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Papers from a Managing Global Order conference hosted by the NYU Abu Dhabi Institute

The Use of Force, Crisis Diplomacy and the Responsibilities of States

Reflection Paper

NYU Center on International Cooperation and the Brookings Institution, Managing Global Order Program, April 20121

A. Debating crisis management after the Arab Awakening

1. In the last eighteen months a series of crises – most obviously those in Libya and Syria – have created divisions among major powers. These divisions have not followed easily predictable patterns. The decision to use force in Libya split NATO. South Africa voted in favor of action in the Security Council, but then joined the other BRICS powers (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in criticizing the length and scale of the ensuing Western air campaign. All the BRICS opposed putting serious pressure on Syria in 2011, but a majority of smaller non-Western powers called for a tougher line. In early 2012, India and South Africa changed position, backing calls for regime transition in Damascus.

2. Although the rhetoric around these crises has often been vitriolic, there has also been a general recognition that disputes must be contained and diplomatic channels kept open. Despite their differences, Western and non-Western powers alike have repeatedly returned to the Security Council to debate options for post-conflict reconstruction in Libya and crisis management in Syria. There have also been renewed efforts to restart stalled diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program.

3. There have also been attempts to find common ground on the principles of crisis management such as Brazil’s initiative to discuss a “Responsibility While Protecting” – a set of guidelines for regulating the use of force in cases such as Libya. While Western officials have raised doubts about the details of this proposal (noted below) they have welcomed the opportunity for a more constructive debate.

4. Relatively constructive debates on crisis management, and even on the use of force, are possible because both Western and non-Western governments and commentators have moderated their positions over time. Few non-Western leaders have argued for the strict application of the principle of non-interference during the Arab Spring, as their predecessors might have done during the Cold War. Equally Western – and especially American – officials have recognized both the need for multilateral support for their policies and the limits to their ability to transform Arab societies.

5. In conceptual terms, therefore, there is a (gradual and complicated) international convergence towards agreement on the need for international engagement in crisis management. This has been engendered by three factors: (i) conceptual debates such as that over the Responsibility to Protect;

(ii) practical experience of cooperation among established and emerging powers in handling weak states such as Haiti and Sudan; and (iii) awareness among emerging powers of their global interests.

6. However, this process of convergence still has clear limits. Deep differences remain over the how to legitimize interference in other states’ affairs.
Conversely, general debates about legitimacy are typically sidelined when crises affect major powers’ own national interests. And even where there is some diplomatic consensus on the need for action, there is often little common understanding of how to mix and match the conflict management tools (such as mediation and sanctions) available. The question of whether to use force, and its relationship to other tools, is still more divisive.