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This bi-monthly report, a joint effort by ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank, provides a comprehensive analysis of Yemen's food security challenges. Combining quantitative modeling with in-depth qualitative insights, it offers a multi-faceted view that surpasses standard metrics.
Designed to inform effective interventions, this report is a vital tool for understanding Yemen's complex food security situation. It complements the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) framework by incorporating additional perspectives and early warning indicators, enabling more timely, scaled, and targeted responses to food and nutrition insecurity.
The report identifies key areas where food security risks are escalating or emerging, driven by factors like conflict, economic instability, climate change, and other evolving issues. While focusing on specific governorate hotspots, it also examines broader global and regional trends impacting food security, highlighting the interconnectedness of food security at local, regional, and global levels.
Ultimately, this report aims to foster collaboration, inform resource allocation, guide response planning, and advocate for international support and action. We believe it will be instrumental in developing effective solutions to address Yemen's pressing food security challenges.
Key Messages (Report # 9 - June 2025)
- Between May–August 2025, nearly five million people (or 50% of the population) in Government of Yemen (GoY)- controlled areas of Yemen will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and above levels of food insecurity, with 1.5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) according to the latest IPC analysis. The situation is rapidly deteriorating, with all 118 districts analyzed affected, including 41 in IPC Phase 4, up from 12 in February. Key drivers include economic collapse, rising food and fuel prices, currency depreciation, reduced humanitarian aid, delayed planting, and conflict. Humanitarian food assistance fell from 3.6 million recipients in 2024 to just 2.8 million in 2025, weakening a critical safety net. Without urgent funding and targeted aid, food insecurity is expected to worsen, especially for IDPs, the marginalized vulnerable, and rural low-income households.
- In April 2025, according to the WFP Food Security Update, inadequate food consumption reached 65%, up from 57% in March. Severe food deprivation reached 38% nationally, with all governorates exceeding the critical 20 percent IPC threshold. In Marib and Ibb, rates more than doubled compared to the previous year. The primary drivers of continuing high levels of food insecurity include economic instability, high food prices in GoY controlled areas, impacts of the lean season, limited livelihood opportunities, funding shortages causing humanitarian assistance gaps (particularly affecting AA-controlled areas), and the impact of airstrikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In April, severe food-based coping strategies (rCSI ≥ 19) were widely adopted to meet essential food needs, 45% in AA areas and 38% in IRG areas.
- The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling raised 210 critical and 313 heightened risk alerts for conflict, displacement, drought, exchange rate, proxy food imports, food prices, and fuel prices in April 2025. JMR modeling also indicates that up to 11.2 million people (27% of the population) resided in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse levels of food insecurity in the same month.2 The increase in the number of alerts and people residing in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or above in April compared to previous months primarily relates to the integration of two new indicators: proxy food imports and proxy fuel imports, which raised a cumulative 67 critical and 160 heightened risk alerts (32% and 51% of the total critical and heightened risk alerts respectively).
- In April 2025, the JMR model raised 117 critical risk alerts resulting from exchange rate depreciation in GoY controlled areas. The monthly average exchange rate hit a new record high of YER 2,473 to USD 1 in April, marking a 32% depreciation compared to April 2024. The depreciating exchange rate in GoY areas is primarily attributable to the dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves resulting from halted crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the AA decision to prohibit the sale of liquefied petroleum gas produced in GoY-controlled Ma’rib governorate in AA areas. In contrast, the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates remained largely stable at YER 537 to USD 1 as a result of tight control by the authorities. Despite the nearly fixed exchange rate, there remain concerns about liquidity and the status of foreign currency reserves in AA areas.
- In April 2025, food prices and import dynamics in Yemen highlighted stark regional disparities. Proxy food imports triggered 67 critical and 160 heightened alerts, mainly in AA-controlled areas like Al Bayda, Al Mahwit, Amran, and Sa’dah, due to persistent misalignment between local and global prices for five staple commodities. While the indicator value declined slightly from previous months, it remained above alert thresholds in all AA areas. GoY controlled regions saw fewer issues, just 11 total alerts, reflecting better price alignment.
