiencies in coordination and the lack of a shared vision and common strategic framework for peacebuilding activities. The latter
dilemma relates both to the interaction between the diverse political, financial and civil actors at the international, national, and local level as well as to that between headquarters and the respective field officers. Figure 1 sums up the problems of the international community in simple terms: political will, money, common peacebuilding strategies, and coordination are often lacking in peacebuilding processes: key elements for successful post-conflict recovery.

Figure 1: Deficiencies of the international community in peacebuilding
Source: Author (2008)

UN Response to Peacebuilding?

The United Nations as a key player in contributing to peace and security have shown great commitment in addressing the symptoms of conflict by “making” and “keeping” peace in the world in the last few years, experiencing successes and failures during its operations (Dobbins et al. 2005). Nevertheless, the organisation has been challenged by institutional inadequacies in sustained peacebuilding which aims to address the origins and root causes of the conflict. Within the UN architecture post-conflict activities do not come under the overall responsibility of the Security Council, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, or the Economic and Social Council. As Barakat (2005: 27) correctly points out:
“A number of UN agencies, already concerned to clarify their role in post-conflict, now recognise that post-war reconstruction required specialist attention and established units dedicated to post-war recovery. However, institutional jealousy led to intra-organisational competition rather than cooperation as each UN agency develops its own post-war competency. As a consequence the UN still lacks an integrated approach [emphasis added].”

In its report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (2004: 83) the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change finally suggested the setting-up of a Peacebuilding Commission and came to the conclusion that:

“There is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. That this was not included in the Charter of the United Nations is no surprise since the work of the United Nations in largely internal conflicts is fairly recent. But today, in an era when dozens of States are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.”

In his note to the General Assembly in December 2004, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004: 3) expressed his equal support. Finally, during the UN reform summit in October 2005, the Heads of States and Governments agreed on the establishment of the PBC. In this respect, the World Summit Outcome (2005: 21) precisely states:

“Emphasising the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Nations in that regard, we decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body.”

Peacebuilding Commission: Mandate, Structure and Modus Operandi

Security Resolution SC 1645(2005) and General Assembly Resolution A/60/180 determine the overall mandate and structure of the PBC more precisely. As an intergovernmental advisory body it aims
at filling the institutional gap within the UN system in the relief-to-development continuum by dedicating itself exclusively to countries recovering from war. To overcome the lack of political attention that many post-conflict countries are facing, the General Assembly Resolution (2005: 2) specifically assigns the PBC:

“(a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

(c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to postconflict recovery.”

The aim of keeping up political attention, increasing and broadening the donor base via advocacy in the medium and long-term, bringing together key stakeholders and suggesting peacebuilding strategies is practically realised through the work of the PBC Organisational Committee, the PBC’s Working Groups on Lessons Learnt and the PBC’s Country-Specific Configurations. The Organisational Committee consists of 31 members including:

- seven from the Security Council (including the five permanent members)
- seven from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
- five from the top 10 financial contributors to the UN budget
- five from the top 10 military contributors to UN missions
- seven additional members to balance geographical biases including countries with post-conflict experience elected by the General Assembly.

The Organisational Committee deals with organisational and procedural issues including rules of procedures and working methods. The PBC’s intention was to look at concrete peacebuilding situations in specific countries and therefore engages with so-called PBC post-conflict focus countries. Country-Specific Meetings (CSM) are
regularly held to discuss specific issues for the individual focus country under PBC consideration. In addition to the participants from the Organisational Committee, CSMs include representatives from neighbouring countries, regional organisations, financial and multilateral institutions, and civil society.

The task of the Working Group on Lessons Learnt is to identify and learn from instructive situations from previous international engagements in post-conflict settings for the future. Lessons learnt sessions have been held, for instance, on regional approaches to post-conflict recovery, post-conflict elections, frameworks for cooperation, and on gender and peacebuilding (Peacebuilding Commission, 2008a).

Requests to appear before the PBC can be made by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and by any of the member states themselves, preferably only from countries emerging from conflict where a peace accord and a certain level of security persists. The interests of the country appearing before the PBC are paramount and a PBC representation against the will of the respective government is improbable. As Assistant Secretary-General Carolyn McAskie, Head of the PBSO, describes it (McAskie, cited in Papenfuß, 2007): “The country has to wish to come. You cannot drag someone on.”

The resolution identifies as for the PBC’s work, the importance of ensuring national ownership of the peacebuilding process, close consultation with regional and sub-regional organisations, and the need to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities.

Besides, the General Assembly’s resolution confirms the support required to establish a peacebuilding fund that was finally established by the Secretary-General and launched in October 2006. Trying to improve the mobilisation of financial resources is another important pillar of the new UN peacebuilding architecture for better international involvement in post-conflict environments. As a multi-year fund targeting US$250 million, it aims at tackling immediate peacebuilding needs in post-conflict countries when other funding mechanisms might not yet be in place. As Assistant Secretary-General Carolyn McAskie (McAskie, cited in author unknown, 2007) states, it is “designed to provide initial seed money for peacebuilding, but is not designed to finance all peacebuilding requirements.” The PBF is meant to have a catalytic and short-term effect that can kick-start and prepare the ground for longer-term recovery and development activities. Importantly, the PBF assists PBC focus countries, but also other countries as designated by the Secretary-General (e.g. Liberia, Nepal).
To overcome the deficiencies in coordination and common peacebuilding frameworks, the third pillar in the new peacebuilding architecture that was mentioned in the resolutions is the PBSO. It is mandated to support the work of the PBC, the PBF and their focus-country activities but, as the PBSO (Peacebuilding Support Office, 2008) states, it also functions as a “knowledge centre for lessons learned and good practices on peacebuilding.” Figure 2 illustrates the new UN peacebuilding architecture:

**Figure 2: UN peacebuilding architecture**

*Source: Author (2008)*

**Conclusion**

With the new peacebuilding architecture in place, the UN aims to prevent countries from relapsing into conflict by strengthening political will, mobilising financial resources, and improving coordination and strategies in peacebuilding: elements previously analysed as key components for successful post-conflict recovery. The creation of the PBC was inspired by the UN’s “experience with the complex and interrelated challenges of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping
and post-conflict peacebuilding, reconciliation and development” (Biersteker, 2007: 37). Compared to other items on the UN reform agenda, the reform of the Security Council or internal management reforms, the PBC was welcomed as one of the most substantive and important institutional outcomes within the UN system in the light of the reform summit of 2005. As this chapter has demonstrated, conceptualising peacebuilding is a difficult task. Biersteker (2007: 42) sees in the lack of agreement among international actors one possible explanation as to why there was broad backing for the creation of the PBC, because theoretically “it means different things to different people.” Besides this, according to Biersteker (2007: 38), being one of the key results of the reform summit can also be regarded as an original challenge for the PBC as an institution because it is facing considerable political expectations. The challenges relating to peacebuilding that were pointed out in this chapter must be kept in mind when it comes to analysing the performance of the PBC in Sierra Leone in the following chapters.

After having set out the PBC’s general mandate and the context in which the PBC and its related mechanisms were established, the following chapter is dedicated to providing a brief background to Sierra Leone to better understand the environment in which the PBC started operating.
2 Introducing the Case: Context – Sierra Leone

Introduction

Before assessing the PBC’s experience in Sierra Leone, it is vital to obtain a deeper knowledge of the country to understand the reasons behind its engagement there. As stated earlier, preventing countries from relapsing into conflict can, to a considerable extent, only be successful by addressing the root causes of the conflict. Therefore, the following chapter will concentrate on identifying the key factors that led to the civil conflict in Sierra Leone and that have to be addressed by the international community and the PBC in the long-term to gain sustainable peace. Besides a conflict background, this chapter will highlight current challenges and problems that Sierra Leone is facing in its post-conflict recovery phase. The latter make the country still vulnerable to conflict and thereby justify the PBC’s engagement in Sierra Leone.

Conflict Background and Conflict Manifestation

As Keen (2005: 8) states, “[a]t independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was not a particularly likely candidate for civil war.” Rich in fruitful land and natural resources like diamonds, gold and iron, Sierra Leone was once considered “the Athens of West Africa” (Foray, 2000: 100). When Sierra Leone gained its independence in 1961, the British left behind a functioning court, parliament and local administration, and even a small but effective army (Foray, 2000: 100; Alie, 2000: 17). Furthermore, Alie (2005: 51) states that “[t]he conflict, unlike many intra-state wars in contemporary Africa, was not ethnically or religiously motivated nor was it a communal one.” Today however, after a decade of disastrous conflict, Sierra Leone ranks at the very bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index (2006) in position 176, followed only by Niger.2 The country’s conflict history symbolises what Robert Kaplan (1994) called the “Coming Anarchy”3 and puzzles many scholars as to how a country so rich in potential could slip into many years of conflict, destruction and human suffering.

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2 Sierra Leone also finds itself in the first half of the Failed State Index (2007) at position 23 (out of 177 countries).

3 According to Kaplan (1994: 46) “Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring in West Africa and much of the under-developed world: The withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”
The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted eleven years from March 1991 until January 2002. Though statistics vary, it is assumed that during the years of conflict about 200,000 people were killed and about two million people were displaced (Peacebuilding Commission, 2006: 2). 70,000 combatants including 7000 child soldiers were fighting during the years of conflict and millions of victims today are traumatised, homeless or orphaned.

The leading force during the years of devastation was a rebel army named the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by former corporal Foday Sankoh. Having backed Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front (NPFL) in overthrowing President Samuel Doe in Liberia, Sankoh and his rebels attacked the cities Bomaru and Sienga in the eastern Kailahun District from Liberia in 1991 (Laggah, et al., 1999: 184; Gberie, 2005: 59). Their aim was to topple the government and President Momoh of the All People’s Congress (APC) party. During the years of fighting the political history of Sierra Leone was marked by several state coups and peace agreements including the Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996 and the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 that were signed and then broken mainly due to a lack of political commitment (Berman and Labonte 2006: 147/160). The international community was highly involved in the country’s peacemaking efforts.4 Only after British troops moved in to bolster the UN peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and to control the RUF, was the way to another ceasefire paved in 2000. On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah officially declared the conflict to be over (Kaldor, 2006: 8).

The violence and atrocities perpetrated by the RUF, especially against civilians, was dreadful and labelled as the “new barbarism” (Pugh and Cooper, 2004: 18). Children were recruited, plied with drugs and alcohol and forced into combat and the killing of civilians (Kaldor, 2006: 6). The looting of villages, attacks on refugee camps, widespread amputation of limbs as well as rape took place around the country (Weissman, 2004: 55). In order to prevent citizens from voting, the RUF chopped off people’s hands and arms particularly during the 1996 elections.

“Women and children, old and young men; it made no difference. Hands and arms were hacked off by machetes, sending a message that others would lose their limbs if they used their hands to mark a ballot paper. [...] Remarkably, these amputations received virtually no international media attention, largely because they took place far away from the capital city.” (Hirsch, 2001: 45)

Pugh and Cooper (2004: 96) similarly conclude that for a long time the conflict in Sierra Leone was beyond international attention. The media generally was more interested in powerful images than in analysing the original causes of conflict. But as Foray (2000: 100) rightly states “[t]he war itself is not the root of the problem. It is merely the appalling symptom.”

The Causes of Conflict in Sierra Leone: Greed versus Grievance?

What factors can be identified that might explain long years of disastrous civil conflict in Sierra Leone? Finding accurate answers to this question is crucial because identifying the root causes of conflict impacts profoundly on future national and international intervention. However, there is no consensus on the causes of conflict in current discussions. Therefore, the following section will examine three factors within the grievance thesis: the nature of the state, the question of exclusion and marginalization and the regional context, and then continue analysing the relevance of the greed thesis.

War as a Result of State Failure?

As the literature on “state failure” suggests, “poor” and “bad” governance generate conflict (Rotberg, 2004; Reno, 2003; Jackson, 2006: 23). The lack of state legitimacy and institutional capacity leading to poor delivery of public goods like security and welfare are argued to be the driving causes of conflict.

After a “golden era” (Mansaray, 2000: 139) of democracy and good governance in 1961 with Sir Milton Margai as first Prime Minister, the politics of mismanagement started in 1964 when his brother Albert took over power (Hirsch, 2001: 28). He regarded the state as an instrument for personal power and this way of thinking prevailed in Sierra Leone and dominated the mind-set of the political elite until the outburst of conflict in 1991. Mansaray (2000: 139) argues that the armed conflict did not erupt “accidentally”, but “was generated by more than two
Figure 3: Map of Sierra Leone
decades of bad governance that led to the corruption and, finally, the total collapse of the Sierra Leonean State.” When Prime Minister Siaka Steven and his APC party came into power in 1967, “the country was dominated by a single-party dictatorship which created an environment of bad governance. They instituted a highly centralized, inefficient, and corrupt bureaucratic system of government, marginalizing the people and robbing them of their rights and freedoms.” (Alie, 2000: 18).

As a consequence of the power-concentration in Freetown, local administration became weak, rural communities were marginalised, judges were corrupt and education expenditures dropped. APC membership became an instrument to access resources and power (Alie, 2000: 19). As Hirsch (2001: 29) describes it: “He destroyed and corrupted every institution of the state.” The situation did not change fundamentally when General Momoh became President in 1985 leading Sierra Leone into bankruptcy and economic and educational collapse (Lancester, 2007: 3).

A particularly important role in Sierra Leone’s conflict history was played by the collapsing state security system. According to Squire (2000: 51) the national army was confronted with several key problems: it was politicized, corrupt and lacked equipment and training for the army. The weak security institutions could not prevent the RUF invasion and were incapable of regaining control over certain territories and powerless to defend citizens from atrocities.5 Furthermore, the line between official soldiers and rebel fighters became blurred over time giving rise to the term “sobels”: soldiers by day, rebels by night. Pretending to combat the RUF, the Sierra Leone army was often secretly working with the rebel group (Hirsch, 2001: 32; Gberie, 2005: 64). Continuing economic, social and political mismanagement, a fragile security apparatus and corrupt political elites resulted in the collapse of the state confirming that “poor” and “bad” governance might be crucial explanatory factors in the conflict in Sierra Leone.

War as a Result of Exclusion and Marginalisation?

The question of what made people, and youth in particular, take part in violence against other civilians is of particular importance in Sierra Leone. Turning to a more constructivist approach, social exclusion and marginalisation are examined as other possible determinants to explain the conflict (Jackson, 2006: 24; Keen 2005: 56ff.).

5 Reports of Human Rights Watch (1999) state that even ECOMOG that was sent to Sierra Leone was sometimes involved in human rights violations and the execution of rebel prisoners and civilians.
People’s disillusionment with state institutions and the political leadership provided a good breeding ground for violence. Poverty, a lack of education, unemployment and feelings of frustration and resentment were deeply ingrained in society, particularly within the rural population. The RUF pledge of socio-economic development, political integration and an end to corruption became attractive to ordinary people. Nevertheless, the question remains how the RUF could become so powerful while terrorising its citizens and using such violence against other civilians. In this respect, Keen (2005: 56ff.) draws attention to the psychological function of violence. The base of the RUF comprised urban marginalised, school drop-outs or young unemployed. Before the conflict these groups particularly felt “redundant, abused, or somehow ‘small’” (Keen, 2005: 56) and they were especially prone to RUF recruitment, because for such marginalised youths using violence was an instrument to change their status.

“Those who were poor and poorly regarded could become ‘big men’; and those who were ignored and forgotten could become front-page news. […] Some of the kids I spoke with during my field work kept telling me that handling a gun empowered them – it made them feel somebody.” (Keen, 2005: 56ff.)

Another important consideration is that the war created an environment in which law, values and moralities were perverted. Rebels punished those who refused to use violence and demonstrated great respect for those who were brutal (Keen, 2005: 76). Though the “psychological function of violence” must not be underestimated in explaining the atrocities, it is also widely known that the RUF enforced drugging to make civilians commit acts of violence (Human Rights Watch, 1999b). Nevertheless, deep and extreme feelings of marginalisation and exclusion, alongside the desire for respect and recognition, seem to be plausible variables that explain many of the atrocities in Sierra Leone.

