Regional: The Houthis in Yemen and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq carry out joint operations against Israel
On 6 June, the Houthi forces in Yemen and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a generic ‘brand’ identifying several pro-Iran Shiite militants — claimed to have carried out two joint drone operations targeting three commercial ships near and in the Israeli port of Haifa. Although there were no Israeli reports corresponding to possible interceptions of these attacks, United States forces claimed to have intercepted eight Houthi drones over the Red Sea. While both actors had separately claimed numerous attacks against Israel since the launch of the Israeli offensive in Gaza in October 2023, this was the first time the two actors claimed to have coordinated on an operation.
The claim followed a joint statement by the Houthis and Kataib Hizbullah — a component of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — calling for increased coordination between ‘axis of resistance’ members on 24 May.1 The two groups issued a total of seven claims of joint operations targeting either Israel or ships in its vicinity in June. While most of the attacks are uncorroborated, Israeli forces have reported several interceptions that correspond to some of the claims. The attacks also seem to have already impacted shipping in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. One of the vessels targeted, the Waler chemical/oil products tanker, was recorded as turning off its automatic identification system while in the waters around Haifa to hide its trajectory toward Israel.
Gaza Strip: Violence decreases as Israel scales down operations in central and southern Gaza
Israel started to scale down its ground operations in the Gaza Strip. In June, ACLED records an 18% decrease in the political violence in the Gaza Strip in comparison to May. While overall fatality and event numbers decreased, several aerial attacks claimed a high number of victims. On 6 June, an Israeli airstrike targeting an UNRWA school in al-Nusayrat refugee camp killed at least 35 Palestinians, with Israel claiming that most of them were militants.2 Two days later, at the same camp, Israeli forces conducted an operation to rescue four Israeli hostages kidnapped in the 7 October Hamas-led attack. While the Israel Defense Forces successfully rescued the hostages, concurrent Israeli airstrikes in the area killed at least 270 Palestinians.3
Meanwhile, in Rafah’s Tal al-Sultan area, armed clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants escalated in mid-June. Eight Israeli soldiers and at least 50 Palestinian gunmen were killed on 15 June in heavy clashes in Tal al-Sultan, marking the highest number of Israeli soldiers killed in a single day in Gaza since January. Throughout the month, Israeli forces also launched new, smaller-scale operations in Gaza City’s al-Zaytun, Sabra, and Shujaiyya neighborhoods and Dayr al-Balah and al-Burayj in central Gaza.
Iraq: Demonstrations over power shortages surge across Iraq
In June, 35 demonstrations were held across Iraq over power supply outages, mostly in the southern provinces of Thi Qar, al-Muthanna, and al-Qadissiya. On 23 June, demonstrators began an open-ended sit-in in front of the Nassriya Thermal Power Plant in Thi Qar province. Similarly, demonstrators in Al Najaf, Al Qadissiya, Diyala, and Maysan blocked main roads, including with burning tires, to protest the electricity problem. Iraq’s power shortage has been exacerbated by heat waves, with temperatures reaching 51°C in at least 10 cities across Iraq in June.4 Daily power shortages last up to 10 hours in some major cities and 18 hours in some rural areas.5 Although many Iraqis rely on private generators, high costs and gas shortages present additional challenges.6 On 25 June 2024, private generator owners protested in Kerbala City against shortages in gas oil. While the Iraqi cabinet has taken measures to lower electricity consumption, such as reducing official working hours, the power shortage problem is likely to persist throughout the summer.7
Lebanon & Israel: Tit-for-tat attacks continue while the risk of all-out war increases
In June, Israel and Hezbollah continued exchanging cross-border attacks for the ninth consecutive month, with attacks escalating in intensity and geographic scope. On the Israeli side, one Israeli reservist soldier was killed in a drone attack on 5 June. Meanwhile, Israeli strikes in Lebanon killed at least 27 Hezbollah fighters over the month, including one of the group’s most senior commanders in an airstrike on 11 June in Jouaiya. This latter attack prompted Hezbollah to retaliate with barrages that fired hundreds of missiles and drones targeting northern Israel between 12 and 14 June.
Both sides continued to spread the geographic scope of their attacks. Hezbollah carried out its deepest attack into Israel to date on 7 June, when it targeted Nazareth with an armed drone that fell in an open area by the city without causing any damage.8 Similarly, on 10 June, an Israeli airstrike killed three Hezbollah members and destroyed a Hezbollah compound in the northeastern town of al-Hermel. The attack was the deepest strike by Israel in Lebanese territories — about 130 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border — since the beginning of clashes with Hezbollah on 8 October 2023. The number and intensity of attacks leveled off in the second half of June, after the Muslim holiday Eid al–Adha.
Diplomatically, the US increased efforts to de-escalate the conflict. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein, who mediated a maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon in 2022, was dispatched to Jerusalem and Beirut on 17 and 18 June to calm tensions.9 Several countries, including the US, have asked their nationals to leave Lebanon due to the increased risk of war.10
Syria: Regime forces suffer major losses following the launch of a new campaign against the Islamic State in the Syrian desert
On 6 June 2024, regime forces and pro-regime militias, with air support from Russian forces, launched a new campaign against the Islamic State (IS) in the Syrian desert (al-Badia).11 IS launched more than 30 raids and IED attacks against advancing Syrian forces. These attacks killed at least 70 army troops and pro-government militiamen in June, compared to 38 fighters killed in 14 attacks launched in May. Most of the attacks occurred in the deserts of Dayr al-Zawr and Homs provinces. In Dayr al-Zawr province, IS carried out two suicide attacks against Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD) bases in the villages of al-Izbah and Attala following a similar attack last month in the town of Shiheil. IS had not conducted suicide attacks in QSD-controlled areas since 2019. IS continues to pose a threat to both regime and QSD forces despite the removal of IS’ self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria in 2019 and several subsequent military campaigns to suppress the group.12 The endurance of IS is partly due to the retreat of its remaining cells into the Syrian desert, a geographical area that spans several provinces, including Dayr al-Zawr, Ar Raqqa, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Rural Damascus, and al-Suwayda.
Yemen: Houthi forces use a drone boat to sink their second ship in the Red Sea
A drone boat attack by Houthi forces resulted in the sinking of a ship — a first since the group started targeting commercial shipping in the waterways around Yemen in November 2023. While this is the second ship the Houthis have sunk during their latest string of attacks, it is the first to result from a drone boat attack. On 12 June, a Houthi drone boat struck the engine room of the Tutor bulk carrier, causing severe flooding and damage. The attack killed one crew member and ultimately led the crew to abandon the ship on 14 June. Once the crew evacuated, Houthi forces booby-trapped the Tutor before it sank on 18 June.
The Houthis’ use of drone boats is not new. The first such attack was reported in 2017, when Houthi forces targeted a Saudi frigate in the Red Sea, causing the death of two Saudi soldiers. In the most recent string of attacks against international shipping, ACLED records the use of seven drone boats by Houthi forces in the Red Sea prior to the attack on the Tutor.13 Since the attack, ACLED records Houthi drone boat use at a rate never seen before, with at least 17 drone boats deployed in the Red Sea between 13 and 30 June — more than twice the number deployed over the previous five months. Houthi forces are likely to continue increasing their use of drone boats, particularly as they recently unveiled a new version of their ‘Tufan’ drone boat, which they claim can carry a warhead weighing up to 1,500 kilograms.14 In comparison, the warheads of the weapons employed in Houthi maritime attacks to date range from 15 to 450 kilograms.