This report draws heavily on the conflict
analysis methodology developed by the Forum on Early Warning and Early
Response -- Africa (FEWER Africa).
Three assumptions/values permeate
this report. Firstly, good and operationally relevant analysis is not neutral
or impartial, but strives to be balanced. It should reflect local voices
as much as possible and concomitantly incorporate regional and international
perspectives. Secondly, deep concern of the eminent conflicts throughout
the Africa continent is in the spirit of the conclusions drawn. In some
instances this make the analysis seemingly partial with certain groups,
however, as previously mentioned, the analysis and conclusions drawn aim
to be balanced. Finally, analysis is about making judgements that are based
(where possible) on carefully supported evidence. Nonetheless, there are
always many interpretations of facts and their significance.
It is the objective of this monitoring report to contribute to the better understanding of the current conflict dynamics in the pre-electoral period in Zanzibar, and to identify entry points of engagement for conflict prevention in the electoral/post-electoral period. (1) Given also a free mandate to draw tough conclusions, this report could possibly appear quite controversial for some. Its objective, though, is to be a thought-provoking report, rather than a consensus document.
Fewer Arica is currently seeking support for its analytical and peacebuilding activities in Zanzibar for the period of 2005-06.
Introduction
The two islands that comprise Zanzibar, Pemba and Unguja, form with mainland Tanganyika the United Republic of Tanzania. Despite a thriving tourist economy, however, the islands lag behind the rest of Tanzania in social and economic terms,(2) prompting criticism that they have been marginalised, with an unequal distribution of resources between the mainland and the islands. Zanzibar has its own president, parliament, and jurisdiction over the islands' education, social and cultural affairs; the mainland is responsible for programmes including defence, immigration and foreign affairs.
The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has held power both nationally and in Zanzibar for the last 40 years. President Benjamin Mpaka, due to stand down at the elections in favour of current Foreign Minister Jakaya Kikwete, is politically dominant on the mainland, but highly criticised in Zanzibar. The opposition, the Civic United Front (CUF), with its powerbase in Zanzibar, is determined to turn around its defeat in the polls of 1995 and 2000 -- elections criticised for fraud and repression.
Against the backdrop of unrest that followed the disputed elections in 2001, fears of a resurgence of violence are growing as the elections approach.(3) Following the 2000 elections, 40 Zanzibaris were shot dead and a further 600 injured when the Tanzanian army and police opened fire on a crowd of CUF supporters who were protesting against the results of the ballot. In the days following the 2000 elections, Tanzanian security forces, backed by ruling party officials and militias, went house-to house arresting, beating and sexually abusing residents. During that period, an estimated 2,000 Zanzibaris fled to Kenya.(4)
A majority of independent electoral observers agree that the CUF won the 1995 and 2000 elections in Zanzibar, and that the CCM retained power through fraud. CCM supporters admit isolated irregularities, but deny widespread fraud. The CCM is likely to win elections on the mainland, though the separate contest for the presidency and the seats in the House of Representatives of Zanzibar is far less certain. The upcoming elections will cast light on the quality of governance in Tanzania, which is a self-proclaimed model of African coexistence.
On October 2001, the CCM and CUF signed a political reconciliation agreement, the Muafaka II. The main objective of the Muafaka Accord was to create a level playing field and a conducive atmosphere for 2005 elections.(5) However, the current tensions and violence related to the registration process indicate that more violence is likely during and after the October elections. It is imperative to address these issues. Local analysis over the next three months, combined with support for the mechanisms of reconciliation between different stakeholders in the post-electoral period, will help address the root causes of the conflict and work towards prevention rather than management of conflict in Zanzibar.
Footnotes
(1) On the 27th January 2001, violence broke out in Zanzibar when the riot police violently cracked down on a peaceful demonstration staged by the opposition in response to the election results of the October 2000 elections.
(2) April 2003 - The Economic Research Bureau of the University of Dar es Salaam reported that the GDP per capita of Tanzinia is US$600 whilst that of Zanzibar is US$220. 61% of Zanzibaris are without basic livelihood needs. In the Pemba Island the poverty rate is 64%. Water, sanitation, energy, transportation, health and educational services are very poor.
(3) Elections are being held on 30th October 2005
(4) Field research and Human Rights Watch Report, "The Bullets were Raining -- The January 2001 Attack on Peaceful Demonstrators in Zanzibar", April 10, 2002.
(5) The Accord included constitutional and electoral law amendments to restructure the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), create a permanent voters register, and reform the Zanzibar judiciary and state-owned media. The parties agreed to hold by-elections on Pemba in 2003. Following the Muafaka Accord, political tensions on Zanzibar eased, despite CUF complaints at the slow rate of implementation. No major violent incidents occurred in the run-up to 2003 by-elections. Both parties expressed their satisfaction with the formation of the new ZEC in mid-2002 (the ZEC was restructured to include two party nominees each from CCM and CUF. The commission was also given greater control over the ZEC Secretariat, in particular the Director of Elections).
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