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6 Though aiming at overthrowing the government, the RUF’s real political programme of government was never clear (Reno, 2003: 90f.; Gberie, 2005: 7/12). One document by the RUF often mentioned in the literature is the so called Footpath to Democracy in which the RUF states that “[w]e can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military adventurers...It is our right and duty to change the present political system in the name of national salvation and liberation...This task is the historical responsibility of every patriot...We must be prepared to struggle until the decadent, backward and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of history. We call for a national democratic revolution – involving the total mobilisation of all progressive forces. The secret behind the survival of the existing system is our lack of organisation. What we need then is organised challenge and resistance.” (Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone)
War as a Result of a “Bad Neighbourhood”?

Berman and Labonte (2006: 144) emphasise that, until 1991, the conflict in Sierra Leone was mainly internally driven due to oppression, mismanagement, and state coups. A regional dimension was gained when the RUF and its leader Sankoh invaded the country from Liberia. It is said that the RUF was supported by members of Taylor’s NPFL and mercenaries from Burkina Faso when they invaded the country (Gberie, 2005: 59). In this respect, Weissman (2004: 45) states that “[t]he Sierra Leonean conflict is generally presented as an off-shoot of the Liberian civil war.”

Taylor supported the RUF for different reasons. First, it has to be kept in mind that he had previously failed to overthrow the Liberian President Samuel Doe in 1989. The reason behind this failure originated from the fact that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had sent a peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to restore order in Liberia. For Taylor, the fact that Sierra Leone was used as a logistical base for ECOMOG and that it was contributing troops was regarded as a threat to his status. It had therefore to be weakened. Second, Taylor used the RUF as a proxy-force to fight other rival forces in the border area. The final reason for Taylor’s involvement in Sierra Leone was his interest in exploiting the diamond resources. In conclusion, both the structure of the invading force as well as Taylor’s motives illustrate the regional drive of the conflict in Sierra Leone (Pugh and Cooper, 2004: 94). The case of Sierra Leone illustrates that a “bad neighbour” contributed to a great extent to the outbreak and the sustainability of the conflict (Weissman, 2004: 45). As Keen puts it in a nutshell:

“In many ways, Sierra Leone may simply have been unlucky in its combination of proximity to Liberia and possession of very valuable – easily extractable resources – most notably in the form of alluvial diamonds.” (Keen, 2005: 8)

Greed Thesis: War as a Result of Economic Benefit?

Sierra Leone stands as an example for validating the link between armed conflict and the accessibility of easily lootable mineral resources like diamonds, gold or timber (Collier, 2000; Pugh and Cooper, 2004: 20). It illustrates that economic motives and the exploitation of resources can fuel and perpetuate conflict. In this respect Keen (2005: 50) argues
that, “[f]or many observers the word ‘diamonds’ eventually became a kind of one-word summary of the war.” For most people the war in Sierra Leone meant great suffering with devastating effects on their lives, but as Keen (2005: 297) points out there were people benefiting from the condition of war: mercenaries, arms and diamond traders and “sobels”. Securing mining areas also became a profitable business for private security firms like Executive Outcomes (EO).7

The so-called “blood-diamonds” strongly influenced the armed conflict in Sierra Leone in many ways. Diamond resources served as an attractive medium of exchange for arms. The RUF used diamonds in return for arms from government soldiers or neighbouring countries like Liberia or Guinea (Keen, 2005: 49ff.). Taylor exploited diamonds to fund his military activities in Liberia. Mercenaries from Liberia or Burkina Faso were equally active in mining and trading diamonds. The diamond mining industry became a convenient source of income for national soldiers collaborating with the RUF who were suffering from low state salaries (Montague, 2002: 233). Finally, the government forces themselves were selling diamonds to Guinean merchants in return for weapons (Campell, cited in Dobbins, 2005: 137). “Thus, what Liberia did for the RUF, Guinea did for government forces.” (Dobbins, 2005: 137).

Diamonds were not only used as a source to invest in arms, they were themselves turned into a source of violence. The Kono District and the Mano River Region which were rich in diamonds were hard-fought for by the RUF and brought great distress to the ordinary people. As Keen (2005: 51) describes: “One woman from Kono observed: ‘We don’t want the diamonds in Kono, because it has brought this suffering on our people.’”

Both factors created a vicious circle of violence: “Whilst some rebels were no doubt exploiting the local economy in order to fight, many soon took to fighting in order to exploit the local economy.” (Keen, 2005: 51). In conclusion, though the conflict in Sierra Leone was not all about greed and diamonds, it is certainly an important explanation which helps to comprehend the extension of the war in Sierra Leone.

Having found different explanations for the causes of conflict ranging from greed to grievance, Sierra Leone demonstrates that multiple factors including weak state institutions and social exclusion,

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7 In 1995 the government apparently paid EO $1.8 million a month including diamond mining concession (Hirsch, 2001: 38) and Montague (2002: 233f) emphasizes that EO left great parts of the population unaccompanied, because it had “little interest in providing humanitarian services outside of financially lucrative areas.”
combined with economic greed and bad neighbourhoods, created the conditions for conflict in Sierra Leone. Each of them is only one part of the explanation for the conflict. Together however, they can fruitfully contribute to the various social, economic, political and regional aspects leading to a comprehensive understanding of the conflict as figure 4 illustrates:

![Figure 4: Overview of conflict-contributing factors in Sierra Leone](source: Author (2008))

After the Conflict: Building a Lasting Peace?

The complex history of conflict in Sierra Leone meant that reconstructing the country after the guns became silent was an extremely difficult challenge for internal and external actors. Reconstruction “had to deal with much more than just physical infrastructure”. (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007: 9). It included the resettling of thousands of displaced people, the integration of soldiers and ex-combatants into society, the reconciliation of communities, the strengthening of local civil society structures and the creation and transformation of state institutions. Local government structures in the rural areas were greatly weakened and over decades malfunctioning institutions had created
unaccountable and nontransparent working procedures within the state. The cutback of endemic corruption became a primary objective in the reconstruction process (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007: 22). In addition to the physical, economic and political challenges of the country, the “social fabric” of Sierra Leone society was torn and trust in the state had to be re-built. In the immediate post-conflict period, the reconstruction process was internationally driven concentrating on establishing security. With UNAMSIL a 17,500 strong peacekeeping force was deployed till December 2005 that created the necessary conditions for stability. Among other fully involved actors such as the World Bank and DFID, UNAMSIL provided important support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 75,000 ex-combatants, security sector reform and the conduction of elections (Albrecht and Malan, 2006: 36f.). A smaller UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) finally replaced UNAMSIL leaving more responsibility for the reconstruction process to the country.

As the Sierra Leone Priority Plan for the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (2007: 1) states, the country has made significant progress. Since the end of the conflict, national elections in 2002 and local elections in 2004 have been held. The presidential and parliamentary elections in August 2007 led to a peaceful change of government. APC leader Ernest Bai Koroma became the new President of the country replacing former Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) President Amad Tejan Kabbah. State authority, the security situation and the provision of basic public services have been improved. The DDR plan was implemented and the national police and the Republic of Sierra Leone
Armed Forces (RSLAF) gained strength to maintain national security. Though being one of the poorest countries in the world the country’s growth rate was estimated at 6.8 % in 2007 (CIA-Factbook, 2008). A number of national strategies for peace were formulated: Vision 2025, the Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Peace Consolidating Strategy and the UN Development Assistance Framework (Peacebuilding Commission, 2006: 3ff.). Since the end of the war, several democratic institutions were also put in place including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the National Electoral Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Human Rights Commission aiming at promoting national reconciliation and human rights. But as Jabbi and Kpaka (2007: 24) correctly emphasise the gap between “institutional hardware and software: having the institutions set up is one thing; getting these institutions to impact public behaviour in a sustainable way is another issue altogether.”

Some social indicators show that Sierra Leone still finds itself in a very difficult situation. With a median age of about 17.5 years, life expectancy at birth is about 40 years. The literacy rate stands at around 35%, and 70% of the population still live below the poverty line (CIA-Factbook, 2008). Sierra Leone has the highest child mortality rate in the world. Regardless of the improvements, the Conference Room Paper for the PBC Country-Specific Meeting on Sierra Leone (Peacebuilding Commission, 2006) explains clearly that the country is still facing massive problems that threaten its future. In many respects, the stability of Sierra Leone depends on future political, economic and social developments in close-by countries such as Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau or Côte d’Ivoire and is strongly linked with the stability of the whole region (Peacebuilding Commission, 2006: 15ff.). Many of the other identified root causes, widespread corruption, marginalization and disempowerment of the rural population and youth, the lack of economic opportunities, unemployment and inadequate state capacity, are still not fully resolved.

The conference paper (Peacebuilding Commission, 2006: 11) emphasises that “economic growth has not been translated into improvements in the living conditions of the poor majority.” More improvements in key infrastructures, roads and electricity, and important economic sectors, agriculture and mineral mining, are needed for Sierra Leone’s economic revival. Due to the continued mismanagement of the state’s natural resources and the lack of domestic revenue collection, the state is still facing a high degree of dependency on
external revenues with a high level of debt. The poor quality of public services delivery in education, health and the infrastructure does not meet public expectations and challenges the standing of the government. Former combatants and a large percentage of the youth need more employment opportunities. “What we are offering them at the moment is reintegration into poverty.” (cited in Albrecht and Malan, 2006: 14). Furthermore, local districts lack the capacity, bureaucratic structures, and financial and human resources and this threatens improvements in decentralisation measures. Poor living conditions and low state salaries create a fertile breeding ground for demoralised staff and stimulate corruption: for example in the Sierra Leone Police and RSLAF which still lack professionalism. Financial funds for salaries, equipment and capacity-building activities are unavailable for security institutions. Furthermore, the security services have to make a “change of mentality”, as Albrecht and Malan (2006: 19) call it; the “transformation from heavily politicized, unaccountable organizations focused exclusively on the security needs of the state and its rulers, to professional, transparent institutions addressing the much broader agenda of ‘human security’”. Besides the positive steps of setting up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Human Rights Commission, the judiciary particularly needs further improvement in efficiency and professionalism. Struggling with a lack of capacity, transparency and accountability, not only access to, but also the quality of, the justice system has to be improved and the numbers of backlog cases reduced.

As has been illustrated, the post-conflict phase in Sierra Leone is expected to bring about reform and to complete transformation processes in the economic, political and security sectors. Peacebuilding is not only about reconstructing what existed before the conflict, but transforming some of the structures identified as the root causes of the conflict (Albrecht and Malan, 2006: 20). Corruption is one crucial factor why progress in the different sectors is hampered. “The extent of corruption in every sector is nearly impossible to assess.” (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007: 22). Developed by Transparency International the Corruption Perception Index in 2007 ranks Sierra Leone at position 150 out of 179 countries (Corruption Perception Index, 2007). According to Transparency International, it remains a difficult challenge in the peacebuilding process to transform public state institutions that were originally not based on merit but on patronage. It will take time, resources and technical support. Furthermore, Albrecht and Malan (2006: 21ff) make the point that in the long run, “change
can only be brought about by Sierra Leoneans themselves” and will also include an “attitudinal change”. In this respect, institution building as a key element in Sierra Leone’s reconstruction process must not “get lost in the technical detail”, but be aware of cultural factors that support or hamper peacebuilding processes. Albrecht and Malan conclude (2006: 143) that: “Building state institutions is significant. However, it is equally important not to construct paper tigers.”

Conclusion

Although progress in Sierra Leone has been made since the end of the war, many of the root causes of the conflict still persist making it a candidate for the PBC. The study of Sierra Leone has confirmed that:

“[c]omplex political conflicts do not have a single cause. Conflict, as a multi-causal phenomenon, demands a comprehensive analytical framework that reviews a wide range of conflict-contributing factors.” (Mac Ginty, 2006: 85).

Increased efforts particularly in the sectors of youth employment and empowerment, good governance, capacity building, and justice and security are needed to overcome the causes of conflict. Identifying conflict causes is one thing, but finding ways to address them is a more difficult problem to solve. There is no single cause of conflict and therefore there is no single measure that guarantees sustainable peace and development. The complexity and inter-weaving of the different conflict causes make peacebuilding in Sierra Leone a long and highly complex endeavour requiring holistic and comprehensive approaches. To make real economic and social change happen, it will need a long time and the steady and orchestrated financial and technical support of the international community as well as the political will and commitment of the government and the people of Sierra Leone. The PBC could be the institutional vehicle necessary to move this process further along. In 2006 the PBC therefore decided to put Sierra Leone on its agenda to give it additional support in this difficult process.

Having set out the country situation in which the PBC began operating, the following chapter will synthesise the previous two by asking how the PBC has translated its mandate, outlined in chapter 1, into concrete action in Sierra Leone.
3 Getting Involved: The Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone

Introduction

This chapter will examine the PBC’s engagement in Sierra Leone and its relevance to the country since 2006. After studying the theoretical peacebuilding architecture and the country context, it will explore how the PBC performed practically in the field. The chapter will draw particular attention to the question of how the PBC strengthened international political and strategic engagement in Sierra Leone and how the PBF marshalled and implemented financial resources. The aim of this section is to provide a chronology of the major outcomes of the PBC/PBF engagement as a basis for further analysis in chapter four.

The Performance of the Peacebuilding Commission

Sierra Leone, with Burundi, became one of the first PBC focus countries in June 2006 having originally expressed its interest in a letter in February 2006 (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, 2006). It stated that after having hosted “the largest UN peace keeping force in the world” and “the most successful United Nations peace keeping operation in recent times”, the government requested

“that the Peace Building Commission consider selecting Sierra Leone among its first country-specific operations. […] In spite of the remarkable progress in transition from war to durable peace and sustainable development, numerous formidable challenges remain in the way of the recovery process, for which we need the support of the Peace Building Commission.”

After referral from the Security Council in June 2006, the PBC held its first formal CSM in October 2006 and, as figure 6 demonstrates, has met with many other formal and informal bodies since.

8 In addition to Sierra Leone and Burundi, Guinea-Bissau was put on the PBC agenda in December 2007; the Central African Republic followed as a further PBC focus country in June 2008 (General Assembly, 2008a; General Assembly/Security Council, 2008).
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>19 Jul.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting on both Sierra Leone and Burundi</td>
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<td>12 Oct.</td>
<td>Formal country-specific meeting</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>8 Feb.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting on the Peacebuilding Commission's six-month workplan for Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>20 Feb.</td>
<td>Working Group on Lessons Learned meeting with a focus on the upcoming Sierra Leone elections</td>
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<td>28 Feb.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific thematic discussion on justice sector reform and development</td>
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<td>19 - 25 Mar.</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission delegation field mission to Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>27 Mar.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting: debriefing from the field mission</td>
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<td>9 May</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting: first discussion of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>21 May</td>
<td>Informal country-specific thematic discussion on youth employment and empowerment</td>
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<td>Formal country-specific meeting to discuss the draft Sierra Leone Framework</td>
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<td>Informal country-specific meeting to discuss the preparations for the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections</td>
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<td>Informal country-specific meeting to review the Sierra Leone elections</td>
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<td>Informal country-specific meeting to prepare for the CSM Chair's visit to Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>8 - 12 Oct.</td>
<td>CSM Chair's Visit to Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Informal country-specific meeting: discussion on the draft Framework</td>
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<td>Informal country-specific meeting on the Energy Sector Development</td>
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<td>12 Dec.</td>
<td>Formal country-specific meeting to adopt the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>14 Feb.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting on the implementation of the Framework: local council elections and energy sector development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Mar.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting on the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 25 Apr.</td>
<td>CSM Chair's visit to Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 Apr.</td>
<td>Informal country-specific meeting: debriefing on mission to Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>High-Level Stakeholders Consultation on Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 - 7 June</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission delegation field mission to Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 June</td>
<td>Biannual Review of the Cooperation Framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Chronology of PBC engagement with Sierra Leone
Source: Peacebuilding Commission (2008b), amended by author
With a view to formulating a future Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) as a framework for cooperation between Sierra Leone and the PBC, a six-month workplan was set out in January 2007 for each of the three major phases (Peacebuilding Commission Implementation Plan, 2007).

During the first phase (June – December 2006), the PBC, with the Sierra Leone government and other stakeholders, concentrated on identifying peacebuilding priority areas while CSM participants agreed on the following key areas for peacebuilding activities (Country-Specific Meeting, 2006):

- youth empowerment and employment;
- consolidation of democracy and good governance;
- justice and security sector reform;
- capacity building.

