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Regional approaches to food security in Africa

The CAADP and other relevant
policies and programmes in SADC

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Acronyms

ACBF	Africa Capacity Building Foundation
AfT	Aid for Trade
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CCARDESA	The Centre for Coordinating Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CTF	Child Trust Fund
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
DPs	Development Partners
EAC	Eastern Africa Community
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOWAP	Economic Community of West African States' Agricultural Policy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FANR	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
FANRPAN	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS-NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FO	Farmers Organization
FTA	Free Trade Area
HQ	head-quarters
ICPs	International Cooperating Partners
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IWRM	integrated water resources management
MDTF	Multi-donor Trust Fund
MS	Member States
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTP	Medium-Term Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
NSA	non state actors
NSC	Tripartite North South Corridor
NTBs	Non-Tariff-Barriers
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRINT	Promotion of Regional Integration in the Livestock Sector
RAP	Regional Agricultural Policy
REC	Regional Economic Community
RFSF	SADC Regional Food Stock Facility
RI	Regional Integration
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Plan
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACAU	Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SLRSF	SADC Land Reform Support Facility
SPS	sanitary and phytosanitary (measures)
TF	task force
UK	United Kingdom
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WG	working group
WSRG	Water Strategy Reference Group

Executive Summary

In 2003 the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) was established by the assembly of the African Union (AU) aiming to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6% per year and increasing public investment in agriculture to 10% of national budgets per year. After an initial phase focused primarily on interventions at the national level, there is growing awareness on the need to work more on the regional dimensions of the CAADP. In this context, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has undertaken policy-oriented analysis and stakeholder consultations on regional CAADP processes - and issues at stake - as well as on its linkages with the broader regional integration (RI) dynamics, in various African regions. This paper focuses on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with the objective to stimulate further discussions among involved stakeholders, to contribute to the consultative processes around the implementation of CAADP at regional level, as well as to contribute to lessons-sharing across Africa on regional approaches to food security.

SADC never formally launched a regional CAADP compact preparatory process as it is currently developing a Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP). Despite according to some stakeholders in Southern Africa the exact relationship between the CAADP and the RAP is not fully clear yet, the initial ambiguity on possible competition between these two frameworks is clearing up. The formulation of the RAP and the regional CAADP compact preparation are now the same process. Indeed, the RAP is being designed through the same multidimensional approach to food security as CAADP, and the thematic pillars of the two frameworks match. Given this alignment, but also taking into account current criticisms about the RAP such as insufficient multi-stakeholder ownership, the regional CAADP compact and the RAP would be made to coincide by further mainstreaming the CAADP principles into the RAP:

- enlarging the range of stakeholders regularly involved in the regional preparations;
- including in the mechanisms governing regional food security actions a strong mutual accountability framework for those responsible for implementation, also in relation to the continental CAADP processes and the peer-reviewing of the regional compact and investment plan;
- ensuring coherence and complementarity, and promoting coordination, between the national and regional CAADP compacts and investment plans in SADC.

Indeed most consulted stakeholders tend to agree that one of the weaknesses of the RAP process so far was the limited *multi-stakeholder engagement*. Compared to its early stages, RAP consultations are now broader and more aligned to the CAADP methodology. However, it is still unclear for many actors what is the actual way forward for a "CAADP-compatible" RAP, what the concrete plans are for designing the regional compact in the coming months, and what process will be followed to ensure that such compact add value to national food security strategies. It would be important to make this information widely available to the public, so that the SADC agenda, relevant documents and steps to design a common approach to food security are accessible for any interested stakeholder. This would also counter the perceptions that the SADC Secretariat and few other SADC member states (MS) officials tend to centralise the important work on RAP and that such regional preparations are slow and inefficient. Another crucial process improvement would be to widen scope and depth of *non-state-actors* (NSA) consultations on the RAP. Most NSA lack platforms to engage regularly on food security at regional level, and creating such platforms for CAADP/RAP would be urgent particularly for small farmers and other intermediary business organisations. A pre-condition for increased engagement would be capacity building for farmers and institutional strengthening for both regional and national farmers associations. This in turn would require a mapping of farmers organisations in each SADC country, to assess type of membership, geographical coverage and assistance needed. These accompanying support measures and broader participation would be very important for the smooth conclusion of the RAP formulation in 2012.

A consensus seems also to emerge in the region about the need for more institutional support for the *SADC Secretariat* given its key role for an effective regional CAADP preparatory process. The Secretariat is already acting to tackle some of the challenges it traditionally faces, such as the internal ‘silos mentality’ hampering coherence and coordination between different areas of regional cooperation. But also the SADC MS should do more to support the Secretariat. A possible recommendation for the way forward is to strengthen the Secretariat, including by: enhanced efforts by MS for more systematic input and interaction with the Secretariat on ‘agriculture and rural development’ (ARD) and food security; increased support by donors to the ‘Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources’ Directorate to increase the quantity and quality of technical personnel dedicated specifically to food security processes at national and regional level.

SADC Development partners’ contribution to the regional food security plans has been lukewarm, with weak donor coordination and not-functioning (though existing) donors-SADC engagement structures. In general, more donors are needed to step up their support to regional food security initiatives in SADC, and in particular to the RAP as the overarching framework that should guide also future external support. Many donors assist ARD programmes at national level in SADC countries, but only few of them have a policy to create synergies between regional and national level assistance and between their different sectoral programmes that contribute to food security (e.g. aid for trade). According to many actors in SADC, both types of synergies should be built, and if donors are to fulfil their commitment to support implementation of CAADP at regional level, including to fast-track regional action, they could: improve operational linkages and coordination around regional CAADP plans between their respective head-quarters, regional and national offices; increase regional donor coordination in SADC around CAADP including by assigning a donor lead agency (possibly in Gaborone) and establishing a specific donor working group for the SADC regional CAADP. Existing formal engagement structures between SADC and development partners lost impetus, and all parties agree this type of dialogue should be revitalized (looking possibly at the experience of the water Joint Working Group which is the one that progresses better).

Another emerging message from the SADC stakeholders is that the regional agricultural plans, which have the overall RI framework (RISDP) explicitly at its core, should take into account the cross-cutting general bottlenecks to RI experienced so far by SADC. For RI to work, including cooperation on CAADP, a better match should be achieved between: i) bottom-up RI (business-led) processes and dynamics and ii) top-down (government-led) RI moves, like policy frameworks and protocols. There seems to be no “low hanging fruit” in regional cooperation, and formal binding SADC frameworks are not sufficiently followed-up at national level: the same is likely to hold for a future regional CAADP. In addition, ARD action will have to be accompanied by a much better ‘campaign’ in each SADC MS to raise awareness about the benefits of regional approaches in every proposed regional cooperation area relevant to food security, and about the results achieved so far (in this sense the example of the ‘water basin cooperation awareness kits’, disseminated also in the rural areas, could be replicated for future ARD programmes and other initiatives like the ‘trade corridors’).

Most of the suggestions by consulted stakeholders on the way forward for a regional CAADP relate to the *process* and not the substance. This is not only because the content of the RAP has not been developed yet, but also because few SADC countries have signed a national CAADP compact and the national-regional nexus in agriculture is yet to be fully explored within SADC. Such ‘vertical’ coherence (and synergies) between national and regional policies and investments, however is deemed crucial by many actors in SADC, in parallel with the ‘horizontal’ coherence (and synergies) between policies and investments in food security and in other sectors of regional cooperation in SADC. Despite this process is only in its early stages, and strategic thinking on regional policies and investment to complement action at national level is lacking within several SADC governments, many SADC stakeholders realise the

importance of linking a regional CAADP to ongoing initiatives on ARD, trade, infrastructure and natural resources, and are willing to explore in detail the opportunities and challenges for the creation of synergies. This paper shows that some linkages will naturally emerge, such as on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 'agriculture trade corridors', irrigation as well as existing regional agricultural programmes and institutions. Other synergies will need to be carefully analyzed, in order to design a regional CAADP compact which includes policies and investments that are coherent, complementary and coordinated with those that SADC is taking forward in other RI areas. In specific cases, building synergies with an existing SADC initiative and framing it within a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder policy process like CAADP could also contribute to removing some of the current obstacles to its full implementation.

As most actors in the region agree on the need for an holistic regional approach to food security and for stronger cross-sector linkages, a realistic way forward for an overarching multidimensional regional CAADP could be a programmatic approach to different areas of intervention. This could meet the interest of all involved SADC countries and their different stakeholder groups and could be shaped as a 'differentiated-gears' regional CAADP framework. SADC countries are very different and it would be realistic and useful to build the regional food security compact and investment plan around: different cooperation areas that are progressing at differentiated gears; and different sub-groups of SADC countries which already cooperate well in specific areas (or are likely to) and do have in place a series of programmatic cooperation initiatives. Countries would come on board gradually in different sectors and parts of the regional compact, where they see interest and also benefits (to be assessed on a sector by sector basis). Some of the CAADP initiatives will be new; in other areas the supporting regional institutions and strategies are already in place and a regional CAADP compact would only need to integrate them into the overarching food security plan for the region.

Hence "different gears" for different groups of countries: for instance a uniform agricultural markets information system for those where, de facto, the trade integration happens already; further -and faster- natural resources management cooperation for countries who share water basins; and so on. A faster 'gear' would mean a specific investment plan for that specific area or sub-sector, or a pilot joint programme to be initially implemented only by those few willing SADC MS. The added value of such approach would be to look at existing sector progress and find a niche for CAADP, either as synergy-creation or in some cases as new 'multi-purpose' programmes related to food security, e.g. a value chain development approach which identifies and addresses simultaneously the bottlenecks on natural resources, corridors, and trade. Such gradual and 'differentiated-gears' approach could also apply to the formulation of a flexible 'Tripartite' CAADP compact (bearing in mind that the pace and directions towards a possible 'Tripartite' compact will be set by formal consultations involving the policy organs of the three RECs). This approach would allow SADC to simultaneously formulate its part of the 'Tripartite' compact and complete its ongoing process for the RAP, but without imposing to non-SADC countries the same degree of legal value in other programmes that will instead be common to the three RECs on certain shared challenges.

Given the many countries involved and the complexities at stake, the process towards a flexible, differentiated-gear, regional food security framework would necessarily take time for identification, agreement and definition of realistic plans. Careful design of a 'comprehensive, internally coherent and differentiated gears' compact would require a step-by-step multi-stakeholder consultative process, where all key actors should be represented. This would probably have to start with identifying a minimum common ground among SADC MS on what major bottlenecks and opportunities are for: establishing operational linkages between CAADP and other regional programmes; articulating possible multi-sector priorities into the SADC (and 'Tripartite') CAADP compact; and finding ways for regional actors and their development partners to work more effectively together to fast-track implementation of a regional CAADP.

1. Introduction

After an initial phase focused primarily on interventions at the national level, there is growing awareness on the need to work more on the regional dimensions of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). This was also formally recognised at the 7th CAADP Partnership Platform meeting in Yaoundé, Cameroun (March 2011): of particular importance was the acknowledgement by all CAADP stakeholders that the development and implementation of regional CAADP compacts should be accelerated. This would require greater involvement of all CAADP partners at the regional level and effective harmonization of their interventions, including bringing countries together to share lessons, providing support to link regional and country processes, identifying and addressing cross-border issues.

