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Yemen

Yemen Key Message Update: Flooding restricts access to food and income during the main cereal harvest season, September 2024

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Key Messages

  • September marks the start of the main cereal harvest season in Yemen when poor households experience a seasonal boost in food availability from crop production as well as income from labor opportunities along crop production and marketing chains. Harvesting is currently ongoing across many highland areas (main harvest of sorghum, millet, and maize), and in the Red Sea and Tihamah Plain agroecological zone (summer short harvest of sorghum). However, recent flooding damaged and destroyed standing crops, with localized below-average harvests expected to constrain agricultural labor opportunities in severely affected areas. Meanwhile, poor households will continue to face seasonally low access to food and income until the start of harvesting in other highland areas where the harvest starts in October and early November and in other parts of the country – lowland areas, the eastern plateau, and coastal areas – where the main harvest starts in the second half of November.
  • Although the harvest season brings some seasonal improvements, crop production contributes only marginally to agricultural households’ food consumption, and competition for agricultural labor opportunities is high. As such, even in the harvest period, poor households will continue to contend with high market dependence amid out-of-reach food prices. Given poor purchasing capacity and the continued pause of WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance in areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA), millions of poor households are likely to continue to face food consumption gaps across Yemen, with particular concern for IDPs, flood-affected households, and poor households that depend on daily wage opportunities. Across the country, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist through January 2025, with some SBA-controlled governorates likely to continue facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes amid the food assistance pause and the impacts of recent devastating flooding.
  • Above-average rainfall in July/August contributed to favorable growing conditions for crops and rangeland resources (pasture and water for livestock) in many areas. However, severe flooding has negatively impacted crop production in affected areas. According to a rapid assessment conducted by FAO in August, around 99,000 hectares (ha) of farmland have been impacted. The vast majority of this impacted farmland was in Al Hudaydah (77,362 ha) and Hajjah (20,717 ha), representing approximately 12 percent and 9 percent, respectively, of the total farmland. Meanwhile, around 279,000 sheep and goats were potentially impacted, according to the same FAO assessment. Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Al Jawf were the most affected, with an estimated 6 percent of sheep and goats impacted Al Hudaydah (106, 361), followed by 4 percent Al Jawf (50,664) and 4 percent in Hajjah (46,424). These areas are important livestock suppliers and pastoralism is an important livelihood system, particularly in Al Jawf, where an estimated 20 percent of households considered livestock to be their primary source of income, according to the 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment. Due to losses of key sources of food and income amid the ongoing assistance pause, some worst-affected households in severely affected areas have likely experienced losses of livestock assets and damage to livelihoods. Households worst-affected by flooding in both pastoralist and agropastoral areas are likely unable to meet their minimum food needs in the absence of assistance.
  • On September 29, Israel targeted vital infrastructure and facilities in Al Hudaydah for the second time in retaliation for SBA attacks on Israel. The recent Israeli airstrikes targeted oil tanks at the Ras Isa port (north of the western city of Al Hudaydah), the port of Al Hudaydah (the target of the first attack in July), and the governorate’s two main power stations. According to officials, the airstrike killed five civilians and wounded 57. The damage to power stations resulted in power outages, including in Al Hudaydah and parts of Sana'a; as of the end of September, the power stations remained non-operational. Ras al-Khuthayb power station (the largest) reportedly incurred the most damage, with boilers destroyed by the bombing. Meanwhile, three of four oil tanks in Ras Isa were damaged, though reportedly not significantly. SBA officials also report that the fuel tanks had been recently emptied in anticipation of Israeli strikes. Significant damage at Al Hudaydah port has not been reported. Overall, SBA officials report that impacts of the strikes were insignificant. According to available information, food and fuel imports are ongoing following the attacks. FEWS NET continues to triangulate available data and information sources in the aftermath of the strike and will provide an updated analysis of any expected impacts on acute food insecurity in the forthcoming October Food Security Outlook report. However, early analysis indicates overall low concern for the potential for meaningful disruptions to food and fuel import volumes; it should also be noted that recently available data show normal import volumes of key food and fuel commodities through the Red Sea ports in September, providing additional support to the conclusion that damage from the first strike does not threaten imports. FEWS NET has comparatively higher concerns about the potential impacts of reduced fuel stock levels in SBA areas due to reduced storage capacity; specifically, FEWS NET anticipates that traders may be faced with increased importation costs, given that fuel must be imported in smaller batches.
  • The ongoing cholera outbreak is both contributing to increased risk of acute food insecurity in Yemen among impacted households (by forcing them to reduce income-generation and increase essential health expenditures) and is exacerbating the consequences of acute food insecurity on impacted households (by increasing their risk of malnutrition and other poor health outcomes). According to OCHA, as of September 7, a total of 186,000 suspected cases of cholera and acute watery diarrhea and 680 associated deaths have been reported across Yemen since the start of the latest outbreak in mid-March, with western highland governorates worst affected. Recent data point to hotspots currently in Al Dali’, Al Bayda, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Amran, Hajjah, Marib, and Raymah. Factors contributing to this outbreak include contaminated water (in part due to the recent heavy rainfall and flooding) and lack of access to alternative sources of clean drinking water, expired/spoiled food, inadequate sanitation facilities, poor public health services, lack of public health awareness, underlying poor nutritional status of the population, and the absence of prevention interventions. Additionally, insufficient funding has severely affected partners’ ability to sustain essential response interventions; six Diarrhea Treatment Centers (DTCs) and 62 Oral Rehydration Corners (ORCs) were closed at the end of August and 80 percent of DTCs are anticipated to close by December 2024 given available funding. Malnourished children, pregnant women, the elderly, the poor and very poor, and IDPs are both at the highest risk of illness and most likely to be negatively impacted by illness.
  • The SBA continues to intensify efforts to increase revenue generation and replenish depleted currency reserves through taxation. Effective September 1, the SBA has significantly increased taxes on imported clothing, shoes, and bags. Taxes are now being levied at 30 million YER (in terms of the Sana’a-based currency) per commercial truck, a 50 percent increase relative to the 20 million YER per truck in 2023 and a 200 percent increase relative to the 10 million YER per truck in 2022. In IRG areas, the official taxes for similar commercial trucks are 97 percent lower, at 1 million YER per truck in the equivalent currency. This comes as the SBA continues to block the movement of all commercial goods into their territory that have been imported through seaports under IRG control in an effort to re-route imports through the Red Sea ports. The SBA is also intensifying unofficial taxation of local businesses. In July, reports stated that 1,161 shops and companies in Sana'a had been raided, extorted, and closed by SBA officials, and about 90 owners and workers had been assaulted. While it remains to be seen how supply chains will adjust to the increased taxes, traders will likely face profit losses and some households whose livelihoods were dependent on these supply and marketing chains will likely lose income-earning opportunities. FEWS NET is monitoring the situation, and additional analysis is forthcoming in future reports.