Attachments
Highlights
The underlying drivers of food insecurity warn of a severe food security crisis in Yemen. Key underlying assumptions of the IPC 2020 prediction (July-December) for the 133 districts in areas under control of the Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen (IRG) most likely scenario have been overpassed. This includes the assumed continued scale of humanitarian operations and replenishment of foreign currency reserves. Two additional assumptions, the depreciation of the USD/YER exchange rate to reach YER 1,000/USD and displacement in conflict areas are close to being reached.
Therefore, IPC figures of food insecure people risk being underestimated and rendering a review.
Conflict has further escalated in Ma’rib and Al Bayda governorates leading to over 4,800 newly displaced families to Ma’rib city and other areas of Ma’rib governorate between mid-August and 24 September alone. 1 With the implementation of the Riyadh agreement not yet in effect and a reduced level of humanitarian funding, the threat of famine facing the Yemeni people is resurfacing stronger than in the past two years since the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 2417.
The accelerating depreciation of the Yemeni rial in areas under has reached unprecedented levels, i.e. YER 841/USD 1 by 21 September. Consequences for the capacity and costs of food and fuel imports are dire and have contributed significantly to inflationary trends of food prices in 2020. A renewal of the USD 2 billion Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) deposit to replenish foreign currency reserves, that in 2018 helped the rial recover within a few months, has yet to materialise.
Since the beginning of 2020 and until mid of September, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) crossed the 2018 crisis-level benchmark by 23 percent. For households who could barely afford the MFB at the start of the year, the 38 percent cost increase in IRG areas means that a household of seven people would share the same food that originally only four and a half members shared. It is likely that inferior diets and poor food consumption will rise also triggered by reduced income levels.
The fuel crisis, which erupted in the second week of June has continued to limit the availability of both petrol and diesel on official markets throughout July and August. With price increases for petrol of more than 70 percent and diesel between 52 percent in IRG and 67 percent in areas under Sana’a-based authorities (July to mid-September), transport of essential goods including food and water as well as access to income opportunities are becoming more constrained.
The proportion of households with inadequate food consumption remained on average at 39 percent during July and August. Poor food consumption surpassed the IPC threshold of 20 percent of the population in four governorates: Al Jawf, Raymah, Al Dali’ and Al Baydah, driven by the combination of reduced assistance in the northern governorates, the decrease in remittances, increased unemployment and conflict in Ad Dali' and Al Jawf.
Receiving only half assistance since April 2020 in areas under control of the Sana-based authorities, peoples’ resilience capital is diminishing: the value of the reduced food coping strategy index in Raymah, Al Jawf and Al Baydah has crossed the threshold of 19 points. 46 percent of households apply food-based coping strategies every day of the week (compared to 36 percent in areas under IRG). With continued stress on vulnerable households, a further deterioration of acute food insecurity is concerning.