Mid-Year Review of the 2001 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda

Humanitarian Context
Despite the controversy shrouding its presidential elections March 2001, Uganda has remained stable with both economic and social indicators revealing steady progress. The country's stability is inextricably related to security throughout the Great Lakes Region and this was bought, in part, by maintaining military forces in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and pressure on Sudan. The price for stability was high and led to confrontations with its former ally Rwanda and to international condemnation for the alleged involvement of Uganda in supporting the rebel coalition, in training child soldiers and in exploiting mineral resources in the DRC. While Uganda continues to withdraw troops from the DRC, it remains uncertain as to who will fill the vacuum and how this will impact on the humanitarian situation in both Uganda and the region.

Those fearing religious, ethnic and political persecution and conflict in neighbouring countries continued to seek refuge in Uganda. Following ethnic clashes between the Hema and Lindu in DRC, some 5,000 Hema fled to Uganda in February 2001, along with 26,000 head of cattle. Uganda convened reconciliation talks between the two warring parties resulting in the majority of refugees repatriating. Still, Uganda's relative stability and generous open-door policy encouraged others to seek protection within its borders on a more permanent basis. In the past year, the number of Rwandan, Congolese and Sudanese refugees in Uganda increased by 23,615 or 11.7%, the majority coming from Southern Sudan. During the same period, external support to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was reduced forcing the rebels to rely on increasing numbers of abducted Ugandan children (+ 37.5%) to swell their ranks and to provide logistics support.

The Ugandan military applied increased pressure on both the LRA and Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) as external support for both rebel groups dwindled. While rebel forces continue to attack civilian targets in Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole districts in the west and in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts in the north, the frequency and severity of attacks have decreased. The majority of displaced still fear the rebels, preferring to remain in protected villages by night. The construction of security/access roads and the increased mobility and presence of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) is encouraging increasing numbers of IDPs to return home. During the past year, the number of displaced in need of assistance decreased by 151,062 or 20.5%.

Karamoja and other regions affected by three years of consecutive drought are now recovering following average to above-average rains. World Food Programme (WFP) emergency food assistance to women and children in chronically food insecure Karamoja is being phased out. However, the majority of Karamojongs remain vulnerable to the vagaries of the dry climate. WFP will continue providing food assistance to primary and secondary school children as a means of maintaining enrolment and of ensuring children receive adequate nourishment. As highlighted in Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2001, the problem of recurrent drought necessitates millions of dollars in repeated relief food operations annually. This cycle can only be broken with much needed investment in water infrastructure, improved grazing, health and education. Presently, there is little evidence of either public or donor financed projects in Karamoja where social indicators continue to slide further below the national average each year. Compensating for the neglect through costly relief assistance is a strategy that can no longer be justified or sustained. Alternatives must be found to level the regional disparities and to bring Karamoja back into the mainstream of development.

Scenarios

The 2001 Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) had forecast a continuation of the status quo, erring on the side of pessimism. Planning was based on the assumption that the number of refugees, displaced and drought affected would be maintained with slight increases experienced as a result of refugee influxes, rebel attacks and spontaneous displacement and natural calamities. While these events actually occurred, their impact on the populations involved were less severe than anticipated. Overall, there has been a modest 26.7% decrease in the number of people requiring humanitarian assistance.

The problems underlining the crises in Uganda have not subsided and consequently the scenarios included in the CHAP/CAP remain relevant. While the number of affected have declined, there are several valid assumptions that will perpetuate the need for humanitarian assistance as follows:

Insecurity: while some Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned on a semi-permanent basis, insecurity still prevails. The majority of IDPs will be discouraged from returning until the rebel threat has been fully eradicated. Uganda is under considerable pressure by the donor community and Bretton-Woods Institutions to reduce its defence spending, presently at 26% of total Government expenditure. Donors have not acted to compensate for decrease in public defence spending by providing the UPDF with adequate logistics and communications equipment. The return and retrenchment of over 10,000 troops from the DRC is likely to pose additional security risks. An increasing number of those captured are not rebels but rather poverty-stricken individuals who have turned to banditry. The situation in DRC remains highly volatile and capable of producing additional refugee caseloads. The conflict in Southern Sudan will continue to have its spill-over effects on Uganda and it is unlikely that the new rebel coalition, following the UPDF withdrawal, will be able to curb attacks on Uganda launched from the DRC. Disarmament of the Karamojong has not been implemented and neighbouring districts continue to be attacked. Displacement continues to wax and wane in parallel with the cattle migration seasons. Growing tension between Rwanda and Uganda and its implications should not be underestimated. It is advised that a senior United Nations (UN) or Organisation of African Unity (OAU) official be appointed to meet regularly and informally, without fanfare, in seeking reconciliation between both governments.

