Attachments
Executive Summary
“Nobody attacks a stronger opponent” Peacekeeping is a risky activity. A certain number of casualties may occur even if all necessary preventive measures are taken. But since 2013, casualties have spiked. 195 personnel in United Nations peacekeeping missions have been killed by acts of violence, more than during any other 5-year period in history. In 2017, there had been 56 fatalities at the time of publication – the highest number since 1994. These numbers go beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk, and they are likely to rise even higher. Something needs to change to reverse the trend.
This report aims to identify why the United Nations has had so many casualties caused by acts of violence in recent years, and what should be done to reduce these casualties.
Overall, the United Nations and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries need to adapt to a new reality: The blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer “natural” protection. Peacekeeping environments now feature armed groups, terrorists, organised crime, street gangs, criminal and political exploitation, and other threats. The era of “Chapter VI-style” peacekeeping is over, but the United Nations and Troop/PoliceContributing Countries are, by and large, still gripped by a “Chapter VI Syndrome.” If the United Nations and T/PCCs do not change their mindset, take risks and show a willingness to face these new challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm’s way.
Casualties will continue to occur, and will even increase, if the United Nations and T/PCCs fail to change in the following areas:
LEADERSHIP: A deficit of leadership is one of the main problems that prevents the United Nations from adapting. Leadership at all levels, from New York to the most remote field locations, needs to demonstrate initiative, commitment, and determination to adapt. This has grave consequences in the form of fatalities. To stay secure, the United Nations must be robust not only through its military, police, and civilian personnel in the field, but in its political behaviour as well, actively seeking solutions rather than waiting for casualties to stop.
OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: Fatalities rarely occur as a result of troops and leadership taking action: the United Nations is most often attacked as a result of inaction. When leaders’ decision-making processes depend too heavily on general standard procedures, they are bound to fail to take appropriate, timely action to promote security. Operational behaviour on the ground should, therefore, be based on a risk assessment, according to the specific situation and threat environment. Each mission is unique, and even within each country, different area. But what never changes is that the interpretation of mandates, rules of engagements and other documents should support taking ACTION, and not be used to justify INACTION.
USE OF FORCE: Unfortunately, hostile forces do not understand a language other than force. To deter and repel attacks and to defeat attackers, the United Nations needs to be strong and not fear to use force when necessary. Some T/PCCs and leadership remain riskaverse when it comes to using force, but they have failed to understand projecting strength is more secure for uniformed and civilian personnel.
DEFENSIVE POSTURE: To improve security, missions should identify threats to their security and take the initiative, using all the tactics, to neutralise or eliminate the threats.
Missions should go where the threat is, in order to neutralise it. Missions should also push combat to the night, to take advantage of their superior technology. Waiting in a defensive posture only gives freedom to hostile forces to decide when, where and how to attack the United Nations.
PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING: The United Nations should provide an updated interpretation of the basic principles for peacekeeping. Troops should not see the principles as restrictions on the initiative and the use of force. The principles should clarify that in high-risk areas featuring high-intensity conflicts (ambushes, for instance), troops should use overwhelming force and be proactive and preemptive. In battles and in fights, the United Nations needs to win, or troops, police and civilian personnel will die.
SELECTION OF TCCs/PCCs: The United Nations should establish what it expects from T/PCCs on the ground regarding posture, mindset, training and proper equipment. T/PCCs should make a formal commitment to satisfy this profile, and be held accountable for it.
T/PCCs may seek to participate in peacekeeping for different reasons and interests. This is normal and acceptable, but they must perform. The United Nations should not accept caveats, because they weaken integration and mutual protection within missions. This increases the risk of casualties. At the same time, United Nations leadership must be held accountable to do everything possible to keep troops secure. This includes demanding that leadership from the SRSG to the rank and file will default to action, and not inaction, when faced with security-related decisions.
PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING: Deficient pre-deployment training is one of the main causes of fatalities and serious injuries in the field. Some contingents and commanders are visibly unprepared to demonstrate the operational behaviour required in the field. The United Nations and T/PCCs are both responsible for this unpreparedness. The United Nations conducts a pre-deployment visit to verify the contingent’s preparation. This should be an opportunity to verify the training, including by surprise exercises and tests. The United Nations must have, and exercise, the authority to say yes or no: if contingents do not pass, the United Nations should refuse to authorise deployment and recommend specific points for further training. In the same way, troops putting themselves and their colleagues at risk of death and injury because of their poor performance should be subjected to intensive in-mission training and repatriated in serious cases. Basic training should be complemented with specialised training to prepare troops for specific threats, such as operating in jungle areas and in areas with improvised explosive devices. This training should continue in-mission. To reduce deficiencies in pre-deployment training and contingent-owned equipment, the UN should create a system to pay in advance part of the annual reimbursement to the T/PCCs. This will allow T/PCCs to conduct better preparation regarding training and basic equipment, and the United Nations will have more authority during the verification process.
EQUIPMENT: Troops should not be deployed without the necessary and appropriate equipment in the threat environment. Inadequate or missing equipment facilitates and increases the number of casualties. In some missions, specialised equipment like mine-protected vehicles, special weapons, and special ammunitions are needed.
INTELLIGENCE: To prevent casualties, peacekeeping missions need tactical intelligence.
Missions must be able to transform intelligence into simple tasks and actions that boost security, but they often fail to do this. Missions do not lack high-tech resources to collect intelligence. They lack the basics, especially human intelligence, networks of informants, situational awareness, and capacity to communicate with the population. Military units should also have more structures for tactical intelligence. And when information is available, troops sometimes do not take the appropriate action. The end state of intelligence should be action and results that increase security, not a written report.
TECHNOLOGY: The United Nations must review and initiate efforts to rapidly equip troops with basic technology for improving security. High-level sophisticated technology will not give personnel the capabilities and information they need on the ground. Knowing know who is who, where and when will make it possible to prevent attacks and identify attackers. Then, basic technology will enable personnel to take action against attackers.
Appropriate vehicles, special rifles for snipers, special ammunition, night vision capability to operate during the night, and laser aim, among other forms of technology, are needed.
MEDICAL: To save lives after attacks occur, improving the quality and availability of firstaid and Level 1 hospitals is crucial. Military units, convoys and long-range patrols should have more medical teams, equipment and capacity for communications with bases and helicopters.
BASES: Bases must have the best possible physical security measures. But security also comes from action: bases should be a point for irradiating security. All bases should be surrounded by a clearly-defined security zone including few kilometres of roads, villages and IDP camps in the vicinity, where all the population should know that it is an area with “zero tolerance” for the presence of armed groups. United Nations troops should use all tactics to dominate the area, including night operations, foot patrols, the occupation of hidden/dissimulated static positions during the day and night to impose restriction of movement on criminal groups.
MISSION FOOTPRINTS: Overstretched deployment without a clear objective imposes frequent long, slow supply convoys along roads in very bad conditions. This facilitates attacks against the United Nations by armed groups. Large footprints also force some missions to dedicate about of 90% of their operational capacity dedicated to escorting convoys and self-protection. This leaves missions without the capacity to concentrate forces and means to solve local problems, such as eliminating spoilers which would target the United Nations. Missions should deploy personnel to solve specific security problems and not to have a national presence, as a national army would.
ADMINISTRATION: Administration, not operations, tends to dominate logistics. The slow procurement of operational assets, lengthy check-in processes for personnel, and other processes reduce the operational effectiveness of missions and hinder them from taking proactive action against threats and responding swiftly to attacks. They also reduce flexibility needed to provide the capabilities needed to boost security, for instance, ensuring that all patrols should have interpreters to communicate with the population and collect information. An “operational administration” is fundamental to improving security.
IMPUNITY: When the United Nations lets criminals enjoy impunity after attacks, they are likely to view the organisation as weak and attack again. The United Nations should pursue the armed groups and individuals who attack, kill and seriously injure personnel, to arrest them and bring them to justice. Immediately after a security incident, the United Nations should respond strongly, by mobilising forces and creating a special operational project, to prevent impunity from stimulating future violence against personnel.
The report discusses these factors in four broad domains: changing mindsets, improving capacity, achieving a threat-sensitive mission footprint, and enhancing accountability. It makes specific recommendations in 18 areas, identifying steps to be taken in the shortterm and medium/long-term, and linking each one to a responsible actor. The report also recommends four proposals for extra-budgetary funding from the Peace and Security Trust Fund.
Enactment of the recommendations requires strong and committed leadership at all levels. These recommendations will reduce fatalities and injuries due to acts of violence.
Otherwise, the fatalities trend will likely worsen. We need to change the way we are doing business!
Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz
19 December 2017