The ECDPM works actively with African institutions on how to better integrate agriculture, trade and aid policies and processes. Improved coordination, coherence and complementarity between agriculture, trade, regional integration processes and development partners' support is key for Africa's development agenda. While CAADP implementation at national level has gained momentum in recent years, implementation at the regional level has been slow, and progress differs between regions. For example, ECOWAS articulated and launched a regional CAADP compact, the ECOWAP and its regional investment plan; and a well functioning regional donor group exists in West Africa for CAADP. On the other hand, COMESA, EAC and SADC started preparations but currently still lack a regional CAADP compact and structured regional donor coordination for CAADP; but they have made significant advancements on other policies and programmes which are key for food security, such as trade corridors.

The rate and degree of progress emphasise the need for lesson-sharing between Regional Economic Communities (RECs). To contribute to the CAADP, ECDPM undertakes policy analysis on regional CAADP processes -and issues at stake- as well as on its linkages with the broader regional integration processes in Africa, including by facilitating deeper dialogue and lesson-sharing among and between the RECs and development partners working on CAADP in various African regions. In those regions where the preparations for a regional CAADP compact are under way, ECDPM's work included in 2011, in collaboration with RECs, development partners, and other key CAADP actors such as the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA), the analysis of:

1. progress made in implementing and supporting CAADP Regional Plans and other relevant regional programmes linked to CAADP Pillars (natural resources management, trade, infrastructure, etc.);
2. how regional integration is dealt with within the CAADP and the linkages between CAADP and other regional programmes (and whether these are effectively utilised to achieve CAADP objectives).

This paper outlines the results of such 'mapping exercise' for SADC, and is meant to stimulate further discussions among stakeholders and to contribute to the consultative processes around the implementation of a regional CAADP compact in SADC. Indeed, the first key step is to make important information about regional strategies and plans available to everyone to contribute to multi-stakeholder ownership.

This paper, a contribution in this direction, is part of a series of publications, made possible by the financial support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presenting an independent assessment by ECDPM on the status of regional approaches to food security. It is the outcome of: extensive and regular consultations and interviews with stakeholders in the regions (including RECs Secretariats, the NPCA, government officials, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other experts from regional institutions); ECDPM's different types of informal contributions to the formal CAADP-related processes; as well as deep investigation of the existing literature (which is already very extensive on regional integration and growing rapidly on CAADP).

Section 2 of this paper describes the status of preparations in SADC for a regional CAADP compact, highlighting the role played so far by key involved stakeholders and the relationship between food security processes and the overall progress on regional integration. Section 3 analyses other regional initiatives relevant to food security and the possible synergies between CAADP and such policies and programmes. Taking into account these existing challenges and opportunities, Section 4 presents some ideas and recommendations on the way forward for regional food security plans, both in terms of what each actor could do to contribute positively and what features could characterize a regional CAADP compact in SADC.

2. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme in SADC

2.1. Progress made in implementing and supporting CAADP Regional Plans: Lessons & Challenges

A Regional CAADP in SADC: the initial ambiguity is slowly clearing up

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) never formally launched a regional CAADP compact preparatory process¹ as it is currently developing a **Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP)**. The formulation process for the RAP was initiated by the SADC Secretariat in 2008, as that roadmap for agriculture suggested in the 2003 multi-sectoral Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP) that provides strategic direction with respect to implementation of all SADC programmes, projects and activities. For long time the **RAP and CAADP seem to have been perceived as two competing frameworks**, within and outside the region. Now this tension seems to be clearing, with most involved actors recognizing that the RAP (under the overall RISDP) will indeed be the SADC regional CAADP compact.

According to the SADC Secretariat, the RISDP incorporates the same principles and objectives of CAADP for agriculture, natural resource management and environment. The Secretariat is now developing a four-year (2012 - 2015) Medium-Term Plan (MTP) that will formalise and mainstream CAADP principles, values and targets into RISDP activities. As reported by the SADC Secretariat during the last CAADP Partnership Platform in Yaounde (March 2011), through the explicit alignment of RAP (and RISDP) thematic pillars with the CAADP pillars, the RAP will be fully “CAADP-compatible”.

So far the RAP formulation process consisted of a number of steps: an ‘audit’ or ‘stocktaking’ of agricultural policies in SADC Member States (MS), followed by national workshops with all relevant stakeholders; a ‘Synthesis Report’ of such consultations (“RAP: Synthesis Report & Policy Directions”); a regional workshop on the RAP preparation; five studies to analyse key agriculture issues to be addressed in the SADC region. The results of such consultative process feed into the ‘Draft RAP Policy Statement’ currently being prepared, which covers areas such as transboundary water management, regional agricultural markets and climate smart agriculture. The time-frame for the RAP is the following: the ‘RAP Policy Statement’, considered to be the basis for the SADC regional CAADP compact, is to be approved by Ministers in May 2012 and endorsed by the SADC Council in August 2012; this will be followed by the preparation of an investment plan, with the aim of completing the **RAP by end 2012**. A reason for such

¹ See Box 1 for a brief explanation on the CAADP processes.

long period of preparation could be that one of the options currently discussed is for the RAP to be a legally binding framework, which thus requires substantial consultation, analytical, and drafting activities.

Despite these deliverables of the RAP process are consistent with the CAADP process, and work is ongoing to establish a CAADP-related 'Child Trust Fund' (CTF) for SADC², **different views still exist** about the future relationship between RAP and CAADP and especially about how to design and implement regional plans that add value to national food security strategies which are shaped in many countries under the CAADP framework. On the one hand, key steps for implementing the CAADP are taking place in some SADC MS, including joint missions by NPCA, SADC and other partners such as FAO to support preparations of the national compacts (e.g. Lesotho and Namibia). On the other, there still is very little specific exchange on the RAP between SADC stakeholders and the NPCA and other official CAADP structures (e.g. the Pillar Lead Institutions), and it is still unclear for many actors what is the actual way forward for a "CAADP-compatible" RAP.

Regardless of its final name (RAP or regional CAADP compact), two important dimensions of the way forward should be distinguished (and will be addressed separately in the remaining part of this section): *substance* and *process*. In terms of the *content* of policies and investments, it will be crucial to design any regional food security plan to be coherent and foster synergies: vertical coherence and synergy between the content of national CAADP compacts and the regional compact; as well as horizontal coherence and synergy between policies and investments in the food security sector and other sectors of regional cooperation in SADC. In terms of *process*, to guarantee ownership, gather support, facilitate implementation, it will be key for the regional food security plan formulation to: be inclusive and transparent; effectively take into account the different points of view of all relevant stakeholders; include the design of mutual accountability mechanisms allowing for the monitoring of stakeholders' implementation responsibilities and the evaluation of food security impacts.

Box 1: CAADP in brief

CAADP is the agricultural programme of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is a programme of the African Union. Established by the AU assembly in 2003, CAADP's goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 percent of their national budgets. CAADP identifies four key pillars for food security improvement and agricultural investment: (1) Sustainable Land and Water Management; (2) Market Access; (3) Food Supply and Hunger; and (4) Agricultural Research.

The CAADP is centered around the definition of national and regional plans ('compacts'), an agreement between all stakeholders (public, private as well as donors) serving as a framework for partnerships, alliances, and dialogue to design and implement the required policy interventions and investment programmes. The formulation of national and regional investment plans is one of the most important activities to implement CAADP after the definition and signature of the compact (to date more than 25 Countries in Africa have signed the CAADP compacts, 18 have reviewed Investment Plans and 12 have convened Business Meetings; for more information: www.caadp.net)

CAADP therefore is not a (donors') programme, it is a common framework for stimulating and guiding national, regional and continental initiatives on enhanced agriculture productivity and food security which each region and country can develop and implement as preferred. CAADP is a very advanced attempt at fully implementing the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action on Aid Effectiveness. It is difficult to identify similar partnerships, even sector-wide approaches, that can claim to have the same: degree of African ownership (at political-bureaucratic-experts level),

² The MTP is also the basis of the financial proposal submitted by SADC to MDTF for a SADC CTF, still under discussion.

including at national level (unlike other AU/regional initiatives such as FTAs); robust plans for mutual accountability (serious monitoring & evaluation is built into CAADP); outreach to other sectors (trade, capacity development, natural resources, infrastructure, research and technology, safety); level of ODA predictability (substantial commitments of funds and relatively advanced alignment by donors) and regular donor coordination (e.g. headquarters focal points work together via teleconference every other week to task-divide and harmonize their CAADP activities).

The clear linkages between trade and agriculture within CAADP are confirmed by the fact that around thirty percent of the investment needs included in national CAADP investment plans formulated so far relate to the development of market access and value chains. Weaknesses remain, with CAADP criticized by some stakeholders for lacking sufficient: private sector involvement; regional level implementation; and clarity on the continental-regional-national nexus.

Formulation and implementation of CAADP-related initiatives is driven by a broad range of actors. CAADP being a continental framework, the African Union, and particularly the NPCA, is tasked with its coordination. Designated Pillar Lead Institutions oversee and support work that falls under the 4 CAADP pillars. RECs facilitate the formulation and implementation of a regional compact and a regional agricultural investment plan, while supporting their member states with CAADP initiatives on the national level. At the national level, governments facilitate the formulation and implementation of a national compact and investment plan. Bilateral and multilateral donors provide financial and technical support to CAADP processes and investment.

One specific financial donor vehicle to support the CAADP processes (not investments), is the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MTDF) hosted at the World Bank. The MTDF aims to strengthen institutional capacities of African drivers of CAADP, particularly on the continental and regional level, to effectively lead, implement, monitor and evaluate CAADP processes. Beneficiaries of so-called 'Child Trust Funds' include the NPCA, Pillar Institutions and the RECs. Among the contributing donors are UK's DFID, the European Union, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and USAID.

The substance: the national-regional nexus in agriculture is yet to be fully explored

SADC Heads of State and Government called for regional action through the SADC Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in 2004. This Declaration was the first attempt at specifying the *substance* of the regional approach to agricultural development and food security as defined in the 2003 RISDP. It called for the implementation of a series of short and long term measures aimed at strengthening sectoral cooperation between MS through the development of coherent regional policies and programmes related to crop, livestock, fisheries and forestry development, as well as protection, storage, processing, utilization and trade.

The formulation of the RAP aims at translating this political decision into concrete regional action, but for a number of reasons the development of a comprehensive regional approach and coordinated series of regional programmes is progressing slowly. This is not only due to the complexities and long-time frame of the RAP consultation process itself, but also to the low priority accorded to regional-level interventions in agriculture by many stakeholders in SADC. Despite many of the interviewed actors recognise the potential value of regional plans as possible policy coordination and strategic investment that individual countries, acting alone, could not achieve, there seems to be limited consensus within SADC about the importance of regional cooperation in agriculture. Governments, and politicians, tend to focus on agriculture as a national issue, where protecting the national interest is particularly important. Farmers and other businesses also concentrate on the national challenges they face in the sector, and probably have little resources and time to devote to the regional dimensions. As a consequence, the national-regional nexus in agriculture is yet to

be fully explored: strategic thinking is lacking in SADC about concrete plans, issues and sub-sectors where regional policies and investment need to complement action at national level.

In regional policy-related circles such thinking is more advanced compared to the national debates. Indeed the SADC Secretariat envisages the RAP to also guide the integration of trans-boundary priorities into country agriculture investment plans, and a number of SADC regional food security programmes are already coordinated by the Secretariat. Both the design and implementation of such policies and programmes however remain the responsibility primarily of regional officials and specific country-level focal points, without real involvement of the wider group of national stakeholders. For instance, there seem to be very limited knowledge about the RAP in several SADC countries, and some key actors in the Agricultural Ministries have little knowledge of the RAP documents. The Working Group responsible for formulating the RAP is small³ and many do not know its composition. This is compounded by the fact that **at national level a regional CAADP compact may not be a real priority**. Some SADC countries already signed a national CAADP compact while others have not; others did not seem interested for long time (e.g. the Republic of South Africa only launched the CAADP national preparatory process in October 2011).