Strategy Imbalance: economic recovery in Uganda since the mid-eighties has led donor government to pursue a split assistance strategy. Large funds are disbursed for development assistance in more stable areas, whereas the UN Consolidated Interagency Appeal (CA) for humanitarian activities is critically under-funded. The poverty and instability in western northern and northeastern Uganda are largely attributable to economic, political and ethnic marginalisation. Donors have a tendency to consider the humanitarian crises in Uganda as isolated situations of socio-political instability and are reluctant to acknowledge their regional interdependence and chronic character. This makes it difficult for the UN to establish and maintain a strategic orientation of humanitarian programmes, beyond ad-hoc relief interventions. Both the Government and donor community contends that the affected districts are too insecure for investment. The counter argument is that only by investing in market and social infrastructure and in employment generation can the displaced be provided assets worth protecting and be able to reintegrate and accommodate their opponents. Poverty is a primary factor contributing to the instability and displacement. Investment in transitional and development activities should therefore be made as relief assistance is phased out. Until this controversy is resolved, humanitarian assistance and care/maintenance will be needed to provide for basic needs and services. Unfortunately, public and external development assistance remains absent from those areas where it is most needed and humanitarian assistance, as illustrated by the attached financial tracking data, continues to be woefully under-funded.

Absence of Political Strategy: as indicated in the CHAP/CA, any exit strategy will be contingent upon Member states of the UN engaging in preventative diplomacy with all parties to the conflict and to link development aid and political support with human rights conditionalities or to otherwise apply political and economic pressure to diffuse or contain the conflict and continued displacement. The unwillingness to deal responsibly with friendly or strategically important actors will perpetuate the need for humanitarian assistance and foreclose on alternative/transitional activities or exit strategies. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) will be undertaking a study on those factors underlying and perpetuating displacement to ensure that various actors are better informed and in a position to influence the situation.

Goals

The goals of the CHAP/CA remain generally the same. Unfortunately, progress towards the achievement of these goals has been slow owing primarily to a) lack of funding for humanitarian assistance, b) lack of public investment and external development assistance in affected areas that would restore jobs, dignities and coping capacities, and c) serious and timely discussions with major actors to enhance stability. Note that insecurity is not viewed as a constraint per se but rather as a symptom of prolonged poverty, neglect and regional disparities.

The goals differ only in the priority now being given to Recovery and Infrastructure and Food Security. There is general consensus amongst UN Agencies and NGOs that one cannot make progress towards alleviating human suffering, advancing human rights, and reintegrating ex-combatants unless simultaneous efforts are made to reactivate agriculture, incomes and basic social infrastructure.

Vulnerability/Socio-Economic Analysis/Gender

Presently, 909, 929 refugees and Ugandan citizens are dependent upon assistance for their basic survival needs. Several assessments undertaken since the CHAP/CA reveal that the health, nutrition, education and social status of both refugees and displaced has either remained stagnant or worsened.

Economic Costs: The economic costs of displacement are far greater than those arising directly from rebel or terrorist attacks on the Acholi people and their property. Displacement has prevented the Acholi from being gainfully employed which has a) made them dependent upon aid flows and b) incapable of contributing to the country's revenue base and development. Continued insecurity has discouraged internal and external investment and removed 20% of the country's land area from production. The negative aggregate effects on ouput, food production, investment and exports are sizeable and may soon reach the point of being irreversible.

Social Costs: Over 500,000 Ugandan citizens/IDPs have been traumatised by terrorist attacks and have remained physically and mentally idle in camps for over five years. Many of the traditional community and family mechanisms for ensuring cohesiveness and stability in society have broken down. Children have lost years of schooling, preventing them equal access to employment and future opportunities for participating in the national political system and economy. Increasingly more women are organising themselves into farmer associations and are becoming more involved/accepted in project identification and planning, but their general status has not improved.

