Attachments
Syria’s interim president has formed a new cabinet to replace the caretaker government, following promulgation of a transitional constitution. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Jerome Drevon and Nanar Hawach assess what these steps mean for the country’s future.
What is happening?
On 29 March, Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, announced the formation of a 23-member cabinet to replace the caretaker government that had been in place since December 2024, immediately after Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell. His announcement followed a constitutional declaration two weeks earlier, which established a transitional legal framework for the post-Assad era. These two steps were keenly awaited by Syrians and outside observers alike. Many had been criticising the caretaker government because it was narrowly composed of al-Sharaa’s closest allies from Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former rebel group that had led the offensive overthrowing Assad. Several of its members had served in the Salvation Government that HTS created to administer Idlib, the north-western province where Sunni Islamist insurgents carved out an autonomous enclave during the civil war.
What does the new government’s composition suggest?
The new cabinet includes a mix of figures. Some are affiliated with HTS and the Salvation Government, and others are technocrats or civil society leaders. Still others were ministers in the ousted Assad regime. HTS, however, retains the most powerful posts. Asaad al-Shaibani has remained foreign minister, and Murhaf Abu Qasra, HTS’s long-time military commander, has kept the defence ministry. Two other senior HTS leaders have assumed new positions: Anas Khattab, formerly head of the group’s internal security apparatus, has become interior minister, and Mazhar al-Wais now serves as minister of justice. The foreign, defence and interior ministers also sit on the newly formed National Security Council, alongside the president.
Other HTS associates are also prominent. The prime minister of both the caretaker government and the Salvation Government, Muhammad al-Bashir, has returned as energy minister; Muhammad Anjarani, a former Salvation Government minister, is now minister of local administration and environment; and Muhammad Skaf and Muhammad Sameh Hamed, who held several administrative roles in the Salvation Government, have been appointed minister of administrative development and minister of sports and youth, respectively.
Other appointments suggest an attempt to reach out to broader constituencies. Al-Sharaa named a number of credible independent figures with recognised standing in society and experience or training abroad. Nine are from Syria’s largest minority communities – Kurds, Druze, Christians and Alawites. None is from a known political faction. Raed Saleh, president of the White Helmets, a volunteer civil defence group that operated in rebel-held areas, was appointed minister of emergency and disaster management; Hamza Mustafa, general manager of Syria TV, which backed the opposition to Assad, is the new information minister; and Mohammad Tarko, a Kurdish professor, has become minister of education. The last appointment is notable given many Syrians’ concerns about whether the new authorities will introduce Islamic doctrine into the curriculum and longstanding Kurdish apprehension about efforts by Damascus to “Arabise” the country’s Kurdish areas. Syrian Kurds have rarely been represented in the central government.
Yet more surprising, perhaps, is that the new government includes three officials who served under Assad, though all had quit before the civil war began. The new economy minister, Muhammad Nidal al-Shaar, and transport minister, Yarub Badr, held these positions previously, while the new finance minister, Muhammad Yasir Barniya, also had a post in an Assad government. Through these appointments, al-Sharaa has signalled that he will value technocratic skill and relevant experience in the bid to kick-start economic recovery, which is arguably Syria’s most pressing need after years of civil war. The country also remains under heavy international sanctions imposed in the Assad era, and is now affected by others placed on HTS, which is still designated as a “terrorist organisation” by the U.S., the UN Security Council, Western powers and states within the region due to its past ties to al-Qaeda and ISIS.
How has the new government been received?
Reactions to the new cabinet have been mixed. Some Syrians are disheartened that the top posts remain under the tight control of al-Sharaa and his associates, while others are hopeful that the changes could help the country emerge from its deep trauma. Speaking to Crisis Group, a Damascus-based doctor noted that “stability is paramount, given the challenges we face in rebuilding the country. Ultimately, the biggest question is whether this government will gain legitimacy and succeed in getting the sanctions lifted”. International responses have also varied. Arab states were broadly welcoming, expressing hope that the new government will usher in greater stability and economic cooperation, while Türkiye applauded it as a step forward in Syria’s post-Assad transition. Western and European countries offered more tentative support, largely linking the prospect of sanctions relief to tangible progress toward inclusive governance. In conversations with Crisis Group, some European officials flagged concerns that the inclusion of a few non-HTS figures in the government may be more tokenistic than substantive.