In general, all interviewed stakeholders consider the CAADP cycle and processes (with national and regional dimensions) as well designed, but most actors agree that more should be done to **help countries realize what is needed at regional level** and what a regional compact can bring in addition to a national CAADP compact.

The process: limited non-state-actors engagement in regional agriculture plans

One of the crucial 'process' dimensions of regional food security plans is 'ownership' by stakeholders, and arguably farmers and other private sector actors are the most important groups to be involved in the design and implementation of these policies and investment, both as key contributors to food security and as beneficiaries of support programmes. However, farmers, and in particular the small ones, suffer seriously from lack of voice in agriculture and rural development (ARD) processes. Some of them, when interviewed, questioned the real openness of the preparatory process for the RAP, considered not "truly multi-stakeholder" (as the guidelines to implement CAADP for instance prescribe). In general, no policy process will ever achieve a perfect degree of ownership, satisfactory to all, but in the case of RAP/CAADP the apparently limited involvement of the final beneficiaries seem to be a particularly serious problem.

In SADC numerous farmers organisations (FOs) exist both at national and sub-regional level but are **not sufficiently organised and involved in regional food security decision-making**. Their involvement on a RAP/regional CAADP is very limited, as they lack a platform for regular engagement at regional level. In general, farmers face challenges even at national level to be involved in (and anticipate potential impact of) national agriculture policies and programmes. The regional level seems to bear little relevance for them, including a RAP, while most FO tend to consider as a priority an improved farmers' awareness on CAADP national compacts and the reinforcement of their links with the CAADP Country Teams that coordinate the national compact formulation.⁴

In SADC, like in other African regions, it should not be given for granted that the farmers representation at regional level is optimal and accepted by all.⁵ The Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU) is involved in the RAP and other regional processes but many stakeholders believe it should do

³ The RAP WG was formed in 2009, composed of: SADC Secretariat, FAO, ReSAKSS, SACAU and DFID (SADC Secretariat, 2010).

⁴ For more details on farmers organisations work-plans, see Dietvorst (2010).

⁵ Similar conclusions on the weaknesses of farmers' involvement in CAADP and issues of regional representation can be found in other independent studies, e.g. APRODEV (2012).

better to empower its national members. On the other hand, SACAU already undertakes a number of important activities and intends to do more in terms of: conducting awareness workshops on CAADP for farmers and other agriculture stakeholders; supporting policy engagement of FOs; strengthening national FO capacities on CAADP technical issues; supporting communication on CAADP in the region through the media; informing on the links between national and regional CAADP processes.

Like small farmers, also other non-state-actors, such as NGOs and **private businesses, face challenges in terms of engagement in regional decision-making, and in particularly the RAP**. Though there is a general perception in the region that at national level most intermediary civil society and business organisations are quite strong, regional platforms for their regular involvement are lacking.⁶ For instance the SADC Business Forum launched in 2005 does not play any role in the RAP formulation process.

The role of the SADC Secretariat: 'old' challenges and recent progress

Another key actor in the regional food security processes is the SADC Secretariat, responsible for overall coordination of regional policies as well as implementation of a number of relevant programmes. The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) Directorate of the Secretariat has the mandate for implementing and coordinating actions to respond to the strategic directions provided by the RISDP and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security. These include the RAP formulation and the mainstreaming of the CAADP into existing RISDP-derived programmes and activities, including recently through the development of the Medium-Term Plan (MTP). Coordinating regional cooperation entails a set of complex and demanding tasks and, like in other 'regional economic communities' (REC) in Africa, the SADC Secretariat has always faced several challenges to its effectiveness, including financial and human resource constraints.⁷

Based on such persisting challenges and their own experience, some interviewed stakeholders expressed a negative assessment about the role played so far by the SADC Secretariat in supporting the progress of CAADP in the region. One of the arguments mentioned is the fact that only those SADC MS which are also members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) signed a CAADP compact, with the assistance of the COMESA Secretariat; while the SADC-only MS do not have compacts in place yet (with the exception of Tanzania which however is also part of the Easter Africa Community, EAC).

Apparently, the SADC Secretariat was not effective in assisting MS as expected with the identification of their food security needs and coordinating external support to them, in collaboration with the AUC/NPCA and other institutions responsible for CAADP implementation. For instance in certain cases, the national government did contact the SADC Secretariat requesting for assistance to start the CAADP process, and appointed a CAADP Focal Person, but received a delayed response. Slow progress, as mentioned, also characterizes the regional CAADP process, and some stakeholders point to the weaknesses of the Secretariat in leading this process as well, mentioning as an example that a Regional CAADP Focal Person at the FANR Directorate was only identified in February 2011.

Such negative assessment is to some extent an issue of perceptions, given that country CAADP cycles are ongoing in a number of SADC MS and the Secretariat is indeed facilitating national-level preparations in countries that have so requested (e.g. Tanzania, Namibia, Lesotho). Moreover, some actors in SADC also note that the responsibility for slow progress is probably to be shared with other organisations with a

⁶ According to some interviewed stakeholders, this problem has become so serious that in November 2010 the President of Namibia asked for a special Heads of State Summit to get back to effective private sector involvement in every SADC process, since in recent years many SADC-led processes seemed to fail to be truly multi-stakeholder.

⁷ ACBF (2008).

leading role for CAADP implementation, e.g. the NPCA. The NEPAD Agency would have often failed to communicate effectively and timely with regional stakeholders about various aspects of the CAADP processes, including in terms of opportunities to share lessons across different RECs as well as avenues to access external funding through 'multilateral' mechanisms such as the MDTF.

Another argument behind the negative views on the role played so far by the Secretariat for CAADP relates to a series of constraints that limit the effectiveness of its regional coordination function (i.e. consultation processes with the MS and sector stakeholders), including the complexity and costs associated with organizing regional meetings, particularly as national budgets are under financial pressure.⁸ At the SADC Secretariat there is **little interdepartmental coordination**, few meetings among (perceived) isolated units and even less operational linkages that should guide inter-sectoral coordination at regional level. Some observers point to a 'silos mentality' due to both the 'working culture' and the lack of managerial direction to coordinate. Moreover, a key general problem mentioned is that the Secretariat tends to centralize all preparatory work, including technical, despite its limited human resources⁹; while, according to critical views, it should only act as good facilitator of national level input and manager of external expertise.¹⁰

Other actors however note that the Secretariat of a REC is like its Member States want it to be, so if there are problems of ineffectiveness, more should be done by the **SADC MS to support and direct the Secretariat**. Exclusively technocratic solutions like more regular working groups in Gaborone and invitations to NSAs by the Secretariat are not enough, and it could be necessary to modify the mandates and operational guidelines for the Secretariat, which would require political decisions by the MS. This is indeed also a national issue: ultimately it is the MS who are responsible to start and complete the CAADP process, for a regional compact as well. Finally, it was also mentioned that the Secretariat's weaknesses could be addressed by increasing financial contributions by MS for broader participation of national officials and stakeholders in the regional processes and for attracting highly skilled staff to the Secretariat (through higher salaries and other benefits). However, as recognised by others, this would require in turn more tangible returns for the MS on their investment into the Secretariat's activities.

The SADC Secretariat is currently addressing these long-term challenges and recently progress was made also on CAADP implementation. In general, a Management Technical Committee was established to meet every month and holistically address matters of regional integration across the different SADC Directorates and Units in order to streamline the operations, optimize on synergies through joint planning processes, and tackle the 'silos mentality'. Development partners were also approached to support institutional strengthening through their interventions, e.g. the Capacity Building for Regional Integration Programme funded by the European Commission (EC). Particularly in the area of food security, in 2012 the FANR Directorate plans to increase multi-stakeholder involvement in the design of RAP both at national and regional levels, including by expanding the membership of the RAP Working Group (also to continental-level organisations responsible for CAADP like the NPCA) and ensuring that future consultations are open to any other interested partner.

⁸ For a discussion, see Mutai (2011).

⁹ This is not only the perception of some interviewed stakeholders, it is also referred to by independent assessments such as in Keet (2007) who describes a process of "highly centralised and increasingly technocratic control over SADC policy-making in Gaborone".

¹⁰ Apparently this is the approach of COMESA Secretariat, e.g. when it outsourced the CAADP regional compact formulation process to an independent organisation, the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN).

The role of development partners in SADC: weak engagement and emerging lessons

Another important actor in the regional food security processes is the group of development partners (DPs), comprising all major international donors which support with substantial funds and other inputs the CAADP and other related programmes. The engagement between SADC and its DPs is organised through a formal system of joint working groups (WGs) for specific themes under the overall umbrella of a Joint Task Force. However most of those involved seem to agree on the fact that in reality those **coordination and engagement structures do not work effectively**. Some WGs for instance tend to meet only once a year and others are considered “dormant”. Specifically, only few donors have been involved in the WG (led by DFID and FAO) where the RAP is discussed.

This may be partly due to the weaknesses of the SADC Secretariat as discussed above, but also to the **lukewarm contribution of most DPs to the agriculture-related processes at regional level in SADC**. Such lack of engagement (and enthusiasm), contrasting with the proactive approach to CAADP taken by many donors in other African regions, is explained by certain officials from DPs with the lack of certainty about the real prospects for a regional CAADP compact in SADC and the relatively slow progress of the existing regional agricultural plans (which on the contrary should be guiding donors’ involvement and generating clear demands for external support). However, additional reasons behind this relatively feeble cooperation with international partners emerge from consultations with stakeholders, and they could represent important lessons for the way forward on regional food security plans in SADC.

First of all, a common overarching approach by donors to regional cooperation support in SADC is lacking which also leads to weak DPs coordination. Different DPs focus on supporting different regional cooperation areas, which results in a high variety of externally funded programmes. Despite many actors in SADC believe that the regional level is the right one for donor coordination, while HQs are too far away from the regional dynamics, coordination in SADC tends to remain most often only exchange of information. Several DPs finance regional programmes that contribute to ARD and to one or more of the CAADP/RAP thematic areas, but there is no fully-fledged common approach, support and alignment to one regional ARD framework. Other important donors do not have regional agricultural programmes, facing therefore **little incentive to create or participate in sectoral coordination**.

Another reason for the weak engagement of DPs in regional food security initiatives is that **working at regional level on ARD is relatively new** for most donors, traditionally involved in supporting national food security action. Many development cooperation agencies and their officials in Southern Africa remain to be convinced that regional work on ARD is a priority, and many would point to the need to first strengthen donor support and coordination at national level, including on CAADP. Given that it would make sense to build a regional CAADP compact on the basis of policies and investments included in the national compacts, but many SADC MS have not adopted or finalised such national plans, donors would then have to focus on supporting **national processes first**, and only later work on the regional dimensions.

