Attachments
Introduction
The crisis in Syria continues to change, but the donor-funded aid response has failed to adapt. Syria has seen no major military offensives since March 2020, and although skirmishes, shelling, and airstrikes continue and large-scale conflict activity remain a possibility, frontlines are — for now — essentially frozen. Localised violence persists, and no part of the country is safe for return. However, the scope and intensity of armed conflict in the country pale in comparison to conditions witnessed between 2012 and 2019. Paradoxically, however, the UN characterises Syria as being locked “in a downward spiral,” and top officials warn that humanitarian needs are now greater than at any point in the crisis. These realities should prompt reflection over donor fatigue and funding shortfalls, as well as the evolving nature of the crisis in Syria and the approaches, objectives, and operating modalities of donor governments.
As 2022 begins, the Syria crisis response stands at a crossroads. Donor governments and aid actors have been at pains to develop strategies to match new paradigms in Syria. One reason for this is the changing nature of the crisis, as the dynamics that are now most pertinent to needs in the country bear little resemblance to the main donor concerns of previous eras, such as the delicate aid politics of sieges, access restrictions, and interference by proscribed groups. While the capacity for emergency response must be retained, particularly in chronic conflict hotspots, the most pressing challenges that now confront crisis response actors on a daily basis are no longer directly related to violent conflict. Arguably, the most urgent needs in Syria are fuelled by the secondary and tertiary effects of the protracted crisis, such as economic volatility, state collapse, and the impacts of COVID-19 on already distressed sectors. In an effort to promote needed discussion of the overall direction of the Syria crisis response, this report identifies six broad issues that will shape the space for implementation in Syria, each of which should draw greater attention to the need for forward-looking implementation strategies. Each trend is, directly or indirectly, a consequence of the fragility and instability that have plagued Syria for a decade. In many ways, the future of the donor-funded aid response — and the lives and livelihoods of millions of Syrians — depend on the adoption of approaches that acknowledge how the crisis in Syria has evolved and manage to do more with less.