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Ukraine

Score-Inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population (SHARP): Assessing Social Cohesion, Resistance, and People’s Needs in Ukraine Amid Russian Full-Scale Invasion – Wave 1 (2022)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research question 1. What is the state of social cohesion across Ukraine since the full-scale invasion by Russia for the selected elements of the concept?

Finding 1. The elements of social cohesion measured by SHARP are largely high across Ukraine.

SHARP measures 9 indicators (elements) organised under four dimensions that help our understanding of social cohesion. These elements and their national average scores out of 10 are presented below:

• Identification: a Sense of Belonging to the Country (9.5) and Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity (8.2).

• Confidence in Political Institutions and Figures: Authorities Care (5.8),
Trust in Central (5.6) and Local Institutions (6.3).

• Orientation for Common Good: a Sense of Civic Duty (7.6) and Social Tolerance (6.9).

• Actions for Common Good: Community Cooperation (5.5) and Civic Engagement (3.3).

The evidence shows that Ukrainians have coalesced around these elements of social cohesion. This seems to be a phenomenon that indicates more than ‘rallying around the flag’ in the face of Russia’s full-scale aggression and an existential threat to the survival of the state and individuals.

Ukrainians are unifying not only in their support for institutions but also as a society in their sense of belonging, values, and purpose. The results show a strong sense of identification with the country and nation as well as an orientation towards the common good. Confidence in public institutions and figures also exhibits the strongest boost among panel respondents compared to 2021. However, there is some room for improvement in terms of transforming the willingness to engage in civic and political life into actual participation.

Research question 2. How does displacement impact social cohesion? What are the critical needs of internally displaced?

Finding 2a. Massive displacement has not caused any significant rupture to societal fabric, but addressing new challenges is important for nurturing social cohesion. These challenges are seen differently by IDPs and host communities as well as by different macro-regions.

From competition over jobs, income, and public services to antisocial behaviour, draft evasion, and cultural differences, SHARP examined a range of potential sources of tension between host and internally displaced populations. Although people living in the west of Ukraine are more likely to report tensions between host communities and IDPs compared to the other oblasts, 80% of respondents on the national level strongly or somewhat disagree that there are tensions between IDPs and host communities. This percentage shows that the widespread collective trauma and the effect of full-scale Russian aggression and displacement did not rupture Ukrainian society’s ability to show empathy and generosity. This finding also shows that a larger number of IDPs in a locality does not automatically translate into greater tension. Still, some challenges and tensions exist in certain western oblasts, and these should be monitored and constructively addressed to ensure that social cohesion is preserved and these do not evolve into bigger societal rifts. Furthermore, IDPs’ and locals perceive sources of tensions differently. While IDPs emphasise accommodation, the latter report anti-social behaviour and male draft evasion frequently. There are also regional differences. While the severely affected, partly occupied, and liberated oblasts appear to be more concerned with practical and tangible issues (access to essential items, public services, and accommodation), relatively stable western oblasts seem to be more focussed on ‘transcendent’ issues such as political, cultural, and language differences and stereotypes; anti-social behaviour; and draft evasion. Central oblasts are rather in-between concerned with accommodation and anti-social behaviour.

Finding 2b. SHARP evidence shows that IDPs have been more exposed to war-related adversities and are more vulnerable. Their immediate needs may include affordable housing, livelihood support beyond welfare payments, and psychological support.

SHARP data shows that IDPs are more likely to have witnessed or heard fighting and shelling, have had their homes and property damaged, and/or experienced family separation. They are also more reliant on welfare payments, in need of affordable housing, and livelihood support that can provide more economic stability and support social integration beyond the welfare payments. As such, it is particularly important to address the psychosocial needs of the displaced, who are more vulnerable to war-related adversities than other groups.

Research question 3. What are the different forms of civic resistance against the Russian invasion? What is the relationship between social cohesion and civic resistance?

Finding 3a. The overwhelming majority of SHARP respondents are active participants of various forms of civic resistance against the Russian fullscale invasion.

Analyses shows that donating money (77%), volunteering to help people in need (60%), and volunteering to help the Ukrainian Army (52%) are the most popular forms of civic resistance. Age and income level are the two main demographic differences that seem to have significant influence in someone’s propensity to participate in civic resistance. Furthermore, SHARP analysis points to a particularly strong sense of civic duty among young respondents, which makes them valuable contributors to civic resistance as well as Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction efforts.

Finding 3b. A focus on the common good orientation nurtures cohesion and drives resistance, and resistance fosters focus on the common good and stronger connection with the state.

SHARP wave 1 found that orientations and actions for the common good (e.g., a sense of civic duty) contributed to unarmed forms of civic resistance, which enhances Ukraine’s resilience towards the external threat. The civic resistance, in turn, contributes to the elements of social cohesion including a focus on the common good but also nurturing the connection between citizens and the state.