Additional problems are linked to the geographical organisation of donor support in Eastern and Southern Africa and related capacity constraints for some of the DPs offices in the SADC region. RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa, namely COMESA, EAC and SADC, present serious problems of overlapping membership, the so-called 'spaghetti bowl' of RECs, with several countries belonging to more than one regional community and implementing respective policies and programmes which are not necessarily coherent across regions. This leads to a degree of **uncertainty on the side of DPs on where to establish the regional donor office** responsible for regional food security work. For instance, in order to best

support the integration of staple food trade among neighbouring Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and Rwanda, shall a donor programme be managed in collaboration with which REC Secretariat (as Zambia and Malawi belong to both SADC and COMESA, Tanzania to both SADC and EAC while Rwanda to COMESA and EAC)? This 'spaghetti bowl' makes coordination more complex and support less effective, since different DPs tend to answer differently to this kind of questions. Moreover, the current traction on the side of several donors to support both SADC and COMESA Secretariats in their CAADP-related work seem to be **placed in the Pretoria or Nairobi offices** or in the Headquarters (possibly with the exception of the EC); while according to many stakeholders the centre of donors' action and coordination to assist the formulation of regional CAADP compacts for COMESA and SADC should be in Lusaka and Gaborone respectively, where the REC Secretariats are based. Engaging effectively in regional agricultural development processes and supporting the relevant regional actors require an adequate number of staff and quality of the related technical expertise, which are often lacking in the case of many donor agency offices, especially in small countries with relatively limited 'political appeal' such as Zambia or Botswana.

Finally, when assessing the role of DPs in regional food security processes, some stakeholders in SADC noted that donors' judgments on, and subsequent support to, the SADC Secretariat's initiatives vary significantly from one programme to the other, despite they are all meant to contribute to the same objectives. Those actors question the real motivations behind this seemingly swinging attitude: why most donors seem to fully support some ARD programmes by the Secretariat (e.g. the Centre for Coordinating Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Africa) but have not engaged in the overarching food security initiative, i.e. the RAP? Is this because DPs see the RAP as competing with CAADP, i.e. a framework which they would be able to better control from their HQs compared to the fully "SADC-owned" RAP process? According to this criticism, the provision of financial support by donors would constitute sometimes a distortive incentive as it could influence the choice of African actors like a REC Secretariat on the basis of availability of external resources and not of local ownership and legitimacy. For instance, when considering the argument that the COMESA Secretariat would be more effective in supporting CAADP compared to the SADC Secretariat, some stakeholders in SADC respond that this is due to the creation of a pool of experts within COMESA following exclusively CAADP, a process originating outside of COMESA, and fully funded through a Child Trust Fund managed outside COMESA (i.e. at the World Bank). The SADC Secretariat on the other hand may be less efficient and under-resourced but it has a mandate to formulate the RAP which originates within SADC and is implemented by a department which is fully funded by, and accountable exclusively to, the SADC member states.

2.2. CAADP regional plans and linkages with the overall framework for regional integration

Regional integration (RI) is at the core of regional agricultural plans, but RI itself is a shaky process

A very important dimension related to the progress of regional approaches to food security which emerges from consultations with SADC stakeholders is the relationship between such regional plans and the overall framework for, and status of, regional integration initiatives. The RAP formulation process has RI and the synergies across different sectors of regional cooperation at its core since the RAP is to be directly derived from the 2003 multi-sectoral Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP), which has a strong multidimensional nature and RI as its goal. Regardless of its name, it would be therefore natural for any SADC regional agricultural plan to give **central stage to RI**. Synergies are likely to emerge across policies and programmes related to existing regional frameworks on natural resources, trade, infrastructure and

ARD, some of which seem to progress well. The next section of this paper analyses such possible synergies across different sectors of regional cooperation that are relevant for food security. However, here it is important to discuss some of the **serious overall challenges faced by SADC** on the prospects for effective RI, which are linked to political economy factors¹¹ and are **likely to be reflected also in any regional approach to food security**.

This concern about the implications of general RI problems for a regional CAADP is the prevailing view among the majority of stakeholders in SADC, who also tend to share the overall assessment that so far RI in SADC was mostly a government-driven process, with neat formal structures, but limited implementation¹². Many seem to agree on the fact that **for RI to work**, including cooperation on ARD (and CAADP) at regional level, it is fundamental to better **match**:

1. **bottom-up RI** processes and dynamics, which tend to be driven by the private sector and various forms of investment; and
2. **top-down RI moves**, such as policy frameworks and protocols that are usually driven by the governments and the public sector.

The bottlenecks to deeper RI in SADC start with the extreme economic heterogeneity of MS: many stakeholders refer to the fact that RI has not shown its benefits to the weaker economies and countries but only to the Republic of South Africa (RSA)¹³ and few other strong SADC MS. Some, including national-level donors, indeed point to the lack of evidence on the benefits of regional programmes for the population at large. Some even conclude that if RI does not progress further then it means RSA and its private sector are satisfied with the current degree of regional cooperation and integration: in order to fast-track RI, it is argued, clear incentives should be created for RSA and its private sector to intensify their efforts.

According to many actors in the region, another obstacle to RI is that **'regional thinking' is not institutionalized in most SADC MS**, and arbitrary unilateral policy measures are still common and contradict basic principles of regional cooperation. Among certain groups of stakeholder, the private sector in particular, a certain degree of mistrust remains with respect to the regional institutions such as the SADC Secretariat. These are often defined as "highly political" organisations, perceived to pay too much attention to the internal political dynamics and power struggles within each MS, to the detriment of the overall regional integration agenda. This is compounded both by the low levels of technical personnel, managerial capacity and financial resources of the regional institutions, as well as by the scarce efforts devoted by the MS to their effective participation in SADC coordination structures.¹⁴

Many stakeholders concur that the most serious problem for SADC is probably the **regulatory uncertainty in the region**, especially on trade: there are too many layers of bureaucracy, little implementation and **no real enforceability of regional decisions**, especially since these do not get domesticated in MS through national legislation¹⁵. It was noted by certain actors that it is too easy to blame only the SADC Secretariat: it is the MS who should translate regional frameworks into national legislation, while the Secretariat's function

¹¹ Draper (2010).

¹² See for instance a recent interesting article explaining that what emerges from the SADC experience is "a story of high ambition (on paper) and a poor record with regard to implementation", where "the question marks are not about the formal legal dimension: it is mostly about poor implementation and insufficient monitoring of compliance" (Erasmus, 2011).

¹³ Looking at RI from RSA, the picture seems positive, with substantial part of private sector benefiting at least from trade liberalization and concretely contributing to the economic integration via investment and trade, with spillovers on job creation (also thank to the ability of the RSA Government to create an enabling environment for this).

¹⁴ UNECA (2008).

¹⁵ "SADC member states neglect their legal obligations, that legal instruments are incomplete, that judgments by the Tribunal are often not respected, and that there is insufficient awareness about the various SADC instruments and how to enforce them" (Erasmus, 2011)

is to monitor such process¹⁶. In other instances, the problem in terms of regulatory uncertainty for SADC economic operators is represented by the overlapping membership of Eastern and Southern African RECs. As explained in the previous section, certain SADC MS also belong to COMESA or EAC and cases are reported of regulations changing at the same border post, with the SADC regime or rule being applied and then changed for the COMESA or EAC regime or rule in a short span of time, and vice versa.¹⁷

Signs of progress, however, exist in terms of both addressing the cross-cutting challenges to SADC integration and removing obstacles in specific RI areas. For instance, the ongoing work under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers responsible for Finance and Investment to establish the SADC Regional Development Fund (with two components: Integration and Adjustment Facility; and Infrastructure Fund) should address the long-standing problem of limited resources to finance projects under the RISDP. An example of progress in a specific sector is the model applied to removing non-tariff-barriers (NTBs) to trade, which seems to be producing the first results and therefore incentives to SADC MS for national-level reforms.¹⁸ A system is in place for monitoring NTBs whereby any private operator can report the encountered NTBs to a website and then the SADC Secretariat can take the matter to the responsible body in the MS for follow-up action. Similar approaches to private-public cooperation could be considered for other areas of regional integration.

A regional CAADP/RAP designed to take into account the key underlying bottlenecks to RI and the above lessons learnt, in particular the importance of matching bottom-up business-led dynamics with government-led processes, would have better chances to achieve its objectives. Delivering results in a crucial sector such as agriculture could also be a real contribution to the overall integration and cooperation in SADC.

Thinking forward: a 'Tripartite' approach to the regional CAADP compact?

While assessing the relationship between CAADP regional plans and the overall framework for RI, it is important to take into account that SADC, COMESA and EAC in 2005 established the 'Tripartite', an umbrella organization consisting of the three RECs and overseen by a Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government, with the main objective of strengthening and deepening economic integration of the Southern and Eastern Africa region. In 2008 the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Task Force (TF), composed of the heads of the three RECs Secretariats, identified three priorities for joint work: the Free Trade Area (FTA), trade facilitation and infrastructure corridors (the so-called "first generation issues"). Despite many stakeholders in the three sub-regions express doubts related to the complexity and current pace of the Tripartite integration¹⁹, all seem to agree that this is the only solution in the long-term to the problems created by the 'spaghetti bowl', since the Tripartite was created exactly to harmonise programmes, policies and regulations within and between the three RECs.

More recently, climate change and food security were identified by the TF as "second generation issues", and in July 2010 the COMESA region decided to finalise its regional CAADP compact as part of a "Tripartite CAADP compact"²⁰. The process for 'Tripartite' decisions and frameworks can be lengthy²¹ and

¹⁶ On the contrary, some actors believe that when a regional decision is detrimental to one important SADC MS the regional institution responsible for it risks being penalised, as it happened in May 2011 when the SADC Tribunal was 'dissolved', or 'temporarily suspended' according to others, out of a long controversy on a judgment against the Zimbabwean government (see for instance www.zimeye.org/?p=30022; for an analysis of the legal aspects of this case, see Ndlovu, 2011).

¹⁷ AU and ECA (2010).

¹⁸ African Economic Outlook (2011).

¹⁹ See for instance Mutai (2011) who concludes that "the most recent effort – in the form of the tripartite COMESA–EAC–SADC negotiations – to harmonise the trade regimes of these different bodies is promising; but, given the different objectives of the three bodies, such negotiations do not offer much hope of a short-term solution", though the three RECs agreed in June 2011 to establish Africa's largest free trade zone by 2013.

²⁰ The COMESA Ministers of Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources decided that: "Given the progress made on the Tripartite Agreement between COMESA, EAC and SADC, COMESA Member States should take this development into consideration and

its compatibility with the requirements for 'CAADP open multi-stakeholder processes' is to be assessed, but certainly many actors, especially in COMESA, are interested in designing a 'Tripartite' compact.²² The willingness on the side of SADC and EAC is less explicit, although also many stakeholders from SADC - especially those working on RI at the technical level- agree that a 'Tripartite' approach to agriculture and food security makes sense as it would address fundamental issues related to overlapping RECs membership, such as SPS and other types of agricultural trade barriers.

The SADC Council of Ministers in August 2011 decided that SADC should join the process towards a 'Tripartite' compact. After this, informal consultations between officials of the three RECs Secretariats started, with a view to agree on which specific areas of cooperation will be covered by a 'Tripartite' food security framework as well as on which REC will take the lead in the preparations under each thematic areas. Some actors in the SADC region emphasise the need to be cautious about a 'Tripartite' compact, taking into account that high expectations on the Tripartite were created by the announcements of the FTA but were not met even after the idea has been discussed for a number of years, and that consultations around agriculture have just commenced among RECs and are still at an informal stage. According to other stakeholders the Tripartite initiatives so far have been to some extent driven more by donors and by the COMESA Secretariat than by other players in the region, so any further expansion of the Tripartite agenda should be evaluated more carefully.²³

On the development partners side, it is well known that DFID is more advanced in terms of political, technical and financial support for the 'Tripartite' initiatives, while others are not on board yet. A 'Friends of the Tripartite' group of donors exist for support related to the trade sector, and a similar approach could be considered in the future as basis for RECs-donors engagement for a possible 'Tripartite' CAADP compact, but this type of discussion is only in its infancy.²⁴

3. Other regional initiatives relevant to food security and possible linkages with CAADP

Under the overarching framework of the multi-sectoral Regional Indicative Strategic Plan, the SADC region has already in place several policies and programmes which are very important to achieve food security objectives, in particular in the areas of ARD, natural resources, trade, and infrastructure. In many cases these initiatives precede the CAADP. In order to assess the progress and future prospects of regional food security plans therefore it is important to analyse also the status of such policies and programmes in SADC, as well as the possible synergies with a regional CAADP compact.

approve further development of the COMESA regional compact within the tripartite framework. The Tripartite CAADP regional compact will have to be approved and adopted by the three RECs" (FANRPAN, 2010).