Many among Syria’s minorities find it grating that the appointees from their communities have no formal political base. The most visible and possibly fateful exclusion may be that of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led group that controls much of the north east. On 10 March, al-Sharaa had signed an agreement with SDF leader Mazloum Abdi recognising Kurdish constitutional rights and calling for the integration of the SDF’s military and civilian institutions into the central state. But the process hit a roadblock almost immediately, when the SDF rejected the 13 March constitutional declaration (see below). When the new cabinet was announced, the SDF was dismayed by the appointment of a Kurd who is not one of its affiliates. The Druze, too, are unhappy, as the Druze appointee represents neither the community’s spiritual leadership nor the influential armed factions based in Suwayda in the south. Likewise, the Alawite minister – a member of the Alawite minority sect from which the Assad family hails and where its repressive security services fished for recruits – cannot claim to speak for a broader Alawite constituency. Alawites are particularly nervous about the country’s trajectory following the events of early March, when government-aligned armed factions committed atrocities against civilians in largely Alawite coastal areas following clashes with Assad regime loyalists.
Critics have ... expressed disappointment with the inclusion of only one woman among the new government’s members.
Critics have also expressed disappointment with the inclusion of only one woman among the new government’s members. Hind Kabawat, a Christian, is known for her opposition to the Assad regime and her activism on behalf of women’s rights. Unlike the sole woman in the interim government formed in December 2024, who was head of women’s affairs, Kabawat holds the social affairs and labour portfolio, which deals with matters besides gender. Kabawat has said she pushed without success for additional woman ministers, but did receive promises that more women will be appointed to other high-level positions.
On balance, the new government confirms a pattern that has been taking shape over the past few months: al-Sharaa and his close associates keep a firm hand in all strategic matters, while seeking to incorporate others as subordinates to help consolidate the government’s hold on the country and secure broader public legitimacy. The inclusion of minorities and independents suggests a calculated effort to reach out beyond the HTS core. Yet because none of these appointees represents a political party or another former rebel faction, al-Sharaa has also made clear that he is reluctant to share power with political rivals, at least for now.
Events on the ground, meanwhile, indicate that while the government’s composition matters, local power is equally being shaped by the security apparatus and the influence wielded by factions loosely affiliated with the defence ministry. In practice, a range of groups – from those linked to non-HTS Sunni Islamist groups, like the Syrian National Army, to Druze militias – are carving out their own spaces of de facto authority that the new government will have to manage somehow.
What does the constitutional declaration augur for Syria’s transition?
The 13 March constitutional declaration outlines the new government’s prerogatives. It was drafted by a seven-member committee appointed by the president and, while it comprised mostly independent legal experts, including two women, al-Sharaa had to approve its proposals. The declaration, which is essentially a transitional constitution, is set to remain in effect for five years, after which a permanent charter will be adopted, followed by elections.
The constitutional declaration establishes a strong presidential system, with no prime minister. In granting the president overarching authority, with no meaningful checks, it exhibits a strong authoritarian bent. The president directly appoints one third of the members of parliament and forms a “high committee” responsible for selecting the remaining two thirds; he serves as head of the armed forces; and he names one or more vice presidents and all the ministers. He also can issue executive orders, propose legislation and declare a state of emergency for up to three months, subject to approval by the National Security Council, which he also appoints. The judiciary is formally independent, but the president selects the members of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
The declaration guarantees the separation of powers, freedom of belief and equal citizenship without discrimination based on race, religion or gender. It also affirms the freedoms of opinion, expression, information and publication, as well as the rights to political participation and forming parties. It upholds the right to education and employment for women, along with broader social, economic and political rights. Additionally, it recognises the constitutional validity of international human rights treaties, charters and agreements ratified by the Syrian state in the past – even if most treaties will still require appropriate legislation for them to be implemented.
Not all Syrians are comfortable with these provisions, however. The Syrian businessman Ayman Asfari, whose name had been floated earlier as a potential prime minister, has labelled HTS “exclusionary, monopolistic and dangerously unaccountable”, echoing the opinions of many in the country’s beleaguered middle class. The SDF was also sharply critical of the constitutional declaration, because it failed to recognise explicitly the cultural, linguistic and political rights of Syria’s various ethnic and religious groups. The SDF views the Syrian state as overly centralised and insufficiently diverse. It argues that a federal system would better serve the country’s needs – though, of course, such a system would also allow the group to thrive in the area it controls in the north east.
Given HTS’s jihadist past, many Syrians and foreign governments alike have questions about what role Islam will play in its approach to governance.
Given HTS’s jihadist past, many Syrians and foreign governments alike have questions about what role Islam will play in its approach to governance. The transitional constitution makes only one textual adjustment to the previous charter in this respect, but a contentious one. As was the case under Assad, the president must be a Muslim, but the document refers to Islamic (specifically, Sunni) jurisprudence as “the” rather than “a” main source of legislation – which may not sit well with the country’s sizeable religious minorities.
