European Union Election Observation Mission Venezuela 2021 Final Report - Regional and municipal elections 21 November 2021

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The European Union deployed an election observation mission (EU EOM) from 14 October to 5 December to observe the regional and municipal elections on 21 November 2021 and assess the extent to which they were administered in compliance with national laws and Venezuela’s international commitments for elections. The mission, headed by Chief Observer and Member of the European Parliament Isabel Santos, from Portugal, comprised 134 observers on Election day and was the first ever international mission to cover all 23 states and the capital district of Venezuela. The 21 November elections were the first national elections contested by the majority of the opposition parties since 2015. They were widely seen as a possible first step towards a broad political agreement on the necessary conditions to conduct democratic elections accepted by all parties and to advance the country’s re-institutionalisation.

• The EU EOM noted structural shortcomings that should be addressed in future elections, such as the lack of legal certainty, which caused the arbitrary disqualification of candidates and the rerun elections in the State of Barinas; the handing over of party symbols and electoral ticket to internal minority party factions; the extensive use of state resources in the campaign; and the unequal access to the mass media by candidates. The EU EOM also concluded that there were improved electoral conditions compared to past elections, such as a more balanced election administration, the conduct of several audits at different stages of the election process, which had been recommended by the 2006 EU EOM, and a broader update of the voter register.

• The legal framework for elections complies with most basic international election principles. Venezuela has signed and ratified all relevant international and regional treaties on civil and political rights. However, some media laws and especially the lack of judicial independence and non-adherence to the rule of law compromised the level playing field and the fairness and transparency of elections. The Supreme Court of Justice, in highly controversial rulings, handed the control of the party identity and the use of the logos to minority dissenting factions who had claimed them. Furthermore, the arbitrary suspension of opposition candidates’ right to stand for elections through an administrative procedure and without notification, put in danger the country’s process towards improved electoral conditions initiated with the 21 November regional and municipal elections.

• The current board of the National Election Council (CNE), appointed in May 2021, has been frequently described by EU EOM interlocutors and political commentators as the most balanced in the past 20 years. EU EOM interlocutors considered it as the most important measure to regain confidence in the CNE after the opposition parties did not participate in the three previous national elections since 2015. While the three councillors close to the government were in control of the CNE executive bodies, the board achieved improved conditions in technical components of the elections through internal dialogue, and the two councillors linked to the opposition and civil society did not hide their dissenting votes on issues on which no consensus could be found, such as the disqualification or withdrawal of candidates.

• The CNE implemented most of its activities in an efficient manner and according to the calendar published on 28 June. One of the most important transparency measures implemented by the CNE was the conduct of 16 audits of different stages of the electoral process. A comprehensive audit of the electronic voting system by academic experts concluded that the system guarantees the integrity of the vote, in spite of the widespread popular belief that the secrecy of the vote is not protected. A mock voting exercise conducted in October 2021 was assessed as successful by domestic observers, who however criticised the concurrent partisan activities, as well as the use of state resources, mostly by the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). Virtual and in-person polling staff training sessions were superficial and too short. In addition, civic and voter education efforts were insufficient, especially regarding the option to vote for different candidatures across all four elections on 21 November.

• The CNE conducted a voter register update campaign from 1 June to 15 July, over a longer period and with more officials than in past elections. However, the information provided to voters was insufficient and in many cases registration officials displayed a partisan behaviour. Furthermore, according to national observation organisations, 12 per cent of the observed stands were in areas controlled by the ruling party, while 14 per cent were not installed in the officially announced location. The CNE estimates under-registration at around 745,000 persons, but civil society put this figure at to two to three million. In addition, almost six million Venezuelans have migrated, according to UNHCR figures based on official data, but there are only 108,000 voters registered abroad.

• The CNE registered 42 national and 64 regional parties to participate in the 21 November elections, along with six national and 24 regional indigenous organisations to participate in the 26 November indigenous elections. Candidate registration comprised three phases, from 9 August to 11 November. Changes made in the last phase, which started on 27 September, were not reflected in the ballot. The possibility of exchanging candidates up to 10 days before Election day benefited political parties but negatively affected the right of voters to cast an informed vote, since changes were not reflected in the ballot.

• The rejection of candidacies through an administrative process, without notification or explicit reasoning, based on decisions seen as politically motivated by the Comptroller General (CG), affected 15 candidates of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela and the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática candidate Freddy Superlano, who shortly before the CG’s decision had been determined by the CNE winner of the governorship of Barinas. These decisions contradicted article 42 of the Constitution, guaranteeing that only a final judgement can suspend the exercise of political rights, as well as international principles for democratic elections.