Efforts in these areas were considered to be critical to avoid a relapse into conflict. In order to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace, the PBC analysis clearly related to some of the most important root causes of the conflict that have been identified in chapter 2 and that still remain largely unaddressed in the country today.

Based on the named priority areas, the development of an IPBS began during the second phase (January – June 2007) when the government, with the support of the UN and in consultation with relevant stakeholders in the country, worked on a first draft. This was discussed during several consultations and meetings in New York and Freetown. Since the PBC’s engagement with Sierra Leone, delegations from New York visited the country regularly to gain first-hand information about progress and challenges in the peace consolidation process. During these field missions, the delegations directly engaged with the Sierra Leone government and other relevant stakeholders in the field. In Freetown representatives of the Sierra Leone government, donor institutions, UN agencies and members of civil society took part in wide-ranging and flexible video teleconferences with New York. As the exemplary list of participants of an informal CSM focusing on the IPBS in May 2007 illustrates below, a wide variety of stakeholders participated in these discussions. A first draft of the IPBS was finally discussed during a formal CSM in June 2007 (Country-Specific Meeting, 2007b).
I. Government
Hon. Momodu Koroma, Minister, Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation
Hon. Umaru B. Wurie, Ambassador at Large, Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation
Hon. Dr. Mohamed L. Kamara, Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation
Mr. Sahr E. Johnny, Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation
Mr. Paul A.S. Minnah, Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation

II. International Partners
Ms. McIntosh, British High Commission
Mr. Robert Collett, British High Commission
Mr. Hans Allden, European Commission Delegation, Sierra Leone
H.E. Mr. Cheng Wenju, Ambassador, China
Mr. Cheng Yan, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Mokowa Blay Aou-Gyamfi, Ghana High Commission
H.E. Mr. Dembom Badjie, Gambia High Commission
H.E. El Sayed Nabil, Egyptian Embassy
Mr. Martin Schwarz, German Embassy
Ms. Grainne O’Neil, Irish Aid,
Ms. Susie Pratt, US Embassy
Ms. Christine Shecker, USAID
Mr. Engilbert Gudmundsson, World Bank

III. Civil Society
Ms. Nana Pratt, Mano River Women’s Network for Peace (MARWOPNET)
Ms. Harrite Turay, 50/50
Mr. Mohamed Kamara, AMB Development NGO
Mr. Edward Jambala, West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP)
Mr. Tennyson Williams, Action Aid International Sierra Leone
Ms. Emma Kamara, Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee (CSPEC)

IV. United Nations
Mr. Fioner C Kaikai, UNFPA
Ms. Felicity Zawaira, WHO
Mr. Gebremedhin Haggos, Chief, Peace and Governance Section, UNIOSIL
Mr. Nega Berhanemeskel, UNIOSIL
Mr. Rudolpho Landeros, UNIOSIL
Mr. Benedict Sannoh, UNIOSIL
Mr. Israel Jigba, UNIOSIL
Ms. Harnik Deol, UNIOSIL
Ms. Maria Kantamigu, UNIOSIL
Mr. Frederik Brock, UNIOSIL
Mr. Rui Flores, UNIOSIL

Figure 7: List of participants, informal Country-Specific Meeting (9 May 2007)
Source: Country-Specific Meeting (2007a)
In the third phase (June 2007 – today) the workplan was followed by the review, monitoring the continued implementation of the IPBS. However, due to the presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone in August 2007 and a change of government, it was only in December 2007 when the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, shortened to the Compact, was finally adopted (Compact, 2007). During discussions with the new government, it strongly advocated the incorporation of energy as another focus area. In addition to the four peacebuilding priorities, the energy sector was eventually included in the final version resulting in lively debates among stakeholders that will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter (Country-Specific Meeting, 2007c).9

The overall aim of the Compact is threefold: first, it clearly defines the mutual responsibilities and commitments of the Sierra Leone government and the PBC in the identified peacebuilding priority areas in the medium-term. As a political framework it guides the work of the government and the PBC by the principles of national ownership, mutual accountability and sustained engagement. Second, the Compact should be used as a tool to mobilize additional financial resources in the different priority areas. Third, it serves as an instrument of engagement to keep international attention and to enhance relations between the government and the international community by highlighting key peacebuilding challenges (Peacebuilding Commission Annual Report, 2008: 8; Peacebuilding Commission, 2007: 7; Compact 2007). According to the Compact, the PBC will support Sierra Leone for a period of three years and views its engagement with the country over the medium term. Continued engagement between the PBC and Sierra Leone will be jointly reviewed in 2010 (Compact, 2007: 11). The Compact (2007: 3) stresses that it is “a flexible document which can be modified jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission in response to developments in the peace consolidation process”. It is open to reshaping and subject to amendments depending on the realities and results on the ground. In relation to other existing frameworks, the Compact should not be considered as a document that replaces commitments in other existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements. In fact, it should be seen as a document that underpins existing frameworks.

In a broader context, it has to be kept in mind that the formulation of the Compact was not imposed by the international community, but was created in common by the government, international partners,

9 A complete version of the Compact can be found in the annex.
civil society organisations and the UN. In this respect, the process of defining the Compact was as important as the end product. The formal and informal CSMs, including specific thematic discussions, created many opportunities to integrate a variety of different actors from New York and Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone civil society organisations convened several national consultation meetings on the PBC. Workshops for civil society organisations were, among others, organised by the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP) and the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET), in July 2006 and January 2007 (WANEP, 2006: 2; WANEP/MARWOPNET, 2007). As an example of the broad integration of different stakeholders, among the thirty participants at the meeting in July 2006 members from the government, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Special Court of Sierra Leone, UNIOSIL and other international agencies were represented. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (University of Cape Town) invited civil society members to discuss their points of view on the PBC in Johannesburg in October 2006 (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2006). In December 2006, it additionally arranged a wider civil society consultation in Freetown (CSPEC, 2007: 2). In December 2007, Sierra Leone civil society organisations finally established an association called the Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee (CSPEC) (CSPEC, 2007: 2) “to present a united front and enable civil society in Sierra Leone to speak with one voice to ensure that the populace benefit from the PBC’s work.” Regular meetings with representatives of civil society were also on the agenda during mission visits of the PBC and the CSM Chair in Sierra Leone (Report on Civil Society Meeting 2007; CSPEC, 2008).

After having successfully adopted the Compact in December 2007, the PBC’s action plan for 2008 (January – June 2008) focused on three goals: first to generate support for the implementation of the agreed obligations in the Compact; second to broaden the donor base and initiate new partnerships in Sierra Leone; and third to activate or up-scale existing peacebuilding efforts in the priority areas (Peacebuilding Commission Implementation Plan, 2008; Peacebuilding Commission Annual Report, 2008: 8). In order to mobilise resources and to strengthen advocacy, the CSM Chair of Sierra Leone, UN ambassador Frank Majoor, made great efforts and visited many capitals including Washington, London, Brussels, Berlin and The Hague to meet with representatives of member states, the European Commission, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, the Commonwealth Business Council, the
Commonwealth Secretariat and the High Commissioner of Sierra Leone to the UK (Country-Specific Meeting, 2008b:1). Furthermore, the Compact was forwarded to relevant stakeholders through a joint letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone and the Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands to raise awareness about the Compact and to gather political and financial backing for its implementation. In May 2008, the advocacy and resource mobilization efforts gained vital momentum and led to the High-Level Stakeholders Consultation in New York (Peacebuilding Commission Annual Report, 2008: 9; General Assembly, 2008b). Representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, senior representatives of member states, the United Nations, the private sector, civil society representatives and private foundations came together to discuss the challenges and benefits of partnership and new ways for mobilising and handling resources, for instance through pooled funding or sector-wide approaches. A number of stakeholders promised to continue or increase their assistance to Sierra Leone according to the principles of the Compact. In this respect, Japan, Sweden, Norway, India, Bangladesh, the World Bank, the European Community, the International Parliamentary Union and the UN stand, among others, as examples which have expressed their commitment to such a promise (Peacebuilding Commission Progress Report, 2008: 9; Peacebuilding Commission, 2008d:1).

As well as the Compact, the PBC’s engagement in Sierra Leone focused on support for the national elections in 2007. A meeting with the Working Group on Lessons Learnt and several CSMs was exclusively dedicated to this critical subject in order to discuss progress and monitor election developments. In the informal CSM in July 2007, participants agreed that

“the upcoming elections represent a critical milestone for peace and democracy consolidation in Sierra Leone. As the second post-conflict elections, they will test the maturity of state institutions and the democratic process.” (Country-Specific Meeting, 2007d:1).

During the formal CSM in June 2007, the participants adopted the Chair’s Declaration on the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone, which was transmitted to the General Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC (Peacebuilding Commission Declaration, 2007). In general,

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10 The declaration appealed to the political parties and the media “to remain committed to the Political Parties Code of Conduct and the Media Code of Conduct.” It also emphasised the importance of the participation of women and youth in the elections, as voters as well as candidates. It finally
the CSMs were considered to have provided a useful platform for all relevant national and international actors to exchange their views on the election process and to show sustained commitment during this critical time (Peacebuilding Commission Annual Report, 2008: 7). In view of the upcoming local council elections in July 2008, the CSM particularly focused on this vital issue in the first half of its work in 2008. The CSM in February led to appeals to contribute to the UNDP Basket Fund for the local council elections to overcome the funding gap of $13 million (Country-Specific Meeting, 2008a). During the CSM in March, it was finally announced that the funding gap had been successfully addressed thanks to CSM members and other contributors such as the UK, EU, Japan, Ireland or Norway (Country-Specific Meeting, 2008b:4; Peacebuilding Commission Progress Report 2008: 11).

The Sierra Leone government and the PBC have begun the first monitoring of the commitments required by and expressed in the Compact. The Biannual Review of the Framework Implementation was held in June 2008 to examine progress and challenges encountered by all stakeholders in the implementation process. According to the first PBC progress report, the Sierra Leone government together with its partners “has made significant progress in implementing several commitments contained in the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework” over the last six months (Peacebuilding Commission Progress Report, 2008: 5). More specifically, the report highlights progress in the fields of anti-corruption, good governance, preparation for the local council elections, the energy sector and in the areas of justice and security sector reform. Challenges and stronger national endeavours still remain with respect to the priority areas youth empowerment and capacity-building. Furthermore, the economic situation in Sierra Leone still remains delicate. The report states clearly that the current global food crisis and rising oil prices have become an additional burden for the Sierra Leone government in the last few months. Agricultural development and food security are therefore seen as the government’s top priorities at the moment. Concerning the ongoing review process of existing aid coordination structures by the new government, the report (2008: 12) stresses that the Sierra Leone government urgently needs to communicate new aid coordination mechanisms to the respective actors.

In view of the PBC’s performance, the report (2008: 8ff.) comes to the conclusion that it has made progress in fulfilling its obligations of

stated that the PBC country configuration would remain committed to closely monitor the election developments in Sierra Leone and that it would provide advice to the Security Council and other stakeholders, as requested.
strengthening engagement with Sierra Leone, stimulating financial and technical assistance, and enhancing dialogue between the government and international partners. The PBC has been engaged with the Sierra Leone government and was greatly involved in advocacy efforts and resource mobilization. Twenty-one CSM members are actively engaged in Sierra Leone. Through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, they support mainly the priority areas of good governance, justice and security reform and the energy sector. CSM member countries like Sweden, Norway, Germany or Japan have been increasing their assistance to Sierra Leone during the PBC’s work. Additional financial resources and technical assistance could be produced for the local council elections and the energy emergency plan (Peacebuilding Commission Progress Report, 2008: 21). By December 2008, the PBC aims at supporting equally the operationalization of the Capacity Building Fund and the Youth Basket Fund. With respect to the priority area youth empowerment, the report states that the PBC aims at supporting the establishment of a National Youth Commission and adjustments to the National Youth Policy. To make any future action of international partners more coherent, the PBC expressed its willingness to provide assistance to the government to develop and prepare a National Aid Policy. The PBC has been engaged with regional actors like the Mano River Union Secretariat since its engagement in Sierra Leone and aims at promoting greater cooperation with ECOWAS and regional member states in the future. The CSM Chair intends to meet with ECOWAS and the Special Representative of the EU Presidency for the Mano River Union to consider such cooperation in line with the Compact by December 2008 (Peacebuilding Commission Progress Report, 2008: 22). Besides a stronger engagement in the areas of youth empowerment, capacity building and regional cooperation, the first biannual review of the Compact, among others, finally recommends the PBC (Peacebuilding Commission, 2008c:2f.):

- to support the secretariat responsible for PBC coordination in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to guarantee governmental leadership in the PBC process;
- to help the government in mitigating the consequences of the rising food and oil prices by increasing efforts in developing the agricultural and private sector;
- to remain involved in promoting better coordination of bi- and multilateral assistance frameworks;
- to further strengthen advocacy so that additional partners get involved in Sierra Leone.
Reflecting on the PBC’s overall performance since 2006, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon finally came to the conclusion that,

“[t]he Peacebuilding Commission has already demonstrated its value by accompanying Sierra Leone through successful national elections and the democratic transition process and by broadening its donor base and enhancing Government and donor partnerships.” (Ban, 2008).

The Performance of the Peacebuilding Fund

As an integral part of the new peacebuilding architecture, the PBF assists the PBC in Sierra Leone. An understanding of the interplay between these two peacebuilding pillars is vital (Peacebuilding Fund, 2007: 5). The PBC plays a pivotal role, because it activates the PBF allocation process and possibly influences the strategic emphasis of PBF resources. Accordingly, the PBC formally declared Sierra Leone as eligible to receive PBF assistance during its CSM in October 2006 (Country-Specific Meeting, 2006: 2). In March 2007, the Secretary-General finally offered Sierra Leone a Peacebuilding Fund country envelope of $35 million. In line with the interim focus areas of the PBC in 2006, the PBF Sierra Leone Priority Plan (2007: 1) identified the following as its key priorities for funding:
– youth empowerment and employment;
– democracy and good governance;
– justice and security;
– capacity building of public administration.

The Sierra Leone Priority Plan (2007: 2) more precisely states that it will effectively contribute to these identified areas by “realizing immediate and quick impacts that will help bring visible and tangible peace dividends to the population.” Concerning the relationship between the PBC and PBF, as the financing tool in Sierra Leone, the PBF ideally complements and supports the broader strategic peacebuilding agenda of the PBC by initiating critical peacebuilding interventions.

The PBF terms of reference (Peacebuilding Fund, 2006: 6) for the technical level of project implementation state that once the PBF country envelope for funding is approved, “the review and approval of project activities will be conducted at the country level in a process co-managed by the respective special representative of the Secretary-General and the Government authorities concerned.” Accordingly, the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee (PBFSC) was
established. As the decision-making body, its overall task is to oversee and coordinate PBF project activities at the country level. It reviews and approves PBF project proposals and decides on the PBF allocation (Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee, 2007: 1). The PBFSC is also responsible for making sure that PBC decisions are reflected in PBF financed projects. Besides the two co-chairs, the membership of the PBFSC includes a multitude of different stakeholders, namely:

- two representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone;
- two representatives of the donors (DFID, European Commission);
- two representatives of the UN Country Team;
- two representatives from the civil society (MARWOPNET, WANEP);
- one representative from the World Bank Country Office.

As the PBFSC terms of reference state, the PBFSC should meet once a month and other relevant stakeholders can join the meetings as observers. The PBFSC is supported in its action by the Peacebuilding Fund Support Secretariat and the Technical Committee. The PBF Support Secretariat is obliged to facilitate the work of the PBFSC and the Technical Committee provides technical advice on project proposals. Figure 8 summarises the working procedures of the PBF in Sierra Leone (Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee, 2007).

Regarding the status of project implementation, the PBFSC has gradually approved seven projects in line with the Sierra Leone Priority Plan since May 2007. Together with the national authorities and UNIOSIL all seven were executed by UNDP. Of the allocated $35 million, approximately $16 million were committed and $8 million were disbursed up to April 2008 (UNDP, 2008: 2f.). About $19 million are still in the project pipeline.