To understand how the new leadership views the role of religion, however, one should look not at the constitution but at the new Fatwa Council, which al-Sharaa established to assess whether legislation conforms to Islamic law. Of the council’s fourteen members, all of whom are Sunni, only a minority are directly affiliated with HTS. Several others have ties to the group through past cooperation in Idlib, though not all share HTS’s Salafi, or puritanical, inclinations. Most importantly, the council is led by Grand Mufti Osama Rifai, a prominent Sunni scholar who previously headed the Islamic Council in Istanbul, a Syrian opposition body that repeatedly denounced HTS, particularly during its armed confrontations with other factions in Idlib. The inference observers have drawn is that HTS is more concerned with controlling religious discourse – specifically, preventing radical religious dissent against the new authorities by including an array of Sunni viewpoints – than with enforcing Salafism and its austere views.
The council is new, so its significance will become clearer only in the coming months. Yet HTS’s record in Idlib suggests that its primary goal with the council is to legitimise its rule, including by silencing critics who accuse it of being insufficiently Islamic. For instance, it engaged in spirited jurisprudential debates with fellow Islamists over controversial policies such as mosque closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Idlib, most of the fatwas – religious edicts – that HTS issued were fairly mundane in character, addressing subjects ranging from rent control to commercial transactions.
What will the new government’s first tasks be?
The new government faces immense challenges, starting with the need to obtain international recognition in order to avert further conflict and salvage the economy. The president and key ministers have travelled widely in the Middle East and Europe to present a new image of Syria in the post-Assad era. In all their encounters with Arab and European governments, their interlocutors have stressed the importance of an inclusive political transition that reflects the diversity of Syrian society. The new government is an important step forward in that process, yet it has fallen short of expectations, due to what seems to be a cautious and circumscribed degree of power sharing with non-HTS political and social groups as the post-Assad transition moves along.
Despite progress toward wider international recognition, particularly in forging links with important states such as Türkiye and Gulf Arab monarchies, the government faces serious threats from abroad. Israel remains the most destabilising foreign power, having invaded southern Syria right after Assad fell and established a de facto demilitarised zone there, nominally to deter attacks on Israel, though neither the new government nor any armed group operating under its authority has expressed any such intention. Israeli airstrikes in December 2024 also destroyed Syria’s main military capabilities, while its forces continue to hit military facilities across the country. Meanwhile, Israel is trying to manipulate Syria’s ethnic and religious mosaic to its advantage, for instance by offering its protection to Druze in the south (an overture Druze leaders have rebuffed). All these actions undermine the transitional government’s ability to assert full control of the country. They may also drive Damascus into closer alignment with Ankara, potentially with ominous consequences, for instance if Türkiye and Israel were to engage in competition for dominance in Syrian airspace. For now, the two states have begun deconfliction talks to prevent inadvertent confrontations between their respective air forces in the skies above Syria.
Broader recognition of the new government would ... be a major step toward lifting international sanctions.
Broader recognition of the new government would also be a major step toward lifting international sanctions. Foreign governments have reiterated their consistent position that that they will condition any lifting of sanctions on the new powers in Damascus making progress in areas such as the inclusiveness of the political transition. Recent months have seen encouraging developments, including the EU’s suspension of a number of restrictive measures on Syria’s economy, but there is a long way to go. U.S. sanctions, which in effect prohibit almost all trade with Syria, remain the biggest obstacle to recovery and reconstruction.
Finally, the government faces a number of domestic threats to stability. The interim government must rebuild the security apparatus to rein in the many former rebel groups that remain under arms and have varying degrees of autonomy from Damascus. It also must consolidate and discipline the newly formed national army, ensuring that it can prevent incidents like the wave of killings that occurred along the coast in early March, committed by a range of groups organised nominally under the Defence Ministry but in practice operating without real command or control. Last, but not least, it must continue the process of bringing the SDF into the Syrian state. The 10 March agreement has defused the risk of immediate confrontation, but it has yet to yield concrete proposals for reintegrating SDF-controlled areas into the Syrian state, through extending the reach of either the national administration or its security forces in the north east. The most likely scenario is that the status quo will prevail, with little real progress toward integrating the SDF into the state.
The government formed on 29 March is the one Syria is likely to have for the next five years. While it may not allow for the power sharing many had hoped for, foreign capitals should deal with it constructively. They should work with the authorities in Damascus to prevent any escalation in the conflict with Israel, lay the groundwork for lifting sanctions, ward off a return to fragmentation in Syria and build toward the promise of a new constitution within the next five years that could establish a more representative and inclusive government. For now, engaging with the new order is critical, as its failure would bring chaos to Syria and likely beyond.