by Jenna Russo
The United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial recently took place in Berlin from May 13 to 14, bringing together one of the largest numbers of delegations of any ministerial, representing more than 134 countries, including more than 50 ministers. Centered on the theme “The Future of Peacekeeping,” the ministerial came at a moment of uncertainty for UN peace operations, not only due to changes in the peace and security landscape, but also due to broader geopolitical shifts, major funding shortages, and the UN80 Initiative. While these looming shifts did not dampen member states’ expressed enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping, which was heralded by Germany’s new foreign minister as a powerful example of “burden sharing,” much attention was paid to how the UN can shift from doing “more with less” to doing “less with less.”
In parallel to the ministerial, the UN is grappling with these challenges in multiple other policy tracks, including the review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations, mandated in the Pact for the Future, and the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review. Against this backdrop, this article outlines three major themes from the Peacekeeping Ministerial that may continue to influence policymaking and peace operations in the near future.
Partnerships in Peace Operations
On the margins of the last UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, held in Ghana in late 2023, member states were busy negotiating the final draft of the landmark Resolution 2719, which provides a framework for African Union-led peace support operations to receive UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. While energy around 2719 was more muted during this ministerial, in part due to hurdles around its implementation, partnerships remained a key theme. Practicing subsidiarity and supporting the role of regional and subregional organizations is seen by many member states as not only normatively sound but also a fiscal solution to liquidity constraints within the UN.
However, while the idea of partnered peacekeeping has broad support among member states, there is not yet a clear sense of who should be doing what or how to operationalize “networked multilateralism,” as called for by the secretary-general in his New Agenda for Peace. While the AU’s added value in leading peace enforcement operations continued to be heralded by some leaders at the ministerial, including top brass from both the UN and the AU, others see the AU’s added value at the political or strategic level. In particular, given the challenging relationship the UN has had with some host states, it could leverage the AU as a political partner, though this aspect of the partnership is often overlooked in the rhetoric of the secretary-general and other senior officials. At the same time, demand for AU-led peace enforcement operations is far from surging, with few viable contexts on the horizon outside of Somalia. Some member states have also hesitated to further promote the use of peace enforcement operations, given their poor track record in resolving conflict.
When it comes to operationalizing peacekeeping partnerships, including via the 2719 framework, significant hurdles remain, particularly within the Security Council. Despite widespread support from other member states, the US has signaled its intention to continue playing spoiler on the Somalia file. While the US expressed its broad support for the 2719 framework during the ministerial, there is no evident test case expected soon, and some officials have quietly expressed concern that the framework may never be successfully utilized. While Resolution 2719 does not embody the totality of the UN-AU partnership, it was nevertheless seen as an important consolidation of that partnership, particularly given how long African member states fought for its realization. Thus, while the potential failure of the framework should not subsume other positive areas of progress in the UN-AU partnership, neither would it be inconsequential, particularly from a normative standpoint.
Modular Approaches to Peace Operations
In the lead-up to the ministerial, the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) published an independent study on “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities.” The study lays out various models or tasks that can be included in mission mandates either independently or in combination with one another. The idea that sets of tasks can be used like building blocks to create a mandate is referred to by some as a “modular approach” to peace operations. It has gained momentum among some policymakers insofar as it could facilitate more targeted mandates that are tailored to individual contexts, reducing political and financial barriers that larger multidimensional missions may face.
While supporting a shift toward modular approaches was cited by many participants of the ministerial, including the German foreign minister, many practicalities of this approach have yet to be articulated. While there is ample documentation of the negative consequences of “Christmas tree” mandates, particularly their tendency to misalign resources with mandated tasks, there are often legitimate reasons for including a long list of tasks in a mandate. These tasks do not simply reflect the diverse parochial interests of Security Council members and Secretariat departments; rather, many of them are broader peacebuilding tasks included in mandates based on the recognition that signing an agreement is not enough in itself to consolidate peace. Under a modular approach, partners outside the UN peace operation could be mandated to undertake some of these peacebuilding tasks. However, it will not be easy to ensure these tasks are undertaken by partners with sustainable funding and that all partners are working toward common objectives. Taking an integrated approach is difficult enough within a single mission structure, let alone when trying to coordinate with other UN and non-UN entities.