Three of the PBF projects in particular supported Sierra Leone at a critical time during the national and presidential elections in August 2007. These could be completed and were generally much appreciated (UNDP, 2008: 2; Peacebuilding Fund Support Secretariat, 2008b:1). During interviews with different stakeholders, it was widely acknowledged that the projects enabled national authorities to maintain stability and order during the election process. More precisely, the project supporting the National Electoral Commission aimed at addressing a funding gap. It contributed to the recruitment and payment of salaries of over 37,000 polling staff and strengthened the National Electoral Commission in its ability to provide the required logistical preparations for the elections (UNDP, 2008: 8).
Figure 8: PBF working procedures in Sierra Leone
Source: Author (2008)

Figure 9: Polling staff during Election Day (11 August 2007)
Source: UNDP (2008)
Because of the forthcoming elections, the project Emergency Support to the Security Sector aimed at filling gaps in critical funding for the security forces such as RSLAF and the Sierra Leone police. To increase their operational competence and morale, the project’s goal was to improve the working and living conditions of the security forces and to address gaps in key logistic requirements. More specifically, the project provided the security forces with fuels and lubricants, medical and diet rations, stationery and uniforms (UNDP, 2008: 6; Peacebuilding Fund Support Secretariat, 2008b:1ff.).

The project specifically supporting the Sierra Leone police was intended to strengthen the police’s public order management capacity particularly during the election phase. The project provided the police with modern equipment and continuous training. The Operational Support Division and the Crowd Control Units, which are responsible for the management of demonstrations and gatherings, were supplied with riot gear. In addition to the provision of necessary equipment, the project’s objective was to strengthen the morale and professionalism of the Sierra Leone police (Peacebuilding Fund Support Secretariat, 2008b:7; UNDP, 2008: 7).
Though there was no project specifically dedicated to the priority area Capacity Building of Public Administration, the PBF projects supporting the Human Rights Commission and the Judiciary are focusing on strengthening the national capacity of these state institutions (UNDP, 2008: 9f.; Peacebuilding Fund Support Secretariat, 2008b:1ff./15ff.). The projects were confronted with initial implementation difficulties, but made progress over time. The project Capacity Development of the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone generally aspires to promote the respect and protection of human rights by giving the Commission the capability to function as a monitoring and advocacy body to redress human rights abuses. To make the Commission functional in its operations and build up its capacity, it was provided with office space, furniture and other office equipment. Furthermore, members of staff have been recruited and trained in order to develop management and human resources capacity. A five-year Strategic Action Plan for the Commission is now in the process of being finalised and about 70 cases touching on human rights violations have been handled by the Commission so far. The project Capacity Development to the Justice System to Prevent Delays in Trials and to Clear Backlog of Cases seeks to strengthen public trust in the delivery of justice by increasing the capacity of the magistrates and High Courts. The country struggles to deal with the backlog of criminal and civil cases resulting, amongst other things, in overcrowded prisons in Sierra Leone. The PBF project therefore supports the established Backlog Courts through the provision of necessary logistical equipment, training programmes and the recruitment of additional qualified staff. So far, 401 backlog cases out of 700 have been cleared.
One of the PBF projects that faced obvious implementation problems was the project Rehabilitation of the Water and Sanitation Facilities for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Barracks in Freetown (UNDP, 2008: 11; Peacebuilding Commission Support Secretariat, 2008a:4). The project’s aim is to improve the living conditions of RSLAF staff, including their families, in three of the most crowded barracks in Freetown (Wilberforce, Murray Town and Goodriche). Through a safe supply of drinking water and the provision of adequate and improved sanitary, medical and health facilities in the barracks, the project aims at indirectly strengthening the stability and operational capacity of RSLAF. The tendering for the rehabilitated Community Health Centres or Medical Inspection Rooms should be completed and education on hygiene is continuing successfully. Nevertheless, the project faced implementation difficulties partly due to a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, difficulties with procedural arrangements of tendering, contracts and other regulatory frameworks.

The last PBF project, the Youth Enterprise Development Project, was struggling greatly after its approval by the PBFSC in May 2007 (Peacebuilding Commission Support Secretariat, 2008b:2/13f.; UNDP, 2008: 3). In March 2008 none of the allocated $4 million had been spent. Originally, the project aimed at stimulating the creation of youth enterprises, providing micro-credit services and strengthening skills development and training for young people employed in the formal and informal sector. Implementation obstacles that created bottlenecks were partly caused by institutional and operational factors such as capacity gaps, a misunderstanding of the Youth Employment Secretariat on UNDP procurement procedures, missing data and a lack of clarity of delivery mechanisms for the project. Generally, it was believed that the PBF projects were right in time, because they supported the country in the establishment of a peaceful election environment. However, the implementation of other PBF projects such as the youth project was suffering greatly from the highly politicised election environment. It was thought to be at risk of being politically driven by the government during the election campaign. Interviewees mentioned that people were conscious of the fact that PBF projects could be politically used by the ruling SLPP to win further electoral backing. The fact that the Vice President co-chaired the PBFSC and was simultaneously a presidential candidate at that time could support this argument (Mollet, et al., 2007: 13). As a result, UNDP and donors agreed on protecting it from being used for political ends which led to further complications and delays. After the elections, the restructuring of the Ministry of
Education by the new government additionally affected the implementation procedures of the PBF youth project (UNDP, 2008: 5).

The implementation obstacles PBF projects faced can be summarised as follows: the highly politicised environment, inconsistent frameworks and rules of procedure, the lack of institutional capacity and coordination problems, together with the government demand for direct cash flows and the worries of donors relating to the accountability and transparency of the projects (UNDP, 2008: 3f.). The government generally was dissatisfied with the slow disbursement of PBF funds and eventually suspended its work with the PBFSC in July 2007. This situation led to a stand-still of the PBF decision-making body at the country level. According to the terms of reference the PBFSC should meet once a month and a PBF project should ideally be implemented within a year, but this was not put into practice. The capacity of the PBFSC to act was additionally paralyzed, because after the change of government it took some time for the new administration to settle in, define its future priorities and structures, and to become familiar with the procedures of the PBC/PBF. A first informal PBFSC meeting was only held in April 2008.

Figure 12 gives an overview of the status of PBF project implementation in March 2008. As the table clearly indicates, most of the PBF projects, five out of seven, focused on the priority area Justice and Security. Three of these five projects in particular supported the conduct of the elections in 2007. The priority areas Democracy and Good Governance, and Youth Empowerment and Employment covered one project each. Though there was no project specifically dedicated to the priority area Capacity Building of Public Administration, the project supporting the Human Rights Commission and the Judiciary focused on strengthening the national capacity. At the same time, there are still about $19 million in the PBF project pipeline.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Area</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Approved Projects</th>
<th>Funds Committed (US$)</th>
<th>Funds Disbursed (US$)</th>
<th>% of Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice and Security</strong></td>
<td><strong>Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL)</strong></td>
<td>1,522,055.70</td>
<td>1,522,055.70</td>
<td>584,775.00</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sierra Leone Police (SLP)</strong></td>
<td>1,042,564.91</td>
<td>1,042,564.91</td>
<td>958,053.93</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Judiciary - Office of the Chief Justice</strong></td>
<td>3,959,772.54</td>
<td>3,959,772.54</td>
<td>1,132,414.80</td>
<td>28.60</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Support to the Armed Forces</strong></td>
<td>1,955,706.00</td>
<td>1,955,706.00</td>
<td>6,078.80</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Support to the security sector</strong></td>
<td>1,822,823.94</td>
<td>1,822,823.94</td>
<td>1,788,453.54</td>
<td>98.11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>10,302,923.09</td>
<td>10,302,923.09</td>
<td>4,469,776.07</td>
<td>43.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Empowerment &amp; Employment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ministry of Youth and Sports (MYS) - Youth Empowerment &amp; Employment</strong></td>
<td>4,080,906.92</td>
<td>4,080,906.92</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>4,080,906.92</td>
<td>4,080,906.92</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy and Good Governance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support to the electoral process - NEC</strong></td>
<td>1,598,727.36</td>
<td>1,598,727.36</td>
<td>1,531,946.00</td>
<td>95.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>1,598,727.36</td>
<td>1,598,727.36</td>
<td>1,531,946.00</td>
<td>95.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>15,982,557.37</td>
<td>15,982,557.37</td>
<td>6,001,722.07</td>
<td>37.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12: PBF project implementation (status: 17 March 2008)  
Source: Peacebuilding Fund (2008b)
Despite the problems discussed, by the time of writing, it seems that the PBF slowly got back on track. The informal PBFSC meeting in April was a first step to create a trusting relationship between the PBF stakeholders and the new government in the future. Furthermore, the PBFSC and the PBF Support Secretariat are currently in the process of undertaking a close review of PBF structures and procedural mechanisms. Pipeline projects were reviewed for forwarding to the Technical Committees. During discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a representative emphasized that the new government treated the PBF very seriously and that it, together with the other members of the PBFSC, would remain committed to improving policies and strategies for speedy PBF project implementation. Some interviewees welcomed the decision of H.E. the President to co-chair the PBFSC himself. This step was regarded as a hopeful sign for stronger governmental commitment and a more powerful PBF in the future.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to outline some of the major developments since the PBC and the PBF started their involvement in Sierra Leone in 2006. As the chapter has illustrated, the PBC was successful in its goal of developing strategies for peacebuilding that aim at strengthening the engagement with the international community in the mid-term. In Sierra Leone, the Compact is now one of the main instruments of political engagement and collaboration between the international community and the government. Having formulated crucial commitments in pivotal peacebuilding areas like youth development and capacity building, the government, the international community and the PBC are now in the process of implementing and putting into practice the mutual agreements. According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Ban, 2008) the Compact stands for an “unprecedented and an innovative engagement instrument” and if implemented, “the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework can mark the difference between a Sierra Leone burdened by persistent threats to its peace and stability, and a Sierra Leone that has the opportunity to successfully consolidate peace.”

The CSM chair made great efforts to realise the PBC’s stated mandate of bringing together relevant peacebuilding actors and sustaining international attention through its advocacy work. In very different configurations, meetings between financial institutions, civil society, the UN and governmental institutions took place in Sierra Leone and
in New York. These meetings, together with the many PBC mission visits to Sierra Leone, offered much room for discussion on different thematic peacebuilding issues and also stimulated the increasing financial support of several countries. The PBC was active during a critical phase in Sierra Leone’s history. The peaceful elections in 2007 were considered a milestone for further peace consolidation in the country. In this respect, the PBF supported the country at an important time as its contributions to the security and justice sector were highly appreciated by several stakeholders in the country. Nevertheless, the PBF was severely challenged by the need for speedy implementation of the financial resources available. With half of the $35 million still waiting for disbursement to address remaining peacebuilding challenges, it is obvious that several problems occurred during the PBF implementation phase. Consequently, the PBF could not fully realise its mandate to effect a quick and immediate impact in critical peacebuilding areas in order “to bring visible and tangible peace dividends to the population” (Sierra Leone Priority Plan, 2007: 1).

Though the country seems to be peaceful and stable, the Peacebuilding Commission Mission Report (2008: 2) of June 2008 states that “this is a critical time for peace consolidation in Sierra Leone.” The population is confronted with very high unemployment rates, a lack of basic health and educational services and food shortages. The recent global food crises and the rising oil prices are additional challenges for Sierra Leone and its government. In this situation, the PBC/PBF can play a crucial role in the country. Therefore, it is important to have a closer look at the challenges and problems the PBC/PBF is facing in one of its first PBC focus countries in order to draw lessons for further interventions. Having set out their activities undertaken in Sierra Leone, the following chapter will analyse further some of the PBC/PBF conceptual, procedural and political challenges that these two new institutions have experienced in Sierra Leone.
4 Making it Happen?
Analysis of the Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone

Introduction

As new institutions within the UN system, the PBC and the PBF find themselves undergoing a process of institutional learning. They still face several challenges when it comes to the question of how to translate their general mandate into concrete activities on the ground. Therefore, identifying practical obstacles in Sierra Leone is an important exercise in improving future interventions. The ongoing “institutional experiment” in Sierra Leone provides valuable food for thought about the PBC/PBF’s way forward. In order to conduct a more detailed analysis of the PBC/PBF’s working procedures in the field, three different levels were identified during the research process. In the course of the analysis, conceptual, procedural and political challenges that seemed to hamper the PBC/PBF’s performance in Sierra Leone will be examined – bearing in mind that the different levels of analysis are clearly interlinked.

Conceptual Challenges

Since coming into being, the PBC has faced the challenge that “[t]he resolutions that created the Peacebuilding Commission, like most UN resolutions, contain ambiguities and compromise language. There is no definition of peacebuilding itself” (Biersteker, 2007: 42). On a theoretical or conceptual level, the lack of an agreed definition triggers the “simple” question of the practical meaning of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. In the field, it looks as if there is no clear consensus about the term. Stakeholders on the ground often related peacebuilding to activities after the immediate end of conflict including measures like DDR, the resettlement of refugees, reconciliation and the holding of elections. In contrast to this “narrow” definition, the PBC states several times that peacebuilding is about addressing the deeper root causes of conflict and finding long term solutions in the areas of youth development, justice, good governance and capacity building. However, the latter and broader definition raised the justified question among experts involved in the development sector in Sierra Leone of whether peacebuilding has become just a new label for development. Or as one interviewee put it: “There is
the risk that in the end everything becomes peacebuilding.”

In the case of Sierra Leone, the energy sector stands as an example which illustrates the lack of consensus among stakeholders about the definition of peacebuilding. When it came to the process of selecting peacebuilding priority areas, the new government, which came into office in 2007, insisted on adding the focus area energy into the Compact. Among stakeholders, the disputable question of whether the energy sector constitutes a peacebuilding priority activity remains. Critics were afraid that by putting increasingly more focus areas on the peacebuilding agenda “everything and nothing becomes a priority.” Besides, there was the anxiety that the energy sector could overburden the peacebuilding agenda and could easily be prone to politicisation, opponents also stated the concern that PBF money might be spent and implemented at the expense of other important focus areas such as youth development. The latter argument may be confirmed in the future. The PBF allocated almost $9 million for a future PBF pipeline project in the energy sector. One critic ironically put it this way: “The PBF tries to build peace by bringing light to the people of Freetown.”

With regard to selecting and prioritising the “right” peacebuilding activities, interviewees were finally of the opinion that some other “more important” peacebuilding issues like reconciliation, reparation or food security should have been given more attention on the PBC/PBF’s agenda. As one interviewee expressed it: “Now we have light, but we are still hungry.”

However, with only seven percent of the population having access to electricity, CSM participants underlined in an informal thematic discussion on the Sierra Leone energy sector development in November 2007 that efforts in that sector could support all other priority areas as an “overarching issue” and could have an equally positively impact on employment, public revenue generation and poverty reduction (Country-Specific Meeting, 2007:2). An improvement in the energy sector was regarded as an important peace dividend for the people of Sierra Leone and it was argued that by adding energy into the Compact, national ownership, flexibility of the Compact and adaptability to environmental changes were demonstrated.

Overall, the initial lack of a conceptual consensus on the term “peacebuilding” not only led to difficulties when it came to the question of how to operationalise, select and prioritise peacebuilding activities at the country level, but raised other critical conceptual questions concerning the timing and sustainability of peacebuilding. Though the needs in Sierra Leone are enormous and the majority clearly appreciates the
PBC/PBF’s involvement in the country, several informants expressed doubts whether Sierra Leone was the right country to be selected originally by the PBC. Keeping in mind that the conflict had ended in 2002, DFID, for example, categorises Sierra Leone not as a “classic” post-conflict country any longer, but as a country in an early development phase – “although the lines between the two phases are somewhat blurred” (Mollet, et al., 2007: 12).

