Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: 2nd Summary Report by the Director General, 28 April – 5 September 2022

A. INTRODUCTION

1. On 24 February 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through its Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC), was notified by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), in its capacity as a national competent authority under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, of the imposition of martial law on the territory of Ukraine and of an alert at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant (ChNPP). Since 24 February, when the IEC was activated, it has remained in regular contact with Ukrainian authorities, and closely monitors the situation at nuclear facilities as well as activities involving radioactive sources and nuclear material in Ukraine, focusing on the implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The IEC also monitors the websites and social media channels of SNRIU and other relevant Ukrainian government organizations, as well as other open-source information channels. Regular updates continue to be issued to the public.

2. On 3 March, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine, which “deplores the Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine”, expresses “grave concern that the Russian Federation’s aggression is impeding the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities”, and “requests that the Director General and the Secretariat continue to closely monitor the situation, with a special focus on the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and report to the Board on these elements, as required”.1

3. On 4 March, Ukraine informed the IAEA that Russian forces had taken control of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant (ZNPP) site.

4. On 28 April, the IAEA’s Director General published a summary report of the situation in Ukraine regarding nuclear safety, security and safeguards of nuclear facilities and activities involving radioactive sources in Ukraine2 . The report consolidated information that the IAEA had been communicating to the public since 24 February, including actions taken by the IAEA in response to Ukraine’s request for assistance in re-establishing, as appropriate, a sound nuclear safety and security regime at its nuclear facilities and in activities involving radioactive sources.
   In addition, the summary report included findings from the IAEA expert missions led by the Director General to Ukraine in March and April 2022.

5. In brief, the Director General expressed great concern regarding the situation and impact of the military conflict at the ChNPP site and the ZNPP (with respect to operating staff, physical integrity of the facilities, nuclear safety and security systems, communication and power supply) and reiterated the importance of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict ("Seven Pillars"). The report furthermore indicated that the Khmelnytskyy NPP, Rivne NPP and South Ukraine NPP had not been directly impacted by the Russian Federation’s actions and that the SNRIU had not reported any increase in radiation levels in the off-site data monitored around the five Radon facilities that would constitute a hazard to public health or the environment. The Neutron Source installation of the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology had come under significant shelling, but this had not given rise to any radiological consequences and had not resulted in the loss of the fundamental safety functions for the confinement of radioactive material. Nevertheless, it was reported that the impact on the facility’s physical protection required further assessment once conditions in the field allowed. Based on the evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to the IAEA until April 2022, no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material or any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern was found.4

6. With the worsening nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP since April, the Director General raised concerns in his public updates that any further escalation affecting the six-reactor plant could lead to a severe nuclear accident with potentially grave radiological consequences for human health and the environment in Ukraine and elsewhere and that renewed shelling at or near the ZNPP was deeply troubling for nuclear safety and security at the facility, and reiterated his demand that all such military activity cease.

7. Since April, the Director General has repeatedly made efforts to lead another expert mission to Ukraine, and in particular to the ZNPP, to allow the organization to carry out important technical activities in nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and at the same time provide a stabilizing influence for the nuclear safety and security situation at the site and reduce the risk of a severe nuclear accident in Europe. To support that endeavour, the Director General met with high level officials from Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

8. The Director General reported on the situation of the nuclear facilities in Ukraine to the United Nations Security Council in March and, subsequently, on 11 August where he briefed on the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP and his efforts to agree on and lead an IAEA expert mission to the site as soon as possible. He provided details on how the shelling of 5 and 6 August compromised all of the Seven Pillars that he had outlined at the beginning of the conflict almost half a year ago, including those related to an NPP’s physical integrity, functioning safety and security systems, staff and external power supply. The Director General briefed the Security Council about his plans and preparations to personally lead an IAEA mission to the site as the IAEA’s presence at the plant was of paramount importance to help reduce the danger of a possible nuclear disaster there.

9. Arriving in Ukraine on 29 August, the Director General met with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and led the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) comprising a high-level delegation and technical team to help stabilize the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP. The ISAMZ gave the IAEA a unique opportunity to closely observe the current situation related to nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP. The continued presence of IAEA experts at the plant will help further improve and deepen the understanding of the situation.

10. This report provides a summary of the situation in Ukraine regarding the nuclear safety, security and safeguards of nuclear facilities and activities involving radioactive sources and nuclear material in Ukraine since the first report was published. In particular, the report:

• Focuses on the events at the ZNPP and surrounding area, and the preliminary nuclear safety and security findings arising from the expert mission to the ZNPP led by the Director General in August–September;

• Reports on outcomes and findings from the second mission to the Chornobyl NPP site on nuclear safety and security that took place in May;

• Provides a detailed update on the delivery of assistance to Ukraine to support nuclear safety and security;

• Summarizes relevant aspects of the implementation of safeguards in Ukraine under the comprehensive safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA; and • Outlines the next steps including the urgent establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone.