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Yemen

Yemen Joint Monitoring Report: Bimonthly Update on Food and Nutrition Security Crisis Risks (January 2025 - Report 7)

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Key Messages (Report # 7 – January 2025)

  • The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling, which uses data up to December 2024, raised 137 critical and 46 heightened risk alerts for exchange rate, drought, conflict, and displacement. JMR modeling also indicates that 3.3 million people resided in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse levels of food insecurity in December 2024.
  • In November–December 2024, according to both the FAO High-Frequency Monitoring Snapshot and WFP Food Security Update, food insecurity – as measured by inadequate food consumption – remained consistently high across the country. The decline in purchasing power, driven by the higher cost of the minimum food basket (MFB), is the main driver of continuing high levels of food insecurity. This is especially evident in Government of Yemen (GoY)-controlled areas, where MFB prices in December were 33% higher than the three-year average.
  • In December 2024, the use of Crisis and Emergency livelihood coping strategies decreased slightly in both GoY and Ansar Allah (AA) areas compared to November, although such strategies were used by over half the population in both areas of control. Severe food-based coping increased in GoY areas, from 24.6 to 26.6% compared to November, and decreased in AA governorates from 33.4 to 31.7% in the same period.
  • Households in AA-controlled areas relied on Crisis livelihood and severe food-based coping strategies more extensively than those in GoY areas: 60.7% compared to 56.1%, respectively, for Crisis livelihood coping strategies, and 31.7% in AA areas and 26.6% in GoY areas according to the Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI ≥19).
  • Food insecurity is expected to worsen between January–February 2025 as the lean season intensifies and food prices are expected to increase. A high risk of frost is forecast for Yemen’s highlands, particularly in Sana’a and Dhamar, threatening agricultural livelihoods. Dry conditions will persist, aggravating water shortages and hampering crop growth while the likelihood of locust infestations remains minimal.
  • According to the Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 17.1 million people (49% of Yemen’s population) will be in need of food and agriculture assistance (severity levels three and above2) during 2025, including 5.1 million people projected to face severity level four. Out of the total, 12.4 million people (73%) are in AA-controlled governorates and 4.7 million (27%) in GoY controlled areas.
  • Proxy GAM trends in 2024, based on data from the Community Health and Nutrition Volunteers (CHNVs), were stable throughout the year and lower than the previous three years, except in Al Hodeidah governorate, where rates were 4–5% above the national average.
  • Yemen has been experiencing a severe outbreak of acute watery diarrhea and suspected cholera, with nearly 256,000 suspected cases reported between mid- March–December 2024 across all 22 governorates. The country continues to bear the highest cholera burden globally. Malnourished children are at heightened risk of contracting these diseases. In December 2024, 33 districts reported a 100% response gap (no organization presence), 30 districts reported a 75% gap (one organization responding), and 20 districts reported a 50% gap (two organizations responding). The cholera response faces a USD 20 million funding gap.
  • In December 2024, the JMR model raised 119 critical risk alerts resulting from the exchange rate depreciation in GoY areas. The monthly average exchange rate hit a record YER 2,047/USD 1 in November before further depreciating to YER 2,053/USD 1 in December, marking a 26% depreciation compared to December 2023 and over 50% depreciation since the truce was signed in April 2022. The depreciating exchange rate in GoY areas is primarily attributable to the dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves resulting from decreased crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the AA decision to prohibit the sale of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) produced in GoY controlled Ma’rib governorate in AA areas. In contrast, the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates remained largely stable at YER 531/USD 1 as a result of tight control by the authorities.
  • In December, the JMR recorded 20 critical drought risk alerts in 11 governorates, concentrated in Ad Dali’, Ibb, Lahj, Ma’rib, and Ta’iz. Despite this, the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) for November–December 2024 showed no impact on cropped land, as many areas were off-season in this period.
  • The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported that, in November and December, 352 and 256 households faced displacement, respectively. The JMR model raised one critical and seven heightened risk alerts for displacement in Al Hodeidah, Al Mahwit, Amran, Ibb, Lahj, and Raymah governorates. Overall, between January 1 and December 31, 2024, 3,668 households were newly displaced in Yemen, mostly into or within Al Hodeidah, Ma’rib, and Ta’iz governorates.