The fact that the PBC started its engagement six years after the conflict had a crucial impact on the PBC’s work. Sierra Leone was not a strategic “tabula rasa” when the PBC became involved in the country in 2006. As a result, the formulated Compact became “only” one document among others that would have to tie in with existing strategies. Some interviewees regarded the Compact positively as an important additional tool and a good document which put further pressure on the Sierra Leone government and the international community to keep up political commitment. However, informants also stressed the risk of follow-up problems including the establishment of parallel strategic structures, strategy fatigue and greater confusion among stakeholders. The question that remains on the ground is where is the real “added value” of this new framework when other development strategies are already in place (e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Vision 2025, Peace Consolidation Strategy or the UN Development Assistance Framework). Concerning the Compact, one informant said, “Not bad, but no new ideas. Every pupil could agree on the key areas.” Some critics stated that they would have welcomed a stronger commitment to implementing existing development frameworks instead of creating new ones.

With regard to the PBF, its “catalytic” peacebuilding effect was disputed keeping in mind that the conflict in Sierra Leone ended six years ago. Interviewees were also critical of the one year time span for PBF projects. Particularly in the fields of youth development and capacity building, areas where “quick impacts” are not likely and long-term solutions are needed, doubts were raised whether one year was realistic and whether the PBF could contribute to a significant change. Instead, fears were expressed that the PBF short-term project approach might threaten achievements in sector-wide development programme approaches. The review by Slotin and Bruce (2008: 13) concludes that:

“[t]he focus on developing PBF projects fostered an operational approach that treated the question of peacebuilding on a short-term, project-by-project basis at the expense of analyzing the overarching strategic priorities and political risks to peace.”

Another issue, which was raised by different sides, was the question of how the PBF with its short-term and catalytic rationale could guarantee sustainability and follow-up support. The PBF project supporting the Human Rights Commission can be cited as an example that illustrates the vital importance of readily available post-PBF funding. In the case of the Human Rights Commission, office space, equipment, vehicles, and staff were made available through PBF support. Nevertheless, the project was confronted with enormous problems when follow-up funding that was promised by the government counterpart was not made available. As a result, though the PBF provided the Human Rights Commission with vehicles and generators, they could not be used because follow-up funding for fuel and maintenance was missing. Furthermore, the Commission encountered problems, because no money was available for competitive staff salaries in the long term.

A broader question for future discussion is what will happen after the $35 million from the PBF have been spent? According to Mollet, et al. (2007: 13), besides the fact that the PBC aims at activating financial resources and broadening the donor base “[a] clear link between
PBF funding and the long-term plan is missing.” This could have severe consequences, for example, in the youth sector, because a lack of funding in youth employment schemes could trigger further dissatisfaction and disturbance within the young Sierra Leone population. In this respect Mollet, et al. (2007: 13) point out that “PBF funds must not simply postpone the problem.”

The chronological order of allocation of PBF money and preparation of the political framework for commitment in Sierra Leone, the Compact, caused another timing problem. In a nutshell, the question was what should come first: strategy or money? Due to the fact that the allocation of PBF money was decided before the Compact was developed, informants stated that, at the beginning, the government tended to over-emphasise the PBF and concentrated on the $35 million PBF envelope instead of participating in a broader political peacebuilding dialogue. As a result:

“[m]uch of the conversation around the PBC in Sierra Leone became about how to divide up this sudden new injection of money […], rather than promoting political change or re-energising the commitment of the government and its partners around a common agenda” (Mollet, et al., 2007: 14).

The research of Mollet et al. concluded that the problem in Sierra Leone was that the Compact was ‘a lot of analysis with no money’ and the PBF was ‘a lot of money with no analysis.’ During the research process the general impression on the ground was that an understanding was absent as to which criteria the $35 million was based on. To stakeholders on the ground it looked as if the extra money was “suddenly” available and had to be implemented disregarding a result-oriented or needs-based approach. Controversially, the base for the amount of PBF money for Sierra Leone was also discussed. In relation to Sierra Leone’s annual official development assistance of $344 million, the PBF money of about $16 million, which has been committed so far, appears to some observers as “peanuts” (Roth, 2008: 18).

Finally, as has been demonstrated on a conceptual level, the general lack of a clear definition of peacebuilding has had great implications for the PBC/PBF’s work in the field. It will clearly impact on decisions about future PBC focus countries and PBC/PBF activities in the long run and, for Sierra Leone, prompted searching follow-up questions particularly relating to the prioritization of PBC/PBF peacebuilding activities and questions touching on PBC/PBF timing and sustainability.
Procedural Challenges

An important statement of Biersteker’s (2007: 40) is that “most peacebuilding strategies fail not because of their content, but because of deficiencies in their process.” On the procedural level, capacity issues were expressed on all fronts in Sierra Leone making it difficult to realise the PBC/PBF’s mandate in the field.

The PBSO does not have a permanent presence in Sierra Leone, but currently one staff member is permanently responsible for PBC issues in the country. However, the UNIOSIL PBC focal point was absent for three months due to a staff medical emergency. Interviewees underlined the need for more staff as well as more representative PBC interlocutors on the ground, senior P4/P5 positions, who could better engage with representatives on a higher political level. The PBC’s work was additionally burdened by the fact that within the Sierra Leone government a strong formal focal point was not formally established (Country-Specific Meeting, 2008c:5). As a result of these weak institutional structures, preparations for CSM meetings are at risk and in the future this could affect the speedy and dedicated implementation of the Compact.

Among stakeholders, the fact that half of the PBF money has not yet been disbursed raised great concern about the performance of the PBF, its capacity and efficiency. Besides the implementation problems already discussed, the poor delivery of the PBF projects seems to have originated from the lack of capacity in the PBF Support Secretariat. The Secretariat was not fully staffed and equipped while the research was being conducted and an official vehicle and a driver were still missing. The
Head of the PBF Support Secretariat, the national Programme Officer, has yet to be recruited. With one national Programme Assistant and one national Administrative Assistant currently employed there, some interviewees regarded the Secretariat as understaffed. The fact that the members of the PBF Support Secretariat are officially employed by UNDP but work under the overall guidance of the UNIOSIL Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG) could contribute to additional confusion among stakeholders and unclear status for the PBF Support Secretariat. Furthermore, the establishment and staffing of the PBF Support Secretariat started at a late stage, beginning in May 2007. As a result of this, the Development Assistance Coordination Office of Sierra Leone (DACO) initially undertook the organisation of the technical working group meetings in order to start the technical review of PBF project proposals.

In general, during the research process the impression was gained that, rather than creating new posts and new institutional arrangements that dealt exclusively with the upcoming PBC/PBF tasks, an attempt was made to integrate PBC/PBF activities within old existing structures. In this respect, Slotin and Bruce (2008: 18) rightly state that “ [...] UNIOSIL staff[s] that have been tasked to liaise with the PBSO and country-level actors have been doing a tremendous job to support the PBC process, but they too have full-time jobs.”

UNDP Sierra Leone, currently the only implementing partner for PBF projects, has come in for criticism from various sides. Though UNDP took seven additional PBF projects on board, the organisation was slow in recruiting extra staff for the increasing workload. Criticism of stakeholders also touched on UNDP’s vast bureaucratic structures. During workshops, beneficiaries stated that UNDP procedures and guidelines for project implementation were too complex and difficult to follow. Representatives of the Human Rights Commission, for example, stressed that as a new institution it was not familiar with UNDP guidelines, rules and regulations concerning disbursement mechanisms or UNDP procurement procedures. Because of the concerns of the Human Rights Commission, better guidance and enhanced communication and information-sharing would have been desirable from the beginning which would have avoided delays in procurement and the setting-up of the infrastructure for the Human Rights Commission.

During the phase of designing PBF projects, informants identified capacity problems on the side of the government and its ministries when formulating and handing-in suitable project proposals. The
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request for quick approval and implementation of PBF projects led to a “first come – first served” situation in which the level of participation of government counterparts unfortunately did not seem too prominent. In general, some projects were described as “rushed through” without having accurate log-frames and indicators, or benchmarks and clear monitoring frameworks.

Representatives from the civil society articulated the problem that local NGOs, especially outside Freetown, lacked the capacity to become more strongly engaged in monitoring and evaluating PBC/PBF activities. They called for stronger financial and technical support in this respect and pointed out that more help was needed in disseminating PBC/PBF information to the grassroots level and local communities in the countryside. Unfortunately, informants also stated that CISPEC had encountered problems in reporting back and meeting regularly, not least because the work of the PBFSC came to a standstill. On a practical level, representatives from civil society stressed that they were occasionally informed about PBC/PBF meetings at the last minute so that it became difficult for umbrella organisations to consult with the different members of civil society organisations.

Due to the lack of institutional capacity of the various organisations in Sierra Leone, the PBC/PBF encountered other procedural challenges in the field: communication, coordination and information problems. This issue not only related to the relevant stakeholders in the field but also to the relationship between UN headquarters and the UN country office.
“The process to date [...] has placed a large burden on actors in the field, particularly the government, ERSGs [...] and UNIOSIL staff, rather than empowered them to drive a more strategic and coordinated approach. This relationship must be reversed so that the PBC in New York serves field-level efforts to achieve sustainable peacebuilding results rather than create an extra burden” (Slotin and Bruce, 2008: 25).

The feeling of “being managed” by UN headquarters was expressed in Sierra Leone at times. An occasional criticism was that the UN country office was too little involved, for instance, in the preparation of meetings, in the setting up of agendas and in the writing of reports. As a result, it was stated that some PBC CSM turned into diplomatic gatherings without tackling the technical problems on the ground. Though PBC missions are highly appreciated and are regarded with the utmost importance because they enhance communication and coordination with UN headquarters and stakeholders on the ground, it was pointed out that these week-long visits could not replace a strong permanent field presence in the country which would profit from the advantage of local expertise.

Functioning communication channels at a high diplomatic and political level or between UN headquarters and Sierra Leone are important. However, the smooth working of communication procedures at a technical level in the country must not be underestimated. Operational procedures, for instance, for project submissions have to be explained, responsibilities among the different bodies have to be clearly defined and contact details of respective experts have to be made available. The confusion about the PBC/PBF among stakeholders, the over-emphasis of the PBF at the beginning, the slow disbursement of PBF money, and the lack of clarity on PBF policies, responsibilities and procedures in particular could be traced back to deficiencies in communication and information sharing. The lack of a clear and extensive information and communication strategy integrating all important stakeholders at the beginning of the PBC/PBF’s involvement missed the opportunity to raise wide-ranging PBC/PBF awareness among stakeholders and the population, in particular outside Freetown. Furthermore, it also missed the opportunity to clarify what the PBC/PBF is, what it does and how it does it.

As a consequence, in order to increase knowledge of PBC/PBF structures and procedures, to improve management arrangements and to raise the level of public and stakeholder awareness, the PBF has
formulated a communication strategy (Peacebuilding Fund Communication Strategy, 2008). Although it could be argued that this occurred at far too late a stage, the PBF communication strategy foresees, amongst other things, designing information leaflets, schematic implementation handbooks for partners, and bi-monthly status and impact reports. While this research was being conducted, preparations were ongoing to organise a key awareness-raising workshop. Together with all relevant stakeholders, within the country and from New York, its main purpose will be to explain and review PBC/PBF structures and procedures.

To sum up, it can be argued that “managing” the PBC/PBF process on the ground was partially underestimated and followed by a “learning by doing” approach. In Sierra Leone there was no clear initial strategy on how to prepare the first PBC focus country with the necessary capacity and structures in the field for the upcoming PBC/PBF tasks. As one interviewee put it: “The PBC is an example of New York having a bright idea, but it is not yet realised on the ground. It is a good idea that was not really thought-through on the ground.” Weak information and communication efforts, together with a lack of institutional capacity and a rather small PBC/PBF permanent presence in the field, fostered confusion about PBC/PBF working mechanisms, irritation among stakeholders and created feelings of being controlled in part by UN headquarters. PBF money was quickly available in the country, but no institutional capacity or structures were put in place in advance that could quickly absorb the money and implement it adequately.

Political Challenges

According to Biersteker (2007: 38) “[o]ne of the first major challenges facing the Peacebuilding Commission is a product of the timing and the context of its creation”. As new institutions and celebrated as a key success of the UN reform summit in 2005, the PBC/PBF in Sierra Leone was certainly confronted with managing and meeting high expectations from the beginning. One informant argued that Sierra Leone might have been chosen not only to become a success story for UN peacekeeping, but, as one of the first PBC focus countries, to mark a first success story in UN peacebuilding. The failure of the PBC in Sierra Leone could affect not only the country and provoke the risk of increasing donor fatigue and frustration but could also damage the UN’s overall image in the peacebuilding sector. Intense political pressure in the light of the UN reform summit to produce
visible results quickly, and successes in the case of Sierra Leone, could have pressured the PBC/PBF at the expense of clarifying conceptual issues and setting up a thought-through and time-consuming strategy explaining in detail how processes are managed in the field.

When it comes to the political dynamics, the politicised environment prior to the elections in August 2007 had a simultaneous positive and negative impact on PBC/PBF developments. On one hand, interviewees underlined that it was the right timing for the PBC/PBF to step in, because their involvement contributed to the stabilisation of a peaceful election environment at a critical time. On the other hand, keeping in mind that a presidential candidate was part of the Steering Committee, projects, in particular the youth development project, were at risk of being politicised by the government prior to the elections. The government’s dissatisfaction with the slow disbursement of money and the suspension of its work in the Steering Committee was followed by stagnation of its work, irritation among stakeholders and poor PBF project implementation with half the PBF money still waiting in the pipeline. The reason why, on the other hand, some of the PBF projects were described as “rushed through” might have originated from the fact that the UN was pressured to disburse the PBF funds quickly due to high political expectations, the government pressed for quick disbursement because of the approaching elections, and civil society wanted a quick release of money underlining the miserable living conditions of the population (Mollet, et al., 2007: 14).

It took some time for the new government to settle in and define its new priorities, thus delaying the work of the PBF and the finalization of the Compact. In the case of the PBF, the decision of the Sierra Leone President to co-chair the Steering Committee in the future encountered various reactions. Some interviewees regarded it as a very positive sign. Hopes were expressed that with the President being part of the Steering Committee, it would give this body new strength and speed up processes. However, critics emphasized that the President’s multiple obligations and his likely unavailability might trigger a “busy man syndrome” resulting in a situation in which “you only have the name” but not the political assertiveness. The co-chairs could keep changing and this would make it difficult for the Sierra Leone government to develop an institutional memory.

In terms of political leadership, the absence of the former UNIOSIL ERSG since December 2007 was certainly not conducive to PBC/PBF development in Sierra Leone (Country-Specific Meeting, 2008c:5). Fortunately, a new UNIOSIL ERSG took office in late May 2008 and it
is hoped that new ideas, direction and guidance for PBC/PBF activities are better assured resulting in dedicated implementation of the Compact and PBF projects. Besides a dynamic ERSG that is actively engaged in PBC/PBF, informants also underlined the importance of the Secretary-General in pushing PBC/PBF matters in Sierra Leone forward. In this respect, some interviewees desired the more active involvement of Ban Ki-moon and other powerful UN member states in PBC/PBF issues.

Coming to the relationship between PBC and PBF, it has to be kept in mind that the PBC and the PBF are strictly speaking independent bodies although their individual performances impact on each other (Slotin and Bruce, 2008: 26). Their distinct mandates in the country can be explained after some confusion among stakeholders. Nevertheless, the initial over-emphasis on the PBF money and the frustration with its slow disbursement affected the credibility of the PBC. During the research, it was stated that in front of donors it became difficult for the PBC to credibly justify the claim for more funding in the medium term, when it was obvious that the PBF already had difficulties in implementing its money in the short term. As one informant put it: “Why should states give more money, if much of it has not yet been spent?”

Finally, as the stakeholder analysis in figure 16 demonstrates: different actors have different interests and political agendas in the peacebuilding process.