²¹ Senior officials from RECs MS achieve full consensus among them, once the 3 SGs (TF) have agreed the topic is to be addressed together. Then the 3 Secretariats work out the details and related decisions to Ministers for endorsement; finally from Ministers Council the issue is referred to the Heads of State for official decisions and issuing of political directions.

²² This paper refers to a possible 'tripartite' CAADP compact, or any 'tripartite' food security initiative, only in a broad sense, as joint approaches by the three RECs, i.e. 'trilateral'; without any judgment on the merit of food security being tackled through the same processes and steps that the three RECs chose for the Tripartite FTA. Such steps, the political decisions behind them and their timing will depend on the governments of the three RECs member states.

²³ In a recent article for instance, EAC officials were quoted referring to 'mistrust' among different players and arguing that delays in the Tripartite would have to be attributed to SADC: "mistrust, delays and lack of a legal framework from SADC partners have derailed negotiations on the harmonisation process" (in "Plan to merge regional blocs runs into trouble", October 10th 2011, The East African, www.tralac.org/category/tralac-news).

²⁴ In addition to this, at the moment of publishing this paper, the Secretariat and MS of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda) together with their international partners announced the launching of a process to formulate an IGAD regional CAADP compact. This adds to the uncertainties related to the Tripartite.

As mentioned in the previous section, the RAP formulation process is designed to build on existing sectors of regional cooperation, hence a regional CAADP is likely to include actions on climate smart agriculture, transboundary water management and regional agricultural markets. In turn, many of the areas where SADC frameworks and processes -different from CAADP- are ongoing or in the pipeline include among their objectives agriculture development and/or food security. Regional cooperation on water issues, for instance, is one of the priority intervention areas under RISDP and one of its main specific targets is to develop by 2015 the water infrastructure needed to double the size of land under irrigation, boosting therefore agricultural production.

Assessing the progress made by the other policies and programmes relevant to food security, understanding their strengths and weaknesses, what major bottlenecks they encounter, is crucial to:

1. avoid duplications and identify opportunities and challenges for the creation of synergies with the RAP;
2. understand whether the implementation of CAADP at regional level can build on the progress in other sectors and possibly contribute to removing current obstacles to those existing regional initiatives;
3. design a regional CAADP compact which includes policies and investments that are coherent, complementary and coordinated with those that SADC is taking forward in other RI areas.

Given that the RAP process is only in the early stages of defining the substance of a regional compact, this section can only provide some examples and preliminary ideas about possible synergies between CAADP and other relevant regional initiatives. Many other programmes, policies and investments could be looked at to derive lessons for regional food security cooperation. And synergies could be explored more in detail during the RAP process and other multi-stakeholder dialogues, when actors will be able to discuss concretely about coherence, complementarity and coordination of specific CAADP actions within the regional compact with other existing policies and investments. In certain circumstances, even if synergies were clear, there may be other challenges to prevent their operationalisation, for instance political sensitivities, potential conflict between institutions involved in those programmes, or simply the preference by one or more SADC MS to deal with that particular issue outside of the CAADP framework.

Agriculture: ongoing programmes as good basis to develop a more comprehensive framework

SADC established various regional cooperation frameworks and programmes on agriculture and food security well before the RAP and CAADP formulation processes, including on food stocks, research and technology, information sharing and dissemination, crop and livestock development and protection. In these areas, progress was made in developing policy statements, strategies, MoUs and protocols; creating supporting regional institutions; concluding agreements at technical level on the harmonization of different national rules.²⁵

However, on the one hand, it is probably too early for a sound and comprehensive evaluation of most programmes and the clear identification of success-stories, as most ARD initiatives are relatively new compared to other regional cooperation sectors (e.g. both the Trade Protocol and the Power Pool were launched in SADC nearly a decade before the Dar Declaration on Agriculture). On the other, it seems that some of the challenges faced by other RI sectors also limit the progress of the ARD initiatives: decisions and commitments made by SADC MS at regional level are not sufficiently followed up through national legislation enactment ('domestication') and mechanisms for mutual accountability among all the actors responsible for implementation (i.e. 'who should be doing what by when'); limited funds for implementation, affecting all players involved (national governments and private sector as well as related regional

²⁵ The website of the SADC FANR Directorate (www.sadc.int/fanr) describes the different initiatives and their status.

institutions); scarce private sector participation (and public-private cooperation) in both the design and implementation of policies and programmes.²⁶

Another message emerging from stakeholder consultations in the region is that the existing different ARD initiatives seem to be managed and implemented in relative isolation, without systematic coordination and an overarching food security policy framework concretely guiding them. In other words, they seem to be approached as individual projects rather than coordinated components of one holistic ARD programme. Therefore a preliminary conclusion could be that the role and value-addition of regional CAADP would indeed be the systematization and coordination of existing, pipeline and future programmes, in the context of a unifying policy framework (the CAADP compact). This approach, and the standard process requirements of CAADP, should also partly address the challenges which limited progress so far, by: enhancing mutual accountability mechanisms and the complementarity between regional and national commitments and choices (vertical coherence between regional and national compacts); enlarge the range of stakeholders involved in design and implementation (all relevant actors sign the compact); improve the resources mobilisation opportunities (all relevant actors should indicate how they intend to contribute financially to the investment plans).

Specific examples from existing ARD initiatives in SADC, and their strengths and weaknesses, offer other important lessons for a regional CAADP as well as ideas on possible synergies. Regional frameworks covering important dimensions of food security, namely 'agricultural research and technology', livestock and 'early warning system', constitute sub-sectors where supporting regional institutions and strategies are in place, and a regional CAADP compact would only need to integrate them into the overarching food security plan for the region. The Centre for Coordinating Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Africa (CCARDESA) approved by the SADC Council in 2010 is the centre to coordinate agricultural research, technology generation and dissemination of research information in the region. Despite the Charter for CCARDESA is yet to be signed by all SADC MS, CCARDESA is in the process of establishing its secretariat in Gaborone²⁷. This institution could be given the mandate as part of the regional CAADP compact to oversee all CAADP Pillar IV (research and technology) activities in the region, so avoiding the preparation of a new CAADP-related research framework for SADC as well as duplications of administrative layers.

Similarly, the SADC Promotion of Regional Integration in the Livestock Sector (PRINT) project was established in 2005 to lay down a sustainable foundation for a coherent regional approach towards the development of the livestock sector. This could be very important for the regional CAADP and PRINT could provide the basis for the chapter about livestock policies and programmes in the compact, without starting preparations from scratch. A further synergy with the CAADP or RAP process could be the creation of a specific centre, if useful, to oversee a livestock sector strategy and act as unique PRINT coordination table. Moreover, the CAADP could build on the multi-annual experience of the SADC Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS-NET) with national Early Warning Units measuring harvests, assessing production levels and forecasting stocks availability. This network could be upgraded through the regional compact to contribute more broadly and systematically to the evidence-based policy making cycle used for the CAADP compacts design and implementation, towards a full-fledged SADC 'Agricultural Information Management System'.²⁸ On the contrary, in other areas where regional cooperation does not exist yet, a CAADP compact would create both the required new strategic frameworks and supporting institutions, for instance policies and investments to promote more processing of agricultural produce in the region, or

²⁶ See for instance an assessment by FANRPAN of the Southern Africa experience in regional food reserve systems: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/59/46609384.pdf

²⁷ As of June 2011 only few have signed the Charter, see Southern Africa Today, Vol.13 no 4 June 2011, SADC Secretariat.

²⁸ Preliminary plans by the Secretariat include this, see SADC Secretariat (2011).

regional programmes to support specific commodities deemed to be useful (e.g. on basic grains and proteins that are marketable such as beef).

Framing certain existing initiatives within a comprehensive, multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder policy process like CAADP could also contribute to removing some of the current obstacles to their full implementation. The 'SADC Regional Food Stock Facility' (RFSF) for example would be very important for regional food security objectives, but after many years from his conception it is still not in place, since there is no consensus yet among SADC MS about creating physical stocks. Other hurdles include the very different food stock holding policies in different MS, the costs related to the construction or rehabilitation of storage facilities, and exclusion of the private sector from the current arrangements for the regional facility. Revamping the RFSF in the 'bigger picture' of overall food security cooperation at regional level through a comprehensive CAADP compact could convince SADC MS about the benefits of the reserve system as well as facilitate: harmonization of national food stock holding policies in line with regional priorities; involvement of the private sector in the management of the RFSF (all signatories of the compact would likely be part of such an important regional mechanism); the mobilisation of adequate resources through the regional CAADP investment plan, including for donors' and private investors' financing of storage facilities.

Finally, also the cases of existing regional frameworks for transboundary conservation and animal disease management provide a lesson for CAADP: in certain specific cooperation areas it may be better to design programmes that are flexible and can be implemented through a 'variable geometry' of countries, without necessarily the participation of all SADC MS. One of the strengths of both the "transboundary animal disease management cooperation programme" and the transboundary conservation project known as "Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area" is that membership of these frameworks is activated on a need-basis by the interested countries only. For instance, this was the case of the action by only five SADC MS veterinary authorities to contain the foot and mouth disease. Creating synergies between CAADP and existing regional frameworks therefore may also mean building on the progress made by clusters of countries in specific areas, depending on their needs and characteristics, without all SADC MS moving together at the same pace. On the contrary, when action should be taken by all MS simultaneously in a specific area, CAADP could gather the necessary political support to mobilize the whole SADC. For example, one of the bottlenecks of regional integration of seeds markets is that technical agreements for the harmonization of seed regulations were drawn up but only a number of SADC countries have already signed the Memorandum of Understanding that will put into legal force such harmonized regulations. CAADP could facilitate faster progress in this area by building on the existing technical agreements on seeds and develop a broader framework for regional agricultural input markets.

Trade: markets are increasingly open but NTBs and structural inequalities limit trade

The *SADC Trade Protocol*, providing for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between MS, was signed in 1996 but only came into force in January 2000. Markets are increasingly open and intra-SADC trade has more than doubled since 2000, but most actors in the region believe that real progress is still slow. **SADC trade integration suffers of self-imposed restrictions**, with all SADC MS to some extent still making use of both tariffs and NTBs.²⁹ Very different legal frameworks in different MS also constitute serious bottlenecks and facilitate unilateral trade restrictions. Intra-regional trade as proportion of total SADC trade has only grown from 15.7 % in 2000 to 18.5 % in 2009.

²⁹ See Behar and Edward (2011).