  • In December 2024, the conflict indicator recorded 19 heightened risk alerts across several governorates. In Abyan’s Mudiyah district, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched multiple offensives against Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. In Ta’iz, an AA drone strike killed eight civilians in Maqbanah district, followed by intense clashes. In Lahj’s Al Musaymir district, STC forces repelled AA attacks, causing six fatalities among AA fighters. GoY-STC forces in Ad Dali’ targeted advancing AA fighters with artillery strikes, resulting in three additional fatalities. In Sana’a City’s As Safiyah district, AA security forces opened fire on migrants, killing three. Landmine explosions in Al Hodeidah’s Al Khawkhah district also caused two civilian fatalities.
  • The average price of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) in Yemen has continued to rise since January 2024, reaching a new all-time highest value in November in GoY areas, peaking at YER 143,000 (USD 70) before falling 1.3% in December, but remained 25% higher year-on year compared to December 2023 as a result of currency depreciation. In AA areas, prices remained stable at YER 45,118 (USD 84), 12% lower year-on-year, with price caps minimizing variations despite higher USD costs. The JMR model did not raise any alerts for food prices in December. JMR modeling raised no alerts related to fuel prices in December 2024 but recorded 17 heightened risk alerts in November. In November, fuel prices rose by 3–4% in GoY areas, driven by a 4.6% Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) price increase in Ta’iz and Al Hodeidah, but fell 2% in December. In AA-controlled areas, prices dropped 1.2% from October to December and declined 6% year-on-year, while GoY-controlled areas saw a 6% annual increase.
  • In November and December 2024, total food imports to Yemen amounted to 1,161,000 MT similar to total food imports in September–October.5 Food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) in November and December were 15% lower compared to September– October. The southern ports (under GoY control) saw the highest food import volumes in November since June 2020, at 243,540MT, 123% above the 12-month moving average, following two months of below-average food imports in September–October. The increase is likely driven by higher available storage capacity that usually affects import trends and dynamics. Moreover, the lower price of wheat grains in July and August may have encouraged traders to purchase larger volumes that were then delivered in November.
  • On November 24, 2024, AA authorities banned wheat flour imports to support local milling industries. The policy, effective January 8, 2025, may lead to higher wheat grain imports for domestic processing. In 2024, flour imports totaled 181,000MT, compared to nearly 3 million MT of wheat grains. Major importers have milling capacity, and Red Sea ports can process 12,250 tons daily. While no immediate food security risks are expected, potential fuel shortages in AA areas could disrupt milling and raise flour costs. Monitoring global wheat prices, grain imports, and milling efficiency will be crucial.
  • In November–December 2024, fuel imports through Red Sea ports were 59% and 13% above the 12-month moving average, respectively, and 71% higher compared to September–October, indicating alternative storage capacity despite reduced Al Hodeidah capacity. Conversely, southern ports saw a declining trend, with imports 70% and 42% below the 12-month average in November and December, despite a slight month-on-month rise in December.

Pre-Assessment for the Yemen Preparedness Plan: Not Triggered

The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling, utilizing data up to December 2024, indicates a concerning trend in Yemen's food security. Approximately 3.3 million people, or nearly 10% of the population, now live in areas at risk of escalating to Emergency (IPC 4) or worse levels of food insecurity, primarily in Government-controlled areas. This represents an increase of 400,000 individuals from the 2.9 million identified in the April JMR analysis. Nonetheless, these figures remain within the historical average of 4.5 million people facing IPC 4 or worse conditions in the country.

Given the current situation and the lack of any significant acute shocks based on available data, the activation of the Yemen Preparedness Plan may not be necessary at this time. However, vigilant monitoring is crucial, particularly concerning the rise in IPC 4 or worse conditions, to identify any further deterioration.

It is essential to emphasize that the high levels of acute and chronic food and nutrition insecurity in Yemen require ongoing attention. Continued humanitarian aid and long-term development support are vital to addressing these persistent issues. We recommend maintaining and potentially expanding existing support programs to avert further declines in food security conditions.

For any inquiries or feedback, please contact yahinfo@acaps.org. The next update is scheduled for release in a couple of months.