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**Figure 16: Stakeholder analysis**

Source: Author (2008)
The PBC is confronted with the challenging task of integrating these different political actors with their different visions and political interests. In Sierra Leone, donors and UN institutions generally referred to their obligation to guarantee accountable and transparent funding procedures, and challenged the capacity of the government. Furthermore, the point was made that ownership and national leadership is needed, but UN consensus is important, otherwise the government might risk using the PBC/PBF for its own political interests. The government on the other hand stressed that the Compact clearly states that the Sierra Leone government should take the lead in its recovery process and that this should include having overall responsibility for financial means. Donors were asked to have more patience in Sierra Leone’s recovery process. Instead of mistrust à la “you cannot do it”, more confidence in the country was desired by the government which should include allowing Sierra Leone “to do and learn from its own mistakes.” As for the UN, it was stated that coordination between the various UN agencies should be strengthened and working procedures simplified to improve overall performance. This argument was addressed with particular regard to UNDP as the implementing partner of PBF projects. Civil society representatives accused the PBC/PBF in part of being Freetown-centric. In their opinion, with no PBF project being implemented outside Freetown, the countryside was widely neglected by the government and development agencies although it was stressed that “Freetown is not Sierra Leone.” Concerning the representation of the civil society in the PBFSC, Mollet, et al. (2007: 16) report that the two civil society organisations, WANEP and MARWOPNET, are not regarded entirely as organisations representing those at the grassroots. Instead, it is reported that they were chosen in agreement with the government. On the other hand, it was stated by interviewees that, though these two organisations suffer from a lack of human and financial resources like other NGOs, they are among the few that have the experience, capacity and the network to represent the civil society in the PBC/PBF process in Sierra Leone.

Finally, as the stakeholder analysis has illustrated the different claims of the various stakeholders, it has become clear that harmonising these different political interests and defining a common peacebuilding vision among them remains a key challenge in Sierra Leone.
Conclusion

As this chapter has highlighted, the PBC/PBF still struggles with translating its general mandate into operational practice in the field. The problem analysis illustrates that “making things happen” in the first PBC focus country Sierra Leone is a difficult process. Different conceptual, procedural and political issues, which are strongly interlinked, have greatly influenced the PBC/PBF performance in the country.

The fact that there was no agreed consensus on how to define peacebuilding in operational terms had severe consequences when it came to the point of putting peacebuilding into practice. The vague conceptual design of peacebuilding led to lively discussion when it came to the task of selecting peacebuilding priorities and formulating PBF peacebuilding projects in the country.

The theoretical question of PBC/PBF timing triggered further procedural issues. The involvement in Sierra Leone, a country that was argued to be beyond the “immediate” post-conflict phase in the main, had a significant impact on the work of the PBC/PBF itself. Partially, the “catalytic” impact and the sustainability of PBF projects were questioned, the tension between peacebuilding and broader development objectives was underlined and the “added value” of the Compact was in doubt. As Slotin and Bruce (2008: 15) declare: “After years of intense international engagement, there were already a number of strategies and coordination mechanisms in play.” Furthermore, the decision that the allocation of PBF funding was finished before the strategic priorities were discussed created “a widespread feeling that the process was out of sequence” (Slotin and Bruce, 2008: 14).

Instead of having a clear strategy that prepared the country for the PBC/PBF’s involvement with the necessary capacity, it would appear that the PBC/PBF followed a “learning by doing” approach that led to deficiencies in informing stakeholders about PBC/PBF policies and procedures. The lack of a clear information and communication strategy further impeded the rise of awareness among stakeholders and in the population, in particular outside Freetown. As underlined, the lack of capacity of various stakeholders, the politicised environment prior to the elections, together with a rather small UN field presence to deal exclusively with PBF matters, resulted in concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the PBF.

The heavy political pressure on the PBC/PBF to produce results quickly could have meant neglecting time-consuming and more focussed discussions on conceptual, procedural and structural issues.
However, because the PBC was discussed as a “flagship” initiative and an important outcome of the UN reform agenda, it was to be expected that the UN would invest enormous institutional resources in it and would have made appropriate arrangements for putting the respective capacities and structures in place.

Nevertheless, in addition to the conceptual, procedural and political challenges, it must be remembered that Sierra Leone is one of the first pilot countries. One informant described the current status of the PBC/PBF in Sierra Leone in the following way: “The PBC/PBF has the potential, but it is not yet realised.” Sierra Leone remains an “institutional experiment” in progress and there are a lot of lessons to be learnt for future PBC focus countries. The following final chapter will identify some of these key lessons and will provide some recommendations for further PBC/PBF action in the case of Sierra Leone.
5 Lessons from Sierra Leone: Conclusions and Recommendations

Sustained international political and strategic commitment, consistent financial resources, and a good level of cooperation and coordination among stakeholders on the ground were identified as key prerequisites for external peacebuilders to support a post-conflict country in its internal recovery process. The PBC was created as a new institution to improve and strengthen the abovementioned conditions in international peacebuilding, in order to reduce the country’s risk of a relapse into conflict.

According to Ponzio (2007: 9), “the PBC’s real added value will come from the work of the country-specific meetings”. In Sierra Leone, as one of the first PBC focus countries, the PBC has contributed greatly to the focussing of international attention on the country’s recovery process. Since the setting up of the PBC, multiple consultations including key stakeholders in Sierra Leone’s recovery process have been held and have fostered mutual dialogue. The PBC’s efforts to stimulate further international political involvement and increase financial support in the country have been mostly successful. The Compact will certainly continue to be an important tool in order to put the promised sustained international commitment into practice. The dedicated and speedy implementation of the Compact by the government and the international community will remain a crucial indicator when it comes to evaluating the PBC’s work in the future. It will demonstrate if the peacebuilding efforts by the PBC really work in practice. Furthermore, the Compact could be regarded as an instrument by which dialogue, cooperation and coordination among stakeholders can be strengthened and improved. It should be given credit too, for supporting the PBC/PBF at a very critical time, during the election process in 2007. The peaceful transition of power to a new government was certainly a milestone in Sierra Leone’s process of peace consolidation.

Two years on, it is still too early for final judgements on the PBC/PBF in Sierra Leone and, in line with Biersteker (2007: 38), “individuals working on the Commission or in its Support Office do not need to be reminded of the challenges they face or the constraints under which they operate” day-to-day. However, it is certainly helpful to explore some of the key challenges for the PBC/PBF in the field and examine the difficulties of Sierra Leone “being the new kid on the block”, as the CSM chairman for Sierra Leone once put it (General-Assembly 2008c).
Sharing Biersteker’s opinion (2007: 38), this paper has discussed the PBC/PBF’s conceptual, procedural and political challenges from a country perspective “to support the purposes of the Commission, not to cast doubt on its ambitious agenda.” In order to strengthen the implementation of the PBC/PBF’s mandate and its objectives in Sierra Leone and future PBC focus countries, the following recommendations and lessons learnt have been identified.

Conceptual Recommendations

One lesson that can be learnt from Sierra Leone and that was highlighted by the energy debate in the country is that in the end, “[p]eacebuilding means different things to many people” (Ponzio, 2007: 11). Creating a common understanding among stakeholders of how the theoretical term “peacebuilding” becomes an operation which is put into practice in the field remains a key aspect for further discussion among PBC/PBF stakeholders. Ponzio’s concern, that the PBC might risk overburdening itself by trying to take everything on board, has to be taken seriously and his claim to limit the PBC/PBF’s area of involvement should be given serious consideration. Critics in Sierra Leone pointed out that the peacebuilding aspect of some PBF projects, compared to “ordinary” development projects, appeared to become blurred and imprecise. One informant stressed that “Everything relates to the conflict in Sierra Leone.” However, to make the PBC/PBF’s work in the peacebuilding sector more precise, it should concentrate on the direct key causes of conflict. In order to avoid duplication of activities in the development sector and to guarantee “comparative advantages”, having a clearer operational definition of peacebuilding remains vital. This should question the point at which the PBC/PBF begins its engagement in a country. The answer will determine to a great extent the selection of future PBC focus countries and influence the PBC/PBF’s future work. Countries like Sierra Leone which can be defined beyond the immediate post-conflict stage need different forms of support compared to countries that are still in an immediate post-conflict situation. There are certainly no PBC blueprints. Different countries with different local contexts and in different transition phases will need different and flexible PBC approaches. However, the PBC should develop clearer criteria for the selection of future PBC focus countries so that overlaps with the development sector in countries in late post-conflict phases are avoided and parallel strategic and institutional structures prevented. This should contribute to an increased
understanding of the added value of the PBC. A decision that will similarly influence the PBC’s future work is whether the PBC will stick to its small case-load and possibly risk becoming negligible or whether it will take on board high-profile cases which have a higher risk of failure (Slotin and Bruce, 2008: 25).

Sierra Leone, a country in a late post-conflict phase, has demonstrated that the timing of PBC/PBF activities in a country is crucial. The country’s experience and the original over-emphasis on the PBF have shown that an overall strategic framework of peacebuilding priorities should be developed before PBF funding starts flowing. If not, there might be the risk that discussions overemphasise PBF money in the short term. This could marginalise and threaten the PBC’s important role in strengthening broader political and financial commitments in the medium-term. Concerning the time span of PBF projects, especially for those relating to capacity building or youth development, the one-year timeframe seems questionable. Instead, the PBF should underline its “catalytic” impact and concentrate on projects which focus on acute peacebuilding threats and gaps. Another important lesson that can be learnt is that post-PBF funding and reliable follow-up mechanisms must be ready in place. Questions on how to guarantee sustainability beyond PBF funding have to have been considered and addressed during the process of project design. In this respect, more attention has to be paid on how to improve the link between PBC and PBF activities. The PBC and the PBF, as well as the PBSO, seemed to be in a joint learning process in which they were all trying to find out how the three different peacebuilding pillars could work together most effectively. The PBC’s resource mobilization mandate goes far beyond the PBF. Ideally, to support the short-term efforts of the PBF in filling funding gaps, the PBC must find reliable mechanisms and coalitions that guarantee follow-up support after the PBF money runs out. However, the example of the Human Rights Commission has shown that reliable instruments for post-PBF funding and project sustainability are still issues for further clarification. Nevertheless, in the case of Sierra Leone, there are hopeful signs that through the advocacy and resource mobilisation efforts made by the CSM configuration, new political and financial partnerships are very likely to be initiated and intensified in the future. This remains one of the most critical points of the PBC’s work, because the guarantee of sustained political and financial commitment was one of the key PBC objectives and it should not diminish as the PBC’s work comes to an end.
Procedural Recommendations

As Sierra Leone has illustrated, having the capacity and managing the PBC/PBF process thoroughly in the country remains a real challenge. In this respect, Slotin and Bruce’s argument (2008: 25f.) cannot be emphasized more strongly at this point:

“[T]he PBC can rally actors around a common strategy and bring international attention and resources, but the UN presence on the ground has to guide the day-to-day work of ongoing dialogue, consultations, and coordination. If the UN presence does not have the leadership or capacity to fulfill [sic!] this function, the PBC’s impact will be limited.”

Strategies and better preparation of the country offices prior to the PBC’s involvement would be desirable. Human capacity, procedural and institutional structures have to be set up ready to guarantee smooth and speedy operational procedures once the PBC has started its involvement in a country. In Sierra Leone, a rather small presence deals entirely with PBC/PBF issues and became involved at a late stage. In the case of the PBF, human, technical and administrative structures have to be put in place ready to implement the resources on the ground quickly. As Sierra Leone illustrates, money is not always the problem in peacebuilding, but the structures and capacity that can implement it are essential. The lack of capacity of the PBF Support Secretariat was among other issues that were responsible for the bottleneck of PBF projects, and which could not mitigate the poor delivery of projects on its part.

It remains essential for the PBF Support Secretariat in Sierra Leone that the Head of the Support Secretariat is recruited as soon as possible in order to support the PBFS and the implementation of PBF projects. To clarify the status of the PBF Support Secretariat, and due to the fact that it works under the overall guidance of the UNIOSIL ERSG, it might be worth discussing whether their staff could work under contract for the respective UN mission in Sierra Leone, instead of being employed by UNDP. In this respect, the relationship between UNIOSIL and UNDP responsibilities should be further clarified. For the PBC it will remain crucial to increase its capacity on the ground. In addition to a stronger PBC focal point in quantitative terms, a qualitative change of PBC interlocutors and senior P4/P5 staff, would be desirable to assure engagement on a higher political level. In order to improve further coordination and the relationship with UN headquarters, the creation of a new position for a permanent PBSO representative
in Sierra Leone is worth serious consideration. With UNDP as the only implementing partner of PBF projects, so far, more staff at an earlier stage would have been advantageous in order to prevent bottle-necks of projects.

Increased and strengthened permanent human resources in the field will have positive effects on the overall performance of the PBC/PBF. It will also guarantee greater inclusion and participation of the country office in PBC/PBF processes. Equipped with more capacity, it will be empowered to become more involved in the planning and decision-making process of substantive and technical issues on the ground. In relation to the organisation of meetings, it was suggested that fewer meetings, but with more extensive preparation and increased participation of high-level representatives, should be put into practice in the future. Concerning this point, Slotin and Bruce’s study (2008: 18) is strongly supported when it comes to the conclusion:

“In order to ensure that meetings are as productive as possible and to enable a two-way dialogue, the CSM Chair, the PBSO, and the UN presence in-country should work together to prepare a clear and focused agenda and to provide adequate preparatory materials well in advance of the meeting.”

With a new administration in place, the Sierra Leone government should do its best to create a strong focus point for PBC/PBF coordination. In order to ensure sustainability and to increase the participation of government institutions in designing PBF projects, the PBF should consider the funding of projects focusing on capacity building in project implementation and monitoring/evaluation.

Overall, the difficulties in managing the PBC/PBF process on the ground were underestimated in part and it should be better planned in the future. For a meaningful PBC/PBF process to take place, this will mean time as well as human, technical and financial resources in the field. Managing the process is closely linked with the quality of communication and information-sharing. This is not only of importance on a higher diplomatic or political level, but is particularly essential on a technical and practical level in everyday work. It is vital that PBC/PBF procedures and mechanisms, roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, communicated and explained to remaining UN agencies, donors, government institutions and civil society on the ground at the earliest time possible. Information and communication are significant in two ways. First, they increase the level of awareness and the public dialogue. They ensure better participation and inclusiveness of the population in the PBC/PBF process through which its
acceptance and legitimacy is more likely to be guaranteed. Second, communication and information are essential in order to clarify and explain PBC/PBF policies and procedures among stakeholders. With a high level of communication and a thought-through information campaign, PBC/PBF processes could be speeded up from the outset. In Sierra Leone, the confusion about the different mandates of the PBC and the PBF, the over-emphasis on PBF money, and the poor delivery of PBF projects could be caused partly by an initial lack of a clear communication strategy. In order to increase delivery, participation and commitment in Sierra Leone, it is imperative, in particular for the PBF and UNDP, to clearly explain procedural prerequisites concerning project formulation, approval, implementation, and fund management. Furthermore, PBF updates on project implementation and disbursement have to be made available on a regular basis. For the PBF in Sierra Leone, it is crucial that the formulated communication strategy be carried out without further delay to overcome the lack of clarity of the PBC/PBF, its policies and procedures. UNDP should either reduce its complexity and bureaucracy or increase its assistance to allow national counterparts to better follow UNDP standards. Though it could be judged as too late, it would be a positive move in order to achieve a good and common understanding between UNDP and its national counterparts and could be observed while research was being conducted in Sierra Leone. UNDP organised a workshop explaining UNDP policies and procedures to national counterparts. The retreat gave UNDP the opportunity to explain its corporate policies during the management of projects that are necessary to guarantee accountability and transparency. At the same time, national counterparts could present their points of view and articulate practical difficulties that they encountered during the implementation process. The clarity and complementarity of different UN agencies involved in peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone (e.g. the UNDP Peace and Development Unit or the UNIOSIL Peace and Governance Unit) could be improved by recommendations that they coordinate their activities more efficiently with the PBC/PBF. It remains vague as to what the new dimension of PBF projects really is keeping in mind that UNDP as the implementation partner has been carrying out projects in Sierra Leone for many years already.

