News Feature by Steven Heydemann
After several days of intensive negotiation, U.N. Security Council (UNSC) members have developed a draft resolution that may address longstanding Russian objections, and permit a UNSC vote on the crisis in Syria.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as well as the secretary-general of the Arab League and Qatar’s foreign minister briefed the Security Council on January 31 in support of a UNSC resolution modeled on a transition framework for Syria that had been approved by the Arab League on January 22.
The U.S., U.K. and French delegations to the United Nations all conveyed the view that they were prepared to force a Russian veto if the UNSC could not reach a consensus that reflected the essence of the Arab League framework.
The Arab League framework -- which followed the failure of the Syrian government to comply with the terms of the League’s observer mission -- calls on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to transfer power to his deputy, and for a negotiated political transition to end the country’s increasingly violent 11-month uprising.
Since the start of the uprising, Russia and China have been the principal obstacles to a UNSC resolution. Russia has strenuously resisted any attempt to impose UNSC sanctions on Syria, to approve a resolution that might leave open possibilities for military intervention, or one that would impose (in its view), a change of regime on a sovereign state. Russia thus entered the week’s negotiations threatening to veto a resolution that included core provisions of the Arab League framework.
Indeed, even after Western governments and Arab League states presented draft resolutions that addressed Russian concerns, and contained language that modified the Arab League framework, the Russian delegation continued to resist, demanding further compromises.
In an effort to accommodate Russian concerns, Arab League member states represented on the Security Council, together with Western UNSC delegations, accepted changes in the language of a draft resolution that removed language taken from the Arab League Framework—notably concerning the need for Assad to leave office—strengthened references to Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, ruled out the possibility of military intervention, reaffirmed that Syrian-led negotiations offer the only legitimate framework for a settlement of the crisis, noted the Syrian government’s offers of reform (while expressing disappointment that they have not been fulfilled), and avoided references to an arms embargo, suggesting that Russia will now continue to arm a regime that has been accused by the U.N. Human Rights Council of significant abuses.
This draft, which was agreed upon late in the evening of February 2, is now under review by the governments concerned. If the relevant world capitals approve, a vote is expected within the next several days. Western and Arab League governments now argue that by including explicit references to the Arab League framework, the current draft resolution requires Syria to comply with its terms and conditions. Presumably, this includes provisions calling for Bashar al-Assad to leave office.
However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Western and Arab League governments have calculated that getting a resolution through the Security Council mattered enough to justify the quite extraordinary compromises they have made to bring Russia on board.
Even while governments review the draft, a loud and vigorous chorus of dissent is being heard from critics of the Assad regime who view it as having been gutted in a misguided effort to secure Russian support.
If Western and Arab League governments are to allay these concerns, a coordinated high-level effort will be needed to clarify their understanding of the resolution, to make clear their view that the resolution gives the force of the U.N. Security Council to the Arab League transition framework and requires the Syrian government to abide by the terms and conditions of that framework within the timetable set by the UNSC.
If they fail to do this, Western and Arab League governments may find themselves justly accused of having missed a critical opportunity to secure a more robust resolution—or to force the Russians into using their veto to prevent it—and, ultimately, exacerbating rather than helping to resolve the Syrian crisis, even as the country moves closer to the brink of civil war.