Tariff liberalization progressed well. However, the SADC Free Trade Area (i.e. 100 % of the tariff lines liberalized by all MS) was supposed to be established by 2008 but it is not yet there. 85 % was achieved in 2008 with a view to complete liberalization by 2012, but SADC will not be able to meet this target either. The 15% of the tariff lines excluded from liberalization is a different list of sensitive products for each country -not a common list- which complicates the picture. Moreover, Malawi and Zimbabwe, due to high revenue loss and recent economic crisis, requested, and were granted, further derogation on the liberalization of the 15% 'exclusion list'. Finally, there are still trade bans imposed unilaterally by MS that are presented as temporary, but tend to become permanent.

According to stakeholders, **NTBs and especially SPS** problems are the “everyday rule” of trade in SADC, not the exception, and often they are not safety-based but respond to a protectionist rationale.³⁰ When an SPS problem is addressed through the SPS Regional Coordination Committee (only recently made operational after its launch in 2008), it basically means through the development of a protocol, a statement of intentions; but there are no enforceable legal instruments to guarantee the removal of the problem. Any private operator can report NTBs at regional level in the context of the Tripartite ‘NTB Monitoring Reporting and Removal System’, but often no follow-up action is taken by national governments. Gaps in the regional legal framework and slow regional policy implementation at national level delay the implementation of regional commitments to address NTBs (Pearson, 2011).

A Protocol on liberalization of **services** trade was supposed to be signed in August 2011, with negotiations to start in 2012 and last for three to four years. Today no regional cooperation framework exist to ensure a predictable and open services trade regime for all SADC MS. Only some bilateral services liberalization schemes exist and many actors in the region believe that these are non-transparent and “can change overnight with politics”. According to some observers, RSA service providers benefit from bilateral deals in powerful sectors such as telecommunication and banking, while for rest of SADC providers still face very serious restrictions, compounded by different legal systems in each of the MS.

The resulting picture of regional trade is that in recent years **substantial trade increasingly flows from RSA, the strongest economy, to other SADC MS but little progress was made on the other way round.**³¹ It was noted by some stakeholders that regional trade moves with the demand and supply dynamics in RSA, due to market forces and in line with the interests of the RSA economy: when a product is needed in RSA it circulates freely within the SADC region; if not, additional NTBs seem to emerge³². A very serious part of this picture is the continued **supply-side-constraints** in most SADC MS, which limit the possibilities of exploiting liberalised trade even when no tariffs or NTBs are in place. Aid for Trade (Aft) could address this problem but the only initiatives on Aft in SADC are about trade corridors development while a full-fledged **Aft regional framework does not exist**. The SADC Secretariat apparently is working on presenting a draft “SADC Aft Strategy” by 2012.

All this is very relevant for the development of a SADC regional food security approach. The linkages between CAADP and the different SADC trade policy initiatives may be less direct than the links with ongoing ARD programmes, and will certainly need to be elaborated further. Nonetheless, given the importance of food trade and regional agricultural markets for food security, a regional CAADP will have to cover the trade dimension, both by taking into account progress and obstacles in the overall SADC integration initiatives and possibly by including synergetic actions on agricultural trade. For instance a

³⁰ In Eastern and Southern Africa there are around 600 standards.

³¹ During the period 2005-2008 South Africa supplied nearly 44% of total intra-regional exports, but took up only about 11% of intra-regional imports.

³² This is questioned e.g. by horticulture exporters in Botswana who believe they would win the case on scientific grounds if ruled by an international court; however it is very difficult for them to go the legal way against RSA.

trade chapter in a regional CAADP compact could possibly envisage measures to improve intra-SADC trade in agricultural products through the continued facilitation and elimination of agricultural trade barriers within SADC, including by filling the gaps in the regional legal framework on SPS and building on the substantial work already done in this area. Bearing in mind the lessons learnt from the overall trade liberalization and reforms in SADC, a regional compact could also include actions to promote: agricultural aid for trade (building on the upcoming “SADC AFT Strategy”); the strengthening of regional agricultural input markets; and the development of market information systems for agricultural produce.

Infrastructure and corridors: progress on hardware but remaining bottlenecks on software

SADC made good progress on the major element of the agenda for regional cooperation in infrastructure, i.e. the development of trade corridors, though most actors in the region would refer to serious remaining challenges (for a summary on progress, see Annex 1).³³ For instance, the **Tripartite North South Corridor** (NSC) Investment Programme is **considered a model Aft programme**, launched in April 2009 through a donors pledging conference which raised US\$ 1.2 bn. Backstopped by DFID through ‘Trade Mark’, actions are being taken to fast track the implementation of the NSC and other prioritised corridor programmes, with corridor experts being recruited by the RECs and an MOU signed between the Tripartite Task Force and DFID on the management of the NSC.³⁴ Several other corridors are under development in the region, such as Trans-Kalahari, Beira, Lobito, Dar es Salaam and Nacala, with important coordination structures (e.g. the Trans-Kalahari Corridor Management Committees) which convene meetings and review progress in the implementation of the corridors action programmes.

In addition to infrastructure development, many **other programmes, especially trade facilitation initiatives**, are ongoing along the corridors, including to promote integrated border management, ‘one stop border post’ and the ‘trade single window’ concept, all aimed at the reduction of time and cost of transportation in the region and the coordination amongst border agencies for effective and efficient border clearance procedures. Donor support contribute substantially to corridor development and related initiatives, including through infrastructure investment, capacity building and training activities. Major bottlenecks in this area are about coordination of the different infrastructure programmes and insufficient development of the ‘software’ part of the corridors, i.e. what should be the conducive environment accompanying the infrastructure, for example business facilitation, harmonization of administrative regulations across countries, smooth customs clearance, etc.

Coordination within SADC should be improved, since a number of corridors in the region have their own management structures that are usually established through a MoU between the countries the corridor transits through. However not all corridors have their own management structures; functions and responsibilities of existing management structures are different; and there is no formal linkages between the corridor management structures and Secretariats of regional organizations. Donor support in this area should also be better coordinated.³⁵ Different views exist on whether the partial success on corridors would be enhanced or diminished by a full-fledged regional coordinated approach to corridors management, with some actors pointing to the fact that corridor development is a ‘collection of bilateral arrangements’ rather than a real regional cooperation framework. Better coordination could at least take the form of **harmonization** of tendering procedures and standardized bidding documents for infrastructure

³³ For a discussion on infrastructure and corridors in this region, see African Development Bank (2011).

³⁴ Another MOU has also been signed between the TF and the Development Bank of Southern Africa for the management of the NSC Fund and in 2010 a US\$ 10 m budget was approved for various financing proposals and projects.

³⁵ Mackie, Bilal, Ramdoo, Hohmeister and Luckho (2010).

development, and possibly a special purpose vehicle³⁶ to run the corridors, especially with a view to attracting the much needed private investors.

The 'software' part of the corridors also remain problematic, with the large transportation costs in SADC depending more on **inefficient regulations** than on hardware problems. SADC MS do not share a single customs approach and there is no regional framework for customs procedures, which seriously hampers investors' certainty. According to some stakeholders, this should be turned into an issue of compliance within each country, i.e. "behind the border issue"; while the current situation is a "border issue" with 10-15 agencies on average involved in clearance/customs procedures on each side of the border for each border (in each REC). A lot of this is rent-extraction and seeking, since every time the economic operator has to pay for the certifications. Some stakeholders believe there should simply be one central agency in each SADC capital checking all papers there so that when the operator arrives at the border, everything is ready for clearance.³⁷ Much more could be done also by donors for better 'software' development along the corridors, for instance investing more in trade-facilitation technology, equipment to address SPS problems, or in a wider use of automated data clearance.

Making agriculture in SADC more productive requires better roads, storage, irrigation and other infrastructural enhancements. But more specifically, given the central role of food trade and regional agricultural markets for food security, a regional CAADP in SADC will have to take into account the strengths and weaknesses of corridors development. According to some stakeholders in the region, considering the lesson learnt on the importance of the software dimension, a possible synergy between CAADP and corridors could be the identification of ways for a regional CAADP compact to contribute to the development of 'agriculture trade corridors'³⁸ and regional trade tools (regional market information systems, business facilitation initiatives, match-making exercises between buyers/sellers). This could complement ongoing SADC infrastructure programmes, contributing to the debates on how to strengthen their 'software' components, through the support to regional value chains development and trade facilitation. The availability of information such as surplus/deficit areas of food production and the overall regional food balance sheet is key not only to enhance food security for SADC MS but would also be very important to facilitate increased flows of intra-regional trade, which is the last phase of the development of the corridors (i.e. the actual increased volumes of goods transiting through them).

Natural resources: fundamental but tricky issues and the possible model of water cooperation

SADC has in place several regional cooperation frameworks and programmes also in the field of natural resources management, including water, land and energy.³⁹ Transboundary **water resources management seems to be working relatively well**, both as cooperation within SADC and between SADC and development partners. The overall regional approach is guided by the Regional Strategic Action Plan on 'integrated water resources management' (IWRM), the SADC Water Policy and Strategy, and the SADC Water Infrastructure Programme. The platforms for the SADC member countries to address water related issues and challenges are the SADC Protocol on Shared Water Courses and the individual water basins

³⁶ Southern African RECs and donors have started discussions on the creation of a Supranational Infrastructure Development Fund that would work as an international organization or special purpose vehicle capitalised by governments and donors in the region.

³⁷ The current procedure requires checking a sample of goods, send it to Johannesburg for those different agencies to check. This may mean that trucks wait 5 days at border in which case investors lose money. Businesses need certainty and operate on forward contracts basis, often choosing another option since this situation is too risky for them.

³⁸ This should include raising awareness of small farmers on the potential benefits of -and how to use- such corridors, since today many farmers are not aware and have not experienced concrete benefits from them, including due to lack of knowledge.

³⁹ More recently also climate change related initiatives, e.g.: on climate smart agriculture the "SADC/COMESA/EAC Climate Initiative project" established in 2008 and funded by the Norwegian Government; and a five-year tripartite programme entitled "Agriculture Adaptation Framework for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Region-Up scaling of Climate Resilient Agriculture" (it will run from 2010 to 2015 and is also funded by the Norwegian Government).

arrangements. Shared watercourse institutions are the main vehicle for implementing the SADC water programmes at river basin level, under the framework of the Protocol, which is a multi-country arrangement reinforcing -on a subsidiarity basis- single basins protocols (in Annex 2 a description of the many cooperation frameworks and structures for SADC transboundary water management).

Despite an effective organisation, sound policy frameworks and positive progress, **challenges still remain** also in the water sector, in terms of institutional weaknesses, insufficient financial and human resources for the relevant regional organisations, as well as political bottlenecks⁴⁰.

According to many stakeholders in CAADP, water resources management is also one of the best examples of SADC-donors partnership. The **thematic coordination for the SADC Water Sector** takes place mainly through the Water Strategy Reference Group (WSRG), consisting of the SADC Secretariat and all international cooperating partners (ICPs), under leadership of GIZ. The WSRG meets at least twice a year, and in various formats: a pre-donor meeting, where ICPs coordinate among themselves; the main WSRG meeting, where the SADC Secretariat makes presentations and where roundtable discussions take place; bilateral discussions between SADC and individual WSRG members. This is also complemented by a SADC Water Sector ICP Collaboration Web Portal, which provides ICPs and the public with an overview about all international support programmes, events and latest developments in the region.