The involvement of the population is a prerequisite in any peacebuilding process, particularly in Sierra Leone where marginalisation

and exclusion exacerbated the conflict. The shared criticism of many civil society representatives is that the PBC/PBF process neglects rural areas because it takes place mainly in the capital. This is of concern and stakeholders may wish to elaborate on this aspect in the future, in particular, whether the PBF should start funding projects for the rural population outside Freetown. Another method by which the PBC/PBF processes could be more inclusive and participatory would be to strengthen civil society engagement and communication channels at the grassroots level. However, in order to achieve the capacity to monitor, evaluate and disseminate information about PBC/PBF developments at this level in the countryside, more technical support and training is needed for civil society organisations. It was proposed that parts of the PBF fund should support capacity building of the civil society organisation from the beginning. The workshop Strengthening Civil Society’s Engagement with the PBC Process in Sierra Leone held on 15 May 2005 in Freetown was a promising initiative. Civil society organisations from all over the country could express their problems regarding PBC/PBF developments in Sierra Leone. The lectures on PBC/PBF architecture, monitoring and evaluation were greatly appreciated by all participants. Though members of local NGOs were well aware that “understanding the principles of a log-frame will certainly not be the solution for everything”, it will empower civil society groups to become more involved in the PBC/PBF process, to ask questions and to put pressure on the PBC and the PBF to hold them accountable. It is hoped that these seminars will continue in Sierra Leone in the future. Nevertheless, to ensure the voice of civil society is heard in PBC/PBF processes, it remains vital that CISPEC gets back on track and intensifies its own work as soon as possible. For this to happen, civil society organisations have to overcome tendencies of fragmentation and speak with one strong voice. During workshops, it was suggested that they should consider increasing their cooperation with other non-governmental organisations in New York to better influence PBC/PBF processes in UN headquarters.

Political Recommendations

Leadership is vital to implement the PBC’s vision effectively. The occasional absence of an ERSG in Sierra Leone and the coming closure of the UNIOSIL mission in September 2008, are two factors that could have slowed down the PBC/PBF processes. The new ERSG assumed his duties at a critical time of transition. In the process of downsizing
UNIOSIL staff, there are plans that it will be replaced by a smaller mission called the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). To ensure a smooth transition, an important decision for the future will be how the PBC/PBF can be integrated into UNIPSIL. The transition phase offers a great opportunity to rethink PBC/PBF structures and to strengthen capacity on the ground so that a high PBC/PBF profile and a strong field presence are assured in the future. With a new ERSG there is now hope that PBC/PBF processes gain encouraging impetus and direction that lead to a dedicated and speedy implementation of the Compact and PBF projects. However, the performance of the PBC/PBF will equally depend on the political will and the level of engagement of powerful UN member states and the UN Secretary-General. For its part, the Sierra Leone government has to demonstrate clear commitment to, and a strong political will with the PBC/PBF processes. For the PBF to function properly in Sierra Leone it remains crucial that the work of the PBFSC is re-activated as soon as possible. Whether the representation of the Sierra Leone President in the PBFSC is a benefit or a burden has yet to be proved.

As the case-study has demonstrated, peacebuilding is a political process taking place in a highly politicised environment in which different actors have different political interests and it is difficult to harmonise these divergent interests. To turn the frustration among stakeholders with the PBC/PBF “learning process” into new optimism, donors, UNDP, the civil society and the government should hold an open and honest debate about PBC/PBF improvements and failures in a constructive manner. The question of how to integrate Sierra Leone, its government and its people into the PBC/PBF process will remain a key aspect in such a debate, because it will determine whether dependency on the peacebuilding process will be reinforced or local capacity strengthened in the future. Sierra Leone was one of the first PBC focus countries, and the PBC/PBF process was faced with a significant conflict of aims, which was to balance time with considerable political pressure and expectations to produce visible outcomes quickly. However, it has to be acknowledged that “institutional experiments” need time and patience, particularly in highly complex contexts like war-torn societies. To make the PBC/PBF more effective in its future performance, the exchange of experience and the dissemination of lessons learnt from other PBC focus countries, like Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, will remain vital. In order to learn most from the test-cases it is extremely important to create in-built mechanisms and bodies to
discuss and reflect on information gained from PBC focus countries and to design dissemination structures to communicate these findings to other countries. In conclusion, some of the key lessons that future PBC countries could learn from the experience in Sierra Leone is that besides a clear operational peacebuilding vision, strong leadership and political will, a capable field presence and a clear and timely communication and information strategy are needed to realise the PBC’s ambitious mandate. If these lessons are incorporated in the future, “[a]lthough the challenges are many, and the constraints daunting, there is a very real chance that the Peacebuilding Commission and the institutional experiment it represents could eventually succeed” (Biersteker, 2007: 43).
Appendix

Country Profile – Sierra Leone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country name</th>
<th>Republic of Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Western Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Guinea, Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government type</td>
<td>Constitutional democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>27 April 1961 (from UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>6,144,562 (July 2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Age structure           | 0-14 years: 44.8%
                        | 15-64 years: 52%
                        | 65 years and over: 3.2% (2007 est.)|
| Ethnic groups           | 20 African ethnic groups 90% (Temne 30%, Mende 30%, other 30%), Creole (Krio) 10% (descendants of freed Jamaican slaves who were settled in the Freetown area in the late-18th century), refugees from Liberia’s recent civil war, small numbers of Europeans, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Indians |
| Religions               | Muslim 60%, Christian 10%, indigenous beliefs 30% |
| Literacy                | Definition: age 15 and over can read and write English, Mende, Temne, or Arabic total population: 35.1%
                        | male: 46.9%
                        | female: 24.4% (2004 est.)|
| Life expectancy at birth| Total population: 40.58 years
                        | male: 38.36 years
                        | female: 42.87 years (2007 est.)|
| Infant mortality rate   | Total: 158.27 deaths/1,000 live births |
| Population below poverty line | 68% (1989 est.) |
| GDP - composition by sector | Agriculture: 49%
                        | Industry: 31%
                        | Services: 21% (2001 est.) |
| GDP - per capita (PPP)  | $900 (2006 est.)          |
| Natural resources       | diamonds, titanium ore, bauxite, iron ore, gold, chromite |

Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework

I. Principles for cooperation

1. *The Republic of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission*, in accordance with the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission, inter alia, to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and advice on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, determined to strengthen the partnership and cooperation between Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission, recognizing the progress made in Sierra Leone’s stabilization, recovery and peacebuilding since the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999), mindful that lasting peace and sustainable development in Sierra Leone would require addressing the remaining threats to stability and the root causes of the conflict, stressing the need to build on existing achievements, strategies and commitments for peace and development and to continue their implementation, noting the strong partnership and coordination structures in Sierra Leone between the national authorities and the international community, recognizing that peace consolidation in Sierra Leone requires full national ownership and the participation of all relevant stakeholders, such as the central and local governments, civil society, the private sector and international partners, further recognizing the need for continued engagement of the international community in the process of peace consolidation until the objectives of sustainable peace are met, have developed the present Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework based on the following principles:

(a) **National ownership**: the primary responsibility and ownership for peace consolidation and the development of a prosperous and democratic Sierra Leone rests with the Government and the people of Sierra Leone;

(b) **Mutual accountability**: sustainable peacebuilding requires a strongpartnership on the basis of mutual respect and accountability between the Government and the people of Sierra Leone and their international partners;

(c) **Sustained engagement**: peacebuilding is a long-term process requiring sustained and predictable engagement from all stakeholders.

II. Context

2. Since the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and its people, with the support of the international community, have made tremendous progress in rebuilding the country and securing peace. Among key achievements are the peaceful and democratic national elections held in 2002 and 2007 and the local government election held in 2004; the establishment and completion of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; the comprehensive reform and restructuring of national security institutions, such as the Sierra Leone Police, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Office of National Security; and the creation of a number of democratic institutions, such as the National Electoral Commission, the Political Parties Registration Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission.

3. A number of national frameworks and strategies for peace and development, such as Sierra Leone Vision 2025, the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Peace Consolidation Strategy, the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact and the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have contributed to the achievements made thus far and continue to guide the process for recovery and stabilization.

4. Notwithstanding the significant progress made, peace and stability in Sierra Leone remain fragile. The root causes of the conflict — widespread corruption, marginalization and disempowerment of the rural and some sectors of urban communities, lack of economic opportunities and inadequate State capacity to deliver basic services — remain largely
Andrea Iro: The UN Peacebuilding Commission

unaddressed. The unemployment and marginalization of youth in particular present a serious threat to stability and peace.

5. Sierra Leone’s engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission is aimed at ensuring sustained attention of the international community in providing additional political, financial and technical support to the country’s peace consolidation efforts. The present Framework is a medium-term document for partnership and mutual accountability, with specific actions that the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission commit themselves to undertake to address the challenges and threats most critical to sustaining and consolidating peace. It will guide the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Government of Sierra Leone by highlighting key peacebuilding gaps in existing national strategies and commitments and ensuring their timely and effective implementation. The Peacebuilding Commission will also use the Framework to enhance dialogue and strengthen the partnerships between Sierra Leone and its international partners.

6. The commitments in the present Framework are identified based on three main criteria: they are critical to avoiding relapse into conflict, they are short-to-medium term in duration, and they require mutual action from the Government and other national stakeholders and Sierra Leone’s international partners. The focus on these elements should not be seen as replacing the commitments in other existing frameworks and bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements.

7. The present Framework is a flexible document which can be modified jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission in response to developments in the peace consolidation process in Sierra Leone. It has been developed through a consultative process in Sierra Leone and the deliberations of the Peacebuilding Commission.

III. Analysis of priorities, challenges and risks for peacebuilding

8. Consistent with existing national strategies, the present Framework highlights critical and inter-dependent priorities for risk reduction and peace consolidation in Sierra Leone. It also identifies constraints in the implementation of existing strategies and identifies mutual commitments.

2 The root causes of the Sierra Leone conflict have been explored fully in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
in response to these. Primary challenges in the implementation of many of the existing strategies and commitments are related to political will, limited financial and human capacity of the Government, civil society organizations and the Parliament, as well as constraints in coordination mechanisms and arrangements with international partners. These challenges are further compounded by the poor state of basic infrastructure, such as electricity, water and roads. The Government of Sierra Leone has also stressed the need to ensure harmonization of benchmarks and monitoring requirements for its international commitments to ensure effective implementation of existing priorities.

9. The priority areas contained in the Framework were identified by the Government of Sierra Leone in country-specific meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission and subsequent consultations with all relevant stakeholders. These include: youth employment and empowerment, consolidation of democracy and good governance, justice and security sector reform, capacity-building, and energy sector development. In addition, the subregional dimensions of peacebuilding and cross-cutting issues of gender equality and human rights are considered in the analysis of priorities for peacebuilding and the selection of commitments.

A. Youth employment and empowerment

10. The marginalization and political exclusion of youth was identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as one of the root causes of the civil war and is widely perceived to be a threat to peace consolidation today. The Government defines youth as persons between 15 and 35 years, who are estimated to represent approximately two million people out of a total population of about five million. Close to two thirds of those young people are considered to be unemployed or underemployed. Young people also tend to have less paid employment and fewer opportunities in the public and formal sectors. They face a number of employment constraints, such as low levels of education, limited access to land, social capital and credit. Ex-combatants, urban slum youth, poor and socially excluded youth in rural areas and youth in squatter settlements in border areas of Sierra Leone comprise key sections of marginalized young men and women requiring special measures to address their needs. The challenge of youth marginalization, however, goes beyond the issue of economic opportunities and employment. It is also necessary to ensure the full participation of young men and women in the political process and protection of their rights. Ensuring equal participation of women,
especially young women, within the political process constitutes a specific challenge and requires targeted interventions, such as legislative reform and sustained capacity-building.

11. A few short- and medium-term initiatives are under way to address youth unemployment, such as the Youth Employment Scheme launched by the Government in 2006 with the aim of generating up to 135,000 short-term jobs for young people. The Government of Sierra Leone has also developed a National Youth Policy and is setting up a National Youth Commission to promote youth empowerment and greater participation in decision-making. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund has also provided support for the Government’s Youth Enterprise Development Programme. The World Bank and the Government of Sierra Leone have produced a comprehensive study on youth employment, noting the need to develop both medium- and long-term solutions to the problem.

12. The challenge of addressing youth unemployment is closely linked to the creation of long-term economic growth, reviving agricultural production and marketing, and creating an enabling environment for private-sector development and domestic, diaspora and foreign investment. A number of preconditions, such as improved availability of electricity, water and other basic infrastructure and support for entrepreneurs and the self-employed, would need to be addressed in that context. Although the importance of long-term economic growth in the context of peace consolidation is recognized as part of the present Framework, specific activities under this sector fall within the purview of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Within this Framework, a more targeted and medium-term focus on addressing youth unemployment will be prioritized, in particular in the areas of policy reform and youth empowerment through the implementation of the National Youth Policy, strengthening of the National Youth Council, District Youth Committees and the expansion of the Government’s Youth Employment Scheme.

B. Justice and security sector reform

13. Despite some progress made in the re-establishing of judicial institutions throughout the country, lack of access to justice for the majority of the population, coupled with lack of capacity in the justice system, are serious concerns for peace and stability. The justice system is plagued with outdated laws, inadequate personnel and logistical problems. Almost 80 per cent of the population relies on the traditional (chief-
tainty-based) system of justice, which lacks the capacity to effectively dispense justice and is seen as biased against women and young people and lacking in transparency and accountability.

14. A number of initiatives are under way to rebuild the institutions of justice in Sierra Leone. With the support of the Peacebuilding Fund, considerable progress has been made in the reduction of the backlog of cases and providing urgently needed capacity-building support to the judiciary and the justice sector as a whole. However, addressing the longstanding challenges facing the justice sector, in particular improving access to justice, requires a holistic approach. To that end, the Government of Sierra Leone, with the support of international partners, in particular the United Kingdom Department for International Development, has launched a Justice Sector Development Programme, a Justice Sector National Policy Framework and a Justice Sector Reform Strategy for 2008-2010. Legal and constitutional review and reform programmes are also under way, through a Law Reform Commission and a Constitutional Review Commission.

15. These efforts need to be closely coordinated and further measures are needed to raise the population’s confidence in the justice system and to ensure timely and equal access to justice. In that regard, the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, support for the continued work of the Special Court, support for the newly established National Human Rights Commission and support for the efforts enhancing traditional dispute mechanisms and community-based mediation and “peace-monitoring” initiatives will be critical.

16. Since the end of the conflict, successful security sector reform initiatives have been undertaken to transform and restructure security institutions to effectively respond to threats to the State and citizenry of Sierra Leone. Further consolidation of those reforms is needed, with a focus on making the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces effective and affordable. The Conditions and Terms of Service of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces also need to be reviewed and updated. There is also a need for further training to improve police and community relations, and the expansion and strengthening of the Family Support Units. Recognizing that poor coordination among the security institutions was a contributing factor to the conflict, further support is needed for the Government’s strategy to strengthen coordination among security institutions through the Office of National Security, including in strengthening the conflict
prevention and early-warning capacity of the District and Provincial
Security Committees and promoting policy dialogue between the Office
of National Security and civil society organizations.

C. Consolidation of democracy and good governance

17. Democratic governance and the establishing and strengthening of
national institutions are indispensable for durable peace, economic and
social progress and promotion of human rights and the rule of law. One
of the key strategies of the Government of Sierra Leone in the consolida-
tion of democracy and the establishment of an accountable Government
has been the expansion of State authority and service provision to all
parts of the country. That strategy is based on the recognition that the
marginalization from the political process of a significant portion of
the population and the unequal access to economic opportunities were
contributing factors to the civil war and continue to remain risk factors
for peace consolidation. Additional efforts are needed in the lead-up
to the 2008 local council elections to strengthen institutions of local
governance and ensure effective decentralization in accordance with the
Local Government Act (2004) and in particular to clarify the division
of roles and responsibilities between local councils and the traditional
chiefdom authorities. Adequate resources and technical support need to
be mobilized in the lead-up to the local council elections.

18. Further support is also needed to enhance the capacity of national insti-
tutions such as the Parliament, the National Electoral Commission, the
Political Parties Registration Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion, the National Commission for Democracy and the Human Rights
Commission. Efforts in support of governance institutions need to be
complemented through enhanced dialogue among political parties and
the reconciliation and full participation of all segments of the population
in decision-making. In that context, enhancing the role and participation
of civil society, including youth and women’s groups, in political trans-
formation is critical and requires urgent attention and support through
capacity building activities and the strengthening of coordination mecha-
nisms.