Political Costs/Instabilty: continued containment of the IDPs and the redirection of public funds and development assistance has acted to deepen ethnic divisions and widen regional disparities in terms of education, income levels, and poverty. The Human Development Index (HDI) of the affected areas is considerably below the national average and is steadily declining. Such disparities have lowered mutual trust and confidence and bred resentment. Donors and Government must agree to focus more attention on transitional and development activities in the present crisis areas. If peace and stability is the main objective, then the humanitarian community must invest in peace.

Human Rights Abuse: some contend that the displacement has led to discrimination, making the IDPs in Bundibugyo, Kasese, Kabarole, Gulu, Kitgum, Pader second-class citizens and "faceless" under the limited legal structures existing within the camps. Women and children have been particularly vulnerable to HR abuse. The incidence of Human Immune Deficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Virus (HIV/AIDS) and Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) is rising and camp life has been conducive to family violence and separation. Deteriorated infrastructure in the west, north and northeast has made marketing of surplus commodities unprofitable, forcing the majority of the population to rely upon subsistence production and charcoal-making to cover basic needs. The amount of time in which women spend fetching firewood and water and in performing domestic work is increasing, forcing girl-students to drop out of school at an early age in order to care for their younger siblings.

Care and Maintenance: While the cost of maintaining the camps and of providing for basic needs is increasing, support for such activities are steadily decreasing, rendering the camps unsustainable on purely financial grounds. Donor fatigue is becoming increasingly apparent and is particularly noticeable in food aid assistance which has rapidly declined. Freedom of movement and access to land has been limited, preventing the IDPs from compensating for the loss of external assistance. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR's) Self Reliance Strategy had to be discontinued due to lack of support. Trends in malnutrition and nutrition-related diseases and the status of IDPs in general, has worsened. Improved security, combined with asset and job creation, remain the only means of overcoming the problem.

Need for A Catalyst: There have been numerous studies undertaken on the needs of displaced persons in but none have investigated those factors which have perpetuated the crisis and displacement overtime. Consequently, agencies have yet to develop a coherent approach on how to deal with the issue of 'protected villages.' Country Programmes are primarily development-oriented and widely disbursed in the south-central regions in parallel with the National Budget or Poverty Eradication Action Plan, both of which fail to devote adequate attention to relief or transitional recovery needs. Lacking a sense of donor empowerment for assuming inter-agency coordination responsibilities in the field, UN Agencies have confined themselves to their agency's mandate. OCHA will conduct a comprehensive and authoritative Study on Protected Villages in June 2001 to identify those factors which have perpetuated the crisis and displacement overtime. The study will rely heavily on the opinions of the Government, donors, UN Agencies, NGOs and particularly IDPs for identifying alternative strategies and for outlining the conditions under which assistance should be provided in future. The UN Country Team is presently formulating a Framework for Recovery and Common Humanitarian Action Plan for the north. Both will necessitate enhanced donor involvement, confidence and funding.

Sectors

The priority sectors, as outlined and mutually agreed upon in the CHAP/CA, remain unchanged. Whereas Economic Recovery has gained more priority, the dearth of funds has encouraged agencies to concentrate their meagre resources on the most immediate, life-saving or hazard-reduction requirements, particularly food aid, food security, water, sanitation, primary health care and control of infectious diseases.

Projects

Lack of funding has discouraged agencies from increasing project budgets or identifying additional projects. Where necessary, they have modified existing budgets by reallocating funds towards the more immediate needs. This has diverted funds away from recovery and reconstruction but the amounts received and actually reallocated have been insignificant.

Monitoring

Each agency was responsible for monitoring the utilisation of funds received. OCHAs proposal to establish a Humanitarian Evaluation and Advisory Team (HEAT) was not supported owing to the small size of aid missions in Uganda, the preoccupation of staff in sub-sector meetings and the preference of donors to make independent arrangements to monitor and evaluate the projects they have funded. A monitoring report for Northern Uganda (Gulu and Kitgum) was issued earlier in the year. The report recommended improved monitoring and coordination of humanitarian activities at field level. In May, OCHA established a field office in Gulu, co-located with WFP, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) with staff seconded from the NRCl and funded by the Norwegian Government. The Field Coordination Support Unit will establish District Disaster Committees, undertake inventories of on-going and planned projects, identify resource gaps by area, affected group and sector and establish inter-agency monitoring mechanisms in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Adjumani districts. OCHA established similar coordination structures in the western region (Bundibugyo) late April and an attempt will be made to do the same in the northeast (Karimoja) in June 2001.