In 2001 the SADC Ministers of Lands directed the Secretariat to develop a strategy for land reform in the region. In August 2003 a proposal for the establishment of the SADC Land Reform Support Facility (SLRSF) was approved by SADC Council, with the objective of: providing technical support to MS implementing land and agrarian reforms; mobilise financing and technical services of regional and international experts to support MS; establish a regional land information resource including a website; strengthen the capacity of national agencies and civil society institutions in land and agrarian reforms; and facilitate the exchange of information and experiences amongst the states. However no real progress was made on the SLRSF. According to many observers this is mostly due to the fact that **land** is dramatically political in SADC, like in any other region, with some cases making headlines world-wide, such as the ongoing reforms in Zimbabwe and the recent movement of white farmers who lost their land to other SADC countries (also through the economic incentives offered to them).

The **Southern African Power Pool**, the first in Africa, was inaugurated in 1995 with the objective of shifting from bilateral contracts (complex and often difficult to administer) to a more efficient regional market. It is considered 'best practice' and indeed is delivering results⁴¹, but the full development of regional energy potential in SADC is often frustrated by challenges in reaching power purchase agreements, a pre-requisite for securing project funding. Lack of synergies between national energy planning and regional commitment also constitutes a major constraint, with countries often giving priority to the development of domestic energy resources to the detriment of joint exploitation of regional energy potential. Southern African Power Pool identified a number of priority projects for commissioning over next few years but SADC Energy Ministers meeting in April 2011 revealed that serious shortages could continue in the future as most ongoing projects are slower than expected.⁴²

⁴⁰ As shown by the case of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission regional cooperation can always be hampered by political obstacles. This Commission will only come into force when six out of eight countries ratify the Agreement (as of now four countries only have ratified). If only one MS does not sign, the whole cooperation process is shelved.

⁴¹ Efforts to reduce SADC's energy crisis appear to be achieving results (electricity shortfalls were 325 megawatts in 2010 compared to more than 900 in early 2009).

⁴² Southern Africa Today, SADC Secretariat, Vol.13 no 4 June 2011.

Natural resources management is obviously a crucial part of the development of a regional food security approach. The first clear lesson for CAADP from regional cooperation in this field is that good intentions and the adoption of general strategies may not translate in sufficient results, either because the particular sector is too sensitive (like land) or not adequately followed through at national level (like energy). Therefore despite CAADP currently receives high level political attention and seems to progress well at national level, expectations on a regional compact should be managed carefully. On the other hand, it may also be that framing certain existing initiatives within a comprehensive, multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder policy process like CAADP could also contribute to removing some of the obstacles that were blocking implementation. The idea of a SADC Land Reform Support Facility could be resuscitated through the regional CAADP formulation process and serve as the basis for dialogue and action on land reform among SADC Member States in order to address the discrepancies that exist with land ownership as well as access to land.⁴³

Regional cooperation on water seem to be on a path of more robust progress in SADC and a regional CAADP should take into account the water-related advancements, existing policies and programmes, as well as include synergetic action. While some of these synergies seem clear, others are also worth but will need to be explored further. The SADC Water Infrastructure Programme, for instance, has its main specific targets to develop by 2015 the water infrastructure needed to double the size of land under irrigation in the region, and CAADP policies and investment could be coordinated and complimentary to the Water Programme to boost agricultural production. In addition, the water resources management approach in SADC (a combination of an overall SADC Protocol and single basins protocols) suggests that creating synergies between CAADP and existing regional frameworks may also mean building on the progress made by clusters of countries in specific areas, without all SADC MS moving together at the same pace.

Given that regular engagement and dialogue with development partners is going to be crucial for the implementation of a regional CAADP, the experience of the SADC water Joint WG with donors -which seems the one progressing better- should be analysed and possibly taken as model. Finally, CAADP could also work to replicate the successful experience of the water sector in terms of stakeholder awareness and information sharing, namely the web-portal reporting all donors support and initiatives related to IWRM in SADC and the water awareness kits (for most water basins) which significantly contribute to mutual accountability objectives. Other interesting ideas and opportunities are referred to by stakeholders but their feasibility needs to be examined carefully. An example would be regional cooperation on water use in agriculture, with a policy framework to link regional agricultural trade with the availability in each SADC MS of the water to produce such traded goods, possibly encouraging MS to trade more food within SADC in cases when one of the MS faces a water-shortage crisis due to very intense agricultural withdrawals for food production. Regional cooperation on these aspects however may be tricky, as it would imply a regional consensus on the fact that regional trade and economic policies should take into account 'virtual water', i.e. the levels of water used in the production of a good or service.⁴⁴

⁴³ Preliminary plans by the SADC Secretariat include a discussion on regional land policy as part of the RAP process, see SADC Secretariat (2011).

⁴⁴ In semi-arid and arid areas, knowing the virtual water value of a good or service can be useful towards determining how best to use the scarce water available. This idea is currently debated in some policy circles in SADC, but also discussed in the international literature, for instance in Earle and Turton (2003): "The Virtual Water Trade amongst Countries of the SADC".

4. Concluding remarks: towards a regional CAADP compact in SADC

Previous sections analysed the status of preparations in SADC for a regional CAADP compact, highlighting the role played so far by key involved stakeholders, the relationship between food security processes and the overall progress on RI, as well as the possible synergies between CAADP and other regional policies and programmes. Taking into account these existing challenges and opportunities, the final part of this paper presents some ideas and recommendations on the way forward for regional food security plans, both in terms of what each actor could do to contribute positively and what features could characterize a regional compact. Given the complexities and sensitivities involved, such concluding remarks can only be considered preliminary, and will have to be tested against the results of upcoming policy dialogues and formal decisions by the relevant SADC institutions. Nonetheless, the clarifications and suggestions provided here can hopefully shed some light on the way forward and be useful in the process, as they emerge from a series of stakeholders consultations and reflect the current plans around the RAP and the CAADP formulation.

Emerging messages on the way forward

Despite according to some stakeholders the exact relationship between the CAADP and the RAP is not fully clear yet, the initial ambiguity on possible competition between these two frameworks is clearing up. The formulation of the RAP and the regional CAADP compact preparation are now the same process. Indeed, the RAP is being designed through the same multidimensional approach to food security as CAADP, and the thematic pillars of the two frameworks match. Given this alignment, but also taking into account current criticisms about the RAP such as insufficient multi-stakeholder ownership, the regional CAADP compact and the RAP would be made to coincide by further mainstreaming the CAADP principles into the RAP:

- enlarging the range of stakeholders regularly involved in the regional preparations;
- including in the mechanisms governing regional food security actions a strong mutual accountability framework for those responsible for implementation, also in relation to the continental CAADP processes and the peer-reviewing of the regional compact and investment plan;
- ensuring coherence and complementarity, and promoting coordination, between the national and regional CAADP compacts and investment plans in SADC.

Indeed most consulted stakeholders tend to agree that one of the weaknesses of the RAP process so far was the limited *multi-stakeholder engagement*. Compared to its early stages, RAP consultations are now broader and more aligned to the CAADP methodology.⁴⁵ However, it is still unclear for many actors what is the actual way forward for a “CAADP-compatible” RAP, what the concrete plans are for designing the regional compact in the coming months, and what process will be followed to ensure that such compact add value to national food security strategies. It would be important to make this information widely available to the public, so that the SADC agenda, relevant documents and steps to design a common approach to food security are accessible for any interested stakeholder. This would also counter the perceptions that the SADC Secretariat and few other MS officials tend to centralise the important work on RAP and that such regional preparations are slow and inefficient. Another crucial process improvement would be to widen scope and depth of *non-state-actors* consultations on the RAP. Most NSA lack platforms to engage regularly on food security at regional level, and creating such platforms for CAADP/RAP would be urgent particularly for small farmers and other intermediary business organisations. A pre-condition for increased engagement would be capacity building for farmers and institutional strengthening for both regional and national farmers associations. This in turn would require a mapping of farmers organisations

⁴⁵ According to the latest information available the RAP Working Group now includes the SADC Secretariat, DFID, USAID Pretoria, USAID Trade Hub Gaborone, FAO, SACAU, Sugar producers, and AFD.

in each SADC country, to assess type of membership, geographical coverage and assistance needed. These accompanying support measures and broader participation would be very important for the smooth conclusion of the RAP formulation in 2012.

A consensus seems also to emerge about the need for more institutional support for *the SADC Secretariat* given its key role for an effective regional CAADP preparatory process. The Secretariat is already acting to tackle some of the challenges it traditionally faces, such as the internal 'silos mentality' hampering coherence and coordination between different areas of regional cooperation. But also the SADC MS should do more to support the Secretariat. A possible recommendation for the way forward is to strengthen the Secretariat, including by: enhanced efforts by MS for more systematic input and interaction with the Secretariat on ARD and food security; increased support by donors to the FANR Directorate to increase the quantity and quality of technical personnel dedicated specifically to food security processes at national and regional level.

SADC Development partners' contribution to the regional food security plans has been lukewarm, with weak donor coordination and not-functioning (though existing) donors-SADC engagement structures. In general, more donors are needed to step up their support to regional food security initiatives in SADC, and in particular to the RAP as the overarching framework that should guide also future external support. Many donors assist ARD programmes at national level in SADC countries, but only few of them have a policy to create synergies between regional and national level assistance and between their different sectoral programmes that contribute to food security (e.g. aid for trade). According to many actors in SADC, both types of synergies should be built, and if donors are to fulfil their commitment to support implementation of CAADP at regional level, including to fast-track regional action, they could: improve operational linkages and coordination around regional CAADP plans between their respective HQs, regional and national offices; increase regional donor coordination in SADC around CAADP including by assigning a donor lead agency (possibly in Gaborone) and establishing a specific donor working group for the SADC regional CAADP. Existing formal engagement structures between SADC and development partners lost impetus, and all parties agree this type of dialogue should be revitalized (looking possibly at the experience of the water Joint WG which is the one that progresses better).

Another emerging message from the SADC stakeholders is that the regional agricultural plans, which have the overall RI framework (RISDP) explicitly at its core, should take into account the cross-cutting general bottlenecks to RI experienced so far by SADC. For RI to work, including cooperation on CAADP, a better match should be achieved between: i) bottom-up RI (business-led) processes and dynamics and ii) top-down (government-led) RI moves, like policy frameworks and protocols. There seems to be no "low hanging fruit" in regional cooperation, and formal binding SADC frameworks are not sufficiently followed-up at national level: the same is likely to hold for a future regional CAADP. In addition, ARD action will have to be accompanied by a much better 'campaign' in each SADC MS to raise awareness about the benefits of regional approaches in every proposed regional cooperation area relevant to food security, and about the results achieved so far (in this sense the example of the 'water basin cooperation awareness kits', disseminated also in the rural areas, could be replicated for future ARD programmes and other initiatives like the 'trade corridors').

Most of the suggestions by consulted stakeholders on the way forward for a regional CAADP relate to the *process* and not the substance. This is not only because the content of the RAP has not been developed yet, but also because few SADC countries have signed a national CAADP compact and the national-regional nexus in agriculture is yet to be fully explored within SADC. Such 'vertical' coherence (and synergies) between national and regional policies and investments, however is deemed crucial by many actors in SADC, in parallel with the 'horizontal' coherence (and synergies) between policies and

investments in food security and in other sectors of regional cooperation in SADC. Despite this process is only in its early stages, and strategic thinking on regional policies and investment to complement action at national level is lacking within several SADC governments, many SADC stakeholders realise the importance of linking a regional CAADP to ongoing initiatives on ARD, trade, infrastructure and natural resources, and are willing to explore in detail the opportunities and challenges for the creation of synergies. This paper shows that some linkages will naturally emerge, such as on SPS, 'agriculture trade corridors', irrigation and existing regional agricultural programmes and institutions. Other synergies will need to be carefully analyzed, in order to design a regional CAADP compact which includes policies and investments that are coherent, complementary and coordinated with those that SADC is taking forward in other RI areas. In specific cases, building synergies with an existing SADC initiative and framing it within a comprehensive, multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder policy process like CAADP could also contribute to removing some of the current obstacles to its full implementation.

