Attachments
Introduction
The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives,1 most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe.
The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011.2 In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood.
Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.3 Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country.
The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield.7
In December 2018, fearing a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in light of Coalition advances towards the important harbour city of Hodeida, which accounts for approximately 70 percent of Yemen’s imports (including humanitarian aid), the international community urged the conflict parties to agree the UNmediated “Stockholm Agreement”. The agreement led to a local ceasefire and the establishment by the Security Council of a small UN mission to monitor party compliance (UNMHA – the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement). However, since the agree ment entered into force, compliance has been incomplete, particularly with respect to the anticipated full redeployment of military forces by the Houthis from the ports and the city of Hodeida.8 The agreement was widely seen as a watershed moment in Yemen’s civil war. In 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced a withdrawal of most of their military forces9 and Saudi Arabia sought direct talks with the Houthis. The reduction of material support by the Coalition reportedly contributed to tensions between the different Yemeni parties opposed to the Houthis and in August 2019 fighting broke out between soldiers loyal to the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist political movement and proHadi forces, over control of Aden.10 While this crisis was resolved through the Saudi-brokered “Riyadh Agreement” and later through the formation of the “Presidential Leadership Council”, the fault lines between the different factions weakened the anti-Houthi camp.11
Meanwhile a truce was agreed between the Houthis and the internationally-recognized government in April 2022 and while it formally lapsed after eight months, the Houthis have largely refrained from cross border attacks and the Coalition has not resumed its aerial attacks in Yemen, while humanitarian concessions made by the government side, such as the operation of limited commercial flights from Sana’a and the improved access for commercial ships to Houthi-controlled ports have remained in place.12 Negotiations to advance the peaceful settlement of the wider conflict have demonstrated limited progress to date. The Houthis appear to have used the lull in the fighting to increase their military arsenals, displaying large numbers of sophisticated weapon systems in a series of military parades in Sana’a and Hodeida on the anniversaries of their “revolution” and amongst other holidays in September 2022 and 2023.13 Following the outbreak of the Gaza conflict in October 2023, these weapons were used to launch attacks on Israeli territory and on commercial ships, posing a threat to the vital shipping lines between Suez and the Bab al-Mandab. The continued threats and targeting of civilian vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the subsequent decision by the United States of America and allied Member States to deploy a naval mission in the Red Sea to protect international shipping ended the period of relative calm and brought the conflict in Yemen back into the international spotlight.14 The subsequent launch of strikes onto targets inside Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen by the United States and United Kingdom as part of a campaign to counter the attacks on civilian shipping has added further complexity to the situation.