19. Many efforts have been taken to address corruption, such as the adoption
of Anti-Corruption Act (2000) and the creation of the Anti-Corruption
Commission. However, corruption remains a major challenge and a threat
to the country’s stability and socio-economic progress. Additional concrete
measures and political commitment are critical to combat corruption. Such measures would require, among other things, strengthening of the Anti-Corruption Commission, revision of the Anti-Corruption Act and strategy and capacity-building of law enforcement institutions and the civil service as a whole. Further efforts are also needed to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone, in accordance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, for the management and governance of natural resources for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone. Initiatives such as the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact signed by the Government and the four donors who provide direct budgetary support in July 2006 provide important measures for strengthening mutual accountability and good governance in Sierra Leone.

D. Capacity-building

20. Progress on the identified peacebuilding priorities cannot be separated from capacity-building in its broadest sense and at all levels. After many years of neglect and as a result of the civil war, Government institutions and other national stakeholders have limited capacity to deliver services, implement reforms and ensure adequate economic and financial management. This is also manifested at the provincial and district levels, where State institutions in many instances remain weak or non-existent, hindering the process of decentralization. In addition, capacity limitations undermine the oversight roles of the national Parliament, civil society organizations and the media.

21. A number of public-sector initiatives and accountability measures have been implemented, including through the Institutional Reform and Capacity-building Programme. However, further progress is needed, in particular in the area of civil service reform. A comprehensive and sustainable civil service reform strategy needs to be developed to ensure opportunities for merit-based recruitment, stronger performance and accountability and to address urgent capacity gaps, including the low percentage of women in the civil service. A comprehensive capacity review of Ministries, Departments and Agencies is also needed to identify and address the short-to-mid-term challenges and capacity gaps. To ensure the long-term sustainability of peacebuilding efforts, all programmes and activities must incorporate capacity-building as a key element. Furthermore, international agencies operating in Sierra Leone should assess their own capacities to effectively support the country’s peacebuilding and development efforts.
E. Energy sector

22. Sierra Leone’s energy sector, particularly its electricity subsector, is in a state of crisis. The country’s energy crisis is one of the main challenges to its economic growth and recovery and it impedes continued progress on peace consolidation. The current electricity needs of the country stand at 250 MW, with current production at 10 MW. The shortcomings in the supply of electricity constitute a critical and overarching challenge affecting all peacebuilding priorities identified in the present Framework. Addressing the energy crisis will have a significant positive impact on employment generation, public revenue generation, poverty reduction and the overall recovery of the country. It will also deliver a critical and long-awaited peace dividend to the population five years after the end of conflict.

23. While many of the challenges in the energy sector are of a long-term nature, the present Framework will prioritize and address short-term emergency issues, such as the generation, distribution and management of electricity supply to Freetown and its surrounding areas.

F. Subregional dimensions of peacebuilding

24. Long-term peace consolidation in Sierra Leone is closely linked to developments in the wider subregion, in particular the Mano River Basin, comprising Guinea, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. For decades, instability in one country has spilled over to its neighbours and border areas have in many instances served as safe havens for armed militias. There is a continued need to enhance dialogue between the countries in the subregion and promote conflict prevention, resolution and mediation capacities. The cooperation within the Mano River Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations constitute key platforms for such dialogue and need to be enhanced through a more proactive political leadership and increased resource allocation. The Mano River Union secretariat should also be strengthened to ensure effective coordination among the member States of the Union. Peace consolidation efforts at the national and international levels must also be supplemented by confidence-building measures between border communities, through specific dispute resolution mechanisms and strengthened trade relations.
IV. Mutual commitments

A. Commitments of the Government of Sierra Leone

25. Recognizing that responsible and democratic leadership, effective management of resources and adequate capacity are the prerequisites for peace consolidation in Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone will fulfil the following commitments:

**Youth employment and empowerment**
(a) Develop and implement targeted programmes for youth employment and empowerment, including through literacy, vocational training programmes, and civic education programmes;
(b) Promote efforts to strengthen youth organizations and increase the participation of youth in decision-making, paying particular attention to the needs of young women and girls;
(c) Revise and implement the National Youth Policy;
(d) Review and revise the Youth Employment Scheme in order to benefit from the most effective programmes for youth employment generation and empowerment;
(e) Support the participation of young men and women as candidates and voters in the 2008 local council elections;

**Justice and security sector reform**
(f) Develop a plan for, and embark on, timely implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission;
(g) Ensure inclusive, participatory and transparent legislative and constitutional reform processes, including through support for the efforts of the Law Reform Commission and the Constitutional Review Commission;
(h) Provide additional support to the Family Support Units of the police to adequately address sexual and gender-based violence and other crimes against women and children;
(i) Establish an Independent Police Complaints Review Board aimed at preventing police excesses or misbehaviour and improve accountability, professional standards and police-community relations;
(j) Ensure timely and full implementation of the laws on the Registration of Customary Marriages and Divorce, Domestic Violence and the Devolution of Estates;
(k) Provide additional support for the work of the Human Rights Commission;
(l) Implement the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Core Review Programme, including on the size and the terms and conditions of service, to ensure that the armed forces are affordable and effective;

**Consolidation of democracy and good governance**

(m) Ensure adequate preparations for the local council elections in 2008 through increased political dialogue, support to the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration Commission;

(n) Consolidate democratic governance by strengthening governance institutions, especially local governance institutions;

(o) Ensure and support greater participation of women in national decision-making and political processes, especially in the 2008 local elections;

(p) Review the Local Governance Act of 2004 and clarify the roles and responsibilities of local councils and traditional authorities;

(q) Develop and support programmes for civic education and participation and greater information-sharing between the Government and the people;

(r) Review the Anti-Corruption Strategy (2000) and develop a holistic strategy which gives the Anti-Corruption Commission independent powers to prosecute and takes into account the need for capacity-building efforts;

(s) Separate the positions of the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice;

(t) Review the Core Minerals Policy and related regulations to improve the Governance and management of natural resources, including on current contracts and revenue collection, to prevent smuggling and illicit trade, and to ensure participation at the local and community levels;

**Capacity-building**

(u) Review civil service reform proposals and undertake a comprehensive reform of the service, including the Senior Executive Service, ensuring greater participation of and enhanced career opportunities for women and young people;

(v) Accelerate the capacity-building of Local Councils so that they can take responsibility for the devolved functions from line ministries;

(w) Facilitate and support capacity-building initiatives for the private sector and civil society, especially women’s and youth organizations, which contribute to peace consolidation, reconciliation and community-based socio-economic recovery and reconstruction;

(x) Develop a strategy for holistic support to the Sierra Leone Parliament;
**Energy sector**

(y) Develop and implement an emergency plan for improving electricity generation and distribution in Freetown and Western Area;

(z) Elaborate a short-to-medium-term comprehensive energy sector-wide strategy;

**Subregional dimensions of peacebuilding**

(aa) Fully participate in and support initiatives of the Mano River Union and other organizations for subregional peace consolidation, with a special focus on initiatives aimed at building confidence and cooperation among border communities and generating youth employment;

(bb) Support the capacity-building of the Mano River Union secretariat;

**Support for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission**

(cc) Utilize existing coordination mechanisms to support implementation of the present Framework and raise awareness for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission;

(dd) Encourage and facilitate documentation and sharing of the lessons learned from Sierra Leone’s experience in restoring and building peace with other post-conflict countries.

**B. Commitments of the Peacebuilding Commission**

26. Recognizing the primary responsibility of the people and the Government of Sierra Leone for peace consolidation and development in their country, the Peacebuilding Commission, in accordance with its mandate as defined in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions (General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005), and the discussions at its country specific meetings on Sierra Leone, will:

(a) Maintain its engagement with Sierra Leone for a period of three years and jointly review continued engagement after 2010;

(b) Support the efforts of the Government and the people of Sierra Leone for peace consolidation consistent with the present Framework;

(c) Support the implementation of the present Framework within the context of the governing bodies of international institutions;

(d) Advocate for a sustained partnership and an enhanced dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and its international partners, including through efforts to increase the number of international partners supporting peace consolidation efforts in Sierra Leone;
(e) Support the development of a Sierra Leone National Aid Policy to ensure effective and timely implementation of aid effectiveness policies and good practices, such as the Paris Declaration;

(f) Galvanize attention and sustained levels of financial resources and technical assistance to support the implementation of the present Framework. This may include the development of multi-donor sector-wide funding mechanisms, such as multi-donor trust funds;

(g) Support the efforts of the Government and the people of Sierra Leone, taking into account existing instruments, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Kimberley Process, by advocating for appropriate action in the engagement of the relevant stakeholders, in ensuring national ownership for effective, transparent and sustainable exploitation and management of Sierra Leone’s natural resources;

(h) Encourage effective coordination of United Nations and other actors on peace consolidation issues consistent with the present Framework;

(i) Integrate a subregional dimension in its engagement with Sierra Leone, notably through enhanced partnerships with the countries in the subregion and support for the Mano River Union and its secretariat;

(j) Support national research and learning institutions to conduct research, collect and share, at the national, regional and international levels, lessons learned and best experiences related to peacebuilding;

(k) Encourage tangible contributions to support Sierra Leone in its peacebuilding efforts and implementation of the present Framework through individual and collective actions by all relevant stakeholders for, inter alia:

**Youth employment and empowerment**

(l) Support capacity-building of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports to ensure mainstreaming of youth concerns;

(m) Support the Government’s efforts for the generation of youth employment;

(n) Support the upscaling of existing vocational, literacy training and civic education programmes;

**Justice and security sector reform**

(o) Support the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in addressing the root causes of conflict;

(p) Support the work of the Sierra Leone Special Court;

(q) Support capacity-building initiatives for the armed forces and the police, in particular to enhance Sierra Leone’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations;

(r) Broaden donor support for the Justice Sector Development Programme;
(s) Support additional management training and capacity-building for mid-level management of the Sierra Leone Police;
(t) Provide technical assistance in support of Sierra Leone courts and in support of the capacity-building of traditional courts;

**Consolidation of democracy and good governance**
(u) Support Sierra Leone’s efforts to promote accountable democratic governance and the rule of law;
(v) Support the work of the Human Rights Commission, the National Electoral Commission, the Political Parties Registration Commission, the National Commission for Democracy and other national institutions;

**Capacity-building**
(w) Support the Government’s programmes to address the immediate socio-economic needs of the population, in accordance with the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Millennium Development Goals, and the development of basic services and infrastructure, including water, electricity and roads, as essential conditions for peacebuilding;
(x) Support capacity-building of the Sierra Leone Parliament;
(y) Support capacity-building for civil service reform, including the Senior Executive Service;
(z) Support capacity-building to enhance the Government’s efforts in the management of natural resources, in particular the Ministries of Marine and Mineral Resources;
(aa) Support capacity-building initiatives for the private sector and civil society, especially women’s and youth organizations, which contribute to peace consolidation, reconciliation and community-based socio-economic recovery and reconstruction;
(bb) Support the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone in the area of gender mainstreaming;

**Energy**
(cc) Marshall support for the implementation of the short-term emergency plan of the Government of Sierra Leone for electricity generation and distribution, including the restructuring of the National Power Authority and other public institutions in that sector;
(dd) Marshall support for the enhancement and rehabilitation of the electricity generation capacity, distribution networks and transmission lines;

**Subregional dimensions of peacebuilding**
(ee) Provide additional technical and financial support for the revitalization of the Mano River Union, especially in fostering cross-border confidence-building and addressing common peacebuilding challenges, including at the community level;
(ff) Provide assistance to the Mano River Union and Economic Community of West African States in addressing cross-border issues, such as the illicit trade in small arms.

C. Roles and responsibilities of the United Nations in support of the Framework

(a) Support the implementation of the present Framework and the work of the Peacebuilding Commission;
(b) Take into account the priorities of the present Framework in reviewing the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and related United Nations programmes and activities in the country;
(c) Enhance coordination within the United Nations system on peacebuilding priority issues;
(d) Ensure coordination among all actors and programmes in peacebuilding to ensure coherence and avoid duplication of efforts;
(e) Develop and implement a peacebuilding sensitive approach to United Nations activities and programming;
(f) Provide continued support to initiatives and programmes promoting greater subregional cooperation and development, including through the programmes undertaken by the Economic Commission for Africa.

D. Roles and responsibilities of bilateral and multilateral partners in support of the Framework

28. Within the framework of their respective cooperation programmes and taking into account the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the commitments in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, bilateral and multilateral partners are encouraged to:
(a) Support the implementation of the present Framework and the work of the Peacebuilding Commission;
(b) Integrate the priorities of the present Framework into their cooperation programmes;
(c) Support the implementation of Government of Sierra Leone priorities as reflected in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2008-2010);
(d) Join with the Peacebuilding Commission in advocacy on behalf of Sierra Leone, including in galvanization of additional resources;
(e) Fulfil the commitments made at the 2005 and 2006 Consultative Group meetings;
(f) Ensure the coordination of programmes and interventions to avoid the duplication of peacebuilding efforts;
(g) Develop and implement a peacebuilding-sensitive approach to activities and programmes.

E. Roles and responsibilities of the States in the West African regionin support of the Framework

29. The States in the subregion are encouraged to:
(a) Contribute to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone by supporting the work of various subregional organizations, including through the revitalization of the Mano River Union;
(b) Contribute to, and cooperate on, joint subregional projects aimed at cross-border confidence-building;
(c) Commit to the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of outstanding disputes and promote enhanced cooperation for conflict prevention and early warning;
(d) Contribute to a comprehensive approach to addressing economic and social challenges, including in the development and implementation of subregional energy-sector cooperation strategies.

V. Review and tracking of progress

30. The Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission will review, through semi-annual country-specific meetings and regular consultations with all relevant stakeholders in Sierra Leone, progress on the implementation of the present Framework. Key stakeholders in the peacebuilding process of the country will be invited to attend at least one of the semi-annual meetings. The purpose of the formal meetings will be: (a) to review progress in achieving the objectives and commitments of the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework and the overall engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission with Sierra Leone; (b) to focus the attention of the international community on key peacebuilding issues requiring additional action; (c) to ensure that the Government of Sierra Leone, the Peacebuilding Commission and all other relevant stakeholders honour their commitments under the present Framework; (d)
to draw lessons and good practices; and (e) to update the present Framework, as appropriate. The meetings will result in advice and recommendations on how relevant stakeholders might achieve their commitments contained in the present Framework.

31. The semi-annual review process will be based on progress reports comprising several key elements, such as: (a) a trend analysis describing important developments under each peacebuilding priority issue and cross-cutting area; (b) review of progress in the implementation of mutual commitments; and (c) recommendations for follow-up actions. The progress reports will be developed by the Government of Sierra Leone, with critical inputs from the Development Assistance Coordination Office and civil society organizations and the support of the United Nations in Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The account of progress on the commitments of the Peacebuilding Commission will be prepared by the Peacebuilding Support Office, in consultation with the Peacebuilding Commission. To the extent possible, the analysis in the periodic reports will be based on existing indicators and benchmarks contained in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, the Multi-Donor Budget Support Framework, and the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact.

32. The Government of Sierra Leone, with support from the international community, will allocate sufficient resources to existing aid coordination mechanisms to support the review and implementation of the present Framework. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission will also develop a monitoring tool or “matrix” to facilitate the effective implementation of the present Framework and its review process. The matrix will have specific benchmarks and indicators, will include existing peacebuilding efforts and will identify additional support required for the implementation of the commitments listed in the present Framework (for matrix template, see annex).

33. Informal civil society briefings, with the participation of both international and local civil society organizations, will precede the formal meetings of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Civil society groups will play an important role in raising awareness about the partnership of the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission and will contribute to the review and monitoring of the present Framework, including in the further development of the matrix for the review of progress and the implementation of commitments.
34. The calendar of formal meetings of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission will be established in consultation with the Government of Sierra Leone and its partners so as to minimize additional administrative requirements. Those formal meetings will be complemented by additional meetings or briefings and an annual visit of the member States of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone, as appropriate. Such additional meetings and field visits will result in advice and recommendations from the Peacebuilding Commission to the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other relevant institutions.

Annex

– Matrix for review of progress in the implementation of commitments

[Note: This matrix will be a “living document”, continuously updated following the adoption of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. It will provide the basis for the generation of the six-monthly periodic reviews of the implementation of the Framework for consideration by the Peacebuilding Commission and the Government of Sierra Leone.]

– Commitments Benchmarks and indicators; Ongoing international support Status of implementation; Additional requirements

Source: Compact (2007)
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