• The election campaign started well before the official 28 October date, despite the fact that it is prohibited by the General Regulation on the Electoral Processes Law. The campaign was generally calm and peaceful. The ruling party’s candidates benefited from a wide network of activists and the extensive use of state resources, including public transportation, and distribution of goods and services. EU EOM observers reported indications of people being pressured or paid to attend party events, while the opposition’s freedom of movement was limited by a lack of financial and material resources, including fuel rationing. Access to traditional and social media was also more challenging for opposition parties. The CNE failed to sanction violations of the campaign regulations and the use of state resources, despite the deployment of 2,000 inspectors. The monitoring of the funds of political parties remains a significant lacuna of the Venezuelan electoral system.

 Mass media in Venezuela suffer harsh technical and financial constraints. In addition, some media outlets choose not to provide information to avoid political problems. EU EOM interlocutors reported self-censorship in 21 states, and the change of some media outlets’ editorial line as a result of political pressures in 13 states. The state media regulatory agency, CONATEL, can directly sanction media, even withdraw broadcast licenses, without requiring judicial verification of the infraction. EU EOM media monitoring showed that national media had a strong bias in favour of the ruling party, which received the largest share of TV and radio coverage, particularly on the state-owned Venezolana de Televisión and Radio Nacional de Venezuela. Political advertising complied with the daily limits set by law. No compulsory broadcasts of government messages (cadenas) were identified by the EU EOM.

• The importance of Internet as a media channel has increased in Venezuela after the loss of trust in traditional media. Government attempts to influence the online media include the blockage of website, smear campaigns against reporters and propaganda operations.
  Although the CNE established the obligation to respect the electoral law also online, there were no sanctions for violations or limits on spending on online media. The 2017 Law Against Hatred pushed journalists and candidates to self-censorship online. The government use of public funds to promote its narratives through Twitter has been widely documented. The EU EOM social media monitoring also found that Facebook pages of government officials, including President Maduro, the President of the National Assembly, ministers and several incumbent governors, and to a much lesser extent some officials from the opposition, were used to promote the campaign of party candidates and messages.

• Venezuela’s legal framework for elections guarantees equal rights and full political participation for women, indigenous groups and persons with disabilities. Despite that, women face economic and social challenges when running for elections. A CNE directive yielded a 49.44 per cent share of female candidates in the 21 November elections, but women are only 19 and nine per cent of the mayors and governors elected, respectively. As there is no specific register of indigenous voters, the CNE implemented a two-stage election to choose indigenous representatives: one in July and August to choose 4,334 delegates, who then chose indigenous representatives to municipal councils and state legislative councils on 26 November. The indigenous election was criticised as opaque in its procedures and as a second-rate election which did not respect the constitutional rights to a direct, secret suffrage. As for the vote of Persons with Disabilities, the CNE created a dedicated commission to elaborate guidelines and voter education materials, but this did not produce satisfactory results due to a weak communication effort.

• The 2020 CNE regulation for election observation restricts observers’ activities by requiring them to have their deployment plans and reports approved in advance by the CNE.
  The CNE accredited six domestic observer organisations and more than 300 international observers. Domestic observers did not report any limitations regarding freedom of movement or expression as the CNE requirements were not enforced, but on Election day some observers could not access some polling stations in three of the 24 state entities. The CNE and the EU signed an Administrative Arrangement and the CNE passed a resolution to fit the EU observation activities into the existing legal framework. This was criticised by civil society as a double standard for national and international observation.

• Election day was characterised by delays in the opening and closing of polling stations, the absence of the original polling staff selected and trained by the CNE, widespread voter coercion and abuse of assisted voting. Political parties, mostly PSUV, but also opposition parties on a minor scale, set up points to control voter attendance. Election day was generally calm, but overshadowed by violent incidents, especially in Zulia, where one voter was shot down while waiting in line for voting.

The EU EOM 2021 offers 23 recommendations to improve future electoral processes. The seven priority recommendations listed below relate to the main structural deficiencies highlighted by the mission’s findings:

1. To enhance the separation of powers and the confidence in the independence of the TSJ with the passing of a new Judicial Career Law and a reform of the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice, to align them with the Constitutional safeguards that ensure transparent, non-political and merit-based selection of judges, avoiding the encroachment on the competences of the electoral power.

2. To abolish the Comptroller General prerogative to strip citizens of their fundamental right to stand for election through an administrative procedure and without a timely notification, which negatively impacts on the right to defence.

3. To conduct a voter education campaign that increases confidence in the integrity and secrecy of the electronic voting, and teaches voters how to vote for different political options in simultaneous elections.

4. To strengthen the CNE’s sanctioning powers by introducing a system of monitoring and sanctions, ranging from reprimands to the imposition of progressive penalties, especially regarding the use of state resources for campaign purposes.

5. To balance the state-owned media coverage during electoral campaigns, in line with the Organic Law on Electoral Processes and international good practice.

6. To repeal the Law against Hatred, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance in order to promote freedom of expression and avoid self-censorship.

7. To make more efforts to inform citizens about their selection as polling staff in order to increase the presence of trained and accredited polling staff, considering a mix of incentive and sanction measures.