A flexible, 'differentiated-gear', regional compact?

As they agree on the need for an holistic regional approach to food security and for the creation of stronger cross-sector linkages, most stakeholders seem to support the argument that SADC now faces in principle the clear opportunity of both designing a multidimensional regional CAADP/RAP and using the current traction (political and financial) of CAADP to push also other regional cooperation sectors to make bolder progress. The difficult part, however, will be effectively shaping and managing the synergies that are likely to emerge across different sector policies and programmes, as well as coordinating the different sub-sectors and initiatives under one overarching 'umbrella' (which should 'respect' at the same time also existing regional frameworks and institutions).

A realistic way forward for such overarching 'umbrella' and a multidimensional regional CAADP could be a programmatic approach to different areas of intervention, to meet the interest of all involved SADC countries and their different stakeholder groups. This would be a **'differentiated-gears' regional CAADP framework**. SADC countries are very different and it would be realistic and useful to build the regional food security **compact and investment plan** around: different cooperation areas that are progressing at differentiated gears; and different sub-groups of SADC countries which already cooperate well in specific areas (or are likely to) and do have in place a series of programmatic cooperation initiatives. While to be credible and attractive a compact and an investment plan need to have a minimum ambition in terms of joint action and policies valid for all SADC MS, countries would come on board gradually in different sectors and parts of the regional compact, where they see interest and also benefits (to be assessed on a sector by sector basis). Some of the CAADP initiatives will be new; in other areas the supporting regional institutions and strategies are already in place and a regional CAADP compact would only need to integrate them into the overarching food security plan for the region.

Hence "different gears" for different groups of countries: for instance a uniform agricultural markets information system for those where, de facto, the trade integration happens already; further -and faster- natural resources management cooperation for countries who share water basins; and so on. A faster 'gear' would mean a specific investment plan for that specific area or sub-sector, or a pilot joint programme to be initially implemented only by those few willing SADC MS. The added value of such approach would be to look at existing sector progress and find a niche for CAADP, either as synergy-creation or in some cases as new 'multi-purpose' programmes related to food security, e.g. a value chain development approach which identifies and addresses simultaneously the bottlenecks on natural resources, corridors, and trade. This type coordination in the context of a regional CAADP would need to be funded as well, because it is a demanding exercise for all stakeholders involved.

This idea seems realistic not only because regional cooperation through differentiated gears and programmes by clusters of countries already takes place in SADC (e.g. on water or transboundary animal disease management); but also because it would better allow to take into account the political economy factors that often constitute obstacles to deeper regional cooperation. In particular, from a private sector point of view, regional strategies such as CAADP are very much about regional institutional 'fabrics' and high-end ideals (such as food security). But it is still unclear what are the interests at stake, and the stakeholders to benefit or lose out from regional agriculture cooperation and integration (within each SADC MS and in the region). For example, parts of the private and public sector are concerned about water management and scarcities in RSA. Since agriculture in RSA is a major consumer of water - there is an interest with policy makers and some large businesses to 'contract out' some of the agricultural production to the SADC region, and use water for more added-value production (manufacturing-etc) in RSA; while South African farmers are unlikely to agree. Flexibility and differentiated gears would allow to better factor in the political sensitivities, economic imbalances and business dynamics in the region, hence facilitating compromise, both within and between SADC countries.

Such gradual and 'differentiated-gears' approach could also apply to the formulation of a **flexible 'Tripartite' CAADP compact** (bearing in mind that the pace and directions towards a possible 'Tripartite' compact will be set by formal consultations involving the policy organs of the three RECs). This approach would allow SADC to simultaneously formulate its part of the 'Tripartite' compact and complete its ongoing process for the RAP, maintaining for instance the objective of having RAP as a legally binding framework for SADC MS, but without imposing to non-SADC countries the same degree of legal value in other programmes that will instead be common to the three RECs on certain shared challenges. Similarly, if one REC does not have within its mandate a specific cooperation area, it could achieve full multidimensionality of a 'Tripartite' CAADP at its own pace. This for instance would be the case of COMESA, for which including regional water resources management in its CAADP framework would require -unlike SADC- first an expansion of the traditional agenda of COMESA, currently more focused on economic regional integration. In terms of concrete cooperation programmes, examples of REC-specific action building on existing differentiated progress could be: a COMESA investment plan for regional market information system along the trade corridors; a SADC programme to link sustainable regional water management with balancing food production and trade; and an EAC financing mechanism for agricultural input development. In other areas where it makes sense to move jointly as Tripartite bloc, the three RECs could launch common policies and investment, e.g. for SPS and pest management, Tripartite corridors, or 'monitoring and evaluation' on the overall CAADP progress.

Both for a SADC compact and in the event of a Tripartite compact, given the many countries involved and the complexities at stake, the process towards a flexible, differentiated-gear, regional food security framework would necessarily **take time** for identification, consultation, agreement and implementable plans design (especially for the new 'multi-purpose' programmes). However, useful examples of joint RECs-plans (e.g. COMESA/SADC Fertilizer Joint Procurement Strategy) and Tripartite programmes (e.g. North South Corridor, climate smart agriculture) already exist and should be looked at as possible building-blocs.

Careful design of a 'comprehensive, internally coherent and differentiated gears' compact would require a **step-by-step multi-stakeholder consultative process**, where all key actors should be represented. This would probably have to start with identifying a minimum common ground among SADC MS on what major bottlenecks and opportunities are for: establishing operational linkages between CAADP and other regional programmes; articulating possible multi-sector priorities into the SADC (and 'Tripartite') CAADP compact; and finding ways for regional actors and their development partners to work more effectively together to fast-track implementation of a regional CAADP.

Annex 1

Summary Status of Development in Key Southern Africa Transport Corridors (Source: African Development Bank, 2011)

SADC Transport Corridor	Corridor Member States	Development Status
North South (or Durban)	1. South Africa 2. Botswana 3. Zimbabwe 4. Mozambique 5. Malawi 6. Zambia 7. DR Congo	<p>✓ Priority infrastructure (roads and border posts) have been identified and feasibility and technical studies ongoing.</p> <p>✓ By early 2010: MoU was signed under negotiation for establishing legal instruments for corridor governance. Corridor Management Committee not functional.</p> <p>✓ Chirundu One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) completed and operational since December 2009 at border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. OSBP law adopted in both states.</p> <p>✓ Kazungula OSBP (Zambia-Botswana): feasibility financed by AfDB. Fixed road and rail bridge to replace ferry is under design (Feb. 2010). Project Steering Committee formed. Funding of infrastructure construction not ready.</p> <p>✓ Beit Bridge (Zimbabwe and South Africa): March 2010 situation analysis ongoing and draft MoU prepared for Border Efficiency Management Project. Action Plan for 2010 also prepared. Call for Steering Committee to aggressively oversee the project.</p> <p>✓ Chililabombwe/Kasumbalesa (DR Congo-Zambia): Situation analysis ongoing for a OSBP project.</p> <p>✓ Martin's Drift/Groblers Bridge (Botswana/RSA): still under study stage (included in the South African Land-Ports Freight Optimisation Study to cover the following border posts: Maseru bridge, Beitbridge, Lebombo, Oshoek, Kopfontein, Skilpadhek and Grober's bridge)</p> <p>✓ Beitbridge-Bulawayo Railway under concession.</p>
Maputo	1. Mozambique 2. South Africa 3. Swaziland	<p>✓ By end of 2009 legal instruments for establishment of corridor governance established (articles of association). Corridor Management Committee established and functional.</p> <p>✓ Ressano Garcia/Lebombo (Mozambique/South Africa): MoU signed in 2007. Facility under repeated lower cost design. OSBP concept practised only during peak holiday periods. Draft legal instruments under review before adoption. Financing will be needed to allow for phased implementation by 2010.</p> <p>✓ Maputo Port rehabilitation ongoing and some elements of the port infrastructure and services are under concessions.</p>
Beira	1. Mozambique 2. Zimbabwe 3. Malawi 4. Zambia	<p>✓ By end of 2009 legal instruments for establishment of corridor governance established, but Ministers recommended some revision. Corridor Management Committee established but weak and require resuscitation.</p> <p>✓ Beira railways under concessions.</p> <p>✓ Rehabilitation of the Sena Railway line to Moatize coalfields on the Beira corridor ongoing.</p> <p>✓ Beira Port rehabilitation ongoing and some elements of the port infrastructure and services are under concessions.</p>
Nacala	1. Mozambique 2. Malawi 3. Zambia	<p>✓ Nacala railways under concession. Its rehabilitation progressing too slowly.</p> <p>✓ By end of 2009 legal instruments for establishment of corridor governance established, but Ministers recommended some revision. Corridor Management Committee established but weak and require resuscitation.</p> <p>✓ Mandimba/Chiponde (Mozambique/Malawi) OSBP: part of Nacala Corridor OSBP project funded by AfDB. JICA funded earlier studies. Steering Committee formed in November 2009.</p> <p>✓ Mchinji/Chipata (Zambia/Malawi) OSBP: part of Nacala Corridor OSBP project funded by AfDB. JICA funded earlier studies. Steering Committee formed in November 2009.</p>
Mtwara	1. Tanzania 2. Mozambique 3. Malawi 4. Zambia	<p>✓ Currently dominated by road network plans to construct a railway system linking the four countries. Bridges between Tanzania and Mozambique and Tanzania and Malawi already constructed.</p> <p>✓ By end of 2009 legal instruments for establishment of corridor governance established. Corridor Management Committee established but weak and require resuscitation.</p>
Dar es Salaam or TAZARA	1. Tanzania 2. Mozambique 3. Malawi 4. Zambia 5. DR Congo	<p>✓ A combination of roads (e.g. TANZAM road, Dar to Lusaka), pipeline (e.g. TAZAMA pipeline, Dar to Ndola) and railways (TAZARA: Dar to Kitwe).</p> <p>✓ By end of 2009 legal instruments for establishment of corridor governance established (MoU and constitution). Corridor Management Committee established and functional.</p> <p>✓ Tunduma/Nakonde (Tanzania-Zambia) OSBP: Feb 2010: ongoing situation analysis</p> <p>✓ Songwe/Kasumulo (Tanzania-Malawi) OSBP: Feb 2010: feasibility study planned funding by USAID/SAGC. Work is underway on ICT connectivity between the two customs agencies.</p> <p>✓ Dar es salaam Port rehabilitation ongoing and some elements of the port infrastructure and services are under concessions.</p>

Annex 2

Cooperation frameworks and structures for SADC transboundary water management

- Inco-Maputo Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee: South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland; help to manage the water flow of the Inkomati River and Maputo River specifically during times of drought and flood;
- Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA): Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia. The LTA promotes regional cooperation required for socio-economic development and sustainable management of the natural resources in the Lake Tanganyika basin.
- Limpopo Water Course Commission (LIMCOM): Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique
- Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM): Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. ORASECOM was the first commission established following the regional ratification of the SADC Protocol on Shared Water Course Systems.
- Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM): Angola, Botswana and Namibia works well.
- Ruvuma Joint Water Commission (Ruvuma JWC): The Governments of the Republic of Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania

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