Funding

As of 8 April 2001, five months after the CHAP/CA was launched, some US$ 13,211,391 or 17.21% had been provided for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Six donors had announced contributions (Sweden, Cyprus, Germany, USA, Finland, and UK) which were provided to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP), OCHA, UNHCR and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as follows:

Funding shortfalls for FAO has caused a lack of adequate agricultural seeds and tools in Karamoja and neighbouring districts (Karimojong-affected areas), thus undermining recovery of food security efforts for the adversely affected in northeastern Uganda. Only one project from the FAO's CA has been funded for northeastern Uganda. Its implementation and impact will not be seen until the second half of 2001. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has received no funding from CA 2000 or CA 2001. It maintains its assistance programme through funding from the Bill Gates Foundation. WFP has inadequate funding under CA 2001 for its Protracted Relief and Recovery Programme (PRRO 6176) and Emergency Operation (EMOP 6235) and has been forced to reduce food rations drastically. Food stocks under PRRO 6176 (UGA-01-1/N01) are expected to be depleted mid-August 2001 which will have a severe impact on the nutritional status of over 730,000 displaced persons and refugees. Highly successful food-for-work programmes aimed at establishing reservoirs, small dams, fish ponds and other infrastructure for enhanced food security have been reduced due to lack of funding. UNICEF lacks sufficient funds to engage in humanitarian assistance outside of its on-going 5-year country programme. Lack of funding has forced the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to reduce staff and activities by 30% in 2001.

In discussing the above funding levels with various donors, the following explanations were provided:

• Lack of adequate aid mission staff results in CA reviews being undertaken primarily in donor capitals.
  
  
• CA funds are often not tied to any specific country but rather sent in lump sum to OCHA/Geneva which is responsible for allocating the funds as per priority countries.
  
  
• Competing demands of crises in other countries reduced pledges that might otherwise have been available.
  
  
• The donor budget year and CA period are not always synchronised, resulting in contributions not being received until June onwards. This seems consistent with previous years. Ireland and Norway have both indicated that they have made contributions tied to Uganda (OCHA) but these are not yet reflected in the FTS.
  
  
• As a matter of convenience, some donors prefer to work with individual NGOs in identifying projects. The CHAP/CA is too encompassing and requires more time than they can afford.
  
  
• Some donor representatives in Uganda believe there are inconsistencies between the "Common Observations" made in Montreux and their own terms of reference. They are in most cases unaware of any correspondence from their head offices which suggests that the CHAP should be the "main tool" for humanitarian coordination. They confirmed that they have their own procedures/guidelines for identifying and approving relief programmes, few of which mention the significance of the CHAP or CA. (This was highlighted last year by donors and NGOs). Despite all the agreements/rhetoric at the IASC, few agency directors are encouraged by their head offices to support the CA process. A casual look at UN, NGO and bilateral aid mission staff performance evaluation formats reveals that agency visibility is given far more emphasis as performance criteria and this often runs counter to the coordination effort. If the CHAP/CA are considered important by members of the IASC, then they need to reinforce the CHAP with incentives and measure staff performance accordingly.

Agencies not participating in the CA filled a small portion of the gaps in assistance. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided non-food relief items as well as seed and other agricultural inputs. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), IrishAid, Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), Italian Cooperation and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) provided limited funding for agriculture and water/road infrastructure in the crisis areas. Various NGOs with bilateral funding were also able to improve living conditions but only slightly. Many complain that their projects had to be terminated due to insufficient or delayed funding, the latter having prevented them from retaining staff, equipment and capacity in-country. Outside the framework of the CAP, FAO has mounted relief operations for target groups in Karimojong-affected areas and in other districts in western and central Uganda using Technical Cooperation Programme resources (FAO's internal resources from member countries) and savings from previous projects. These are the funds that have kept FAO emergency relief operations alive in the field.

Disclaimer

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

To learn more about OCHA's activities, please visit https://www.unocha.org/.