Under a modular approach, there is also a risk that critical tasks in areas like the protection of civilians, human rights, and gender could get left on the chopping block. This would not only undermine the UN’s normative commitment in these areas but also shift it away from the sorts of human-centered approaches that research shows are critical to the consolidation of peace. Thus, as policymakers look ahead to the future of missions and mandates, member states should be dogmatic about the centrality of these tasks to peace operations, regardless of who implements them. This is particularly the case for the protection of civilians, which is often used by local populations as a “yardstick” by which to measure mission performance and which, if left unattended, can undermine other mission priorities.
Financial Constraints
Financial constraints were the not-so-subtle elephant in the room throughout the ministerial, permeating the secretary-general’s opening speech and echoed by numerous delegations throughout the two days. While it is clear that missions will have to shift from doing “more with less” to doing “less with less,” there is a lack of clarity over what this will mean in practice. The secretary-general noted that the Secretariat’s review on the future of all forms of peace operations would work “hand-in-hand” with the UN80 Initiative. However, the lack of clarity over UN80 has left many wondering whether a clear vision will be articulated to guide reforms, including the proposed 20% cut in staffing across DPO and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) that many UN staff view as arbitrary.
Rather than making blanket cuts across departments, the secretary-general should use the UN80 Initiative and the Secretariat’s review of peace operations to advance a strategic vision for the UN’s future role in peace operations and the peace and security landscape more broadly. Given the scale of recent changes in the global political, security, and financial landscape, such a vision should precede and serve as a guidepost for any significant cuts or institutional reform. Recent policy documents, including the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future, can provide a foundation for this vision.
In addition to broader reforms, the UN should consider ways to facilitate the more flexible use of resources, as called for by the secretary-general in his opening remarks at the ministerial. A key barrier to missions operating in an efficient or agile way is the UN General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, which is in charge of reviewing and approving mission (and other) budgets. Because Fifth Committee negotiations are often contentious, missions’ configurations and budgets are difficult to change once agreed upon. Missions are thus prone to ask for the maximum number of posts possible based on their mandates with the knowledge that asking for more in the future may well be denied by committee members. In other words, the system disincentivizes missions from working with less because it is so difficult to scale up if needed. Therefore, if member states want missions to work in a more agile manner, they must be willing to resource them accordingly. More could also be done to adjust the UN’s rigid financial regulations and rules to allow for the more flexible use of resources, including during mission transitions and in the context of partnerships.
While the UN must adapt to a changing financial landscape, one ministerial panelist sharply noted that there is no shortage of money in the world. In 2024, member states surpassed $2.7 trillion in military expenditures, whereas the UN peacekeeping budget was just 2% of that—around $5.6 billion. To be sure, the Trump administration’s threat to make potentially massive cuts to its peacekeeping contribution would have a major impact. However, for member states to wring their hands and suggest that there’s nothing to be done belies the extent to which many of these countries have shifted their priorities away from collective security toward investments elsewhere.
Conclusion
In many ways, this year’s peacekeeping ministerial was a success: it achieved its aim of gathering a broad cross-section of member states to reaffirm their commitment to UN peacekeeping and provide pledges to fill a range of capability gaps. At the same time, holding a peacekeeping pledging conference at this moment in time feels somewhat incongruous against the backdrop of such massive global shifts and existential questions over the future of UN peace operations. While many of these difficult questions were raised at the ministerial, few answers were provided, and the mood among policymakers and UN officials remains decidedly unsettled.
In this and other recent fora, many member states continue to reassert their belief in the value of UN peacekeeping. This value is backed by the data, though much of this data comes from an earlier era of peacekeeping with different conditions. Additional studies are needed to show whether and how UN peace operations can be effective in today’s contexts. The Secretariat’s review provides one such opportunity. Most urgently, member states and UN leadership need to chart a strategic vision for how they want the UN to operate in the peace and security crises of today and tomorrow. Their ability to implement this vision has less to do with the UN’s operational capabilities than with their commitment and willingness to see it through.
Jenna Russo is Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.
Originally Published in the Global Observatory