- Still, the food price indicator recorded 113 heightened alerts across most GoY governorates, with the minimum food basket (MFB) averaging YER 161,000 (USD 65), up 32% year-on-year due to currency depreciation. In contrast, AA-controlled areas kept MFB prices relatively stable at YER 47,000, though the USD cost remained higher at USD 88. Food imports rose to 576,000MT, 4% above the 12-month average and 40% higher than in March, driven by stable flows through both Red Sea and southern ports.
- Fuel conditions were relatively stable but showed localized stress. Only two heightened alerts were recorded, both in Socotra, where cooking gas prices surged 35% year-on-year and 74% over six months. While prices elsewhere remained below alert thresholds, AA-controlled Red Sea ports saw fuel imports drop 27% below average, the lowest since September 2024, due to infrastructure damage from airstrikes. Southern ports under GoY control maintained stable fuel volumes. Though current alerts are limited, the sharp import drop in the north signals emerging risks to supply continuity, especially in conflict-affected areas reliant on consistent fuel access for transport and food distribution.
- In April 2025, the conflict indicator recorded 15 critical and 17 heightened risk alerts across AA-controlled areas, with the majority in Al Hodeidah, Sa’dah, and Sana’a governorates. It is reported that US airstrikes caused casualties, including at least 80 deaths in Ras Issa port (Al Hodeidah), 68 at a detention center in Sa’dah city, and 17 in Sana’a. In Al Jawf, landmines and tribal violence led to at least 15 fatalities. Al Khukhah (a GoY-controlled district in Al Hodeidah) saw 11 deaths from clashes and a landmine. The 6 May 2025 ceasefire between US and AA paused the conflict escalation in Yemen and the Red Sea, although AA attacks on Israel and retaliatory airstrikes continue.
- In April 2025, the drought indicator flagged nine critical and 18 heightened risk alerts across Abyan, Al Bayda, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Lahj, and Shabwah as a result of below-average rainfall during the Saif rainy season (April–May). The Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) showed minimal crop stress, as most affected areas had limited active cultivation during this period.
- In April 2025, 418 households were displaced in Yemen, more than double the monthly average (169) between January–April. The majority (82%) were displaced as a result of conflict, mainly by shelling. The JMR displacement indicator flagged two critical and three heightened risk alerts. Critical alerts were recorded in As Sab’in (Sana’a City) and Sabir Al Mawadim (Ta’iz), with 37 and 39 households displaced respectively. Heightened alerts were issued in Al Jarrahi, Al Mina (both in Al Hodeidah), and Maqbanah (Ta’iz), which saw a combined displacement of 141 households, largely as a result of conflict, with some citing economic reasons. The majority of the displacement that raised JMR alerts came from AA-controlled districts towards GoY controlled areas; however, data limitations mean that intra-AA displacement has not been captured.
Pre-Assessment for the Yemen Preparedness Plan: Not Triggered
A recent Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modelling continues to show alarming trends in Yemen's food security. Approximately 11.2 million individuals, representing nearly 27% of the population, are now living in areas at risk of escalating to Emergency (IPC 4) levels or worse in terms of food insecurity. Of these, 2.3 million people are in Government of Yemen (GoY) controlled areas and 8.9 million are in Ansar Allah (AA) areas, making up 21% and 30% of the populations in these respective areas. The rise in people residing in at-risk areas has notably increased from previous JMRs due to the addition of two new indicators: proxy food and fuel imports. The proxy food imports indicator, in particular, has generated the most alerts, contributing to the higher numbers of at-risk residents. However, when adjusting past figures to align with the new model, April 2025 recorded the lowest number since 2023. It is crucial, however, to recognize that these figures remain within the historical average of people facing IPC 4+ conditions in the country. Given the current context and the absence of any major acute shocks based on available data, activating the Yemen Preparedness Plan may not be necessary. However, close monitoring is essential, especially regarding the rise in IPC 4+ conditions, to detect any further deterioration.
It is important to stress that the high levels of both acute and chronic food and nutrition insecurity in Yemen require continuous attention. Ongoing humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance are crucial to tackling these persistent challenges. We recommend maintaining and possibly expanding existing support programs to prevent further decline in food security conditions.