Research question 4. What is the level of trust in different state and nonstate institutions? How has citizens’ confidence in institutions changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion?

Finding 4a. Compared to 2021, trust in all state institutions, both local and central, has increased. The state institutions responsible for national defence and safety enjoy the highest trust while local institutions are more trusted than the central ones except for the President. Despite high trust in the majority of state institutions, confidence in the justice system is still weak. Trust in NGOs is most strongly related to the belief that Authorities care, which could suggest that NGO efforts constructively complement the efforts of public institutions instead of undermining or competing with them.

The Ukrainian Army, the State Emergency Service, and the President boast trust scores as high as 9.6, 8.6, and 7.9 respectively across the country. When it comes to local institutions, trust is still relatively high at 6.3. Although citizens are rallying around their institutions, and their expectations with regards to performance may be lower under the conditions of war and martial law, SHARP data shows that trust is still associated with service provision and human security. This shows that institutional performance is still important for sustaining trust. Further, there is a spill-over effect of institutional trust.

In other words, respondents can be sceptical towards all institutions or confident towards all, especially within their own ‘eco-systems’ of central institutions: Cabinet of Ministers, Verkhovna Rada, Prosecutor General’s Office, and courts; local institutions: Oblast State (Military) Administration,

Town/Village Administration, and Head of Town/Village; and justice system: Courts, Police, and Prosecutor’s Office. This highlights that change in trust triggered by a scandal or success of one institution can spill over to another. It is notable however that courts receive the lowest trust among SHARP respondents at 4.2 out of 10, and the prosecutor’s office is just above average at 5.1. These findings highlight the urgency to invest in the justice system and law enforcement, as the role of these institutions in post-war transition and in forging a healthy social contract cannot be overstated. Further, while there are no big variations across oblasts when it comes to trust in central institutions, trust in local institutions is lower in Zaporizhzhia, Poltava, Chernivtsi, and Zakarpattia oblasts compared to the national average and to other oblasts. The finding that trust in NGOs and citizens’ perception that authorities care for them is in a strong positive relation is certainly a desirable finding especially during full-scale war as it would strengthen resilience. However, a strong positive relation between trust in NGOs and citizens’ perception that authorities care for them should not become too strong that it could indicate ‘blind trust’ and ‘civic society having become co-opted’ by state institutions. As such, given the important role that NGOs in particular, and civil society in general plays for providing oversight, checks and balances over public institutions in democracies, it’s important to make sure this relationship remains constructive and healthy especially in the post-war period.

Research question 5. What is the state of service delivery and the availability of necessities across Ukraine? Which demographic groups and regions need which services and basic necessities?

Finding 5a. Older age groups, low income groups, and those living in rural areas are more vulnerable when it comes to access to services, access to basic necessities, and to health security. While air raid shelters are a relatively bigger concern for frontline oblasts like Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia as well as in rural areas, and among low-income and older age groups, access to clean water is the biggest concern in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts as well as for low-income respondents. Access to specialised medical care is a relatively lower for rural residents, while the affordability of medicine is lower among older age and low-income groups, undermining their health security.

Finding 5b. Access to communication and information, especially to digital channels, is high. This creates more room for strategic communication as well as information dissemination when it comes to civic resistance and humanitarian efforts.

The SHARP respondents are most satisfied with the access to means of communication and to information outlets (8.1). This creates an opportunity for strategic communications and information provision about security and humanitarian efforts. Older age groups can benefit from better digital literacy skills as the access to digital means of information consumption and communication is higher than the traditional ones during wartime.

Finding 5c. Despite all the adversities caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion, school attendance across all regions continues to be high.

SHARP analysis shows that regardless of the extent to which macro-regions of Ukraine are affected by Russian full-scale military aggression, children are continuing to attend schools. However, while we do not know the regularity of attendance, the mode of education also varies across macro-regions with offline and blended learning being the most popular in the west, while the online mode being more prevalent in severely affected and partly occupied oblasts. Continued school attendance is particularly important for Ukraine’s future human capital and for recovery efforts.

Research question 6. What is the future vision of Ukraine in terms of its geopolitical orientation?

Finding 6. Differences about Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO has significantly decreased compared to 2021. Ukrainians from all demographic groups and macro-regions are expressing strong support for both EU and NATO accession.

There were significant differences between macro-regions, age, and income groups in 2021 regarding Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership. In 2022, support for the EU is as high as 92% and for NATO is 88% nationally.

Moreover, the SHARP study clearly demonstrates that there is now a much stronger unity across income and age groups as well as across macro-regions. This unity can be partly explained by increased trust in institutions and hence in the direction they are driving the country, as well as security motives and security alliances perceived as existential for Ukraine’s victory and national security. The adverse experiences related to Russian full-scale military aggression further reinforce the desire for NATO especially among those who were previously sceptical.

Other findings: SHARP analysis did not reveal any meaningful gender differences across different indicators measured which is why data has not been disaggregated by gender in the report.